



INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

A MONTHLY JOURNAL
OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS

CONTENTS

Seven Decades—the Judgement of History	3
Lenin's Ideas on Defending Socialism and Evolution of the Military Doctrine	Ivan LYUTOV 12
CMEA: Restructuring the Multilateral Cooperation Mechanism	Yuri SHIRYAEV 20
The Way to Security: Polish Initiative	Anatoli ZAGORSKY 27
Honduras and Central America at a Historic Juncture	Rigoberto PADILLA RUSH 33
African Countries: National Statehood in the Making	Lev ENTIN 43
Australia: Problems and Prospects	Fyodor YEVGENYEV 53

THE FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY OF THE CPSU AND THE NEW POLITICAL THINKING IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

The Strategy of Acceleration and the Historical Destiny of Socialism	Yevgeni SHASHKOV 61
--	---------------------

A DIPLOMAT'S VIEWS

Perfecting Diplomatic Practice	Aleksei VORONIN 71
--	--------------------

PEACE AND COOPERATION FOR EUROPE

USSR-Finland: A New Quality of Peaceful Coexistence	Yuri KOMISSAROV 77
---	--------------------

EXCHANGE OF OPINION

New Means in the Practice of Diplomatic Negotiations	Vladimir PRYAKHIN 86
--	----------------------

(Continued on page 2)

1

JANUARY

1988

THE "FREE WORLD" AS IT REALLY IS

The Mafia in the Dock Vladimir MALYSHEV 94

LOOKING BACK

"Harmless" Fascism Yuri YERSHOV 102

FEATURE STORIES

Bucharest Meetings Vyacheslav SAMOSHKIN 110

**Afghanistan: Following the Road of Goodwill
Gennadi MUSAELYAN, 117
Aleksandr SUKHOPAROV**

BOOK REVIEWS

**Security and Disarmament—the Position of Soviet Scientists
. Roald SAGDEYEV 126**

A Critical Look at US Foreign Policy Vyacheslav MURAVYEV 128

FACTS AND FIGURES

Laos: Economic and Social Reforms ★ Burma—40 Years of Independence ★ Kampuchea: National Revival ★ Euroterrorists: Accomplices of Reaction ★ The GDR: Side by Side with the Soviet Union ★ Syrian Arab Republic 130

Международная жизнь, 1988, № 1, англ. яз. 144 стр.

Перевод с русского

This journal is published by the USSR Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the All-Union ZNANIYE Society

In Russian, English and French

Editor of English Edition

G. A. PRIBEGIN

Editorial Office

14 Gorokhovskiy Pereulok, Moscow K-16

Printed at the Chekhov Printing Works

Chekhov, Moscow Region

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English Translation © Progress Publishers 1988
Signed for printing on January 6, 1988

SEVEN DECADES— THE JUDGEMENT OF HISTORY

October is not just a month in a chronicle of years inexorably passing by. It is a milestone in an epoch of unique social and political meaning which doubtlessly is of worldwide historic significance.

Astronomical and historical calendars keep the record of time by their own laws. In humankind's five-thousand-year history, seven decades are hardly noticeable. But the laws of social development have a different measurement—the place of one or another socio-political event in history is determined by history, and history alone.

The profound, large-scale impact of our revolution on the course of world development was felt immediately after it was accomplished. But now, seven decades later, when we have enough scope for retrospection, the historical place and grandiosity of the most profound popular revolution mankind has ever known are ever more evident. The reflected light of the gun volley of cruiser *Aurora* illumines the main paths of social progress opened by our revolution.

The past seven decades have shown beyond doubt that the **Great October Socialist Revolution** was a turning point in world history, that it **determined the main direction and trends of world development and started the irreversible replacement of capitalism by a new, communist socio-economic system.** This characteristic of the place the socialist revolution in Russia occupies in world history is confirmed by the facts that are of cardinal significance for the major tendencies of world development in our age. "The year 1917 showed that the choice between socialism and capitalism is the main social alternative of our epoch, that in the 20th century there can be no progress without advance to socialism, a higher form of social organisation. This fundamental conclusion is no less relevant today than when it was first drawn by Lenin. Such is the logic of society's progressive development", said Mikhail Gorbachev in the report **October and Perestroika: The Revolution Continues** on November 2, 1987.

Socialism has unleashed the energy and will of the people and opened up unlimited opportunities before them, thus enabling the Soviet people to accomplish within a historically brief span of time what took other nations centuries to achieve.

If one reviews the extremely complex, contradictory and at times even tragic course of world development in the past seven decades, one cannot fail to admit that its main features and peculiarities, alleys of progress have been predetermined by the socialist revolution in our country and its victorious course. The past seventy years are not only a series of triumphs and achievements, but also a difficult process of accumulating experience to be used by mankind in its continuous struggle for a better and just world worthy of man.

The new society has been built through immense efforts and great sacrifices, but this makes its achievements still greater, and we, assessing the past and clearly visualising the future, look with confidence into the 21st century full of unprecedented opportunities and hopes.

The 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution is not just a festive occasion for the Soviet people, for their friends and allies,—it has demonstrated the inexhaustible potential inherent in the

new social system. The celebration of the anniversary was an occasion for reflecting on the path travelled over those years, for fearlessly analysing the mistakes made, revealing the unused opportunities, and mustering all energy and resources to effectively fulfil the tasks facing the country.

A man of 70 is considered old. But a revolution which derives its strength from its people is young and strong and has a vast potential for self-development at 70 as well. And a genuine social revolution—which is what our Great October Socialist Revolution has become — keeps developing, accomplishing new tasks arising in the course of history. At each stage of history these tasks become ever more complex, requiring new methods for solving them.

All the great achievements of the Soviet people are closely associated with the leading, guiding role played by the CPSU equipped with a truly scientific Marxist-Leninist world outlook. The earnest of our victories is in the creative and innovative spirit of scientific communism. On the other hand, distortion or disregard for the principles of Marxism-Leninism, or conversion of some of its propositions into dogmas are a source of mistakes, which were made during the difficult process of socialist construction.

In the report at the jubilee meeting devoted to the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, Mikhail Gorbachev thoroughly reviewed the path traversed by our country. He duly appraised the creative spirit and revolutionary boldness with which the party guided socialist construction. At the same time, he evaluated many events in our history, which some persons try to exploit, being motivated not by common sense and respect for facts, but by abstract constructions, divorced from reality. History has always been an arena of acute struggle, of conflict of opinions and positions, reflecting at times diametrically-opposite points of view. That is why the analysis of historical problems made by Mikhail Gorbachev in his report **October and Perestroika: The Revolution Continues** on the basis of Marxist-Leninist methodology is so important.

In that report he revealed without premission the grave miscalculations and gross mistakes made in the process of building a new social system. It is not the party's style to conceal drawbacks, or to belittle their negative effect. Analysing its historical experience, the CPSU applies Marxist-Leninist methodology and displays an approach the essence of which was expressed by Lenin: "Revolutionary experience and organisational skill are things that can be acquired provided the desire is there to acquire them, provided the shortcomings are recognised, which in revolutionary activity is more than half-way towards their removal."

In the final analysis, it is not the mistakes made when the new system was being built that determine the essence of this system. Not in the least belittling the gravity of these mistakes, it must be stressed that by exploiting the consequences of former blunders one cannot disprove the main thing—that socialism alone offers the peoples a wide scope for building a society free from exploitation and oppression, violence and diktat, and a world without constant conflicts, products of the old system.

The main directions of socialist construction, the Soviet state's home and foreign policy over the past seven decades, have successfully stood the test of time and proved to be correct. The continuity of the chief goals of the home and foreign policy pursued since October 1917 by the CPSU and the Soviet state, is an obvious and undeniable fact, caused by the nature of the new social system, by its class essence and humanistic content.

The line of direct historical continuity, from the first steps made by Soviet power to the political course followed today, is a natural law-governed process as is the objective and inevitable continuity between Lenin's plan for building socialism, his ideas on international cooperation, on establishing lasting peace on democratic principles and on excluding

war from the life of human society, on the one hand, and the course charted at the 27th Congress of the CPSU and at the subsequent plenary meetings of its Central Committee towards an all-round acceleration of social and economic advance, towards further improving every aspect in the life of Soviet society, and the comprehensive foreign-policy programme of building a nuclear-free and non-violent world, on the other.

The October Revolution exerted a manifold influence on world development, on the future of mankind. But this influence has been, perhaps, most significant in international affairs, for it is there that war and peace problems, vital for all nations, are being solved. Due to the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution the idea of struggle for peace, removing war from the life of the world community, has not only become worldwide, but has also acquired a powerful material basis—the new social system.

Socialism has not only proclaimed peace as its ideal, it has not only chosen disarmament as the way to achieve this goal, but is using its entire economic, political, defence potential, its intellectual and moral values for the cause of peace. Soviet Communists for the first time in history have become a political force which has translated its humanistic political and philosophical views into practical actions—words acquired a real content, and policy, which previously was a sphere of activity for a few, has become the cause of the people themselves. Policy, including foreign one, has become popular in content and in methods.

Among the problems being tackled by the CPSU today, top priority is given to those which concern foreign policy and international relations. And it would be no exaggeration to say that the proportion of these problems among others is growing at every new stage, because the fate of not only the Soviet people, not only the future of socialism, but the destiny of all mankind depends on their solution. Addressing the meeting of representatives of parties and movements, who came to Moscow for the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, Wojciech Jaruzelski, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, said: "The destinies of peace and progress depend today more than ever before on the economic and socio-political development of the socialist states, on the results of their peace offensive in the international arena. Therefore the changes taking place today in the Soviet Union and in many countries of the socialist community affect and will continue to affect more the image of the modern world."

This explains why foreign policy issues are in the focus of the activities of the CPSU and the Soviet state. Today, the problem of ensuring close ties between domestic and foreign policies—an axiom of Marxism-Leninism—has acquired a new dimension. However, the realities of the modern epoch have drawn closer together, largely in a new way, the tasks of domestic and foreign policy. All this confirms the simple truth: our time has intertwined the problems we have set out to solve in domestic policy and on the international scene. Effective fulfilment of the strategic task of speeding up the social and economic advance of our society pertains not only to the internal development of the Soviet state. It is a problem whose solution will greatly influence the course of international developments and the historical competition between the two social systems.

The renovation of socialism, if viewed in the international perspective, leads logically to the strengthening of the positions of the forces of peace and social progress as a whole. On the other hand, solution of our domestic problems social and economic ones above all, depends on how effectively the key problems facing us in the international sphere are solved.

The changes taking place in the USSR are felt practically everywhere. This was obvious from the speeches of the representatives of parties and movements, who took part in our anniversary celebrations. Many appro-

priate quotations could be cited here, but important is not the number of arguments, but the quality of these arguments. Touching upon this question, Georges Marchais, General Secretary of the French Communist Party, declared: "This process has a most profound impact on the development of international relations. The Soviet proposals and initiatives have already furthered considerable progress in disarmament. They largely facilitate the growth of the liberation movement, which is placing mankind on a higher level of civilisation."

●

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, whose policy rests on the scientific basis of Marxism-Leninism, creatively develops this teaching and uses Marxist-Leninist methodology to soberly and boldly analyse all the complex problems arising at the present stage of development. Life poses entirely new problems, which are to be solved in a new way, considering the cardinal changes taking place in the world in all spheres, primarily in science and technology.

Stereotypes have always hindered the understanding of social phenomena, especially in international affairs. It is only logical that the revolutionary changes in the world today have made it absolutely necessary to adopt a new political thinking to help solve complex international problems. Our party has been the first to propose adopting new political thinking, and at its 27th Congress it demonstrated an entirely new and creative approach to solving urgent problems of our time. New thinking, which the party has placed at the basis of its course, is the CPSU's response to the challenge of our time, which demands a new approach to the solution of problems arising before mankind at the turn of the third millennium.

It is impossible to solve today's vital problems, especially war and peace problems, by applying the thinking of the pre-nuclear era, a thinking which takes no account of the entirely new developments in our epoch. And the fact that the Soviet Union has issued a call to all mankind to look at old problems in a new way and to find new ways of solving them is convincing evidence that socialism as a new social system keeps pace with the times.

Our country has proved that it not only calls for new approaches to world problems, but itself paves the way to them. It resolutely tears apart stereotypes, rejecting anything that hinders a realistic approach to the problems of today's world. The Soviet Union demonstrates by its practical deeds not only preparedness, but also a sincere desire, to find solutions to many old problems. The main criterion of new thinking is how it is realised in practical deeds.

Definite positive changes towards a more realistic evaluation of the world situation today are observed in the camp of our class adversaries. This is understandable, since class hatred for socialism is by far not the only sign characterising the conduct of the imperialist powers. The realities of our epoch are evidently as clear to them as they are to us. This prompts them to make practical conclusions about their political strategy; their goal, of course, is not to change the nature of imperialism, not to make it a force interested in peace and in cooperation among nations on principles of justice and democracy. But it can no longer afford not to make corrections in its world outlook.

Possibly the most serious argument, which is really of historic significance, has always been whether or not imperialism can coexist with socialism without changing its nature. The answer has been provided by history. The report by Mikhail Gorbachev has raised a series of complex and urgent problems pertaining to this problem. The fact that they are posed shows that the new thinking among Communists is gaining ground, that it is not limited by scholastic dogmas but is addressed to life itself.

Theoretical postulates, no matter how great the prestige of those who formulated them may be, always recede into the background when compared to the demands of reality. And Marxism-Leninism has never been oriented on following implicitly the propositions which, correct in certain historical conditions, lead into an impasse in a new situation. To Marxism-Leninism a concrete analysis of a given moment has always been the main methodological principle making it possible correctly to assess historical developments and, on that basis, to make proper conclusions. Lenin stressed: "History as a whole, and the history of revolutions in particular, is always richer in content, more varied, more multiform, more lively and ingenious than is imagined by even the best parties, the most class-conscious vanguards of the most advanced classes."²

Our reality poses in a new way the old questions which seemed to be long resolved. One of such questions was formulated in the Mikhail Gorbachev's November 2, 1987 report. The first and foremost question pertains to the nature of imperialism, for it presents the greatest military danger. The nature of a social system cannot, of course, be fully changed under the impact of external conditions. But is it possible at the present stage of world development, when the world's interrelationship and integrity have reached a new level, to influence this nature and thus to block its most dangerous manifestations? In other words, can one expect that the regularities of our integral world, in which the common values of mankind are the main priority, to limit the range of operation of the egocentric, narrow class regularities of the capitalist system?

In the context of new thinking, this question is of paramount significance. Indeed, a new approach to old problems cannot be taken by only one side—it is needed as well by our partners in the capitalist world. Their recognition of the indisputable fact that nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, which was secured in the joint Soviet-American statement on the outcome of the Geneva summit, is evidence of a sober and objective assessment of the world situation by the ruling circles in the West. These are the sprouts of new thinking which cannot but find their way to those who are at the helm in the West.

Our adversaries, naturally, use their own logic, which is class logic, but this does not mean that it is absurd. Because opposite class logic is not tantamount to absurd logic, especially when it concerns life and death issues. And this is precisely how the question has been posed by life. This is how the question is raised with regard to the profound contradiction of the modern epoch—the contradiction between the "party of war" and the "party of peace".

While recognising the fundamental and indestructible character of the contradictions dividing the two social systems, history allows them no opportunity to prove their advantages by way of military confrontation. The class interests of both systems, if properly understood, make it imperative to find peaceful ways and means of resolving the historical confrontation between them, for the military way is suicidal in our time. The instinct of class self-preservation is, perhaps, the strongest of all class interests, and our policy takes this fully into account when it concerns prospects for reaching agreement with imperialist powers on the main problems of our time.

Agreements are not bargains. And they do not represent an underestimation of the class essence of imperialism, and have nothing to do with insipid pacifism. Today, as ever, peace can be ensured only by relying on the power of reason, on the material possibilities to curb the aggressor. Our country believes that the world should be seen as it is. And the last decades of the 20th century have confronted mankind with extremely complex but quite solvable problems. The need to solve pressing global problems should impel the peoples to cooperate in order to save civilisa-

tion. The course of world development provides the necessary intellectual prerequisites for that, which are expressed in new political thinking.

Bridges of mutual understanding can be built only from both sides. And the establishment of cooperation between countries with opposite social systems demands an adequate approach from the other side as well. Changes towards new thinking, towards a realistic assessment of the entire world situation among Western statesmen and politicians are taking place and are increasing. This is a forced but inevitable tribute to the times.

A realistic approach to world affairs, which is being established today, is to the West the main stimulus for reaching agreements with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries on the entire range of international problems. But this is only one side of the problem. The forces which have not discarded historical delusions, and which still intend to build their future on the ruins of socialism, those forces which cannot tolerate the very existence of the new social system, still play an immense role in the imperialist camp. Therefore new political thinking, based on the philosophy of a nuclear-free world, seems to them to be void of meaning and absolutely redundant.

All this reminds one of a character from a book by Russian classic writer Saltykov-Shchedrin who proudly declared: "I don't understand new ideas. I don't even understand why they should be understood". This comparison, paradoxical as it may seem, carries an obvious message: as they reject new political thinking, they hope that by old methods, by relying primarily on force, they will be able to solve the main problems in the relations between the two systems. Such a policy was hopeless in the past and is even more useless today. But the fatal danger of this "philosophy" has increased many times over, and it cannot only lead to an impasse, but can cause fatal consequences—even for its authors.

Soviet foreign policy with regard to the capitalist countries is rooted in Lenin's concept of peaceful coexistence of states with differing social systems. The realities of the present epoch today more than ever before stress the concept's viability and actuality, revealing its universal and realistic character largely in a new light. It is safe to say that each major turn in world affairs confirms ever more the irrefutable fact that there is no alternative to peaceful coexistence in our epoch.

Lenin's concept of peaceful coexistence is not a translation of the ideals of the great French Revolution into modern notions, as some imagine. This is an entirely new concept put forward by the course of historical development, at a time when there appeared two opposite social systems. It is inadmissible to pour fresh wine into an old wineskin. We speak not of some or other principle that was proclaimed in the past, but of an entirely new social phenomenon which requires forms of coexistence between two diametrically-opposite systems. One can go too far in the search for historical parallels, but it is not parallels that bring out the essence of social processes, especially significant ones as peaceful coexistence.

Lenin's concept of peaceful coexistence is a concept of the future, a concept of mankind's survival. It is an integral alloy of a class approach and humanistic ideals, in which both elements are inseparable and do not dominate each other, because the class aspirations of the proletariat are permeated with the spirit of humanism. The concept of peaceful coexistence combines the idea of peace and the idea of building socialism under conditions of peace. To be sure, Lenin's concept has undergone changes. At the initial stages of the existence of Soviet power it was based primarily on the need to provide at least a minimum of favourable exter-

nal conditions required for building a new society. But, being a continuation of the class policy pursued by the victorious proletariat, peaceful coexistence became later, especially in the nuclear age, a condition for the survival of mankind.

The argument over who stands to gain from peaceful coexistence—capitalism or socialism—has been solved by life itself—the future of one system or the other is inconceivable without such coexistence.

The goal of the foreign policy pursued by our country is not to gain prestige, but to achieve real results and reach concrete understanding with our partners. Anyone who, when analysing our policy, turns to Lenin, is sure to find answers to all important questions arising in the present situation. Lenin said that "to each paper proposal we will respond with a paper proposal, and only to true deeds we will respond with deeds".³ This approach characterises our foreign policy. We respond with serious proposals and meaningful measures to everything which meets the demands formulated by Lenin. The impact of socialism as a social system on the present and future of world development is seen, above all, in that our firm course towards peace is reflected in our deeds, in all our conduct on the international scene, and in the style of our foreign-policy and diplomatic activity aimed at open and honest dialogue, taking into account one another's concerns and the achievements of world science.

It would be naive, of course, to ascribe, as we sometimes did in the past, all positive changes in international relations only to Soviet initiatives, and to think that only owing to our constructive moves can progress be made in some or other international issues. If this logic is followed to the end, it appears that the course of world affairs depends on Soviet proposals alone. The logic of international life is far more complex, and progress in international affairs, in solving specific problems, depends on two, and often even more, sides.

New thinking, which our party promulgates not only in domestic, but also in international affairs (which are inseparable) is manifest mainly in the adoption of a truly dialectical approach to international affairs. Marxism-Leninism believes that international affairs should be approached as a sphere which may develop by its own laws and which is in a process of constant change. At the same time, Marxists have never claimed to have the monopoly on the dialectical method of studying international relations and foreign policy. A witty remark was made in this connection by Frederick Engels: "Men thought dialectically long before they knew what dialectics was, just as they spoke prose long before the term prose existed".⁴ The historic achievement of Marxist-Leninist theory was, above all, that it placed the study of international relations and foreign policy on a strictly scientific basis, with a class approach and revolutionary dialectics being its core.

The CPSU proceeds from the fact that the living soul of Marxism, as Lenin put it, lies in a concrete analysis of a concrete situation. This is why the party's new approach to analysing key problems is based precisely on a profound study of real contradictions and problems of the modern world. It was impossible at the start of this century to dogmatically extrapolate all the propositions formulated by Marx and Engels to the epoch of imperialism. And it is still less possible to do this when assessing the present developments with the help of postulates formulated in the 1960s, 1950s, or even the 1930s. The theoretical heritage created by our predecessors in the name of the social emancipation of man should be looked at in a new way, so as to allow a precise analysis of the new realities and prompt the most accurate political conclusions.

New political thinking applied to present-day conditions is a kind of breakthrough into the future. It means a radical change of long-established views and a major revision of many foreign-policy and military-strategic

concepts. And it would be naive to believe that this can be done quickly and easily. Because for this purpose, it is necessary to reshape the consciousness of those who do political decision-making in the major powers of the world, and also to change the consciousness of the peoples the world over. It has been noted already by Lenin that "the force of habit in millions and tens of millions is a most formidable force".⁵ Therefore mastering new thinking is quite a long process, but it is necessary if mankind is to develop the qualities enabling it to restrain the forces pushing it towards self-destruction.

Our country demonstrates new thinking in practice. We shall list here only the main Soviet initiatives which, in fact, appeared to be pivotal for major political developments in the world today: the Soviet proposal on a stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear arms under strict international control by the year 2000; an integrated programme for creating a comprehensive system of international security, covering military, political, economic, humanitarian and ecological spheres; the package of detailed and balanced proposals, advanced by the USSR at the talks with the USA on nuclear and space weapons; the proposal on the complete elimination of chemical weapons under appropriate control and verification measures; the programme for reducing the conventional armaments and armed forces in Europe proposed by the USSR jointly with the other Warsaw Treaty states; package proposals of the Berlin meeting of the Political Consultative Committee set forth in the propositions on the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty states; the Soviet proposals on medium-range missiles in Europe and on shorter-range missiles; the Soviet proposals on ending nuclear test explosions under strict international verification (to achieve greater progress in this direction the Soviet Union extended its unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions for four times); the USSR-proposed broad programme for ensuring peace and cooperation in the Asia and Pacific region. The Soviet Union is a resolute proponent of strengthening the UN's prestige and an advocate of a more extensive and efficient use of the rights with which the world community has invested this organisation and its bodies.

This is a far-from-complete list of the concrete, realistic and balanced initiatives undertaken by the Soviet Union to promote peace and strengthen international stability. There should be added a series of proposals on solving protracted regional problems which aggravate the world situation and undermine international stability. It is safe to say that, on the whole, the foreign-policy moves made by our country in the past two and a half years have substantially influenced the international climate.

Efforts to achieve the practical implementation of these proposals constitute the main content of all foreign-policy activity of the CPSU and the Soviet state.

A policy can be judged by the results it brings. The results here are obvious. The signing of the treaty on eliminating medium- and shorter-range missiles at the Washington summit in December 1987 is a major step towards a nuclear-free world. But this is only the beginning. The Soviet Union intends to achieve real progress and concrete results in solving the key problem of eliminating the nuclear threat—the reduction of strategic offensive arms and the prevention of arms in space.

One of the most important ideas proclaimed for the whole world to hear during the celebrations of the anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and at the meeting of representatives of parties and movements, was the idea that there is a close relationship between the problem of combating poverty in many developing countries and the problem of preserving peace and ensuring the survival of mankind. One cannot say, of course, that this idea is new, that it emerged comparatively recently. The point is that the present circumstances and the very logic of life today have made it unprecedentedly urgent, demanding undelayed solution. This

is a new approach, which is at once strict, realistic and, as the Moscow forum showed, "We have no doubt that some day history will mark October 1987 as a date when the elimination of nuclear weapons began and perhaps ushered in a period of final peace and hope for mankind which lived, and still lives, in fear of self-destruction and in disgraceful poverty which takes as heavy toll of children's lives in the Third World annually as one hundred nuclear bombs would take". These words uttered by Fidel Castro show that global problems become inseparable from each other and confront mankind as a whole. This expresses the essence of the concept of the unity and interrelationship of the modern world.

The paths of historical development are not as straight as the boardwalk of Nevsky Prospekt. They are complex and contradictory. But history has proved beyond doubt that the main road for the advancement of human society is the road opened by the Great October Socialist Revolution. The most profound revolution in the history of mankind lives in our daily deeds. October is rightly considered an hour of triumph in world history.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1961, p. 378.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, 1974, p. 95.

³ В. И. Ленин о советской внешней политике, Politizdat, 1979, p. 170.

⁴ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1987, p. 132.

⁵ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, 1974, p. 44.

LENIN'S IDEAS ON DEFENDING SOCIALISM AND EVOLUTION OF THE MILITARY DOCTRINE

Lieutenant-General Ivan LYUTOV,

Professor

With the ideological struggle growing ever more acute, it has become more important to correctly understand the goals and intentions of the socialist states and their military-political alliance aimed at preventing war and safeguarding peace and international security.

Historical experience tells us that armed defence of the gains of socialism can be ensured only if it is prepared beforehand and is based on thoroughly coordinated economic, political and military activity of the socialist countries, in keeping with a jointly elaborated and adopted military doctrine.

The modern epoch is characterised, from the military point of view, as an epoch of coalition wars. In order to achieve such political goals as the prevention of war, and, if a war is unleashed by the imperialists, to reliably defend the freedom and independence of the socialist states united in a coalition, there must be a coordinated military doctrine. This is necessitated mainly by external reasons, first and foremost by the military threat coming from the imperialist states united in the aggressive NATO alliance. The internal reasons for setting up a coalition of socialist states follow from their major function—the international protection of socialist gains.

The document The Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty Member States, adopted at the Berlin meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in May 1987, reflects the results achieved by the active participation of each member of this organisation in ensuring a balanced combination of the national and international interests of our peoples in building a new life and protecting it from aggression.

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Doctrine" in the broad sense of the word means a scientifically grounded theory, a system of views and principles, and also a formula expressing the main guidelines for political or other activities.

The classical definition of "military doctrine" reflects a system (officially adopted by a given state or a group of states united in a coalition) of scientifically grounded views on the goals, character and ways of conducting a possible war, and preparations for it, by a country or a group of countries and also by their armed forces.

A military doctrine is a historical category. Its main elements were beginning to take shape already in the slave-owning states, though it was not clearly defined. As society was developing and the art of warfare was being improved, especially after large regular armies appeared, the experience of preparing and conducting military operations and waging a war in general was summed up. Military knowledge was

systematised, the principles of preparing a country and its armed forces for war and methods of warfare were formulated. Thus the fundamentals of the state military doctrine were being created and it was developed most rapidly in the epoch of monopoly capitalism.

Involvement of numerous armies in the wars of this epoch, the improved technical equipment of these armies and the increasing scope and duration of armed struggle made the success of military actions more dependent on objective factors associated with the theory of preparing and waging a war. Preparation for war became complex and required actions affecting every sphere of life of a state—its policy, economy and the population. Carrying out actions required that common views recognised on the level of states be adopted.

Bourgeois military theoretical thought correctly noted, on the whole, the trends in the development of the art of warfare, which enabled the capitalist states to formulate empirical principles of a military doctrine. But at the same time it proved unable to reveal objective, above all social, laws of war and take duly into account the impact of various factors on the preparation for a war, a war itself, and its outcome.

It became possible to reveal these kinds of relationships and use them most fully for shaping an entirely new doctrine, a doctrine of the socialist state, only on the basis of Marxist-Leninist theory, when socialist military science was created.

The content of a military doctrine of any state depends on many objective factors, most important being the socio-political and economic system of a state, its natural resources and level of production, the level of the means of warfare and prospects for their development, the size and composition of the population, the geographic position of a country, or a coalition of states in general, above all with regard to probable enemies and allies. In other words, the categories making up the content of a military doctrine cannot just be "invented" and cannot exist in isolation from reality, because all of them, to quote Mikhail Frunze, "are already given in the life around us, and the job of theoretical thought is to seek out these elements and bring them together in a system".¹ Doctrinal principles are elaborated on a sound scientific basis, follow from the domestic and foreign policy of a state and are formulated by its top political and military leadership.

Any state which envisages the possibility of solving political problems by military means usually had, and still has, a military doctrine. The military doctrines of states belonging to opposite world social systems, have many common elements. This is accounted for by the fact that a military doctrine is above all a socio-political category and therefore reflects the main features of a given system. But each state belonging to a definite social system has some or other specifics, which inevitably affects its military doctrine. The states having small armed forces are normally part of a coalition and adhere to a doctrine of a more powerful ally.

Until recently the bourgeois press used to stress that, since the elaboration of a military doctrine is a prerogative of each country, the adoption of a common military doctrine allegedly limits a state's sovereignty, preventing it from independently determining the military aspect of its policy. It is easy to see that this reasoning is groundless.

The adoption of a military doctrine by the Warsaw Treaty countries was preceded by many years of close political, economic, military, scientific, technological and cultural cooperation based on full equality, with the interests of each country taken into account. During these years they tested their coordinated foreign-policy strategy and tactics, and their joint actions in solving problems involved in the struggle for peace were improved and are being constantly perfected. In other words, the

socialist states in the Warsaw Treaty Organisation achieved a higher level of unity and cooperation, which enabled them to express their common will in what is probably the most important area of international relations, the military-political one, in a document on a military doctrine. The adoption of this document did not deprive them of having their own national doctrines.

The need to protect the socialist homeland was substantiated by Lenin long before the October Revolution. Proceeding from the conclusion that a socialist revolution could win in one separate country, Lenin predicted that the defence of its gains by military means would be inevitable, and fair. He wrote: "Socialism cannot achieve victory simultaneously in *all* countries. It will achieve victory first in one or several countries, while the others will for some time remain bourgeois or pre-bourgeois. This is bound to create not only friction, but a direct attempt on the part of the bourgeoisie of other countries to crush the socialist state's victorious proletariat. In such cases a war on our part would be a legitimate and just war."²

Lenin's theory of proletarian revolution and the state set as a top priority the task of defending the socialist homeland, armed defence of the gains of the revolution became part and parcel of socialist construction as a whole. Foreseeing that the victory of the proletariat in one country would inevitably cause fierce resistance of the world bourgeoisie, Lenin taught that the revolution should resolutely defend itself and be able to respond to force by force.

History has proved Lenin's forecast to be correct. The overthrow of the bourgeois government in Russia was followed by the civil war and intervention. The latter involved the armed forces of 14 imperialist states. Under those extremely severe conditions, in the battles to defend the revolution, the main principles of the Soviet military doctrine were taking shape and being tested, to become a streamlined and scientifically grounded system of views.

The threat of a military attack on the young Soviet Union remained, as did the need for armed defence. That was the main cause that objectively accounted for the emergence of the Soviet military doctrine which differs in principle from the military doctrines of imperialism. It rested on the policy pursued by the Communist Party and the Soviet state aimed at strengthening the socialist system; the just goals of the defence of the revolution; the real economic potentialities of the country; and the high moral and political spirit of the victorious people.

The principles of the Soviet military doctrine were being formed with due consideration of the prospects of the technical equipment of armies in that period, the development of science, and the experience of World War I and of the armed struggle of the proletariat in Russia in difficult historical conditions.

Lenin played a great role in the evolution of the socialist military doctrine and in elaborating the major principles concerning both its aspects—political and military. Having revealed the causes and character of the wars in the epoch of imperialism, pointing out that the victory of proletarian revolution is inevitable and showing the conditions in which such a victory takes place, he defined the main principles of the political aspect of the doctrine. He developed a number of Marxist ideas on the character of the military organisation of the victorious proletariat, pointed out ways of building the Red Army and Navy, and indicated their basic specific features, which distinguished them from all the previously existing armed forces. The fundamentals of Soviet military science created

by Lenin offered the necessary basis for a profound elaboration of the military-technical content of the doctrine.

Important for developing a military doctrine was the establishment of the Communist Party's leading role with regard to the Armed Forces of the Soviet state. That truly historic decision was adopted in December 1918 in the CPSU Central Committee's resolution On the Policy of the Military Department. The correctness of Lenin's line was later confirmed in the resolution of the Eighth Congress of the Party, which said the Red Army, in order to accomplish its historic task, should be a class, workers' and peasants' regular army, strictly disciplined and functioning under the constant leadership of the Communist Party.

The work to organise the main principles of the military doctrine into a strict system continued in the 1920s. In the 1930s, the military doctrine of the world's first socialist state took shape.

As the socialist system of states emerged, the military doctrines of each of the people's democratic countries reflected the objective demands of protecting national independence and territorial integrity from imperialist aggression, the threat of which appeared after the end of World War II. The young socialist states effectively used the vast Soviet experience in military development in their own military policies and in determining their doctrinal principles.

These countries drew on Soviet experience to build their military potential and armed forces. The principles of military development in each of the socialist countries were formulated in accordance with national specifics and traditions. The methods of conducting a possible war to protect their independence were determined with due regard for the bilateral treaties of friendship and mutual assistance signed with the USSR and other states of the socialist community.

In the years that followed, the forms of all-round cooperation, including the military sphere, were constantly improved in the framework of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. Full unanimity of views was achieved on all the main problems of international and domestic affairs: on carrying out a foreign policy of peace on principles of peaceful coexistence of states with different political systems; on economic and cultural development; and on building up defence capability. Thus the necessary conditions were provided for formulating and adopting a common military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty member states.

The understanding of the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty countries changed. Now it is an officially adopted system of guiding principles and scientifically grounded views not only on the essence, character and ways of waging war which can be started by the imperialists against them, but also on ways of preventing war.

This definition contains a number of provisions making it greatly differ from the military doctrines of the capitalist states: it is based on the Marxist-Leninist world outlook; it is aimed at averting war, and, in the event of imperialist aggression, at repelling it, which makes it unquestioningly defensive; and it envisages a rebuff to any aggressor who jeopardises the peaceful labour and socialist gains of the peoples in the fraternal countries.

Marxist-Leninist theory determines the truly scientific character of the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty countries. In it the knowledge of the laws of social development closely associated with the practical activities of the communist and workers' parties. It was precisely this dialectical unity which Lenin saw in Marxism as a system of theoretical propositions organically linked to the practice of the revolutionary struggle of the working class, when he wrote: "The Marxian doctrine has fused the theory and practice of the class struggle into one inseparable whole."³

Based on the Marxist-Leninist theory of the state, war and the army, on

socialist military science and the entire system of military theoretical knowledge, the socialist military doctrine combines politics, military theory, and the practical activities of our states to maintain defence capability.

Socialism categorically rejects war as a means of settling interstate political and economic contradictions and ideological differences. Adherence to the cause of peace and peaceful cooperation is dictated by the very essence of socialist society. Therefore the Warsaw Treaty states come out for establishing a comprehensive system of international security and effecting for this purpose a series of measures in the political, military, economic and humanitarian fields. The main measures to be taken are: the renunciation of war; the reduction and then complete elimination of nuclear and other types of mass destruction weapons; refraining from a militarisation of outer space; reducing the military potential of both sides to the level of reasonable sufficiency required for defence; solution of international problems by political means; respect for sovereignty and non-interference in one another's internal affairs; promotion of equitable and mutually beneficial economic and cultural ties among various countries; disbandment of military alliances, dismantling of foreign military bases and withdrawal of the troops stationed there to regions within their national borders.

The Warsaw Treaty states have declared that they are prepared to take part in all international actions aimed at achieving these goals, at ensuring peace and international security.

As they come out consistently for the improvement of the world situation, the countries of the socialist community consider the realities and the threat presented by the aggressive policy of imperialism for the cause of peace and detente. Under these conditions they are compelled to strengthen their defence potential and to enhance the combat readiness of the United Armed Forces in order to secure the reliable protection of socialist achievements.

The principles of a military doctrine of any state may be subdivided into two large groups, which are traditionally called political and military-technical (or military proper) aspects.

The political aspect of a military doctrine reveals the social and political essence of a war in which a state may take part, and its political goals in that war, and the relevant requirements for making the country prepared militarily.

The military-technical aspect reflects the principles determining the strategic character of a possible war, the tasks of the armed forces set in keeping with its political goals, ways and means of waging war, the direction of the development of the armed forces, and preparation of them and a country in general for a war.

The political and military-technical aspects of a military doctrine have a close dialectical interrelationship, which is characterised by the following.

First, both aspects are inseparable from each other and can exist only together as components of a single whole, that is, of a system of views called a military doctrine.

Second, the political and military-technical principles of a doctrine should be thoroughly coordinated to ensure the integrity and practicability of a military doctrine.

Third, both aspects of the military doctrine constantly influence each other, with the political aspect playing a major role. At the same time the content of the political principles should not upset their harmony with the military-technical aspect of the doctrine, for otherwise the possibili-

ties of giving effect to the military doctrine as a whole would be reduced.

The views expressed in the military doctrine are not immutable for various reasons. They are specified in case of need, in accordance with changes in the political, economic, scientific, technological and military spheres. The content of the political aspect is characterised by greater stability, for it reflects the class nature and the socio-economic system of a given state or a coalition of states, which remain unchangeable as long as these states exist. Nonetheless, these principles may also be changed, if this is necessary for objective reasons. Military-technical questions are far more changeable, since they depend to a great extent on the means of armed struggle, which are developing constantly in step with scientific and technological progress.

The political aspect of the military doctrine of a socialist state or a coalition of states is based on Lenin's principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems and also on the proposition that no revolution is worth anything unless it is capable of defending itself.

In the countries of the socialist community there are no forces, nor can there be, interested in a policy of aggression or in war. The fraternal states come out for settling all disputes only in a peaceful way, by political means. Unjust wars of aggression are alien to them. They have no claims on the territories of any state and, from the point of view of their internal conditions, do not need armies. The supreme goal of their military policy is to ensure the further improvement of socialist society and increase the well-being of their peoples. Therefore the chief historical mission of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the United Armed Forces was, and still is to make it possible for the countries of the socialist community to live and work under conditions of stable peace and freedom.

In contrast to imperialism, which has not given up hopes of stopping by force of the development of human society, socialism has never associated its future with a military solution of international problems. Such a policy, it was stressed by Lenin back in 1918, "would be completely at variance with Marxism", which has always been, "opposed to 'pushing' revolutions, which develop with the growing acuteness of the class antagonisms that engender revolutions".⁴ The socialist countries proceed from the fact that the export of revolution, and counter-revolution, is inadmissible.

The countries of the socialist community are convinced that in the era of nuclear weapons the world has become too fragile for war and power politics. If a nuclear war is unleashed, it may lead to the destruction of mankind.

The Warsaw Treaty does not have, nor can it have, any motives for attacking other states. In the document on the military doctrine, issued on May 29, 1987, the Warsaw Treaty member states declared that never, under no circumstances, will they start military actions against any state, be it in Europe or in any other part of the world, or against an alliance of states, unless they themselves become the target of an armed attack. They will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. They have no claims to the territory of any state in Europe or elsewhere in the world. They do not treat any state as their enemy; on the contrary, they are prepared to maintain relations with all countries of the world without exception with due regard for the interests of security and peaceful coexistence. The defence measures and military development in the allied countries are designed exclusively for response measures of defence against possible aggression.

The Warsaw Treaty member states fully support the USSR's commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Their doctrine is based on the immutability of this commitment, which is taken into account in

the preparations of the allied armies for defence, including matters of planning, the training of administrative bodies and troops, and also methods of armed struggle.

The defensive character of the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty does not rule out resolute actions to repeal aggression by NATO or by any state against the allied socialist countries. This is fully in accord with Lenin's ideas. He said: "If, in the face of these ever actively hostile forces, we pledged ourselves—as we have been advised to do—never to resort to certain actions which from a military-strategical point of view may prove to be aggressive, we would be, not only fools but criminals."⁵

The military-technical aspect of the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty countries determines the development, long-term prospects for technical equipment and the character of the preparation of the United Armed Forces in peacetime, how they are deployed and used in the event of an attack on the countries of the socialist community. It corresponds to the political aspect of the doctrine and relies on the military and economic potentials of the allied countries. The declaration of the common military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty objectively facilitates the further harmonisation of measures taken by the member countries of the alliance, which, no doubt, helps to increase the effectiveness of all their forces and means.

The chief purpose of the military-technical aspect is to maintain the United Armed Forces on a level sufficient for the defence of the socialist countries and for response defensive actions to rebuff aggression by imperialism, if it ventures to encroach on the sovereignty and security of the fraternal socialist countries. "As long as there is a danger of war," Mikhail Gorbachev noted in his report on the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, "and as long as the drive for social revanche forms the core of Western strategies and militarist programmes, we shall continue to do everything necessary to maintain our defence capability at a level ruling out imperialism's military superiority over socialism."

As regards the development of the United Armed Forces, the military doctrine proceeds from the principle of accordance of their composition, set-up and combat readiness with the extent of the military threat on the part of the forces of imperialism. Their military might should reliably guarantee the security of the socialist states without overstraining material means, finances and manpower resources, which would hamper the normal growth of the socialist national economy. The socialist countries do not seek military superiority, but they will not allow the existing military strategic equilibrium in the world to be upset. The defence might of the socialist countries is developed with due consideration of the fact that it should be equal as regards the USSR and the USA, the Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries, that their security should be mutual and, on the international scale, universal. The socialist countries do not want greater security, but they will not agree to less security.

Viewing approximate parity as a necessary condition for containing aggression, the allied countries demand that it be at the lowest possible level. The present level is too high and ensures for the sides only equal danger while the strategic situation remains stable. The socialist countries are convinced that truly equal security in our age is guaranteed not by a high, but by a minimal level of strategic balance determined by the needs of defence.

The proposition on the need to limit the military potentials of the opposed sides was advanced at the 27th Congress of the CPSU. It should be regarded as a major principle of the party's policy with regard to the country's defence and security. Today, it is fully reflected in the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty countries.

The progressive public the world over has noted with satisfaction that the Warsaw Treaty countries give no country or government grounds for fearing for its security. At the same time the peoples of our allied countries equally want to get rid of the threat hanging over them, and therefore they bend every effort to keep their armed forces on the level securely containing any aggressor, which is guaranteed by the balance of military forces.

The Warsaw Treaty Organisation, this new form of cooperation among equal and sovereign states, is fully determined to guard socialism and serve as a reliable instrument for preventing war and strengthening international security. Peace, proclaimed in the first Lenin's decree, remains its motto.

¹ М. В. Фрунзе, *Избранные произведения*, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1951, p. 148.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1964, p. 79.

³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 12, 1962, pp. 107-108.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, 1965, pp. 71-72.

⁵ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, 1974, p. 520.

CMEA: RESTRUCTURING THE MULTILATERAL COOPERATION MECHANISM

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In mid-October 1987, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance held its 43rd (special) session in Moscow. In accordance with the guidelines set by the Moscow working meeting of the fraternal parties' leaders (November 1986), its participants discussed the urgent problems of restructuring the mechanism of multilateral cooperation and socialist economic integration, and of improving the CMEA's activity. They determined measures to ensure that their joint activity promotes the utmost intensification, dynamic and harmonious development of the fraternal countries' economies, helps to improve their peoples' well-being through a broad introduction of scientific and technical achievements, to raise the efficiency of the international socialist division of labour, and strengthen the community's positions in the world economy.

The way to the elaboration of these measures was paved by the Sofia conference of CC secretaries of the CMEA countries' communist and workers' parties in September 1987. The proposals on restructuring the cooperation mechanism, the mutual relations within the organisation, and the CMEA's activity discussed at that conference made it possible to formulate important conclusions on the state of socialist economic integration and on the need to improve cooperation among the CMEA countries.

The socialist countries' great economic, scientific and technical potential, their rising material and cultural standards, and ever more vigorous cooperation are major prerequisites for more efficient internal economic activity and external economic ties. These indicators, however, still fall short of the fraternal countries' potentialities and do not meet their long-term tasks. Hence an improvement of the cooperation mechanism has been regarded as an essential contribution to the community's efforts to attain its strategic goals in socio-economic development.

Thus, in the present five-year period most fraternal countries have markedly stepped up the pace of their socio-economic development, as the following table shows.

At the same time, the community has not as yet been able to overcome the tendency toward its slower growth of mutual trade or reliably to prevent any stagnation in the international socialist division of labour under the impact of adverse factors of the world market situation. Thus, in spite of an increase in the supply of specialised and cooperated output,¹ the USSR's foreign trade turnover was reduced by 2.3 per cent in the current prices in the first nine months of 1987. Exports fell by 0.5 per cent, and imports, by 4.2 per cent. This shows that extensive growth factors in the sphere of external economic ties have not as yet been replaced by intensive ones.

**Average annual rate of national income growth
in the CMEA countries in 1986-1990 (per cent)**

	1981-1985	1986-1990	1990 as a percentage of 1985
CMEA countries*	3.4	4	121.7
including:			
Bulgaria	3.7	6	130
Hungary	1.3	2.8-3.2	115-117
Vietnam	7.1	—	—
GDR	4.5	4.6	125
Cuba**	7.3	5.0	128
Mongolia	6.5	4.7-5.3	128.8
Poland	-0.8	3.0-3.5	116-119
Romania	4.4	7.6-8.3	144-149
USSR***	3.1	4.1	122.1
Czechoslovakia****	1.7	3.3-3.6	118-119

* For Bulgaria, Hungary, GDR, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, USSR and Czechoslovakia, the 1986-1990 data for the national income, industrial production and agriculture are taken from the five-year plans, and for Vietnam and Cuba—from congress documents.

** Gross social product.

*** National income used for consumption and accumulation.

**** Gross national income.

The measures projected at the Moscow working meeting and the September conference were dictated by the existence of unresolved problems in socialist economic integration, the need markedly to increase the volume of foreign trade operations, to make cooperation supplies more regular, accelerate the introduction of scientific and technical achievements, and improve the use of commodity-money instruments.

The decisions taken at the 43rd session were the result of painstaking collective work by all the CMEA countries. They reflect the development specifics and interests of each state and the socialist community as a whole. Departments, research institutes, leading specialists and scientists took part in their preparation.

A major result of the session's work was recognition of the need for a conceptual approach to the projection of long-term lines, methods and forms of developing and deepening mutual economic cooperation and socialist economic integration. It was decided to work out a collective conception of international socialist division of labour for 1991-2005. This document will determine the goals and content of concerted policy in fields of mutual interest for the CMEA countries, structural changes in the economy and mutual trade, and transition to a technological model of mutual division of labour which gives priority to cooperation in the introduction and spread of new machinery and technology, an improvement of their existing specialisation profile with due regard for the latest tendencies in scientific and technical progress. Since these processes are dynamic, the main provisions of the conception are to be specified and supplemented every five years, which makes it possible to take account of the changes in the internal and external conditions of economic development and the emergence of new socio-economic problems which can hardly be foreseen in detail for two decades ahead.

The elaboration of a collective conception is connected with a quest for ways of perfecting the CMEA countries' specialisation profiles and economic structures in accordance with the demands of the scientific and technical revolution. The conception will help to realise the Comprehensive Programme of Scientific and Technical Progress (primarily in the sphere of material production). It should in principle answer the ques-

tions of how to increase mutual trade in the forthcoming period, how to open up prospects for the dynamic development of economic relations among our countries.

The conception is to be based on the resolutions of communist and workers' party congresses on matters of economic and social development in the fraternal countries, the decisions of the Economic Summit (1984), the Comprehensive Programme of Scientific and Technical Progress (1985), other multilateral agreements, and bilateral long-term programmes of joint activity.

As Mikhail Gorbachev noted at a meeting with the heads of government delegations and CC secretaries of the fraternal parties, once long-term guidelines for cooperation and specialisation are laid down in the collective conception, each CMEA country will be able to tap its internal reserves to a fuller extent, to show its face, accelerate socio-economic development and help fulfil the common tasks of the socialist community.

Special comprehensive programmes of multilateral cooperation with Vietnam, Cuba and Mongolia are to be elaborated alongside and in accord with the general conception. Their purpose is to ensure efficient coordination in the interests of accelerating these countries' socio-economic development, closer to gear the economic and technical assistance being given them to the tasks of boosting their economy, extending and diversifying their export potential on rational lines, and ultimately to promote their consistent involvement in the international socialist division of labour.

Comparisons show that Mongolia, Cuba and Vietnam have been more successful than most developing countries in building up a national economy and overcoming backwardness. In 1976-1985, average annual economic and industrial growth rates in the CMEA's three non-European countries were higher than for the community as a whole (the only exception was the growth rate of Vietnam's national income, but in 1981-1985 that indicator also increased by an annual average of 8.3 per cent, as compared with 3.4 per cent for the CMEA countries in general). However, in the key indicators of economic development, Cuba, Mongolia and especially Vietnam are still far behind, although the gap has been narrowing. Joint concrete measures are being elaborated and partially put into effect in order to accelerate these countries' economic development, raise its efficiency, and invigorate their involvement in international economic ties.

The second major package of decisions adopted by the session is connected with an improvement of the mechanism of multilateral cooperation. This is to be done step by step, with due regard for the state of the national economic mechanisms and the measures being taken by the countries to restructure them. Basic guidelines have been laid down for concerting national economic plans under the direction of central planning bodies, with a view to the growing independence in many CMEA countries of enterprises and organisations, the main economic units.

As in plan coordination, so in the development of other forms of cooperation, a three tier system of organising cooperation is to be put into practice. On the intergovernmental tier, the main efforts are to be concentrated on concerting economic, scientific and technical policy in fields of mutual cooperation and, for any interested countries, also in other fields of socio-economic development, and also on elaborating and putting into effect large-scale programmes and agreements. On the sectoral tier, the countries coordinate the lines and concrete measures in developing international specialisation, cooperation in the technical re-

equipment of various industries and types of production, fuller use of productive capacities, and so on.

Associations, enterprises and organisations are to be involved in cooperation, as it is already being done in practice, by way of development on a contractual basis of science-production cooperation with broad use of mutually advantageous direct ties, and, formation by the countries concerned of joint enterprises, international associations, and research bodies. Thus, in the agro-industrial sphere alone, direct ties have been established between 13 pairs of Soviet and Bulgarian organisations and enterprises as of early September 1987. The two countries are planning to involve in that form of cooperation another 15 enterprises on either side. Agreements have been concluded on the formation of three joint associations: in winter hothouse vegetable-gardening, in flower growing, and in selection and seed farming (corn and other crops).

These associations are to coordinate research, design and use, wherever necessary, of the same technology in order to meet the Soviet and Bulgarian people's requirements to a greater extent. Thus, the hothouse vegetable-gardening association will primarily help to supply Moscow with fresh vegetables in the autumn and winter period. Once its 360 hectares of hothouse area are put on stream, vegetable supplies will multiply roughly 4.5 times.

The CMEA countries have agreed to ensure the necessary economic, organisational and legal conditions for the development of all forms of direct production cooperation on the basis of civil-law contractual relations. To promote the development of direct ties, the formation of joint enterprises and associations, seven countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Cuba, Mongolia, Poland, the USSR and Czechoslovakia) agreed to introduce mutual convertibility of national currencies for settlements connected with servicing cooperation in these new forms.

Use of national currencies does not mean a departure from the use of the transfer ruble, the CMEA's collective currency. The bulk of the trade among the CMEA countries will continue to be serviced by settlements in transfer rubles. The countries concerned intend to use their national currencies to pay for goods and services within the framework of direct ties, joint enterprises, international economic organisations and associations. In effect, this is still an experiment which will make it possible to decide whether such a form of settlements justifies itself. The main aim here is to create favourable conditions for an efficient exchange of resources over and above the amounts agreed through conventional foreign-trade channels. The earnings in national currency could be converted into transfer rubles. An understanding was reached at the session to improve the commodity-money instruments of cooperation, monetary-financial and credit relations. Naturally, these questions will have to be researched in depth, and require joint efforts by scientists and specialists. The important thing is to project a clear-cut step-by-step solution of the most complicated problems, singling out those on which concrete recommendations could be given before the start of the next five-year period. It is also necessary to specify the deadlines for a detailed validation of subsequent steps to be taken after 1990.

A point to emphasise is that broader use of commodity-money instruments in the community will be no substitute for plan agreements. The long record shows that the latter are a reliable means of guaranteeing the scheduled fulfilment of basic commitments for mutual commodity deliveries. And that is highly important for each country from the standpoint of regulating the pace of production, maintaining the basic reproduction proportions, and so on.

So, the idea is to use prices, foreign exchange, exchange rates, payments, credit, bank interest rates and other value instruments not to

replace plan agreements, but to give them a more profound economic grounding and ensure their consistent implementation with the use of economic instruments. Commodity-money instruments are important for observing such fundamental principles of mutual cooperation as equivalent, mutually advantageous and highly efficient exchange. Such is the aim of the CMEA session's decision on fuller use of economic cooperation methods in the process of integration.

As it was noted at the session, wide use of economic instruments paves the way for a gradual shift of emphasis in mutual cooperation from the sphere of simple trade to that of science and production, to an extent which meets the common interests. The fact that enterprises become directly involved in the integration process does not deprive cooperation of the advantages connected with centralised planning and administration. On the contrary, a reform of the cooperation mechanism along these lines will make it possible to tie in planning even closer with the elaboration of a scientifically grounded investment and external economic policies, with the formation of optimal proportions in economic development.

The session examined the question of restructuring the activity of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, deeming it advisable to focus that activity on arranging cooperation in matters which can only be resolved on an interstate level. The CMEA should concentrate its efforts on coordinating its member-countries' economic, scientific and technical policies in the fields of mutual cooperation. The countries concerned could coordinate such policies in other fields of socio-economic development as well. The CMEA will also focus its attention on large-scale programmes and agreements, arranging their elaboration and implementation. Among these are the CMEA's Comprehensive Programme of STP for the Period Until 2000, other long-term comprehensive programmes and agreements, the most important measures in deepening multilateral cooperation in the sphere of material production, extending mutual trade and meeting the countries' requirements for the necessary resources to a fuller extent. Another of its tasks is to elaborate the planning, commodity-money and legal principles of cooperation, to perfect the economic mechanism of integration. That helps to make the CMEA structure more compact, to streamline it and eliminate parallelism.

The member-countries' investment and technical policies on projects of mutual interest in the corresponding fields, as well as programmes of cooperation in the technical re-equipment of production, its specialisation and ways of raising its technical level, and the product mix and volume of mutual deliveries of specialised and cooperated output are to be agreed on the sectoral level of administration.

Of course, far from all the concrete problems of realising the new cooperation conception are clear both from a theoretical and a practical standpoint. Evidently, these cannot be solved all at once, without due experience, without bold and diverse experiments. But the process of transformations in present-day reproduction is irreversible, for it is conditioned by the objective requirements of socialist economic development.

The session's decisions are regarded in its final documents as the starting point for restructuring the CMEA's activity, as the initial stage. It was deemed necessary to continue improving the mechanism of cooperation and socialist economic integration, to muster the countries' efforts for drafting further proposals and implementing approved measures.

Since the CMEA's 43rd session did not give a final answer to all the questions connected with restructuring the cooperation mechanism, economic science is faced with responsible tasks. It is necessary both to make a serious analysis of the impact of current and projected changes in the economic mechanism, and to tackle the problems of its further

improvement. This applies to the convertibility of the collective currency and the formation of a common market, a free trade zone, and a customs union. On the most complicated questions, international conferences could probably be held in the near future. After that, temporary scientific-practical teams could be set up to draft concrete proposals for a step-by-step improvement of the integration mechanism over the long term. These teams could also take part in the expert appraisal of the results of the economic experiments agreed by the countries concerned.

At the CMEA's 43rd session, the fraternal states signed a number of important documents determining the development of their mutual ties in concrete spheres: a convention on a quality assessment and certification system for mutually delivered goods, a general agreement on the establishment of an international informatics and electronics centre (Intercomputer), and a general agreement on cooperation in developing the CMEA countries' integrated power grids and the power systems of Vietnam, Cuba and Mongolia for the period until 2000.

A protocol was also signed on supplementing, specifying and extending over 1991-2000 the June 28, 1979 agreement on multilateral international specialisation and cooperation of production and mutual deliveries of equipment for nuclear power plants for 1981-1990.²

In their drive to intensify mutual economic cooperation, the CMEA countries take a consistent stand against autarky in international relations, which international reaction has been trying to impose on them. The session noted the importance of creating the most favourable international situation for a further development of the CMEA countries' economies and mutual cooperation. It reaffirmed their resolve to extend diverse economic, scientific and technical ties with all socialist states.

It emphasised the CMEA countries' readiness to deepen economic cooperation with the developing countries, to develop mutually advantageous trade and economic ties with the industrialised capitalist countries, and to establish official relations between the CMEA and the EEC, between their member countries. The CMEA session approved the agreement on cooperation between the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

The session, held on the eve of the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, emphasised the immense importance of that crucial historical event of the 20th century, which opened a new era in the life of mankind, starting to implement the peoples' striving for justice, social and national equality. The triumph of socialism in many countries has led to the emergence of the world socialist system, which plays an ever more important role as the leading force of economic and social progress in the struggle for freedom, equality and independence, for disarmament and peace.

The participants in the session reaffirmed their resolve to work to curb the arms race throughout the world, the nuclear-arms race above all, and to bring about disarmament in order to use the immense resources thus released for purposes of development. International political tension, they noted, is a major obstacle in the way to normal development of the world economy and economic cooperation; it intensifies crisis phenomena in world economic ties, destabilises trade, economic, scientific and technical relations between states, blocks their restructuring on a just and democratic basis and the formation of a new international economic order, hinders a just settlement of foreign debt problems, and jeopardises the economic security of states.

As Mikhail Gorbachev noted at the Kremlin meeting, many difficulties remain and will yet arise in the way of deepening integration and restructuring the CMEA's work, but if our states act together, in a socialist spirit of true comradeship, they will undoubtedly overcome these difficulties. As for the Soviet Union, it regards cooperation with the socialist countries as the crucial, priority line of its policy.³

That is why the results of the CMEA's 43rd (special) session in Moscow were thoroughly analysed at the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers. As it was noted, the session's decisions adopted in fulfilment of earlier understandings among the leaders of communist and workers' parties pave the way for purposeful work by all the community countries to restructure the mechanism of socialist economic integration and the CMEA's activity in the interests of broad use of the advantages of socialism, greater efficiency of the fraternal countries' cooperation and their faster socio-economic development. Much importance for the fulfilment of the socialist community's tasks attaches to the future drafting, in accordance with the session's resolution, of collective documents determining the most promising lines of the international socialist division of labour, and also multilateral cooperation of the CMEA's European countries with Vietnam, Cuba and Mongolia.

The CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers maintain that efficient use of the reserves of integration will be promoted by greater emphasis on economic methods in the development of economic ties between the fraternal states, by broad involvement in cooperation of enterprises and associations in accordance with the session's line. In that context, special attention was drawn to the tasks facing Soviet ministries and other organisations in realising the session's decisions by linking these up with the radical reform in economic administration under way in the USSR, to the need to raise the responsibility of party, state and economic organisations for meeting the Soviet side's commitments.⁴

The socialist community's experience of economic cooperation over the past decades warrants an optimistic assessment of the prospects of cooperation and integration. Consistent work to implement the session's decisions will give a fresh impulse to the development of ties among the CMEA countries, actively promote the dynamic growth of their economies, strengthen their unity, and reinforce the international positions of socialism.

In Mikhail Gorbachev's report *October and Perestroika: The Revolution Continues* it was noted that the socialist system and its time-tested experience are significant for the whole of mankind. This system supplied the world with answers to the basic problems of human existence, tested its humanistic and collectivist values, where the supreme value is the working man. The new social system gives him a sense of dignity, a feeling of being master of the country, ensures social protection, confidence in the future, provides him with an opportunity to acquire knowledge, culture and creates conditions for the realisation of individual abilities. All that has been achieved by the peoples of the socialist countries is mostly the result of fruitful cooperation over many years.

It was noted with satisfaction that relations with all socialist states have been invigorated and improved and their cooperation within the Warsaw Treaty and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance has become more business-like. It was stressed that in its foreign policy the Soviet Union attaches prime significance to the strengthening of

THE WAY TO SECURITY: POLISH INITIATIVE

Anatoli ZAGORSKY

The Warsaw Treaty countries clearly stated their approach towards the conduct of international relations under the new historical conditions in joint documents adopted at the Berlin meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in May 1987. The most important provision of the Communiqué of the meeting is the solemn pledge by the socialist states never and under no circumstances to be the first to start military activities and to use nuclear weapons.

A unique document The Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty Member States was signed at the Berlin meeting. The strategy contained therein is not a code of conducting a war but a purposeful concept of its prevention, a fundamental system of principles and methods to strengthen security for all.

Guided by the policy of ruling communist and workers' parties and the common strategic course of the Warsaw Treaty, each allied socialist state is exerting great efforts to stop the arms race, to reach specific agreements in the area of disarmament and to eliminate the nuclear threat. The solution of this cardinal problem will assure the survival of humankind and will allow it to resolve many long overdue tasks of primary importance. The socialist countries act in several directions which lead to one common goal.

In accordance with the programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000 put forth in the January 15, 1986 Statement by Mikhail Gorbachev, and the foreign policy guidelines of the 27th CPSU Congress, the Soviet Union persistently searches for means and approaches to the solution of disarmament problems both on the global and regional levels.

Apart from advancing far-reaching proposals the Soviet Union is undertaking bold unilateral steps as well. The whole world witnessed the Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests which lasted more than 18 months and which, regrettably, was not followed by Washington. True to its chosen course, the USSR together with other socialist countries submitted for consideration at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva Basic Provisions of a Treaty on the Complete and General Prohibition of Nuclear Weapon Tests. On our initiative the Soviet and American scientists for over a year now have been conducting a joint experiment which confirms the feasibility of reliable control over the discontinuance of nuclear tests. As was agreed by the Soviet and US foreign ministers, full-scale stage-by-stage negotiations on limiting and ultimately stopping nuclear tests began in Geneva.

To give an impetus to nuclear disarmament the Soviet Union agreed to discuss the issue of medium-range missiles outside the Reykjavik package. Moreover, it proposed to eliminate Soviet and American shorter-range missiles in Europe and later—both classes of the aforementioned missiles everywhere. In other words, we are dealing here with the double global zero concept and the complete elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles from Soviet and US arsenals. Speaking at

a press conference in Washington on September 18, 1987 after the talks with US Secretary of State George Shultz, USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze said: "For the first time in the entire history of the existence of nuclear weapons and, more precisely, of nuclear confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States of America, we managed to agree upon the elimination of two classes of nuclear missiles. This is undoubtedly the beginning which, we hope, will be followed up."¹ In a word, this is a prelude to further steps—the reduction of strategic offensive arms in conditions of strict observance of ABM Treaty.

Attaching great importance to the conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons, the Soviet Union together with fraternal countries put forth proposals and undertook practical steps which lay the groundwork for the solution of complicated problems and the achievement of mutually-acceptable agreements.

Among other large-scale initiatives I would like to single out the proposal of the Soviet Union and the allied states to establish a comprehensive system of international peace and security. This issue was high on the agenda of the 42nd session of the United Nations General Assembly.

The practical efforts of the socialist countries are centred around the European continent which witnesses the direct confrontation between powerful military forces of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty. The continent is also the site of over 150 nuclear reactors, countless chemical plants, depots of chemical agents and toxic agents dumping grounds. All these factors would turn even a conventional war, if it breaks out, into a catastrophe. Mindful of the existing real danger for the European nations, the Warsaw Treaty member states at the Budapest meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in June 1986 submitted a proposal on drastic reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments on the entire territory of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

All fraternal countries make an important contribution to lessening the military confrontation on the European continent and the danger of a military conflict. Well known in particular are the joint initiatives of the GDR and Czechoslovakia on the establishment of a chemical weapons-free zone on the territories of three states, including the FRG, and a nuclear-free corridor along the line of contact between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO. An important contribution to the CSCE process is made by Bulgaria and Romania which consistently advocate turning the Balkans into a nuclear- and chemical weapons-free zone. Other socialist countries have come forward with equally important initiatives.

The Polish People's Republic is exerting intensive efforts in the international arena, especially in the sphere of strengthening European security.

The difficult and sometimes tragic past of Poland, which over the thousand years of its existence was often in the epicentre of bloodshed on the continent, and in the 20th century was devastated by two world wars, awakened the Polish people to the need for maintaining good relations with other states, of preserving peace and stability in Europe and all over the world.

The concept of lowering the level of military confrontation between the two social systems and strengthening detente is inherent in socialist Poland's foreign policy. Suffice it to recall its diplomatic activities at the United Nations and foreign policy efforts undertaken together with the USSR and other socialist countries in the post-war years.

What distinguished Poland's conceptual approach and its practical diplomatic moves in the area of disarmament is the fact that, in searching for solutions to complicated problems, Poland lays the emphasis on partial agreements on a regional scale, which could and should become the catalyst of a comprehensive process.

Poland's proposals to establish an atom-free zone (the Rapacki Plan, 1957) and to freeze nuclear weapons in Central Europe, on the territories of Poland, Czechoslovakia, the GDR and the FRG (the Gomulka Plan, 1963) are widely known. For some years these Polish initiatives were the subject of an international dialogue and encouraged the search for solutions aimed at strengthening security in Europe and worldwide. But due to the opposition on the part of certain Western powers they were not implemented. Later, the deployment of American nuclear missiles on the continent, mainly in the FRG, and the stockpiling of nuclear weapons of other countries in this region considerably impeded the establishment of a nuclear-free zone.

Nevertheless, the Polish government is confident that today there exist conditions conducive to the adoption of measures aimed at ensuring equal security for European states on a considerably lower level of their present military potentials. Mindful of all these factors, the Polish People's Republic stepped forward with a new foreign policy initiative. The essence and main provisions of this initiative were expounded by the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party Central Committee, President of the Council of State, Wojciech Jaruzelski at the second congress of the patriotic movement of national revival on May 8, 1987, on the eve of Victory Day in the war against the fascist Germany. Wojciech Jaruzelski underlined that a new Polish plan should be considered as a component part of the CSCE process started in Helsinki, supplementing other initiatives in the area of disarmament advanced by the Warsaw Treaty member states.

The Polish initiative was announced at the plenary session of the CSCE Vienna meeting on May 12, 1987. The day before, Poland's Foreign Minister Marian Orzechowski had stated in an interview he granted to a PAP correspondent: "Our wish to announce the plan at the CSCE forum ensues from the fact that the key component of the CSCE process is the problem of military security. This is exactly why the Vienna forum keeps discussing the extension of the Stockholm Conference mandate, complementing it with disarmament issues. The Polish proposal to that effect is very important."²

In July 1987, the Polish government forwarded a memorandum to all CSCE participating states. Besides the detailed programme of arms reductions and confidence-building in Central Europe it expresses the willingness of the Polish side to hold negotiations with all interested countries. The memorandum was also presented to the UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar.

Poland's new foreign policy initiative was tagged by the international public the Jaruzelski Plan. While maintaining the traditional Warsaw course towards the solution of the disarmament problem above all in Central Europe, the initiative goes beyond the previous Polish proposals.

The Jaruzelski Plan which covers the territory of nine states—Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the FRG, the GDR, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Poland, including their territorial waters and air space, envisages in particular:

1. Gradual withdrawal and (or) reduction of certain mutually-agreed upon types of nuclear weapons and their numbers. These measures should encompass all types of nuclear weapons if they are not covered by other agreements, in particular such types as: enhanced range tactical

and tactical missiles, especially with a range of up to 500 km, nuclear artillery, nuclear-capable aircraft as well as nuclear weapons including nuclear mines and bombs. They should be examined with account taken of the withdrawal and reduction of conventional arms.

2. Gradual withdrawal and (or) reduction of certain mutually-agreed upon types of conventional weapons and their number. These measures should cover in the first place the most destructive and accurate types of weapons which are intended for offensive operations, including a surprise attack.

These measures could be implemented by withdrawing weapons together with the personnel attached to them from the zone designated in the plan; by eliminating or discarding weapons with their subsequent conversion for peaceful purposes or by storing weapons under international control.

3. Joint efforts aimed at turning military doctrines into exclusively defensive ones. For this end we should ensure that the military doctrines are based on the principle of sufficiency according to which a state should possess a military potential sufficient exclusively for an effective defence. It would be advisable to hold joint discussions and to compare military doctrines and concepts, to analyse their substance and tendencies of development.

4. Harmonisation of appropriate far-reaching measures to build up confidence and strengthen security as well as of mechanisms for strict verification of compliance with undertaken obligations, including those which for various reasons would be difficult to fulfil throughout Europe. The states should make efforts to extend the confidence-building and security-strengthening measures to the sphere of independent activities of the air force and the navies.³

It should be emphasised that the Polish plan harmoniously accords with other proposals of the socialist countries in the area of disarmament in Europe, in particular with the 1986 Budapest Appeal of the Warsaw Treaty member states and the GDR and Czechoslovakia initiative on the establishment of a nuclear-free corridor along the line of contact between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO.

The Polish government believes that these three interdependent and at the same time different promising programmes, including each element of the Jaruzelski Plan, can be considered and implemented separately or in parallel. The plan could be the subject for discussion at various forums held within the framework or in relation to the process started by the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

By its scope and direction the new initiative (and this is underscored by Polish comrades) is considered not as simply a proposal but as a programme for purposeful actions. It is rightfully a priority of Poland's foreign policy. Any European country can join the programme. The Jaruzelski Plan immediately attracted the considerable attention.

The Soviet Union was among the first to support the Polish initiative on arms reductions and confidence-building in Central Europe. The Jaruzelski Plan was unanimously highly-appraised by all Warsaw Treaty member states at the Berlin meeting of the Political Consultative Committee. It was also backed up by many other states.

The Polish initiative received wide coverage in the Western mass media. The press, radio and TV made public the Jaruzelski statement of May 8, 1987 and, later on, the Memorandum of the Government of Poland. Numerous commentaries emphasised that the Jaruzelski Plan, compared to previous Polish proposals, was considerably vaster in scope. Thus, for example, the American *Baltimore Sun* even coined a new term—"extended Central Europe". The British Reuters news agency underlined that the new Polish initiative envisaged the withdrawal and

reduction in the extended zone of both nuclear and conventional weapons and the French *Le Monde* noted the important possibility of the Polish programme being extended to all of Europe in the geographic sense of the word.

Initially the West German press was rather reserved in covering the new Polish plan. Nevertheless, even in the first days newspapers published the opinion of Egon Bahr, an expert on the disarmament issues of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, who stated, inter alia, that in the framework of the negotiations on the issues of balanced conventional weapons from the Atlantic to the Urals, the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe plays a special role. The Jaruzelski Plan corresponds to this goal.

The representatives of governments of a number of West European states pointed out such aspects of the Polish initiative as the lessening of the danger of a surprise attack, making military doctrines exclusively defensive in nature, further development of confidence-building measures worked out in Stockholm, and so on.

Marian Orzechowski wrote in the weekly *Polityka*: "The international response to the Jaruzelski Plan immediately after its announcement surpassed our expectations. We have not heard a single statement rejecting the plan. It contains ideas which were already current in Europe but were not clearly formulated. Thus, for example, the issues of tactical nuclear weapons, battlefield nuclear weapons and conventional armaments were combined. Even those circles which resented the plan could not reject it. This is an open plan."

Certainly it would be an error to assume that the West and its mass media wholeheartedly supported and approved the Poland's foreign-policy initiative. From the West came the hackneyed statements to which it often resorts in order to distort the essence of the proposals submitted by the socialist countries.

We should also keep in mind that nowadays the international public focusses attention on the Soviet-US talks on key issues. According to the *Trybuna Ludu* these talks should lay the groundwork for or establish the framework of the system of collective security which is to be strengthened as well by regional subsystems like the Jaruzelski Plan.⁴

Of special importance is the signing of Soviet-US agreement on the elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles, which was agreed at the Washington and Moscow talks. Eduard Shevardnadze emphasised that conclusion of this treaty is a very important event as regards the attainment of an agreement on the entire range of arms reductions in Europe, and a major impetus to and a propitious background for the implementation of the Jaruzelski Plan.

Recently, it has been heard in the West that with the Soviet Union and the USA signing the treaty on medium- and shorter-range missiles, the Polish proposals to reduce tactical nuclear and conventional weapons hold good promise. This was stressed, for instance, by Hans-Jochen Vogel, Chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, Robert O'Neill, Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and others.

Promising prospects for the implementation of the Polish programme of arms reductions and confidence-building in Central Europe were opened up by the consultations between Poland and other countries of Central Europe started in August 1987.

World War II unleashed by fascist Germany left a deep and bleeding scar on the consciousness of mankind. It brought enormous sacrifices and untold sufferings upon the Poles—every fifth Pole was killed.

But, as *Trybuna Ludu* put it, the war taught Poland a valuable lesson. "Hence," the paper continued, "our first conclusion: no more wars! But the idea itself is not enough. It is still necessary to translate this into specific and effective actions. Poland sees the main guarantee of averting war and ensuring vital interests of our people in the alliance with the USSR and other socialist countries. In the international arena, at the United Nations and other organisations it advances initiatives aimed primarily at lessening world tensions; reducing armaments, especially nuclear ones; and strengthening international cooperation."⁵

The contribution of the Polish People's Republic to the strengthening of European and international security is truly formidable. It has put forth more than 20 major proposals since 1946. Some of them were adopted as official UN documents or reflected in UN resolutions like a declaration on preparation of societies for life in peace, a resolution on strengthening trust in international economic relations, and so on.

The essence of the main proposals of Poland related to the European continent could be summarised thus: security for Poland in the conditions of security for the whole of Europe and our planet in general. This approach lies at the core of the Jaruzelski Plan which is a serious contribution to the elaboration of a comprehensive international security system. As Mikhail Gorbachev noted in his article "Reality and Guarantees for a Secure World", this idea "is the first plan for a possible new organisation of life in our common planetary home. In other words, it is a ticket into a future where security for all is a token of the security for everyone".

¹ *Pravda*, Sept. 19, 1987.

² *Trybuna Ludu*, May 11, 1987.

³ *Trybuna Ludu*, July 21, 1987.

⁴ *Trybuna Ludu*, Sept. 15, 1987.

⁵ *Trybuna Ludu*, July 29, 1987.

CMEA: RESTRUCTURING THE MULTILATERAL COOPERATION MECHANISM

(Continued from page 26)

friendship and an all-round development of cooperation with the socialist countries.⁵

¹ In 1986, the USSR accounted for 64 to 98 per cent of the exports of specialised and cooperated engineering output of the various CMEA countries (*CMEA Secretariat's Press Release*, No. 19, 1987, p. 38).

² See *Izvestiya*, Oct. 15, 1987.

³ *Pravda*, Oct. 15, 1987.

⁴ See *Pravda*, Oct. 26, 1987.

⁵ *Pravda*, Nov. 3, 1987.

HONDURAS AND CENTRAL AMERICA AT A HISTORIC JUNCTURE

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It is hard to get a clear look at current developments in Honduras, a small country in the eye of the Central American hurricane, without a detailed analysis of certain historical events. This has to be done if only in order to point out once again that Central America has long been an area coveted by both British and US imperialism. The persistence shown by Washington in trying to perpetuate the occupation of Honduras and overthrow the lawful government of Nicaragua is by no means a whim of Reagan's but the result of a long-standing contest between the two empires for control of the Panama Canal Zone.

This permanent aspect of British and US policy explains why, as far back as the last century, Frederico Shtafeld, a plenipotentiary of the British Crown, plotted against the newly-established Federation of Central America, a republic, and why he had a stake in the shooting of Francisco Morazán,¹ whom José Martí called a military and political strategist of Central America. Even in those days, Morazán considered that although the projected canal was to serve the international community, it should remain under our control.

In view of British-US rivalries, it is understandable why William Walker's piratical action, the first armed intervention to be mounted by the new-born North American empire, was defeated by the combined forces of Central America, Walker himself being shot in Honduras with suspicious "help" from the British. Also understandable are the brazenness and arrogance with which Theodore Roosevelt sanctioned the partition of Colombia² so as to subsequently bring Panama under US control and suppress the movement of those who sincerely believed that the United States supported the Panamanians' patriotic aspirations.

Mention should also be made of repeated invasions of Nicaragua by US Marines, which resulted in the overthrow of President José Santos Zelaya in 1909 and the crushing of General Benjaminn Zeledón's uprising in 1912, as well as of the heroic fight carried on against the invaders by the insurgents under General Augusto Sandino's leadership (1927-1934). Moreover, the United States imposed on Nicaragua the disgraceful Bryant-Chamorro Treaty which they expected to help them acquire a permanent title to the strategic Gulf of Fonseca. Without wandering too far from the topic under discussion, we wish to merely put on record Britain's seizure of the Atlantic seaboard of Central America all the way from Belize to Honduran-Nicaraguan Mosquitia.

Lastly, there are the unrelenting attempts by the US administration to pigeonhole the Carter-Torrijos agreements on the Panama Canal, destabilise the present government of Panama, overthrow Nicaragua's Sandinist regime by force and make Honduras a counter-revolutionary base in Central America.

CHANGE IN US POLICY TOWARDS HONDURAS

The victory of the Nicaraguan people's Sandinist revolution was a major political and historical event on the continent in the twenty years which had passed since the triumph of the Cuban revolution. The Sandinist revolution pierced the wall of US domination in the region which the United States disdainfully calls its "backyard".

After the assassination in 1934 of the recalcitrant "Free Men's General", Augusto Sandino, the Americans were compelled to get out of Nicaragua. But before they did so they used a praetorian guard to transfer power to the Somoza clan, which ruled the country with fire and sword for nearly half a century. Washington reserved Nicaragua as a suitable area for the construction of a new interoceanic canal should it encounter any problems in Panama. Nicaragua also became Washington's chief agent who helped it implement its policy of blackmail and pressure throughout the region.

In the closing days of the Carter administration, Viron Vaky, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, arrived at the conclusion that while the United States had "lost" Nicaragua and something comparable might happen in El Salvador, the special circumstances prevailing in Honduras still left room for political manoeuvre there. The fact is that while the Central American states have a common history and language and common historical and cultural traditions, they are also divided by distinctions which the United States takes into account in pursuing its policy.

In 1979, the situation forced Washington to revise (even against the will of the domestic oligarchy) its obsolete pattern of domination over Honduras. Previously it had relied on a traditional alliance between the old conservative (National) party and the army plus the top leadership of the Catholic church. The oligarchs, generals and bishops patronised long-standing tyrannies such as the one under Tiburcio Carías Andino,³ who used to say that there were "no social problems in Honduras" so as to please the banana monopolies.

The United States concluded a "musketeers' alliance" with the dictatorial regimes of Ubico (Guatemala), Martínez (El Salvador) and Somoza (Nicaragua) even though they were somewhat heterogeneous politically. For decades the alliance had suppressed all progressive trends and the activity of popular organisations. Franklin Roosevelt often said to his advisers that such dictators were "sons of bitches", adding, however, that they were America's "sons of bitches" after all.

The situation changed radically with the Sandinists' victory. In response to the challenge which the Carter administration saw in the event, it advanced the idea of creating a model of "limited democracy" in Honduras. This model of a "liberal democratic" system under which representatives of the highest echelons of power are elected in "free elections" (skillfully planned by themselves) was to be represented as the antithesis of "Sandinist totalitarianism", with Honduras becoming something of a shield against what was described as a "communist threat from Moscow and Havana". Our south-western frontier was to be made a cordon sanitaire with a view to keeping El Salvador's insurgents to a restricted area.

With the advent of the present US administration, the global and regional strategy of the United States was readjusted in the spirit of the so-called Santa Fe Document, dialogue giving way to confrontation and overt or covert interference to containment. This policy led to the Irangate scandal, which shook the Republican administration to the foundations and threw doubt on the US President's moral and political prestige. The scandal laid bare the nature of CIA activity under the

late William Casey and Lieut-Col. Oliver North of the National Security Council. By decision of the NSC, a start was made by supplying Argentine "dirty war" experts with, among other things, \$50 million through General Alvarez Martinez, Commander-in-Chief of the Honduran Army. The money was to be spent on reorganising the battered Somozist horde with the ultimate aim of incorporating it in the counter-revolutionary alignment known as the Nicaraguan Democratic Forces.

The Somozists entrenched themselves in Honduran areas bordering on Nicaragua and started, with support from US troops in the rear, a war of attrition against Sandino's courageous people. The Nicaraguans had to hold their own against a trade blockade and a Voice of America (VOA) smear propaganda campaign broadcast through a network of transmitters and relay stations and had to beat off armed attacks from land and sea, which have already claimed over 16,000 lives. The material damage caused to Nicaragua since the revolution, or in eight years, runs to about \$3 billion.

Washington has also picked new allies in Honduras: the Liberal Party, the top military and the contras have become the social, political and military base for setting up a "counter-insurgency infrastructure" and pursuing a "national security" policy in the country under the guise of "bourgeois democracy", a policy which has cost our people over 200 killed and "missing" popular leaders, including Communists and Christian Democrats. In other words, the United States makes selective use of state terrorism in Honduras and has achieved what a few years ago seemed impossible: it has brought about the formation of a one-party (Liberal) government and, indeed, assured it mass support, established control over the country's legislative, executive and judicial power and temporarily isolated the left and other progressive forces. As for the latter, they were unable to prevent the government under President Suazo Córdova and the Honduran army from following a line meeting solely the interests and foreign policy of the White House.

WORSENING SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS

It is safe to say that Honduras is now going through a crisis of the model of capitalist development imposed by US imperialism. The past 30 years have seen our country test the following three models:

1. *Desarrollism*. This was first tried under the Gálvez government and reached a peak in the "Second Republic", headed by Dr. Villeda Morales,⁴ one of the ablest political leaders that the Honduran bourgeoisie has ever had. After that the model suffered a crisis which resulted in the disintegration of the Central American Common Market (MCCA).⁵ The model had been evolved by the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) to end backwardness through regulation of the economy by the state, which was also expected to encourage the establishment of enterprises that could produce import substituting goods. A further aim of the model was to attract foreign capital, effect a limited agrarian reform and extend economic integration.

The ECLA programme cherished by Raul Prebisch⁶ was conceived by US government agencies, which considered the MCCA as merely an instrument for enabling transnationals to gain access into the economic fields holding the biggest promise of profit.

Inasmuch as Honduras was lagging behind other countries in production facilities, it had to content itself with the role of a raw-material supplier to the region. Its balance of payments shaped up adversely; the unevenness of the development of Central American states was coming out more and more. Incidentally, it was this situation that gave rise to the armed conflict which broke out between Honduras and El Salvador

in 1969. The deportation of thousands of Salvadorans and the football passions of the time were of secondary importance.

2. Due to the failure of *desarrollismo*, a section of the financial and industrial bourgeoisie of the North (it now belongs to the Continental Group and declares for, among other things, the promotion of trade with the socialist community) tried in alliance with the reformist wing of the trade union and peasant movement and the military command to implement a more progressive bourgeois reformist plan. From what its authors said, the plan envisaged accelerated development of the capitalist production mode and recourse to state regulation as a means of accumulating capital. Diverse autonomous companies were established to carry it out, including the National Financial Corporation, the Honduran Banana Corporation and the Honduran Forest Development Corporation.

The progressive forces, including the Communists, enthusiastically endorsed the plan. As for the landed oligarchy, it called the plan a rehearsal for "Sovietisation". A similar view was taken by US representatives and the reactionary governments of neighbouring countries, all of whom were alarmed by reformist word-juggling and the emergence in the Honduran army of a trend known as "Peruvian" (its members called themselves the Young Officers' Movement). Against this background it became clear that the bourgeoisie of the North was neither determined enough nor consistent in putting its own projects into practice, and was unable to use the political room won for ensuring the unhampered development of the mass movement, which would have raised the revolutionary process to a new plane.

With the administrative apparatus resorting to sabotage and the more conservative forces assailing the "socialist project" while the reformists themselves were backing down due to pressure from Washington, a seemingly accidental scandal (a tactics now being used against most member states of the Contadora Group) was all that was needed for the process of realising far-reaching plans to be reversed and sunk ignominiously into oblivion. "Bananagate" (as it was tagged by *the Wall Street Journal*) drove Eli Black, financial genius of United Brands, to suicide and served as a pretext for a coup against General López Arellano.⁷

3. After a brief period needed for a regroupment of the ruling bloc, it came to imposing the present neo-Liberal model upon us. The model calls for a speedy accumulation of capital by stepping up the exploitation of working people. This model, which is being promoted by the "Chicago School", is designed to give free reign to financial capital, reduce state intervention in the economy to the utmost, abolish autonomous state institutions and enterprises, entrust economic decision-making to the employers while at the same time subordinating the private and public sectors to US business. This model also amounts to frozen wages, an end to price control and cuts in social expenditures.

Neo-Liberal concepts have fallen through in some other countries, such as Uruguay and Chile. In Honduras they not only failed to improve the situation but resulted in the burden of the structural crisis being placed on the middle strata and, what is more, on the working people. It should be admitted, however, that the "reformist" period (1972-1978) witnessed some lessening of social pressure on the lower sections of the population. This is one reason why there is no insurgent movement in Honduras comparable to that in Nicaragua, El Salvador or Guatemala.

A further circumstance worthy of note is that the Liberal government under Suazo Córdova (1982-1986), was committed to what may be described as a "double Washington-type policy". In the economic field it applied a neo-Liberal monetarist model with all the ensuing social consequences. As for the military sphere, the government relied on state terrorism and counter-insurgency in line with the doctrine of "national

security". This domestic policy told necessarily on the country's foreign policy in the form of vicious, aggressive anti-Sandinism. Some cherished the hope (if not for long) that Honduras would be able to play the role of a Central American Israel. What followed was a logical consequence, that is, the militarisation of social and political life and an unrestrained arms race, which led to a redoubling of the numerical strength of the army and police in less than six years and to the appearance of the notorious "death squads" with their network of clandestine prisons. Honduras found itself teeming with US Green Berets; agents of Israel's secret police, MOSSAD; thousands of US occupation troops and Somozists.

Indicatively, even under the Suazo Córdova government there emerged early signs of the failure of its neo-Liberal model and the policy of repression, which were, in effect, two sides of the same coin. Here are some specific indications of the economic crisis of the last days of Liberal rule: purchasing power declined due to "home-made" and "imported" inflation; mass unemployment reached 21 per cent and as much as 57 per cent in the case of the economically-active population; the GDP fell 0.3 per cent (1981-1982) although early in 1986 it showed faint signs of inching up; the state budget in the first half of 1987 ran a \$129 million deficit. Honduras has an adverse balance of payments, and its foreign-exchange reserves are dwindling. Its external debt is growing fast and stands at \$3.5 billion (nearly seven billion lempiras).

Such is the dismal political, economic and military legacy left by the previous Liberal government, which came to power amid optimistic forecasts. The proportion of votes cast for President Suazo Córdova implied that he was given a real mandate by the majority of our people, who longed for change, greater democracy, respect for human rights, less corruption and repression, and wanted the army to return to its barracks. Few governments win such support, and hence such freedom to manoeuvre and such political capital. However, Suazo Córdova recklessly wasted this capital. He obeyed the instructions from Dimitri Negroponte, the former US Ambassador, who comported himself like a proconsul and formed a triumvirate to organise counter-revolutionary terror in Central America, being helped in this by General Alvarez Martínez, Commander of the Honduran Army, and General Paul Gorman, Chief of Staff of the US Southern Command in Panama.

The Honduran people are moving into action against this policy but it would be wrong to imagine that their effort could be led by a politician such as Azcona, the President now in office, who took a stand against Suazo Córdova merely because the latter was said to have discredited liberalism through corruption and embezzlement of public property. Azcona never came out against the US presence in Palmerola, where the Pentagon has a base, and until recently he hypocritically denied the fact that the Nicaraguan contras were using Honduran territory to attack our neighbour from bases at El Paraíso, Choluteca, Olancho and la Mosquitia.

Delivering his inaugural speech, Azcona made clear that his government would end corruption in the administrative apparatus, shameless robbery of the population and the headlong privatisation of public enterprises and, moreover, radically change Honduras' foreign policy, which had badly discredited the country in the eyes of other Latin American states. He readily promised to respect civil rights and democratic freedoms, recognise the right of neighbouring nations to self-determination and establish relations with them on the principles of equality and mutual respect.

Nearly two years have passed since the present administration took over, so we can draw some conclusions about its performance. This government is a mere continuation of its predecessor. Azcona has failed to bring about a tangible change in economic policy. The crisis is going

from bad to worse for all that at the beginning of his term Azcona could have used favourable external factors to achieve economic stability. After all, the rise in world prices for coffee was accompanied by a drop in prices for oil, which Honduras is compelled to import.

The encouraging prospects that opened up in the early days of the Azcona government's term in office evaporated after coffee prices dropped (May-June 1986). At the same time, decisions adopted by OPEC resulted in jacked-up oil prices and cuts in export quotas for bananas and sugar. By mid-1986, Honduras owed foreign bankers so much that the regime was on the brink of bankruptcy, which it avoided through use of a classical device, IMF aid. The aid was granted on terms injurious to our economy.

In 1986, the GDP was worth 38.1 per cent of the foreign debt, with interest payments on debt equalling 35.3 per cent of our export earnings. According to official data, US economic and military aid in 1986 fell somewhat short of the earlier amount but in 1987 it is to go up by \$158.8 and \$88.8 million respectively. These figures are evidence of the US Republican administration's invariable expansionism in Central America and the degree to which the new Liberal regime follows US foreign policy guidelines.

However, this line has lately given cause for a measure of discontent among some sections of the Honduran bourgeoisie and in the government, who consider that Honduras is paying too high a political price for its loyalty to the United States. *El Tiempo*, a newspaper expressing the views of the Continental Group, has described this alliance as serving solely US interests and yielding dividends to El Salvador and Costa Rica as a consequence of the discrediting of Honduran policy.

Furthermore, part of the Honduran officer corps considers that our real enemy is not Nicaragua, despite ideological contradictions between it and Honduras, but the Salvadoran army, which the United States goes on reinforcing. This, in turn, explains why the Salvadoran government under President Duarte persists in objecting to the delivery of 12 F-5E or Kfir warplanes to the Honduran Air Force by the United States or Israel. Were this to happen, the balance of forces in Latin America would be seriously upset, a development which the Nicaraguan government would certainly have to reckon with and which the Salvadoran and Guatemalan military fear so much.

The effect of the "continuity" of the Azcona government's policy is only too obvious. The economic crisis is deteriorating, being aggravated by the ominous spectre of falling prices and an inexorable reduction in quotas for staple export goods: coffee, frozen meat, sugar, bananas and other key sources of revenue. All this certainly affects the working people. The south of the country was hit by a frightful famine. In 1986, a Commission of the Ministry of Public Health established that in this region alone 300,000 Hondurans are suffering from hunger and exhaustion. Mention should also be made of the fact that 7,000 cases of syphilis have been registered in Honduras, a country of four million people. Recently the authorities of Camayagua, a small town 20 kilometres from the US Palmerola base, released information on numerous cases of sexual offence against children under 12, drug addiction and AIDS.

In this context, a tragically discordant note was struck by a government decision to purchase 12 warplanes for \$79 million, aircraft which the country does not even need because no one is threatening it.

Reality has repeatedly refuted dangerous allegations made by White House advisers. It is an open secret that the roots of Central America's sharp contradictions go back to the distant past and also lie in present-day reality and not in the misrepresented East-West confrontation which advocates of a "sacred war against communism" are resorting to.

THE PEOPLE'S RESPONSE AND THE PROSPECT OF A SOCIAL EXPLOSION

The general impression is that many people in South America and Europe, to say nothing of other continents, believe that Hondurans unquestioningly submit to the ruling quarters' fallacious policy. Indeed, some think the people neither reject nor protest against this perilous policy, which is certain to end in an armed conflict in Central America unless reversed. Such a conflict is not only endangering peace in the region due to the interconnection of the economic, political and strategic interests of many countries but could easily spark off a conflagration with unforeseeable consequences.

Yet these views on the situation in Honduras are a product of inadequate information. To begin with, it should be stressed that the social and political forces expressing the interests of the workers, peasants, students, office employees and other population groups belong to trade unions, diverse associations and leagues, the Coordinating Committee of Popular Organisations, the Committee on Human Rights, the Committee of Relatives of the "Missing" and Political Prisoners, the Honduran Women's Committee for Peace or the Honduran Peace Action Committee. They carry out mass protest actions against official policy and demand that the government respect human rights, punish those responsible for killing or kidnapping popular leaders, adopt a foreign policy of peace and resist imperialist interference.

For instance, 55,000 small and medium owners of coffee plantations, the backbone so to speak of the Honduran middle bourgeoisie, whose profits remain in the country, are grouped in the Honduran Association of Coffee Producers. Many such landowners and peasants are robbed of their land, especially in areas bordering on Nicaragua. There the *contras* feel like masters and proceed as though they are the real authority, ordering house searches, checking cars on highways, harassing and killing those who oppose these outrages; in the process, they appropriate coffee plantations and cotton fields, once the sources of income for the local population. All this takes place under the very eyes of the Honduran civilian and military authorities, who turn the other way at this plunder. It is no accident that the Honduran Association of Coffee Producers has held protest marches on the capital to demand of the US Ambassador that his country pay \$50 million in compensation for the losses resulting from the *contras*' presence in the El Paraíso and Olancho areas.

Along with this, the workers and peasants are becoming more politically conscious. They realise that the Honduran government cannot solve major social problems, cannot end mass unemployment or the ruin of small enterprises or create new jobs. The reason why it cannot is that it is trailing behind US policy and obeys the diktat of the IMF, an institution playing into the hands of the transnationals. In fact, we are forced to export our goods to the US market at low prices while imports cost us a lot. But even the meagre receipts that are left as a result are wasted on arms purchases. We are even made to pay for the fuel used by US troops during joint US-Honduran manoeuvres. Enormous sums are spent on payments of interest on a foreign debt that cannot be repaid.

It is indicative that the Presidents of Central American states subscribed to Mikhail Gorbachev's thesis by writing "peace and development are inseparable" into the Preamble to the Guatemalan Declaration of the meeting held on August 6 and 7, 1987. Thousands of lives were lost, rivers of blood were shed, thousands of houses, schools, hospitals and cooperatives destroyed, crops lost, with hunger making inroads into town and countryside, thousands of young men crippled in an undeclared war and many people robbed of all hope for a future before there came

what Mikhail Gorbachev had spoken about and called for and what is stated explicitly in key documents of the CPSU and the Soviet government. They stress that only in a climate of peace and international security can the peoples narrow the gulf between small and poor countries and industrial powers, that nothing but renunciation of the arms race will make social progress possible and that adherence to general and broad democracy is the only way for the people to exercise their right to shape their destiny.

The more advanced social and political organisations of our people condemn attempts to impose a fratricidal war against Nicaragua upon us. They demand an end to using our territory as a bridgehead against the courageous people of El Salvador, who have taken up arms against their enemies. The forms and methods of our struggle are most varied; they include the occupation of lands, factories and other enterprises, rallies and street demonstrations, and armed resistance to the invaders to send them packing so that we can decide our fortunes by ourselves, without foreign meddling. The struggle of Honduras' progressive and democratic forces is appreciated by and finds a response among the more progressive sections of the Catholic church many of whose members have given their lives for the people's just cause. This struggle has its effect on influential military leaders and young army officers, who regard foreign presence as an insult to their honour and identify themselves with those who insist on restoring their country's national sovereignty, now trampled underfoot.

In this intricate gamut of opinions and forces, the position of some sections of the industrial and financial bourgeoisie is coming out more and more. They dread a revolution and call themselves anti-communists but at the same time there arise friction and even contradictions between them and the United States. It is understandable why certain groups of employers, lackeys and agents of transnationals, mostly those who under Suazo Córdova had real intentions of putting the country on a fascist footing, are now regrouping as they cast about for a new leader. This is because they fear that their "man of destiny", Reagan, is fighting a losing battle with time and has failed to fit into the image of an all-powerful Rambo. He has proved to be an ordinary demagogue, turned sweet dreams of an "American age" into a nightmare by substituting the Star Wars programme for it, the aim being to deliver a first strike against the Soviet Union and to blackmail other countries.

A much-advertised plan for economic revival, proudly presented as "Reaganomics for Honduras", has flopped. Our employers were surprised and indignant to learn that the US President's "Caribbean initiative" is merely a petty deception. This was the description given it by Gómez Andino, Chairman of the Honduran Committee of Private Entrepreneurs, at a rally held in the town of El Progreso in the summer of 1987. "Every time we want to export our goods," he stated, "we are told that they are not on the list of products to be purchased from us." Recently Edmundo Bogran, leader of the People's Liberal Alliance and spokesman for the Continental Group, said that the "United States is only concerned with its own interests". National Assembly Chairman Carlos O Montoya, leader of another economic group connected with coffee exporters and Japanese capital publicly stated that the United States was a mediocre ally and that Honduras should seek trade contacts with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Only a year ago, statements of this kind would have sounded like demagogic bravado.

It is reasonable to presume that such outbreaks of anger are not contrary to the mentality of individual members of the Latin American bourgeoisie whom Rodney Arismendi has aptly compared to our peasants "belabouring a saint to make him yield, yes, rain". In other words, they

want to scare the United States with the spectre of communism. But this view should not mislead us just because it is so simple. Their instinct serves them well, and they see clear signs of a sharp slump in the US itself. The dollar is ceasing to be all-powerful as it fluctuates. The crisis of the strongest capitalist power is becoming more and more evident; the United States has a negative trade balance and an astronomical budget deficit.

Besides, the USA is falling in prestige on the international scene and feels cornered by numerous proposals for a world without wars and arms. Socialism is gaining in potential and strength; it has demonstrated that the powerful weapon of self-criticism helps eliminate mistakes and shortcomings in humanity's great experiment. Soviet domestic and foreign policy is aimed at moving ahead with redoubled efforts to the heights of economic, scientific and cultural progress through unprecedented scientific and technological achievements and at entering with giant strides the world of the third millennium where an end will be put to the economic plunder hitting Third World countries, where there will be no more prerequisites for the exploitation of man by man and the peoples will no longer dread a nuclear war capable of destroying all life. Humanising the conditions of existence in the name of humanising the individual!

Changes are never for the worse, say the peoples engaged in an arduous search for ways of deliverance from social and national exploitation, which prevents democratisation and renewal. The mirage of the "American way of life" is dissipating. It is becoming evident that we owe the scourge of exploitation to this way of life and that it has polarised our society in which the satiety of the minority contrasts with the hungry existence of the majority, with freedom turned into permissiveness and flight from reality cunningly encouraged by the mass media which pushes people towards prostitution and drug addiction.

Our people, like other peoples of Central America, certainly want integration but not on instructions from monopolies and transnationals. We want a restoration and renaissance of the great Morazanist country. We reject payments on the foreign debt, which makes us sacrifice to the infinite greed of imperialists resources we need. With every passing day we set greater store by the friendship and generous solidarity of Lenin's great country, which 70 years after the victorious October Revolution goes on illuminating our road to the future, a country which has advanced from illiteracy to the heights of science, from the wooden plough to a developed economy. The Soviet people have made their way into outer space, doing it not to threaten other peoples but to explore the stars. This is a clear indication that man has left the pre-historic world, as Engels would have said, to intelligently make and record his real history.

Central America and the Caribbean, inspired by the victorious Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions and the formation of the Contadora Group and the Group of Support, are marching together as a common movement of peoples and governments against discredited imperialist policies. We are sure that even though the Washington administration is backed by the powerful military-industrial complex, it cannot put down the popular uprising on our continent. There is the case of Cuba, a country which has not only refuted the notion of fatal dependence on imperialism and exploded the myth of imperialism's invincibility in the Western Hemisphere but is successfully building socialism a mere 90 miles from the chief stronghold of capitalism, in the face of a blockade that by now has been defeated thanks to the political maturity of our peoples and as a result of imperialism's acute social and economic crisis.

Such a revolution would hardly have survived amid predatory attacks from the United States had it not been for a continuation in the 1960s of the era which began in 1917 and had the Soviet Union and the social-

ist community as a whole failed to render Cuba friendly assistance and express disinterested solidarity with it, as Fidel Castro has repeatedly pointed out.

Notwithstanding the defeat sustained in Chile, the ebb of the revolution in Peru and the suppression of Grenada, the march of history led irresistibly to an outbreak of popular anger in Central America, an area of conflict which Ronald Reagan calls the "fourth frontier" of the United States. The axis of Latin American democratic and anti-imperialist struggle has shifted to this region. The people's Sandinist revolution is not a "historical exception" to the rule but the most obvious confirmation of it. The Nicaraguan revolution, which enrages imperialism, is a clear indication that times have changed. However, we are mindful of the danger threatening Sandino's country.

A world fit for humanity should be based on political pluralism, a mixed economy, non-alignment and an end to interference in internal affairs flouting the right of nations to self-determination, refusal to pay the foreign debt, integration on the principles of cooperation, mutual respect and assistance, a new international economic order. These principles and ideals are gaining ground in Honduras and other Latin American countries, which are eagerly watching the bold process of renewal going on in the Soviet Union. The triumph and consolidation of this process is bound to be the best guarantee of our own independence and social progress and of world peace.

¹ The Federation of Central America was founded by Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and El Salvador on July 1, 1823. Power in it was contested by the Liberal Party under Francisco Morazán and the conservatives. In response to a series of progressive reforms effected by Liberal governments between 1829 and 1838 the conservatives started armed operations and defeated Morazán's troops (1838). The pact establishing the Federation was abrogated, and it broke up into the five independent states listed above. (This and further footnotes have been supplied by the editorial board).

² In 1903, the United States backed Panama's demand for secession from Colombia and secured a perpetual lease of a part of Panamanian territory for the construction of a canal connecting the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.

³ Head of a dictatorial regime in 1933-1949.

⁴ Juan Manuel Gálvez was President of Honduras from 1949 to 1954 and Villeda Morales, from 1957 to 1963.

⁵ After Honduras had withdrawn from the MCCA (1971), integrational processes slowed down sharply and the MCCA entered a long crisis period.

⁶ Raul Prebisch, a noted Latin American economist, co-author of the theory of peripheral economy underlying the so-called ECLA Doctrine and the theory of *desarrollismo*.

⁷ General Oswaldo López Arellano was removed from the Presidency by the armed forces in April 1975.

AFRICAN COUNTRIES: National Statehood in the Making

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The emergence of independent countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America represents a historic victory of the national liberation movement, which, says the Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, has had a substantial impact on the world balance of forces. During the independent years many of these countries made notable progress in economic and cultural development and in building up national statehood. They have developed ways of jointly fighting for their rights on the international scene. Having won political independence, they are carrying on a persistent and just struggle against neocolonialism, against interference in their internal affairs, against racism and apartheid. But experience has shown that their advancement towards greater political independence and economic and social renovation is seriously obstructed by certain moves by imperialism, by the burden of colonial heritage and by financial and economic bondage which, for their part, handicap the operation of political structures and give rise to social tensions and political instability.

Authoritarian methods of government have become widespread in the overwhelming majority of the countries following the capitalist path, and some of them are ruled by dictatorial and despotic regimes. The nascent states have been confronted with so many difficulties that the crisis which has hit most of the sovereign states is even less surprising than the fact that their problems are nonetheless being solved to varying degrees. The crisis had largely been predetermined by the fallaciousness of the initial models of statehood which were, as a rule, imposed on them by the former colonial powers.

Back in the 1940s there existed merely three formally sovereign states in Africa. Today, there are 50 of them. But it would be an oversimplification to confine oneself to figures alone. The shaping of national statehood largely depends on the correlation of conflicting forces between the national liberation movement and a colonial power at the time independence is obtained. A point to note here is that the legal terms of granting independence to, for instance, the former British colonies had been formulated at constitutional conferences in London, and the constitutions of the young states, largely copied from the "Westminster standard", were adopted as annexes to an order issued by the Queen. The granting of independence to nearly all the former French colonies in Tropical Africa (with the exception of Guinea) was formalised in the so-called agreements on the transfer of competence.

Bourgeois authors often allege that it was all a matter of using definite political and legal techniques. Each colonial power left behind in a newly independent state the model of state organisation which it knew best, that is, its own. African authors interpret the developments in a

somewhat different way. For instance, L. Sylla from the Republic Côte d'Ivoire believes that the acceptance of Western models was the price the young states had to pay for the recognition of their independence.

But in actual fact the imposition of the imitation models of statehood was in no way a purely technical procedure. It was just an instance of the policy of neocolonialism designed to tie the nascent states that copied foreign structures and institutions to the former "paternal nation" and thus to secure the dependent development of African statehood.

Very soon, however, experience proved that the imposed models of political organisation were hopelessly ineffectual. Placed in a different social environment, the bourgeois-liberal models not only failed to take root, but were in direct conflict with the requirements of social development. That was followed by a long series of revisions of the constitutions and by coups, as a result of which one-party systems and one-man rule became predominant.

One could, of course, ask the rhetorical question: were not those changes a negative phenomenon, a step back? As I see it, this would not be a proper enough way of looking at the matter. Since the imposed institutions proved *ineffectual*, they could not ensure the advance of African society. It would be more correct, perhaps, to say that these artificially introduced models had an inherent potential of negative political development, which is felt in many independent countries to this day. The point is that the tendency to concentrate power in the hands of ruling groups is an intrinsic element of bourgeois statehood itself.

In the industrialised capitalist countries this tendency to establish reactionary power is opposed by the working class and its militant vanguard, and by the broad democratic forces. In the poorly developed countries of Africa such forces either do not exist at all, or are just beginning to grow. But this is far from all. Colonial administration had always been highly authoritarian. And most of the elitist groups to whom a former "paternal nation" entrusted power had gone through that school of colonial administration. Liberal values and models of conduct have never been the features of pro-bourgeois autocracy which came to power in most of the countries after independence was proclaimed there. Evidently many traditional notions of power as a talent or gift of a definite individual, power which comes and goes with him, worked in this direction too.

The collapse of the models of statehood and their institutions imposed by imperialist powers is not tantamount to rejection of the capitalist path of development. Pro-bourgeois autocracy employing authoritarian methods of rule normally facilitates capitalist development to varying degrees, though the forms of such development quite often differ from the known "classic" versions. Only if a rejection of an imitation model of development is associated with the coming to power of revolutionary-democratic forces can statehood and its mechanism become an instrument of truly democratic reforms opening up a socialist perspective. Still, even such a cardinal change in the fate of a society is not followed by an automatic change of state structures.

The qualitative characteristics of new power and its social nature do indeed undergo radical changes as a result of a revolutionary upheaval, but the experience of many socialist-oriented countries has proven that it is immensely difficult to smash the old state machinery and build a new one in its place. It is significant that, for instance, the ruling Congolese Party of Labour stated at its special Third Congress in 1979 that the neocolonialist state had far from been eliminated and a new revolutionary-democratic state apparatus was yet to be built. But the revolutionary upheaval that led the national-democratic forces in the country to power took place in August 1963. So experience does not confirm the view, which is quite widespread among African revolutionaries, that the

seizure of power by progressive forces almost automatically solves the problem of building the new state machinery. In almost none of these countries was it possible to form and bring into play such machinery within a relatively brief time span. Furthermore, many revolutionary-democratic parties have come to realise that neocolonialist administrative structures and methods of administration are extremely viable, while professional bureaucracy, remaining the source of the growth of the so-called bureaucratic bourgeoisie, often sabotages and wrecks progressive measures and programmes.

The different features of the social nature of power, which is a coalition power as a rule, are most important for the future of young states, for choosing a model of society which the state has set out to build. At the same time, the specifics of a social environment affect the state structures and the practice of running the mechanism of power. Economic backwardness and the rudimentary productive forces (according to UN statistics, most African countries are among the least developed countries in the world) are the reason why the main social classes have not yet taken shape or are just being born in many African countries. Pre-bourgeois—and in some countries even pre-feudal—social and extra-social communities and institutions making up the so-called traditional structures have a significant role to play there. Under such conditions the elitist groups formed for the most part from among people of median social strata are most active politically. This lends an elitist quality to the exercise of power. The gap between the ruling elite and the mass of patriarchal peasantry, who often constitute 80 to 90 per cent of the population, is extremely wide. Development along the capitalist path sharply increases social disproportions and differentiation. All this has a direct effect on state-legal development.

In most of the countries there are autocratic regimes in which all state power is concentrated in the hands of an individual who is, as a rule, the head of state and the ruling party leader. Such rulers are often proclaimed presidents for life (as in Malawi, Zaire, and some other countries) or occupy that post *de facto* for a lifetime. Only in Tanzania the amendments to the constitution adopted in the 1980s limited the succession of presidential terms to two five-year periods. Over the years of independence heads of state have been unconstitutionally replaced in all the capitalist-oriented countries (Senegal and the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire are the only exceptions). The autocratic rulers are often given pompous titles, like the "nations' founding father", the "chief of all chiefs", and the like. The issue is not the pompous titles but that such a leader becomes an unlimited sovereign, alone deciding the destiny of his country and shaping its domestic and foreign policies. The decisions taken by such a ruler become the supreme source of legislation.

In the countries with autocratic rule legal opposition is liquidated, and the political process is void of competitiveness. In those nations where constitutions are formally adopted, they are either fictitious or sanction unlimited rule by one person.

The ruling party, usually controlled by the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, includes all, or the greater part of, the adult population (Zaire, Rwanda, etc.). Under Zaire's constitution, the sole political institution in the country is the Popular Movement of the Revolution (PMR). It is defined in the constitution as a "politically organised Zairean nation" (Article 33). In fact it is not a party in the generally accepted sense of the word, but a completely statist political organisation. In line with this is the law which provides that the power of the people is exercised by the PMR chairman who is the president of the republic by right (Article 9).

Over the period of independence (assuming that the first independent year was 1960, known as the Africa Year) there have been more than

one hundred military coups in African countries. Some countries experienced several coups. Military regimes remained, as of March 1987, in Nigeria, Niger, Mauritania, the Central African Republic and some other countries. The establishment of military rule is followed by the cancellation of the constitution and suspension of constitutional guarantees, disbandment of political parties and banning of representative establishments. More often than not, military regimes function for many years. In Niger, for instance, the military have been in power since 1974. In some countries, where attempts were made to replace the military rule by regimes that imitated Western models (as was the case in Ghana and Nigeria in the late 1970s), those regimes soon discredited themselves, having showed complete disorder in social and state activities. As a result, the military were restored to power, though they held different political positions, as in self-same Ghana and Nigeria.

Neither does the establishment of a progressive regime automatically bring about political stability. There has been, regrettably, quite a few instances in Africa's political history when the forces coming out for social progress failed to retain their positions. The irreversibility of the choice of socialism, proclaimed by many revolutionary democrats and sometimes recorded in the constitution, reflects a desire rather than a reality. To be sure, the destabilisation of progressive regimes is to a considerable extent, and sometimes entirely, due to plottings and sabotage on the part of external reactionary forces. Nonetheless, one cannot fail to see that in a number of cases this happened because the national-patriotic forces failed to ensure a consolidation of power and to enlist popular support for the regime to the extent making it possible to hold out against the joint onslaught of imperialism and domestic reaction.

The state is designed to ensure public power. It is namely the state which has the right to decree rules of conduct for all citizens within the bounds of national territory. It has the material means of coercion ensuring the observance of its directives. The state is a commanding centre mapping out the guidelines of social development. In most African countries modern nations have not yet taken shape, they have no single national markets; ethnic and regional divisions still persist there, modern social classes are weak, or even lacking, while the bulk of the population work in the natural and seminatural economy. Under these conditions the transforming and guiding role of the state increases immensely. It is symptomatic that attempts have been made in almost all African countries, whatever their socio-political orientation, to draw up and implement national plans and programmes of economic and social development. Meanwhile the concept of a deideologised "administrative" state has obviously failed to spread and win broad recognition.

The specifics of a social environment make the state more independent with regard to the society which produced it. In contrast to the history of industrialised capitalist countries, where the state has an increasing role to play in the conditions of a relative balance of the major conflicting class forces, in Africa this takes place against the background of weakness of the major social classes. As is known, the state materialises in the existence of a section of the population called upon to run social affairs. Lenin wrote: "The state really does amount to such an apparatus of rule which stands outside society as a whole."¹ Therefore the state maintains its independence by increasing the role of the bureaucratic machine of administration and of the ruling groups that control the formation and work of the state machinery. This accounts for the greater

role played by the subjective factor in the elaboration and pursuance of state policy.

At the same time it would be wrong to overestimate the potentialities of the African states for modelling social processes. These potentialities are obviously limited due to scarce material and financial resources, the shortage of skilled personnel, adherence of a large proportion of the population to traditional values and ideals and, last but not least, due to the absence in many cases of a scientifically-grounded and workable programme of development. Officially proclaimed goals are by no means always attained, words are not always followed by deeds, and law and practice are often at variance in nearly all African countries. This inevitably diminishes social support for a regime, and reactionary regimes try to make up for that loss by building up the repressive potential of the state. The toughening of repression leads to greater alienation between the state and the ruling elite, on the one hand, and the greater part of the population, on the other. Then state structures inevitably become degraded and a crisis sets in, which was the case in recent years in Chad, Uganda, the Central African Republic and some other countries.

Most African countries were confronted perhaps with the greatest difficulties in solving problems involved in building an efficient state machinery, in national-state and socio-economic development. All these countries have managed more or less successfully to Africanise the state-machinery personnel. But in many capitalist-oriented countries this phenomenon, which is in itself positive, was not followed by a change in the content, style and methods of work used by the state administration. Moreover, it often copied the negative side of colonial administration. African leaders and political scientists often note that career officials practice bureaucratic methods, that corruption, bribery, lack of initiative and irresponsibility become widespread, and the patrimonial system of rule and patronage relations prevail. In many capitalist-oriented countries, the officially-proclaimed "administration of development" is not established. Instead, the bureaucratic apparatus is swelling out of proportion. During the independent years in Nigeria the number of state employees shot up from 200,000 to 2 million by the early 1980s and was growing at a rate of 10 per cent a year, which by far exceeds the population growth rate. In many cases the spending on the state machinery takes up the greater part of budget appropriations and sometimes even a large portion of foreign loans.

The excessively-grown bureaucratic machinery has become a parasitic sponge on society, blocking its progress. Some measures taken in the 1980s to save state funds and to rationalise administrations and reduce staffs have not so far yielded tangible results. Only in socialist-oriented countries relatively radical measures are taken to reorganise the state machinery and extend the participation of the working people in administering public affairs and production. To that end measures are being taken to strengthen party guidance and control over the activities of the administration, set up a single system of administration and confer powers on elective representative bodies in the centre and in the provinces, and to encourage self-administration and control by the working people at the enterprises. But, as is seen from the materials of the congresses of the ruling revolutionary-democratic parties held in recent years in Angola, Benin, the Congo and some other countries, no radical change has been effected in the activities of the administration, in making it more efficient and purging it of the so-called bureaucratic bourgeoisie.

The problem of national-state development appeared to be extremely complex. The populations in the Tropical African countries are multi-ethnic. The building of a sovereign state in that part of Africa precedes

the shaping of a nation, and the use of the term "national statehood" in literature signifies more a tendency, or a prospect, of development than a real fact. The supposition that the formation of an independent state and political and legal measures will help rapidly overcome ethnic seclusion and interethnic differences and form and consolidate one national community (or communities) within fixed state borders has not been borne out. Traditional structures, institutions, notions and ideals turned out to be far more tenacious than expected. Furthermore, in some countries interethnic rivalry and even enmity have grown more acute, sometimes erupting into conflicts and bloodshed. Suffice it to recall the civil war in Nigeria, caused by the attempted break-away of Biafra, which by some estimates took the toll of about one million lives. There have been regular communal-religious and ethnic clashes there in subsequent years as well.

The tenacity of traditionalism and such of its institutions as the patriarchal commune, the large family, the tribe, the institution of chiefs, and others is accounted for not only by socio-economic but also by political reasons. In a number of countries adhering to the concept of African identity or authenticity, reliance on traditional values and institutions has been proclaimed as official policy (Zaire, Togo, Malawi, and others). The idealisation of archaic values and institutions and their intergration into modern state structures are a major means of ensuring the stability of a regime. Traditional chiefs often exercise what may be called parallel power in the localities. The revival of traditionalism in many countries is a response of traditional society to the negative anti-human effects of capitalist modernisation.

The aggravation of interethnic conflicts and enmity is often directly caused by outside interference. Such means has been most widely used by imperialist reaction in its attempts to destabilise progressive regimes. Separatist movements in Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia are organised precisely on ethnic principles.

As a rule, the constitutions and legislation of African states contain the principles and norms designed to facilitate national consolidation and integration. Equality of citizens irrespective of ethnic affiliation is proclaimed and propaganda of ethnic exclusiveness, seclusion or enmity and formation of political parties or organisations on ethnic principles are banned in almost all African countries. Such measures are positive, of course. But one is sure to see that communal and tribal consciousness quite often prevails over national awareness, while membership in a definite ethnic group for most Africans takes priority to their legal ties with the state.

The specifics of the ethnic make-up of the population have a direct effect on the form of statehood.² Under circumstances when overcoming ethnic divisions remains the top-priority task, while economic, cultural and sometimes language ties among tribes and ethnic groups are practically non-existent in most countries, the unitary form of state organisation turned out to be most advisable. Federative state organisation has been preserved only in Tanzania and Nigeria due to the specifics of their historical development. Even in the countries proclaimed as multinational in the constitution, like Benin, the state remains one and indivisible.

In the non-capitalist-oriented countries, the state, as a rule, does not limit itself to a formal proclamation of equality of nations or ethnic groups, but exerts real efforts to even out the levels of regional development. This is considered to be a means of drawing various ethnic groups together. The democratic forces seek to make the positive elements of the traditional commune, such as collectivism, mutual assistance and others, serve social progress. In Tanzania, in accordance with

the *ujamaa* concept (the Tanzanian concept of socialism) the village commune is viewed as both a production association of working people and a basic self-governed unit. About the same role is played by the *jokonolona*, the traditional commune of Madagascar, which is being modernised. However, all attempts to present the traditional commune as a cell of a future socialist society are nothing more than a tribute to the utopian ideas and illusions of pre-bourgeois socialism.

The effectiveness of a state machinery, and of the entire political system for that matter, makes itself fully felt in achievements in social and economic development. Among the burning problems which the post-colonial state begins to solve, the most urgent are the elimination of starvation, poverty, diseases, illiteracy and other social ills inherited from colonialism. The young states have achieved definite progress in combating those ills. Their social infrastructure has improved, many of the countries have improved public education, and illiteracy among the adult population is being combated, the medical care system has been established and is developing, life expectancy has increased, and child mortality has decreased. Yet complete solution is still hard to achieve. Even in the countries of non-capitalist development, where primary attention is given to the social sphere, little progress have been achieved so far. At the Second Congress of the Popular Revolution Party of Benin, held in 1985, it was stated, for instance, that the task set in the Statement on the Party's General Line—to provide clothing, sufficient food and education for the country's population and to combat serious diseases—had not been accomplished.

The speeded-up fulfilment of social programmes, which were inadequately planned and poorly-grounded, caused grave social setbacks in many countries. In some of the countries suffering from the shortage of skilled personnel there is a growing number of people who have secondary and higher education but cannot find a job. But the main thing is that the increased spending on social needs has caused a notable reduction of state input in production. In Africa, where local private capital is weak, the state remains the main investor.

It is the urban population that stands to gain in the first place from state social programmes. As a result, ever more people are concentrated in city centres. The exodus of the rural population into the cities has brought about a host of very serious social problems. As African cities cannot provide jobs and housing for the people moving in from the rural area, the number of the unemployed and lumpen proletarians is increasing. These sections of the urban population are the source of constant rumblings and discontent. This creates an explosive situation, adding to the threat of political instability.

The exodus into the cities of the most able-bodied part of the economically-active rural population aggravates the economic situation, and agricultural production is therefore on the decline in a number of countries. According to data obtained by the ECA, by extrapolating the current trends, the grain deficiency in Africa will amount to about 40 million tons by the year 2000.³ Despite the strenuous efforts exerted by African states, their economic growth rate is relatively low, and in the 1980s the economic performance of a number of countries notably worsened. In some of them there was a zero or even negative growth. Under conditions of the continuing rapid population growth in Africa, this often has catastrophic consequences. The average population growth in Africa is 2.9 per cent, which is the highest rate in the world. In some countries the growth rate is even higher. In Kenya, for instance, it has reached the natural maximum level of 4 per cent a year.

If this growth continues at such a rate, the African population will double within 25 years. By the end of this century the continent's popu-

lation will exceed 800 million. But it has been estimated that to ensure sustenance of new generations, the population growth by one per cent should be accompanied by a 4-per cent annual increase of the national income. Practically no African country has achieved this level of the average annual growth of its national income. As a result, the population increase not only "devours" the entire economic growth, but also causes a decline in the living standard of the population.

The efforts exerted by the young states to intensify production are hampered by insufficient technical facilities, funds and skilled personnel, and by the general worsening of the market situation in the capitalist world. The efforts made by the states to regulate the demographic processes have so far been ineffective. In addition, one has to take into account the fact that African families are traditionally large, and it is not easy to change this age-old custom.

The plans and programmes of economic and social advance devised by the state are financed to a great extent by external sources. This causes two negative phenomena. The planned revenues from abroad (they often account for up to two-thirds of planned capital investment) are, as a rule, higher than the actual ones, which inevitably obstructs the implementation of relevant programmes. The foreign debt of African states is rising inexorably, and was estimated at \$170 billion at the start of 1987. Many countries spend all their export revenues on repaying the debts and interest on them. The debts are not only a financial problem but also an acute political one.

The efforts taken by some African countries to rationalise the state machinery and make it more effective, and sharply reduce the spending on its maintenance come up against great social and political difficulties. The attempts to find a purely technocratic solution to financial and economic problems in keeping with IMF recommendations have brought about grave social and political complications in a number of countries. The search for a way out at the expense of the working people and to the detriment of their interests was followed by violent disturbances and even bloodshed in Morocco, Tunisia, Liberia, Zambia and some other countries. Under these conditions persistent attempts are made to revise on the scientific and theoretical, as well as on the political and practical levels the general theory of development and to determine the main elements of a state organisation capable of ensuring the progress of society.

In bourgeois political science the pessimistic assessments of the past years and the gloomy outlook for the future of young African states obviously prevail. US author T. Molnar writes that most countries in the Third World cannot be regarded as states, political regimes or nations. They are, he alleges, superstructures used for draping the vague conglomeration of tribes, clans, religious communes and heterogeneous families linked with each other superficially, and some of them do not even have a common language.⁴ R. Clark, a more liberal-minded American political scientist, arrives at about the same conclusion, believing that the development of the newly free countries proceeds along a close circle leading nowhere, and the absence of required resources, means, structures and personnel guarantees complete failure.⁵

Symptomatic also is the cardinal change taking place in general theory. In keeping with the concept of political modernisation, the acceptance of modern political organisation, personified in the bourgeois state, was viewed as a necessary condition of social progress. After the

failure of the "Westernisation" policy, political modernisation is regarded not as a condition, but as a function of development. "It really doesn't matter what form the government of a particular country takes," allege American political scientists E. Stockwel and K. Laidlow, "as long as it sees its major role as furthering the well-being of the nation and its people, and performs its role accordingly."⁶ In other words, any regime, even if it is dictatorial or despotic, is good so long as it ensures development in the capitalist direction, because economic growth and well-being, according to these experts, go hand-in-hand with private enterprise. It is namely this postulate, says US political scientist J. Sanders, that has been adopted by the present US administration, which it supplemented by the pledge to support any regime opposing the Soviet Union.⁷

In the 1980s, a "new approach" to analysing the results of the state-legal development of African countries and possible prospects for their political evolution gained considerable currency in bourgeois literature on the state. In the opinion of its advocates, both the Western "liberal" and the Soviet "communist" models of statehood equally failed in Africa. Therefore the conclusion is made that there should be special statehood, different from the existing models and adapted only to the needs of the Third World. The concept of such statehood differs also from the well-known theory of the "third way". The point is that the new concept does not call into question the capitalist way of development. It is designed to prove that it is not the bourgeois-liberal institutions that are no good, but that there is no social environment required for their continued existence. The main conclusion, on the surface of it, sounds objective and neutral: the African state should suit the existing social conditions and structures. Quite often this conclusion is backed up by references to the expansion of traditional structures and even to their idealisation.⁸ Such concept has also been accepted by African authors, some of them being from the socialist-oriented countries.⁹

The fallacy of the initial premises of the above concept is that its authors are trying, under the guise of objectivity, to give a negative assessment of both "Western" and "Eastern" experience in Africa. And that is distortion of facts. As regards the main principles of state organisation imposed on African countries by the former colonial powers, these principles have failed all right. This is a generally recognised fact. But no honest and objective analyst will ever be able to cite a single instance of a "Soviet model" of statehood being imposed on African peoples. No doubt, the progressive forces in Africa draw upon the experience of state development in the USSR. But the positive experience of social development is the common possession of all mankind, and its creative application has nothing to do with any model being imposed.

Comparing and analysing the practical experience of state development in the countries of different world systems, African scholars often arrive at a conclusion which is by no means in favour of bourgeois democracy. "The empirical evidence we have," writes Professor E. O. Awa of Nigeria, "shows that political advance along the lines of capitalist democracy leads not to political development but to political growth, while advance along the lines of socialist democracy leads for all practical purposes to political development."¹⁰

No state, of course, functions in a vacuum, outside of a definite social environment. But it is likewise obvious that this relationship is complex and dialectical. Attempts to build a modern state relying on archaic traditional structures are always fraught with the preservation or establishment of conservative forms of power, to be followed by a slow-down or even regression in social development. Also the projects

for reorganising state structures suggested by some African researchers can hardly help overcome traditionalism.

In a quite interesting essay on the post-colonial African state G. Pambou-Tchivounda, an author from Gabon,¹¹ suggests a cardinal solution—rejection of unitarism and establishment of an ethnoregional federation. Proceeding from the fact that African countries are multi-ethnic, he proposes that each of the main ethnic groups be given autonomy and that its interests be necessarily represented in the higher state bodies. The post of the head of state would in this case be occupied in turn by representatives of each ethnic group within a strictly fixed term. In the author's opinion, this would help build an effective mechanism for resolving conflicts, harmonising interests and ensuring stability and national integration. But one thing is not clear here—in what way will the autonomisation of tribes and ethnic groups ensure their integration within the existing state borders?

The choice of the ways and methods for organising and exercising power is the inalienable sovereign right of every people. The establishment of concrete state-legal forms, institutions and mechanisms depends on a multitude of factors and has its own specifics in each country. But without the interested and creative daily participation of the broad popular masses in the activities of the state it can degenerate into an instrument for protecting the interests of narrow elitist groups isolated from the people, an instrument used to trample on the will of the people, to repress and coerce. Regrettably, there have been quite a few instances of this in the history of many African countries. This is why the progressive forces of the countries on that continent ever more clearly associate the possibility of social progress with building a democratic national and people's state capable of expressing and defending the interests of the working people.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1965, pp. 474-475.

² The legal aspects of this problem have been analysed in greater detail in P.-F. Gonidec, *L'Etat africain*, Paris, 1985.

³ According to the ECA's estimates, the African countries will be able to meet only 60 per cent of their food demand by the year 2000 [*Alternative Futures for Africa*, Boulder (Colorado), 1982, p. 292].

⁴ T. Molnar, *Tiers Monde. Idéologie. Réalité*, Paris, 1982, p. 92.

⁵ G. Berlich, R. Clark, D. Wood, *Comparing Political Systems: Power and Policy in Three Worlds*, New York, 1978, p. 446, 452.

⁶ E. Stockwel, K. Laidlow, *Third World Development: Problems and Prospects*, Chicago, 1981, p. 263.

⁷ J. Sanders, *Empire at Bay: Containment Strategies and American Politics at the Crossroad*, New York, 1983, pp. 21-24.

⁸ *Dynamiques et finalités des droits africains*, Paris, 1980, p. 472.

⁹ M. Dahani, *L'Occidentalisation des pays du Tiers Monde. Mythes et réalité*, Paris, 1983.

¹⁰ *Political Science in Africa: A Critical Review*, London, 1983, p. 31.

¹¹ G. Pambou-Tchivounda, *Essai sur l'Etat africain postcolonial*, Paris, 1982.

AUSTRALIA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

Fyodor YEVGENYEV

Experts in international affairs pay special attention to Asian and Pacific countries due to the growing role of this region in world politics and economy in recent years. In the South Pacific it is clearly Australia that sets the tone by virtue of its geostrategic position and its economic, military and foreign policy potential.

Australia today is a highly developed industrial-agrarian country, one of the ten leading capitalist powers. Until recently, its economic growth rate was one of the highest among industrial nations. Australia has rich supplies of natural resources; it holds first place in world exports of iron ore, coal, alumina, lead, wool and meat and is one of the largest exporters of nickel, zinc, sugar, salt and wheat. Its proven uranium reserves equal one-third of those of the capitalist world. With a population accounting for a scant 0.32 per cent of the world's, the country contains 5.5 per cent of the globe's natural resources.¹ Speaking of their riches, Australians rightly call their country fortunate.

A mere decade ago, Australia could by no means be classed as a scientifically and technologically advanced state. But at present it manufactures computers meeting world standards and makes ample use of automation, solar energy and biotechnology. Needless to say, the level of its agricultural production is as high as ever. Australia has attained the greatest efficiency in the world in merino sheep-breeding. It has a well-organised system of arable farming and irrigation and produces large quantities of rice, cotton and sugar cane. With 10 sheep per inhabitant, Australia holds a world record.

Paradoxically, however, the important place which mining and farming hold in the Australian economy, especially exports, is also the reason for the extent of the economic difficulties that the country has encountered of late. An unfavourable world market of raw materials and farm produce has badly affected Australia's trading and financial positions. Funding the development of these branches mainly out of foreign loans pushed up the external debt in 1986 to 101.37 billion dollars, or ten times as much as in 1980. According to official statistics, Australia is compelled to spend nearly 28 per cent of its export earnings on debt repayment.

The situation was made worse by a marked exacerbation of competition on the world market between the United States, EEC countries and Australia. As a consequence, the country's balance of trade deficit in 1986 increased by 250 per cent, reaching 3.4 billion dollars.² The exchange rate of the Australian dollar fell accordingly—by more than one quarter in a year, to be specific—and the inflation rate went up. Steps taken by the government to curb inflation led to higher credit rates and economic stagnation. In mid-1986, economic growth came to a virtual standstill, slightly exceeding one per cent over the year. Unemployment was still high and amounted to 8.3 per cent of the workforce.³ It was worst among youth, with nearly one quarter of school-leavers unable to find a job.

Australia's current economic troubles are due in measure to the Conservative government's policy of encouraging the growth of the mining

industry (50 per cent of which is owned by foreign, chiefly US, capital) and agricultural production, to the obvious detriment of manufacturing and machine-building. Indeed, finished products account for a mere 19 per cent of all exports. In other words, the euphoria brought about by the "resource boom" of the early 1980s against the background of a worldwide decline in this field gave way in Australia to a foreign trade crisis, with all ensuing unfavourable consequences for its economy and living standards.

Besides, Australia found itself involved in the "economic battle" which the United States, Japan and the EEC countries are fighting among themselves on the grain and animal product market. Australian Prime Minister Robert Hawke has characterised the situation as follows: "Agricultural war between the United States and Europe is waged mainly at the expense of Australia farmers." In 1986, Australia lost over six billion dollars, being forced out of traditional world markets of minerals and farm produce.

The Labour government, which took over in 1983, expects to remedy the nation's economic situation by pursuing an austerity policy, by cutting government expenditures, primarily in education, health and other social needs, while at the same time curbing pay rises. Announcing the intention to reduce relevant appropriations by 700 million dollars, Hawke called on his fellow-Australians to "come to terms with the lowering of living standards and constant increase of the level of efforts". This policy of massive government attack on the people's vital interests is welcomed by employers, who urge the government to keep it up, but it is meeting mounting resistance from the trade unions. There has been an increase in strikes, and the government's popularity showed a downward trend. It is only fair to say, however, that the Liberal and National parties forming the opposition offer no positive alternative; they call for even greater austerity measures and cuts in social spending.

The Conservatives were weakened still further by a split in the years-long coalition of Liberal and National parties. Nor is there any unity within these parties, whose upper echelons struggle for party leadership.

The Labour Party skilfully took advantage of the discord among its political adversaries. In July 1987, it won the early parliamentary election. What helped it win was undoubtedly the fact that by then Australia's economic situation has somewhat improved, and the government has adopted a number of financial measures.

Now it is not only economic problems that the Australian public is concerned about. There are growing fears and dissatisfaction due to the hitching of Australia to the United States in the military sphere. Australia is affiliated to ANZUS, a military political alliance headed by the United States, and is cooperating with that country militarily both within the alliance and on a bilateral basis; what is more, this cooperation has expanded considerably in recent years. Even while the Conservatives were in charge, Australia committed itself to purchase 172 US F-18A fighter-bombers worth 2.5 billion dollars.⁴ Units of the Australian Navy participate regularly in diverse naval exercises in conjunction with US, British and Japanese ships.

US nuclear-armed ships call more and more often at Australian ports to refuel and to give their crews a rest. Australian peace fighters report that from 1980 to 1985, the country's ports were visited by 370 US ships 80 per cent of which were equipped with nuclear arms. There are about 40 US military communication centres on Australian territory,

including the important Pine Gap military space communication and electronic reconnaissance center, the major North-West Cape radio communication base and the Nurrungar ground-based satellite communication station. They are all of strategic importance to the United States.

With many Australians condemning the present US administration's policy of aggression on the international scene, the fear that Australia might be dragged into a nuclear conflict helped step up the anti-war movement and hold mass peace actions. These included traditional springtime peace marches in major cities, powerful demonstrations against the US military bases and the entry of US warships into Australian ports; also there were public actions demanding an end to US and French nuclear blasts.

Australia's peace fighters take a stand against military cooperation with the United States and criticise Washington's rejection of real disarmament measures and its bid to militarise the Pacific and Indian oceans and turn them into a zone of military political confrontation. Operating in the country are numerous anti-war organisations and parties, such as the Nuclear Disarmament Party, Party for Nuclear-Free Australia, Australian Peace Committee, Campaign for International Cooperation and Disarmament, People for Nuclear Disarmament, Scientists Against Nuclear Arms, Medical Association for the Prevention of War. Lately the Australian Democrats Party has pledged itself to actively combat the nuclear danger.

Anti-war, anti-nuclear sentiments are also on the rise in the Australian trade union movement and local government bodies. Congresses of the Australian Council of Trade Unions, the biggest association of working people, have repeatedly passed resolutions demanding an end to the nuclear arms race, the abolition of all nuclear weapons, an end to nuclear testing, a ban on chemical weapons, and so on. The unions of building workers and seamen devised an expressive form of action against the war menace: 200 building sites in Sydney were declared "peace projects", and similarly, 70 Australian merchant ships became "peace ships". Over half of all Australians live in cities and districts declared nuclear-free zones by their municipalities.⁵

The ranks of Australia's peace supporters are growing. But the anti-war movement is still weakened by disunity, a shortage of funds and lack of access to the media. Imperialist agents are out to sell the Australian anti-war movement the idea that the Soviet Union and the United States are "equally responsible" for the continuing nuclear arms race. They are busy spreading preposterous lies about alleged persecutions of "fighters for peace and confidence" in the Soviet Union.

The Labour leadership cannot but lend an ear to the demands of the growing movement against nuclear weapons, including demands made within the party itself. Unlike the conservative parties, which label peace fighters as "Moscow's agents", the Labour Party recognises the legitimacy of public concern over the danger of nuclear war. Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs William Hayden addresses participants in peace marches every year, assuring them that the government "will do everything in their power to secure peace and disarmament". Demonstrations in Canberra, Sydney, Melbourne and other cities involve members of the Federal government, the Labour governments of individual states, leaders of the Labour and Democrats parties, public figures, trade unionists, MPs, people active in culture.

Growing anti-war sentiments and public actions demanding a more independent foreign policy, one in keeping with Australia's genuine national interests, influence the position of the Labour government on a number of topical international issues.

While pursuing a policy intended to support the military-political alliance with the United States and remaining that country's chief ally in the South Pacific, the Hawke government considers it necessary, nonetheless, to distance itself from the more objectionable aspects of the present US administration's foreign policy, above all in the policy that concerns measures to curb the nuclear arms race, bring about disarmament and remove the nuclear war menace.

In spite of the pressure put on it, Australia refuses explicitly to join in the US SDI programme, rightly considering that this programme, if put into effect, would destabilise the strategic situation in the world and heighten the danger of nuclear conflict. The Australian delegation to the 40th Session of the UN General Assembly backed the resolution for the prevention of an arms race in space drafted on the basis of a document submitted by non-aligned countries. Australia took a negative view of US violations of the SALT-2 Treaty. Speaking in parliament, Prime Minister Hawke reaffirmed Australia's support for the treaty and voiced deep concern at the USA's intention to exceed the level of nuclear delivery vehicles established by the treaty. It is in line with this policy that the Australian government has decided to bar the use of Australian territorial waters in the Pacific for testing the strategic MX missile.

At various international forums Australia comes out for the early conclusion of an agreement ending nuclear weapons tests. Minister for Foreign Affairs Hayden has on more than one occasion spoken approvingly of the Soviet position on the issue, in particular the Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions. For its part, Australia promotes the idea of establishing a global system of control over the observance of a ban on nuclear testing.

Australia responded favourably to the Soviet-US summit in Reykjavik. William Hayden described the work done at the summit in the interest of nuclear disarmament as "breath-taking" and as the biggest world political achievement of recent time. Australians regretted the summit's failure to reach an "historic accord", and called for a continued Soviet-US dialogue on the principles agreed by them. Canberra welcomed the prospects for eliminating medium-range missiles in Asia and arriving at the double global zero conception, brought about by the new Soviet initiative.

Anti-nuclear trends in Australian foreign policy found expression in that country advancing—along with others—the concept of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific; the idea took legal form as the Rarotonga Treaty, which came into force in December 1986. The treaty stipulates that the signatories shall renounce the manufacture, acquisition and deployment of any nuclear explosive devices on their territory, and bans all nuclear tests as well as the dumping of radioactive wastes and other radioactive substances in the area covered by the treaty. The Soviet Union was the first nuclear power to sign Protocols 2 and 3 of the Rarotonga Treaty, which contain a commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against parties to the treaty nor to test any nuclear devices in the treaty area.

By contrast, the United States, Britain and France show no intention of signing the treaty protocols on establishing a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific. Although the treaty does not prevent the United States from continuing military activity in the region, including nuclear activity, Washington plainly fears that enforcement of the treaty would foster anti-nuclear sentiments in the Asia and Pacific region and serve as a catalyst of demands for the establishment of similar zones in other parts of the globe to the detriment of US military strategic ambitions.

The US decision caused a wave of indignation in Australia. Minister for Foreign Affairs Hayden, who was careful to use diplomatic language, could not help expressing "deep regret" at the US refusal "to take into account peaceful aspirations of the peoples of the South Pacific" and to follow the Soviet example by signing the Rarotonga Treaty.

The Australians' "anti-nuclear syndrome", coupled with their actions for the decolonisation of French New Caledonia, annoys France, which late in 1986 retaliated by suspending political contacts with Australia at the ministerial level. Furthermore, it declared the Australian Consul-General in Nouméa, the New Caledonian capital, *persona non grata*.

On the other hand, Australia takes its cue from the United States, virtually joining it in sabotaging the UN General Assembly decision to turn the Indian Ocean into a peace zone. At meetings of the UN special committee on this issue, the Australian delegate generally identifies himself with the Americans' obstructionist stance.

Ever since the Labour Party came to power, Australia has been giving increased attention to the adjoining region, promoting relations with its neighbours and main trading partners: the ASEAN countries, Japan and China. Expressing the sentiments of Australian business, R. Carnegie, head of CRA, a major mining company, said that the country's business quarters were drawn to the fast-growing markets of Southeast Asia. "It is there that our future lies,"⁶ he said.

Whereas the ASEAN nations are more or less traditional international partners of Australia, with whom it maintains extensive ties in various spheres, such ties with China are a relatively new phenomenon. Australian-Chinese relations have become more active in recent years. In 1984 alone, the two countries signed four major intergovernmental agreements on cooperation in agriculture, ferrous metallurgy, civil aviation and other fields. Summits now take place on a regular basis. Prime Minister Hawke visited China in 1984 and 1986; in 1985, the General Secretary of the CPC CC paid an official visit to Australia. Exchanges in culture, sports and other fields have expanded considerably. Trade turnover between the two countries reached a record high (nearly 1.5 billion dollars) in 1985, exports from Australia to China increased 74 per cent in the course of a year. Reciprocal trade is planned to amount to four or five billion dollars by the year 2000.

Relations with Japan, one of Australia's main trading partners, are gaining in importance. Japan accounts for 28 per cent of Australia's exports (mostly minerals and farm produce) and for 24 per cent of its imports (machinery and equipment).⁷ Australians are deeply worried about the obvious prospect of decreased purchases by Japan, which tends to switch increasingly to the United States. Washington insists on Tokyo taking effective steps to reduce the imbalance in reciprocal trade by greatly increasing imports from the United States.

Canberra is also watching with concern the strengthening of Japan's economic and military positions in the region even though it is careful for understandable reasons not to publicise its apprehensions. Expressing these, *The Canberra Times* on January 10, 1987, wrote that "many in Australia are worried by the widely publicized intention of Japan to play a more active role in the South Pacific ... what it was unable to achieve in 1945 by military force, Japan is now getting by concealed economic methods".

During his tour of Oceania, the former Japanese Foreign Minister Tadashi Kuranari readily promised various handouts to developing

countries of the region. He accompanied his promises with calls for effort to block "Soviet penetration" in the South Pacific and grossly distorted Soviet policy towards newly free insular states. This prompted Australian Prime Minister Hawke to publicly declare that "Australia is not at all nervous" over Soviet activity in the region.

It must have been no accident that Australia, like the ASEAN countries, responded guardedly to the plan for a Pacific Community promoted by Washington and Tokyo. Those behind the plan visualised it as a closed regional alignment to be transformed afterwards into a further military bloc. This is why Canberra pointedly stressed its stake in the economic and cultural aspects of Pacific co-operation and took a stand in favour of the Soviet Union joining in it.

Australia does much to build up relations with New Zealand and the insular states of Oceania, which belong together with it to the South Pacific Forum, the leading political and economic organisation of the region. With regard to the young developing countries of the South Pacific, Australia is trying to play the role of "senior partner" pressing out Britain and France. In fact, its economic and political influence there is probably dominant now. "We are the superpower of the South-West Pacific,"⁸ said Paul Dibb, a leading Australian international relations analyst. This comment is indicative of the concern which Japan's stepped-up activity in insular states of Oceania causes in Australia.

The Labour government's approach to certain regional problems is likewise distinctive for all that in this case, too, the Australian position is somewhat inconsistent and half-hearted. Fearing an intensification of conflict situations in the adjoining region, Australia has declared its support for a political settlement of the "Kampuchean question", with Minister for Foreign Affairs Hayden even proposing the establishment of an international tribunal to investigate the crimes of the Pol Pot clique. Reflecting a sentiment which has come to prevail in the country, the Labour government has called for more effective international sanctions against South Africa's racist regime, criticised US support for the Nicaraguan contras and taken exception to US attacks on UNESCO.

The Labour government is also compelled to take into consideration the sentiments of the party rank and file, who disapprove of US policy, of maniacally persistent US attempts to make New Zealand go back on its prohibition for US nuclear-armed ships to call at its ports, a prohibition which in June 1987 became a law. With the threatened disintegration of ANZUS as a consequence of the planned "excommunication" of New Zealand, the United States is at pains to make up somehow for its weakened positions in the South Pacific by stepping up military cooperation with Australia. But while Canberra has condemned on Washington's insistence New Zealand's decision regarding US nuclear ships, it refuses to openly back US sanctions against that country.

Favourable changes have occurred in Australian-Soviet relations. Whereas the early 1980s were marked by a deep freeze on contacts and relations with our country in line with the policy of the coalition government under Malcolm Fraser, the accession of the Labour Party to power led to progress in relations with the Soviet Union. What was particularly important was the resumption of the political dialogue. In 1984, Minister for Foreign Affairs Hayden visited our country. Both

sides found the visit useful. It helped decide on ways of promoting bilateral relations, compare the positions of the two countries on pressing international problems and begin a search for closer bilateral ties. In May 1985, Australia was visited by a Soviet parliamentary delegation, which had numerous meetings with spokesmen of the most diverse sections of Australian society. The following year, Australian MPs paid a return visit.

Soviet-Australian trade, scientific and technological relations are making headway. In November 1986, the two governments signed an agreement in Canberra on cooperation in agriculture. An accord was reached on resuming the activity of the Soviet-Australian commission for trade and economic cooperation. Australia has shown its readiness to expand cooperation on both a bilateral and multilateral basis. Cultural relations between the two countries benefit both sides.

A growing number of Australians have become convinced that Washington's persistent allegation about an "increasing Soviet military threat" is a myth from beginning to end, no matter how often it is repeated. Experience shows them that the Soviet Union is a consistent advocate of greater mutual confidence and understanding in relations with their own country and other South Pacific countries, of developing extensive and durable, mutually beneficial cooperation with them.

While striving for lasting peace and security in the region on this basis, the Soviet Union seeks no privileges or special status for itself; it is not out to strengthen its security at others' expense, nor does it want benefits for itself to the detriment of others. This explains why the appeal for peace and cooperation in the Asia and Pacific region that the Soviet Union launched from Vladivostok a year and a half ago met with support among most Australians. Australia's progressives welcomed the important foreign policy proposals made by Mikhail Gorbachev in Vladivostok. The Australian press described the statement as "policy-making", commenting that it was only natural for the Soviet Union to be interested in strengthening peace in the region, joining it to the general process of establishing a comprehensive international security system and contributing to peaceful cooperation there in various fields. Canberra declared that it welcomes the Soviet Union's intention to further trade and economic relations with the countries of the region.

Of course, not everyone in Australia welcomed the Soviet Union's foreign policy proposals. Pro-conservative quarters continue harping on "Soviet expansionism" and "Moscow's penetration" into the South Pacific, said to be designed to set up military bases there. It is safe to say, however, that the Australians' attitude to our country is not really conditioned by this echoing of what is an old US tune.

The official visit which Eduard Shevardnadze, Political Bureau member of the CPSU CC, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, paid to Australia in March 1987 was a noteworthy indication of the positive trend of Soviet-Australian relations. It was the first visit of its kind in the history of these relations.

Eduard Shevardnadze's meetings with Australian leaders, the talks that took place on a wide range of international and regional problems and problems of bilateral cooperation, and the signing during the visit of an intergovernmental protocol on consultations demonstrated the substantial potentialities of these relations and their indisputably friendly character. It is no exaggeration to say that Soviet-Australian cooperation is developing on the principles of peaceful coexistence, which alone can safeguard the interests of both countries and contribute to world peace and international security.

Australia, which is going to celebrate in 1988 the bicentennial of its statehood, is changing. Its industrial, scientific and technological base is expanding, production is growing and so is the volume of services. Its economy is gradually undergoing the requisite structural changes. Despite foreign economic difficulties, Australia holds solid positions on many world markets. Its economic potential is large enough but realisation of this potential is influenced by many factors some of which do not depend on the Australians themselves. Adverse indicators include the high level of US and British investment in the country, the continuing dependence of the Australian economy on exports and membership of the West's military political blocs, which visibly restrict the room for manoeuvre on the international scene.

Be that as it may, the experience of recent years has shown that manifestations of independence in approaching international affairs add to the country's prestige and influence in the world. In 1985, Australia was elected a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. Australian delegates play a notable role in various UN agencies, including the Geneva Disarmament Conference. Australia's championing of the idea of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific has unquestionably helped strengthen the country's standing in a region which is so important to it. Many Australians consider that this trend in both the economy and foreign policy meets the real national interests of their country.

¹ *The New York Times Magazine*, Sept. 29, 1985.

² *Newsweek*, June 30, 1986, p. 40.

³ *The Canberra Times*, Dec. 29, 1986; *The Economist*, March 7, 1987, p. 58.

⁴ *The Bulletin*, Apr. 8, 1986.

⁵ *Pravda*, Apr. 21, 1986.

⁶ *The New York Times Magazine*, Sept. 29, 1985.

⁷ *The Age*, Jan. 7, 1987.

⁸ *The New York Times Magazine*, Sept. 29, 1985.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE CPSU AND THE NEW POLITICAL THINKING OF THE NUCLEAR AGE

THE STRATEGY OF ACCELERATION AND THE HISTORICAL DESTINY OF SOCIALISM

Yevgeni SHASHKOV

In 1987, all progressive humanity marked the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Seven decades have passed since Lenin's party accomplished a victorious socialist revolution, since it set out to struggle for socialism, freedom, equality, social justice and social progress, against oppression, national one included, exploitation and poverty. For the first time in world history, the working people and their interests and needs were placed at the centre of state policy.

The Soviet Union has made truly historic economic, social, political and cultural progress. Our people, led by the Communist Party, built a socialist society, defeated fascism in the Great Patriotic War, rehabilitated and consolidated the economy and transformed the country into a mighty power. After World War II, the process of social renewal of the planet begun by the October Revolution was highlighted by the overthrow of exploiter regimes in a number of countries in Europe and Asia and then America. Socialism went beyond the limits of one country to become a world system.

The new stage of history saw a radical change in the balance of forces in favour of the peoples fighting for social emancipation, democracy, national freedom and peace. Progress today is justly identified with socialism. World socialism is a powerful international formation based on a highly developed economy, solid scientific achievements and a reliable military-political potential. It encompasses over one-third of humanity and more than a dozen countries and peoples striving for the full application of the intellectual and moral potential of man and society. The progress of the socialist countries and the activity of their collective entities, such as the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, show that socialism is a great internationalist force, an important factor for peace and social progress, a dependable guarantee of international security.

Our achievements are immense and indisputable. The working people of the socialist countries have good reason to be proud of their successes. But Communists should see life in all its complexity, and hence all contradictions in the development of society, their own mistakes and failures, whatever the achievements.

Lenin held that the best way to celebrate the anniversary of a great revolution was to concentrate attention on its unsolved problems. Taking this approach and paying tribute to the pioneers of the revolution, we now ask ourselves: What induced the 27th CPSU Congress to work out a strategy of acceleration? How does perestroika fit into the history of socialism?

Socialism as seen against the background of world civilisation is a young society that has yet to display its full potential. There is much that we do not know about it even today. In Marx' and Engels' lifetime, only the main direction of society's advance to socialism could be indicated. This was based on conclusions drawn from the contradictions of capitalism. The October Revolution called for the translation of theory into practice, to be effected in conditions largely differing from those predicted by the founders of scientific communism. The programme existing at the time contained but the most general, the most abstract concepts of building a new society. "We cannot give a description of socialism," Lenin told the Seventh Congress of the RCP(B) in 1918, "what socialism will be like when its completed forms are arrived at—this we do not know, we cannot tell."¹

The methodology of Lenin's approach to this problem necessitated an investigation of the concrete historical situation, a search for forms of socialist construction adequate to it, debates on the decisions to be made and bold, occasionally quite extensive transformations on the basis of the experience gained. All this allowed vast scope for the people's initiative, experimentation and history-making. On the other hand, it made both the practice and the theory of socialist construction more dependent on diverse chance factors, on the operation of forces and circumstances of a concrete historical nature, something which eventually could have a negative effect on the formation of the new system. Foreseeing this, Lenin noted that we would be called upon more than once to complete much in our system or even to do it anew. In principle the renewal of forms of social relations and their being brought into accord with the development level of the productive forces under socialism should proceed continuously, by improving one or another aspect of these relations.

Regrettably, this factor for the historical determinacy of a particular road to socialism, of a particular form of socialist economic management, was not taken into proper account. In other words the dialectic of the development of the socialist world, which must be mastered in order to build a new society, did not find full reflection in practice. What is more, adherence to a particular form of economic management was occasionally seen as loyalty to the ideals and principles of socialism, of Marxism-Leninism, which is characterised—more than any other scientific doctrine—by a creative spirit and dialectical assessment of reality. This misinterpretation of concepts was bound to result in absolutising the form to the detriment of the substance of the socialist system.

Our Party's keen awareness of its responsibility for the destiny of the people and of socialism led it to the conclusion that perestroika was needed, for an improvement of the obsolete economic mechanism and for an acceleration of the country's social and economic development.

The April 1985 Plenum of the CPSU CC represented a turning point for our Party and country, for it ushered in a fundamentally new stage in socialist development, one aimed at advancing Soviet society to a qualitatively new state. It provided opportunities for solving the key problems of social reorganisation, of socialist progress in the main areas of life.

The 27th CPSU Congress finalised the course set by the April Plenary Meeting. It evolved a comprehensive programme for the country's deep-going social and economic transformations, a programme of fundamental importance for the Party and the people. In terms of theory the strategy of acceleration is based on the idea of returning to the truly Marxist conception of the operation of the laws governing social development. It consists in steadfastly cognising what has been accomplished and removing what holds back the development of socialism, what is a result of difficult objective circumstances or gross subjective mistakes,

inadequate theoretical knowledge or inadvertent errors, an inability or unwillingness to rectify them in time, to see the realities of life in all their complexity and contradictoriness and base policy on a scientific assessment of them.

Acceleration is something more than a way of quickening the pace of economic, scientific and technological growth. It is also a quest for effective ways and means that in the foreseeable future should make socialist society the embodiment of all that is humane in world social progress, a model of social efficiency and spiritual richness. According to the platform of the 27th CPSU Congress, to accelerate social and economic development means to open up new potentialities of socialism through the new opportunities offered to people.

The records of the CPSU CC Plenary Meetings held in 1987 and Mikhail Gorbachev's speech to the meeting dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution are aimed at translating the ideological and theoretical platform of perestroika into practice, thereby furthering the process of revolutionary transformation.

The primary purpose of perestroika is to end stagnation, defeat the mechanism halting progress, and set up a dependable and efficient mechanism for accelerating the social and economic advance of Soviet society. The principal idea is to combine achievements of the scientific and technological revolution with a planned economy and set socialism's whole potential in motion.

Important aspects of perestroika are reliance on the people's effort, ever-growing democracy, socialist self-government, the encouragement of initiative, stronger discipline, better organisation, greater openness, criticism and self-criticism in every sphere of society. The January Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee made socialist democracy the centrepiece of perestroika as a prerequisite for steady development. This implies that socialism is to be perfected for the people by the people themselves, and that it is necessary to end in a revolutionary manner a situation in which some used to state their will while others meekly submitted to it. It is impermissible under socialism to keep people out of decision-making on affairs of state and society.

Perestroika is directed towards steadily increasing the role of intensive factors in Soviet economic development, reviving and furthering the Leninist principles of democratic centralism in economic management, introducing economic management methods everywhere, renouncing injunction and administrative fiat, ensuring the adoption by every economic echelon of the principles of economic calculus and new forms of organising labour and production, encouraging innovation and socialist enterprise. It constitutes a radical change in favour of science, of businesslike partnership between science and practice as a means of achieving the highest end results.

Lastly, perestroika is aimed at ridding society of distortions of socialist morality and at consistently applying the principles of social justice. It connotes unity of words and deeds, of rights and duties, the exaltation of conscientious, highwork standards, an end to egalitarian trends in remuneration and to consumerism.

The ultimate goal of perestroika is to thoroughly renew every sphere of life, provide socialism with the most up-to-date forms of social organisation and fully bring the humanist character of our system to bear on all its decisive aspects: economic, social, political and moral.

However, perestroika does not imply rejection of the past. It means renouncing a heritage that we neither can nor have a right to take with us into the future, and this not in view of any subjective preferences or dislikes but because certain roadblocks could check our advance or stop it altogether. We are taking with us all that can really contribute to so-

It is realised in the fraternal countries that they will yet come up against complicated problems and will have to show staying power and boldness but that this work must be done in order to purify, renew and strengthen socialism and pave the way for the attainment of a qualitatively different level allowing the advantages of the new system to fully prove their worth.

The 27th CPSU Congress showed that the party is taking up the challenge, that it is prepared to face up to realities, to approach problems in a new manner, open the road to the future and eliminate all that has prevented the solution of internal and international problems. Our response to the challenge was translated into the strategy of acceleration and the policy of perestroika. As is noted in Mikhail Gorbachev's book *Perestroika and New Way of Thinking for Our Country and the Whole World*, "By embarking on the path of perestroika we proceed from the assumption that perestroika, being an undertaking of the Soviet people and called upon to lead our society to qualitatively new frontiers, contributes and will continue to contribute to the strengthening of socialism as a whole."³

Numerous facts show that already perestroika in the Soviet Union is having an increasing effect on the situation in the fraternal countries and is becoming a powerful incentive to positive processes and changes there, even in socialist countries where reform processes began earlier than in the Soviet Union. This is confirmed by, among other things, the latest CC Plenary Meetings of the ruling parties and sessions of the supreme organs of people's power of socialist countries. They concentrated on measures to improve and restructure the economic mechanism, bring out reserves and make better use of resources. All these forums generally showed a more exacting approach to problems than before, firmness of principle, a critical attitude to the prevailing state of affairs and concern for fuller utilisation of socialism's creative potentialities.

"Speaking of today's realities," says a relevant document of the July 1987 Plenary Meeting of the BCP CC, "we mean the new stage which the socialist countries, primarily those of the socialist community, are entering." The socialist countries have embarked on dynamic, intensive development on the basis of scientific and technological progress, of the utilisation of their advantages in the economic sphere as well as in public life, in the spiritual sphere. The decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the January and June Plenary Meetings of the CPSU CC are of historic significance for the Soviet Union and for the fraternal countries generally, including Bulgaria. "The task facing us," the document mentioned above goes on to say, "is not only to remove existing shortcomings. We must also evolve a new model of our socialist society in order to implement the party's strategy for qualitatively new growth."⁴

Bulgaria has already introduced the principle of electing economic executives of low and medium rank, a new labour code and new regulations on cooperatives and on collective and individual enterprise. It is reorganising banking and setting up economic associations of a new type. These and other measures are creating the prerequisites for a changeover from mostly administrative to economic methods of management, from governing society on behalf of the people to people's self-government.

A government programme for the second stage of the economic reform and problems of a radical reorganisation of both the economy and the highest (central) government bodies were discussed in October 1987 at the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the PUWP CC and a regular session of the Polish Sejm. The restructuring is to begin with changes in the functions and structures of the central bodies of state power. The changes imply a thorough reshaping of what is known as an administrative sy-

stem suffering from various bureaucratic maladies and rejects self-government and enterprise autonomy. "The second stage of the reform," Zbigniew Messner, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of PRP, said, "may be described—to put it briefly—as developing a model of socialist enterprise. The principle 'All that is not prohibited by law is permitted' is, in effect, the key to creating such a model and to its further development." The situation in which "the enterprise pretends to pay while people pretend to be working"⁵—a phenomenon resulting from bureaucratic barriers—must disappear from the economy.

The reform, the head of the Polish government pointed out, cannot be reduced to the restructuring of economic mechanisms. It was becoming part of the process of socialist renewal and had to be supplemented by changes in political life, the further promotion of democracy and self-government and the reorganisation of state structures. Unless the people themselves became involved in implementing the reform programme the country would be threatened with defeat; which would not affect the government alone, for all Poles would stand to lose.

A process of radical reform is also going on in other socialist countries, such as Czechoslovakia. The economy of that country is stable. In terms of living standards and the supply of food and manufactured goods on the domestic market, the country is second to none of West European countries and moreover exceeds many of them in benefits provided to the population from social consumption funds.

Certain problems of socialist construction, *Rudé právo* noted, were solved "in a distinctive manner and earlier than was done by our socialist allies". Nevertheless, the need to continue improving socialism is felt even in that country. "With due regard to our conditions," said Gustáv Husák, General Secretary of the CPCz CC, President of the CSSR, "we are considering a restructuring of the economic mechanism and other sectors, a deepening of socialist democracy, encouragement of the working people's participation in management and leadership, greater glasnost and control as the main line of our work, as a prerequisite for the further progress of our socialist society."⁶

Perestroika demonstrates its internationalist essence in increasing measure. This is only logical, for renewing socialism and improving socialist society are not a Soviet privilege. These categories are components of the whole of socialism, of its theory and practice. In the socialist world no one is imposing perestroika on anyone else. Each socialist country is perfectly sovereign and only borrows from others what it needs and what contributes to its development. The Soviet Union, the CPSU are not at all intending to urge anybody to imitate us. Each socialist country has its peculiarities, and fraternal parties shape their policy line with due regard to national conditions.

If all national peculiarities in the development of socialism were to be represented in colour the resulting picture would be fairly motley. Nor is this surprising. Lenin considered that an integral socialism could only take shape as the result of a number of attempts each of which was bound to be one-sided and incomplete. An intensive search is underway in the socialist countries for national ways of lending their political, economic and public life greater dynamism.

Hungary, for one, is making a special effort to modernise industrial production and put scientific and technological achievements to use without delay. Vietnam is searching primarily for effective methods of regulating price formation, wages and money circulation. Cuba is engaged in a persevering search for ways of sharply raising the efficiency of economic management. In Mongolia the 19th MPRP Congress and CC Plenary Meeting outlined plans for radically renewing the country's social and economic management mechanism. According to *Unen*, the

MPRP CC newspaper, the chief task today is to ensure that there are real deeds and concrete results in advancing the economy and improving the people's social conditions and living standards.

A reorganisation and restructuring process is on in China aimed at completing the building of socialism. A significant economic reform has been effected in the country. At this stage, the key tasks set by the reform may be listed as reviving the operation of state-owned factories, primarily large and medium ones, by widely applying the principle of responsibility under contract for the results of economic management; forming a single socialist market; abandoning direct administrative methods of control over the operation of enterprises in favour of control exercised mainly by means of economic levers. It is pointed out in China that the economic reform taking place in the country is generally following the same lines as in other socialist countries. A long-range reform of China's political structure is being planned to make the party and the state viable, stamp out red tape, raise the efficiency of the party and government apparatus and encourage greater activity by workers, peasants and intellectuals. The general ideas of the proposed political restructuring were discussed by the 13th CPC Congress (in the autumn of 1987).

With reorganisation and restructuring going on, there comes out the need common to all socialist countries for increasing joint use of the advantages of the internationalisation of economic activities, a process bringing substantial material and other benefits to each country. This was a topic of the meeting which leaders of the fraternal parties of the CMEA countries held in Moscow in November 1987. The meeting may be called the starting point for our common progress in continuing the transformations we began. The fact is that for many years past, relations between CMEA countries were dominated by simple trade turnover, or an extensive type of economic cooperation. Meanwhile it was direct ties between firms, cooperation and the establishment of joint property that became the rule in the world. Our socialist integration lacked this intertwining of interests at the "microeconomic" level. The CMEA was assigned a major task: charting ways to restructure the mechanism of cooperation and socialist economic integration as well as the functioning of the Council itself.

In line with the considerations expressed at the 1986 meeting in Moscow, the 43rd Extraordinary Session held by the CMEA in October 1987 discussed the current reconstruction of the mechanism of multilateral cooperation and socialist economic integration. It approved measures for ensuring that cooperation contributed to the intensification and dynamic, harmonious development of the member countries' economies and helped raise living standards on the basis of scientific and technological progress, effectively use the international socialist division of labour and strengthen the member countries' positions in the world economy.

The final communique adopted by the session contains many constructive ideas. Important now is to implement the decisions made by the session. "Life," said Nikolai Ryzhkov, speaking at a reception in the Kremlin in honour of the participants in the 43rd CMEA Session, "constantly tests us for receptiveness to the new, for our ability to show dynamism, to devise and use the most effective forms of cooperation. To meet this challenge, we need an imaginative party approach to the problem in its large and small aspects alike, in all that has a bearing on the interests of each country in particular and the community as a whole."

Prospects for peace and social progress are now linked more closely than ever with dynamic economic and political development in the world

socialist system. This dynamism is necessitated by concern for the people's welfare, as has been said. However, the socialist world also needs it from the point of view of resisting the war danger.

Now that outdated canons are being discarded, with socialism getting its second wind as it were, socialist society is becoming more dynamic in every respect, including in foreign policy. "Our foreign policy," Mikhail Gorbachev emphasised, "is today to a greater extent than ever before determined by domestic policy, by our interest in concentrating our efforts on constructive activities aimed at improving our country. And that is why we need a lasting peace, predictability and constructiveness in international relations."

Hence it is not accidental but logical that there is not merely a temporary coincidence but an inherent dialectical connection between process of perestroika and the powerful wide-ranging peace offensive which the Soviet Union, together with other socialist countries, has been carrying on in recent years. The reason for this connection is that to accomplish the tasks set in the area of internal development, we also must step up efforts to bring about favourable external conditions for it. Peace is a most important prerequisite for the realisation of our plans. At the same time, it is the paramount prerequisite for all progress today. This applies to both the historical destiny of socialism and the destiny of all humanity.

The report *October and Perestroika: the Revolution Continues* said: "Think, for instance, of the vast potentialities for peaceful coexistence inherent in just the Soviet Union's perestroika."

"By making it possible for us to attain the world level in all major economic indicators, perestroika will enable our vast and wealthy country to become involved in the world division of labour and resources in a way never known before.

"Its great scientific, technological and production potential will become a far more substantial component of world economic relations.

"This will decisively broaden and strengthen the material base of the all-embracing system of peace and international security."

There is every reason to say that external and internal factors for the development and progress of society today interlock so closely that they cannot be considered in isolation from each other. Openness, criticism, democracy, refusal to pretend to infallibility, all of which has had its effect primarily on domestic politics, have also played their part in the actual framing and implementation of the socialist community's international policy line. The April 1985 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU CC and the 27th CPSU Congress formulated the basic principles of a new political assessment of the world and evolved approaches taking maximum account of the objective requirements of international activity; they are entirely consonant with the values of socialism and the interests of progress.

The Soviet foreign policy programme worked out on this basis and backed by other socialist countries was immediately set in motion in the form of a series of concrete initiatives. This includes primarily the programme for a nuclear-free world put forward by the Soviet Union nearly two years ago. Also important were the Geneva and Reykjavik summits; the Delhi Declaration on Principles for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free and Non-Violent World; a set of the initiatives taken by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in favour of achieving disarmament and limiting the arms race in Europe; the treaty on medium- and shorter-range missiles; the Soviet Union's readiness to join in strengthening peace and security in Asia and the Pacific, in every part of the globe; the socialist countries' proposals for a comprehensive system of international security and peace.

The dynamism of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the other fraternal countries adequately reflects the dynamism of the internal development processes that are going on in socialist society and are revolutionary in content. In terms of the destiny of socialism, these processes are, in effect, two aspects of one and the same phenomenon, the renewal of socialism. A dynamic domestic policy combines naturally with an equally-active foreign policy. Both are aimed at raising living standards, at helping strengthen the system of world peace and deliver humanity from the threat of annihilation.

All that is taking place in the socialist world has an impact on capitalist countries and the international revolutionary movement. We can now put it on record that the peace initiatives taken abroad and the radical reforms launched at home in accordance with the policy line worked out by the CPSU have enhanced the prestige of the Soviet Union and made for greater confidence in socialism, thereby improving conditions for the struggle of the Communists of all countries.

In their revolutionary essence, in the Bolshevik boldness of the plans involved and in their humanist social trend, the processes unfolding in the socialist world today are a direct continuation of the transformations begun by the October Revolution. The eyes of the world are now fixed on the Soviet Union and the other fraternal countries; the world is wondering whether socialism will be able to meet the challenge posed to it. When the programme for perestroika has been fulfilled, as we feel certain it will be, socialism as both a system of relations and a way of life will rise to a qualitatively new level. It will really acquire the force of example which great Lenin wrote about.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1965, p. 147.

² *Pravda*, Apr. 11, 1987.

³ M. S. Горбачев, *Перестройка и новое мышление для нашей страны и для всего мира*, Politizdat, 1987, p. 166.

⁴ *Rabotnichesko Delo*, July 30, 1987.

⁵ See *Rzeczpospolita*, Oct. 12, 1987.

⁶ *Rudé právo*, Apr. 10, 1987.

⁷ *Pravda*, Oct. 15, 1987.

Perfecting Diplomatic Practice

Aleksei VORONIN

The 27th Congress of the CPSU outlined the long-term objectives and main guidelines for the USSR's foreign policy and specifically indicated how diplomatic activities should be carried out to meet the new requirements of the present-day international situation. The congress entrusted the Central Committee "to work consistently, systematically and perseveringly to resolve the problems of international security, ensuring that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union strictly adheres to the course of peaceful coexistence, firmly upholds our principles and positions, shows tactical flexibility and a readiness to reach mutually acceptable compromises, and is oriented towards dialogue and mutual understanding".¹ This formula contains an arsenal of well-considered methods, forms and means of the art of diplomacy. Armed with the new ideas of the Communists' highest forum, Soviet diplomacy ever more vigorously continued the persistent struggle for resolving truly historic problems, vital for all nations. Attention was focussed on such global problems as the creation of a comprehensive system of international security, the strengthening of peace, the removal of military means of resolving conflicts from the practice of interstate relations, and the implementation of the programme for eliminating nuclear weapons by the beginning of the 21st century.

The specific new peace initiatives, advanced by the Soviet Union and aimed at the complete elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles, chemical weapons and means for their production, at banning nuclear weapons tests and at reducing armed forces and conventional armaments vividly illustrate the determination to uphold principles and show tactical flexibility which, in effect, are distinguishing features of Soviet diplomacy. All proposals and initiatives of the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries are widely publicised, and international forums and meetings between political and public figures serve to promote them.

The 27th Congress of the CPSU stressed the need to further activate Soviet foreign policy, to search for ways to peacefully settle conflicts on a just basis and remove hotbeds of tension, to promote good-neighbourly and mutually-beneficial relations with all states. In line with these demands, the contacts with socialist, newly free and capitalist countries as well as with the representatives of different political parties, public organisations and movements, have become more extensive. International ties at the level of republican, regional and city party organisations, between the Soviets, and between Soviet and foreign work collectives have become more fruitful.

The times we live in place immense responsibility on the staff of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its missions abroad. The resolution of the January (1987) Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee stresses the importance of restructuring the work of foreign policy departments, bolstering them with experts capable of creatively and consistently carrying out the party's international policy. This principled demand of the party is aimed at improving the style and methods of work of diplomats and of Soviet diplomacy as a whole.

The need for such improvement is dictated by life itself. Today Soviet foreign policy, which is guided by the new political thinking and actively searches for new constructive approaches to solve the existing and arising problems, is tested, according to the January Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee, "for firmness and consistency in the defence of peace, for flexibility and self-possession in conditions of the frenzied arms race fuelled by imperialism and the international tension fanned by it".² Hence higher standards set for Soviet diplomats.

A diplomat is a state official who conducts official relations with other states and who has special qualifications for exercising such duties.³

This definition, though correct, fails to reflect specific features of a Soviet diplomat. Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politbureau and USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, precisely defined a diplomat's role and position in today's world: a Soviet diplomat represents his nation and embodies its conscience, mind and soul; he is not merely a functionary but a person expressing the party's ideas, energy and will; he is a well-rounded intellectual and an exponent of his nation's culture. This definition of the qualities of a diplomat of a socialist state was understood by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs staff both as a demand of the party and the trust of the people which must be lived up to.


The CPSU has launched the struggle for the purity of party members. The standards set for a diplomat who is a party member have become much stricter. Today it is not enough to be an expert on international affairs or to speak foreign languages. Many other things are just as essential. Today's diplomat should be very active and have a keen sense of responsibility, boldly define problems and show how to solve them on the basis of profound scientific political and economic motivation, demonstrate the new political thinking and resolutely overcome yesterday's stereotypes and dogmas. The diplomat-CPSU member should be critical of shortcomings in work and display genuine courage in promoting criticism and self-criticism; should aptly combine firmness and flexibility and display fortitude and restraint under difficult circumstances; should have impeccable morals and personal modesty and respect his or her collective and colleagues.

The most important and urgent political questions of the present-day international situation and the major aspects of Soviet diplomatic activities are comprehensively and thoroughly analysed at the meetings of the Collegium of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs attended by prominent Soviet diplomats, party workers, scholars and representatives of departments concerned. The party committee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs demands of Communists strict compliance with the requirement formulated by Mikhail Gorbachev: the paramount task is to create in every party organisation the kind of atmosphere that totally precludes biased assessments, self-exaltation and window-dressing, and gives freedom to criticism and self-criticism, particularly criticism from below. It is in this atmosphere that we can avoid serious miscalculations in politics and in practical work.⁴

Soon after the party congress in May 1986 a representative conference

of Soviet foreign policy workers was held. For the first time this conference was attended by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. At the conference Mikhail Gorbachev characterised in detail the activities of Soviet diplomacy at this stage and analysed its trends and forms in their organic interconnection with internal tasks—economic, social, political, ideological and moral. The achievements were viewed through the prism of new developments. The experience of Soviet diplomacy received a critical party assessment and measures were outlined for improving its practical work in implementing the strategic course of the 27th CPSU Congress. The meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Politbureau on June 5, 1986 pointed out the great significance of the conference when discussing its results and stressed the need to consistently improve the style and methods of work in ensuring high efficiency of political, commercial, economic, scientific, technological and cultural cooperation between the Soviet Union and other countries.⁶

The January (1987) Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee stated that at present the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is undergoing perestroika; the structure of its central apparatus and missions abroad are being reorganised and the higher echelon staff is being renewed. To replace the purely territorial and often formal and obsolete structures of Ministry of Foreign Affairs departments, a number of new departments and offices have been created in accordance with the main guidelines of foreign policy and requirements of present-day diplomatic activities. Among the new structures are the Department of the Socialist Countries of Europe, the Department of the Socialist Countries of Asia, the Department of Security and Cooperation Affairs in Europe, the Department of the Countries of the Middle East and North Africa, the Department of the Countries of the Pacific and South-East Asia, the Department of Arms Limitation and Disarmament Problems, the Department of Humanitarian and Cultural Relations, the Department of Assessments and Planning, the Department of Soviet Embassy Affairs, the Central Department of Personnel and Educational Establishments.



The main guidelines for the economic and social development of the USSR in the period from 1986 to 1990 and in the period until the year 2000 envisage a significant extension of foreign economic ties which enhances the role of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its missions abroad in coordinating and maintaining such relations. Soviet embassies have always been engaged in such work. But today general supervision on the part of ambassadors is no longer sufficient; now they are responsible for the efficiency of trade, economic, scientific and technical cooperation between the USSR and other countries and for raising its effectiveness. This by no means belittles the importance of work done by trade representations, representatives of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations of the USSR Council of Ministers and other organisations engaged in foreign economic activities.

As of January 1, 1987 a number of ministries and departments, associations and enterprises have enjoyed the right to maintain direct business contacts with their foreign partners and independently trade in foreign markets. There is much to be done in this connection. Our diplomats are facing new tasks as Soviet specialists of different orientations are being increasingly involved in the construction of industrial projects abroad. Preparatory work towards these ends is underway: diplomats are attending courses in economics, finance, planning, legislation and management under new conditions. Engineers, technicians, and workers who

have found themselves in an unaccustomed situation are being given practical help and advice.

Contacts, talks and meetings are very important in diplomatic work. One cannot say that they were ignored previously. On the contrary, there were periods when embassies and departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs kept a precise count of the talks conducted by a particular official and on that basis determined who was active and who was not. However, what really matters is not the number of talks but their quality. Now questions are asked such as, how vast is the range of contacts? Is it confined to people with a progressive outlook? Does it include those with an outlook different from that of the Soviet Union? Is the diplomatic worker in question able to convincingly explain the Soviet side's position on, for example, why a particular international conference should be convened? Is he or she able to obtain from a counterpart useful information for the embassy to better understand the situation in the host country, of its domestic and foreign policy? Such questions should be posed and answered in order to define the nature of contacts and talks with the representatives of official, political, party, parliamentary, business, cultural and religious circles, the media and public organisations.

Diplomats of all ranks without exception can do a lot to maintain business contacts, obtain and process information. Success is guaranteed to those who are well prepared politically and professionally, work intelligently and boldly, are capable of debating issues with tact and dignity and of avoiding edifying tones, regard their counterparts not as enemies but as partners and apply everything that corresponds to the art of diplomacy.

The experience accumulated by Soviet ambassadors during the past decades must be drawn upon for mastering the art of diplomacy. At a meeting with party veterans, Yuri Andropov described the interconnection between times and generations, saying "each generation has to do its share of the common difficult work. And only the experience of communist construction itself is integral and indivisible. And we have no right to lose a single grain of value from this experience".⁶ This statement can rightfully be applied to diplomacy.

Much has already been done to study and spread the positive experience of Soviet diplomacy. New publications have seen the light: *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki* (Foreign Policy Documents) in 21 volumes, (1917-1938), collected documents of conferences held in Moscow, Tehran, Dumbarton Oaks, Yalta, San Francisco, Potsdam; two editions of correspondence between Joseph Stalin and Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Winston Churchill and Clement Attlee. Two-volume editions on Soviet-American, Soviet-British and Soviet-French relations during the Great Patriotic War have been published as well as a number of books and monographs on international issues and bilateral relations.

Memoirs of Semyon Aralov, Kuzma Kiselyov, Leonid Kutakov, Ivan Maisky, Nikolai Fedorenko and other Soviet diplomats are full of vivid, interesting and instructive facts and events. In recent years the Diplomatic Academy at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been publishing *Diplomaticheskyy vestnik* (Diplomatic Bulletin)—five yearly books have been released, each carrying diplomats' reminiscences. August 1987 saw first issue of the *Vestnik Ministerstva inostrannykh del SSSR* (Bulletin of the USSR Foreign Ministry). At the same time some books have become a bibliographic rarity. Among them Georgi Chicherin's *Statyi i rechi po voprosam vneshnei politiki* (Articles and Speeches on Foreign Policy), Maxim Litvinov's *Vneshnyaya politika SSSR* (Soviet Foreign Policy) and *Protiu agressii* (Against Aggression). Apparently, they should be reprinted and become accessible to the many readers who are interested in the history of international relations and Soviet foreign policy.

I believe that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Academy and the Institute of International Relations should give more attention to studying the experience of Soviet diplomacy, documents and memoirs. Diplomats with vast experience behind them would be making a very useful contribution by writing their memoirs. In a word, much has to be thought about and worked on.

Soviet embassies and consulates conduct intensive political work in the collectives of Soviet citizens who are working abroad. The forms and methods of this work are diverse, and there can be no set patterns for their application. The situation is not favourable in all countries and it is not everywhere that our peace intentions are understood. In certain countries there is a definite influence had by those who conduct psychological warfare and who often resort to direct provocations and acts of terrorism against Soviet citizens.

It is necessary to start giving ample attention to educating the staff of Soviet representations, specialists, and their families abroad in the spirit of self-control and restraint, good organisation and discipline, utmost vigilance, respect for the laws, rules and customs of a host country. There are no ready-made solutions for all the exigencies, for life is more complicated than any scheme or formula. Lenin showed that most important is to "use one's own brains and be able to find one's bearings in each particular instance".⁷ A perfunctory approach, the embellishment of negative phenomena, and the playing up of one's own efforts and merits can inflict serious damage on the state interests of the country.

For example, a Soviet government statement on an important political issue is published. The embassy takes measures to distribute it in the host country. Can one be content if the statement was carried by some two or three papers and in an abridged form at that? It is clear there is nothing to rejoice at. Can diplomats shut their eyes to the commentaries which are often far from friendly? No, they cannot. They should analyse the situation in detail and provide precise and truthful information without exaggeration. At a meeting with foreign ambassadors on December 27, 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev had the following to say concerning the great significance of such information and the role of diplomatic representatives: "Decisions taken by the leadership of respective countries to a great extent depend on the completeness and reliability of their (diplomats') assessments, and their information. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that trust between states begins with ambassadors. I would add, that we demand complete objectiveness and impartiality of our ambassadors."⁸

I recall an instance from my own experience. Twenty-odd years ago I served as the USSR Ambassador to Guinea. At that time in 1965 events in Algeria resulted in the removal from the office of Ahmed Ben Bella. Guinea's President Ahmed Sekou Touré was very disappointed. I tried to calm him and convince him that under the new leadership headed by Houari Boumedienne, Algeria would retain its anti-imperialist positions, its OAU and non-alignment membership. My interlocutor disagreed and criticised the "usurpers".

Reporting my conversation to the Foreign Ministry, I pointed out that I had failed to convince the President of Guinea and that he had not changed his opinion. My colleagues in Moscow worked on my report and provided the embassy with substantive arguments.

Another meeting followed. Hardly had I told him half of the received information when Sekou Touré, who listened to me attentively, said: "Thank you, comrade Ambassador, your information is better than ours." He ordered that Algerian ambassador be invited to be informed that

Guinea's governmental delegation would go to Algeria. The next day the Guinean delegation arrived in Algiers and conducted negotiations with the new Algerian government. Relations between the two newly free African countries normalised.

Soviet diplomacy tackles serious tasks in the sphere of information and propaganda. Lately the press centre of the USSR Foreign Ministry has been considerably more active: it is a site for regular press conferences and meetings between Soviet and foreign statesmen, the military and scientists. Soviet diplomats have given public talks in the USA, the FRG and in other countries. However, I believe that the media have been too laconic in covering their statements. In this regard it would seem to be useful to adopt the methods used by Polish colleagues. The newspaper *Rzeczpospolita* regularly carries verbatim reports of press conferences of the Polish government's spokesmen for Polish and foreign newsmen.

I believe that Soviet diplomats should more often attend different meetings, discussions, round tables, press-conferences and be able to expertly and convincingly expound on the USSR's achievements, about the restructuring now underway, to explain and uphold the peace policy of the Soviet government. And not only should they be able to uphold it but should be capable of launching an offensive when necessary. And this is always necessary when it comes to opposing lies, slander and attempts to distort our lofty ideals—the ideals of socialism and peace.

¹ *Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress*, Moscow, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1986, p. 149.

² Mikhail Gorbachev, *Reorganisation and the Party's Personnel Policy*, Moscow, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1987, p. 66.

³ See *Дипломатический словарь*, Vol. 1, Moscow, Nauka Publishers, 1984, p. 307.

⁴ М. С. Горбачев, *Избранные речи и статьи* (Selected Speeches and Articles), Vol. 3, Politizdat, 1987, p. 84.

⁵ See *Правда*, June 6, 1986.

⁶ *Правда*, Aug. 16, 1983.

⁷ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1974, p. 68.

⁸ М. С. Горбачев, *Избранные речи и статьи* (Selected Speeches and Articles), Vol. 3, p. 121.

USSR-FINLAND: A NEW QUALITY OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

Yuri KOMISSAROV

Among the essential factors forming the new political thinking in the nuclear and space age, there are quite a few whose importance is graphically confirmed by the seven decades of relations between the Soviet Union and Finland. Among these is the conclusion that objective conditions have now taken shape under which the contest between capitalism and socialism can proceed only in the form of peaceful competition and peaceful cooperation. Another factor is the growing tendency towards interdependence of states within the world community, the formation of an interdependent and largely integral world. The combination of these factors, as it was noted at the 27th Congress of the CPSU, constitutes the real dialectics of present-day development.

The relations between the USSR and Finland, between the leading socialist state and a small capitalist country, are in many respects a material embodiment of Lenin's idea on the priority of general human values over the interests of states, classes and ideologies. That is now at the root of the conception of a comprehensive international security system, put forward by the 27th Congress of the CPSU and specified in a programmatic article by Mikhail Gorbachev, "Reality and Guarantees for a Secure World".

The road travelled by Soviet-Finnish relations since 1917, a road which has been far from simple or easy, especially in the period of their formation, in many respects reflects (however specific these relations) how peaceful coexistence on an all-European scale was asserted and what its prospects are.

The very emergence of an independent Finnish state as a result of the October Socialist Revolution and Soviet Russia's immediate recognition of the independence of the bourgeois Republic of Finland¹ predetermined the main content of the relations between the two countries.

True, some Finnish historians still try to sever the political and historical connection between these two events, saying that Lenin's decree was only a tactical move, since he was expecting an early revolution in Finland. Of course, Lenin wanted to see a socialist Finland and spoke of the importance of winning over the majority of the people to the side of socialism in that "one of the most advanced, factually republican, countries",² At the same time, the leader of the socialist revolution emphasised the essential aspect of the question of good-neighbourly relations and recognition of Finland with its existing form of government: "If we were to declare that we do not recognise any Finnish nation, but only the working people, that would be sheer nonsense. We cannot refuse to recognise what actually exists."³

When the 1918 workers' revolution in Finland was defeated, Lenin reckoned with that real fact and came out firmly for peaceful relations with the north-western neighbour on the basis of equality, mutual respect, trust and non-interference in internal affairs. In confirmation of this, the Soviet government made a number of major concessions, including territorial, in signing the Yuriev peace treaty with Finland in October 1920.

Subsequent development demonstrated that the bridge of peaceful coexistence should be built from both sides, with mutual trust. As a result of the fatal adherence of Finland's ruling circles to the idea of a "historically predestined" confrontation between bourgeois Finland and socialist Russia, and of instigation by the Western imperialist powers, a barrier of alienation and sometimes even open hostility was raised between the two countries for over two decades. The Soviet Union's attempts to normalise relations with Finland, to get it to withdraw from the dangerous game initiated in the West, did not succeed. As Urho Kekkonen noted, national prejudices and political mistrust made it impossible to find a solution through cooperation based on mutual confidence.

It is only natural that confidence-building became pivotal to the whole range of problems in Soviet-Finnish relations after the war, the main direction for joint work to restructure these relations on an essentially new foundation. Juho Paasikivi set an example of how to overcome the burden of preconceptions, and Urho Kekkonen became the architect of the policy of trust.

Under the concrete historical conditions of that time, with the cold war in full swing and with the emergence of the atom bomb bringing about new power doctrines, the Soviet Union and Finland displayed the practical ability to give up obsolete stereotypes of thinking in international affairs. These two countries were the first to conduct relations not on a hostile basis, but on the principle of equal partnership. They were the first in postwar Europe to master the art and science of respect, constraint and discretion in mutual relations, of correct good-neighbourly contacts and cooperation. Many states have yet to achieve this.

Another point here is that the rapidly changing world of the second half of the 20th century tends to expand the very concept of "peaceful coexistence". The present content of Soviet-Finnish relations, their steady dynamics (but without susceptibility to time-serving changes in the international politics) indicate a more developed and mature phase of relations between states than simply a lack of conflict and confrontation. It involves active political dialogue and partnership, large-scale economic, cultural and other ties and their new forms, and joint efforts in the struggle to strengthen peace. All of that is now a part of Soviet-Finnish relations, adding a new quality, a new dimension to the policy of peaceful coexistence.

Central to these relations is, today as in the past, mutual security issues, which used to cause considerable difficulties. Today, these problems have been solved on the solid basis of the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, whose military-political articles provide for joint action in the event that Finland or the Soviet Union, through Finland's territory, becomes the target of armed aggression. Finland's pledge not to take part in any alliances or coalitions directed against the Soviet Union is also of essential importance. Finland is the only non-socialist country which has a treaty of this kind with the Soviet Union, and this is bound to influence Soviet-Finnish relations, making them in a sense unique.

All crucial questions affecting Soviet-Finnish relations have always been regarded through the prism of the closely interconnected provisions of the 1948 treaty, the main instrument of mutual trust and cooperation.

The basic goal has always been to prevent any damage to the principled political line laid down by the treaty. It is in the interests of the USSR and Finland to retain this specific nature of mutual relations, which under today's conditions, too, does not contradict the universal democratic principles of interstate relations and is in no way directed against any third country.

At the same time, the Soviet-Finnish treaty became one of the first interstate acts which not only declared but firmly asserted such broad, universal principles of international affairs as mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, independence and equality, non-interference in internal affairs, non-use of force, and mutually-advantageous cooperation, notably in the interests of international security.

Peaceful coexistence, which in many respects was at the root of Lenin's decree recognising Finland's independence, has thus been expressed in contractual form as the will of the two states. The conclusion of the treaty with the Soviet Union was Finland's most important and far-sighted foreign-policy decision in the years of its independence, most convincingly demonstrating the fundamental and irreversible turn in its policy. No wonder Urho Kekkonen emphasised the importance of the treaty not only from the standpoint of Soviet-Finnish relations, but also as the basis of Finland's entire foreign-policy line.

Naturally Soviet-Finnish relations and their fruitful development should not be idealised. Relations between states (even between socialist states, not to mention those belonging to different socio-political systems and ideologies) cannot be built on total unanimity on every point. It would thus be wrong to present Soviet-Finnish relations as a steady ascent, a complete harmony of interests. These relations have seen certain difficulties and fairly complicated periods. That was the case, for instance, in 1958, when right-wing forces took office in Finland and tried to reverse the policy of friendship with the USSR.

The leaders of the two countries also had to display great firmness and self-restraint in 1961, when NATO's moves in Northern Europe created a situation which threatened the security of the USSR and Finland, and there was a question of consultations envisaged by the treaty of 1948. It also took a great deal of joint effort to resolve, in the spirit of trust, the problems that emerged in the early 1970s in view of Finland's plans for cooperation with the Common Market and the attempts by some circles in Finland to promote the neutrality conception to the detriment of the country's commitments under the treaty of 1948.

Today, in Soviet-Finnish relations there are no unresolved problems of a fundamental character. There can be no guarantee, however, that differences of opinion on some issues or, say, a misunderstanding of the motives behind a particular move will not occur again. After all, even while the basic aspirations for peace and good-neighbourliness coincide, there can also be special interests stemming from political, social and economic distinctions, from one's own, not always identical, view of the problems of the modern world. One should also bear in mind the attempts of those who deliberately seek to inject elements of mistrust and confrontation into Finland's relations with its eastern neighbour.

There is only one possible way here, a way tested more than once in the practice of Soviet-Finnish relations. To prevent crisis situations, avert a clash of interests, try to balance these out, and find mutually acceptable answers even to the most complicated questions—that has always been a major aspect of the peaceful coexistence policy followed by the Soviet Union and Finland.

It is no secret that many in the West and some in Finland would like even today to "adjust" Soviet-Finnish relations and Finland's whole foreign-policy line. Thus, the public is being assured that "the Kekkonen days are over", that there is need for greater "independence", "Europeanisation", and so on.

The Soviet Union does not intend to interfere in Finland's sovereign decision-making on matters of its policy, be it external or internal. A different stand would contradict the very spirit of the peaceful coexistence principle and would be a manifestation of mistrust for the ability of the Finns and their leaders to act in accordance with their own understanding of their interests, but also with due regard for the interests of good-neighbourliness with the USSR. The consistency of that line was reaffirmed, in particular, by the attitude to the formation of a new cabinet in Finland in the spring of 1987 with the participation of the National Coalition Party (NCP); since 1966 that party had remained outside the governments, which had usually been formed on the basis of cooperation between the left (Social Democrats and Communists) and centrist (led by the Centre Party) forces.

An evolution of the views of that major right-wing party, whose policy had long been influenced by politicians unfriendly to the Soviet Union, is evident from the policy-making statement of the present government, headed by Harri Holkeri, a prominent NCP leader. The government also includes representatives of the Social Democratic Party, the Swedish People's Party, and the Rural Party. (The Centre Party is now in opposition in view of differences with the Social Democrats over the government issue.) The new cabinet declared its intention to continue Finland's foreign-policy line and to develop relations with the USSR on the basis of the 1948 treaty.

The continuity in Soviet-Finnish relations and in Finland's foreign policy does not, of course, signify that the emergence of new problems, including international ones, will not require new solutions. Not all problems can be solved using old methods, as Urho Kekkonen predicted, noting that "changes in the international situation call for a constant renewal and honing of our foreign policy". But he also warned: "That should be done, however, within such limits as would keep up confidence in Finland's policy."

President Mauno Koivisto has repeatedly emphasised that speculation about a change in Finland's foreign policy is unjustified, and that Finland is to proceed steadily along the path mapped out by Juho Paasikivi and Urho Kekkonen. In the Soviet Union, he said, the "Paasikivi-Kekkonen line" and its major principles have always been associated with the policy of friendship, trust and cooperation with our country, the policy of vigorous efforts to ensure international security.

Lenin's decree of 1917, the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, firm trust between the Soviet and Finnish peoples, the high level of political and economic cooperation, and interaction in international affairs—such are the main points that determined the fruitfulness of President Koivisto's official visit to the USSR on October 5-11, 1987, and his talks with Mikhail Gorbachev. That was yet another major landmark in the improvement of good-neighbour relations, with due regard to the new conditions characteristic of the present stage in the development of each state.

Mikhail Gorbachev and Mauno Koivisto specially noted the duty of the Soviet Union's and Finland's present leadership: to continue the cause of their predecessors and build up trust and good-neighbourliness. If problems do arise—and it is only natural that they will—the sole response will be to step up efforts to improve and develop Soviet-Finnish relations.

The two leaders' common stand that there should be nothing in the

policy of either state which could jeopardise the other's security interests is of fundamental international, as well as domestic, importance. Mikhail Gorbachev emphasised that the Soviet Union would never take any step which could be detrimental to Finland, that it would never allow any disrespect for the Finnish people or their leaders.

The latest Soviet-Finnish summit in October 1987 was an open, straightforward and fruitful dialogue on the main issues of bilateral relations and international security, with the accent on the situation in Northern Europe and the adjacent seas. The results of the summit, which further strengthened the friendly relations between the USSR and Finland and simultaneously, so to speak, laid a bridge into the future, once again reaffirmed that the prospects for good-neighbourliness, which embodies and develops Lenin's principles of peaceful coexistence in all their fullness, are clear and secure. The order of the day now is to materialise these prospects in practical policy.

Evidently, even with the incomparably higher level already attained in the cooperation between the USSR and Finland, and with their reliable and irreversible line towards friendship and trust, the future of Soviet-Finnish relations at the turn of the century, their place in the ever-changing world largely depend on a sensitive response to the needs and realities of international affairs, on ability to duly take note of that which is new, to translate it into the language of practical action and, wherever necessary, to move a few steps in advance, as was often the case in the past.

There is an obvious connection between the prospects for Soviet-Finnish cooperation and the process of restructuring and democratisation in the Soviet Union. Finding a direct expression in foreign policy, the Soviet restructuring makes it possible to bring out to an even fuller extent the potential of good-neighbourliness with Finland, to tap the reserves of peaceful coexistence faster than along many other lines.

Characteristically, in the West it is the Finns who have the greatest confidence in the serious transformations underway in the USSR. According to a public opinion poll held in Finland in July 1987, 86 per cent of those polled gave high assessment of the current development of Soviet domestic and foreign policy, and only 1 per cent took a negative stand. Sixty-four per cent of the Finns believe that Mikhail Gorbachev has been following a more vigorous peace policy than Ronald Reagan, who was given preference by only 2 per cent of those polled.⁴

Having noted that the USSR and Finland have long been carrying on positive dialogue in the spirit of openness, President Koivisto voiced his confidence that the "changes underway in the Soviet Union will have a positive influence on the forms of cooperation that have taken effect in our mutual relations, making these ever more direct and concrete, and, naturally, strengthening all that has already been achieved".

Take the *economic field*. The restructuring of the economic mechanism in the USSR, aimed at intensifying the socialist economy and accelerating scientific and technical progress, in conjunction with the long record of cooperation with Finland could in the foreseeable future engender many additional forms of cooperation, strengthening the material fabric of good neighbourliness.

The influence of the restructuring on Soviet-Finnish relations is evident in the protocol signed during President Koivisto's visit to the USSR on extending until the year 2000 the Long-Term Programme for the Development and Deepening of Trade, Economic, Industrial, Scientific and Technical Cooperation.

Wide use in practice of projects on a product-pay-back basis will give a fresh impulse to the traditional cooperation in joint construction of industrial and other projects on the territories of both countries. In the past, the product-pay-back principle was partly used only in the construction of the Kostomuksha integrated mining and dressing works, whereas today the projects built on Soviet territory, a part of whose products could go to Finland or to third countries in repayment for Finnish supplies and building services, include development of mineral resources on the Kola Peninsula, oil refining, petrochemistry, chemistry, and non-ferrous metallurgy. The sphere of joint work in building projects in third countries is expanding.

Now that the development of solely traditional trade no longer meets demands of the present day, to say nothing of the future, production cooperation and specialisation is coming to the fore. A more efficient combination of Soviet and Finnish technologies and know-how will make it possible to extend the development of advanced technologies and essentially new types of equipment. In connection with the extension of the above-mentioned long-term programme for cooperation until 2000, roughly 40 lines of cooperation have been projected in engineering alone.

There have also been new and interesting developments in the sphere of mutual trade, which in all the postwar years has been based on the clearing system of settlements. In view of demands set by the growing trade turnover and the new forms of economic cooperation, additional opportunities for financing and settlements in accordance with international trading practices could be used parallel to the clearing system.

There is much to be done for the development of such a promising line of bilateral cooperation as joint enterprises on Soviet territory, a new sphere of East-West economic ties largely pioneered by the USSR and Finland. Their special joint concern is to make these enterprises profitable and self-financing, to produce modern and globally competitive products in the chemical and petrochemical, forest, pulp-and-paper and woodworking industries, engineering and non-ferrous metallurgy.

Good-neighbour relations between the USSR and Finland will be further strengthened and enriched by the growing creative element in Soviet-Finnish cooperation and the new attitudes taking shape in its economic, humanitarian and political spheres, attitudes which do not substitute for existing documents and mechanisms but, on the contrary, strengthen these in accordance with the new conditions and the experience of cooperation.

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New dimensions could also be added to Soviet-Finnish relations in the context of the current *turn in European affairs*. The real possibility of the elimination over the next few years of medium- and shorter-range missiles in Europe, of the commencement of talks on cuts in conventional armed forces and armaments, including tactical nuclear weapons, of advancement along the economic and humanitarian lines of the all-European process—all this opens up a new, more mature and stable phase of detente on the continent.

Soviet-Finnish relations have long become a major positive factor of European politics. The development of the present positive tendencies on an all-European scale does not reduce but, on the contrary, increases the importance of Soviet-Finnish relations and expands, rather than narrows, the spheres of cooperation between the two countries.

Take the field of *military security*. President Koivisto welcomed the Soviet-US understanding on the total elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles as an historic event in European affairs, an event of immediate importance for the North European region as well. At the same

time, the President expressed the hope that this step "will not lead to a spiralling of the arms race in other fields, say, on the seas".

Indeed, the deployment on the European continent of new US medium-range missiles, cruise missiles above all, presented a grave danger for Northern Europe, since it was fraught with violation of the air space of countries like Finland and Sweden and the possibility of their involvement in an armed conflict. Once these types of weapons are eliminated, the danger will be markedly reduced. But many problems still remain.

Thus, under the present conditions the naval factor has become more significant for European security, since it is largely through an escalation of the arms race on the seas, including regions adjacent to Northern Europe, that the USA would like to "compensate" for the elimination of its medium- and shorter-range missiles. There are plans for building up sea-based missiles and a reluctance to extend the Stockholm confidence-building measures to naval activity. The NATO countries also seek to confine the agenda for the talks on reducing conventional armaments and armed forces, being discussed at the Vienna meeting, to ground-based forces alone.

Finland's foreign-policy leaders have repeatedly emphasised the problems being created for Northern Europe's security by sea-based cruise missiles, especially long-range ones. President Koivisto's well-known considerations on the need to elaborate confidence-building and security measures in the naval field with respect to Northern Europe, as expressed in October 1986, were dictated by his concern for the overall consequences of naval activity in the northern seas.

The question of curtailing military activity in the northern region of the planet was pivotal to the *package of new initiatives put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev in Murmansk on October 1, 1987*. Calling for a radically lower level of military confrontation in the North and welcoming President Koivisto's initiative on limiting naval activity on the seas adjacent to Northern Europe, the Soviet Union has suggested to get down to practical action and start consultations between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO on limiting the scale and activity of navies and air forces in the Baltic, North, Norwegian and Greenland seas, and also on extending the confidence-building measures to these areas. Among these are the understandings on limiting the rivalry in anti-submarine weapons, on giving notification of major naval and air force exercises, and on inviting all states involved in the all-European process to take part as observers in these exercises.

The question of naval activity in international waters has also been formulated from a new angle. Thus, it is time to ban such activity in mutually-agreed zones of international straits and along intensive shipping routes in general. The USSR proposes to start tackling this problem at a meeting of the states concerned in, say, Leningrad.

Another question that arises in view of the forthcoming elimination in Europe of US and Soviet medium- and shorter-range missiles is whether Finland's idea of setting up a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe is outdated, as was recently declared by Rozanna Ridgway, Assistant US Secretary of State.⁵ In an interview with the Swedish newspaper *Svenska Dagbladet* in September 1987, the head of the White House also said in plain words that the best way to ensure Northern Europe's security was not to set up a nuclear-free zone, but for NATO to remain sufficiently strong.⁶

Clearly, as long as NATO continues to stake on "nuclear deterrence" and retains in its arsenal nuclear-capable warships and aircraft (intending to build these up even further as medium- and shorter-range missiles are eliminated), there remains a real threat of violation of the non-nuclear status of the European North.

At the same time, it is evident that elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles markedly improves the prerequisites for the formation of a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe. It is known, for instance, that the effectiveness of such a move has often been linked to the existence in the north-western regions of the USSR of nuclear weapons which can reach Scandinavian territory. A Soviet-US agreement will mean that no Soviet missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometres will remain in these regions. As for tactical nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union proposes their reduction within the framework of talks on conventional weapons suggested by the Warsaw Treaty states.

Let us recall such essential elements of the USSR's stand as its readiness to act as guarantor of a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe, and to discuss with the parties concerned the question of a nuclear-free status for the Baltic Sea.

Speaking in Murmansk, Mikhail Gorbachev put forward several versions of formalising a possible guarantee for the status of a nuclear-free zone, including multilateral or bilateral agreements and government declarations. He reaffirmed the readiness to discuss with each state or group of states concerned all the problems relating to the formation of a nuclear-free zone, including possible measures with regard to Soviet territory.

The Soviet Union has proved it will go far enough by announcing its readiness to withdraw from the Baltic fleet all submarines equipped with ballistic missiles. The Soviet leader's statement that the USSR has been considering a solution of such a complicated problem as the Novaya Zemlya nuclear testing ground was met with a wide response in the nordic countries. However, much remains to be done to make the idea of a nuclear-free North a political and military-strategic reality. Most important here, perhaps, is that old stereotypes, which still predominate in NATO and at times make themselves felt in its Scandinavian member countries, be eliminated.

In the course of the Moscow talks, the position of the USSR and Finland was formulated in clear-cut terms: measures to strengthen and guarantee the non-nuclear status of Northern Europe would have a positive effect on the security of the nordic countries and on the situation in the whole of Europe.

A special point to note is that *the Murmansk initiatives are not confined to problems of military security. A new large-scale programme for peaceful cooperation in the North, in its polar and adjacent regions, was put forward, with an invitation to a serious discussion of the whole range of matters relating to security and peaceful cooperation—military-political, economic, ecological and humanitarian, including some legal aspects. There is every reason to speak of a "Northern dimension" to the comprehensive international security system.*

Noting that Mikhail Gorbachev's ideas and considerations are in accord with Finland's position, President Koivisto has said that new prospects are opening up for closer contacts between the people in the northern regions of the world which are of importance to Finland.

The USSR and Finland could do much to enrich their experience of economic, ecological and humanitarian cooperation and put it at the service of all-European interests. Thus, the well-known "third basket", with its ideologically-tinged problems of human contacts, education, information and culture, has in Soviet-Finnish relations long become a sphere of cooperation, as envisaged by the Final Act, rather than confrontation. But here, as elsewhere, the task is to continue raising the level of mutual objective information, primarily among the young, to make efficient use of contacts for the mutual spiritual enrichment of the Soviet and Finnish peoples, for greater trust between them. Such is the aim, in particular, of

the latest programme for cooperation in the field of science, education and culture for 1988-1992.

The need to make improvement in the humanitarian field in the countries involved in the all-European process, notably, in implementing the whole range of civil, political, economic and other rights and freedoms, is at the basis of the Soviet proposals, made at the Vienna meeting, on the convocation in Moscow of a conference on humanitarian cooperation, as well as the initiative put forward by Finland together with other neutral and non-aligned countries on holding an all-European forum on information.

Soviet-Finnish relations have been developing—and this could become even more so in the future—in the same set of coordinates as the Soviet conception of a comprehensive international security system. In forming such a system of just and secure peace, each state should make a tangible contribution and bears a great responsibility. The very edifice of comprehensive security equal for all rises out of international practice and experience, including bilateral.

President Koivisto gave a high assessment of the Soviet approach to the formation of a comprehensive international security system set forth in Mikhail Gorbachev's article, "Reality and Guarantees for a Secure World". The President said: "This is an important statement in the debate on international security and disarmament, a statement which in many respects opens up new avenues," adding that he shares the Soviet leader's view on the importance both of the military-political and the non-military factors of universal security.

In putting forward proposals which are a graphic manifestation of the Soviet Union's humane policy, its striving to humanise international relations, this country has its own system of views. At the same time, it does not propose any ready-made formulas, but invites all UN states and the world public in general to exchange views, to think together over a future security system for one and all.

Speaking at the meeting in Moscow on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution President Koivisto stressed: "Over the past decades we have established a system of mutual relations based on mutual trust, which has as its components a candid dialogue, multifaceted practical cooperation in different fields and broad contacts between public circles."

It is only natural that the experience of the USSR and Finland will continue to draw world public's attention, for the two countries, as Mikhail Gorbachev noted, have managed to build a viable model of good-neighbourliness which projects the contours of a secure, non-violent peace on a global scale.

¹ Finland, which was a part of the Russian Empire as Grand Duchy of Finland, was proclaimed a republic by a decision of the Sejm (parliament) on December 6, 1917. On December 31 of the same year, Lenin signed a decree of the Council of People's Commissars recognising the independent statehood of the Republic of Finland.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1964, p. 331.

³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, 1965, p. 174.

⁴ *Helsingin Sanomat*, July 21, 1987.

⁵ *Helsingin Sanomat*, Sept. 15, 1987.

⁶ *Svenska Dagbladet*, Sept. 27, 1987.

NEW MEANS IN THE PRACTICE OF DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS

Vladimir PRYAKHIN

Negotiations are a traditional form of working out an agreement among states with different political identities. The history of diplomacy has examples of successful and failed negotiations, long, drawn-out and lightning parleys, talks involving individual representatives or large delegations. The ensurance of successful and effective negotiations, the reduction of their duration and of the number of participating personnel increasingly depend on the extent to which various kinds of technical equipment is used, ranging from basic clerical aids to state-of-the-art computer systems.

Unfortunately, no exhaustive analysis has been made of the technical means that are currently used at negotiations and no study has been made of their possible future applications. I believe that this problem deserves further treatment.

In the past negotiations were often used for the sole purpose of registering the results of armed conflicts and military confrontation on a regional and sometimes global scale. Not infrequently they were used by the strong, the conquerors, as a way to dictate their terms to the weak, the conquered.

After the October Revolution the potential for peaceful reconciliation of interests of various states, inherent in negotiations, acquired new historical perspectives for development. Genoa, the historic conference of the heads of the states and governments of the anti-Hitler coalition demonstrated the most salient features of the Soviet school of diplomatic negotiations—an intensive search for mutually acceptable solutions, flexibility, regard for the legitimate interests of partners, bona-fide compliance with agreed principles for conducting negotiations.

Negotiations play a particularly important role in foreign policy activities relating to the central problem of our time—the establishment of a comprehensive system of international security. As it was stressed in the Political Report to the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the fundamental principles of this system “could become the point of departure and a sort of guideline for a direct and systematic dialogue—both bilateral and multilateral—among leaders of countries of the world community”.¹

What distinguishes negotiations on all problems of disarmament without exception is that they are used not as a form for registering the results of armed conflicts, but as an alternative to such conflicts. This is the inherent dialectical development of negotiations as a form of diplomatic activity. A characteristic feature that has emerged in the evolution

of negotiations is that they are no longer a restricted domain for career diplomats only and that experts from the most diverse branches of knowledge are becoming increasingly involved in them.

This was clearly evident at the conference organised under the auspices of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis within the framework of the project entitled the Processes of International Negotiations, that took place in Laxenburg, Austria, on May 18-22, 1987. At the conference the need to substantially increase the volume and level of knowledge of existing negotiating procedures was stressed and discussed, world experience in the study of the negotiating process with the help of traditional and non-traditional methods of analysis was summed up and applied recommendations to improve that process were elaborated such as could serve as a basis for practical activities of the participants in negotiations. The conference discussed a wide range of issues, including the numerous elements in the complex and varied system of factors that play a role in forming political will.

In the nuclear age the material basis and precondition for the effectiveness of political negotiations, in particular, in the area of arms limitation, is first of all the understanding that war as a means of resolving contentious issues is a fundamentally flawed approach. In our time finding a solution to all questions, including the most complex political issues, is possible only through negotiations. The recognition of this fact is directly opposed to pseudo-scientific concepts of "limited nuclear war", "protracted war" and "winnable war" that were extensively spread about by the militaristic circles in the West in late 1970s-early 1980s.

It is reasonable to study the mechanism of negotiations, a complex process for finding a common denominator in the sum total of political interests of states relating to questions of their national security, on the basis of the experience accumulated in the 1960s and 1970s when over 20 agreements were concluded in the disarmament area. Among them are such major instruments as the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water; the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; the 1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof; and the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. Of special significance are the bilateral Soviet-US documents with treaties and agreements standing out that have formed the basis of the process of strategic arms limitation: the 1971 Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; the 1972 Treaty Between the USA and the USSR on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems; the 1972 Interim Agreement Between the USA and the USSR on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms; the 1973 Agreement Between the USA and the USSR on the Prevention of Nuclear War; the 1974 Treaty Between the USA and the USSR on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests; the 1976 Treaty Between the USA and the USSR on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes.

The Joint Statement, signed in November 1985 in Geneva, may be considered among the positive steps in the process of developing Soviet-US relations in recent years. In this statement the leaders of the two countries rejected nuclear war as a means of conducting the foreign policies of their states and reaffirmed the importance of constant dialogue, reflecting a serious desire to look for points of contact with respect to existing problems. Of course, this important statement did not at once remove all

problems. It did not eliminate the outdated political thinking that prevented the Reykjavik meeting from being a total success. The most important stage was an accord with the United States on signing an agreement on medium- and shorter-range missiles. This is the first tangible step towards destroying the nuclear stockpiles and eliminating an entire class of nuclear weapons.

Political will is, of course, the most important guarantee of successful negotiations, particularly in an area such as arms limitation. At the same time, studying the ways to enhance the effectiveness of the negotiating mechanism is also justified since it is an important factor contributing to the emergence of political will. It is clear that the negotiating mechanism itself is unable to eliminate the political barriers that separate the participants in negotiations, but it can help in differentiating and clarifying the obstacles to agreements. An expert discussion and analysis may help to establish that many of the problems, dividing negotiators, are not political but technical, and the latter ones, that were previously considered insurmountable, may prove to be solvable. One should also bear in mind that negotiations in the disarmament area are becoming increasingly complex, that more and more they encompass details of a scientific, military, engineering, technical and legal nature.

How can the negotiating mechanism be made more effective?

In answering that question it may be stated with certainty that the potential existing in the traditional ways of enhancing the effectiveness of negotiating forums used by the international community has not been exhausted. More specifically, the following ways are among them: selecting an optimum number of participants in negotiations; expanding the timeframe for conducting negotiations; increasing the number of experts to study the most important questions; making improvements from a purely technical point of view, viz. raising the quality of translation during negotiations and increasing the number of subsidiary working bodies. Along with these traditional ways of enhancing the effectiveness of negotiating mechanisms, the constant growth in volume and complexity of negotiations makes it imperative to use other, non-traditional means.

In this connection close attention should be paid to the work of Soviet experts at the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Applied Automated Systems on introducing modern computer systems to perform various functions in the modern office, including, among other things, using computers to obtain results of a collective expert evaluation. Soviet experts point out that "at present teleconferencing systems ensuring the automatisisation of organisational functions in the process of carrying out joint projects by groups of people are becoming increasingly used throughout the world... Incoming business and scientific information in the form of documents, generated by the activities of various groups of experts, passes through a series of stages—distribution, familiarisation, discussion, follow-up activity, working out an agreement, assessment, confirmation, checking, and so on."²

This approach to finding agreed and mutually acceptable solutions to common problems is in line with the objectives pursued by participants in international forums, including in negotiations of a political nature. Delegations from the socialist countries at these negotiations have repeatedly spoken in favour of improving negotiating mechanisms, of shifting the focus of attention from organisational and procedural problems to substantive matters. For instance, the joint document of the group of socialist countries at the Committee on Disarmament stated that procedural and organisational questions must not distract the attention of the

Committee from the negotiations on the substance of questions and must be resolved primarily within the framework of consultations of the Chairman with the most interested delegations, groups of delegations, or in any other form that will be considered most effective. Official sessions should primarily be devoted to taking decisions prepared in the course of consultations.³ At present conditions have been created to mechanise the process of unofficial contacts among delegations and of consultations of experts, or more precisely, to computerise this process.

There is great potential in using as a mechanism for multilateral forums on disarmament automated dialogue organisational scientific information systems that are in fact advanced computer-based teleconferencing systems. The use of these systems is totally in line with the intensified pace of life of modern society, in which communication systems play an increasingly greater role. It is known that outlays to ensure information links among people during the work process are constantly growing. Soviet experts estimate that communication expenses, including telegraph, telex and telephone communication costs, are many times higher than expenses for the technical preparation of information.

Computers integrated into networks and exchanging information at people's request create a new effective communication medium both for participants in political negotiations and for technical experts. This communication medium is cheap, accessible and user-friendly; it has a developed "intellect"; it transmits information very rapidly and has powerful means for processing and printing textual and graphic materials.

Through an automatic exchange with the major data banks that the international community has in its possession, automated dialogue information systems provide negotiators with state-of-the-art means for maintaining communication among groups of people, the traditional forms of which are conferences, meetings, and so on.

Automated dialogue organisational scientific information systems make it possible for the negotiations process to proceed on practically a permanent basis which represents a qualitative breakthrough in expanding its timeframe. In fact, delegations are ensured constant contact, regardless of whether they are present at negotiations or in their offices in their countries. In this regard some feel that such systems may in fact substitute negotiations as a form of international intercourse.

These misgivings are totally unfounded. Nothing will ever substitute personal contacts among participants in political meetings and forums. The introduction of dialogue organisational scientific information systems pursues a different objective—to prepare direct political contacts, to exclude from them unnecessary technical details, to reach in advance an agreement with respect to everything that can be resolved at the level of experts, to ensure a higher level of expertise, primarily as regards technical and legal questions. Thanks to the introduction of automated dialogue organisational scientific information systems the international community will be able to qualitatively expand the agenda for disarmament negotiations, to inscribe into it all questions and all types of weapons, to increase the number of actual forums and, ultimately, the number of political contacts among their participants.

Among the additional functions of these systems that may well be used within the framework of a multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, is the provision of these negotiations with electronic mail and facilities for simultaneous communication at expert level. In the future computer systems will make it possible to actively involve in negotiations non-governmental institutions and organisations representing the broad scientific public. In this sense, computerisation of negotiations would contribute to making them global in nature both in terms of the number of questions being discussed, and the number of participants that fully cor-

responds to the level of their political objective—preventing mankind's nuclear self-annihilation.

The starting point of any negotiations is establishing their subject matter by one or a number of their prospective participants. In contemporary international affairs the initiative of states at this preparatory stage is, as a rule, preceded by actions of non-governmental organisations that find their reflection in emerging official positions. Teleconferencing systems will make it possible for every member of the international community to formulate the initiative correctly and to justify it, to sponsor negotiations on the most technically complex subject of negotiations if this is determined by its political interests.

At the second preparatory stage the sponsoring state attempts to popularise the subject of negotiations among members of the international community and to set up an initiative group to adopt relevant documents of the international community (General Assembly resolutions, joint statements by groups at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, etc.). As an example of this, the aforementioned joint document of the group of socialist countries in the Geneva Committee on Disarmament CD/200 may be cited which contained proposals to enhance the effectiveness of the mechanism.

Editorial work, the elaboration of agreements and the publication of such documents is, as a rule, carried out by those participants in negotiations holding close political positions. In this case also computer-based teleconferencing technologies may considerably contribute to justifying the proposals put forward by sponsors relating to the beginning of the negotiations.

One cannot also discard a possibility that a thorough discussion of the problem by co-sponsors through a teleconference will prove it unfeasible to advance any initiative; in that case the participants in the initiative group will take a sound decision to refrain from advancing a joint initiative, which would be also a positive result of using teleconferences.

The third preparatory stage is the drawing up of an agenda. There were periods in the history of the Conference on Disarmament when, with the annual volume of work taking up 4-5 months, reaching an agreement on the agenda of an ongoing session took up 4-5 and even more weeks. Of course, underlying this exercise were political differences in the positions of states participating in the negotiations. Technical means in themselves will not ensure the elimination of these contradictions, but they can help in devising a global model of the agenda, taking into account all the proposals that have been put forward which can help in finding solutions, expediting the process of working out an agreement or, which may prove to be even more important, in preventing the negotiations from being used as a smokescreen to cover up a lack of political will.

The next stage of negotiations is no longer a preparatory one, but is of a substantive nature. What is meant is that after the adoption of the agenda and the programme of work, the multilateral forum is then used to expound the political positions of the delegations of participating countries with respect to the items of the agreed agenda. Practical experience demonstrates that at this stage of negotiations there is practically no need for computerisation. Generally, by that time political positions have already been formulated and agreed with the allies and the main task at this juncture is to present them convincingly. As a rule, at this stage negotiations are used as a forum for political statements by heads of states and governments, ministers for foreign affairs and other politi-

cal figures. A question of paramount importance at this stage of negotiations is whether there is a consensus on the question of setting up subsidiary bodies to work out solutions on specific questions.

Elaborating a mandate for a subsidiary working body is the next stage of the negotiations. Comparing political positions is still decisive here; however, the scope of application of teleconferencing techniques may be somewhat broader since at this stage work is underway on the texts of draft mandates in subsidiary groups. For instance, at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament within the framework of the discussion on the question of the mandate of the subsidiary working body on the agenda item entitled Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (the 1984 session) along with the three formally tabled draft mandates, over ten documents were also considered on the working basis. Experience demonstrates that comparing and agreeing these drafts on a display of a teleconference is much simpler and more effective than on paper.

When work gets underway in a subsidiary working body on the basis of an agreed mandate, providing for the elaboration of documents on arms limitation in a specific area and having a binding legal force, a new stage begins at which the use of computers is highly desirable now and in future it will become necessary. As a rule negotiations in a subsidiary working body begin with the study of all the valid agreements and documents in this area. Computer memory is an excellent working instrument for such a study.

Work on the text of the document on the basis of proposals and drafts, discussing and agreeing in a subsidiary working body provisions of a future treaty (convention) is a major stage in negotiations. Here the possibility of applying computer-based teleconferencing techniques may be demonstrated using as an example the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons of the Conference on Disarmament established by it for the period of the 1985 session. This example is cited because, with respect to the question of banning chemical weapons, there appears a growing consensus in the world community contributing to the success of relevant negotiations. Under these relatively favourable political circumstances the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and its subsidiary working bodies was very substantive and intense. In the period from February 27 to August 19, 1985, 12 meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee took place;⁴ at the same time, there were 43 meetings of three working groups and in addition to that open-ended consultations were conducted by the Chairman. On the face of it these figures seem relatively modest but appear quite differently if looked at from the point of view of the negotiators themselves—members of the delegations and experts. In fact, out of the 286 people who were listed as participating in the 1985 session, only 20-30 experts could give their undivided attention to the most complex subject matter of the negotiations related to the prohibition of chemical weapons.

At this stage a considerable amount of work is typical of the majority of political forums. Soviet diplomat Anatoli Kovalyov provides the following data relating to negotiations within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: "The work at the second stage was characterised by an increased number of meetings—often 6-8 meetings of the working bodies a day. As a rule, meetings took place in the morning (10.30 a. m. to 1.00 p. m.) and in the afternoon (3.30 p. m. to 6.00 p. m.). This timeframe, however, was by no means always observed. In completing the work of the second stage, night meetings were a usual occurrence, starting at 8.00 p. m. and often continuing until 2-3 o'clock in the morning of the next day.

"Altogether there were about 2,500 official meetings, including 83 meetings of the Coordinating Committee, 47 meetings of the First Com-

mission, 337 and 247 meetings of subcommissions 1 and 2 respectively, 168 meetings of the special working body; 85 meetings of the Second Commission, 170, 103, 104, 50 and 99 meetings of subcommissions 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 respectively; 52 meetings of the Third Commission, 186, 185, 183 and 155 meetings of subcommissions 8, 9, 10 and 11 respectively. The special group on item 4 of the agenda held 78 official meetings.

"About 4,700 drafts submitted by various delegations were considered, not including draft language formulations that were also the subject of discussions and that were often more important than the officially registered drafts. However, it was impossible to count them all."⁵

Subsystems of information on specific problems that form an integral part of automated dialogue scientific organisational information systems, currently being developed by specialists in a number of countries, hold bright prospects for the partial mechanisation of this work and along with this contribute to finding a solution to the fundamental challenge of ensuring the participation of small delegations in the consideration of all items without exception.⁶

The potential of these systems is similar to the working procedures used at meetings of subsidiary working bodies of the multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament. Reflecting the experience of conducting negotiations accumulated in the world practice, the subsystem of conferences, in fact, reproduced their model. One of the participants in teleconferences may be elected their leader (chairman) and in this case he will be the only person who will be able to perform some functions. Among these functions the following may be listed: drafting individual parts of a document, preparing them for a final agreement, removing sections, establishing the format of documents acceptable for this problem. In addition to that the leader may incorporate new participants, exclude old ones and determine their status.

Apart from other advantages, this system makes it possible for new participants to quickly become involved in negotiations both at the expert and political levels. A number of functions of this subsystem are performed automatically.

A major advantage of computer-based teleconferencing systems is that they make it possible to overcome the existing language barrier. Under the present circumstances the existing mechanism of multilateral forums to a considerable degree makes it possible to resolve the problems of language difficulties both by providing expert translation and interpretation and by constantly improving the language skills of meetings' participants. However, the "globalisation" requirement of negotiations pose the problem of overcoming the language barrier in a new light since the number of items specifically discussed considerably increases, just as the number of direct and indirect participants in negotiations. Teleconferencing systems will enable users to independently draw up texts of all questions and statements of the system, resolving thereby language difficulties.

The broad introduction of teleconferencing systems may generate the fear that the globalisation of negotiations will make them lose their familiar structure and hierarchy. There is no basis for this fear since the system itself provides for a specific hierarchy among the participants in a meeting, as well as the protection from information that is of no value to a given participant. At the same time, the introduction of teleconferencing systems makes it possible to obtain the main objective—to take note in final documents of all constructive opinions, conclusions and judgements, regardless of the level at which they were expressed.

The last decades of the 20th century," says the Resolution of the 27th CPSU Congress, "confronted the nations of the world with difficult and acute problems. The need for solving the most vital global problems should prompt them to joint action, to triggering the tendencies towards the self-preservation of humanity."⁷ This need is also reflected in such a traditional venue of diplomatic activities as negotiations which have always been an important form of bringing into accord the political will of the states and most fully meeting the interests of the peoples.

A further scientific systematisation of views on the role and significance of negotiations is especially important now when the perennial alternative to negotiations—the use of force—is fraught with the risk of a nuclear war. Soviet diplomacy is engaged in a constant search for ways and means to realise the potential of negotiations—the most important means of resolving the burning problems of world politics: preventing a nuclear war, strengthening international security and establishing constructive cooperation among peoples.

¹ *Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress*, Moscow, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1986, p. 96.

² В. Д. Новиков, В. А. Сердюк. *Организация информационно-коммуникационной системы на сетях ЭВМ*. Всесоюзный научно-исследовательский институт автоматизированных систем. Сборник трудов. Issue 3, Moscow, 1986, p. 26.

³ Committee on Disarmament. CD/200, July 24, 1981.

⁴ See UN Doc. A/40/27.

⁵ Ан. Ковалев. *Азбука дипломатии*. Moscow, Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya Publishers, 1984, p. 232.

⁶ See S. Hiltz, M. Turoff, *The Network Nation. Human Communication via Computer*, Massachusetts, 1978; S. Hiltz, *Online Communities. A Case Study of the Office of the Future*, Norwood (New Jersey), 1985.

⁷ *Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress*, p. 136.

THE MAFIA IN THE DOCK

Vladimir MALYSHEV

A few decades ago Sicilian cardinal Ruffini uttered a phrase which became proverbial: "The Mafia does not exist—it is a fable created by the enemies of Sicily." Today, one can only smile ironically on hearing this: 400 mafiosi are on the defendants list at the Palermo trial of the bosses of this gangster syndicate. Other big trials are being held in Messina, Agrigento and Catania. At the trials the Mafia's horrible crimes are revealed: cold-blooded murders, dead bodies disposed of in sulphuric acid, or immured inside house walls, kidnapped children, whose fingers and ears are cut off... The Mafia is the horrendous reality of modern Italy.

All these trials have been made possible due to the sensational revelations made by Tommaso Buscetta, a former "superboss" of the Mafia. The mafiosi of a rivalling clan had exterminated all his relatives and friends. Buscetta tried to poison himself in despair but survived. And then he decided to take revenge on his enemies by giving the show away to the police.

Buscetta's confession was a shock. For the first time ever a mafioso so high-ranking "began to talk". The legge della omertà (the law of silence) seals tight the mouths of all members of the gangster syndicate. The "superboss" gave away not only his enemies. He also described the machinery and make-up of the "respectable society" (this is how the Mafia is called by the mafiosi themselves) and the laws of the criminal syndicate, which maintains ties with the powers-that-be in Italy.

Buscetta's confession was immediately followed by massive arrests, and in January 1986 the Palermo trial began. The Mafia today, the investigators declared, has become a kind of a "state within a state" and has deeply penetrated the ruling parties and the economic and financial system not only of Italy but also of many other countries, the USA above all. It is often called an international crime concern, which has gained immense influence in capitalist society, where wealth is the main criterion of man's abilities, no matter how it has been obtained.

As it grows fabulously rich, the Mafia establishes ever closer ties with the powers-that-be. A clear example of this is the story of Michele Sindona, the Mafia banker. He started out by selling lemons from a truck stolen at a US occupation army depot, then he got involved in Mafia operations, which made him one of the wealthiest men in Italy. Sindona built the largest financial empire on the Apennines and in the USA, and received personal invitations from American presidents to inauguration ceremonies. His job in the Mafia was to "clean" in his banks the "dirty" money obtained by robbery, financial chicanery and drug trafficking.

The ruin of his Banca privata Italiana was the first instance in a long series of disclosures. Sindona was sentenced to 25 years in prison in the USA and then was extradited to Italy, where he was sentenced for life on charges of assassinating Judge Giorgio Ambrosoli who had ferreted

out the truth about his machinations. In court Sindona was silent, but nonetheless his former accomplices could not feel safe. The long arm of the Mafia reached him in the cell of the ultramodern Voghera prison, despite round-the-clock watch over him. A hefty dose of potassium cyanide in his daily cup of coffee silenced the "banker" forever. To this day it is not known who put the poison in his coffee and who served it to him in the prison cell.

What sentence should be given to the Italian Mafia for the crimes it has committed? In the opinion of Public Prosecutor G. Aiala, who spoke for the prosecution at the Palermo trial early in April this year, the verdict should be 5,000 years in prison. During eight court sessions he analysed the crimes committed by the omnipotent Mafia bosses. At the very beginning of his speech he said that most of "the Mafia's gold" had been amassed through drug trafficking. It has been revealed that an extremely far-reaching illegal network of "white-staff" death-dealers is spread all across the Middle East, Sicily, the USA and Europe. The underworld syndicate bosses, the public prosecutor said, had established international "cooperation" on a large scale, using major Western banks for their purposes, and placed their gold in secret accounts in Swiss banks. The "dirty" money gained by drug trafficking, he went on, became "clean" capital investments in various industries. In his opinion, this enabled the Mafia dons to penetrate deep into the economic infrastructure of the West and gain control over some major industries like construction.

"The sums handled by the Mafia," said Public Prosecutor of Palermo Vito Palma, "are astounding. It has been ascertained that the Sicilian Mafia sold to its US counterpart a billion dollars' worth of drugs in 1982 alone, with 40 (sic!) times as much money gained from the resale of these drugs on the US markets." The investigation conducted by mixed Italian, West German, French and Swiss police groups, which had examined the documents of many respectable banks and firms in the West, Palma went on to say, led them to the shocking conclusion: the Mafia had invested staggering sums in land, construction, restaurants, hotels, casinos, banks, private TV companies, and the agroindustrial sector. A confiscation of the capital which the Mafia has thus invested, could provoke a "new industrial crisis".

How, then, has the Mafia built up such an immense might? And how did it emerge? Declaring that "the Mafia does not exist", cardinal Ruffini expressed the view, which was quite widespread until recently, that there is no secret organisation called Mafia, that there is ordinary crime, and not only in Sicily but elsewhere. A correspondent of the reputable Milan weekly *Europeo* wrote merely a few years back: "The Mafia as a powerful covert and supersecret organisation ...was invented by journalists, bureaucrats and court officials who have nothing to do with Sicily. They did that to give some kind of name to the complex social phenomenon which otherwise they could not account for."

But it is not only the law of silence which has sealed the mouths of the "respectable society" members, that had given rise to the allegation that "the Mafia does not exist". Even the origin of this word is not clear. There are several versions to that effect. Some associate the word "Mafia" with the name of an Arab tribe, which in the past had settled close to the Sicilian town of Trapani, or with the Arab phrase meaning "I do not know", or with the word "refuge", or "hiding-place".

There are other interpretations of the word. One of them is that allegedly during the uprising against French rule in Sicily in 1282, known in history as *Cenacolo siciliano*, a current watchword was "Morte alla

Francia, Italia anela" (Death to France; Italy, breath again), and "Mafia" is the acronym of that phrase.

The word "Mafia" as the name of a secret criminal organisation first appeared in a play by Italian playwright Gasparre Mosca staged in Sicily late in the 19th century. However, the facts show that the phenomenon which is called today by the short and vicious name "Mafia" emerged long before the play was written. Mafia dons went out of their way to present their organisation as a "defender of the oppressed population of Sicily", the protector of the poor and disinherited. Even some historians took the bait. Some of them still believe that the Mafia had emerged from among peasant self-defence groups, and that there was a time when it defended the interests of Sicilians and came out against the hostile Italian oppressor state. But this is a myth, false throughout.

The Mafia originated, in the opinion of communist writer Michele Pantaleone, an outstanding researcher of the syndicate, in Sicily where a feudal order persisted early in last century. Vast latifundia, at least 2,000 hectares each, were owned by land barons, the full masters of not only land but of all who lived on it. Their lawless subjects, the peasants, worked under the supervision of overseers who, organised in armed detachments, made up a kind of "private armies". Runaway convicts, tramps, thieves and other rabble were recruited into those armies. The secret organisation, subsequently called "the Mafia", was formed on the basis of those detachments.¹

The traditional Mafia boss never hides away in the mountains with a shotgun, but lives openly, though protected by armed mafiosi. He is a "respected" citizen, has friends among Members of Parliament and ministers, and gives interviews to the press. A mafioso does everything to portray an image of "decency", and talks about "justice" and "loyalty to traditions". He must always "tell the truth" to another member of the "respectable society". When detained and interrogated by the police, a mafioso must keep the law of silence. If he fails to do that, only one punishment is meted out for him—death.

The "respectable society" has its own language, which is not understood by strangers. Moreover, the Sicilian dialect differs a great deal from the Italian language and is incomprehensible to the officials and policemen sent from Rome. The Mafia also uses the language of gesticulations. A mafioso does not have to open his mouth to make a speech before his mates, and no outsider can understand him.

The smallest unit of the "respectable society" is the "famiglia" (family). Its nucleus is indeed made up of relatives, members of one or several families, which are so large in Sicily. Previously only relatives could make up a "famiglia", but now, according to Buscetta, even a complete stranger can be admitted to it if he proves his loyalty to the Mafia by killing an enemy of the "famiglia".

The "famiglia" is headed by the "capo" elected by general vote. A few "famiglias" make up a "cosca", and several "coscas" make up a "conserteria", something of a production association using pastures, fruit gardens, fisheries, markets, etc., as a cover for the Mafia's criminal activities. At the head of the Mafia, Buscetta said, is a special commission, or "cupola", in which all regional units are represented. The supreme boss is called "capo dei capi". It is not known exactly who occupies this post at present. Several persons have been named, but it is quite possible that the post is vacant. The Mafia has become too bulky an organisation operating internationally.

During many years of emigration, about 10 million Italians moved to the United States. Mafiosi, too, were among the unemployed and the landless peasants who joined the American society of "freedom and democracy". In the United States the Italian gangsters set up a secret organisation called *Mano nera*, later renamed *Cosa nostra*. The Sicilian mafiosi grew rich on smuggling, gambling, drug-trafficking and on bootlegging during the prohibition.

At its first "congress", held illegally in Atlantic City in 1929, the Mafia bosses divided the spheres of influence among themselves and formed a Sicilian alliance, the largest association of the Mafia's criminal organisations. Now it owns thousands of restaurants, hotels, motels, parking lots and casinos in the USA. The annual money turnover of the criminal community is, according to the US police, about \$100 billion. The mafiosi even wormed themselves into Wall Street where the destinies of the capitalist world are decided. In 1985, Secretary of Labor Raymond Donovan was accused of having close ties with the Mafia and had to resign. Some US labour unions are fully controlled by *Cosa nostra*. Without its consent one cannot even be given the job of garbage collector in many cities, or a docker's job in ports.

The Americans themselves say that *Cosa nostra* has become part of the American way of life. America is more likely to rid itself of the White House, than of the Mafia, Rolf Winter observed bitterly in his book *Kosmary Ameriki* (The Nightmares of America).² One of the versions of US President John F. Kennedy's assassination is that it was namely the Sicilian Mafia which was behind it. Some Italian journalists, in particular, Bisiak, say the Sicilian Mafia looked upon John Kennedy as its bitter enemy because of the "loss" of Cuba, which had long been for the Mafia a transshipping centre in drug smuggling into the USA and a source of handsome profits from gambling dens and bordellos in Havana. The mafiosi also hated the President's brother, Robert Kennedy, then Attorney-General, who had declared a merciless war on the Mafia.

It has become known that the heads of the Italo-American Mafia held a secret meeting not far from New Orleans in September 1962 to talk over the tough spot they had been put in by the "plottings" of the Kennedy brothers. "It is time to take the stone out of the shoe," Carlos Marcello, the New Orleans Mafia boss, said somberly. The meaning of that phrase was well understood by those present—it was a death sentence in the Mafia phraseology.

The Mafia appeared to be involved in the attempt on the life of Pope John Paul II. Mafioso Giovanni Pandico, repenting the action, admitted at an interrogation that the Mafia, represented by one of its bosses, Raffaele Cutulo, "conditioned", at the secret services' request, Turkish terrorist Agca serving a term in prison, to frame Bulgarian citizens, charging them of complicity in the attempt to assassinate the head of the Catholic Church.

Close contacts between the Mafia and the political quarters in the West have a long record. As far back as World War II American secret services released from prison Lucky Luciano, a gangster, and hired him for organising support for the landing of the Anglo-American troops on Sicily. The US occupation authorities appointed inveterate mafiosi, and people associated with them, mayors of many cities and towns on the island, as a token of gratitude. Ultra-right politicians have maintained links with Mafia leaders ever since. In the initial postwar years the "respectable society" bosses took part, together with the monarchists, in staging a right-wing mutiny in Sicily with the aim of separating the island from Italy. However, the operation, engineered by US secret services, failed.

Mafiosi have always had a hand in subversive plots prepared by neo-

fascists in Italy. The Mafia is a reliable supplier of weapons and explosives for the terrorists who create tensions and spread violence in the country. It is involved in many blood-curdling crimes: the bomb explosion at the Bologna railway station, blasts in passenger trains, political assassinations and kidnappings.

So, the Mafia today is not merely crime syndicate, as the bourgeois mass media tries to maintain. It acts regularly and quite actively on the side of reactionary forces which are opposed to democratic changes in Italy, their goal being to make a shift to the right. This, among other things, accounts for the invulnerability and tenacity of the Mafia. Its activity is needed by the powers-that-be because, in the final analysis, it is precisely the Mafia which defends their interests.

The Palermo trial indictment, published in 1986, states: "The idea that the Mafia is an organisation based on solidarity, helping the weak and unprotected, is the product of ignorance or naivety. Even if 'solidarity' does exist within the Mafia, among its members, it concerns only joint profit-making. General human values like honour, the family and friendship, something which the Mafia has always boasted about, have in reality been destroyed by it and have long served as a suitable cover-up for oppressing the poor classes in Sicily, worsening their conditions still more."³

Speaking in the Italian Parliament, Oscar Mammi, chairman of the commission for the interior, said it was not enough to trace back the origin of the big fortunes among the persons suspected of links with the Mafia—it is necessary to find out also how some Sicilian politicians manage to win in the elections.

The Mafia prepares for elections in its traditional manner, using threats, bribing, blackmail, and eliminating the recalcitrants. The "godfathers" provide a sufficient number of Sicilian votes for the Christian Democratic Party, the most influential party in the country. In return, the politicians whom these votes have brought into the Parliament or the Council of Ministers, reward them by secret guarantees of impunity. Moreover, the "godfathers" corrupt politicians, making them obedient servants of the "respectable society".

In early 1980s Mafia activities in Sicily have reached such wide proportions that the authorities were compelled to take urgent measures. General Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa, who had won repute by crushing the elusive Brigade Rosse was sent to Sicily "to deal the Mafia a death blow". Dalla Chiesa received the post of the prefect of Palermo and set to establishing law and order.

Very soon, however, the general found himself in complete isolation. The "city fathers" from the Christian Democratic Party gave him a cold reception, making him understand outright that they were not going to render the least support to the new prefect. The government leaders, those who had sent Dalla Chiesa to "put an end to the Mafia", did not support him either. Sending the energetic general to the island, the authorities were merely trying to calm down the public but as soon as he tried to hamstring the financial might of the "respectable society" and leave its bosses without ties with the political quarters, they abandoned him.

The son of Dalla Chiesa recalled: "For all the assurances, my father soon felt that the government failed to keep its promises... He believed that the local authorities and CDP representatives on Sicily were putting pressure on Rome not to give him the powers required for combating the Mafia effectively... This opposition could mean only one thing—they [Sicilian CDP leaders and mafiosi—V. M.] play the same game."⁴

Dalla Chiesa was the prefect of the Sicilian capital for exactly one hundred days. He and his wife were shot dead in a car in a central street of the city. On the next day after the assassination someone wrote on the wall of a house near the scene of the tragedy: "Here died the last hope of the honest people in Palermo."

Prefect Dalla Chiesa was far from the only "high-level" victim of the Mafia. Among the others shot by the assassins hired by the "respectable society" in recent years alone were Giuliano, chief of the city police; Basile, commander of the carabinieri unit; Judge Terranova, and Public Prosecutor of Palermo Scaglione. The murder of Pio La Torre, secretary of the local federation of the Italian Communist Party on Sicily, set off a tide of public anger and protest.

Previously the Mafia had avoided killing high-ranking state officials so as not to attract attention and provoke mass arrests. But now it has discarded all camouflage and haughtily brings across the message: it will annihilate anyone who ventures to restrict its might.

But why is it so self-confident? Many analysts believe that the source of its haughtiness is in its ties with the political quarters and the ruling bourgeois parties. "The Mafia," says Ferdinando Camon, a writer, "has merged with the bourgeois state like two kinds of liquid in one glass. No one knows any longer now where the Mafia ends and the state begins."⁵

The Mafia almost completely controls the municipality and many municipal services in the Sicilian capital Palermo. Christian Democrat Giuseppe Insalaco, one of the latest city mayors, refused to have ties with the "respectable society", but had to leave his post in four months. "I was a naive man," he told a correspondent of the *Panorama* weekly. "I wanted to do away with the Mafia and with corruption, but this cannot be done in Palermo. Anyone who tries to put obstacles in the way of a big deal associated with municipal contracts for road repairs, sewage or lighting is simply moved out of the way or liquidated. This has been done to all the recent mayors, including myself."

The Mafia's domination has caused severe harm to Palermo. Unemployment is rampant, and the "borgate"—peripheral districts with shabby houses lacking elementary amenities—are in a appalling condition. The historical city centre has grown dilapidated—an old house collapses almost every week, killing people under the debris. The authorities set aside funds to restore the central ancient streets, but the money is not used, mainly because the rivalling Mafia clans cannot divide lucrative contracts among themselves. Meanwhile, ever more villas with fountains spring up in the aristocratic districts, where Mafia bosses come to live.

Back in 1963, a parliamentary commission was set up under public pressure to investigate the activities of the Mafia. The commission, or "antimafia", as it was called in Italy, was composed of representatives from all political parties. Its work was difficult and dangerous, and yet it gathered thousands of revealing documents on the top mafiosi, on their ties, on abuses by the local power bodies, on corruption in the construction industry, on drug-trafficking, and on the Mafia's penetration into political quarters, the administrative machinery, and justice bodies. It remained only to hand this heap of documents down to the judges, and the monstrous edifice of illegal power, built by the Mafia, would have been shaken under the impact of undeniable evidence. But this was not done.

Why? Mainly because the Mafia even had its people in that commission. Besides, the politicians and members of parliament faithful to the

"respectable society" did everything to obstruct the work of the "antimafia", to prevent it from achieving concrete results. In protest against this sabotage organised by the Mafia the communist members of the commission published a separate "minority report", a true verdict on the gangster syndicate.

The important conclusion made in the report is that the Mafia is a class phenomenon and to uproot it "the relations between the state and all its citizens must be changed profoundly. If we want to deal a decisive blow at the Mafia's domination... we must mobilise the working people and build up their unity. Speaking in a broader context, it is necessary to start, at last, solving the problems involved in the economic and social development of the island." "Sicily," the authors of the report say, "will never gain freedom unless Italy moves ahead along the path of democracy, the path towards socialism."

A significant point to note in this connection is that at the current trial in Palermo Public Prosecutor G. Aiala stated pessimistically that the Mafia cannot be combated in courts. We can only pass a sentence on those guilty, but to destroy the Mafia once and for all, we must do away with its social roots.

Commenting on the trial of the Mafia bosses, the democratic press in Italy writes that the Mafia octopus feeds on social injustice, unemployment and lack of housing. The first to be ensnared by the Mafia are young people who have lost all hope of living a decent life in the "welfare society". In the south of Italy, where the Mafia's positions are especially strong, poverty and destitution have spread to appalling proportions. In Naples, for instance, there are districts near the merchant port which are called "bassi", meaning the lower part of the city. It is a truly horrible place, unfit for human beings to live in—gloomy ramshackle houses in little damp streets where even a strip of the sky is hidden from view by the linen hung out to dry, and stench, heaps of garbage and rotting refuse everywhere.

On a hot day the squalid interior of the homes of the poor and unemployed are seen through the doors and windows open wide in such weather. Drunken sailors and throngs of ribald youths with thievish eyes and manners of a rogue are seen in by-streets. Dirty and ragged children beg in the streets. Smuggled cigarettes are sold at every corner and Japanese transistor radios, videotape recorders from Hong Kong, and Malaysian fabrics are sold at numerous little shops, meanwhile police look the other way. All know that illegal business feeds thousands of families in Naples. Official statistics say about 100,000 people in the city live on the money obtained by smuggling.

The unemployment level in the south is twice as high as in the north. "Unemployment and poverty—these are the chief sources of the growing crime not only in Naples, but in the whole of southern Italy," said Maurizio Valenzi, former mayor of Naples, in an interview, "Tens of thousands of people have no means of subsistence. They never know where their next meal is coming from. Meanwhile they see people around them wallowing in luxury. The Mafia has no difficulty in recruiting new people for its criminal deeds from among the unemployed and desolate."

Pio La Torre said that "the Mafia has grown large and powerful because the Sicilian landlords needed a strong hand to keep the peasants in check. The young Italian state clearly could not do that—it was too weak. Today, there occurs the interpenetration of the Mafia and political power, the Mafia and the state, so that the poor classes are kept in submission."

"The Mafia made use for its own ends of the Sicilians' hatred for unfair and anti-democratic state power. It used popular discontent against the people themselves. To be able to commit crimes with impunity the

'respectable society' needed a 'conspiracy of silence' and support by the Sicilians. It did manage to achieve this to a certain extent—an immense campaign for mystification was carried out. The Mafia bent the population to its power and justified in their eyes its illegal power and activities.

"I am convinced," stressed Pio La Torre, "that the Mafia is the product of the ruling classes. All talk that the Mafia is allegedly the Sicilians' way of life and that such are popular traditions, that banditism is in the blood of the islanders make it more difficult to see the essence of the matter and to combat this disgusting and shameful phenomenon in the life of our people, and in general it suits only the Mafia and those who maintain social injustice with its help. Can the Mafia be done away with? We Communists are convinced that the time will come when the sad chapter in the history of Sicily will be closed, and the island and the whole of Italy will be relieved of the monstrous power of the Mafia. But the Mafia cannot be destroyed only by police reprisals, arrests, and court trials. Radical changes are needed in the economic and social life of the country, Italy should undergo genuine and profound change, unemployment should be eliminated and democratic reforms effected..."

This author interviewed Pio La Torre a few years ago. Recently sad news came from Italy: hired assassins shot dead the courageous Communist in Palermo. Meetings and demonstrations of protest against this crime of the Mafia swept all across Italy. The working people declared their determination to carry on unabating struggle against the mafiosi and those in the political quarters who support them.

The legal proceedings in Palermo against the "respectable society" whose members either kept silent or pleaded not guilty continued for several months. Dozens of Mafia bosses or rank-and-file mafiosi who had committed hundreds of murders and thousands of heinous crimes were behind thick iron bars, smirking before cameras. The court house was heavily guarded, police helicopters hovered over the building, numerous plainclothed agents and carabinieri armed with tommy guns were around it.

Briefly speaking, all thinkable, and unthinkable, precautions were taken to carry the proceedings through to the end and duly to punish the criminals. But will this be done? The reports from Italy show that this is not easy, and one cannot be sure that the mafiosi will go to prison in the end. The point is that the barristers, the best in Italy (the Mafia had payed them generously), have resorted to an artful trick. They have demanded that all the documents of the investigation be read out in court. But to do that (there are about 800,000 pages of them) the court will have to hold sittings another two years or so. And the term of preliminary imprisonment of the majority of the defendants expired already in May 1987 and they have been released.

The democratic public in Italy demands that the Parliament interfere without delay to frustrate the attempts of the powerful Mafia and its patrons to "drown the trial". Future will show whether this can be done or not.

¹ See M. Pantaleone, *Mafia e politica*, Turin, 1978, p. 7.

² P. Виптер. *Кошмары Америки*. Moscow, 1978, p. 175.

³ *Mafia. L'atto d'accusa dei giudici di Palermo*, Rome, 1986, p. 70.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 228-229.

⁵ *Panorama*, Sept. 20, 1982.

"HARMLESS" FASCISM

Yuri YERSHOV

A bulky grey stone slab looks incongruous against the serene landscape of a little public garden, which are numerous in Hamburg, the largest West German city. A bas-relief on the slab depicts marching soldiers. The caption reads: "Germany must live on, even if we are destined to die." I saw similar soldiers chiselled on a huge tomb-like monument dominating the Reeser Platz in Düsseldorf...

I could not find out any details about the first warlike symbol. But the second one, in Düsseldorf, was far easier to "decode". A city museum catalogue says that the armed soldiers personify the souls of those who have died for their homeland. Rising from a grave, they marched in an orderly formation to war, to the Second World War, the catalogue specifies, for it began a few days after the monument's inauguration. On the right side of the monument, picturing gallant soldiers of the 39th infantry regiment, are the names of the places the regiment had been between 1940 and 1945. Apart from French populated areas, the list includes Vyazma and Bryansk, the Upper Volga and Staritsa, Kozhevnikovo and Moscow outskirts, Rshv and Kaluga, the Don bend and Staryi Oskol. A caption above it reads: "For the honour and liberty of the German people".

It is amazing that this relic of Hitlerite militarism is in Reeser Platz more than 40 years after the rout of the fascist Wehrmacht. It is hard to believe that the huge monument exists, and the stone shadows of the fallen ancestors march endlessly on to die for Germany, for the honour and liberty of the German people.

Can all this be possible after what happened between the years of 1939 and 1945? Is it possible to speak of the honour and liberty of the German people, which, beginning on January 30, 1933, were trampled underfoot by storm troopers and SS-men with the taciturn "neutrality" of the military? Can one assert today that Germans were dying in the Second World War to save Germany and not to cater to the interests of the Nazi regime which had launched that war?

THEY WERE SAVING THE VATERLAND

Yes, they were saving their fatherland, at least in the 1944-1945 period. When the Red Army had crossed the frontier of the Reich, writes historian Andreas Hillgruber from Cologne. From then on the combat actions of the German troops were defensive, he writes in a pamphlet called *Zweierlei Untergang* (Double Downfall) published in 1986 in West Berlin. In the east of the country, Hillgruber alleges, generals and government officials issued orders aimed only at "preventing the raging vengeance of the Red Army", and "saving the German population from outrage by frenzied Soviet troops". Such noble motives immediately turn the aggressive war into a defensive and "fair" one.

The ordinary man in the street will take this version for granted and

possibly will not notice the fraud, which specialists and those familiar with the history of the Second World War are sure not to overlook. According to Hillgruber, the army units and civilian authorities (if one could call them civilian under Nazism) which operated in the eastern regions of Germany had great independence in decision-making. That is not true. The orders to defend every piece of land, every heap of stones, every bit of a forest and every tree or shrub to the last man were issued from the Fuhrer's bunker. Hitler still ruled the country, Goebbels still expatiated about a "final victory" awaiting the Germans, and Speer hurried up the military works. In the summer of 1944, the Hitler troops still occupied the greater part of Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Balkans; and all of Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands; nearly all of France, northern Italy, and the Baltic regions of the Soviet Union.

Could in those circumstances all the commanders, landrats and burgomasters be the main figures, even if only in East Prussia? They hardly could. As for their nobleness, being the middle administrative section of the Nazi military-political machinery, they were accomplices to the Nazi crimes. Atrocities were committed in Polish and Soviet territories even a short while before the rout of Nazism, and officers were directly involved in them. German anti-fascists and resistance fighters were seized by the Gestapo or sent to concentration camps after the civilian authorities informed against them. Prisoners of war, political prisoners and workers of various nationalities forcefully brought to Germany were ruthlessly exploited at German factories, with the help of those authorities.

There is no need, perhaps, to recall in detail what was it that the loyal defenders of the Reich were so stubbornly protecting. Hillgruber knows this only too well: in the German territory behind the frontlines, arrests, tortures and shootings continued, and thick smoke was rising from the incinerator chimneys of concentration camps.

Why was it necessary, after all, to challenge historical truth with a flimsy version of "defenders of the population" and a "just war", a version not based on facts? In the opinion of Kurt Pätzold, a professor of Humboldt University in Berlin, the author of *Zweierlei Untergang* expects that at least the people in the Federal Republic will look differently at the war launched by the Nazis, in particular at its final stage on the Eastern Front, when they learn about allegedly independent actions, imbued with the "ethics of responsibility", undertaken by commanders, landrats and burgomasters. This attitude is adopted, for instance, by Alfred Dregger, chairman of the CDU/CSU faction in the Bundestag. There is a direct link, he said, between the struggle he took part in on the Eastern Front in 1944-1945, and the struggle he carries on today in the NATO framework against the same enemy.

This explains why it was namely Dregger who issued this call: "It is high time to discard the historiography imposed on us by the victor countries". The call was heard. Ernest Nolte, an historian in West Berlin, was the first to respond to it by publishing the article "The Past Which Can't Seem to Leave Us" in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* in June 1986. By revising history, he declared, we can erect a "wall" in the way of the incessant condemnations of the national-socialist past, which is hanging over the present like a condemning sword. Nolte was backed up by Joachim Carl Fest, the publisher of the above-mentioned newspaper and a well-known biographer of Adolf Hitler; Michael Stürmer, adviser to the Chancellor on historical matters; Joachim Hoffmann, director of the museum of military history in Freiburg; Hillgruber and other historians, philosophers, journalists and right-wing politicians. Their sophistic sallies against long-established facts are convincingly disproved by democratic-minded politicians, scientists, journalists and by members of

the Bund der Antifaschisten, an association of persons persecuted under Nazism.

It is commonly known that history is not an abstract science, that it is based on facts. But as all the sciences it is in constant motion. New, previously unknown facts are being studied, and old truths are being revised when necessary. Precisely this elementary rule is abused by Nolte and his associates as they give a new interpretation to the rise and fall of German fascism, although they have no grounds for this, as there are no discoveries, no documentary finds, and no new sources.

For lack of new facts, they perform a primitive trick, making use of the long-disproved arguments employed by fascist propaganda in the past. In particular, they are trying to revive the well-known statement by Hitler about the preventive character of the attack by Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. It is common knowledge that this tall tale, invented at Goebbels' propaganda ministry, was short-lived. And after the war many facts became known, showing that in the plans for worldwide slaughter, started on September 1, 1939, the Soviet Union was always the chief target of fascist Germany. Serious historians—Nolte and the others claim to be such—cannot fail to know this.

However, they do not venture to ignore confirmed and documented facts. Who would dare outrightly deny the heinous crimes committed by the Nazis over the years of their rule? In any discussion about Nazism the horrible concentration camp Auschwitz is inevitably mentioned. But in this case, too, the culprits are sought elsewhere, and they are found, believed it or not. Bolshevism (sic!) is seen as the "real source" of the policy of genocide, pursued by German fascism. No, they do not deny that the national-socialists and Hitler himself committed an "Asian" crime, to use the expression borrowed from the Nazi parlance. However, the ruthless elimination of political enemies at home and abroad, which is described as a "middle-European" or "German-Austrian" crime by the publisher of *Der Spiegel* magazine Rudolf Augstein to spite Nolte, is being justified by the fear Hitler had of a "communist terror" in the country and an "outside Bolshevik threat".

The new-fangled revisers of history also draw other parallels. They look in the entire history of mankind for analogies to the atrocities committed by fascism. They do this in order to call in question, as Fest does, "the monumental widespread version that the crimes of national-socialism were unprecedentedly unique". This, according to Kurt Pätzold, is an attempt to make Auschwitz, that is, a crime of the Nazi regime limited only to extermination of Jews, part of the global historical view and is designed to lead one to the reassuring conclusion: "Others were no better".

Thus the extermination of people in concentration camps, though it is declared a horrible crime, is at the same time depicted as a normal historical phenomenon. True, the past centuries and millennia have not been without violence, which, incidentally had various historical consequences. This undeniable fact is used to present Auschwitz as an "exceptional case" of violence, which nonetheless has far more common than differing features as compared with other historical crimes.

For internal use of demagogic propaganda, wrote professor Kurt Pätzold in the West German newspaper *Deutsche Volkszeitung-Die Tat*, the postulates are as follows: each nation has at some time produced its own Hitler, and every nation has had something like its own Auschwitz. This is logically expected to prompt the conclusion that it is not right to fuss over Auschwitz so long, and that the time has come to draw a line.

But the historians who responded to the call issued by Dregger and Nolte, though they recognise Auschwitz, do not mention other Nazi atrocities which defy description. Not in concentration camps, but in occupied territory. Suffice it to recall Lidice, Oradour and Khatyn.

AND THEY HUNTED PEOPLE

Mournful silence around the Khatyn Memorial is disturbed now and again by the muffled toll of 26 bells: there had been 26 homesteads which the Nazis had reduced to ashes. The bells toll for all who died at the hands of the Nazis, especially for the 149 villagers who in March 1943 were burnt alive and for those few who tried to escape and were shot dead. Half of them were children. The tragic lot of Khatyn was shared by 618 villages and their inhabitants in Byelorussia alone.

When in Khatyn, one wonders, how man of the 20th century could do this? The answer is hard to find. The one most often provided by West German historians is: "There were orders to carry out". Orders were issued all right. By March 3, 1941, Hitler had anticipated the future war with the Soviet Union: this would be not a military but an ideological conflict, and therefore conquered territories would be ruled by Reichskommissar subordinate directly to Heinrich Himmler, SS Reichsfuhrer. The SS was to purge political commissars and Jewish and Bolshevik intellectuals from the Soviet Union, disunite the USSR and build a new Russia after a national-socialist image. Law and order in the rear was to be maintained by "draconian measures", that is, as the Fuhrer specified later, by fear which would paralyse the population's will to resist. He instructed the Wehrmacht commanders not to abide by the adopted international laws of warfare.¹

And none of them did. The SS mercilessly inflicted punishments, and the Wehrmacht, too, shot and hanged people. This is what Vyacheslav Molotov, the USSR People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, said on November 25, 1941 in a note sent to the ambassadors and envoys of all countries with which it had diplomatic relations: "The Red Army men taken prisoners are tortured with burning hot iron; their eyes are gauged out; their legs, arms, ears, noses and fingers are cut off; they are disemboweled; they are tied to tanks and torn apart. Fascist German officers and men commit such acts of fanatical cruelty and shameful crimes all along the front, wherever they appear and whenever they get hold of Red Army men and officers."²

These and other similar documents were based on facts. The note dated April 27, 1942, said: "In the Pokrov Village Soviet, Cherevishinovo District, Kursk Region, fascists undressed A. N. Alyokhin, a peasant, and forced him to dig a grave for himself, making him lie in the hole to measure it. When the grave was ready, they broke off his arms, cut off his ears, gauged out his eyes, after which they shot him. In the village of Donets, Dolzhansk District, Oryol Region, the Hitlerites tied up Nadezhda Maltseva, a girl of 17, and ordered her mother, Maria Maltseva, to put straw around her and set it on fire. The mother fainted. Then the Hitlerites themselves put the straw around the girl and set fire to it. As the mother came to, she rushed into the fire and dragged the daughter out. The Nazis killed the mother with a submachine gun butt-end, shot the daughter and threw her into the fire."³

Some people in the West believe that Nazi atrocities were inflicted only on the Soviet people. That this is not so is seen from the tragedies of Lidice and Oradour, which were razed to the ground by the Nazis. This is evidenced also by the innumerable memorial plaques that I have seen in Polish cities and villages. The inscriptions on plates state how many civilians were shot by the SS on a particular day. Seeing such plaques in the most varied locations I tried to imagine what people felt like who knew that as they left home each day they could be killed at any moment in a round-up, as happened to 80 people in Lipsko nad Wisla, who were destroyed a week after the start of the Second World War by the "grenadiers" of the 3rd battalion of the 71st infantry regiment. They

burned 50 people alive in a local synagogue, and chased after the rest as in a real hunt, with merry hallooing and the like.

An episode from the book *The Vengeance of Private Pooley*, published in London, shows the aggressors' actions on French soil. On May 27, 1940, in the small town of Le Paradis, SS-men from the Dead Head division shot 99 British servicemen point-blank, though the servicemen had stopped resisting, as they had run out of ammunition, and had waved the white flag. (As we see it, the Nazis disregarded definite international conventions and laws of warfare not only on Soviet territory.) Two privates, Pooley and O'Callaghan, survived by a miracle. When the war was over, Albert Pooley swore he would find the murderers, even if he would have to look for them in all the POW camps. After a long search he did find the commander of the company which had committed outrage in Le Paradis late in May 1940. The British tribunal in Hamburg started proceedings against Fritz Knöchlein and sentenced him to death. The sentence was carried out on January 28, 1949.

But how many other Knöchleins, these Nazi monsters of cruelty, have not yet answered for their crimes? How many of them live in safety in the FRG, or are sheltered by Uncle Sam? According to the French newspaper *Le Monde*, almost 91,000 Nazi war criminals have been put on trial in the FRG since May 8, 1945. Of them, 6,497 have been convicted; 5,025 have been condemned by the courts of the USA, Britain and France.

Last July, yet another Nazi criminal was tried—Klaus Barbie, former chief of the Fourth Department of Gestapo in Lyons. The trial took place in the city where he had French patriots executed. The evidence provided by the witnesses in court unveiled the true face of the butcher for the whole world to see. Among the witnesses was Gert Bastian, a former Wehrmacht soldier, a retired Bundeswehr general, and a deputy to the Bundestag. He said in reply to a question posed by the barrister: "I do not seek justification for myself. What happened can only be regretted and repented. This is precisely why I am here. I have also come to say that the Lyons trial is important to all of us Germans for understanding the horrors of the Nazi system, for realising the need to do all we can to prevent this from happening again."

Gert Bastian represents those sound forces in the Federal Republic, that are capable of understanding and overcoming the past, of hindering a fascist revival. Among such people is Richard von Weizsäcker, President of the FRG, who called May 8, 1945 the day of liberation, in an official speech he made on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the defeat of Hitler fascism. And the sufferings and adversities that befell the German people, he stressed, began not in 1945, but in 1933.

West German reactionaries, whose views are expressed by Dregger and Hillgruber, bluntly refuse to admit that. In the opinion of the latter, the spring of 1945 meant liberation to prisoners of concentration camps and jails, but not to the whole German nation, since the military goals of the victorious allies were not to eliminate the national-socialist system. But the facts indicate something altogether different. The anti-Hitler coalition, according to the Washington Declaration issued on January 1, 1942, pledged to fight jointly for the "victory over Hitlerism".⁴ The leaders of the allied powers always emphasised in their speeches and documents that they waged a war against Hitler Germany. This is why one of the chief goals of the occupation of Germany by the allied troops, proclaimed in the Potsdam agreements, was large-scale denazification.

Deliberately ignoring all this, Hillgruber identifies all German people with national-socialism, with the exception of political prisoners, of course. Moreover, the Cologne historian developed a theory, according to which 1945 was a catastrophe not only for Germany, but Europe as a whole. Because, he maintains, the German empire, established back in

1871, had served as a firm intermediate link between the East and West of Europe. The collapse of the German empire brought about the "downfall of Europe". By the "downfall of Europe" Hillgruber means, naturally, the formation of a system of socialist states there. The conclusion is obvious: had the empire continued to exist, preserving East Prussia, Pomerania and other provinces, socialism would not have spread. Thus, ideas which are clearly revanchist are being pushed at anti-communist expatiations on the significance of May 8, 1945.

A point to note here is that such "historical" conclusions are consonant with statements by some official Bonn politicians about an allegedly "open German question". Besides, slightly disguised claims to the restoration of the "German empire" as a "link" of Europe are suspiciously consonant with statements by US leaders that the agreements signed in Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam are not valid.

Yet another significant point here is that the "revisors" of history, with Nolte at the head, totally avoid mentioning the origin of fascism, its roots. Willy Brandt had every reason to demand at a Social-Democratic meeting last spring that it should not be allowed under any circumstances that "the interests of the ruling group at the time of fascism be passed off as the interests of the nation". It should be made clear once and for all who helped the Nazis come to power. And this is exactly what the historians revising the past do not want to do. Because if the matter is approached seriously, scientifically, the "theories" identifying socialism with fascism, which seem to be so well construed, fall to pieces.

An example of a scientific and all-round approach to the assessment of fascism as a social phenomenon was shown at the Seventh Congress of the Communist International, which defined the class nature of fascism in power as an "openly terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinist and most imperialist elements of financial capital".

"German fascism," wrote Dietrich Eichholtz and Wolfgang Schumann, the compilers of the collection *Anatomie des Krieges* (anatomy of war) published almost 20 years ago, "was a form of rule by state-monopoly capitalism, with the help of which the monopolies intended to overcome the crisis of the capitalist system. The means used to achieve that goal were terror within the country and redivision of the world".⁵

It was big business that brought Hitler to chancellery. It is known that on January 26, 1932, he met at the industrialists' club in Düsseldorf with the owners of the concerns in particular, with Henkel, Krupp, Stinnes, Thyssen, Vöglér, Poensgen, Flick, Kirdorf, and Springorum, to mention a few. Jost Henkel who took part in that meeting, said "off the record" to US diplomat Charles W. Thayer that Hitler had promised them he would do away with the Communists. Hinkel and the others promised him support in return. They were against the Communists and did not support the Nazis, the tycoon recalled, but the Nazis were the only one-hundred-per-cent anti-communist party in the Reichstag, and they hoped that in future they would pull out the poison teeth of the little comedian. But they failed to that, because the comedian, to their distress, turned out to be not so comic. Thus, he said, they made a mistake in their political estimates, but there is no way this can be regarded as a crime against humanity.

Henkel is wrong and he knows it: there was no mistake. The capitalists were not going to pull out Hitler's poison teeth, because he had promised to put an end not only to Communists but to the working-class movement in general, including the Social Democrats and the trade unions.

The monopolists, for their part, having installed Hitler in power and lavishly subsidising the Nazi party, ran the show. The economy was

being militarised at a high pace in line with their instructions. And it was not at all to secure Lebensraum for the German people, as official propaganda alleged, that the Nazis started the world war, but to secure Lebensraum for financial capital and so to provide it with minerals and factories, markets, spheres where capital could be applied, economic and political spheres of influence, raw materials, and cheap labour. To the imperialists Hitler was merely the leader of a political movement which would help them achieve their own ends. The Fuhrer, no doubt, had great-power ambitions of his own, which were growing by the year, but he would have never become Hitler without the big industrialist patrons.

In the opinion of West German professor Josef Schleifstein, the roots of Nazism have never been entirely extracted in the Federal Republic. Right after the war the Western countries reinstated the forces which had nurtured fascism in power in zones of their occupation. They were required for restoring capitalism, averting the "threat" coming from the left anti-fascist movements, and carrying on the cold war more effectively under the guidance of the United States.

A GLIMPSE OF HISTORY AND OF THE PRESENT

The historical dispute started by Nolte and his colleagues doubtlessly pursues political, and not scientific, goals. This is nothing new. Reinhard Kühnl, a well-known political scientist in Marburg, who specialises in studying fascism, writes that even before the First World War history in Germany played the role of a major ideological science. It created the ideological notions of the state and society, on which most of the educated people in the country relied, and it formulated justifications for the domination of the bourgeoisie in Germany and for seizure of foreign territories.

These stereotypes in thinking remained after 1918, Kühnl goes on, because personal and ideological continuity remained. In the late 1920s, this ideology merged with the wide right-wing movement, which made the emergence of the fascist regime possible. So, fascists did not need to "clean" history—it had been favourable to them.

But 1945 is another matter. Human memory, which will long recall the heinous crimes, the defeated Nazi regime committed, demanded that an end be put to fascism and Hitlerism once and for all. The FRG officially condemned Germany's fascist past and in its historiography it recognised that the war had been started by the German Reich and the terror and extermination of peoples were entirely on its conscience. Moreover, owing to the "new Eastern policy" pursued by the government of Social Democrats and Free Democrats, the international prestige of the Federal Republic increased considerably. But even in those good years quite a few attempts were made to whitewash fascism, to revise history, together with the results of the Second World War. In this sense the "revision" of history we witness today is nothing new. However, the pseudo-scientific soil fertilised by it sprouts the followers of the mad Führer, especially in West Germany. The theses proclaimed by the "new" chroniclers are readily swallowed by revenge-seeking and neo-Nazi circles.

This is exemplified by their neo-Nazi frenzy in connection with the death of one of the most prominent Hitler's henchman Rudolf Hess who committed suicide in the Spandau prison in West Berlin. The war criminal sentenced in Nuremberg was glorified as a "martyr" and "peace-maker" and was advertised to the youth as a man of staunch spirit". At a meeting sponsored by the neo-Nazi German people's union an expert on the Third Reich David Irving described Hess as the only man who had sacrificed his life for peace. It comes as no surprise that this

rehabilitation was sprinkled with malicious lies about the anti-Hitler coalition. In particular, Springer's *Die Welt* accused the Soviet Union of cruelty since it was against pardoning Hess because allegedly it regarded him "as a living symbol of the German guilt, thereby striving to humiliate the Germans".

It is indicative that this all-forgiving demagogery was swallowed by some people who are not associated with Nazism. Initially, Klaus Lidtke, one of the managers of the weekly *Stern*, felt some compassion towards Hess. He wrote: "However, my memory returned me to the hangmen who had seized Germany and Europe under the guise of doctors, lawyers, officers. To the true martyrs who perished in gas chambers of concentration camps, who were electrocuted on barbed wire, who, straight from the resistance movement were hanged on butcher's hooks, who were mutilated already in childhood by being used as guinea-pigs..."

"And anger is breeding. Anger at the inability of many Germans to look history straight in the eyes. Anger at the lost opportunities already in the first post-war years to bring to justice all Nazi killers... Anger at the baseness with which new posts were distributed in post-war Germany and with the new glorification of the Nazi obscurantist lawyers, while their victims had to fight for compensation".⁶

Lidtke stressed that there could not be forgiveness for such symbols of national-socialism as Hess. Even in a millennium. Our past, he summed up, will burden us until we attempt to purge it from our memory.

And it is the purging of the genuine Nazi past from the memory of the peoples, and first of all the Germans that the latter-day historians are engaged in. And the persistence with which they impose their strange, to state it mildly, interpretation of the past, puts people on guard. And this is not by chance.

New political thinking today penetrates ever deeper into people's minds. It has influenced even those who in recent decades were considered to be, so to speak, social bastions of great-power ambitions and all sorts of deterrence doctrines. Among them are scientists who no longer merely speak individually about their responsibility for maintaining peace, but come out publicly against military research. Among them are also businessmen who think it more beneficial to maintain business relations than to take part in mad military projects. And among them are millions of men and women of various political and religious views who resolutely demand disarmament.

Such a course of events, naturally, does not suit financial and industrial capital which makes profits on the arms race, nor is it favoured by the political circles catering to its interests. In the FRG they are called the Steel Helmet Faction. It is to fulfil their orders that the present day "innovators" like Nolte, Hillgruber, Hoffmann, Stürmer and others burst into action. In their ideological zeal these heralds of "harmless" fascism have gone too far. Their accusing the Soviet Union of having allegedly become a real source of war and genocide is monstrous. In this way they want to make the public think that the Soviet Union, and socialism as a whole, are, as before, a dangerous source of aggression.

Thus, the present-day hawks in Bonn are given new justification for obtaining nuclear arms, justification for the unrestrained arms race and the striving to secure military-strategic superiority for the West. Thus

(Continued on page 125)

BUCHAREST MEETINGS

Go for a stroll around Bucharest, and the names of streets and squares will remind you of the country's history, of the battles waged by the people for national liberation and social emancipation fought by them long ago.

Victoria Street. Today's generations associate it primarily with victory over Nazi Germany, and history itself has hallowed its name in precisely this sense. Actually the name refers to the victory of Russian and Romanian troops over the Turks in the 1877-1878 war, which won Romania national independence by freeing it from the centuries-long tyranny of the Ottoman Empire. Ever since then, Victoria Street has been a centre of political and cultural activities.

The most noteworthy building there is the former royal palace, which now houses the Palace of the Republic and is the seat of the State Council of the SRR. It is reminiscent of a turning point in Romanian history, the people's armed uprising against fascist rule on August 23, 1944. That day Ion Antonescu, the fascist dictator, was summoned by King Mihai and arrested. This signalled the start of the Communist-led uprising, whose victory was helped along by developments on the Soviet-German front. At daybreak on August 20, the thunder of cannonade in the Iasi and Kishinev area announced the beginning of one of the biggest offensives by Soviet troops which delivered a crushing blow to the 900,000-strong Southern Ukraine fascist army group, the mainstay of the Antonescu dictatorship. The Red Army's liberation campaign in Romania, which claimed the lives of 69,000 Soviet men and officers, entered its decisive and most difficult stage. Joint battles for the liberation of northern and northwestern Transylvania and then Hungary and Czechoslovakia forged Soviet-Romanian companionship in arms, continuing the two peoples' centuries-old tradition of struggle against common enemies.

There is an old hotel, the Athénée Palace, on Victoria Street. Dr. Petru Groza, leader of the farmers' front, stayed there more than once in the years of his political struggle. In March 1945, he became head of Romania's first people's democratic government, which restored diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

Near the children's department store, Victoria Street is intersected by a picturesque boulevard, named after Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the Romanian Communist leader, whose name is associated with many chapters of the proletariat's revolutionary struggle and the country's socialist construction.

These signs of the past set off those of the present, for it is there, in the city centre, the crossroads of the capital and, indeed, the whole country, that you automatically think of the republic as it is today and the headway made by the people in the years of building socialism.

Look at Bucharest. Two-thirds of it may be said to have been built anew or reconstructed since the country was liberated from fascism. Housing construction in the city, whose population has topped two million, is continuing at a high rate, about 30,000 apartments a year. The housing problem is therefore expected to be solved in the main, both in the capital and in the rest of the country, by 1990. And according to preliminary data by the year 2000, every family shall have their own apartment with 12 square metres of floor-space per occupant.

Time was when Bucharest was expanding, with shabby outlying neighbourhoods giving way one after another to new residential areas: Titan, Berceni, Drumul Iabărei, Colentina, and Pantelimon. At present, the city is going through internal development, so to speak, as old neighbourhoods in the centre are being reconstructed. It looks therefore like a gigantic building site, all the more since the subway is being expanded. Not so long ago its new route linked the south with the north. By the end of this decade the length of the subway, one of the world's newest, is planned to reach 60 kilometres. Reliance on the subway as a means of solving the capital's rather acute transport problem is proving well-founded. According to specialists, it saves every passenger one hour a day. "The subway has a beginning but no end," you hear its builders say. Their plans for the future include a circular route.

Bucharest sprang up on the Dîmbovița River in the 15th century. The river crosses the city from the northwest to the southeast. For a long time the narrow stream looked unsightly and somehow out of place in the city's beautiful setting. But now it is undergoing a transformation. A waste water collector is being built under its bed. A concrete channel that is to top it will carry pure water. New bridges will be built. There will appear scenic lakes with recreational facilities. It is said that in time Bucharest will become a river port with an outlet to the Danube 60 kilometres away, and hence to the sea.

The city's inhabitants want every neighbourhood to be up to modern standards, to meet the requirements of socialist renewal, and feel certain that they will succeed in making this come about.

OUTLYING AREAS ON THE RISE

Romania is divided into judets (districts), and a close look at them helps one appreciate and understand the economic and social policy of the Romanian Communist Party and the state over the past two decades.

There are steppe and mountain districts and districts where the Carpathians and lowlands meet or where the hills of Moldova rise. Each district has its unique features and atmosphere but what is common to all is that they show striking social and economic changes.

The republic inherited from the bourgeois and landowner system enormous discrepancies between various parts of the country in economic, primarily industrial, development. Bucharest and eight of the more developed districts, whose population only made up 27 per cent of the total, accounted for over half the industrial output of Romania. On the other hand, many other districts, especially remote ones such as Moldova or Oltenia, were known for their bucolic landscapes, patriarchal way of life and total poverty. The 20th century seemed to have by-passed them. Mihail Sadoveanu, a well-known author, called them places "where nothing happens".

In the second half of the 1960s, with the foundations for socialism laid, the party adopted a policy of rational distribution of the productive forces. The new policy found expression primarily in the approach to investment. Backward districts got larger appropriations used above all for industrialising them. Every district was expected to put out not less than 10 billion lei worth of industrial products. With this task fulfilled, a new target—20 billion lei—was set. It is to be reached by the end of the current five-year period.

The policy of harmoniously developing all districts has transformed most of them. This is exemplified by the more than 250 industrial bases and large enterprises scattered all over the country. All districts produce

electronics articles; 31 districts produce ferrous metals and 12, chemical fertilisers.

Working in Romania as a correspondent, I visited many of these new enterprises, including the petrochemical complexes at Pilești and Borzești, the Tîrgoviște grade steel plant, the Călărași iron-and-steel complex, the pipe-rolling plants at Zimnicea and Zalău, the synthesised fibre complex at Săvinești. It is gratifying to know that many industrial giants in one-time agrarian districts were built with technological assistance from the Soviet Union.

It is important to note that the policy of developing the districts harmoniously provided millions with jobs where they were born and live. The profoundly humane purpose of this policy is to assure people all over the country equal working and living conditions and raise the economic and social role of small- and medium-sized towns. As a result, rural communities are becoming agro-industrial ones.

Even so—despite a vigorous industrial upturn in outlying areas—you can never mistake Iași District for Constanța District, Brașov for Olt or Buzău for Maramures. In the context of rapid overall progress, every part of the country wants to retain its unique character.

AUSTERE ECONOMY

Last winter I had an occasion to visit Bucharest again and to refresh my impressions of Romania. On the face of it, nothing had changed. And yet, when I checked into my room at Hotel Ambasadorul, I realised that something had changed. The mirror was lit too dimly, and glowing feebly in the chandelier was one bulb instead of three.

The next morning I woke up feeling chilly. The radiator was cool, and there was not hot water. This lasted all day. The temperature outside was only two or three degrees below zero but I, a man accustomed to the Russian cold, found myself unable to get warm no matter how hard I tried. The temperature inside did not generally rise above 14 degrees. I only managed to get warm in the car when the driver heated it generously enough.

Such are some of the peculiarities of everyday life in Bucharest today. The newcomer notices them right away whereas the Romanians have had time to get used to them. They see today's difficulties and restrictions, including food rationing, as something necessary but temporary. I mention them to give the reader an idea of the situation in Romania today, where a strict economy has been exercised for several years, primarily in electricity, heating and gas. In homes the number and power of incandescent lamps are strictly limited. Anyone who exceeds the established limit must pay more for every kilowatt-hour. Hot water is supplied only at definite hours. No electric heaters are allowed in offices.

In the production sphere, the economy drive covers raw and other materials and largely influences the assessment of economic performance. The utilisation of reusable scrap is gaining in importance.

What is the reason for these measures? To begin with, they were prompted by serious shortcomings in the mining, oil and chemical industries and particularly by indications of a lag in the power industry. Second, austere economy is due in substantial measure to the efforts which Romania has been making to pay off its foreign debt. The country has reduced to a minimum the import of machinery, equipment, fuels and raw materials from the non-socialist market and lays emphasis on increasing exports. In 1985, its foreign trade turnover went up by 15 per cent over the previous year. These efforts have borne fruit. The past six years have seen the foreign debt go down more than by half. By 1990

Romania expects to pay back all long-term Western credits, including interest on them.

The results achieved in 1986, the first year of the eighth five-year plan, are indicative. Industrial production increased by 7.7 per cent. Grain output—28 million tons—was at an all-time high. The situation in regard to electricity is returning to normal. Thermal power stations with a total capacity of one million kW are to go into operation this year; the hydroelectric stations being built on the country's rivers will have a comparable capacity. Newly-discovered oil and coal deposits are being put to use at a fast pace.

Progress in plan fulfilment leaves no room for doubt that by the end of the five-year period the strategic task set by the party—transforming Romania into a state with an average level of development—will be accomplished. By the end of the century, Romania is to become a comprehensively developed socialist country as envisaged by the RCP Programme.

These aims are also being pursued by a visible shift of emphasis in the party's economic policy that began at its 12th Congress (1979). Whereas in earlier years Romania achieved economic growth primarily by means of extensive factors, from then on priority was given to intensification. This line was continued by the 13th RCP Congress, which approved guidelines for the eighth five-year plan. Special efforts are being made to develop the country's own raw material and energy base, to modernise the pattern of the economy, improving industries of vital importance to the economy. Provisions have been made to rapidly develop electronics, robotics, fine mechanics, optics, nuclear power, the production of technological equipment, high-grade steel for fine-synthesis chemistry, and so on.

Special attention is being devoted to large-scale introduction of the new economic mechanism of self-financing, economic calculus and workers' self-management. The first steps towards an economic reform were taken in the late 1970s. The new is gaining ground surely if slowly. This year the enterprises and associations must, on meeting their commitments to society, secure enough profit to assure their self-financing.

The enterprises that are switching successfully to the new management system include the leading mechanical engineering unit of the country, the August 23 Machine-Building Plant in Bucharest. Its output ranges from diesel locomotives and diesel engines for drilling rigs to cement plants and equipment for rolling mills. Nearly all its products are in demand abroad. But the plant refuses to rest on its laurels. I talked about this with its commercial director, Liviu Matei.

"The new economic mechanism," he told me, "implies achieving a balance between incomes and outlays and securing profit through production effort. We must pay all production costs without resorting to state subsidies. The greater the profit made by the plant, the more the employees will earn. This considerably adds to the role and responsibility of every employee and every executive. We aim to produce articles of the highest possible quality at the lowest possible cost and to maximise our profits. How? We have, for example, taken steps to replace all energy- and material-intensive products, that is, ineffective output. We began by revising the size of forged and foundry products and cutting waste to a minimum. This made for a noticeable reduction of power requirements and the share of manual labour. We are also doing much for the secondary utilisation of energy, such as the temperature of gases from processing and forging furnaces or the heat of waste water. When testing diesel engines, we use their power in the national electrical transmission network. And of course, we are actively modernising technological processes as we work to raise production efficiency and the quality

of output. We are assisted in this both by the plant's design institute and by our inventors and rationalisers. Incidentally, we have a fund for stimulating the rationalisation movement equivalent to two per cent of the wage fund. We distribute it every month among the foremost rationalisers. Solving the problems which face the plant today is made much easier by its long-standing cooperation with the Soviet Union and other CMEA countries.

"We have a stake in extensive interchanges of experience with our Soviet partners in advanced technologies and robotics. This plant is using many excellent Soviet-made machine-tools. We would like to go on importing advanced Soviet technology, in particular quality control equipment. Besides, the Soviet Union is one of our main trading partners. Under long-term agreements we supply your country with equipment for ferrous metallurgy and the by-product coke industry, motors for drilling rigs and certain units for the railway cars exported to the Soviet Union by other enterprises of our country."

TRIED AND TESTED BY TIME

Romania's cooperation with CMEA countries, primarily the Soviet Union, is gaining in importance now that the Romanian people are working hard to overcome economic difficulties. During my stay in Bucharest, everywhere I came across signs of economic relations between our two countries more active than ever before, of their extension to new spheres.

Although the Soviet Union has always held first place in socialist Romania's foreign trade, I remember that until recently it accounted for a mere fifth of the foreign trade turnover of that country. At present its share is close to one-third. It should be pointed out that we continue exporting to fraternal Romania fuel and raw materials particularly important for it today: coal, oil, iron ore, cotton, apatite. Last year the Soviet Union trebled oil exports. In compliance with a request from our Romanian friends, we began delivering electricity ahead of schedule, in compensation for Romania's participation in the construction of the South Ukrainian nuclear power plant. The share of machines and equipment in reciprocal trade turnover is growing. The total volume of Soviet-Romanian economic cooperation is to go up by 80 per cent under the current five-year plan. This is a growth rate unprecedented in the history of cooperation between the two countries. One of the most remarkable indications of this cooperation is the approximately 140 major industrial projects built in Romania with the Soviet Union's technological assistance which play an important part in the industrial progress of that country. Under the current five-year plan, Soviet organisations are participating in the reconstruction and modernisation of many of them.

In recent years, Soviet-Romanian cooperation has been extended to aircraft manufacture, specialisation in atomic machine-building, Romania's participation in developing the Sovetabad gas deposits in Turkmenia and our participation in extracting oil and gas on the Romanian shelf of the Black Sea.

One of the major joint projects of recent date is the construction of Krivoi Rog ore dressing plant. Preparations for an agreement on Romania's participation in it went on for a long time, and people at the Bucharest Heavy Engineering Plant (IMGB) were posted on all its details, having taken a direct part in working out documents as future suppliers of metallurgical equipment.

We sat drinking "Russian" tea in the office of Nuşa Toma, commercial director, with our coats on. Romanians call ordinary tea "Russian" as distinct from limeblossom, mint and other kinds of tea, which are

used in Romania medicinally in greater measure than in our country. Generally speaking, however, Romanians prefer coffee, except that they almost stopped importing it several years ago for the reason given earlier.

"We were prompted to actively join in the giant Krivoi Rog project by the very logic of years-long cooperation with Soviet partners," Nuța Toma said. "It would be hard to imagine the work of our collective without this cooperation, which began with our getting two steel-melting furnaces and a powerful forging press from the Soviet Union.

"The IMGB is barely twenty years old but has already made a name for itself in the industry. It exports roughly one-fourth of its output, 83 per cent of which, mainly equipment for metallurgical and chemical complexes, goes to the Soviet Union. This output is well known above all to Zhdanov steel-makers.

"But deliveries are only one aspect of cooperation. For some time past, we've been making turbines for thermal power stations, some of them under Soviet licence. Cooperation with the Soviet Union in the manufacture of equipment for thermal power stations promises a lot. It is going on within the framework of a mixed interministerial group which includes IMGB representatives. The first documents have been signed. A protocol includes problems we are now concerned with, such as making certain turbine units or the Soviet experience of producing unalloyed steel.

"This cooperation is very important for Romania because we are short of electric power. A major reason for this situation is the low caloric value of Romanian brown coal, used by many thermal power stations. And so our country's programme for power production, in particular by atomic plants receives special attention now. The IMGB has become Romania's chief manufacturer of equipment for atomic power stations. You will recall that Romania is a signatory to the CMEA agreement on multilateral international specialisation and cooperation in the production and reciprocal deliveries of equipment for nuclear power plants.

"We're all very attentively following the ongoing reorganisation of Soviet industry. We study and analyse your experience to find out how we can improve our plant. We benefit a lot in this respect from direct ties with your people, in particular from exchanges of experience with the Elektrostal complex located near Moscow."

The logic of Soviet-Romanian cooperation, which has stood the test of time and has always been characterised by mutual benefit, stability and what I would call economic dependability, sets new and higher targets now. This became particularly evident during the official friendly visit paid last May by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU CC, to Romania.

At that lovely time, when Bucharest's chestnut-trees were still in bloom because of spring's late arrival, it was clear that the spirit of change and reorganisation dominating our country plainly had had a tangible effect on Soviet-Romanian relations, marking a new, important stage in their development.

Talking with workers at the capital's August 23 Plant, Mikhail Gorbachev spoke frankly of the need to improve cooperation between socialist countries by ridding it of all hurdles to joint advance. Among other things, he said: "In the past, products going to the West to earn foreign exchange were selected from the best, while mutual deliveries were of lower quality. How can that strengthen socialism? And how are we to outpace or compete with capitalism? We need to reshape our relations, doing so in good faith, straightforwardly and making demands on each other."

During the visit, Soviet-Romanian relations were analysed in depth, and the two sides pointed out that these relations had a long-standing tradition and had attained a high level. But attention was focussed above all else on evolving new strategy and tactics for cooperation at the new stage, which is a turning point in cooperation within the socialist community. Priority at this stage is given to combining complete equality, reciprocal responsibility, mutual benefit and assistance, to coordinated efforts on the international scene, with every country joining in actively and showing initiative, while in the ideological sphere it is more important than ever to compare notes in socialist construction.

The search for ways and means of effecting qualitative changes in the mechanism of bilateral relations and of bringing it into line with present-day requirements is evidence of the serious approach taken by the leadership of both countries. In some areas of cooperation our countries have made great progress but in other they are lagging behind. The task is to extend ties all along the line. This also goes for a more complete study and utilisation of each other's experience, more extensive contacts between party organisations and work collectives, deeper ideological cooperation and interchanges of spiritual and cultural values.

The economy was understandably a key topic in discussing problems of bilateral relations. It was said that what should come to the fore is the qualitative and not the quantitative criterion of cooperation. "Nowadays," Mikhail Gorbachev said, "it is hard to promote economic cooperation by merely increasing trade turnover. There is a need for cooperation and specialisation in production, for direct ties. And when we are prepared for this, we will need to set up joint enterprises." It is not just a question of reciprocal aspiration. The socialist community countries see a vital necessity in expanding cooperation mainly within the community, for it is no easy task to establish ties with the West, where newcomers are not exactly welcome. Besides, these ties are often accompanied by a mounting debt, and this tells on the economic situation of the debtor countries as well as, to a degree, on their living standards.

In developing new forms of cooperation with Romania, we are prepared to go still further, as by accelerating progress in scientific and technological cooperation. The Soviet leader called on Romanian scientists to join more actively in the wide-ranging fundamental and applied research underway in the Soviet Union. He proposed exchanging more students so as to create what may be described as a reserve for future cooperation in science and industry.

Some of the Bucharest accords are incorporated in one form or another in the Long-Term Programme for the Development of Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation Between the USSR and SRR up to the Year 2000, adopted in Moscow last year. Therefore both sides declared this time in Bucharest for concrete, vigorous steps to implement the programme. This work is now proceeding. One of the problems discussed was that of setting up mixed Soviet-Romanian enterprises; preliminary agreement was reached on cooperation between 32 pairs of industrial enterprises and combines.

Mikhail Gorbachev and Nicolae Ceauşescu discussed in detail international problems of today. Speaking to a Romanian-Soviet friendship rally, the General Secretary of the RCP, President of the SRR, stressed with satisfaction the "identity of fundamental positions" registered at the talks on both problems of bilateral relations and problems of disarmament. He earnestly called for a new way of thinking and a new approach to the issue of war and peace and sharply condemned the concept of nuclear deterrence as outdated. He said that Romania supported the Soviet programme for the phased abolition of nuclear weapons before the end of this century and the Soviet Union's proposals for eliminating

Soviet and US medium-range and shorter-range missiles. In the Joint Communiqué released in conclusion of the talks, the two sides pronounced themselves explicitly for a complete and general ban on nuclear weapons testing, the prevention of the militarisation of outer space and the conclusion of an international convention prohibiting chemical weapons.

Speaking in Bucharest, the Soviet leader highly praised Romania's peace initiatives for the Balkans. "In this connection," he said, "I would like to state that the Soviet Union is willing to give the necessary guarantees of non-deployment and non-use of nuclear and chemical weapons in the zone. I think it would be worth going even further by ridding the Balkan Peninsula of any foreign troops and military bases."

The participants in the talks reaffirmed the importance of implementing the Warsaw Treaty countries' programme for reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe. A useful step in this direction could be taken by freezing the military expenditures of both alliances for a year or two. This idea belongs to the Romanians. Besides, for years past, Romania has been steadfastly championing solution of the problem of underdevelopment and the establishment of a new international economic order. This is why Romania, like other WTO countries, made a tangible contribution to drafting the relevant document approved at the Berlin meeting of the WTO Political Consultative Committee.

The Soviet-Romanian summit showed again that the socialist countries' plans are peaceful and constructive and are directed towards building up and exalting socialist society, whose main goal is "to make the lives of working people richer and fuller", as Mikhail Gorbachev said^{*} in Bucharest.

The Soviet Union is now working to carry out these plans. So is socialist Romania.

Vyacheslav SAMOSHKIN

Bucharest-Moscow
1987

AFGHANISTAN: Following the Road of Goodwill

An impartial observer—be it a local inhabitant or a foreign visitor—cannot help noticing that the appeal for ending bloodshed and establishing long-awaited peace in Afghanistan launched by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan in late December 1986 is meeting with response and enjoying support in the country. The words "national reconciliation" are uttered with hope by people belonging to various social strata, age groups, ethnic entities and tribes. They can be heard in the streets and squares of Afghan cities, in the bustling bazaars and at peasant meetings, from the rostrums of public rallies and from the clergy.

"The policy of national reconciliation fully accords with the sacred principles of our religion and with the laws of Shari'ah," we were told by chairman of the Supreme Council of Ulama and the clergy of Afghanistan, Gulyam Sarvar Mansur. "That is why the patriotic-minded clergy, proceeding from the cherished aspirations of the people unanimously back the government's initiative aimed at stopping the fratri-

cidal war which has lasted for more than nine years. Let the guns fall silent, so that the brothers can hear each other. Let hostilities cease so that the belligerents can enter into negotiations and present their claims to each other and find mutually-acceptable solutions."

He was a participant in the second session of the Supreme Extraordinary Commission for National Reconciliation. We were present at that meeting, which took place in June 1987 in an old palace in the Afghan capital which had housed the first Foreign Ministry of Afghanistan after it regained its independence and sovereignty in 1919. It was in this building that diplomatic negotiations were held between Soviet Russia and Afghanistan. People in Kabul remember well that the Soviet state was the first in the world to recognise the independence and state sovereignty of its southern neighbour and to extend a hand of friendship and assistance. In February 1921 the two countries signed a treaty of friendship which provided a solid basis for good-neighbourly relations and cooperation between them.

Today national reconciliation is a measure of the goodwill of the Afghan leadership and of the country's progressive public opinion. Its aim is to gain and preserve the supreme value of human life—peace.

The first concrete step towards national reconciliation was the Afghan government's decision on a unilateral ceasefire which came into force on January 15, 1987. The Supreme Extraordinary Commission for National Reconciliation unanimously approved the initiative. This important step is seen as a prerequisite for the voice of reason to be heard above the roar of guns, for building bridges of mutual understanding and national unity of the opposing forces.

Along with the ceasefire the national reconciliation programme put forward by the PDPA provides for renunciation of armed struggle in solving the country's present and future problems, just representation of all the people in the political structure and in the economy, no persecution of people for their former political activity, a general amnesty, the preservation and fostering of historical, national and cultural traditions. Respect and observance of the principles of Islam was specially stressed. Another fundamental principle is the PDPA's readiness not to claim monopoly in running the state and its preparedness to share power with all those who are concerned about the happiness and peaceful future of the Afghan people and sincerely want to contribute to the process of national reconciliation.

The second session of the Supreme Extraordinary Commission for National Reconciliation which reviewed the first stage of this positive process in the country noted that there is no other alternative for the Afghan people. "Naturally, we do not expect our enterprise to bring quick results. However, the tree of national reconciliation we have planted has already borne its first fruits," Chairman of Afghanistan's National Front Abdul Rahim Hatef told the meeting. "Perhaps the fruits are still small and not very sweet but they are precious because we have not bought them, we have not imported them but have grown them ourselves by our own efforts, have watered them with our tears, the tears of the widows and orphans of the cursed war which has turned our country into a bleeding wound. These fruits have yet to become juicy and ripe but we are glad that they have appeared."

What are the concrete results of the first step of national reconciliation? While in Kabul we met former Afghan refugees who responded to the revolutionary authorities' call and returned home. A ministry for refugees affairs has been set up in Afghanistan to provide them with

jobs, housing, and material assistance. Their number has topped 90,000.

Those with whom we spoke believe that the number could be much greater if the Pakistani and Iranian authorities did not set obstacles in the way of Afghans wanting to return home, if the enemies of national reconciliation did not try to keep them behind the barbed-wire fences of their camps.

More than 30,000 counter-revolutionary rebels have laid down their arms. More than 100,000 relatives of these people also returned to a peaceful life. The Afghan government has made contact and is negotiating peace with 110 opposition groups which comprise more than 100,000 men. Commissions for national reconciliation are active in all the provinces and towns, in many districts, villages and communities. Their number exceeds 3,000. *Jirgahs* (meetings) for peace are being held everywhere. Some provinces, such as Naimroz and Farah, have been proclaimed zones of peace by their residents. All hostilities are stopped in these provinces.

The decision of the DRA leadership to extend the ceasefire until January 15, 1988 has been welcomed in Afghanistan and abroad. This goodwill gesture is seen as proof that the democratic and the patriotic forces headed by the People's Democratic Party are committed to national reconciliation.

"The ongoing peace process in our country is exerting a growing influence on the opposing side," said Hadji Muhammad Tsamkani, First Vice-President of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA, commenting on the event. "The other side is faced with an alternative: either to follow the road of peace and national unity or to continue serving the selfish interests of their imperialist masters. This brings further divisions in the camp of the armed opposition with some of them coming over to the side of the popular government."

Recent months have seen a certain economic revival in the country. In spite of all their efforts the counter-revolutionaries have failed to paralyse industry and transport and to cause economic dislocation and hunger in Afghanistan. By and large the country's economic performance is better than in the pre-revolutionary year 1978. For a correct assessment one should remember that direct damage from the undeclared war exceeds 50 billion afghani (about 1,000 million dollars). The struggle against counter-revolution is a heavy drain on manpower. More than half of the Afghan government's budget goes for defence needs.

Under these difficult conditions the DRA government launched the first five-year development plan (1986-1990). It provides for a 25 per cent increase in the gross national product as compared to a mere 14 per cent growth in the preceding five years. Industrial output is to increase by 38 per cent and agricultural output by 14-15 per cent. The rate of growth of the national income will increase by 26 per cent, twice the rate of the 1980-1985 period.

"These plans are realistic as proved by the economy's performance in the first year of the five-year period," said Sultan Ali Keshtmand, member of the Political Bureau of the PDPA's Central Committee, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the DRA. "Despite opposition from those hostile to national reconciliation, due to the measures taken by the CC PDPA and the DRA government to restore and develop the public, mixed and private sectors of the national economy, it is making headway. The gross national product has increased by 3.3 per cent and national income by 3.6 per cent compared to the previous year. Considerable progress has been made in major construction where the annual plan has been exceeded by 113.8 per cent. The private sector has become noticeably more active. It has been allowed to create 115 small and medium-size enterprises which has provided thousands of new jobs."

Cooperation between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan in the economic and technical fields should be praised. The Soviet Union is helping its southern neighbour build almost a hundred key economic projects. Last year alone the following projects were put into operation: a power transmission line from the Soviet border to the town of Kunduz, a provincial capital in the north of the country, a foundry at the motor repair works in Jangalak, a gas condensate processing plant at the Jarkuduk gas field, the technological systems in the tunnel under the Salang mountain pass, a new domestic airlines terminal at Kabul airport, a short-wave radio station and a blood transfusion centre in the Afghan capital, to mention just a few.

Soviet credit to the tune of 50 million roubles for developing private and mixed sectors in the DRA economy has attracted great interest in Afghanistan's business circles. During the first half of 1987 alone the government received 110 applications for industrial investment from private entrepreneurs. The DRA government bodies have passed a special decree to ensure long-term mutually-beneficial cooperation between the public and the private sector of the economy. A consultative economic council under the DRA Council of Ministers has been set up to coordinate their work. The council is vested with broad powers which enables it to effectively represent the interests of private entrepreneurs and to encourage their business initiative.

We met Mairmun Farzana, owner of a private garment factory Farzana. As we were told, she was decorated with the government Order of Glory at a recent All-Afghan Conference of National Entrepreneurs.

"Our enterprise has been in operation for more than eight years," she explained in reply to our questions. "At first we made sportswear. Now after receiving government credit we have expanded the range and volume of our goods.... The documents adopted at our conference show that an overwhelming majority of private entrepreneurs welcome the policy of national reconciliation because it offers better conditions for their commercial and production activity. They voted for peace not just by raising their hands but by investing in the country's economy. This is a telling sign indicating confidence in the government, the desire to take part in building a new and prosperous Afghanistan," says Mairmun Farzana in conclusion.

The publication and nation-wide discussion of the draft constitution of the DRA was a major political event. Strengthening of the country's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity; its growing role and authority in the world; social justice and equality; the development of the national economy and the improvement of living standards—these are the lofty goals the republic's main law sets before the people of Afghanistan.

The new constitution is to play an important role in national reconciliation. The spirit and letter of this key government act show that there is a role for everyone who seeks to put an end to hostility and discord and renounce violence as a means of settling internal problems. This legitimises the course for further democratisation of Afghan society.

Local government bodies and special commissions for national reconciliation are increasingly active in the DRA and presently unite more than 90,000 activists in the provinces, towns, districts and villages. Many of these activists were former opponents of the popular government.

Coalition local self-government bodies have been set up in many villages. This form of government is gradually spreading to districts and provinces. Thus, the process, which involves various political forces and social strata, is developing from the bottom up: from villages and districts to central bodies of power. Former leaders of opposition groupings

have been appointed governors in four provinces. The opposition has been offered important government posts, such as vice-presidents of the Revolutionary Council and of the Council of Ministers, President of the Supreme Court and heads of many government ministries. In pursuance of the course for national reconciliation, the PDPA leaders have said that negotiations on the post of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers could also be held. In this way the present leadership is demonstrating that it is ready to share power with the opposing side in deed and not symbolically.

An important step towards creating a real coalition of all the democratic and patriotic forces in the country was the adoption by the DRA Revolutionary Council of a law to legalise and create new parties. Private entrepreneurs, Muslim clergy, peasants and some other social strata, intend to form their own political organisations. In the opinion of the country's present leadership they will be allowed to espouse different ideological views and theories of social development, diverge on matters of strategy and tactics as long as they have a common goal: early restoration of peace on the Afghan soil, the strengthening of national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, adherence to the principles of non-alignment and friendship and cooperation with all countries, notably with Afghanistan's neighbours. The new parties and political organisations are expected to join the existing democratic and patriotic forces as collective members of the National Front.

The coalition form is gradually spreading to public organisations, trade unions and unions of artists and intellectuals. Much has changed in the women's movement. The All-Afghan Council of Women whose organisational set-up has changed drastically over the past year, has increased its membership by several times to over 100,000.

The pluralistic party system, the creation of political organisations and their possible unification in an interparty bloc and the introduction of coalition forms of state management provide favourable conditions for the activity of the fragmented progressive and patriotic forces, broaden the social base of the April Revolution and help to implement the policy of national reconciliation. The united national front being created in Afghanistan can and must provide a basis for strengthening the country's democratic system and set a solid barrier in the way of reaction and armed interference from the outside.

Among the recent changes the development and implementation of a new approach to the agrarian question deserves special mention. It was reflected in the recent decree of the DRA Revolutionary Council On the Basic Principles of the Settlement of Land and Water Relations. This document has provoked lively interest and discussions in the country and not only among the peasants who account for more than 80 per cent of the country's population but also among other groups of Afghan society. Commenting on this document in a television speech Saleh Mohammad Zearai, CC Political Bureau member and Secretary of the PDPA CC, stressed that the land and water reform—one of the major gains of the April Revolution—is being adjusted to suit the main goal under the conditions of national reconciliation. It will be pursued in a new way.

"The PDPA's strategic goals in the land and peasant question," he said, "remain unchanged... They are elimination of feudal and pre-feudal relations, consistent implementation of the land reform in the interests of the broad masses of working peasantry, the development of rural productive forces to boost the national economy and living standards."

The new decree is aimed at rectifying the errors and miscalculations that marked the implementation of the land and water reform in the early years following the April Revolution.

The new approach to the land tenure problem in the country sets the ceiling on land plots at 100 *jeribs* (20 hectares). High priority is given to supporting medium-size farms which account for the bulk of marketable farm produce. The land they received after the revolution is given to the peasants in perpetuity. Conditions are being created for private entrepreneurs to engage in gardening, nut growing and to set up mechanised farms and livestock farms. Land will continue to be distributed among landless and small-holding peasants. But the approach will be differentiated and will take into account the amount of land available in a given area, its quality, the availability of water and the size of the family.

National reconciliation would have been even more successful if the heads of the extremist dushman groupings were not supported and encouraged to stage new bloody raids by the imperialist powers, notably the USA and its accomplices in Pakistan. Washington has already granted more than 2,000 million dollars to the bandits and mercenaries waging war against Afghanistan. For the present fiscal year 630 million dollars have been earmarked for the Afghan bandits, 160 million more than in the previous year. The CIA has supplied the Afghan counter-revolutionaries with more than 600 Stinger missiles. The dushmans also use portable British-made Blowpipe anti-aircraft rockets. US-made missiles were used to shoot down several civilian Afghan planes resulting in the deaths of dozens of women, old people and children. That is not all. According to the US *Soldier of Fortune* magazine the US special services are recruiting and sending mercenaries from Western countries who train the dushmans and join them in raids inside DRA territory.

The refusal of the heads of the counter-revolutionary units forming the so-called alliance of the seven to talk about national reconciliation can only be attributed to their desire to pay off American credits and pursue their selfish interests. The bandits continue to sow death and destruction wherever they are still able to do so.

The group Hizb-i Islami headed by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar is noted for committing the most horrendous atrocities. Hikmatyar is widely believed to be one of the chief opponents of national reconciliation. The reason for his zeal is that he pockets the bulk of the aid given to counter-revolutionaries, as pointed out by the other heads of the dushmans who are vying with each other for a bigger share of Western aid. The bandit groups are riddled with selfishness and envy and according to the foreign press Gulbuddin Hikmatyar now has the backing of only three of the seven organisations in the "alliance".

I talked to Lieutenant Colonel Azizulla of the State Security Board in Jelalabad, the centre of the Nangarhar province.

"This will show you who Gulbuddin is," says the Lieutenant Colonel and give us a thick file. "Some consider him a fanatic. They are mistaken. He has worked for the CIA all his life using Islam as a cover. After the April Revolution he managed to take advantage of our errors, notably in the implementation of the land reform and in the handling of some religious questions. He proclaimed himself a champion of true faith. Gulbuddin worked himself into a frenzy preaching in Peshawar while his underlings were burning and blowing up schools, hospitals and mosques and pillaging our land. Gulbuddin's hands are dripping with blood. But we are prepared to talk peace even with him and others of his ilk. We are concerned not about him but about the thousands of people misled into following him; they are armed and ready to obey his orders."

The Western press is playing an unseemly role in fomenting tensions in Afghanistan. There is no need to dwell on the more fantastic concoctions and unscrupulous allegations it makes. Unfortunately, it is not only the Western press that is adding fuel to the fire. For example, the so-called symposium at Oxford University last April had little to do with scholarship. The symposium was devoted to the problem of the Afghan refugees. This provocative action was held as part of the "programme of the study of the plight of refugees in the world". However, the speeches of Afghan bandits and their learned instructors from the USA, Britain and the FRG showed that both are still on the war path and do not intend to abandon it. This is not surprising inasmuch as the symposium was financed by the US Rockefeller Foundation and the British Foreign Office.

However, as an old Afghan proverb says "you can't cover the sun with a sieve". Try as they do Western propaganda and self-styled scholars will not conceal the truth. Sarwar Uresh, general director of the Bakhtar News Agency, showed us an album of clippings from the press in Western Europe, Latin America and Africa. Many journalists give a truthful account of the life of revolutionary Afghanistan and expose the intrigues of the foreign mercenaries and regional reactionaries. This is what Serge Leirak of *L'Humanité* newspaper wrote: "The counter-revolutionaries can still do harm by impeding road traffic and can hinder the country's economic development. But they are unable to change the course chosen by the people... What are they going to fight against in Afghanistan? Fight against the campaign to stamp out illiteracy? Against universal education? Against the emancipation of women? Against the development of the health system in a country where the average life expectancy is 42 years? Against social reform? The advocates of the 'free world' are prepared to fight to the last Afghan against the revolution which has decided to put an end to poverty, illiteracy and misery. Whose side, then, should people of goodwill take?"

The conception of national reconciliation and the way it is being implemented by the patriotic and democratic forces in the country are attracting growing interest in the world. The mountains of lies and concoctions piled up over the years by the mass media in the imperialist countries and their allies in the Middle East are crumbling. The progressive and peace-loving forces on our planet welcome the initiatives of the PDPA and the DRA government aimed at political settlement of the situation over their country and national reconciliation inside the country. This is evidenced by the official statements of the Soviet Union and the other socialist community countries, the positive reaction of many developing states, members of the non-aligned movement, some members of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference and some other international organisations, communist and workers' parties and the forces which today come out for peace and security and against the threat of war.

The coincidence of views between the USSR and the DRA on the developments in and around Afghanistan and the policy of national reconciliation was noted by Mikhail Gorbachev during his meeting with Najibullah who paid a short visit to the Soviet Union in July 1987. He said: "This is a correct policy. It has now entered a new stage. This policy meets the vital interests of the Afghan people and enjoys the support of broad sections of the Afghan society and all those people in the world who are really interested in a political settlement of the situation. No one in or outside Afghanistan has proposed an alternative to

the policy of national reconciliation put forward by the PDPA. The Afghan people have arrived at this policy through much torment. They want peace on their land."

The Soviet people, who have long-standing bonds of friendship and cooperation with their southern neighbour, want to see Afghanistan as an independent, sovereign, non-aligned state. They support its inalienable right to decide its own destiny, to choose its own government, to map out programmes for national development in accordance with its national aims and interests.

While in Afghanistan we often heard expressions of sincere gratitude for the immense political, economic and moral support the USSR is rendering to the Afghan people who have become victims of an undeclared war waged by imperialism.

Today, with the national reconciliation and a political settlement of the Afghanistan issue underway real prerequisites may emerge for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. As both sides have noted, the timetable for their withdrawal from the DRA has already been agreed. The fact that the limited contingent of Soviet troops began to pull out of Afghanistan was confirmed by Najibullah, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA, at the meeting of the representatives of parties and movements in Moscow on November 5. Troops have been already withdrawn from 12 out of 30 provinces. He said: "We see our internationalist duty in ensuring conditions for the most expedient return of the glorious Soviet defenders to their homeland." Further implementation of the timetable depends on the behaviour of the opposing side, i. e., on whether the imperialist powers cease to interfere in the internal affairs of the sovereign Afghan state and offer reliable international guarantees that such interference will not resume in the future.

The constructive peaceful foreign policy of Afghanistan and its efforts aimed at national reconciliation and at normalising the situation in the region are meeting with growing understanding and support in the world. The DRA maintains constant diplomatic links with almost a hundred countries. Recently Zimbabwe and Cyprus, two non-aligned states, established relations with Afghanistan. During the past year the number of delegations from other countries which visited the DRA increased three-fold. Afghanistan attracts journalists who want to know the truth about what is happening there.

In June 1987 the Afghan capital played host to a conference of journalists from non-aligned countries at which members of the Soviet Journalists' Union were present as observers. The conference discussed what the mass media could do to promote a non-violent nuclear-free world and confidence among nations. In their speeches and documents the 75 delegates from 40 countries and three international organisations unanimously backed the policy of national reconciliation in Afghanistan as the only way towards early cessation of the fratricidal war there.

As many participants in the conference noted, only the road of compromise decisions, the road of national unity and peace can ensure the existence of an independent and non-aligned Afghanistan. "It is the duty of all honest journalists," said Samit Chakvarati, member of the Indian delegation, "to bring this truth to the public in their countries. We would like people in Washington and London and on the banks of the Rhine whose governments are adding fuel to the fire of the fratricidal bloodshed to understand that the Afghan issue cannot be resolved by force of arms."

The situation in Afghanistan remains complex. Its government, backed by the democratic and patriotic forces, continues to follow the course of national reconciliation and take measures to achieve agreement with the opposing side and work out mutually-acceptable solutions. This is no easy process because while the progressives in the world understand and support this policy the extremist counter-revolutionary groups instigated by the USA and their allies are fiercely resisting this process. However, the days and months since the PDPA launched its course for national reconciliation have brought more and more convincing evidence that there is no other alternative to this process.

That was most resolutely stated at the all-party conference of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan which was held in Kabul on October 18-20, 1987. The conference examined the most important problems facing the party and the state and identified the immediate problems whose solution is expected to expedite the process of national reconciliation. It made some alterations in the Programme of Action and the Rules of the PDPA, analysed the plebiscite on the draft constitution of the country, economic development problems, and other issues. As the basic ways of attaining peace in Afghanistan the forum defined: the ultimate formation of the Left-democratic bloc; the elaboration of the mechanism for cooperation with various parties; the creation of a coalition government and the establishment of local coalition governing bodies; the firm maintenance of a ceasefire until January 15, 1988; assistance to the most expedient return of the refugees to the homeland; the adoption of the Afghan constitution and the election of the president of the country; elections to the National Council; preparations to the 2nd Congress of the PDPA and the 10th anniversary of the April Revolution.

Having noted that Afghan-Soviet friendship has stood the test of time, is developing and imbued with new internationalist content, the conference sent its greetings to the CPSU CC, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR Council of Ministers and the Soviet people on the occasion of the 70th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

Gennadi MUSAELYAN,
Aleksandr SUKHOPAROV

Kabul-Moscow

«HARMLESS» FASCISM

(Continued from page 109)

distorted history, like the stone spectres in Hamburg and Düsseldorf, slows down advancement towards the future.

¹ See M. Göhring, *Bismarcks Erben, 1890-1945*, Wiesbaden, 1959, p. 390.

² *Внешняя политика Советского Союза в период Отечественной войны*, Vol. 1, Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1944, pp. 162-163.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 223-224.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 171.

⁵ *Анатомия войны*, Moscow, 1971, p. 26.

⁶ *Stern*, No. 36, Aug. 27, 1987, p. 8.

Security and Disarmament— the Position of Soviet Scientists

Разоружение и безопасность — 1986 год. Ежегодник (Disarmament and Security—1986. Yearbook) in two volumes, Moscow, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1987, Vol. I, 256 pp.; Vol. II, 244 pp.

International security, stability, disarmament—these basic terms are perhaps most widely used today by politicians, public figures, scientists and journalists in the East and the West alike. At the same time, apart from the debate on general problems of war and peace, on ways of preventing a nuclear war and ending the arms race, there is a broad discussion in the press and other mass media on specific aspects of disarmament problems, such as the strategic balance and proportion of forces, the structure of the military arsenals of the sides, capabilities and technical characteristics of weapon systems, problems involved in the observance of agreements and verification, and many others which previously had been discussed only by a limited number of experts and diplomats.

The open discussions on these problems with our political opponents (who are often experienced experts in their field), which are conducted today in the press, over the radio and on TV, require an exceptionally high level of professionalism and competence, the knowledge and understanding of complex questions concerning the reduction and elimination of nuclear arms, prevention of an arms race in outer space, and achievement of international security. The time has come to put out regular analytic publications on the above problems, in which Soviet scientists would comment on the main developments in this major sphere of world politics.

All this makes the issuing of the first Yearbook *Disarmament and Security—1986* so timely. Its publication was prepared by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences in cooperation with the Novosti Press Agency—APN.

It is symbolic that the first issue of the Yearbook is devoted to 1986 which was declared by the United Nations the International Year of Peace. It was in 1986 that the Soviet Union advanced the programme, unprecedented in its goals and scale, for creating a nuclear-free world and eliminating all types of mass destruction weapons by the end of this century. Throughout that year the Soviet unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions was in force and was prolonged four times. The year 1986 saw the historic Soviet-American summit in Reykjavik, which opened up prospects for real nuclear disarmament, and the signing of the Delhi Declaration on Principles of a Nuclear-Weapons-Free and Non-Violent World. That year the USSR made new proposals on nuclear and space arms and on the elimination of chemical weapons. The work on the extremely complex Venus-Halley's Comet project, which was a major event in the exploration of the Universe, demonstrated the immense potential of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space.

The Yearbook makes a thorough analysis of all these international developments, and not only these. Its authors have made a detailed record of the Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons, showing how the positions of the sides were changing; they have set forth the content of Soviet and American proposals at the talks and offered their assessment of these proposals. They also give an in-depth analysis of the evolution of the space arms programme in the United States, of technical and strategic prospects of SDI and anti-satellite systems, and of the debate on questions concerning the observance of

the ABM Treaty, its "narrow" and "broad" reading.

Experts in this field can find in this book all the information they may need on banning nuclear tests and chemical and biological weapons and on nuclear-free zones and international terrorism, safe development of nuclear power engineering and limitation of trade in weapons. Some sections are devoted to various aspects of maintaining peace and security in the Asian and Pacific region and to reduction of military potentials in Europe.

A special merit of the Yearbook is that it is extremely informative and contains a large number of tables, diagrams, maps, charts, facts, a series of international documents (including the text of the agreed statements on the ABM Treaty published for the first time), and a record of major international events in 1986. It is gratifying to know that the team of authors have not confined themselves to merely stating facts and official positions of the sides, but have carried out a profound scientific analysis of the key aspects of disarmament and international security. On many issues examined in the collection they formulate their own assessments, approaches and suggestions.

Progress in nuclear arms reductions is possible due to the major Soviet initiatives. The authors have good reason to say that basically new thinking in the approach to security problems, in keeping with the decisions of the 27th Congress of the CPSU, was displayed in preparedness to forgo a number of individual aspects, calculations and considerations for the sake of achieving the chief goal—rapid and radical progress in diminishing the nuclear threat, bold departure from the practice of endless bargaining over secondary details of an agreement, and determination to come out of the impasse that has existed for many years at the talks.

The present military-strategic balance is an extremely complex macro-system of arms and other components. When effecting a radical reduction of strategic weapons one should not lose sight of comprehensive questions of maintaining stable equilibrium at the declining levels of the nuclear-missile balance. In our view, the authors of the Yearbook raise most timely the question of stability and of reducing stimuli for a pre-emptive strike in a probable critical situation. "Without mutual understanding on this issue and without finding a mutually acceptable compromise it would hardly be possible to reach an agreement on the reduction and limitation of stra-

tegic forces which would make deep inroads in the deployed nuclear forces and programmes of the two powers", the authors say.

Problems of stable parity are exacerbated by the introduction of a defence weapons component into the strategic balance, be these weapons of high or limited effectiveness. Extending the arms race to outer space and development of anti-missile and anti-satellite systems will increase uncertainty in strategic and tactical planning by the sides, making the military-political situation more unstable, and will heighten the risk that a possible conflict may be escalated. The implementation of the space arms programme will have an extremely negative effect on the outcome of the talks on offensive arms reduction, will undermine the regime of the existing treaties and agreements, and will jeopardise the possibilities for broad international cooperation in the peaceful exploration of outer space.

The Yearbook offers a detailed analysis of the five main sections of the SDI programme, pointing out its specific elements which directly violate the provisions of the ABM Treaty and a number of other international agreements. The authors have made an interesting attempt to eliminate confusion in the terms used in this field, which gravely complicates the problem, hard as it is. Indeed, such terms as the Strategic Defence Initiative, space strike weapons, the arms race in outer space and space arms race are often used as synonyms in the press and even during scientific debates, though they are not identical neither in strategic nor in technical terms. In a clearly designed table illustrating the interrelationship between offensive strategic, anti-missile and space weapons, the authors, in our view, have clarified things.

Regrettably, the Yearbook is not available to the general readership—it has been published in Russian and English and is circulated by subscription through the Novosti Press Agency or the Institute of World Economics and International Relations. At present, work on the 1987 issue is nearing completion. We hope that the next Yearbook will contain further profound analysis of the subjects mentioned above, raise new problems and suggest fresh ideas facilitating advancement towards a nuclear-free and safe world. We can only wish them success in this much needed and promising undertaking.

A Critical Look at US Foreign Policy

Evaluating US Foreign Policy, Ed. by John A. Vasquez, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1986, 237 pp.

This book represents an attempt by a group of American and Canadian political scientists to assess the current US government's foreign policy. Not only do the authors vividly offer a critical view of the foreign policy course and of the methods which the US administration uses for implementing it, but also warn that this "inadequately thought-out" foreign policy presents a threat to the world and to the USA's own security.

The book consists of ten essays; the first and final are by Associate Professor of Political Sciences at Rutgers University in New Brunswick (State of New Jersey), John A. Vasquez. As he notes, the authors, in fulfilling the tasks at hand, had to consider two things—the current administration's desire to resurrect the cold war in international relations and the need to comprehensively evaluate and "scientifically substantiate" US foreign policy. This is needed, on the one hand, he feels, because of the role which the USA is called upon to play in the modern world with the existence of the entire Western civilisation practically dependent on the US leadership, and, on the other—because right up to the present day US foreign policy has been one large assortment of "myths", distortions and "blatant lies".

The book focuses on US-Soviet relations and the pivotal issue—the arms race. The authors in particular drew attention to the propaganda ruses which the administration resorts to in its attempt to justify the arms race which they propel as well as its strong-arm approach to relations with the USSR.

Michael D. Wallace, a University Professor in Vancouver (Canada), expresses doubts concerning assertions by the USA that the Soviet Union outstrip it in the area of strategic arms. On the contrary, according to his estimation, it is namely the USA which possesses the advantage in this area. He declares that the view held by the administration, according to which the arms race is not capable of leading to war, contradicts reality and all previous history. He writes that there are many facts showing that under conditions of the continuing large-scale arms race

in the world, a serious international crisis can turn into a war between the USA and the USSR.

In Wallace's opinion, the thesis advanced by the administration that the rapid arms buildup by the USA will continue to deter the Soviet Union, does not hold water. The USA has always attempted to forge ahead in the strategic arms race and the USSR has always managed to catch up with it.

The administration's propaganda efforts to justify its foreign policy plans, in that way winning the support of the American people, are viewed by the authors as very dangerous since they, together with "cardinal decisions" taken in this tense situation, may prove fatal for the destiny of the world.

The article by Louis René Beres, Professor at Purdue University in Lafayette (State of Indiana), is devoted to exposing official propaganda myths. One of these myths—spread by a number of influential administration representatives—is the thesis whereby the USA could survive and even win an all-out nuclear war. Beres convincingly shows that the administration conceals the irrevocable effect a nuclear war would have on the USA and the entire world. This is why a segment of society underrates the threat posed by the USA's current nuclear strategy. The author considers as a delusion the view by US administration officials that USA's readiness to carry out a nuclear war is a necessary condition for an effective policy of nuclear deterrence and qualifies such a strategy as "hopelessly flawed". The implementation of plans for its execution leads one to the conclusion that the USA is preparing to launch a first nuclear strike. A total absence of security will be the result. "To survive into the future, the Reagan administration must learn to recognize that nuclear *Realpolitik* can never work", he concludes (p. 70).

Although this author does not completely reject the nuclear deterrence strategy, he nonetheless proposes ending all nuclear testing, gradually expanding nuclear-free zones, rejecting the deployment in Western Europe

of Pershing 2s and cruise missiles which are first-strike weapons as well as MX missiles and plans to create space defence which in essence is a means of offence.

Professor Russel J. Leng of Middlebury College (State of Vermont) also examines the USA's confrontationist strategy towards the USSR. He comes to the conclusion that using such a strategy when dealing with a power of equal might is more likely to evoke a rebuff rather than a concession.

The book also contains such estimations of US foreign policy, concerning US-Soviet relations first of all, that are not based on reality. Thus, for example, Anatol Rapoport, Professor at the University of Toronto (Canada) writes that the confrontation between the USA and the USSR stems from the artificial confrontation between the "defense communities" of these two countries (p. 82).

On the whole, the current US administration's military strategy towards the USSR is qualified by most of the authors as ineffective and dangerous, while its economic policy is criticised as unsuccessful. Neil R. Richardson, Associate Professor at the University of Wisconsin, expresses doubt concerning the tactic of linkage which the USA tried to lay at the basis of the policy of detente in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In addition, he maintains that because of the "economic benefits" which the USA at that time gave the USSR, so to speak, "Soviet behavior toward the United States became markedly less belligerent as a result" (p. 101). In his opinion, the activities of the current administration in the sphere of economic relations with the USSR have had only a negative effect because the "Reagan administration was unable to manipulate economic rewards and punishments" (p. 106).

An analysis is also given of the US policy towards the developing countries. Thus, Boston University Professor Howard Zinn underscores that not a single American leader, invoking "US special rights" or alluding to "national security" or national interests

treats alike the rights of the US citizens and those of other countries. Moreover, "no political leader dares make: that 'self-interest' really refers to the interest of certain elites and does not include the well-being of ordinary people in any country, including citizens of the United States" (p. 138). This kind of hypocrisy, he points out, also characterises statements by American leaders on the right of every nation to self-determination.

Particularly regarding the situation in Central America, Zinn considers as unsound the assertions that US policy there is based on the desire to stop a communist threat, allegedly emanating from the USSR. History and facts, in his words, show that at the basis of US policy is the striving to exploit the peoples of Latin America.

Zinn notes that the thesis on national defence often applied by the USA to areas situated thousands of kilometres from it, is more likely aimed at upholding the interests of US transnationals rather than at defending the US vital interests (p. 149). However, the author, attempting to be "objective", ascribes the same approach to the Soviet Union using as examples the USSR's position to events in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan.

On the whole, this collection of articles proves that among American political scientists there is growing concern over the aims of US foreign policy and the methods employed to carry it out. The failings and deadlocks of this policy, vividly manifested over the past several years, have caused bourgeois scholars to seek out the causes of these failures and offer ways of eliminating them. In this respect, of some interest is the factual material and arguments they use to counterpose the propaganda devices of the American government. Judging by this collection some Western scholars, in spite of the fact that most of them remain under the influence of the deep-rooted dogma of anti-communism, succeed in finding more objective criteria for evaluating US foreign policy.

Vyacheslav MURAVYEV

LAOS: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REFORMS ★ BURMA — 40 YEARS OF
INDEPENDENCE ★ KAMPUCHEA: NATIONAL REVIVAL ★ EUROTERRO-
RISTS: ACCOMPLICES OF REACTION ★ THE GDR: SIDE BY SIDE WITH
THE SOVIET UNION ★ SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC

Laos: Economic and Social Reforms

On December 2, 1975, the Lao People's Democratic Republic was founded thus opening a new chapter in the history of Laos. The monarchic regime was toppled and a people's democratic power was established—the national-democratic revolution won in the country. All power in Laos went over to the people led by the Marxist-Leninist Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP), which steered the country towards socialism, bypassing the capitalist stage of development.

The country had to start practically from scratch, amidst social and economic backwardness, dislocation caused by years of war, and total illiteracy of the population. Under these conditions the party of Lao working people set as top priority tasks the elimination of the vestiges of feudalism and neocolonialism, socialist transformations, the improvement of farming and the restoration of industry.

The first measures taken by people's democratic power were to nationalise the forests, mineral deposits and water resources, to abolish private property in land in the cities, and to confiscate the property of the compradors and reactionaries who had fled the country. The state took control of the finances, banks, transport, communications, and the mass media, and took vigorous measures to strengthen the state sector, establish a state-private sector, go over to planned economic development, and expand the cooperative movement.

The Fourth Congress of the LPRP in November 1986 was an outstanding event for the Lao Communists and all people, it specified and developed the course for building socialism, creatively and critically analysed the country's social and economic achievements over the decade of people's power, and

outlined the strategy for the period until the year 2000.

The course taken by the party over the past ten years has proved to be correct. The Lao people have defended the gains of the revolution from plottings by the reactionaries at home and abroad, preserved the sovereignty and independence of their country, and have made definite progress in economic and cultural development, in building a new life. Within a brief period of time, in historical terms, the gross social product of the republic more than doubled, and the national per capita income went up by 60 per cent. Intensive methods are being introduced into agriculture, the main branch of the republic's economy, and the irrigation network has been considerably expanded. The harvest of rice, the country's main crop, more than doubled in the years of people's power, and thus the problem of providing the population with food was, on the whole, solved. The cooperative movement has been growing, with the main stress now on strengthening the existing cooperatives, spreading positive experience, and persuading peasants to join cooperatives by demonstrating to them the advantages of collective work. At present, about 53 per cent of all peasant families are united one way or another in joint agricultural production, and the number of cooperatives has increased to 4,000.

Other sections of the economy have been growing rapidly. In the past decade industrial production has gone up by 340 per cent, with over 90 per cent of the output being turned out by state-run enterprises. Much attention has been given to developing communication, and the rail freight turnover has gone up by 45 per cent. The commodity turnover in state and cooperative trade has doubled, and export has

increased six-fold, enabling the republic to cut its foreign trade deficit by almost one-third.

The LPRP's achievements in the social sphere have been considerable. Illiteracy in the country has been, on the whole, wiped out, and every fourth Laotian is studying. There are 6 higher and 39 specialised secondary educational establishments and over 8,000 schools in the country. The republic gives higher and specialised secondary education to as many people during one year as had been trained in the country's entire pre-revolutionary history. The medical care system has been developing well. The number of hospitals and out-patient clinics has increased by 100 per cent over the 1975 level, and the number of physicians has gone up nine-fold. Many dangerous diseases, such as cholera, leprosy and some others have been eradicated, and disease-prevention measures are being taken on a large scale.

Today over 20 newspapers and magazines are published in Laos and national TV has been broadcasting since 1984.

It is no easy matter, of course, to build a new system in a country, especially if it is advancing towards socialism directly from semi-feudal society. Mistakes, difficulties and miscalculations on this path are inevitable. It was noted at the Fourth Congress of the LPRP that, apart from the objective assessments of the successes achieved, it is necessary to openly and honestly identify the mistakes and miscalculations made mainly due to a subjective approach, pre-mature actions, and attempts to artificially speed up socialist reforms. In industry, this was seen in the mass-scale nationalisation of enterprises at a time when the state was yet incapable of single-handedly running them all. That caused malfunctioning of the enterprises, and the reduction of industrial production at the initial stage. Attempts were made to establish cooperation in farming by issuing orders rather than by persuasion. It was wrongly supposed that the sooner the co-operation process in the countryside was completed, the shorter the path to socialism would be. But the cooperatives set up that way did not facilitate production growth. They did not improve the life of peasants and gave the cooperatives no opportunity to prove their advantages. Great harm was caused by the practice of administrative prohibition on transpor-

ting goods, including food, from some regions to others, and in some places private trade was even banned.

Insufficient attention was paid to transforming the excessively centralised and bureaucratic administrative machinery, ending state subsidies to industrial enterprises, and to increasing labour efficiency.

The congress pointed out the need to resolutely eliminate the shortcomings, to discard outdated thinking and methods of work, and ensure the fulfilment of the tasks set for the forthcoming period. And these tasks are great, indeed.

As estimated by Lao experts, the country is now at the initial stage of the period of transition to socialism, which will last several five-year-plan periods. The chief task at this stage is to provide the material and technical conditions for subsequent socialist industrialisation. The congress devised five goal-oriented programmes to be carried out during two or three five-year periods: the food programme, the programmes for environment protection, the production of consumer goods and export items, the development of transport and communications, and the programmes for improving public education and moulding the new Laos citizen.

The party sees as the chief means of achieving the economic targets the transfer over to a new economic mechanism devised at the Plenary Meetings of the LPRP Central Committee in 1984 and 1985. In this process the economic management system is to be restructured and the efficiency of social production is to be raised by introducing self-sufficiency principles in the economy and giving more independence to enterprises.

In November 1985, the Council of Ministers of the republic approved the Provisional Regulations on State Enterprises, and in August 1986 it adopted a resolution on giving broader independence to enterprises and economic organisations. In 1986-1987, a number of enterprises were put on a self-supporting basis as an experiment. The republican meeting on economic management restructuring in 1987 summed up the first results of the operation of the new economic mechanism. The work of enterprises running on a self-supporting basis has shown that payment according to the work performed and work-team contracts are powerful stimuli for enhancing labour efficiency. At these enter-

prises labour productivity rapidly grew, more raw and other materials were saved, and wages increased. The meeting set the chief goal of the party's economic activities at the present period—to effect a radical turn in economic activity from dependence and state subsidies to independent self-supporting operation by the end of the year. In 1987 a number of industrial enterprises of the republic's capital, Vientiane, and of a few provinces were put on a self-supporting basis.

The Fourth Plenary Meeting of the LPRP Central Committee, held in June 1987 carried out important work to elaborate and specify the party's economic policy. On its instructions the Council of Ministers adopted a number of resolutions on the development of commodity-money circulation, price formation, taxation, trade and on the monopoly of the state on purchasing and exporting major categories of goods. The aim of the resolutions is to bring all relationships between enterprises and economic organisations, between producers and consumers, in line with the principles of running the new economic mechanism.

It will be impossible to accomplish the tasks set by the Fourth Congress of the LPRP unless the working people display greater activity and initiative, unless democracy is adequately developed and the activity of the public organisations that are part of the Lao Front for the National Reconstruction (LFNR) is further improved. A number of vigorous measures to that effect were adopted in 1987. The Fourth Plenary Meeting of the LPRP Central Committee jointly with the Council of Ministers of the republic considered the situation in public education and chartered the strategy of its development in the period until the year 2000. It has been planned to begin in the near future a reform of general and vocational education and training in keeping with the requirements of the country's social and economic development and the moulding of the Laos citizen. The Second Congress of the LFNR, held in September 1987 in Vientiane, played a major role in further uniting all the nationalities and social strata in Laos, and in mobilising them for implementing the decisions of the Fourth LPRP Congress.

The establishment of a socialist legislative system is the urgent demand of the times. The Fourth LPRP Congress resolved that a constitution, the first one in the

history of the republic, should be formulated and adopted in the current five-year period, and that the fundamentals of civil and criminal legislation be introduced.

Fraternal friendship and all-round cooperation with the USSR are a cornerstone of the republic's foreign policy. The Fourth Congress of Lao Communists rightly acclaimed Soviet-Laos cooperation and stressed that "all the victories won by the revolution in our country previously and at the present stage, especially after the formation of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, are inseparable from the assistance, support and valuable comradely assistance extended by the CPSU, the Soviet State and the fraternal Soviet people."

The Lao Communists are displaying keen interest in the restructuring process underway in the Soviet Union and support the CPSU's course for accelerating the development of Soviet society. In charting its own course of perfecting the economic mechanism, reforming the education system and developing people's democracy, the LPRP studied Soviet experience in these spheres and the decisions taken at the 27th Congress of the CPSU.

The Soviet Union and Laos adhere to common positions on the international scene. The official friendly visit to Laos by Eduard Shevardnadze, Member of the Political Bureau, USSR Foreign Minister, in March 1987 confirmed that the views of the two countries on today's major problems coincide and they both are determined to relentlessly carry on the struggle against the nuclear threat, for disarmament and for safeguarding universal peace.

Laos fully supports the Soviet initiatives aimed at ensuring peace and security, improving the situation in the Asian and Pacific area and establishing friendly and goodneighbour relations there. These are also the aims of the constructive proposals made by Laos, Vietnam and Kampuchea on improving the political climate in Southeast Asia, making this region a zone of peace, goodneighbour relations and cooperation, including the policy of national reconciliation proclaimed by the government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, and the efforts of the Lao People's Democratic Republic to normalise relations and promote dialogue with China, as well with Thailand and other ASEAN member-countries.

The celebration of an outstanding event—the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution—has also contributed to strengthening friendship and all-round cooperation between the Soviet Union and Laos and the fraternal relations between the CPSU and the LPRP. In accordance with the decision adopted by the Political Bureau of the LPRP Central Committee in April 1987, a large political campaign was launched in the country to prepare for the celebrations of this anniversary. The campaign proceeded under the slogans of fulfilling the decisions of the Fourth Congress of the LPRP, consolidating fraternal friendship with the Soviet Union and preparing for the 12th anniversary of the Lao People's Democratic Republic. The party and government delegation of the LPDR headed by Kaysone Phom-

vihane, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the LPRP, Chairman of the LPDR Council of Ministers visited the Soviet Union to attend the celebrations on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution. On November 6, 1987 a meeting was held between Mikhail Gorbachev and Kaysone Phomvihane which became a landmark in the development of Soviet-Lao cooperation, affirmed the high level of relations between the CPSU and the LPRP, encouraged the further strengthening and expansion of fraternal friendship and comprehensive cooperation between the Soviet and Lao peoples.

The path traversed by the young Lao republic is not long in historical terms, but what has already been achieved enables the people of Laos to see the grand prospects the way to socialism opens up before them.

Vladimir NAUMKIN

Burma—40 Years of Independence

January 4, 1988, marks the 40th anniversary since Burma became an independent republic and withdrew from the British Commonwealth. The country had been oppressed and plundered by British colonialists for over six decades, from 1885 to 1948, and ravaged by Japanese colonialists from 1942 to 1945, which cruelly dealt with its population. By the time of liberation the colonialists had plundered a half of Burma's national wealth and ruined its industrial enterprises, which were few to begin with, its transport network and irrigation facilities. Farming, above all rice production, its main sector, had deteriorated. Over a half of the population was illiterate.

From 1948 to 1962, the country was ruled by bourgeois-landlord parties. The military coup on March 2, 1962, brought revolutionary officers to power. The Revolutionary Council headed by General Ne Win issued a political declaration *Burmese Way to Socialism*, in which it indicated how the working people's desire for profound social and political change could be met.

Since 1962, major changes have been effected in various spheres. All foreign as well as big and medium local capital has been nationalised, and the land was handed over to those who tilled it. The share of

the state sector in the GNP is approaching 40 per cent. Much stress today is on selling up cooperatives, primarily in agriculture. Though there are about 100 production cooperatives functioning in the country, the share of the cooperative sector in the GNP is a mere 6.8 per cent and most of the work to form new cooperatives is yet to be done. Today the Burmese working people are fulfilling the fifth four-year plan (1986-1989).

Burma has achieved self-sufficiency in foodstuffs. In recent years a good harvest of rice (14,600,000 tons in 1985) and other food and industrial crops have been gathered in. High-yielding varieties of rice are sown on 80 per cent of the country's entire sown area, and the crop-yield of maize and sunflowers has increased. Burma exports rice, primary goods, sugar, fertilisers, and cement; it imports machines and equipment, spare parts, tools, construction materials, and consumer goods. Its main contractors are Japan and ASEAN and EEC countries. In the 1984-1985 fiscal year, the share of the socialist countries in Burma's foreign trade amounted to about 13 per cent.

Great efforts are being exerted to develop education, public health and national culture. In 1971 the country was awarded a UNESCO prize for combating illiteracy. By the mid-1980s the average life expect-

tancy in the country increased to 61 years, as compared with 45 years in 1963.

However, during its 40 independent years Burma has not yet overcome the severe effects of British colonial exploitation. According to UN estimates, Burma is still among the least developed countries in the world. The per capita annual income in the country is less than \$200, and the living standards of its population are rising slowly. The situation is made still worse by inflation and unemployment. The country's continued membership in the system of the world capitalist economy, too, has an adverse effect. Though the physical volume of Burmese export has been growing, the profit gained from it has been dropping because of the price discrepancy on the world markets of industrial and agricultural goods, which leaves the country no opportunity to finance its economic and social programmes. In the 1984-1985 fiscal year the country's export amounted to \$434,800,000; and its import, to \$672,400,000. The situation has not improved of late. As a result, by 1987 the country's foreign debt topped the \$3 billion mark.

At the same time, a considerable part of the state budget funds has to be spent on the struggle against the nationalistic anti-government and other groups operating in the outlying regions. The rebels, who are called "puppets of imperialism" in the local press, commit acts of sabotage, rob the population and are engaged in drug trafficking. The regions where the groups operate, which are rich in minerals and wood resources, are practically excluded from the country's economic activities.

The political changes in Burma were formalised in the 1974 Constitution. According to its provisions, the Revolutionary Council resigned and power went over to the democratically-elected People's Assembly and local people's councils. The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma (as the country is now officially called) says that the goal of the state is socialism. As early as 1964, the Revolutionary Council passed a law on protecting national unity. Under that law all political parties and public organisations were dissolved and a one-party system was introduced. The Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), formed in 1962, is the only party in the country. At present, it has more than 2 million members and can-

didate-members. The Fifth Congress of the BSPP, held in August 1985, reaffirmed the country's socialist orientation. Though the next congress is to be convened in 1989, preparations for it are already underway. At recent party meetings it was declared that an objective and unexaggerated assessment of the state of affairs in the country should be made, the results of the country's development since 1962 be summed up, the mistakes and miscalculations that have accumulated in that period be revealed and ways of rectifying them be identified.

Its independent foreign policy of peace has won Burma international respect. The Constitution states that the country is for world peace and friendly relations among nations, and adheres to principles of peaceful coexistence of states. The Burmese leadership steadily takes the position of non-participation in military-political blocs, comes out against imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism, racism and apartheid and had declared its adherence to principles of "true" non-alignment, though the country left non-aligned movement in 1979.

The Soviet Union was among the first to recognise independent Burma and to establish diplomatic relations with it on February 18, 1948. Soviet-Burmese relations have always been based on respect, mutual understanding, equality and non-interference in one another's affairs. They have been invariably friendly, free of contradictions.

The projects built with Soviet assistance—a technological institute and a hotel in Rangoon, the country's capital; a hospital in Taunggyi, and the Chemoltau dam—are symbols of Soviet-Burmese friendship. Many young Burmese who received education in the Soviet Union, now effectively use their knowledge and skills.

The positions of the two countries on many international problems coincide or are close. This pertains, above all to, such vital issues as prevention of nuclear war, prohibition of nuclear weapons testing and elimination of these weapons, prevention of the militarisation of outer space, and establishment of a new and fair international economic order. The positions of the two countries are similar also at the United Nations. The expansion of friendly Soviet-Burmese relations meet the interests of the peoples of both countries and serves the cause of peace and security in Asia.

Kampuchea: National Revival

January 7, 1988, marks nine years since the founding of the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). Over all these years its working people have been struggling tirelessly and consistently to eliminate the vestiges of the genocidal Pol Pot rule, to strengthen people's power, to solve the complex socio-economic problems of providing security and decent living standards and to bring about national revival.

The People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea (PRPK), the vanguard of the Kampuchean people, held its Fifth Congress in October 1985 and this became a landmark in the struggle. The congress assessed the PRK's development in all areas of life since the country was founded. The important tasks, which must be accomplished in the coming period, were outlined.

As is noted in the report by General Secretary of the PRPK Central Committee, Heng Samrin, "the party was able to mobilise the Kampuchean people to defend the gains of revolution, to renovate and develop the economy. On the whole, the Kampuchean revolution was strengthened; the revolutionary forces—the solid basis of the people's power—grew in the country". A democratic, socialist structure is being built in Kampuchea, a system which was non-existent under the Pol Pot regime.

The economic basis of Kampuchean society has been laid in accordance with the current historical stage of its development. The national economy presently consists of four sectors: state, cooperative, family and private. In addition, all efforts are aimed at making the state sector play the leading role.

Along with restoration work, the people's power is devoting a good deal of attention to building up new industry. It is precisely with these goals in mind that the State Construction Organisation (which became the State Committee for Construction in 1986) was built with assistance from the USSR. It is responsible for setting up new industrial projects. Involved so far is the construction of primarily auxiliary facilities. However, major enterprises such as diesel electric power stations, an asphalt concrete works and several others have been put into operation. It is precisely

these projects which both determine the key approaches taken by the government in industrial production and, along with rubber plantations, trade, transport and communication, the banking and financial system, form the PRK's state economic sector.

Serious, qualitative changes have taken place and continue to occur in agricultural production—the country's leading economic branch.

As was noted at the Fifth PRPK Congress, the party's policy of collectivising labour in agriculture has been proven correct. Legislation was passed which fixed the principle of public ownership of the land. Under the law the land has been handed over to the mutual assistance work groups whose number exceeds 100,000. These mutual assistance work groups unite peasants on the voluntary basis and are called on to gradually put agricultural production on a cooperative basis. The PRPK considers that, only thus, by strictly adhering to the principle of voluntariness, can a genuine mass movement be built to create mutual assistance work groups and turn them into a reliable stronghold of people's power to solve not only economic problems but also bring about the social renovation of the countryside, politically educate the peasants and provide security in the periphery regions of the country.

Based on the results of the work carried out by the Kampucheans since January 1979, the Fifth PRPK Congress drew the important theoretical and practical conclusion that the People's Republic of Kampuchea is a democratic power of the Kampuchean working people and is at the initial stage of the transition period to socialism.

Guided by this conclusion, the Fifth PRPK Congress defined the tasks of the Kampuchean revolution for the coming period. They can be summed up as follows: to reliably defend national independence and build Kampuchea on socialist principles. In this regard it was clearly announced that, considering the historical peculiarities of the country's development and the damage inflicted on the nation by the years-long wars and the Pol Pot regime, it will take the PRK decades to make the

transition from a people's democratic revolution to a socialist one.

This guiding principle developed by the party congress was embodied in the first five-year programme for rehabilitation and socio-economic development for 1986-1990. The priority directions of the country's national economy were indicated in this programme. They include increasing the production of food products by an average annual increment of 7 per cent in order to provide an average of 350 kg of food per capita a year, that is, to bring food production up to 3 million tons by 1990. Over a period of five years 50,000 hectares of rubber plantations are to be restored, the output of sheet rubber is to rise to 50,000 tons. By 1990, timber output will be 200,000 cubic metres. The volume of fish catch is to increase to 130,000 tons.

Making the congress guiding principles a reality, as the two years following it have shown, requires tremendous effort from the party, from all the nation's working people. It must not be forgot that in the remote regions of Kampuchea, subversive activities are still being carried out by the undefeated, foreign-backed, armed anti-government forces. As before, natural calamities seriously impede the development of agriculture. Industrial production still suffers from a shortage of raw materials, electric power, fuels and lubricants. There are still not enough people with technical training.

However, it would be wrong to qualify all the country's current difficulties as objective. The Kampuchean leadership directly states that there are still many subjective shortcomings which are being eliminated more slowly than is desired. "Our urgent duty is to make effective use of state organisations and institutions. It is important that all bodies of power at every level correctly fulfil the functions they are entrusted with, especially in the case of economic organisation and management, since in this area we are now in the initial stage and are meeting up with considerable difficulties," said Heng Samrin.

Vital transformations in people's well-being are occurring, and the social structure of the population is changing. As was written in the magazine *Neak Khusana*, organ of the PRPK Central Committee, "The building of a socialist society is not possible without a solid economic foundation and developed industrial production

which are unthinkable without a strong, politically-solid and organised working class. Thus, the consolidation and all-round development of the working class is one of the primary tasks in the transition period to socialism." In carrying out the appropriate decision of the party and state bodies, the local PRPK organs, public organisations and production collectives are devoting most serious attention to the formation of the working class, to raising its political consciousness. At present, there are 200,000 workers in the PRK, 20,000 of whom work on rubber plantations. By early 1987, 83 per cent of all regular workers had completed various political education courses.

A genuine cultural revolution is gaining momentum. In 1987, 2,400 schools with 1.7 million students, 6 higher and 10 secondary specialised schools were in operation. Since people's power was established, approximately 4,000 young people have been sent abroad for education, mainly to the Soviet Union and Vietnam. More than 1,000 have already returned home as qualified specialists.

One of the vital tasks of the present period set by the Fifth PRPK Congress is to consolidate revolutionary power at every level. The Fifth PRPK Central Committee Plenary Meeting (July 1987) analysed in detail the fulfilment of this task. It was noted that the people's revolutionary committees were created and actively function in all the provinces and in most of the district centres. The need to begin consolidation of the local bodies in the rural districts and villages was recognised since it is namely there that the question of whether or not a new system is to be, will be decided.

The country's party and state leadership considers that the enlargement and consolidation of the PRPK's ranks and the strengthening of the party's role in all spheres of the life of society are necessary for the successful fulfilment of the tasks at hand. Over the two years which elapsed since the Fifth Congress, the PRPK's membership increased from 7,500 to 14,000 people. Tens of thousands are joining the activist groups out of which are chosen the most deserving for candidacy in the party in those areas where party organisations have not yet been established.

In addition, as was noted at the Fifth PRPK CC Plenary Meeting, there are still many unsolved problems in the area of

party building. Inadequate attention is paid to the process of admitting members to the party. As a result, unworthy elements are able to penetrate its ranks. Educational work within the PRPK is still at a low level. At the Fifth Plenary Meeting special attention was drawn to this situation as there are signs that the level of party cadres has qualitatively fallen and that some individuals are susceptible to hostile propaganda. In this respect the PRPK CC has called on all party bodies to improve their methods of work in accordance with the present stage of the revolution and increase the political activeness of party members.

The People's Republic of Kampuchea, together with the Soviet Union and the other fraternal countries and all peace forces, actively struggles against the nuclear war threat, for the creation of a comprehensive international security system. An important component of the PRK's foreign policy is the struggle to settle the Kampuchean problem by political means, to establish relations of goodwill and cooperation in Southeast Asia. As Heng Samrin stated, the Kampuchean people view this struggle as a contribution to implementing the programme proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev on July 28, 1986, in Vladivostok for creating an international security system in the Asia and Pacific region.

Along with the fraternal countries of Indochina—Vietnam and Laos—Kampuchea has not ceased efforts to look for a political solution to the region's conflicts.

World attention was attracted to the announcements by the PRK's government on the policy of national reconciliation and on the principles of a political settlement of the Kampuchea problem published in August and October 1987, respectively. People's Kampuchea proposed uniting all Kampucheans in a single bloc, regardless of their past deeds, class affiliation and ethnic origins, ideological or political outlook. The PRK government announced its readiness to begin discussion on issues

concerning national reconciliation with all the opposition Khmer groups and their leaders with the exception of Pol Pot and those immediately around him and set forth fundamental issues of settlement—holding elections and formation of a coalition government.

The PRK expressed readiness to solve, jointly with international organisations and other interested parties, the problem of Kampuchean refugees in Thailand, of their repatriation.

As was noted in the October 18, 1987 Statement of the Soviet government, the Soviet Union considers this a serious step, "reflects the goodwill of the PRK's leadership, its readiness to make a rational compromise in the name of the highest interests of the nation, takes into consideration the positions of various Khmer groups and interested countries, particularly those of Southeast Asia and ASEAN members".

Over the past nine years Soviet-Kampuchean relations have been increasingly developing in all areas. The CPSU delegation participated in the Fifth PRPK Congress and a PRPK delegation attended the 27th CPSU Congress and the 70th anniversary celebrations. The USSR renders the PRK all-round aid in restoring a normal life for its people. With the Soviet Union's assistance key areas of the national economy are being developed such as rubber plant farming, power engineering, construction and transport. Soviet specialists work with their Kampuchean colleagues in the areas of education and health care.

The meetings between Mikhail Gorbachev and Heng Samrin on July 28 and November 9, 1987, gave fresh impetus to cooperation between the two parties and countries. In the course of the meetings the mutual aspiration for expanded and deepened ties between the CPSU and the PRPK was confirmed and the further development of Soviet-Kampuchean relations in the political, economic and cultural spheres was discussed.

Igor OSOTOV

Euroterrorists: Accomplices of Reaction

In the amateur photograph you can barely make out the figures of men running towards a car. They are Italian terrorists from the extremist *Brigate Rosse* (Red Brigades) group. They have just carried out the largest and most brutal operation in Italy in recent years. On February 14, 1987, a "shock group" of nine thugs attacked a postal van in a quiet street in Rome. They shot the guards at pointblank range. Two policemen died on the spot and one was seriously wounded. The attack, the Italian newspapers wrote, was comparable to the *Brigatistas'* most publicised action perpetrated in 1978: the kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro, Chairman of the Christian Democratic Party.

The shock caused by that sortie of the *Brigate Rosse* was very serious. In recent years there has been somewhat of a lull in terrorist activities in Italy. After the late 1970s and early 1980s when, according to the Interior Ministry, more than 2,000 terrorist acts were committed in the country every year, 1986 was named "the calmest year since 1969" (with only 20 sorties and just one victim).

The country had barely recovered from the shock when the terrorists again made the headlines. On March 20 this year General Licio Giorgeri, who headed the research and development department for new aircraft in the Italian Defence Ministry, was murdered in Rome. The press and the politicians unanimously declared that the country was threatened with a new wave of terrorism.

Several months earlier alarming news of the same kind came from France. Formerly the sorties of terrorists, who hid behind pseudo-leftist phraseology, were less common. On November 17, 1986, the terrorists from the *Action Directe* extremist group murdered Georges Bess, General Director of the government-owned motor company Renault. All told, the extremists have recently staged about 80 terrorist acts. These include murders and explosions in state institutions and private firms.

The thugs from the notorious *Rote Armee Fraktion* (RAF), a terrorist organisation in the FRG, make their presence felt from time to time. In June 1986 they murdered Karl-Heinz Beckurts, member of the board of the Siemens electro-engineering concern.

What do the criminals from different West European countries have in common? In the first place, they share an "ideological basis": they all pose as staunch fighters against imperialism, and of late have been at pains to stress their "anti-militaristic" character. Their "manifestos", "declarations", "theoretical documents" bristle with leftist phraseology. The left-wing terrorists choose as their targets captains of industry and high-ranking executives of the military-industrial complex, in particular. They have staged acts of sabotage against NATO military installations (in Belgium and in the FRG).

Most of the recently arrested people charged with belonging to left-wing extremist terrorist groups are under thirty. In social background, they come from petty bourgeoisie, the technical intelligentsia, and some are from the working class.

Terrorist organisations thrive in capitalist society. Objectively, the motives for "conversion into the terrorist faith" are rooted in the social fabric—this is now recognised in the West, and not only by Marxist scholars. Giorgio Bocca, a pundit of the bourgeois press in Italy, notes that people turn to terror because the "technological revolution deprives them of a job or makes their position insecure". It would be interesting to quote Emilio Vesce, a leader of the Italian ultra-left in the 1970s, now one of the leaders of the Radical Party. He says that a terrorist organisation will find many "recruits" among the young people who are on the sidelines of society.

Social injustice, exploitation, deprivation, disenchantment with political parties, including left-wing parties, to change existing conditions—all make desperate, spiritually bereft and politically immature young people turn to terror as a shortcut for overcoming grave social problems. However, the "activities" of left-wing terrorists are incompatible with their proclaimed goals as witnessed by the sad history of terrorism which has been in existence for several decades. Today, as before, terrorists in Western Europe play the role of provocateurs who wittingly or unwittingly play into reactionaries' hands. There is considerable evidence that they often act with the knowledge of, or on instructions from,

Western, including US intelligence services, whose agents infiltrate terrorist organisations.

Details of the Brigade Rosse attack on the postal van photographed by a passer-by are very difficult to make out. It is even more difficult to track down the criminals. But it is harder still to identify those behind the bloody crimes, who continue to mastermind the criminal activities of terrorists in Italy, France, Spain, the FRG and other West European countries. The questions prompted by their recent crimes are: who stands behind the terrorists, who stands to gain from the "strategy of tensions", whose objective interests are served by all these "brigades", "cells", "factions", and the like?

The day after the Italian General Giorgeri was murdered, the newspaper *Paese Sera* wrote: "The name 'Red Brigades' does not stand for 'left-wing revolutionary organisation', as they would like to be seen. Behind the hired assassins can be found forces which will stop at nothing to preserve power, privileges and high posts under conditions of destabilisation."

The current resurgence of terrorist activity in Italy after an all-time low in 1986 coincides with the end of what, by Italian standards, was a long period of political stability. From August 1983 to March 1987 Italy was ruled by a five-party coalition government, headed by Socialist Bettino Craxi. Early this year aggravated differences between the parties led to the resignation of the cabinet followed by the dissolution of Parliament. Drawing attention to the flare-up of terrorism which occurred at the same time, the Italian Communist Party's weekly *Rinascita* stressed: "Their [terrorists'. — S. B.] immediate aim is to interfere in politics, aggravate and dramatise the situation caused by the crisis and absence of government to increase the uncertainty in the country. They want people to be afraid of any political change."

A study of the terrorist crimes leads to the conclusion that the recent provocations by terrorists are an objective obstacle to the ability of the Left to strengthen its position; they cast a shadow on progressive parties and organisations, in the first place the Italian Communist Party, the biggest communist party in the capitalist world. The bourgeois press has been going out of its way to make people associate the star on a red banner—a symbol arrogantly sto-

len by the Brigade Rosse—with the political line of the ICP, and to foment fears about a "communist threat".

The actions of the terrorists from the Brigade Rosse, Action Directe and other groups have revealed, especially recently, an international trend. Belgian and West German Leftists have been staging acts of sabotage against NATO military installations. In 1985 Action Directe members assassinated René Audran, a high-ranking French Defence Ministry official. The Italian Brigatistas make short shrift of General Giorgeri... These are links in the same chain. There is plenty of evidence to show that many Euroterrorist actions are coordinated and directed from the same centre. The documents of Euroterrorists harp on the need to "strengthen cooperation", and "expand links". On the other hand, law enforcement bodies have significant evidence which sheds light on the coordinated activities of extremist groups.

In early June 1987 police carried out a successful operation against the Brigade Rosse. More than ten people were arrested in Rome and Paris. Investigators believe they include those who were immediately involved in the murder of General Giorgeri. According to an observer from the Italian news agency ANSA, who commented on the early results of the investigation, the detectives were inclined to think that the activity of the terrorist organisations operating in a number of West European countries, is directed and coordinated from a single underground international centre. The leaders of the so-called militant wing of the Brigade Rosse who have claimed responsibility for recent acts of terrorism, were closely linked with other West European terrorist groups.

Police in Italy, France, Spain, the FRG and Belgium are conducting difficult investigations into numerous terrorist acts. Many criminals are still at large. Yet one can confidently speak of close coordination of these terrorist acts. A "Transatlantic connection" can easily be discerned. A good deal has been said about the sinister role of the "quiet Americans" in the bloody events which swept some West European countries in the 1970s. The current investigation has so far failed to answer the key question: who is behind the terrorists? It will be recalled that even the three trials in the Moro case failed to give an answer. One thing is clear: the actions of the terro-

rists who camouflage their activities by revolutionary slogans damage the forces of peace and progress and play into the hands of the internal and international reaction. Destabilisation, the undermining

of government institutions—the proclaimed goals of the terrorists—objectively tend to strengthen the existing structures, and toughen the policies of the ruling class.

Sergei BATYREV

The GDR: Side by Side with the Soviet Union

The GDR was formed as a state 38 years ago, on October 7, 1949. But, in actual fact, the history of the first state of German working people began in May 1945, when the eastern part of Germany took the path of democratic development and set out to remove the heavy aftermath of Nazism and militarism. That had become possible only after the defeat of Nazi Germany by the anti-Hitler coalition and the liberation of the German people, after the decisions on the postwar arrangement adopted in Potsdam, and due to the assistance rendered by the Soviet military administration to the class brothers in East Germany in building a new society. The traditions of proletarian solidarity and close inviolable friendship with German Communists, which had been established by Lenin and grew stronger in subsequent years, especially after the nucleus of the Thaelmann leadership formed in the Communist Party of Germany, proved decisive for the relations between our parties, are a source of creative enthusiasm for the German working class today, and have ensured unity between the CPSU and the SED, and between the USSR and the GDR. The Soviet Union was the first to establish diplomatic relations with the GDR, unfailingly supported it in its long struggle for international recognition.

Anyone who goes to the GDR today sees a country with highly developed industry and agriculture, able to supply itself entirely with foodstuffs, a country with a well-developed social sphere, generally recognised achievements in science and culture, and an excellent public education system. This is all the more impressive, if one bears in mind that in 1945 the German Communists had to start practically from scratch.

On the international scene the GDR is

respected for its consistent policy of peace, and for its reliability as a partner in the socialist community, and as a member of the Warsaw Treaty and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). It has actively supported the Soviet Union's peace proposals and has itself, together with the other fraternal countries, come up with initiatives effecting disarmament and promoting detente in Europe. It has also submitted draft resolutions at the UN, of which it has been a member since 1973, and at other international organisations and conferences. The GDR has contributed considerably to drafting joint proposals of the Warsaw Treaty countries and the decisions adopted at the Berlin Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in 1987, and has helped coordinate implementation. Support continues to grow for the proposal of the GDR and Czechoslovakia to the FRG government on creating in the heart of Europe a 300-kilometre-wide corridor free of battlefield nuclear weapons. Combined with the Soviet proposals on the elimination of nuclear medium-range and enhanced-range tactical missiles, the implementation of that proposal would be a big step towards clearing our continent of nuclear weapons.

The GDR enjoys high prestige among the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The nation has won it in the joint struggle for justice and equality in international relations, for the elimination of all forms of racism, colonialism and oppression, by the efficient aid and support rendered to the states and national liberation movements which have embarked on the road of social progress.

Relations with the other German state—the FRG—is a major area of the GDR's foreign policy. The task is to show the futility of West German revenge-seeking ambitions

and to force the FRG government to strictly observe its commitments to respect the results of World War II and the European realities that had arisen as a result of post-war development, that is, to fully recognise the international legal status of the GDR as an independent and sovereign state. Only in this way can the "German-German" relations be finally normalised. The GDR has been working consistently in the framework of the European process for improving these relations. The attempts by certain circles in the FRG to interpret the growth of these relations as advancement towards a mythical "reunification of Germany" are groundless. Besides, a common European home should be built on the principles of stability and respect for the existing status quo, which is precisely what is demanded by the overwhelming majority of the states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Such a "home" can exist only if no one disputes the right of some or other of its "inhabitants" to live in the "rooms" they occupy. In view of this, the reunification slogan does not facilitate, but obstructs the improvement of relations between the two German states, for it is a constant source of confrontation between them on a question which can be answered only in the distant future.

Another aspect of relations between the GDR and the FRG is the safeguarding of peace and provision of a guarantee that a war would never begin on German soil. The slogan of a "coalition of the forces of reason and realism" or, in other words, a "coalition of survival", advanced by the GDR leadership, is a display of new political thinking on the path towards this goal. The work being done by our German friends to explain to the public and the ruling circles in the FRG the Soviet peace initiatives and to draw more and more people in the FRG into vigorous actions for disarmament and peace, is beginning to yield fruit, is changing the balance of political forces in that country and compels even the FRG government to favour, if only in words so far, some disarmament measures.

At present, people of the GDR are working effectively to fulfil the decisions of the 11th Congress of the SED held in April 1986. The decisions taken at the forum of German Communists are aimed at raising living standards and building up the country's economic power. The German friends call the decisions a "course towards the unity of social and

economic policies". The pursuance of this course is facilitated by the streamlined system of economic planning and management and by combining centralism with the independence of production associations, called combines. Ever more of them are beginning to work on the self-financing principle. The results of the first half of 1987 have shown that the national income of the GDR has grown by 3 per cent, despite the bad weather conditions last winter. This growth has been achieved only by raising labour productivity. The net output of industry has gone up by 6.4 per cent, and labour productivity, by 6.8 per cent. At the same time, the expenditure of raw and other materials has dropped by 3 per cent. Within those six months more than 100,000 flats have been built, which improved the housing conditions of over 300,000 people in the country with a population of 16,600,000. Besides, new schools, gyms, kindergartens and creches have been built. A decision on further benefits for young families and a considerable rise in the monthly allowance for each child came into force on May 1, 1987. Labour conditions are being constantly improved, production which is health-hazardous is being eliminated, and labour-intensive monotonous work places are being re-equipped. Nonetheless, as it was noted at the June 1987 Plenary Meeting of the SED Central Committee, this is not the limit. The main sources of growth are to be sought in closing the wide gap in the development levels of some regions and enterprises. The Plenary Meeting named shortcomings in the quality of construction, in the work of factory canteens and in observing sanitary rules in places of production. There are other problems, too. Socialist democracy must be improved and more people must become involved in working out annual production plans and in solving all problems of socialist construction.

The election congresses and conferences of a number of mass organisations and democratic parties held in 1987—from the Confederation of Free German Trade Unions to the Union of Gardeners and Livestock Breeders—demonstrate the unity of the GDR people under the leadership of the Marxist-Leninist Socialist Unity Party of Germany, the effectiveness of social organisation and the stability of the situation in the country. The public celebrations of the 750th anniversary of the capital Berlin, the national sports festival and the youth sports and athletics contests in Leipzig testified to the unanimo-

us support for the SED's course for building socialism and for its policy of maintaining the fraternal alliance with the USSR and other countries of the socialist community. The working people of the GDR enthusiastically celebrated the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

For the GDR cooperation in all spheres with the Soviet Union and the other fraternal countries is a major condition for its continued development. The USSR accounts for 40 per cent of the GDR's foreign trade, and the GDR's share in the Soviet foreign trade turnover is 10 per cent.

The GDR is the biggest foreign partner of the Soviet Union not only in trade, but also in the scientific, technological and some other areas of cooperation. The meetings between Mikhail Gorbachev and Erich Honecker and the understandings reached there have opened a new important stage in cooperation between our parties and countries. On their basis the national economies of both countries are being made more intercomplementary. Practical measures have been planned for carrying out the agreements on new forms of economic cooperation: the promotion of direct ties between enterprises, associations and combines (such relations have already been established by 100 industrial enterprises on each side, and another 30 sets of enterprises are getting ready for this) and the establishment of joint research institutions and industrial enterprises in each of the two countries. Much significance is attached to the joint elaboration of the concept of economic, scientific and technological cooperation between the USSR and the GDR for the period ending in the year 2000. Both countries will be improving cooperation among the CMEA countries and devise measures to remodel the CMEA mechanism.

The spirit of mutual understanding, respect for the partner's interests and preparedness to seek solution of specific problems signify an internationalist approach to economic cooperation in practice, which is especially needed today when the socialist community is facing difficult problems, when the reverberations of the crises raging on the world capitalist market reach our countries, affecting their international ties. In this si-

tuation it is most important to have a reliable friend, know his intentions and coordinate one's actions with him. This is precisely what the relations between the USSR and the GDR are like today.

Great interest has been evoked in the GDR by the revolutionary restructuring process, the increased openness in society and the deepening of socialist democracy in the USSR. The German Communists and all working people of the GDR, aware that the methods used by the CPSU cannot be copied literally, approve of the course for deep-going social and economic changes in the USSR which was declared at the 27th Congress of the CPSU and of the decisions of the June 1987 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee on establishing an integrated system of economic management. The GDR people are convinced that the people of the USSR will successfully accomplish the tasks set and strengthen the USSR's might, thereby increasing the potential of world socialism as a whole and improving conditions for the development of all the other socialist states. Our German friends believe that the working people of the GDR can best contribute to Soviet restructuring by promptly and precisely fulfilling all their obligations in the framework of cooperation with the USSR, and working efficiently to carry out the decisions of the 11th Congress of the SED.

As further progress is made in building a socialist society, cooperation among the fraternal countries, also between the USSR and the GDR, is becoming increasingly many-faceted and rich in content. Many problems have been already or are being solved, and many others are awaiting solution. It is time to expand contacts between people of both countries, about which Mikhail Gorbachev spoke at the 11th Congress of the SED in April 1986, and to promote the exchange of experience and cooperation in cultural and other spheres. The unity of the positions of the CPSU and the SED on all the main issues of international politics and socialist development, forged during many years of joint struggle, is an earnest of effective interaction in the future as well.

Valentin KOPTILTSEV

Syrian Arab Republic

The total area of Syria equals 185,000 sq. km; about 1,370 sq. km of it—the Golan Heights—have been occupied by Israel since June 1967. The nation's population is over 10.7 million, mostly Arabs (88 per cent); there are also Kurds, Armenians, Assyrians, Turkomans, North Caucasians. The capital is Damascus. Eighty-five per cent of all Syrians profess Islam; mostly Sunnites, and also Alavites, Druzes and Ishmaelites. The main minerals are oil, gas, phosphates.


Syria has a vast historic legacy. Architectural monuments on its territory make it possible to trace the history of civilisation as far back as the most ancient settlements. Nor is this surprising, for a favourable geographical location, a fine climate and fertile land have always attracted people to this part of the Eastern Mediterranean. Also drawn to it over the centuries were numerous conquerors.

A number of early slave-holding states existed in Syria as early as the third millennium B. C. From the middle of the second millennium B. C. on, Syria successively formed part of the major Eastern states: Ancient Egypt, Assyria and Achaemenian Persia; it was the core of the Seleucid empire and then an important province of the Roman and Byzantine empires and the Arab caliphate of the Omeyyads. From 1516 to 1918, it was part of the Ottoman Empire.

The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire did not lead to independence for Syria. Under the secret Sykes-Picot Treaty between Britain and France (May 1916), the Arab regions of the former empire were divided into colonies and spheres of influence. The treaty handed Syria over to Britain at first but in 1919 British occupation was replaced by French occupation. In 1923, the League of Nations Council definitively approved France's mandate on Syrian territory.

At the beginning of World War II, Syria found itself under the control of a German-Italian commission, the so-called armistice commission. In the summer of 1941, British and French troops moved into the country. In the same year the French national committee recognised Syria's independence, and in 1943 the first Syrian national government was formed. Nevertheless, foreign occupation continued.

It was not until April 17, 1946, that the last foreign soldier left Syrian territory. This date is observed every year as Evacuation Day, a national holiday marking the beginning of Syria's independent development.



In February 1958, Syria merged with Egypt, and the United Arab Republic was proclaimed. In the autumn of 1961, Syria withdrew from the united republic in the wake of a coup.

On March 8, 1963, power in Syria was taken by the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party (Baath — ASRP). In February 1966, the left wing of the ASRP carried out a coup and removed the right wing from power. On November 16, 1970, an exacerbation of the struggle between the civilian and military wings of the party resulted in the military wing led by General Hafez al-Assad taking over. In August 1971, Assad became General Secretary of the ASRP. In March of that year, he was elected by popular referendum President of Syria and has since been re-elected twice.

The ASRP was so named following a merger in 1954 between the Arab Baath Party and Arab Socialist Party.

The ASRP programme calls for the construction of socialism (in the petty bourgeois sense of the term) and for struggle to bring about Arab unity. It considers that these goals must be achieved by combating reaction, imperialism and Zionism.

Hence the fact that the party has effected a series of progressive social and economic measures to undermine the positions of the big bourgeoisie and foreign capital as well

as of feudal and pre-feudal relations in the countryside and to improve the working people's position. The measures include an agrarian reform, the nationalisation of large-scale industry and the introduction of state control over banking and insurance. The state has taken over all natural resources and prohibited granting private individuals or foreign companies concessions for the exploitation of oil or other deposits.

Thus the state sector of the economy has emerged and won dominant positions. It accounts for roughly 75 per cent of the value of industrial output and for approximately 70 per cent of the basic means of production. The state fully controls finance, the railways and air transport. The private sector plays a leading role in agriculture, retail trade, the service industry, housing construction and motor transport.

The past two decades have seen Syria's national economy make considerable progress. Even so, the economic situation is rather complicated. The state budget is rather strained due to forced large expenditures on defence.

In pursuing an anti-imperialist policy, the ASRP leadership enjoys the support of the country's patriotic and progressive forces. In 1972, the National Progressive Front was established which comprises the Baathists, Communists, the Arab Socialist Union, the Arab Socialist Party and the socialist-unionist movement.

Regarding foreign policy, Syria has a solid standing on the left flank of the non-aligned movement and calls for efforts to radically improve the international situation. Its leadership puts the blame for today's world tensions on the imperialists, primarily those of the United States. It backs the Soviet Union's peace initiatives directed at removing the threat of nuclear catastrophe, curbing the arms race and settling regional conflicts by political means.

One of Syria's main foreign policy objectives is to prevent separate deals as a substitute for a fair Middle East settlement. Syria insists on ending the crisis in the region by political means and is firmly committed to defeating US-Israeli plans to involve Arabs in a separate accord.

It comes out actively in support of the Soviet proposal for an international conference on a peaceful Middle East settlement under the auspices of the UN.

Lebanon is an important line of the Syrian leadership's regional policy. Being in a

state of confrontation with Israel, Syria is trying to prevent Lebanon from drifting into the sphere of influence of Tel Aviv and its "strategic ally", Washington. It assists Lebanese national patriotic forces in the struggle to end Israeli occupation of the south of Lebanon and democratise the political structures of that state.

Relations with the Palestinians hold a notable place in Syrian foreign policy. They have been strained in recent years. Resumption of coordinated action by Syria and the PLO, which is restoring its unity, would add to the role of the Arab factor in the struggle to settle the Middle East conflict.

Syrian leaders have repeatedly pronounced themselves for an end to the Iran-Iraq war. Syria is emphatically against the United States and its allies using the present situation in the Persian Gulf as an excuse for building up their military presence there. Unlike the other Arab countries, it maintains extensive diplomatic and economic relations with Iran. At the same time, its ties with Iraq have long been suspended.

The Syrian leadership under Hafez al-Assad sees growing cooperation with the Soviet Union in various fields as a strategic line of its foreign policy. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were established in July 1944. A major event in the history of Soviet-Syrian relations was the signing on October 8, 1980 of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which laid the solid groundwork for effective bilateral cooperation. In 1987 the Soviet Union and Syria marked the 30th anniversary of economic, scientific and technological cooperation and the 25th anniversary of the agreement on cultural cooperation. The successful Soviet-Syrian space flight accomplished in July 1987 was a vivid illustration of the fruitfulness of relations between the two countries. The ninth session of the mixed Commission for Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation, held in Damascus in 1987, yielded promising results.


President Hafez al-Assad's visit to Moscow in April 1987, during which he met and spoke with Soviet leaders, was an important milestone in the development of Soviet-Syrian relations. The joint statement adopted in conclusion of the meetings and talks reflected the high level of the two countries' coordinated action on the international scene and demonstrated their resolve to improve and further mutual cooperation.

Aleksandr DIMIN

A REAL STEP TOWARDS A SAFE WORLD

The words in the title now ring all over the planet and in all languages, expressing the peoples' appreciation of the results of the Soviet-US summit in Washington on December 7-10. For the first time in contemporary history, a treaty has been signed which eliminates two classes of nuclear weapons. Nor is this because they are physically and morally obsolete, for they are not, but because they are too dangerous to humanity and civilisation. While the treaty is Soviet-American in form, it is truly international in character. Nuclear weapons are to be removed from nine countries. This demonstrates the feasibility of building a nuclear-free and hence a safer world and confirms the unity and oneness of our planet. The treaty on the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles (IRMs and SRMs) is the result of a breakthrough in thinking, of the removal of a seemingly insurmountable psychological barrier between the two nuclear powers. It marks an advance to a qualitatively different level of cooperation in solving major universal problems.

Another indication of this is that, immediately after the signing of the treaty, the participants in the summit proceeded to discuss questions of the drafting of a treaty on a 50 per cent reduction of strategic offensive arms in conditions of preserving the ABM Treaty. What has come about can hardly be overestimated, for the results of the summit may become the starting point for the abolition of nuclear weapons in general. We may put it on record without giving in to euphoria or shutting our eyes to the formidable difficulties ahead that we are in the presence of the most significant international event of the 1980s or possibly even the period beyond. "The treaty on the complete elimination of Soviet and US intermediate- and shorter-range missiles," Mikhail Gorbachev said, speaking in Washington, "...will be a historic landmark in the annals of people's perennial aspiration for a world without war."



The path to the Washington political and diplomatic summit was hard. Nor is this surprising in view of the acuteness and dimensions of the problem of war and peace in the nuclear and space era and the sense of historical responsibility which their solution requires. It took political wisdom, perseverance and flexibility to advance to the summit in the name of the future without giving in to emotion or lapsing into negativism.

Geneva and Reykjavik were important stages on this path. In November 1985, when the two leaders met in Switzerland, they failed to find solutions to the big problems of ending the arms race. But the Soviet Union and the United States pledged to build their mutual relations in accordance with the indisputable truth that there shall be no nuclear war and to refrain from seeking military superiority. In October 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan left Reykjavik without signing a single document. But during that meeting there came a reappraisal of approaches to the problem of disarmament; the talks showed that it could be done. Their results made it possible in the end to actually set about removing roadblocks so as to make headway on

the key problem of disarmament, that of reducing and then eliminating strategic nuclear armaments.

The main incentive to following this course was provided by the Soviet peace initiatives of the past two years. They are fruits of the new political thinking and innovative approaches to politics evolved by the April 1985 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU CC and the 27th Congress of our party. It may be useful to remind the reader of the main components of the set of major Soviet initiatives.

Two years ago (January 15, 1986), the Soviet Union advanced an elaborate programme for the phased elimination of all nuclear weapons in 15 years, by the end of this century. For two years now, our country has been working for the implementation of the programme, taking one concrete initiative after another. In line with this programme, the Soviet delegation to the Geneva talks put forward major compromise proposals for eliminating intermediate-range missiles, cutting strategic offensive weapons by 50 per cent and preventing the militarisation of space.

As early as the summer of 1985, the Soviet Union unilaterally stopped nuclear explosions and reaffirmed its unilateral freeze on anti-satellite weapons tests. Our country called on the United States to follow suit and come to terms without delay on a complete prohibition of nuclear testing. And while our call found no response, our moratorium on nuclear blasts remained in force till January 1, 1987. Besides, the Soviet Union made far-reaching proposals for banning the militarisation of space and using it for peaceful purposes only. These proposals, which still stand, won the unanimous approval of the UN General Assembly, the most representative international forum. The Geneva Disarmament Conference has on the table detailed Soviet proposals for banning chemical weapons and destroying their stockpiles. These initiatives enjoy world-wide support. The drafting of a relevant convention has made great progress.

More than a year ago, the Soviet Union and its WTO allies proposed lowering armed forces and armaments in Europe—all the way from the Atlantic to the Urals—to the level of reasonable adequacy. Some figures have already been mentioned; agreement could be reached on, say, a roughly 25 per cent reduction of the armed forces of both sides.

A further Soviet initiative goes a long way towards solving all these as well as other disarmament problems. The Soviet Union posed in a new way the question of verifying adherence to agreements, a question which earlier had been a stumbling-block at the talks. It proposed a carefully considered system of on-site inspection of the deployment of the weapons to be eliminated, including inspection at the plants manufacturing them. A further important development was the accord on confidence-building measures reached at the Stockholm Conference thanks to the efforts of the socialist, neutral and non-aligned countries of Europe; the accord is being carried out already.

The United States and its allies have yet to respond to the proposal of the Soviet Union and other WTO countries to compare the military doctrines of the two alliances to lend these an exclusively defensive trend. Lastly, there is the particularly important concept of setting up a comprehensive international security system fully substantiated at the 27th CPSU Congress. It is the crowning piece, so to speak, of the detailed action programme proposed by the Soviet Union to its partners in the military as well as the political, economic, humanitarian and ecological spheres.

The world is tired of tension, of the permanent threat of nuclear conflict. The Soviet Union has done all in its power to end this tension and do away with this threat. Among the many acute political problems,

the problem singled out for solution and likely to set off a chain reaction in favour of the solution of other disarmament problems was that of eliminating intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. And now there is a treaty on this.

The Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-range and Shorter-range Missiles was signed thanks to the two sides' readiness to take each other's interests into consideration and seek compromise in the balance of their own and others' interests. The principle which prevailed had been upheld by the Soviet Union from the first; it implies that neither side should gain unilateral advantages at the expense of the other.

The Memorandum of Understanding on the Setting of Initial Data in Connection with the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-range and Shorter-range Missiles stresses that 826 deployed and non-deployed IRMs, including 470 deployed ones, are to be destroyed by the Soviet side and 689 IRMs, including 429 deployed ones, by the US side.

As regards the shorter-range missiles, the Soviet side is to eliminate 926 deployed and non-deployed missiles and the US side, 170 such missiles.

The various data included in the memorandum apply to about 100 facilities for the Soviet side and to more than 30 facilities in the United States and on the territory of five West European basing countries. As is known the Soviet IRMs are deployed exclusively on the territory of the USSR, while the respective American systems are on the territory of the following US NATO allies: West Germany, Britain, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands.

Detailed data is provided, too, with regard to the deployed and non-deployed SRMs of the sides, launchers for those missiles and support equipment associated with those missiles and launchers. In particular, there is data concerning the Soviet SRMs deployed and non-deployed on the territory of the USSR and the Soviet SRMs deployed in the GDR and Czechoslovakia, as well as American SRMs stored on the territory of the USA. There is also data concerning the location of storage and missile and launcher repair facilities, training centres and elimination facilities.

Also cited are the Soviet and American plants manufacturing IRMs and SRMs and their launchers and the exact geographical location of those works.

The IRMs shall be eliminated within a period of three years and the SRMs within a period of 18 months after the treaty has taken effect. In verifying the compliance with the provisions of the treaty, an important role is allotted to national technical means of verification; provisions include on-site inspections. Either side is entitled to conduct inspections over a period of 13 years after the treaty comes into force. There is a provision for surprise inspections, with prior notification coming mere hours in advance. The first three years are to see 20 such inspections per calendar year, the subsequent five years, 15 and the last five years, 10.

Some readily affirm now that concessions were only made by the Soviet side. They claim credit for verification measures. But it is only fair to recognise that credit actually goes in equal measure to both sides; each of them covered its part of the road, the sum total of reciprocal concessions yielded positive results.

The Soviet side went to the Washington summit, being convinced that the difference in ideologies and in social, economic and political systems

is no insuperable obstacle to a way out of the situation and that there are no contradictions fatally dooming the Soviet Union and the United States to confrontation. What is needed to remedy the situation, the Soviet side has said repeatedly, is political will, which the Soviet leadership has always had. It is necessary that US policy be based, not on illusions of the possibility of outpacing the other side in the arms race and securing military superiority or on exaggerated notions about "vital US interests" in the world, but on the living realities of today's world and the changes it has undergone in recent decades.

The Soviet side had a precise concept of the summit flowing logically from our country's principled, consistent approach to its relations with the United States and taking account of the peculiarities of the current stage. Specifically, it had a good idea of the real situation, nor did it entertain the slightest illusions about US policy. We in the Soviet Union saw how very far the militarisation of the economy and, indeed, of political thinking had gone overseas. But we realised that the situation in the world was too dangerous for humanity to miss the slightest chance of improvement, of progress towards more durable peace.

Having no bigger stake in success than the United States, the Soviet leadership was far more keenly aware, nonetheless, of the two countries' responsibility for the destiny of the world. And in helping pave the way for the Washington summit it proceeded from the simple and clear logic of the need to create the right political atmosphere for talks beforehand. "In this critical period," Mikhail Gorbachev said, "the world expects the third and fourth Soviet-US summits to produce more than merely an official acknowledgement of the decisions agreed upon a year ago, and more than merely a continuation of the discussion. The growing danger that weapons may be perfected to a point where they will become uncontrollable is urging us to waste no time. That is why we will work unrelentingly at these meetings for a palpable breakthrough, for concrete results in reducing strategic offensive armaments and barring weapons from outer space—the key to removing the nuclear threat."

During the summit there was an in-depth exchange of views on the main aspects of Soviet-US relations and the contemporary international situation, the Soviet side seeing major problems of security as central to it.

The participants discussed in detail the questions to be dealt with at the talks on strategic armaments. They stressed that the IRM-SRM Treaty was a proper prelude to progress at the talks on 50 per cent cuts in strategic offensive weapons (SOWs).

The Soviet Union and the United States consider, according to the Joint Soviet-US Summit Statement, that given a mutual desire, a relevant accord could become reality as early as the first half of 1988. This will require a good deal of efforts. During his conversation with US Secretary of State George Shultz in October 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev said that the Soviet Union was agreeable to setting limits to the number of warheads on the two sides' various SOWs: land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and air-based cruise missiles. It is a fact of history that while there is overall rough parity in SOWs between the Soviet Union and the United States, the patterns differ notably. In the Soviet Union's strategic potential (in terms of warheads), 70 per cent is made up of ICBMs while in the case of the United States SLBMs account for about 50 per cent of the strategic potential, strategic bombers for 30 per cent and ICBMs for 20 per cent. Speaking of SOWs in general, the Soviet Union has a some-

what greater number of delivery systems, namely, 2,484 against the United States' 2,210. But then the United States has 50 per cent more explosive charges on them—roughly 15,000—against about 10,000 in the case of the Soviet Union.

According to the Joint Soviet-US Summit Statement, the two sides are agreed that as a result of a 50 per cent reduction, either of them will have no more than 1,600 strategic offensive delivery systems and no more than 6,000 explosive charges (warheads) upon them, including 1,540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles. They agreed on the counting rules for heavy bombers and their nuclear armaments and reached agreement that as a result of the reductions the aggregate throw-weight of the USSR's ICBMs and SLBMs will be cut to a level approximately 50 per cent below the existing level and this level will not be exceeded by either side. This is reflected in the agreed portions of the joint draft treaty being developed in Geneva. The Soviet Union proposed that even after reduction either side should decide by itself on the pattern of its armaments; the number of warheads on ballistic missiles, that is, ICBMs and SLBMs, should not exceed 4,900.

The two sides also worked out the counting rules with respect to existing ballistic missiles. They proceed from the assumption that existing types of ballistic missiles are deployed with the following numbers of warheads: in the United States, 10 on MX, three on Minuteman III, one on Minuteman II, eight on Trident I, eight on Trident II and 10 on Poseidon; in the Soviet Union, one on SS-11, one on SS-13, four on SS-17, 10 on SS-18, six on SS-19, 10 on SS-24, one on SS-25, one on SS-N-6, one on SS-N-8, one on SS-N-17, seven on SS-N-18, four on SS-N-23, 10 on SS-N-20.

During the Washington talks, Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan came to terms that the sides shall find a mutually acceptable solution to the question of limiting the deployment of long-range sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) equipped with nuclear warheads. Such limitations will not involve counting long-range SLCMs tipped with nuclear warheads within the 6,000 warhead and 1,600 strategic offensive delivery system limits. The two sides committed themselves to establish ceilings on such missiles and to seek mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification of such limitations, which could include the employment of national technical means, cooperative measures and on-site inspection.

The Soviet and US leaders came to terms in Washington on instructing their delegations in Geneva to work out an agreement that would commit both sides to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development, and testing if required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from it for a specified period of time. Intensive discussions of strategic stability shall begin no later than three years before the end of the specified period, after which, in the event the sides have not agreed otherwise, each side will be free to decide its course of action. Such an agreement must have the same legal status as the SOW Treaty, the ABM Treaty and other similar, legally binding agreements. It will be recorded in a mutually satisfactory manner. Therefore, they directed their delegations to address these issues on a priority basis.

The Soviet Union and the United States will also discuss ways of ensuring the predictability in the development of the Soviet-US strategic relationship under conditions of strategic stability to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

The Soviet response to Star Wars is the concept of star peace. In 1985, our country proposed peaceful exploration of space in conditions of its non-militarisation as the only reasonable alternative to SDI, which is geared to developing, testing and deploying space strike weapons. It has

been said to the US President in the past that the important thing in these matters was to bar weapons from space and that this would determine whether the corresponding armaments could first be reduced by the Soviet Union and the USA by half, as the Soviet side proposed, and then destroyed completely, together with other nuclear powers.

The attention of the President was called to the circumstance that while it was now hard for the two countries to conduct a fruitful dialogue and negotiations on ending the arms race and effecting nuclear disarmament, afterwards it would be harder still. Indeed, were the arms race to spread to space, having entered the stage of development of new types of nuclear armaments, it would become uncontrollable and assume an irreversible character to a degree.

By filling outer space with highly sophisticated weapons, humanity might find itself at the mercy of computers, with the slightest malfunction in warning systems or some other accident presenting a real danger of plunging the world into catastrophe even against the will of political leaders. Important decision-making on security matters must not be controlled by technology.

During the summit the US President defended his favourite brain-child, SDI, and he goes on doing so. The Soviet Union has more than once convincingly proved that the US programme declared in 1983 is a departure from the ABM Treaty. It is aimed at developing a new class of weapons, space strike armaments which the United States expects to use in combination with offensive nuclear weapons as a means of gaining a capability for delivering a nuclear first strike with impunity. A "space shield" brought into being in this way could also perform, if necessary, the function of offensive weapons and would thus become a component of assault strategy.

There are now some who assert that the Washington talks have eliminated the differences over SDI. In line with this plea, they call for the speedy implementation of the Star War plans. "...Those are dangerous trends" Mikhail Gorbachev stressed in his address on Soviet television on December 14, "nor should they be minimised. They might undermine the change coming about in the demilitarisation of international relations." Should the United States press forward with the realisation of its Star Wars programme, the Soviet Union would respond accordingly. However, such course of development would not be our choice.

A particularly important topic of the Washington talks was that of advances in solving the problem of banning nuclear weapon tests, which has been under discussion at many international forums for over three decades. Now as before, the Soviet Union is willing to immediately start talks on a complete ban on nuclear weapon tests without linking this to any other issues. It is agreeable to any variant: bilateral Soviet-US talks, trilateral talks involving Britain, multilateral talks within the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. Our country is also prepared to seek agreement on extending the Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (1963) to underground testing of nuclear arms.

As a result of purposeful efforts by our country, fullscale Soviet-US talks on limiting nuclear tests and ultimately stopping them altogether opened in Geneva in November 1987. As a first step, the two sides will work out effective verification measures which will make it possible to ratify the USSR-US Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976 and proceed to negotiating further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing leading to the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of nuclear testing.

The problem of effective verification is very important in this respect. The Soviet Union is certain that the problem of verification is no barrier to either limiting nuclear weapon tests or signing a treaty on a complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. It is ready to accept any measures for rigid control in this area, to the point of on-site inspection.

The overall balance of the Washington summit is positive. The constructive and consistent policy of our country undoubtedly contributed in decisive measure to the achievement of this result. It is important that the United States reaffirmed at the highest level—at the level of its President—its pledge to negotiate concrete steps towards preventing an arms race, reducing strategic offensive armaments and consolidating strategic stability.

From the political point of view, this objectively makes Star War plans even more vulnerable; it commits their initiators to rethink and revise their approach to the talks on strategic armaments, which the two sides agreed to expedite. There is some common ground between the proposals made by both sides at the talks, deep-going differences notwithstanding; they offer a certain opportunity to search for mutually acceptable decisions on radical cuts in nuclear armaments.

A highly important result of the summit is the fact that the joint document worked out by the participants reaffirms once again: nuclear war must never be unleashed, no one could win it, and the Soviet Union and the United States should build their mutual relations with due regard to this incontestable truth and refrain from seeking military superiority. Also, it is a positive factor for further steps towards security that the final document reaffirms the commitment of both sides to contribute to strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and expresses their allegiance to the cause of working out a verifiable comprehensive and effective international convention on banning and destroying chemical weapons. It hails the progress made to date and reconfirms the need for more intensive negotiations with a view to concluding a truly global and verifiable convention extending to all countries capable of having chemical weapons. The Soviet Union and the United States declare for greater openness and more active confidence measures in the area of chemical weapons on both a bilateral and a multilateral basis. They came to terms on continuing periodical discussions at the level of experts of the growing problem of the proliferation and use of chemical weapons.

The two leaders discussed the significance of the task of lowering the level of military confrontation in Europe in the sphere of armed forces and conventional armaments. They took a stand for the speedy completion of the work going on in Vienna under the mandate for negotiations on this problem, in order that substantive negotiations with the aim of working out concrete measures could be started in the nearest future. They pointed out that realisation of the provisions of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe is an important factor in promoting mutual understanding and increasing stability, and came out for continuing and deepening this process. The General Secretary of the CPSU CC and the US President reached agreement on instructing their respective representatives to step up efforts towards bringing about solutions to unsettled questions.

The two sides discussed the question of the Vienna negotiations on mutual reductions of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe.

Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan expressed their determination together with the other 33 participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to bring the Vienna CSCE follow-up conference

to a successful conclusion, based on balanced progress in all principal areas of the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document.

All this is unquestionably a major contribution to a positive change in the international political and psychological climate, which is so necessary if practical agreements lessening the threat of nuclear war are to be reached.

Along with an in-depth examination of security matters, there was a discussion in principle of regional problems, with the Soviet side stressing the need to respect the sovereign rights of states to choose their path of development without foreign interference in their internal affairs.

All regional conflicts have their roots, their "case histories", their specific cures. The important thing in settling them is to ascertain the basic trend, the pivotal line that can lead to the elimination of trouble spots on our planet. Such a trend exists and is gaining ground surely if slowly. It is unbiassed dialogue, national reconciliation, settlement of disputed issues by peaceful, political means.

The trend manifests itself markedly in Afghanistan. The Afghan leadership has firmly embarked on national reconciliation. To be sure, the process is not easy; it meets strong resistance on the part of both the West and domestic reaction. But there is no reasonable alternative now to the policy of reconciliation. Strictly speaking, it is entirely subordinated to the solution of a two-fold problem: setting up a political power structure such as would neither throw the country back to the Middle Ages nor allow a bloodbath there, and providing at the same time conditions for the withdrawal of the Soviet force from Afghanistan, which we would like to be an independent, sovereign, non-aligned state.

The trend for dialogue is winning recognition in its own way in the Middle East as well, where the most protracted regional conflict persists. Lately there have been some signs of progress on the issue of holding a conference on a Middle East settlement even though the going is hard. The Soviet approach to such a conference is businesslike and flexible. The USSR has nothing against bilateral talks, either, between the Arabs and Israel within the framework of the conference. Let there be any talks at the conference, whether bilateral or multilateral. The main thing is that they should lead to peace in the region.

Another major conflagration, the Iran-Iraq war, is gaining in intensity. The international community must take steps and offer help without delay in order to divert the conflict into the channel of political solutions.

There are many other regional seats of tension in the world, such as southern Africa, Central America, the Kampuchea problem. To end them and prevent the rise of new ones—for this is what Soviet foreign policy is working to help achieve—dialogue should gain the upper hand over confrontation in these areas as well. In searching for ways of settlement, account must be taken of the peculiarities of the country or region concerned. And it must be realised, as the Soviet leader stressed in Washington, that nothing will come of "settling" regional conflicts by imposing one's will on others. This course of action can only lead to the impasse of confrontation in the same way as the policy of exporting counter-revolution, whether in Central America, southern Africa or the Middle East.

The Soviet Union's firm resistance to every manifestation of diktat in international affairs and its invariable solidarity with the peoples fighting for the right to shape their destinies as they see fit are a fundamental reality of Soviet-US relations today.

The participants in the summit had a fruitful exchange of views and new concrete ideas regarding bilateral cooperation. The livening up registered in this respect of late was buttressed by accords on contacts and interchanges in science, culture and education. Promoting mutually

beneficial businesslike cooperation on an equal footing would provide a fairly sound material groundwork for growing mutual confidence and understanding.

Summing up the results of the dialogue at the summit, we may make the following points:

The summit was an outstanding international political event. The very fact that it was held played a stabilising role in today's situation. The summit was needed as a means of finally bringing about a thaw in Soviet-US relations, stopping the escalation of international tensions and taking real steps towards ending the arms race and towards disarmament.

Our concept of Soviet-US relations, which combines firmness of principle in setting and achieving key goals, realism in assessing the situation and unfailing commitment to the policy of peaceful coexistence and of settling acute problems, can be described as a concept that works.

The results of the summit are fresh confirmation of the correctness of the political guidelines advanced by the April 1985 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, the 27th Party Congress and subsequent plenary meetings of the CPSU Central Committee, as well as of the Soviet Union's specific initiatives and moves of the recent period which are aimed at solving key problems of the present crucial period of international development, at putting an end to long-standing dangerous world tensions.

Needless to say, far from every American approves of the results of the summit. There is evidence of increased activity by reactionaries, all sorts of right-wingers and militaristic organisations; they are campaigning, not only against the treaty, but against the whole process of arms control. Frightened as they are at the prospect of normal, let alone good relations between the two countries, they insist on a "tough" policy towards the Soviet Union. In other NATO countries, too, there are still many forces that go on worshipping the nuclear idol and think in terms of military superiority. Some people there simply cannot get rid of their traditional, pre-nuclear political thinking. *The Financial Times* wrote that Western strategists concerned with nuclear armaments were two-faced like that ancient Roman god, Janus. They were willing to scrap land-based cruise and Pershing missiles only in order to proceed immediately to modernise an assortment of shorter-range weapons and possibly to field some new missiles that could be launched from the sky over Europe and from the surrounding seas.

The militarists refuse to relinquish their positions either in deference to the logic of our time or in the face of objective processes which cannot skip the United States. What is more, they are acting, closing their ranks and trying to prevent arms reductions from becoming a legalised concept in Soviet-US relations. There is a whole array of criticisms and doubts concerning the IRM-SRM Treaty; it is alleged that the treaty will not contribute to disarmament and will weaken America and the West as a whole. Congressmen are urged to carefully study and take its "shortcomings" into account. In other words, conservatives hope that they can torpedo the ratification of the treaty by getting Congressmen to introduce amendments unacceptable to the Soviet side.

According to *The Washington Post*, the US Senate has decided to proceed to an examination of the IRM-SRM Treaty on January 19, 1988, or immediately after the Christmas recess. The procedure of ratification has been set for spring. It is to be hoped that the elements of realism in the US stance which came out before and during the summit will manifest themselves in concrete policy on the part of Washington and that there will be sufficient political will there to contribute to the continuation of the new, more constructive and fruitful period in Soviet-US relations.

The real significance of what was agreed in Washington can only find expression in deeds. The Soviet Union is not going to slacken its efforts but will strive with the greatest determination and in the spirit of bona fide cooperation with the United States for an end to the arms race and for a general improvement in the international situation. It expects the United States to do likewise. This is indispensable if the work done in Washington is to produce positive results.

We are living through a most crucial period. The leaders of the Warsaw Treaty countries indicated their appreciation of its significance and crucial character. In the communique released by them at the Berlin meeting, which they held immediately after the Washington talks, they expressed unanimous approval for the results of the visit and emphasised that at the new stage as in the past, they are going to proceed in coordinated fashion in the interests of disarmament and international cooperation.

There is a big task of historic significance ahead. No country can accomplish this task single-handed, for it has to do with the problem of problems of today, that of completely eliminating the threat of nuclear war.

13TH CONGRESS OF THE CP OF CHINA: LESSONS OF THE PAST AND GUIDELINES FOR THE FUTURE

Vitali MATYAEV

The 13th Congress of the Communist Party of China (October 25-November 1, 1987) generalised on the basis of critical analysis the experience and lessons of the policy of comprehensive modernisation pursued in the country over the past nine years. It indicated the lines of further reorganisation in the political and economic spheres and advanced a number of important propositions as part of the theory of building socialism in Chinese conditions. The congress elected new leading bodies of the CPC, most of whose members are people engaged in the actual implementation of economic and political reforms.

The congress reaffirmed the policy of not only continuing but accelerating and deepening economic reforms, of proceeding with a political restructuring. The main point made by the delegates who took the floor was that the line of reform and open policy had been chosen correctly and had fully proved its worth, and that the country should go on expanding and speeding up transformations in all directions.

Zhao Ziyang, elected General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, described the congress as follows: "The most important achievement of the 13th Congress is that it ensures a steady continuation of the party's political, organisational and theoretical line. The new CC will press forward with the work begun nine years ago."¹ Thus, what was adopted as the starting point in analysing CPC policy was not so much the previous congress (1982) as the Third Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC of the 11th Convocation (December 1978), with whose decisions the Chinese associate the party's break with the leftist theory and practice of the two earlier decades, the introduction of the policy of modernisation and the provision of the prerequisites for wide-ranging reforms as a decisive element of "building socialism with Chinese specifics".

The congress was attended by 1,953 delegates representing 46 million party members. Three-fourths of the delegates were staff members at different levels of party and government bodies; about 19 per cent, various specialists; and 5.4 per cent, advanced workers and other employees. The armed forces were represented by 259 delegates. Delegates with a higher education made up about 60 per cent, and over half the delegates were under 55.

According to data released before the congress met, 10,830,000 people were admitted to the CPC between 1979 and 1986, including nearly two million technical specialists. At present, party members who have had a complete secondary education add up to 26.4 per cent against 12.8 in 1978.

The congress was preceded by hard preparatory work. An appropriate commission was set up after a plenary meeting of the CC

(September 1986) had decided to call the next regular congress. In the spring of 1987 the elections of delegates began according to new rules: by secret ballot, with the number of candidates exceeding the established number of mandates. Representation rates varied. Each delegate was elected in the party organisations of bodies directly subordinated to the CPC CC from every 200 or a slightly greater number of Communists, in those of central government bodies from every 1,000 Communists, in those of the biggest cities—Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin—from between 12,000 and 13,000 Communists, and in those of the other provinces and autonomous districts, from roughly 30,000 party members.

It was reported that in February 1987 an ad hoc working group of 19 began drafting the CC report. The group was headed by Zhao Ziyang, Premier of the State Council of the PRC, who in January 1987 became acting General Secretary of the CPC CC. The seventh and last version of the report was approved by the CC at a plenary meeting held in October 1987, shortly before the congress opened. This version took into account the results of an advance study of the draft by representatives of party organisations of diverse levels both in the capital and the provinces (the study involved 5,000 people). In line with tradition, the draft was also discussed by leading members of the country's eight democratic parties (whose membership has grown fourfold since the late 1970s) and a number of prominent non-party figures.

The preparations for the congress were marked by an overall businesslike approach; they were free of all window-dressing and bal-lyhoo, and were not accompanied by any special actions in work col-lectives. It was stressed that "one should work well at all times and not before memorable dates only".

This time, as before (with the exception of the Eighth Congress), no foreign delegations were invited. The congress held only two plenary sessions. Discussions were carried on in delegates' groups, and the press carried summaries of the speeches. Many things were organised in a new way, however. For the first time in 30 years, the work of the congress was covered by journalists, including 300 foreign correspondents. Accredited from the Soviet Union were journalists of TASS, *Izvestia* and *Trud*; besides, correspondents of Soviet radio and television, *Pravda* and the journal *Kommunist* travelled to Beijing for the occasion. The text of the CC report in Chinese as well as in six foreign languages, including Russian, was made available to journalists at the opening of the congress, which was broadcast over radio and television. A press centre held several news conferences, with Chinese leaders participating. After the congress, Zhao Ziyang and members of the new Political Bureau met with representatives of the media.

The central Chinese press carried a number of greetings, including messages from the communist parties of East European countries. The texts of the CPSU CC message to the congress and of the congratulations offered by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU CC, to Zhao Ziyang, General Secretary of the CPC CC, on his election to his new post were not published, but were reported by *Renmin ribao*.

For the first time ever, elections of full and alternate members of the CPC CC and the CPC Central Commission for Control over Discipline were held by secret ballot and by nominating several candidates.

The CC was renewed by more than one-third, with its membership, however, being reduced from 210 to 175. As many as 55.5 per cent of the alternate members of the new CC were elected for the first time. The age of the full and alternate members of the CC elected at the congress averages 55 years, an average which is four years younger

than before. The membership of the CPC Central Commission of Advisers was increased to 200 as against an earlier 172.

Many authoritative veteran leaders of the party and the state were not re-elected to the CC. They include Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Li Xiannian and Peng Zhen. However, Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun were appointed Chairman of the CC Military Council and Chairman of the Central Commission of Advisers, respectively.

The composition of the CC Political Bureau was renewed by nearly half. It includes leaders of the most important economic management bodies as well as the biggest cities—Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin—and Sichuan Province, all of whom have done well as active and competent proponents of the policy of reform. Former general secretary of the CC Hu Yaobang was re-elected to the Political Bureau. Among the five members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau Zhao Ziyang is the only one to have served on it previously.

The personnel replacements effected by the congress are expected to bring about changes in the highest echelon of government as well, including the post of Chairman of the PRC and Chairman of the Standing Committee of the All-China Assembly of People's Representatives. Thus, shortly after the congress, Zhao Ziyang relinquished the post of Premier of the State Council, which he had held since 1980.

"The departure of Deng Xiaoping and other revolutionaries of the older generation from the CC," wrote *Renmin ribao*, commenting on the results of the congress, "cannot prevent them in the least from continuing to play an enormous role in shaping the general policy line of the party and the state."² During the congress, special tribute was paid to Deng Xiaoping. As Zhu Muzhi, who was in charge of the congress press centre, worded it, "the leading role which Deng Xiaoping is playing in the party and the state is not conditioned by the post he holds in the party but by his having correct ideas. He is 'general designer' of China's political guidelines."

Problems of the further internal development of the country held a central place at the congress. The CC report submitted by Zhao Ziyang, "Forward Along the Path of Building Socialism with Chinese Specifics", was devoted almost entirely to this theme.

The report is a well-balanced, comprehensive document of a programmatic character. It soberly and self-critically examines the results of the country's development and indicates the main lines of economic, socio-political, ideological and party work for the future.

The report invites the party and other echelons of the social mechanism to extensive and bold experimentation in every sphere of the economic and political life of the country, proceeding from the highest goal, which is to demonstrate the advantages of socialism in practice. It links the economic reform to more efficient production, the promotion of foreign economic relations and the solution of social problems. The keynote of the political reform is the need to democratise all aspects of social relations and give them legal basis.

The primary objective of China's strategy is to build up the productive forces by making use of scientific and technological progress. It is this that determines the aims of the reform of the economic system and political structure.

The economic development programme appears in general to be complete and logical enough except that tremendous effort will undoubtedly be needed to concretise and implement it. At the same time, the Chinese realise that the line of effecting economic and political reforms

and expanding foreign relations calls for a comprehensive reshaping of every aspect of public life, a process that will take some time and will be very complicated.

"We must see clearly," the CC report says, "that the road ahead is even more arduous and the tasks facing us will require greater efforts than before. We have lost too much time and, indeed, are still lagging behind a good deal. The fast-moving new technological revolution, a market competition growing from day to day and the variability of the international political situation in today's world pose a serious, tough challenge to us."

"The ongoing socialist reorganisation," Zhao Ziyang said, "is a further revolution by virtue of the breadth and depth of the social changes brought about by it."

The fundamental conclusion drawn by the congress about the present general line of the CPC is worthy of note; according to it, China is building socialism, with Marxism as its leading ideology and the Communist Party as its guiding force.

As distinct from previous congresses, the CC report contains no figures on economic development over the past period, nor does it set detailed tasks for the future. It places emphasis on defining the stage which the country is passing through and the aims and tasks of CPC policy that arise from this in every public sphere.

The congress set on record that the past nine years have deeply changed the face of China and that a beginning has been made in solving extremely acute problems which have disturbed the working people for years. Zhao Ziyang said that since 1978 the gross national product and revenues have practically doubled and so has the average income of the urban and rural population. The Chinese people, over one billion strong, are better off today. Consumer goods shortages have been ended in the main. The problem of unemployment is on the way to being solved. The economy is developing confidently and harmoniously.

Indeed, the past nine years have seen China make notable headway in laying the material foundations for socialism.

	Annual increase	
	1953-1978	1979-1986
ECONOMIC GROWTH		
	(per cent)	
GNP	7.9	10.1
Overall industrial and agricultural output	8.2	10.1
National income	6.0	8.7
Revenues and extra-budgetary funds	8.0	12.9
Retail trade turnover	6.9	15.5
Foreign trade turnover	9.5	17.3
Average annual income of the population		
Peasants	2.4	15.5
Family members of workers and other employees	1.0	12.8
STANDARD OF LIVING		
Average per capita consumption	2.2	8.1
Savings of the population	13.1	34.4

In terms of annual growth rate of the GNP and national income, China has joined the ranks of the most dynamically developing countries of the world. Production in the agrarian sector, which is of key importance to the country, has increased by two-thirds, with grain output going up from 300 to roughly 400 million tons. In overall industrial and agricultural output, China has advanced to eighth place in the world; in grain crops, raw cotton, cement, cotton fabrics, washing machines, electric fans, books, it now ranks first; in coal, meat, vegetable oil, TV sets and locomotives, second; in radio receivers, fish and other sea products, third; in steel, fourth; in oil, electricity, paper and cardboard, fifth; in refrigerators and sugar, sixth. Space technology and electronics have registered rapid growth. China has made visible progress in developing extremely promising technologies.

From 1978 to 1986, new industrial capacities were used to produce 6.9 million tons of steel, 3.16 million tons of chemical fertilizers, 24.04 million tons of cement, 19.9 million crates of sheet glass, 1.96 million tons of sugar, 2.9 million tons of cotton yarn, 124.54 million tons of coal and 79.36 million tons of oil.

Production of basic types of industrial and agricultural output

Products	1978	1986
Steel (million tons)	31.7	52.2
Coal (million tons)	618	894
Cement (million tons)	65.2	166
Chemical fertilizers (million tons)	8.7	13.9
Electricity (billion kWh)	256.6	449.5
Motor vehicles (thousands)	149	368
Yarn (million tons)	2.38	3.97
Bicycles (millions)	8.54	35.68
TV sets (millions)	0.5	14.6
Fans (millions)	1.38	35.28
Sugar (million tons)	2.27	5.25
Beer (million tons)	0.4	4.1
Grain (million tons)	304.7	391.5
Meat (million tons)	8.56	19.17
Milk (million tons)	0.9	2.9
Products of the fishing industry (million tons)	4.6	8.2
Cotton fibre (million tons)	2.18	3.54

China's economic development was fostered by a realistic economic policy, taking account of the objective laws of the country's economic life and distinguishing characteristics and geared to searching for and actively using new growth factors. An appreciable role was played by measures adopted under the economic reform, which "breathed new strength into socialism", as Zhao Ziyang put it.

The reform proceeds from the idea of permitting the coexistence of diverse forms of property in the means of production, including private property, as long as social property retains its leading role and the economic system defined as "socialist commodity economy" is developed by extending the economic autonomy of enterprises, reducing the sphere of planning by directive, extending market regulation and strengthening the system of indirect macro-economic control. Experience has shown this kind of reorganisation to be in keeping with the real state of the country's productive forces.

Achievements in the social and economic spheres are inseparable from the tasks of improving the state of the country's political life, ridding

Chinese society of "barrack communist" and pseudo-socialist excesses and renouncing political campaigns, which took place in China almost continuously from the mid-1950s on.

While describing the chief task as "accelerating and deepening reorganisation", Zhao Ziyang stressed at the same time that the problems and difficulties had turned out to be "even more numerous than we had imagined".

He said that in terms of per capita GNP, China "still holds one of the last places in the world"; "700 million of the country's billion inhabitants live in the countryside and still earn a living by using mostly manual instruments of labour"; "there are numerous enterprises lagging behind modern standards dozens or even a hundred years, and along with a few economically advanced areas there exist numerous undeveloped and poor ones"; "the general scientific and technological standard is still low, and illiterates and semi-illiterates still make up one quarter of the population." He admitted that "management and control are lagging in every respect behind the evolution of the situation", that there is still a "tendency to get too far too fast" and that "sluggish thinking still fetters the consciousness of some comrades".

The recent period has witnessed numerous new problems cropping up in China, particularly in the countryside, along with old problems such as structural imbalances, a lag in the fuel and power complex and in raw materials industries, and a pressing situation in transport. The country has so far been unable to set up an adequate system of macro-economic regulation by the state, reduce the scattering of capital investments and the growth rate of the consumption fund, establish a balance between demand and supply, end inflationary trends and overcome a wave of economic crimes. Grain production has shown no increase in the past three years while its consumption has been going up.

The CC report comments on the above facts as follows: "The tasks set by the reform of the economic structure are exceedingly labour-consuming. We will have to remove or rectify in the sphere of production relations all that hampers the growth of the productive forces and, furthermore, to form, and render assistance to, new organisations, new mechanisms and promote new legal norms needed for their development. We are passing through a period of replacing the old mechanism by a new one, and it is hard to fully avoid the rise of this or that contradiction or problem in economic life. A deepening of the reform will lead to a deeper-going regulation of the relation between diverse interests, hence the inevitability of obstacles on its road. We are carrying out the reform in the absence of ample economic opportunities, and this, in turn, aggravates the difficulties. Difficulties are inevitable also because we still lack experience."

The congress indicated three major stages of quantitative economic growth: doubling the GNP by 1990 in comparison with the period of launching the reform, doubling it again by the year 2000, increasing the economic potential fourfold in the next 50 years and overtaking middle-developed countries in per capita production of national income. It also defined the model of China's economic development on the basis of the concept of "socialist planned commodity economy", which provides for the "organic unity of plan and market".

The model is conceived as setting up in the future a "mechanism of state regulation of the market and market orientation of enterprises", to be composed of three interlinked elements: enterprises based on different forms of property and operating as independent commodity producers on the principles of self-sufficiency and self-financing; a competitive market system covering consumer as well as capital goods, raw and other materials, financial resources, technology, and so on; a

system of indirect macroregulation through a set of economic levers (prices, credits, taxes, and so on).

The tasks set for the next few years include a further reduction of the sphere of directive planning and material and technical supply (from 50 per cent now to 30 per cent, according to the report) and a restructuring of finances and money circulation, which encompasses price formation, seen by the Chinese as the focal problem of the current stage of the reform.

The measures that were adopted in the course of the reform and gave rise to the sharpest controversies, such as the promotion of the capital goods market, finances, technology and the service sector, the emission of bonds and shares, are described in the report as "inevitable concomitants of the development of large-scale social production and commodity economy" which socialism must and can place in its service, limiting their negative role in the course of practice. "Monopolisation and division of markets do not encourage commodity producers to raise efficiency; markets of the closed type are not suitable for developing a rational division of labour inside the country or stimulating international trade."

Unlike in the recent past, no mention was made at the congress of specific time limits for the realisation and completion of changes or the formation of the new economic mechanism as a whole. Zhao Ziyang admitted that "building the framework of a new economic system will take longer than we had believed". The CPC will yet have to decide on many things concerning the ways to carry out what is planned, including the advancement of rural China. Still, the congress explicitly reaffirmed the irreversibility of the process of change and the consistency of the party's policy towards it.

The report gives considerable space to social problems involved in the implementation of the policy of stimulating those sectors not belonging to the state and of raising the role of the market in exchange and distribution.

Social advances made since the beginning of reforms

Sector	Industry				Trade and services			
	people at work (million)		share in production (per cent)		people at work (million)		share of the total (per cent)	
	1978	1986	1978	1986	1978	1986	1978	1986
State	30.4	39.5	80.8	68.7	19.8	42	54.6	39.4
Collective	12.1	17.8	19.2	29.2	38.3	88.1	43.3	36.4
Mixed and private	—	4.56	—	2.1	26.2	140	0.1	16.6

A fair number of Chinese believe that the outpacing growth of the incomes of certain individuals and groups is a violation of social justice. Zhao Ziyang said that differentiated incomes were an inevitable phenomenon today due to objective conditions, that they did not run counter to socialist construction and that high incomes and certain kinds of unearned income (from hiring labour, in the form of dividends, and so on) should be regulated by an appropriate taxation policy. He also said that the private sector was likely to hire labour and that, therefore, elements of exploitation might occur.

Congress records suggest that all further changes are to be planned and put into practice with due regard to their possible social effects and the receptiveness of society.

The congress reaffirmed the line of expanding foreign economic relations and using all modern forms of cooperation and financing to this end.

The objective set for foreign trade is to achieve a high growth rate of exports by expanding and judiciously planning export production. As for imports, the emphasis will be placed on importing advanced technology and key equipment while at the same time vigorously developing the production of import replacements. With regard to attracting foreign capital, it is considered necessary to improve investment terms and maintain the scale of investment at a level which takes into account the country's possibilities of paying debts and using investments more effectively.

China has lately accepted substantial foreign investments in various forms (more than 45 billion dollars, of which some 30 billion have actually been used) and has set up about 10,000 enterprises with foreign participation, about half of which have already gone into operation.

Zhao Ziyang pointed out that China would "strengthen and develop the pattern of extending foreign relations which exists already in initial forms".

Gu Mu, member of the PRC State Council, told a press conference that a further special economic zone (SEZ), the fifth, was to be set up shortly in Hainan, China's second largest island after Taiwan. Here, experiments would be conducted with all forms of trade and investment such as China has never used before, including the unlimited sale of property lots. The SEZ in Hainan would be the largest. Foreign investors, mostly from Hong Kong, took a great interest in the idea of transforming Hainan into a subtropical health resort. In addition, it was proposed to turn two major peninsulas, Liaodong and Shandong, into areas to be granted considerable privileges in doing trade with other countries and drawing in foreign capital.

The decisions of the congress are important in specifying the ways and means of China's further advance along the path of reform, although each case may be expected to give rise to controversy as in the past. The newspaper *Jingji ribao* wrote that in the reform period it was necessary "to study and analyse the situation, always to stay sober-minded and to steer clear in every way of one-sidedness and miscalculations in propaganda. Our long-range task is to prevent the penetration and influence of left- and right-wing deviations."³

A conclusion of fundamental importance drawn by the congress is that economic reforms cannot be carried out successfully without adequate transformations in the political sphere. One of the long-range tasks consists in establishing a "viable political system with a high degree of democratisation, perfect law and order, and high efficiency".

It was the first time in the history of the CPC that the question of a political reform was submitted to a party congress for discussion. This problem was first posed as early as 1980 but real work on it did not begin until the spring of 1986. Originally it was presumed that such a reform could be effected in a reasonably short time and without outstanding difficulty. However, it is now admitted in China that this is an even harder task than the economic reform. The report admits that in the foreseeable future a restructuring of the political system can only pursue limited aims, some of which may bear fruit in a few years while others may only prove their worth in ten years' time or even later. The task set for the near future is to overcome red tape and eradicate vestiges of feudalism, for, to quote the report, "the party membership and the mass of the people are particularly unhappy about manifestations of red tape and decay in evidence to varying degrees in many echelons".

The urgency of a political restructuring is said to be due to the fact that "the present political system sprang up in the years of revolutionary wars, was established in the main during the period of socialist transformations and developed in the atmosphere of large-scale mass movements, in the process of continuous development of directive planning, and is out of keeping with the construction in the economic, political, cultural and other spheres now going on in peacetime conditions and with the development of a socialist commodity economy".

The report points out, however, that a restructuring of this system calls for "a prudent course of action and should be carried out step by step, methodically and under proper guidance, as evenly and reliably as possible. In effecting reforms in any sphere, proper attention should be paid to experimenting; it is necessary to encourage quests and devise effective transitional measures and methods in order to move reorganisation forward step by step, steadfastly." The report stresses that changes will be effected on socialist lines and under the party's leadership and that it is impermissible to imitate bourgeois democracy, the Western system of dividing power into legislative, executive and judicial, the so-called multiparty rotation of power.

The congress described a precise delimitation of the functions of party and government bodies as the cornerstone of the proposed reform of the political structure. This implies that the party's activity should be expressed in political leadership, that is, in deciding on political principles and policy line, decision-making on key problems, and so on, since "confusion of the functions of party and government bodies virtually tended to weaken the party's leading position and leading role". To quote *Guangming ribao* (November 9, 1987), "from the 1950s on, the 'absolute' authority of party committees was constantly emphasised in our industrial enterprises ... and this 'absolute' power grew with every political campaign. As a result, party committees assumed a considerable number of administrative functions and there arose a situation in which party and administrative functions were no longer divided and when party committees substituted themselves for management."

It is planned to abolish party committee departments which duplicate government bodies; this also applies to the party groups of ministries and other administrative bodies responsible to the higher party committees which have sanctioned their formation.

The PRC State Council has been instructed to draft proposals for reorganising the central government apparatus and submit them to the session of the National People's Congress coming up in the spring of 1988. The powers of lower bodies are expected to be extended considerably.

The congress, assisted by the media, severely criticised the administrative apparatus. It is said that this apparatus, "which regards administrative methods of economic management as all-powerful, has bureaucratised planning and divorced it from reality and is guilty of making plans directed to no one in particular, seeking higher production costs and tempos, upsetting national economic ratios", and so on. Repeated attempts to reduce the overblown administrative apparatus have proved unproductive so far. Whereas in 1980 this apparatus employed about 19 million persons, in 1986 their number rose to 26.5 million, that is, increased by 150 per cent against the 1950s and was twice as large as in the mid-1960s, or shortly before the "cultural revolution". The growth rate of administrative spending exceeds that of the national income and budget revenues.

Personnel policies are to be based on competitiveness and openness. It is planned to set up an integral system of certification, inducement, punishment, promotion and pensioning of government employees. The

employees' terms of office are to be specified, and the people are to openly supervise their performance.

The new practice of a trial period preceding appointment to a leading post is being introduced; this period may last from 18 months to two years. In enterprises, the pay of executives is to be directly conditional on economic efficiency. According to the Chinese press, these innovations are being hailed by large sections of the population.

A most important component of the reform of the political structure is seen in improving the institutions of socialist political democracy, primarily by increasing the role of Local People's Congresses (LPCs) at various levels in public life.

The report notes that the country's electoral system is to be improved still further by introducing multimandate elections and improving the procedure of nominating candidates.

Some components of the new electoral system are already being tested in practice in lower-level elections. Candidates, whose number may exceed the number of deputies functioning in a given constituency, may be nominated by political parties, mass organisations and work collectives as well as by voters' groups of 10 or more. Party bodies will no longer decide how many party members, Young Communists, members of mass organisations, non-party people, women or others there shall be among the deputies to be elected. At present, a candidate shall be considered elected if he has polled over half the votes cast in the election.

Judging by reports, however, some leaders in the provinces attempt to pressure the electorate, to squeeze present-day electoral procedures into definite patterns, and so forth. Along with this, voices are raised in favour of nominating fewer executives and "advanced workers", since the former bring their departmental interests into the work of LPCs while the latter are often unable to rise to the role of representatives of the people's interests, to show competence in the case of difficult problems solved by LPCs.

At the same time, the congress laid emphasis on the need "to reinforce legislation and improve law enforcement by assuring the judiciary in dependent exercise of their powers and enhancing the citizens' sense of justice" in order to guarantee the implementation of reforms and make the results of transformations permanent.

The report gives special attention to promoting collective leadership and democratic centralism in the party. In line with the procedure to be established, the Standing Committee of the CC Political Bureau shall regularly account to the Political Bureau for its work and the latter, to CC plenary meetings, which, it has been recommended, should be called more frequently. The Secretariat has become a working body of the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee. The near future will see the adoption of a system under which several candidates are to be nominated for each post of party branch secretary, party committee member (at diverse levels) and CC member. The congress amended the party Rules accordingly.

Congress delegates spoke very critically of the present state of party ranks; they pointed to the inadequacy of Marxist-Leninist training, the still low educational standard of party members and the inability of many party leaders to cope with new tasks. They said as much about shortcomings in the party's working methods.

According to the report presented by the Central Commission for Control over Discipline, the CPC will fall into decay and the country's modernisation and reform will miscarry unless organisation and political discipline are improved. The report says that from 1982 to 1986, over 650,000 party members were penalised for breaking party discipline and state laws, and nearly 152,000 of them were expelled from the party.

It is admitted, however, that strengthening the party will be no easy task and will take a long time.

The main theoretical conclusion drawn at the congress is that the current stage of China's development is the "initial stage of socialism". This period, which began with the completion in the main of socialist transformations of private ownership of the means of production in the 1950s and is to end with socialist modernisation, will last, from what Zhao Ziyang said, about 100 years, or, until the middle of the next century. The stage should result in China becoming a modern industrial power with a predominantly non-agricultural population. It will be a "period of great renaissance of the Chinese nation", the report points out.

The very concept of "initial stage of socialism" is nothing new. It has been present in CPC documents ever since 1981. It first appeared in the Decision on Some Questions of the History of the Party Since the Formation of the PRC adopted by the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the CPC CC of the 11th Convocation in June 1981; afterwards it rang out at the 12th Party Congress (September 1982) without being specifically detailed and was included in the Resolution of the CPC CC on the Leading Line in Building Socialist Spiritual Culture adopted by the Sixth CC Plenary Meeting in the autumn of 1986. Working it out and lending it a specific content, however, did not begin until late 1986.

The concept of the initial stage of socialism maintains that socialism is not merely an intermediate stage in the transition from capitalism to communism but an independent and fairly protracted stage of social development. Furthermore, socialism itself is not a rigid society; it is steadily developing, passing through diverse stages, each of which has its distinctive features and uses particular forms and methods of socialist construction determined by the level of the productive forces. China, going over to socialism from a semi-feudal and semi-colonial society, skipped the stage of developed capitalism. This is why it is compelled to complete what should have been done by capitalism, historically speaking.

An analysis of the domestic situation led to the conclusion that to solve the problems in question, it is necessary first to end poverty and backwardness, which are incompatible with socialism, and bring about a decisive rise in the country's productive forces. The contradiction between the people's growing material and cultural requirements and the backward productive forces is seen as the chief contradiction of Chinese society.

Jingji ribao (November 11, 1987), spelling out the theoretical propositions of the congress, pointed to the peculiarities of the initial stage of socialism, which it described as "a low level of development of the productive forces and a multistructural economy, with social property playing the chief role".

Zhao Ziyang said at the congress that for many years "we have kept the task of developing the productive forces in the background, continuing, even after basically completing socialist transformations, 'to put the class struggle first'. From the late 1950s onwards, under the impact of left-deviationist errors, we have sought quick successes, thoughtlessly striving for 'ideal purity' in everything, believing that subjective wishes and massive campaigns are enough to raise the development level of the productive forces and that the more the forms of socialist property are socialised in both scale and degree, the better. We have clung to much of what is not really socialist, shackling the growth of the productive forces, as well as to what is only suitable in special historical conditions, seeing it all as 'principles of socialism'. Conversely, we have taken a

stand against much of what has benefitted the growth of the productive forces, imagining that it is a 'restoration of capitalism'."

The report notes that building socialism in a huge Eastern country such as China is a new problem in the history of Marxism. Its propositions imply that China's orientation to building socialism is regarded from the conceptual point of view as part of the world-wide socialist stream. It is significant that, judging by what was said at the congress, the conclusion about the initial stage of socialism in China was made both on the strength of an analysis of the road travelled by the country and as the result of an in-depth study of the experience of all socialist countries.

Beijing ribao (November 9, 1987) wrote that the proposition about the initial stage of socialism in China "lays the groundwork for building socialism with Chinese specifics. For a reasonably long time to come, this proposition will serve as a powerful weapon in preventing 'leftist' and right-wing deviations."

However, the elaboration of the concept of the initial stage of socialism is far from complete and lively debates are still going on over specifying many of its provisions. It was admitted even at the congress that there is incomprehension of why, nearly 40 years after the victory of the revolution and the beginning of the construction of socialist society, the country is still at the initial stage. Zhao Ziyang said that notions of "the state, contradictions, development and law-governed processes of this period are incomplete and lack depth". Many political guidelines and theoretical propositions "need further improvement" they will be continuously tested in practice, will be enriched, amended and raised to a new plane".

Generally speaking, it appears that the conclusion about the initial stage of socialism in China reflects the present development level of the productive forces and the whole of Chinese society, while at the same time it offers ample opportunities for experiments and quests, especially in the social and economic spheres.

Problems of Chinese foreign policy are set out in general terms in the report, which merely lists the main points of departure of the country's foreign policy strategy.

State Council member Gu Mu, explaining this at a press conference during the congress, said that "there will be no big changes in China's foreign policy, and so Zhao Ziyang did not deal with this matter in detail."

It was stated that China intended to go on pursuing a peaceful, independent and sovereign foreign policy on the five principles of peaceful coexistence and to establish relations of friendship and cooperation with all countries of the world. Peace and development were defined as the chief problem of today. The major agreement on medium- and shorter-range missiles reached by the Soviet Union and the United States and the relaxation of East-West relations that had been achieved to a degree were welcomed. At the same time, it was noted that not a single trouble spot had been eliminated and that some regions were even in danger of a further escalation of conflict. Mention was made of China's intention to join efforts with other nations in ensuring that the international situation evolved in a direction favourable to the peoples of the globe and to world peace.

State Council member Ji Pengfei, speaking at the congress, said that China's current foreign policy was a result of the fact that since the Third CC Plenary Meeting (1978), the party CC, "led personally by

Deng Xiaoping, gradually regulated, contributed to and improved" foreign policy guidelines. The fundamental line, he went on, was "struggle against hegemonism, in defence of world peace". China had always spoken out for establishing, resuming and promoting normal relations with various countries on the five principles of peaceful coexistence and was making efforts to this end. Ji Pengfei then reaffirmed the well-known fundamental principles of Chinese foreign policy since the 12th CPC Congress. According to these principles, China shall neither ally itself with any power nor establish any strategic relations but shall define its attitude "on the merits of the matter"; it shall come out for the settlement of all international conflicts by negotiation, without the use of force or sabre-rattling, and against all arms race.

It was declared again that the CPC advocated complete equality and mutual respect between parties, with every party managing its affairs independently and sovereignly. It was seen as a normal phenomenon that the parties of different countries may differ on some issues.

What Zhao Ziyang and other Chinese leaders had to say about the importance and usefulness of extending interchanges of experience of socialist construction with other countries drew attention. Zhao Ziyang wished the Soviet Union success in implementing the perestroika. So did Zhang Wenjin, Chairman of the Chinese People's Society of Friendship with Foreign Countries, who arrived in the Soviet Union at the head of a delegation of the Society of Chinese-Soviet Friendship for the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Similar wishes were expressed in the congratulatory telegram sent by PRC leaders on the occasion of the founding of the Soviet state 70 years ago.

During the 70th anniversary events, statements were made in both Moscow and Beijing about the importance of establishing durable friendly relations between the two great socialist neighbours, about the desire of both sides to work tirelessly in this direction.

The process of visibly improving Soviet-Chinese relations coincides with the five-year period following the 12th CPC Congress. It was in these years that, thanks to reciprocal efforts, ties and contacts on many lines were resumed and acquired a measure of dynamism. This process is evidence of increasing public interest in both countries towards various aspects of each other's life. "We see China as a great socialist power and are taking practical steps for Soviet-Chinese relations to develop successfully in the direction of good-neighbourliness and cooperation," Mikhail Gorbachev points out. "There is a certain improvement and progress in this respect. We trust the period of alienation is a thing of the past."

¹ *Renmin ribao*, Nov. 3, 1987.

² *Renmin ribao*, Nov. 2, 1987.

³ *Jingji ribao*, Nov. 9, 1987.

USSR AND INDIA:

Cooperation in the Interests of Progress and Peace

Ivan GLEBOV

The Soviet foreign policy gives priority to relations with India. This is only natural: India is a major world power and our close neighbour in Asia. Mindful of the place and role of the Soviet Union and India in the contemporary world, friendship and cooperation between them become a factor of global significance.

This friendship and cooperation did not come into existence from nothing. Neither did they stem from momentary considerations. The steadily developing Soviet-Indian relations are based on a historical and spiritual affinity of the two great nations which was predetermined by the objective course of mankind's social development. There is an unbreakable natural interconnection between 1917, the year of the Great October Socialist Revolution, and 1947—the year India won its independence. Both in Russia (a country of socialist revolution) and in India (where a national liberation revolution took place) a new emergent world of free cooperation of liberated peoples confronted the old historically-doomed world of economic and national oppression, political diktat and aggressive wars.

The community of historical destinies of the two great nations was clearly perceived by the best minds in Russia and India. Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state, closely followed the development of the national liberation movement in India, regarding it as an important component of the global anti-imperialist struggle. He emphasised that the "outcome of the struggle will be determined by the fact that Russia, India, China, etc., account for the overwhelming majority of the population of the globe" and he urged Russian revolutionaries "to foster association and merger" with the fighters for national liberation of the East. At the same time, the architect of the new India, Jawaharlal Nehru, considered the Great October Socialist Revolution as an event of epochal importance, pointing out that it had laid the foundation of a new civilisation towards which the world could move. The great Indian poet Rabindranath Tagore forecast that the future of India lay in its ability to unite its forces with those forces on the Earth striving to eliminate exploitation of man by man and of nation by nation.

Lenin's previsions came true, and the noble dreams of Indian patriots became reality. The colonial system of imperialism collapsed and scores of newly free Asian and African states emerged on its ruins. From deprived objects of history they turned into its active creators. The confident voice of independent India began to sound not only in Asia but all over the world.

The Soviet people welcomed these changes. They viewed the new India as a friend and partner in solving common tasks.

The progress of mankind had been hampered by the obnoxious vestige of colonialism but the combined efforts of the Soviet Union and India

considerably contributed to the eradication of the colonial system of imperialism. Mankind's progress was impeded by aggressive plots of those who attempted to impose their will upon other peoples by military means, and on many occasions interactions between the Soviet Union and India helped diffuse dangerous hot-beds of tension and crisis situations, first and foremost in Asia.

But the main thing that could be put down to the credit of the two countries is their early recognition of the danger for humanity posed by the development of nuclear weapons and the nuclear arms race unleashed by the imperialists. The Soviet Union was the first to call, as early as 1946, for the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, and India was the first to propose in 1954 the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. The Soviet Union highly appreciates the fact that India was also the first to accede in 1963 to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water after it had been signed by the USSR, the United States and Britain.

On many occasions the Soviet Union helped India repulse hostile schemes of external forces. When the young Indian Republic faced the tremendous task of developing modern national economy and industry, it was helped in every possible way by the USSR. The latter provided the former with equipment on credit terms, sent Soviet specialists to India and helped train national personnel.

Gradually the mutually advantageous Soviet-Indian cooperation encompassed such spheres as politics, economy, trade, science and technology.

The Soviet-Indian Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, signed on August 9, 1971, embodied all the positive and mutually advantageous elements accumulated at the time in relations between the two countries. But the importance of the treaty was not only limited to juridical codification of what had been achieved. From the very beginning the treaty was oriented towards the future: it reflected the hopes and aspirations of the two great peoples, their vision of the prospects of world development. The words "peace", "friendship" and "cooperation" contained in the title of the treaty directly point to the goals set by the Soviet Union and India in their bilateral relations and also their activities on the international scene.

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India emphasised that our friendship corroborates the historic necessity to establish a world order based upon coexistence and cooperation. In the opinion of the head of the Indian government, rejection of imperialism, the struggle against colonialism and racism, overall adherence to the principles of equality of peoples and social justice are the factors of strength and vitality in Soviet-Indian friendship.

It is only logical that Soviet-Indian relations have given rise to numerous elements characteristic of the new thinking in international politics. Relations between the two states, which have different social systems, rested from the very beginning on trust, equality, mutual respect and concern for each other's interests. Both states perceive the contemporary multifarious and contradictory world as a single and interconnected entity. They consider international security—global and regional, military, political and economic—to be indivisible. For decades they have been making unilateral and joint efforts to bring about a fundamental change for the better in international affairs: to eliminate the nuclear threat facing mankind, untangle crisis situations, ensure equality and justice in international economic relations, and to work for peace, security and development for present and future generations. Mikhail Gorbachev pointed out that Soviet-Indian relations contain "the shoots of

such international order whereby peaceful coexistence and benevolent mutually advantageous cooperation become a universal norm".

Mutual adherence of the USSR and India to the struggle for the above-mentioned lofty humane goals was embodied in the Delhi Declaration on Principles for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free and Non-Violent World, signed by Mikhail Gorbachev and Rajiv Gandhi during the Soviet leader's visit to India (November, 1986). The document, which is an example of the new thinking, is an appeal to peoples and governments of all countries to think about the future of mankind and to take urgent joint measures to ensure a world free of mass destruction weapons, a world without war, a world free from hatred and violence, racial and economic discrimination.

In fact the Soviet and Indian leaders provided the international community with a specific and clear-cut plan of action aimed at building a world in which the decisive role could be played by the power of human mind rather than by the number of nuclear warheads, by the goodwill and cooperation of all states rather than by confrontation. In such a world each state (large or small) and each nation would have the right to an independent choice which would be respected by others. Among the ten principles of the declaration is the recognition that peaceful coexistence must become a universal norm of international relations, that human life must be recognised as the most precious thing and that non-violence should be the basis of community life.

Disarmament—the dismantling of the war mechanism—combined with demilitarisation of thinking would make it possible to channel the fruits of human labour exclusively into economic and cultural development. Independent states would in this case be protected from outside aggressions, and this would facilitate their progress and deliver them from economic backwardness, social vices and diseases. The Delhi Declaration is permeated with the centuries-old wisdom of the two great peoples and, at the same time, with a new thinking charting the course towards mankind's survival, all-round development of human personality, and the upsurge of civilisation to new heights.

It is quite logical that the declaration drew a broad positive response in the international community—at the United Nations, in the non-aligned movement and in the "initiative of the six states". Even countries with deep-rooted conservative traditions are beginning to realise that it is impossible to live as before. Remarkably the concepts of the Delhi Declaration exert a positive influence on the moral and political climate in the world and help improve international relations.

This is graphically illustrated by the US-Soviet agreement on the elimination of Soviet and American medium- and shorter-range missiles. Though this agreement is of limited nature and envisages the reduction of the existing nuclear arsenals by only three per cent, the very fact of such agreement is of paramount global importance. Any long journey starts with a first step, and the international public hopes that this step will be followed by other more significant agreements, e. g., on a 50-per cent reduction in Soviet and US strategic offensive arms alongside the preservation of the vitally important Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty). India, on its own behalf and acting within the framework of the "initiative of the six states", actively backs the development of this process because it brings closer the attainment of the main current objective of mankind—to rid the planet of mass destruction weapons.

The principles of the Delhi Declaration are principles of universal security and are applicable to situations in all regions of the world, including the largest—the Asia and Pacific region. The ideas of freeing the

world from nuclear weapons and violence are dear to the people of Asia. The People's Republic of China which, like the USSR, has pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and urged other nuclear powers to give the same commitment, is ever more actively advocating for nuclear disarmament. The concept of a nuclear-weapon-free Korean Peninsula is gaining ground. The ASEAN and Indochinese countries speak for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia.

Strengthening peace in Asia has become a major commitment made by the USSR and India in accordance with the 1971 Treaty. The closeness or unanimity of the two countries positions lay a good groundwork for interaction in fulfilling this task. The more so that they have a strong foundation to rely upon.

In 1953 joint efforts by the USSR and India facilitated the cessation of the Korean war; in 1954 they speed up the signing of accords in Geneva on Indochina; in the mid-1960s and early 1970s they helped eliminate crisis situations in South Asia and end the US aggression against Vietnam.

The positions of the two countries are always in harmony on such an important and acute problem as turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace and holding towards this of an international conference in Colombo in accordance with the UN decisions. The security interests of both states as well as universal security are threatened by the intensification of direct foreign military presence and the spread of the nuclear arms race to the region. Advocating a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world, the Soviet Union and India are concerned with the attempts of certain circles in Asia to turn the issue of developing their own nuclear weapons into a kind of national obsession, a means of "self-assertion" on the international scene.

The Soviet Union and India stand for the settlement of conflicts in Asia on the basis of mutually acceptable compromises with due account taken of the legitimate interests of the peoples in the region. They are united on the need to stop the senseless fratricidal war between Iran and Iraq, and speak in favour of a consistent implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 598.

The Soviet Union welcomed the signing by the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and the Sri Lankan President Junius Richard Jayawardene of the agreement on the settlement of Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict. Moscow views this agreement as an important event both for the South Asian region and the entire world. It gives an example of a realistic approach to the political settlement of a conflict through bilateral efforts without any outside interference. This is an appropriate basis for the elimination of hotbeds of tension in other regions of the vast Asian continent.

The co-authors of the Delhi Declaration, the USSR and India, support the policy of national reconciliation in Afghanistan and Kampuchea. The idea of reconciliation is universal. It is indicative that political and public figures in Central America, Angola and other hot spots manifest a keen interest in the developments in Afghanistan and Kampuchea.

Highly rated are the efforts of India to consolidate trust and mutual understanding among the states in the South Asian region, including the efforts being made through the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The Soviet Union has always backed the efforts of developing nations, including those made jointly, to strengthen their political independence and economic self-sufficiency. The SAARC could consolidate, to a considerable extent, the position of South Asian countries at international forums (the United Nations inclusive) in support of peace, disarmament and detente. This would enhance their prestige on the Asian as well as the international scene.

In accordance with the spirit of the Delhi Declaration, the Soviet Union does not try to impose either on India or any other state a ready-made formula for Asian security. Besides, no one has such a formula. The Soviet Union believes that there exist real prerequisites for ensuring peaceful development of the Asian continent. India shares this view. Rajiv Gandhi said that the principles of Pancha Shila and Bandung, a life-giving force of the non-aligned movement, established theoretical and political framework for a new-type relations in Asia and the world in general. The head of the Indian government considers that the Soviet Union, stretching wide into Asia, should, naturally, be part of efforts aimed at creating a new model of peace, stability, development, and cooperation on the continent.

For its part, the Soviet Union consistently advocates the introduction of the Delhi Declaration principles into the practice of interstate relations. It firmly supports the international community's decision to convene the 3rd special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament in 1988. The 1990s should become a decade of a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world.

The constructive initiatives in the spirit of the new thinking advanced by India at international forums, including the United Nations and within the framework of the non-aligned movement and the Group of Six, have become well known, and have won for the country a well-deserved international respect.

The Soviet-Indian joint efforts in the international scene are a factor of global importance. This is explained not only by the fact that the two countries account for one-fifth of the world's population. The considerable potentialities they use in the interests of peace and security are backed by those of their numerous friends. Thus, the Soviet-Indian interactions open the way towards forging a broad coalition of anti-war, anti-nuclear forces, a coalition of peace, reason and goodwill.

Regular personal contacts between Soviet and Indian leaders have become a long-standing and good tradition in the two countries' relations. Since Jawaharlal Nehru's visit to the USSR in the summer of 1955 and the reciprocal visit of Soviet leaders to India a trustworthy and constructive dialogue at the highest level has become the backbone of the multifarious Soviet-Indian cooperation.

In this respect, special mention should be made of the 1985-1987 meetings between Mikhail Gorbachev and Rajiv Gandhi. They laid a groundwork for elevating to a qualitatively new level Soviet-Indian cooperation not only in the sphere of "big politics" on the international scene but also in trade, economy, science, technology and culture.

Soviet-Indian trade and economic cooperation provides a good example for other countries. This cooperation is equitable, mutually advantageous and allows for long-term economic priorities of both partners. Thus it possesses quite a number of elements of a new international economic order.

The Soviet-Indian cooperation is aimed at solving the urgent problems of India's development and is carried out on a comprehensive basis, first and foremost in the key branches of the Indian economy. Since 1955 more than 70 industrial and other projects have been built in the country with the Soviet participation. At present these enterprises produce 36 per cent of India's steel and 32 per cent of aluminium; they account for 77 per cent of its metallurgical equipment, 47 per cent of power equipment, 43 per cent of mining equipment and one-tenth of power production. Another 40 projects are under construction or in the blueprints. This cooperation helps India achieve economic self-sufficiency and, unlike many developing nations, to successfully resist expansionism and pressure from transnational corporations and banks. India is the Soviet

Union's largest trading partner among the developing countries. In turn, the Soviet Union is a major partner of India in foreign trade turnover. Joint scientific and technological research work ranges from applied medicine to outer space exploration.

But these spectacular achievements notwithstanding, neither the Soviet Union nor India can be content with what has so far been achieved. Life itself makes us seek tirelessly and persistently for more perfect forms of cooperation which would be more propitious for the acceleration of social and economic development of the Soviet Union and modernisation of India's economy.

This is the main objective of the Soviet-Indian agreements of recent years. Thus, in the area of trade and economic cooperation (and with due account taken of the objective needs of the two countries), priority goes not only to radical expansion of the scope of cooperation (it is planned to increase the volume of mutual trade by 150 per cent in the next five years) but also to its restructuring. The traditional exchange of goods should give way to long-term industrial cooperation. As the interests of dynamic economic development of India primarily require the development of the national fuel and power base as well as industrial modernisation through the introduction of the latest scientific and technological achievements, the Soviet-Indian cooperation has extended from "traditional" branches of ferrous-metals and engineering industries to those of electric power, coal and oil. In accordance with a major agreement—the first of its kind in the history of Soviet-Indian cooperation—on economic and technical cooperation concluded during the visit by Mikhail Gorbachev to India in November 1986, the Soviet Union will help India to complete such projects as a hydropower complex in Tehri, modernise and retool the metallurgical plant in Bokaro, build four coal mines in Jaria, and prospect for oil and gas on land in West Bengal. The implementation of this and other recent agreements will make it possible to considerably satisfy India's urgent need in electric power, coal and oil products. India's seventh five-year plan of economic development (up to the year 1990) envisages, thanks to projects of Soviet-Indian cooperation, 40 per cent increase in coal-mining; the production of electric power will go up by 10 per cent and of ferrous metals—100 per cent.

A drastic increase in the scope of cooperation requires the involvement of more enterprises, organisations and firms of both countries. That is why last year saw the signing of a number of major long-term programmes which envisage the development of industrial cooperation, establishment of direct contacts between the Soviet and Indian amalgamations and firms, the creation of joint ventures in both countries and joint research in the most promising spheres of science and technology.

A very important aspect is worth mentioning here. It is common knowledge that under various pretexts certain industrialised countries seek to block the access of developing nations to the latest technology so as to put them deliberately at a disadvantage on the world market. Imperialism today, just as in the past, thrives to a considerable extent at the expense of the "tribute" it extorts from the peoples who lag behind in economic development in the form of usurious interest on credits and inequitable exchange. The production structure of the world capitalist economy has been changed of late so as to concentrate technologically more simple but environmentally more hazardous production facilities in countries with cheap labour. The imperialist "centres" tend to specialise in the production of sophisticated science-intensive goods and, primarily, in the expansion of knowledge and the development of top-of-the-line technology. Thus we are dealing here with the strategy of "technological imperialism" which is trying to provide neocolonialist exploitation with a new material and theoretical basis.

Such methods are absolutely alien to the Soviet Union. It has always shared with India all its accomplishments because it regards India as an equal partner in the solution of common tasks of social and economic development of humanity rather than a potential competitor. For its part, the Soviet Union intends to broadly utilise India's experience in the branches where it has attained world standards. The USSR does not erect any custom barriers for India's products and is willing to purchase Indian technology. It is envisaged to engage Indian organisations and firms—both private and state—in building industrial enterprises, hotels and other civil projects in the USSR.

The implementation of long-term programmes of trade, economic, scientific and technological cooperation as well as a certain coordination of economic potentialities of the two countries will meet the requirements of both the USSR and India at home. This will also enhance their ability to participate in the international division of labour and to provide third countries with advanced technology and other forms of assistance. It is believed that this would limit significantly the sphere of domination of "technological imperialism" and become instrumental in the struggle for the establishment of a new, equitable and fair economic order.

Regular Soviet-Indian summits, high-level meetings and growing contacts between the governments of the two countries are actively backed by the people's diplomacy, which was vividly demonstrated by national festivals of India in the USSR and of the USSR in India. During these unprecedented festivals millions of people in the two countries were able to familiarise with the culture and to understand better the life and concerns of each other. The paramount importance of these nation-wide celebrations lay in the fact that the heads of both governments attended opening ceremonies—Rajiv Gandhi in Moscow and Nikolai Ryzhkov in Delhi.

The Indian visit by Nikolai Ryzhkov has resulted in signing a number of major bilateral agreements.

The culture of each nation belongs to the whole humanity. The best minds of Russia and India have always rejected religious, national and class narrow-mindedness. They believed that mutual cultural enrichment of near and distant countries and continents is a means of developing a unique world civilisation. Lenin urged the young to enrich their memory with the knowledge of all riches created by humanity. The great son of India Mahatma Gandhi wanted the winds of culture of all nations to breathe at his home. A truly humane art has always promoted the establishment of closer relations among peoples and increased their mutual understanding. Such mutual understanding has acquired special importance now that the interdependence and integrity of the contemporary world have been recognised.

The significance of the people's diplomacy spreads far beyond the limits of bilateral Soviet-Indian relations. The emergence of the people's diplomacy in international affairs is a typical feature of the process of renovation of the current world and reflects a tendency towards democratisation of international life. The peoples are no longer objects of diplomatic and governmental activities but subjects of conscious political activities on the international scene. The people's diplomacy restores the original, direct meaning of the word "international"—relations among peoples rather than among state representatives. Growing contacts among the peoples of the world introduce a truly humanistic element into international affairs.

In the present integral, interconnected and interdependent world politics should be nourished by the greatest accomplishments of each

BENEFITS OF CONVERTING ARMS PRODUCTION

Vladimir KONOBEEV

Successive peace initiatives taken by the Soviet Union, primarily its far-reaching disarmament proposals, foster a new thinking in various political and social circles. More and more clearly, they show the urgency of practical measures to end the arms race, eliminate the huge stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction and renounce the policy of reciprocal deterrence. In an article entitled "Reality and Guarantees for a Secure World", Mikhail Gorbachev wrote that, according to estimates by Soviet and US scientists, 95 per cent of the nuclear armaments of the Soviet Union and United States could be scrapped without upsetting stability. "We believe," he pointed out, "that the 5 per cent should not be retained either."¹ It is perfectly evident that the time has come for all governments to act fast and resolutely, with a full sense of responsibility for the destiny of humanity, in view of the growing danger of development of more and more new weapons—a process which could get out of hand.

The recent signing in Washington of the Soviet-US treaty on the ultimate elimination of two classes of missiles—medium- and shorter-range—is an event of historic significance unprecedented in the relations between the two major nuclear powers. It is to be hoped that the treaty will pave the way for a 50 per cent reduction of the strategic offensive weapons of the Soviet Union and United States and, subsequently, for a nuclear-free world.

In the international situation shaping up at present, the prospect of a convention on banning and eliminating barbarous means of annihilation, such as chemical weapons, is more likely to materialise than before. We may look forward to stepped-up efforts and positive results also in other areas of the disarmament process, such as that of reducing conventional armaments on the principle of non-offensive defence following from the strictly defensive doctrine of the WTO countries.

To achieve real progress in curbing the arms race is a prerequisite for establishing a comprehensive international security system covering the military, political, economic and humanitarian spheres, and taking into account the vital interests of all developed and developing countries. Mounting military expenditures tell very strongly even on the economy of the richest capitalist country, the United States. This adverse development rebounds through an intricate international currency and financial mechanism on many other nations, as the upheavals on stock-markets in October and November 1987 showed. The current ruinous war preparations, which already swallow nearly one trillion dollars a year, increasingly involve developing countries suffering, as it is, from a chronic shortage of means of combating poverty, hunger and disease.

Generally speaking, the continuing arms race is causing immense economic damage by robbing national economies of numerous resources. True, in capitalist countries, where the bulk of armaments comes from private business, spokesmen of the military-industrial complex try from time to time to revive for selfish reasons the myth of the economic benefits

of military spending. In this they are joined by high-ranking officials. Former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger affirmed in one of his annual reports that defence spending stimulates the economy and that cuts in defence spending tend to increase unemployment.² Claims of this nature are also made in support of the proposition that a reduction in military spending and a considerable decrease in arms production would breed extremely difficult economic problems.

All these would-be arguments are intended to justify the unduly high cost of war preparations and discourage the public's anti-war efforts. However, numerous investigations in both the West and the Soviet Union have shown that one and the same amount spent in the civilian sector of the economy is much more effective than in the military sector both as a source of jobs and on other counts. This has been confirmed by experience: over the past 30 years all the main economic indicators in countries where military spending is high have been much less favourable than in countries where defence spending is lower.

Thus, the dialectics of world development leads humanity to the obvious conclusion that it is now dangerous, and even impossible, to advance the economy while speeding up the arms race. It is imperative to stop senselessly wasting resources on building up the war machine and to channel them into people's everyday needs, that is, to convert military production into civilian one. This issue is unquestionably pivotal among the economic aspects of disarmament.

Conversion presupposes ending (or drastically cutting) arms production and using the resources thus released in the civilian sector of the economy. This would become feasible if the Soviet Union, the United States and other countries signed agreements on major cuts in armed forces and armaments. These agreements would apparently have to provide for the discontinuance and non-resumption of the development and production of basic weapons, and for the procedure of demilitarising the related industrial and research facilities.

Ending the development of weapons and reducing the strength of armed forces would inevitably pose the problem of the fate of the plants and personnel to be released from the military sector. The problem is likely to prove most acute in several capitalist countries, primarily the United States, where military hardware is being manufactured on a very large scale and almost exclusively (not less than 90 per cent of it) by private business. The latter has monopolised the manufacture of basic weapons and perceives any sign of a possible reduction of Pentagon contracts as a blow to its profits. Using the economic and political leverage in the country, private companies invariably come out against cuts in military appropriations and initiate new spirals in the arms race.

Small wonder that in the United States the economic aspects of disarmament, including the problem of conversion, have been the object of research ever since the early 1960s. The most prominent experts—Seymour Melman, E. Bénéit, Wassily Leontief, John E. Ullman, B. Udis, D. M. Mack-Forlist, Lloyd J. Dumas, Gordon Adams, Robert De Grasse—published most of their works in the 1960s and 1970s. However, the mid-1980s saw a revival of the debate on this problem in the US scientific community.

The authors of investigations differ in estimating the extent of likely difficulties and in forecasting ways of solving the problem of conversion. But they are at one in believing that, for all its complexity, the problem can be solved provided this is planned beforehand.

The larger the funds allocated to arms development and production, the more complicated and acute the main problems of conversion. It is also beyond question that ways of effecting conversion would vary from country to country, depending on the conditions prevailing by the time its planning begins.

In the present international context, the issue of conversion will be hypothetical enough until the main prerequisite for conversion—a concrete agreement on substantial cuts in armaments and arms production—has been created. Even so, an idea of the economic problems of conversion can and must be formed, and at least a general estimation of them made even now to prevent opponents of detente from exaggerating the difficulties of a changeover from military to civilian production and misusing them as a pretext for thwarting relevant political accords.

Mikhail Gorbachev's message to the International Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development re-emphasised the need to reverse the militarisation process. "An important step on this road, a step strengthening international confidence," he wrote, "could be taken by each state drawing up its own national plan for conversion."³ This is necessary as a means of dispelling the fears of those employed by military agencies for their future in the event of a drastic reduction in armaments and military expenditure.

In today's conditions, conversion as the totality of technological and economic measures is no easy task, of course, and should differ essentially from the reconversion effected after World War II. At that time, most enterprises switched previously from civilian to military production reverted to their earlier activity—to producing, as a rule, the same items as before the war. As for the munitions factories of today, they are highly specialised and hardly suited for direct use in the economy, any more than their output. On the other hand, many of them have lately been equipped with robots, numerically controlled machine-tools and other universal machines—a circumstance potentially making it easier to convert them to new production.

Many US researchers consider that the main difficulties which the US economy would encounter in converting its military production may be listed as follows:

Choosing alternative goods for civilian use and securing markets for them. The right choice of new products is particularly important for a number of industrial firms supplying the Pentagon and deeply involved in the military business. With some of these corporations, arms production exceeds 80 per cent, and to lose contracts with the Pentagon without compensation would mean serious losses for them. However, these corporations are few. Although there are tens of thousands of firms engaged in US arms production to one degree or another, it is only several dozens that are really dependent on military business to a great extent. In 1986 nearly 68 per cent of the Pentagon's contracts (worth about \$ 146 billion) was distributed among 100 major contractors few of whom delivered non-military products, and only 32 per cent of the contracts went to tens of thousands of other companies.⁴ In the first half of the 1980s the largest proportion of contracts was placed with four companies: General Dynamics (86 per cent of the total amount of sales), Lockheed (85), Northrop (84) and Grumman (82 per cent). In the case of the other companies, the percentages were much lower: Rockwell International and Boeing, 63 and 42 per cent respectively.

Practically all the other contractors of the Pentagon are greatly diversified amalgamations producing dozens of civilian items along with military goods. This means that they have experience of civilian production and hold definite positions on the market. Besides, part of the output delivered under military contracts is not typically military (building and

other materials, products of petrochemical, textile, clothing and shoe industries and agriculture). Thus there are factors facilitating the search for alternative non-military lines of production for the Pentagon's main contractors. For many of these the solution of the problem could be simplified still further if the federal government adopted some civilian production programmes.

US economists have repeatedly commented on the prospects of using the existing high demand for civilian goods. Professor Seymour Melman, for one, notes that trolley-buses and subway cars are imported from Canada, the FRG and Japan; 45 per cent of the machine-tools, including numerically controlled ones, comes from other countries; 45 per cent of the highway bridges is in need of an overhaul. He estimates that an ambitious 20-year programme for modernisation of the country's production facilities and infrastructure would cost about \$3.8 trillion. This would entail an annual expenditure of \$190 billion, or nearly \$100 billion less than is now being spent on the arms race. What is more, every year 14 million people would be assured jobs.⁵ Mention may also be made of investment spheres such as modernisation of civil aviation and the fishing fleet, environment protection programmes, measures to improve the health services and education system, etc.

There is, as the case of the United States suggests, sufficient evidence of the existence of alternative lines of activity which many enterprises now engaged in military business could follow in the course of conversion. To this end it is obviously necessary to plan in time the main stages of the measures that would be needed, since conversion resulting from a political decision by the government would extend to all military production at national level and not merely to individual companies "hit" by it. The US economy is flexible enough, and recent decades have seen it on more than one occasion cope with fluctuations in demand for various goods and master techniques of producing new non-military items. The funds needed to make up for the temporary losses of munitions corporations in the period of conversion could be secured by cutting the military budget.

As regards conversion in the Soviet Union, it would not be hard to decide on the nature and items of alternative production, thanks to the vast scale of the perestroika launched in the country and the existence of a large market for many industrial goods and services needed by the population.

The restructuring of military enterprises, as a natural result of conversion to civilian production, should provide for the requisite changes in their organisation and management and for the supply of equipment needed to produce the selected new items. The amount and costs of the work to be carried out would depend on the degree of the military specialisation and the nature of the output of the firm concerned. Three main variants of conversion may be envisaged.

First, in the case of plants which could be used directly for civilian production (aircraft, freighters, passenger ships, fishing boats, machine parts, construction elements as well as other semi-finished products and materials) without any essential retooling. This applies primarily to enterprises equipped with robots and numerically controlled machines. However, all the management echelons of these enterprises would have to be improved so as to achieve sufficiently high productivity and competitiveness. With this kind of conversion, most employees of such plants would keep their jobs.

Second, in the case of enterprises requiring a substantial retooling. Here, too, the whole management would have to be reorganised to a notable extent. Some of the employees could be given jobs at other plants but most of them would have to be retrained for subsequent work at the

retooled plant or somewhere else, according to their choice. With this variant, funds needed for conversion could likewise be obtained by reducing the military budget.

Third, in the case of enterprises unfit for civilian uses and, furthermore, unworthy of retooling. The fate of such enterprises should be decided by the relevant provisions of an agreement stipulating non-resumption of the manufacture of definite weapons. One of the measures applicable to such enterprises could be the dismantling and scrapping of their equipment.

The technological and economic questions that would arise, should the Soviet Union and United States tackle this problem, are comparable. They would also be very similar in other countries requiring conversion. The technological state of the equipment of munitions factories at the start of conversion would play an important part.

Giving jobs to people released from the military sector of the economy. The threat of joblessness in the event of a serious drop in arms production is very painful to a section of the US population, primarily Americans working under military contract. This fact is widely exploited by the militarists and the media serving them: they link the prospects of greater employment in various regions of the country to a mounting military budget and growing arms production. When, in 1977, President Carter temporarily suspended the programme for the production of a new strategic bomber, B-1, a section of the US press described the situation at the Rockwell International plants where the bomber was made as a natural calamity. This sort of thing was done then, and is done now, with the sole aim of using the bogey of unemployment as a means of discouraging anti-war activities by the US public.

Actually, the problem of jobs for people discharged from munitions plants, while complicated enough, can be solved, considering its dimensions. In 1986, those engaged directly in military production numbered 3,150,000, according to US statistics.⁶ This constituted a mere 2.7 per cent of the workforce. Assuming that a possible bilateral or multilateral agreement reducing armaments on the basis of the concept of non-offensive defence would enable the United States to cut arms production by 80 per cent of its present amount, and that the process of reduction would take five years, the labour market would be replenished by 500,000 people a year. The annual natural growth of the workforce in the United States in recent years has been close to two millions.⁷ A comparison of these figures leads to the conclusion that finding jobs for those to be released from the military sector of the economy would not be a big problem.

An important circumstance making the solution of this problem easier is the qualitative composition of those engaged in arms production. Most of them are highly skilled specialists and workers whom a number of civilian industries are short of. Many of them would be able to find jobs similar to their former occupation in a reasonably short time, after retraining. The expenses entailed could likewise be covered by diverting funds from the military budget.

The adjustment of the managerial and executive personnel of military enterprises to civilian production could prove somewhat harder, since it is used to seeking maximum profit by increasing production costs rather than reducing them—something on which the operation of civilian industries has always been based.

If account is also taken of the fact that one and the same amount invested in civilian production creates from 50 to 100 per cent more jobs than in military production, the problem of re-employing those laid off from the military sector may, with every reason, be considered perfectly solvable. The US economy, which is flexible enough, could give jobs to

500,000 "unwanted" people, who would make up slightly over 0.4 per cent of the nation's workforce. The main thing that would require some effort would be the setting up of a scientifically sound system of vocational retraining taking into consideration the demand in the post-conversion economy for workers skilled in various trades.

The problems that conversion would pose would require simultaneous solution because of their close interconnection and interdependence. Hence the need to plan in time—and at the national level—appropriate measures of a technological, economic, administrative and legal nature.

Lately US scientists who have long been working on the problems of conversion from the theoretical point of view have differed over some of its aspects. Seymour Melman, Lloyd J. Dumas and Suzanne Gordon, pointing to the damage which the ongoing arms race is causing to the country, consider it necessary to have conversion plans even now, without waiting until conversion becomes a reality. They believe the planning should be done at enterprise level with the participation of workers. As they see it, this would reduce the dependence of jobs and incomes on military funding and result in eroding support for the Pentagon budget and the arms race. To make companies producing military equipment draw up the necessary plans, Melman proposes passing a federal law to make conversion planning a requirement of serving the Pentagon.⁸

Gordon Adams, author of *The Iron Triangle*, a book criticising the US military-industrial complex, objects to the above. He considers that it is not employees of munitions factories that urge the arms race on and that it is started and supported at higher level, namely, in the government. He writes that nearly 25 years of efforts by advocates of conversion have yielded no real results and that many attempts to have some enterprises converted have failed.⁹ Conversion bills submitted to the US Congress were ignored. However, Adams objects to explicitly negative views on the economic impact of war preparations, although he has repeatedly taken a stand against the arms race and for conversion.

We think both sides go to extremes in this controversy. A detailed planning of conversion at the level of individual enterprises in the absence of an international agreement on substantial cuts in armaments is hardly called for, since nobody has any idea, not even an approximate one, of the likely time when conversion could begin. With science and technology making rapid headway, concrete plans for conversion into alternative civilian production and for a corresponding restructuring of munitions factories and the retraining of personnel for, say, the early 1990s may prove entirely unsuitable for the beginning of the next century.

It follows that this labour-consuming planning, if begun immediately, would have to be done again almost every two years (the time estimated to be needed for planning the conversion of plants) until an agreement on arms reduction become a real prospect that could materialise within a reasonably definite time limit. There is no doubt that the approach would be strongly opposed by the military-industrial complex, whose spokesmen would do their utmost to discredit the very idea of an early planning of conversion in the eyes of the public.

As for working out national strategic plans for conversion and drafting legislation specifying the dimensions and character of the problem, the main ways and means of solving it, the duties of the leaderships of arms production companies, state guarantees of the preservation of incomes of all those involved in military business—from workers to managers—this is a different matter. Planning conversion at this level is pos-

sible and desirable even now, for nobody knows as yet when arms reduction is likely to start. This fundamental plan should be followed up by working out on its basis concrete measures for the conversion of factories as soon as there emerged a clear prospect of the conclusion of an agreement on reducing armed forces and armaments.

It is hard to agree with Gordon Adam's opinion that the efforts of US scientists advocating advance preparations for conversion have been fruitless. Their writings are a valuable contribution to the investigation of the mechanism and effects of the arms race and the social and economic aspects of disarmament, in particular the problems of conversion. A precise concept of the economic aspect of these processes could help considerably in working out political decisions on so pressing a problem of today as that of curbing the arms race.

The problems which all major arms-producing countries would have to solve in the course of conversion are largely similar. However, the ways of solving them might vary considerably, depending on the economic, social and political situation in the country concerned. Conditions for conversion in capitalist countries would differ essentially from those in socialist countries.

In the United States, for instance, the main difficulties would arise from the need for all those engaged in arms production to retain their incomes. The Pentagon's main contractors, for whom their position as monopoly suppliers of arms earns many benefits, would fully use their influence on government quarters to prevent any substantial arms cuts. Their resistance could only be overcome by guaranteeing through relevant legislation and fundamental national plans and programmes that conversion would entail no losses. This is apparently true of some other capitalist countries as well, where private companies account for a notable part of arms production.

It is also necessary that persons engaged in arms production should be certain of finding other jobs or retaining their incomes in some other way if production under Pentagon contracts was run down. The years-long peddling in capitalist countries of the myth that defence agencies are important employers has made those working in munitions factories supporters of the arms buildup. In the main capitalist countries of the West, where unemployment has risen to between 8 and 10 per cent in recent years, the threat of dismissal often has a stronger effect on certain population groups, if small ones, than the most convincing arguments in favour of cessation of the arms race.

Their fears would dissipate provided national conversion plans were drawn up and made public beforehand—plans specifying through appropriate legislation measures for vocational retraining and the procedure of funding them and guaranteeing the incomes of persons finding themselves temporarily out of job. The attitude of US scientists opposing the arms race and insisting on the early planning of conversion and the adoption of the requisite legal measures is, therefore, understandable and apparently justified.

In the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, cuts in armaments would be welcomed by all working people. There is no private capitalist arms production in these countries; all such production is carried on entirely at state-owned plants and, therefore, no population groups or individuals have any stake in the maintenance of a large-scale arms industry. Nor do the employees of defence enterprises need fear that they would be out of employment. The Soviet Constitution guarantees every citizen the right to work. Since the proportion of persons released from

the military sector would be relatively small while many branches of the Soviet economy are permanently short of skilled labour, it is safe to expect that in our country the problem of jobs arising from conversion would be solved. To be sure, a substantial proportion of workers and specialists employed in the Soviet defence industry would have, like US employees, to refrain to a greater or lesser extent at state expense.

As soon as the prospect of an agreement on arms reductions became a reality, the Soviet State Planning Committee (Gosplan) would be able to start planning the necessary measures. Its plans would evidently specify the main lines of the conversion of each defence industry with due regard to the likely requirements of the economy for the post-conversion period. As for further work on concrete plans for retooling enterprises and mastering civilian production, it would apparently be advisable to carry out this work at a lower level in order to more fully take into account and utilise the potentialities of every factory, laboratory or research centre.

In post-war years, an appreciable part of the Soviet defence industry has been mastering production of civilian commodities. Production efficiency may, in some cases, have been less than adequate but ultimately society was supplied with the output it needed—generally products of high quality. The perestroika under way in our country calls for greater utilisation of the available industrial potential. The defence industry is a major reserve in this respect; it will not be long before this industry starts producing definite types of technological equipment and consumer goods.

It follows that conversion is not too complicated a problem, let alone a utopian one. Its solution would certainly require a series of measures in the technological, economic and social spheres but the difficulties involved would not last longer than from one to three years on the average, nor would they do any serious damage to the economy. Besides, the economies of industrial countries are flexible enough to devise in the course of conversion ways of making rational use of released funds, of material, technological and manpower resources, for peaceful development.

Something similar to what would have to be done in the event of converting arms production is constantly taking place, in effect, in the civilian branches of the economies of many countries. They are mastering production of many items, and retooling enterprises according to requirements. Some corporations are curtailing their activity and reducing their staffs while others are expanding production and creating new jobs. Many companies have vocational training and retraining systems. The efforts that all this necessitates (at the expense of the companies themselves) are comparable to or perhaps exceed those that would be required for conversion with government aid.

All this is evidence that conversion would neither burden the economy nor threaten greater unemployment. It is an economic component of disarmament and would, therefore, be a necessary and natural process should the insensate arms race be stopped and reversed. There is no comparing the temporary difficulties and possibly major outlays likely to be involved in conversion to the benefits which humanity would derive from ending the current dangerous arms race, improving the interna-

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: "POLITICAL DIMENSIONS"

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Over the past two decades, significant changes have taken place in the balance of economic forces among the three main centres of present-day capitalism: the USA, Western Europe and Japan. Since the beginning of the 1970s, the USA's share in the world's gross national product has gone down by one percentage point (from 22.4 to 21.5 per cent), that of Western Europe has shrunk by more than three points (from 30.6 to 27.3 per cent), and that of Japan has increased by more than 1.5 points (from 7.5 to 9.1 per cent).¹ There has been a parallel geographical redistribution of their mutual trade flows. Since Western Europe's share in the USA's foreign trade has been almost halved, while Japan's share has markedly increased, the centre of gravity in world trade has tended to shift from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean.

That was largely a result of Western Europe's lag, in the course of the structural crisis of the 1970s and the early 1980s, behind its rivals in economic growth rates and, especially, in progress along the key lines of the scientific and technological revolution (informatics, robotics, biotechnology, manufacture of new materials, etc.). In the first half of the 1980s, technologically advanced products made up 31 per cent of US exports, 21 per cent of Japanese exports, and 17 per cent of West European exports.²

Naturally, such symptoms were bound to cause concern in Western Europe's business world and ruling circles. West European newspapers and magazines have been debating the question of "Eurosclerosis" and how to get rid of it. The leaders of the European Community (EC) countries undoubtedly regard a further intensification of integration processes, including those in the political sphere, as the most effective way of catching up with the USA and Japan in the shortest period of time. That was reflected in the elaboration of a Single European Act (effective since July 1, 1987), which alters and supplements the 1957 Treaty of Rome on the formation of the EEC (Common Market).

The powers of the community's governing bodies have been broadened, and its activities have extended to new fields: scientific-technical and international monetary policy, environmental protection. The mechanism of European Political Cooperation (EPC), set up in 1969 to concert the community members' positions on the international scene has acquired official status in international law. These measures are meant to promote the formation by 1992 of a truly common market for the 12 West European states, which implies a harmonisation of their legal, tax and technological systems.

The importance of all these steps, however, should not be overestimated. As a report by the French Institute of International Relations put it, "Europe is not a third superpower with classic (notably, military) instruments of power... Within the framework of the European communities and political cooperation, supreme power belongs to the state. More

frequent decision-making by a qualified majority on technical issues does not obviate the demand for the states' unanimity on all matters of principle."³ Still, without substituting for the community's sovereign states, which remain full and equal subjects of international relations, the community seeks to give their foreign policy a "new dimension", to play a more noticeable role in international relations.

REGIONAL CONFLICTS

The recent invigoration of the European Community's activities in international affairs is particularly evident in its approach to regional conflicts in the Third World, notably in the *Middle East*. The chronic tensions between Israel and the Arab countries, the blind alley in Lebanon, where the 12-year-old strife between the religious communities has developed into an indirect struggle between external forces, the senseless and sanguinary Iran-Iraq war, which has jeopardised shipping in the Persian Gulf—all of that gives rise to well-justified concern in the West European countries, whose economy is heavily dependent on imports of Middle Eastern oil.

Their anxiety over the USA's Middle East policy has particularly increased after the loud scandal over secret deliveries of US arms to Iran and the transfer of a part of the receipts to the Nicaraguan contras. The scandal struck a telling blow at the USA's standing in the Arab world, where the US administration's unseemly moves have been regarded as direct proof of Washington's insincerity in its rhetoric on "combating international terrorism", and also in its approach to the Iran-Iraq war.

In the conditions of the crisis of confidence in the USA which has developed in the region and which could result in a vacuum of Western influence in general, EC diplomacy has tried to fill that vacuum. A session of the EC Council of Ministers in Brussels on February 23, 1987 adopted an extensive declaration on the Middle East. Having emphasised the danger of the mounting tensions and conflicts in that region, the community spokesmen expressed their immediate interest in a quest for a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East. The community declared it was in favour of "holding an international conference on the Middle East under the UN auspices with the involvement of all the parties concerned, and also of all countries capable of making a direct and positive contribution to the cause of establishing peace and security in the region, to its economic and social development".⁴

The participants in the session pledged to work for the convocation of such a conference. In the course of a visit to Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel by Leo Tindemans, the then President of the Council of Ministers of the European Communities and Belgium's Foreign Minister, concrete matters were discussed relating to the convocation of the conference.

Shortly before the Brussels session, the head of the Belgian Foreign Ministry's press department, reaffirmed the community's adherence to its 1980 Venice Declaration on the Middle East, which recognised the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and the right of their representatives to take part in any talks on settling the Middle East crisis. During his tour of the region, however, Leo Tindemans took a step back from the text of the declaration, intimating that the involvement of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in the settlement process does not necessarily mean its direct presence at a future conference on the Middle East.

Naturally, such a concession to the negative stand of Israel and the USA did nothing to raise the community's prestige in the eyes of the

Arab countries or to promote the success of its emissary's mission. The next session of the community's Council of Ministers in May 1987 had no alternative but to admit, for the time being, a lack of prospects for a new EC initiative on the Middle East. They put the responsibility for that on the government of Israel, whose Foreign Minister Shimon Peres is nominally in favour of an international conference (regarding it merely as a cover for bilateral talks), whereas Prime Minister Itzhak Shamir is against it.

In these conditions, on the proposal of the Netherlands' Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek, the community has decided to a "pause for thought". As for the statements by its spokesmen on the "sufferings and misfortunes" of the inhabitants of the Israeli-occupied Arab territories, on the need to end the blockade of the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and to stop the bloodshed in that country, these have acquired a purely rhetorical ring.

The explosive atmosphere in the *Persian Gulf* is closely connected with the conflict situation in the Middle East, the scene of the Iran-Iraq war. Initially, the buildup of US naval forces in the gulf on the pretext of "ensuring freedom of navigation", and Washington's attempts to draw its NATO partners into its dangerous policy met with a guarded response in Western Europe. On June 23, 1987, the foreign ministers of Belgium, Britain and Denmark, representing the community countries, met in Brussels with the heads of the diplomatic departments of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia and Oman. According to news agencies, the West European response to the US idea of setting up Western naval forces to protect international shipping routes in the Persian Gulf was a fairly cool one.

Nevertheless, as the USA stepped up its pressure on its NATO partners, in the autumn of 1987 Britain, France and other West European states sent naval squadrons and mine-sweepers to the Persian Gulf. Although these were nominally independent from the powerful fleet of US warships and were not subordinate to the US special command in the region, NATO's West European states have obviously followed in the wake of Washington's dangerous line for whipping up tensions in the region, a line fraught with direct military confrontation with Iran. These moves have markedly undermined the community's prestige in one of the hottest spots on the planet.

Another knot of contradictions directly affecting the interests of the West European countries is in the *South of Africa*. In view of the large investments made by the monopolies of a number of EC states in South Africa's economy, and the strategic importance of the sea route around Africa, the ruling circles of these countries have maintained close ties with the racist regime in Pretoria and refrained from putting effective pressure on it.

At the same time, the community leaders have had to reckon with the position of a number of African countries, with their resolute demands to put an end to the inhuman system of apartheid, to stop South Africa's aggression against the front-line states, and to grant Namibia's people the right to self-determination. These demands have the vigorous support of non-aligned developing countries in Asia and Latin America, including those associated with the EC, and also of the socialist community countries and the democratic public in Western Europe itself.

Considering the powerful upsurge of the national liberation movement of South Africa's black and coloured majority, in response to which Pretoria declared a state of emergency in the summer of 1985, resorting to mass repressions and terrorism, West European political and business circles have had to distance themselves from the most odious aspects

of the racist regime's policy so as duly to prepare themselves for its possible collapse.

In that context, an EC foreign ministers' meeting in Luxembourg in September 1985 adopted a resolution urging the Pretoria government to start a dialogue with the acknowledged representatives of the native majority. The ministers pledged to ensure tighter control of the embargo on arms sales to South Africa, to end the military cooperation with it, recall military attaches, and reduce cooperation in culture, science and sports. But in the most important—economic—sphere, they confined themselves to mere gestures, such as a ban on new contracts in the field of nuclear power engineering, on the re-export of oil to South Africa, etc. On November 20, 1985, it was also decided to tighten the 1977 "code of conduct" for community firms in South Africa, which were recommended, in particular, to recognise coloured trade unions and eliminate racial barriers at the enterprises.

Meanwhile, the African countries increased their pressure on the community in matters of relations with South Africa. At a meeting of EC representatives with the foreign ministers of the front-line states (Lusaka, February 3-4, 1986), President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia resolutely called for economic sanctions against the racist regime, even if that affected the neighbouring African countries. The meeting's final document emphasised the importance of constant international pressure on Pretoria in order to make it lift the state of emergency, recognise the banned black-majority parties, and release political prisoners. It also denounced South Africa's armed intervention in Namibia and its linkage with the presence of Cuban internationalists in Angola.⁵

After the Lusaka meeting, the long-brewing crisis within the community on the South African problem burst into the open. That happened at the European Council's session in the Hague on June 26 and 27, 1986, where Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Britain and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the FRG, the spokesmen of South Africa's main business partners, openly opposed any economic sanctions against Pretoria. Hypocritically arguing that sanctions and the resultant destabilisation of the South African economy would strike hardest at the black population and the neighbouring African states, the British and West German leaders made no secret of the fact that London and Bonn were primarily concerned over regular supplies of strategic raw materials from South Africa.

In a compromise resolution, the European Council once again voiced its "serious concern" over the worsening situation in South Africa and reaffirmed the demand for a release of political prisoners and steps towards a dialogue with the true leaders of the black majority. The heads of state and government of the EC countries promised to consult with other industrialised states over the next three months on such measures as a ban on new capital investments in South Africa and on imports of South African coal, steel, and gold coins. Another community emissary, Britain's Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Geoffrey Howe, was sent to Pretoria for negotiations.

But the head of the racist regime President Pieter Botha first refused to meet the community spokesman (by then, President of the Council of Ministers of the European Communities), and then declared that he would not discuss with him matters of "internal security under the state of emergency".⁶

The leaders of the front-line African states, for their part, saw London's policy as direct complicity with the racists in preserving their system. In these conditions, at least partial use of sanctions was politically inevitable: the community put a ban on imports of steel and gold coins from South Africa. But that measure affected only 6 per cent of the total value of South African exports, while the export of coal (20 per cent of

the total) remained on the same level. The ban on investments in the South African economy, which does not cover earlier investments (with Britain accounting for one-half of these), has just as little effect. Such a half-hearted approach shows the obvious inability of the community countries' ruling circles to go beyond the narrow self-seeking interests of the West European monopolies, which fear the consequences of a collapse of the apartheid regime and prefer to compromise with it.

The community leadership has followed a more constructive line with regard to the crisis situation in *Central America*, where the community countries' ruling circles would apparently like to be seen as a force that could be more successful than the USA in channelling the regional revolutionary process along reformist lines acceptable to the West. Many West Europeans believe that the American administration's undeclared war against the legitimate government of Nicaragua could only increase the striving of local national liberation movements for close ties with Cuba and other socialist countries.

Influential political and business circles in Latin America regard the EC as a kind of counterweight to the United States. However, their largely favourable attitude to the EC was put to a serious test in 1982, when the community was mostly in solidarity with Britain in the course of the Anglo-Argentine conflict over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. The solution of the problem of equality in the community's economic relations with Latin America is also far from satisfactory: while providing the Latin American countries with credits and investments, the West European monopolies markedly infringe upon their trade interests. As President Richard von Weizsaecker of the FRG had to admit in the European Parliament on October 23, 1985, "that is not only doubtful in moral terms, but does not pay politically".

The "Falklands syndrome" among the Latin Americans was to some extent overcome with the entry into the community of Spain and Portugal, which have long-standing historical, linguistic and cultural ties with the Latin American countries.

On September 11-12, 1985, the foreign ministers of the community met in Luxembourg with their counterparts from five Central American states: Nicaragua, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. The participants signed a five-year agreement on cooperation. It envisages the granting of most-favoured-nation treatment in trade, assistance in economic integration of the countries of Central America, provision of aid in agriculture, education and health services.

The participants came out in support of the quest for a global political settlement of the crisis in that region on the principles of independence, non-interference in internal affairs, self-determination, and inviolability of borders, and emphasised their resolve to work for an earliest possible adoption within the framework of the Contadora process of documents on peace and cooperation in Central America, restoration of a climate of trust, an end to the tensions and conflicts, a guarantee for human rights and fundamental freedoms, formation of a reliable regional security system, arms cuts, and an end to foreign military presence.

However, at the Third Foreign Ministers' Conference of EC and Central American states with the participation of representatives from the Contadora group, held in Guatemala in February 1987, attempts were made obviously prompted by Washington, to turn that forum into an instrument of interference in Nicaragua's affairs on the false pretext of "defending democracy". In particular, the FRG, France and the Netherlands toughened the terms of their economic aid to Nicaragua.

According to a Swiss newspaper, "none of that shows, however, that the Europeans have drawn closer to the US-advocated military solution

with the help of the *contras*".⁷ Nicaragua's representative, Foreign Minister Miguel d'Escoto, firmly rejected any encroachments on the Central American peoples' right to an independent solution of their problem, and invited them to sign a treaty of peace, security, friendship and cooperation in Central America.

That principled stand met with understanding among some members of the community, primarily Spain and Portugal. The final communique of the conference noted the need for closer economic cooperation of the Central American states among themselves and with Western Europe, the need to encourage intra- and inter-regional integration. Solidarity was also expressed with the efforts of the Contadora Group and Support Group in order to settle the Central American crisis on the principles of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.⁸ It is only natural in such a context that Guatemala's peace plan, approved by the ministers of foreign affairs from 12 countries on June 22, 1987, and then adopted in August 1987 by the leaders of five Central American countries, met with widespread sympathy and support in the community countries and their ruling circles.

Whereas in its approach to the problems of the Middle East, Latin America and to some extent southern Africa the community has been trying in one way or another, by intricate manoeuvring, to follow a policy of its own, with regard to the conflict situations in South and *Southeast Asia* it has so far toed the Washington line virtually without reserve. An indicative statement in that respect was made by Britain's Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Geoffrey Howe at the Sixth Conference of the EC and the ASEAN countries in Jakarta on October 20 and 21, 1986. While seeking to extend the community's positions on Southeast Asian markets, he attacked the Asian policy of the Soviet Union, especially as regards the situation around Kampuchea and Afghanistan. That speech was a graphic manifestation of the old imperial tradition of the British Tories, who cannot "stomach" the democratic revolution in Afghanistan, whose people were able to defend their independence from encroachments by the British colonialists in the course of three triumphant wars.

The statements on Afghanistan formulated by the European Council in London in December 1986 and by the Council of Ministers of the European Communities on March 17, 1987 have the same keynote. Nominally supporting the efforts of Diego Cordovez, Under-Secretary-General of the UN, in his quest for a political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan through indirect talks in Geneva, the community countries arbitrarily detach some of the terms of such a settlement (withdrawal of the limited contingent of Soviet troops) from its other terms (an end to external interference and its guaranteed non-resumption).

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

The community's policy on the pivotal, East-West line of present-day international relations covers two sets of questions: elaboration by the 12 EC states of a concerted approach to the problems of peace, security and disarmament, on the one hand, and establishment of official relations between the European Community (EC) and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), and also with individual socialist countries, on the other.

In taking office as President of the Council of Ministers of the European Communities in the first half of 1987, Belgium's Prime Minister Wilfried Martens said in an interview with a Brussels newspaper that the community's political activity would thenceforward be pivoted on problems of disarmament stemming from the outcome of the Soviet-US sum-

mit in Reykjavik. At the same time, he admitted that the European Council, meeting in London in December 1986, was unable to work out a "distinct and clear-cut stand" on a complete elimination of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe.⁹

Indeed, differences on that issue emerged both among the 12 EC countries and within each of them. The Social Democratic deputies of the European Parliament adopted a resolution which said that the USSR and the USA have signalled their proximity on major issues, so it is time for the Europeans to act. They should insist that the talks between the West and the East should in reality attain the desired results. For that it is necessary clearly to formulate the interests of the European continent and introduce these at the talks. The Social Democrats called for a special session of the community's Council of Ministers to examine that question.

The 15th Congress of the Socialist and Social Democratic Parties of the EC countries at Estoril (Portugal) in May 1987 approved that proposal, coming out against the militarisation of outer space and, with the exception of the French Socialist Party, for a total ban on nuclear weapons tests. The annual congress of the Federation of Liberal and Democratic Parties of the European Community in Lisbon (early April 1987) adopted a resolution in a similar vein.

At the session of the European Council held in Copenhagen on December 4-5, 1987, the heads of state and government of the member countries adopted a resolution on a major event in the East-West relations, the Soviet-American summit in Washington. Welcoming this meeting, they gave a high assessment of the USSR-USA treaty on the elimination of a whole class of missile-nuclear weapons.

The first contacts between the leading economic integration organisations of European states with different social systems were first made back in the 1970s. In 1972, the Soviet side expressed its readiness to find a basis for some forms of business relations between them, provided the community states refrained from any attempts to discriminate against the other side. However, the EEC leaders' stand on that issue was contradictory: while expressing an interest in the community's recognition by the socialist states, they themselves tried to avoid a dialogue with the CMEA and to confine themselves to bilateral relations with individual socialist countries. EEC circles referred to the unequal juridical status of the two integration groupings, especially in view of the right to conclude trade agreements and treaties with third countries, which has since 1975 been within the competence of the community organs. Ultimately, the talks on a CMEA-EEC agreement, held in 1978-1979, ended in deadlock.

The talks were only resumed in September 1985, after letters proposing their resumption had been sent by the CMEA Secretariat to the Italian Government (which at the time chaired the Community's Council of Ministers) and by the CMEA Executive Committee to the Commission of the European Communities (CEC). This time, the CMEA's goodwill gesture met with a more constructive response among the EC ruling circles. On January 15 and 16, 1987, CMEA and EC experts met in Brussels to discuss mutual relations. The signing of a joint declaration on the establishment of official relations between the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the European Community would have undoubtedly created favourable conditions for development of cooperation both between the two organisations and between individual CMEA countries and the community as such.

But CEC representatives dragged out the talks on the text of a joint EC-CMEA declaration, continuing to give priority to bilateral ties. The pretext for that was the community's demand that West Berlin should be regarded under the Treaty of Rome as an integral part of the com-

munity, as one of the FRG's lands, and not only on an economic, but also on a political plane. Such unwarranted claims, which were in direct contradiction with the four-power agreement between the USSR, the USA, Britain and France of September 3, 1971 and the Treaty on the Basic Principles of Relations between the GDR and the FRG, could never be accepted by the socialist countries.

Some improvement in the international climate in recent years in connection with the Soviet Union's bold foreign-policy initiatives has served to invigorate the community's policy along the East-West line. The EC Council of Ministers' Brussels session in February 1987 discussed these relations in the light of the restructuring process in the USSR, and instructed the heads of the political departments of the 12 countries' foreign ministries to analyse the content of the political, economic and social changes under way in the USSR, their possible consequences for Europe as a whole and for the strategy of Western Europe's relations with the USSR.

In the course of a meeting in Moscow on October 2, 1987, between Andrei Gromyko, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and Claude Cheysson, member of the Commission of the European Communities and France's former Minister for External Relations, the Soviet side expressed the hope that the question of establishing official relations between the CMEA and the EEC would be finally settled without artificial delays. The future establishment of such relations, Andrei Gromyko noted, is not an aim in itself. The socialist countries do not want such relations to lower the level of bilateral cooperation with individual countries involved in West European integration. On the contrary, development of CMEA-EC relations is seen as an additional instrument which could also help to improve bilateral cooperation in different fields.¹⁰

According to Vladimir Kamentsev, Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and Chairman of the State External Economic Commission under the USSR Council of Ministers, the ongoing talks show a mutual desire to establish official relations between the CMEA and the EC, and between the USSR and the EC. When such relations are established, it will be time to discuss a concrete extension of trade, economic, scientific and technical cooperation both along the CMEA-EC and along the USSR-EC lines; arrangement of relations between them will have most favourable political consequences, as well as a mutually beneficial economic result.¹¹

Evidently, the quest for an optimal way of concerting the foreign policies of the EC member states is primarily the community's own affair. But the final result of such a quest is of interest not only to the 12 West European countries, but also to their neighbours in common European home.

Up to now, military-political issues relating to Western Europe were discussed either within the framework of NATO and its Eurogroup or within the Western European Union (WEU), which includes seven states that are both NATO and EC members (France, Britain, the FRG, Italy, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg). Their approach to these problems was of a bloc character.

At the same time, the European Community, which is now empowered by the Single European Act to examine the socio-economic aspects of European security, has demonstrated, in spite of certain differences between its member countries and their inconsistent stand, relatively broader and more balanced assessments of the situation in Europe and the

world. That was evident, in particular, in the course of the European process, notably, at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. This EC approach is apparently connected with the community's global interests, which cover economic, political and humanitarian problems far outside Europe, as well as on the continent itself.

So, the European Community has a considerable political potential. It is for the future to show whether the community will be equal to its historical responsibility in the face of all these problems at this crucial point in human history.

¹ RAMSES 86-87. *Rapport annuel mondial sur le système économique et les stratégies*, Paris, 1986, p. 297 (henceforward RAMSES...).

² *Ibid.*, p. 303.

³ RAMSES..., pp. 355-356.

⁴ *Archiv der Gegenwart*, Feb. 23, 1987, p. 30804.

⁵ *Archiv der Gegenwart*, June 6, 1986, p. 29971.

⁶ *Archiv der Gegenwart*, Aug. 2, 1986, p. 30135.

⁷ *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Feb. 13, 1987.

⁸ *The Financial Times*, Feb. 12, 1987.

⁹ *Le Soir*, Jan. 2, 1987.

¹⁰ *Правда*, Oct. 3, 1987.

¹¹ *Коммунист*, No. 15, 1987, p. 34.

USSR AND INDIA: COOPERATION IN THE INTERESTS OF PROGRESS AND PEACE

(Continued from page 32)

nation and the whole human civilisation. They should be permeated with thoughts about the destiny of peoples and proceed from the supremacy of human values over everything else. The Soviet Union and India are guided in their international affairs by precisely these politics.

The building of a peaceful home for humanity is a long-term and laborious undertaking. The experience of broad Soviet-Indian interactions and cooperation in the present conditions is especially valuable. The high level and rich substance of these relations, the fruitfulness of political dialogue, the effectiveness of economic ties and the broad scope of the cultural exchanges meet the interests of our two peoples and of the whole international community. They are an example of peaceful cooperation and a factor contributing to the establishment of a new, fair and democratic world order. This new order would lead to the predominance of the human mind over military force. It should be based not on the balance of terror but on a just and mutually beneficial cooperation of all states, irrespective of their social systems, size and geographic location.

STOCK MARKETS IN TURMOIL

Aleksandr POKROVSKY

The turmoil that broke out on the major stock exchanges of the capitalist world in the second half of October 1987, and the panic triggered off by the rapid plunge of share prices and their frenzied selling (the number of shares sold on the New York Stock Exchange alone on some days ran into hundreds of millions) have brought out new features in the development of the world capitalist economy.

The stock market is a sensitive barometer indicating the state of the capitalist economy and reacting to any changes in the economic outlook. At the same time, the stock market can have a noticeable impact on the economy, accelerating or slowing down its development.

On the whole, stock market upheavals, which serve to enrich individual speculators, are undesirable for the state-monopoly bourgeoisie, which is interested in maintaining stability, for then it can make more efficient use of the mechanism of capitalist exploitation. Hence the ruling circles strive to control stock market activities. No wonder the board of the New York Stock Exchange consists by one-half of government representatives, and its activities are monitored by a special Security and Exchange Commission, which has broad powers and is even entitled to close down the stock exchange.

The need for relatively tight regulation of the market in stock values (stock exchange) is dictated by the specifics of the commodities in which it deals. The securities being bought and sold on the stock exchange do not constitute real values, but are merely an indirect reflection of actually functioning capital. In other words, the stock exchange deals with fictitious capital, which has to some extent a life of its own, whose value can rise and fall within a wide margin, and which can arise out of nothing and vanish without trace. But the very mobility and flexibility of fictitious capital give rise to speculation on a gigantic scale, which disrupts economic life and threatens the operation of the capitalist economy. That is why the USA and other capitalist countries have adopted laws putting the stock exchanges under constant government control.

One could say that the bourgeoisie has learned a lesson from the resounding crash of the New York Stock Exchange on October 29, 1929, which was the first and menacing symptom, and then a catalyst of the world economic crisis of 1929-1933. At that time, the rules of the game on the stock market were more liberal and state intervention was insignificant, and that is why the stock market disaster eventually triggered off a chain reaction of crises in all the major areas of the capitalist economy.

One should also note that market speculations in the 1920s were based on credit, which means that the buyer of shares made wide use of borrowings from commercial banks and specialised institutions rather than his own assets. When share prices began to fall and creditors clamoured for a return of the loans, speculators began to sell shares in order to obtain the necessary funds, so accelerating the fall in share prices. Today, stock market credit is under government control, and the overall amount of borrowed funds that can be used to buy shares is much smaller, although the value of traded securities is several times higher than in 1929. There are also restrictions on the sale of shares. Another point to

note is the growing tendency towards a monopolisation of stock market dealings. The once-independent stockbroker, who carried out his customers buy and sell orders for a certain commission, is being replaced by broker institutions, which are often affiliates of industrial and financial monopolies.

Nevertheless, none of the measures taken to regulate stock market operations, as the autumn events of 1987 show, have been (or could have been) able to restrain the spontaneous operation of market forces that is intrinsic to the capitalist economy.

The "black days" on the New York Stock Exchange in October 1987 set in after a nearly five-year boom, marked by an upward trend in share prices until September 1987. The Dow Jones industrial average, based on the quoted share prices of 30 leading US industrial corporations, rose from 1,896 points in late 1986 to 2,722 points in late August 1987.

The long rise in share prices was not a "natural" one, that is, it was not a rise in expectation of larger dividends to be paid out to the shareholders as a result of a rise in the profits of companies whose shares are quoted on the stock exchange. It was largely due to the speculative activities of the "bulls", or stock exchange operators who seek to raise share prices, drawing their numerous customers into the game. Shares here are bought and held by the new owners with the sole purpose of boosting the demand for them in the conditions of inadequate supply, so as to push up their prices and then to resell them at a profit.

Practice shows that speculative share prices are sooner or later reduced (corrected), but such a reduction often assumes an equally speculative character as a result of manoeuvres by the "bears", who operate in expectation of a price decline. In different periods, one and the same dealer switches from "bull" to "bear" tactics, depending on his experience, intuition and available information.

The general decline in security prices on the New York Stock Exchange in September 1987 was at first regarded by all as a usual correction. In October, however, the decline steepened and turned into a plunge. On October 19, share prices hit the lowest level since the Second World War. That was the day when the Dow Jones index dropped by 508 points, or 22.6 per cent, to close at 1,738 points.

As the market plummeted, panic gripped most shareholders, who tried to sell off their shares as soon as possible in order to avoid even greater losses. As a result of share dumping, the total value of all US corporate stock shrank by over \$500 billion in the course of one day, Monday, October 19.¹

One should emphasise that even the shares of such giant US transnationals as IBM, General Motors and Exxon were affected by the fall in share prices. Thus, IBM shares sunk in value from \$176 in August to \$104, and those of General Motors dropped by \$14, or 21 per cent. The share prices of other major companies—Teledyne, Digital, CBC, Eastman Kodak—fell just as sharply, while those of some smaller companies were almost halved.

The frenzy on Wall Street immediately spread to the stock exchanges in Tokyo, Hong Kong, London, Frankfurt on the Main, Amsterdam and other financial centres.

Tokyo, for instance, saw an unprecedented fall in share prices: on October 20, the market value of all shares shrank by 57 trillion yen. According to press reports, the decline in the value of shares traded on the Tokyo stock exchange exceeded the volume of Japan's annual exports to the USA. Japan's Nikkei index, similar to the Dow Jones industrial aver-

age, and the stock index published by *The Financial Times* of London dropped, respectively, by 620, and 243 points, to 25,746 and 2,059 points.² Japanese dealers declared that there was no serious cause for the crisis on the Tokyo Stock Exchange except for the powerful impact of the events in New York, and Bank of Japan manager Satoshi Sumita emphasised that the sharp fluctuations on the currency and stock markets of the major capitalist countries, with rapidly falling share prices, show that market dealers take a pessimistic view of the business outlook as a whole.³

In Amsterdam, the general share index fell by 13 per cent in a short time, affecting the shares of such powerful corporations as Unilever, Philips and Shell. In France, the first to panic were the small shareholders who had invested their savings in the securities of denationalised state companies and banks, whose prices dropped to a level below the average.

Frenzied trading led to the closure of some stock exchanges, like that in Hong Kong, one of the major stock exchanges in Asia.

In the days and weeks that followed Black Monday, trading on the New York Stock Exchange remained highly volatile, with repeated ups and downs in the Dow Jones index. Optimistic forecasts alternated with gloomy predictions. Within a week of Black Monday, when some began saying that the crisis was over, there was a fresh fit of panic on the stock markets. In New York, the Dow Jones index once again dropped by 158 points, followed by a decline in share prices around the world: by 10 per cent in Frankfurt on the Main, 8 per cent in Paris, 6 per cent in London, 5 per cent in Tokyo, and 33 per cent in Hong Kong, where the stock exchange had reopened after a week's break.

At the worst moments of the stock market crisis, US administration spokesmen made a number of statements to reassure shareholders and stabilise the situation on the stock exchange. Thus, on October 24 (the sixth day of the stock market's "passion week"), the President tried to prove in his traditional radio address that there was no ground for any analogy with the Great Depression (the cyclical crisis of 1929-1932) and that the US economy remained stable. At the same time, he conceded that in late October 1987 the stock exchange had been the scene of the worst-ever gyrations in share prices.

Fearing that the troubles on the stock exchange could induce the worried owners of bank deposits to withdraw their money from bank accounts, the Federal Reserve System announced that large funds were available to counter a "run on the banks". It also became known that two big banks—Chemical and Marine Midland—were reducing their prime rate to 9.25 per cent in order to stimulate share prices. Share prices are known to be directly proportional to dividends, growing with the increase in this or that company's expected profits, and inversely proportional to the lending rate. That is why the banks decided to reduce their interest rate, that is, the rate at which loans are available to customers.

US Treasury Secretary James Baker hurried back from Western Europe, and Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve System, cancelled a scheduled speech in Texas. All of that indicated the administration's extreme concern over the situation, in spite of reassuring statements by government spokesmen.

There was good reason for the administration's concern, especially considering that 47 million Americans are tied to the stock market either directly or through pension funds which invest in shares. As a result of falling share prices, small firms whose capital was invested in shares were short of free funds and found themselves facing bankruptcy. Larger companies which managed to stay afloat were nevertheless obliged to scale down their operations. Experts thought it quite probable that the crisis would engulf numerous banks, which have lately been investing

their funds in securities. These forecasts were primarily made by analogy with the Great Depression, when the stock market upheavals of 1929 were followed by a collapse of the banks.

Another source of anxiety in the US ruling circles was that the governments of the leading West European countries saw the US administration as being largely responsible for the economic difficulties which had led to the sharp drop in security prices all over the non-socialist world. According to *The Washington Post*, senior officials in the FRG, Britain and France pointed to Washington's inability to show political courage in reducing the USA's huge trade and budget deficits as the cause of the global stock market panic. The threat of a recession, they believe, will remain until the USA takes the most resolute steps to reduce these deficits.

Thus, Britain's Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher sent a telegram to the US President, which was described by *The Times* of London as urging him to take prompt action to reduce the huge budget deficits and head the efforts to normalise the Western economy.⁴ Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer Nigel Lawson was even more outspoken, saying it was doubtful that the Americans could muster the political will to reduce the budget deficit and maintain interest rates on a level that is necessary not only to stabilise the dollar, but also to guarantee the funding of the deficit so long as it exists.⁵

Many Western commentators suggested that the stock market troubles would further aggravate the tensions between the USA and its imperialist partners. The cracks in the foundation on which US-European relations rest, wrote *The Washington Post*, are turning into deep rifts under the impact of the global financial crisis.⁶

In late October, the waves of panic in the main financial centres of the capitalist world appeared to subside, with an upward tendency in security prices. But even the rosier optimists did not venture to speak of stabilisation, let alone a recovery in the Western economy. As the Associated Press agency put it, Wall Street remains mistrustful of the possibility of stabilising the financial market. The unpredictable ups and downs in share prices in the following weeks showed there was good reason for such assessments.

Western analysts offer numerous explanations of the sudden panic on the stock markets: from rising interest rates and a decline in the dollar's exchange rate to the possibility of a war between the USA and Iran.

In our view, the most realistic explanation is that over a long period there was no stability in economic growth, and the atmosphere in US business circles was one of uncertainty as they feared a day of reckoning for the gigantic military outlays, which swallow up a sizeable share of the national income and create tensions in the federal budget, foreign trade and investments. Besides, the long-range factors which lie at the core of the turmoil on the stock-exchange markets include shifts in the correlation of forces between the three centres of imperialism, the loss by the USA of its former dominating position in the world capitalist economy and the substantial strengthening of the economic positions held by Western Europe and Japan.

The present US administration came to office with a widely advertised plan for a return to prosperity, a plan meant to produce the utmost propaganda effect. In 1981, the US Congress approved the government's strategy, set forth in a programme for economic revival. The architects

of Reaganomics from among the members of the administration spared no effort in extolling its achievements, both present and future.

But many thought differently. An influential Paris journal wrote that the myth of "prospering America" was being steadily dispelled. America's revival had not come about; the country's economic decline was ever more evident, and it was in for a financial crash.⁷ And the New York *World Policy Journal* admitted that in the first half of the 1980s the US economy had experienced at least one serious slump and could not sustain the high growth rate of the preceding period. The trade deficit was swelling. Investments and labour productivity were making little headway, and unemployment was mostly around 8 per cent.

The failures of Reaganomics were predetermined by the flaws of the theoretical conceptions taken as the basis of the Republican administration's economic policy.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, diverse neo-Keynesian theories were rapidly losing their prestige. Their advocates believed that the state could regulate economic processes as required in each phase of the cycle by regulating aggregate demand, primarily the demand of the state itself and the consumers. Measures to stimulate demand in the conditions of a slowdown or cessation of growth were seen as a way to stoke up the economy, while measures to reduce demand were seen as a way to restrain economic activity and prevent the economy from "overheating", with all its adverse consequences. The neo-Keynesians tried to put their ideas into effect mostly through the budget and budgetary policy. In other words, by manipulating public expenditures they sought to change the volume of aggregate demand, and so to influence the pace of economic growth.

Meanwhile, the practical application of these logical constructs was running into ever greater difficulties and, in the first place, engendered virtually uncontrollable inflation, usually coupled with production stagnation. Naturally, that was bound to discredit neo-Keynesianism both in theory and practice.

As a result, neo-classical conceptions were gaining recognition in bourgeois political economy. Their main distinction from neo-Keynesianism is that they shift the focus of attention from regulating demand to the problems of production efficiency, of mustering financial resources for capital investments in industry, and stimulating business activity. With these aims in view, the government was invited to reduce social expenditures, which serve to increase consumption, and to lower the taxes on corporations and the public, so encouraging them to make new investments. The incentives to investment were to be increased by a sharp slowdown in the pace of inflation through an end to deficit financing of the budget.

In the most general form, with insignificant modifications, these theoretical ideas and practical recommendations were adopted by the Republican administration. First of all, it declared inflation to be the enemy No. 1 and launched a drive against it, sharply increasing the interest rate of bank credit. More expensive credit was meant to hold back rising demand and so to limit its pull on prices.

It is common knowledge, however, that in the economy, where everything is interconnected, no "remedy" meant to treat a certain disease (in this case inflation) can be free of "side-effects". This case was no exception. As the interest rates rose, there was an influx of foreign loan capital, which saw the USA as a sphere of more profitable investment. There was greater demand for dollars all over the world, which led to an increase in the dollar's exchange rate against all other currencies. On the one hand, that entailed a temporary increase in the US balance-of-payments surplus and, on the other, sharply weakened the positions

of US exporters on the world markets, since the foreign exchange they received for their goods had depreciated against the dollar. Foreign companies, on the contrary, enjoyed considerable advantages when selling their goods in the USA. All of that soon resulted in a growing deficit first of the trade balance and then of the payments balance.

One should emphasise that the Republican administration's concrete programme of action differed on one major point from "pure" neo-classical theory: the programme provided for a significant increase in military expenditures. From 1981 to 1987, these expenditures (in constant prices) increased by an annual average of 9 per cent, and their share in the gross national product was up from 5.6 to 7.8 per cent. Under the Republican administration, military spending reached a truly astronomical scale, rocketing from just over \$160 billion in 1981 to \$291.9 billion in 1987 (preliminary estimate).

Militarisation of the economy carried out by the government in the interests of the military-industrial complex was primarily aimed to break the existing military-strategic parity between the USA and the USSR, and also to get an opportunity to conduct an aggressive policy in different regions of the world so as to assert US domination by force. But the buildup of military expenditures was in theory justified by purely economic reasons as well: the need to "stoke up" the economy in definite situations.

The reduction in federal budget expenditures from cuts in outlays on social programmes could not compensate for the growth of military expenditures in any way. Besides, budget revenues were markedly reduced in view of tax cuts. As a result, far from being eliminated, as America's revival programme had declared, the budget deficit increased many times over.

The United States had never had such an imbalance between federal budget revenues and expenditures. Americans still remember the modest one-digit deficit of the early 1970s. That is why they welcomed the President's assurances upon his arrival at the White House that he would end the faulty practice of deficit financing.

In 1981, however, the federal budget deficit was already up to \$78 billion, and in subsequent years it kept climbing towards the \$200 billion mark. In 1985, it was \$212 billion, and in 1986, \$221 billion. The rapidly growing budget gap was a graphic illustration of the contradictory nature of the goals recorded in the revival programme, which both envisaged greater military spending and generous tax concessions to the monopolies and promised to eliminate the federal budget deficit by fiscal 1984. As *The New York Times* wrote with bitter irony, the President who had spoken loudest on the need to reduce the budget deficit was in effect nearing his second term in office with the biggest deficit in the country's history, a deficit surpassing the sum total of the deficits run up by all the Presidents before him.⁸

To cover the ever-rising budget deficits, the Treasury had to issue bonds (government promissory notes) and float these on the credit markets. The more bonds were issued (at a fairly high interest, for otherwise there would be no demand for them on the market), the greater was the federal debt, with billions of dollars swelling into trillions.

In 1950, the US federal debt was already fairly impressive: \$257 billion. By 1960, it reached \$284 billion, rising much faster than before. In the early 1970s, it was up to \$400 billion, and in 1980, to \$914 billion. Under the present US administration, it increased two and a half times to \$2.3 trillion, and over the next few years its growth is expected to continue. The forecasts are confirmed, in particular, by the fact that on September 29, 1987, the President signed a bill raising the federal debt

ceiling from \$2.3 to \$2.8 trillion, although he said he was doing that with great reluctance.

To service the USA's unprecedented debt, that is, to pay interest to bondholders, the Treasury will have to spend more than \$500 billion over the next three years. Naturally, such unproductive spending will put a heavy burden on the US economy, because to find the necessary funds the government will have to redistribute the country's national income to the detriment of accumulation. And the rate of accumulation (or the share of the national income going into production investments) is largely crucial to the results of corporate activity, to its expected profitability. If one recalls that profitability determines corporate share prices on the stock exchange, one will realise how anxious shareholders are and why they are prepared at any moment to dump shares that are beginning to fall.

The huge public debt and the chronic budget deficit covered by foreign investors (according to *The New York Times*, these buy roughly \$150 billion worth of US property and securities every year) undermine confidence in the US economy. Everyone knows, says the same article in *The New York Times*, that such a state of affairs cannot last forever, but what will happen when all of that ends? ⁹

In 1985, some steps were taken in the USA to curb the growth of the budget deficit. For one thing, Congress passed an act (known as the Gramm-Redman-Hollings Act) on a gradual elimination of the federal budget deficit. Under the act, public revenues and expenditures were to be fully balanced out by 1991.

Implementation of the act, however, met with serious resistance mostly from the Defense Department with its growing appetites, which insisted on the continuation of multi-billion-dollar programmes, including those connected with the notorious SDI, the Stealth bomber, and other armaments.

The way of alleviating the deficit problems by increasing taxes, as advocated by the Democrats in Congress, also involved great difficulties in view of inevitable resistance from the leading industrial corporations, which did not want to give up the concessions they had received. Moreover, the Republicans refused to raise taxes on the population, fearing a decline in their party's popularity on the eve of the presidential election. The only way left for the administration to follow was to reduce non-military spending, in particular, by slashing the remaining social programmes. But the surgical operations on the budget in the first half of the 1980s had left very few such programmes.

That is why the 1985 plan to reduce the federal budget deficit was not fulfilled. In fiscal 1987, which ended in September, the deficit turned out to be higher than projected, and in fiscal 1988 it is also expected to surpass the established ceiling. In view of that, the government has drawn up a new, adjusted schedule for eliminating the budget deficit, under which revenues and expenditures are only to be balanced out by 1993. In accordance with an amendment to the Gramm-Redman-Hollings Act passed in late September 1987, the 1988 deficit ceiling was raised from \$108 billion, as scheduled in 1985, to \$144 billion.

Having signed the new plan to eliminate the budget deficit, the President declared that the alternative to its adoption would have been the first bankruptcy of the federal government in the 200-year-long history of the United States. But even today many analysts have serious doubts as to whether the plan to balance out public revenue and expenditure can be fulfilled.

So, a whole complex of negative phenomena took shape in the United States: a huge federal debt, a chronic budget deficit, and a trade deficit resulting from the artificially overvalued dollar and a sharp slowdown in

labour productivity growth in the country. Each of these by itself would possibly not have presented a grave danger, but when taken together they served to increase each other's impact.

The way to correct the situation was either to boost exports by lowering the dollar's exchange rate or to introduce protectionist measures to restrict imports.

As soon as the revival programme was launched, the US administration firmly declared that it did not intend to alter the dollar's exchange rate, allowing market forces to shape the proportions between the currencies. But the strategists of US economic policy soon began to realise that the overvalued dollar did not signify a strong national economy and became aware of the damage it was doing to the United States.

In early 1985, the US government had to review its conceptions on currency matters. At a meeting of the Group of Five (the USA, Japan, the FRG, France and Britain), the US spokesman in effect admitted a connection between the budget deficit and the dollar's exchange rate, and agreed to take regulatory measures. After a series of joint market interventions (i. e., sales of currency) in the first quarter of 1985 totalling \$10 billion, the incipient tendency to a decline in the dollar's exchange rate began to strengthen. The danger now was that the dollar would fall too sharply, and the government began working on a plan to "parachute" the dollar, that is, to ensure its gentle and managed decline.

In September 1985, the finances ministers and managers of the central banks of the USA, the FRG, Japan, France and Britain met at the Plaza Hotel in New York and signed an accord on joint measures to lower the dollar's exchange rate and harmonise economic policies. This time, the US representatives had to admit that they were interested in a devaluation of their currency, in particular, in order to curb protectionist attitudes among some business circles, which were facing difficulties in view of the dollar's high exchange rate. Up to the end of 1985, the central banks of the Group of Five sold about \$12 billion on currency markets, so pushing the dollar's exchange rate further down. In 1986, however, the "parachuting" process went out of control. The dollar tumbled, causing grave concern in Japan and Western Europe.

In October 1986, the Japanese government held talks with the USA on how to slow down the rapid rise of the yen against the dollar. In January 1987, Japan's central bank bought up \$10 billion, and in March and April the USA took steps to maintain the dollar against the yen to the effect of \$4 billion. Nevertheless, the yen continued to rise against the dollar. There was a similar situation on the currency markets of Western Europe.

At a meeting in Paris in February 1987, the Big Seven decided to seek a stabilisation of exchange rates at around the current levels. Over the next few months, the central banks of Japan, the FRG and other West European countries staged a number of interventions in a bid to stop the dollar's decline. By September 1987, they had spent roughly \$90 billion for these purposes. Nevertheless, they did not achieve monetary stability in the world capitalist economy. In October, the dollar took another slide on the major currency markets.

This meant that foreign investors would receive their interest and dividends in depreciated dollars. Meanwhile, share prices continued to rise. Considering the above-mentioned tendencies, the situation was a tense one. Shareholders were avidly awaiting a further rise in share prices and, at the same time, were prepared to sell off their shares at the least sign of trouble.

The fire that burned up over \$500 billion of fictitious capital was sparked off by the Commerce Department's announcement that in August 1987 the USA's trade deficit was \$15.7 billion, a far from comforting

figure only slightly below the absolute record of \$16.5 billion, registered in July.

The stock market turmoil in the autumn of 1987 was not a purely market phenomenon, as some Western experts maintain. Its roots are much deeper. It showed very well that the new forms of state-monopoly regulation of the economy tried out by the Republican administration are an obvious failure. The laws of capitalist production and circulation remain unchanged, whatever the attempts to modify them. Life has also proved yet again that the arms race, initiated by the US military-industrial complex, harms the interests not only of individual nations, but also the world economy as a whole.

¹ *The New York Times*, Oct. 20, 1987.

² *The New York Times*, Oct. 20, 1987.

³ See *The Japan Times*, Oct. 21, 1987.

⁴ *The Times*, Nov. 6, 1987.

⁵ *The Times*, Nov. 5, 1987.

⁶ *The Washington Post*, Nov., 7, 1987.

⁷ *Le Monde diplomatique*, October, 1987, p. 20.

⁸ *The New York Times*, Oct., 22, 1987.

⁹ See *The New York Times*, Oct., 22, 1987.

BENEFITS OF CONVERTING ARMS PRODUCTION

(Continued from page 40)

tional climate and releasing resources for humanity's steady social and economic progress.

¹ *Ispasda*, Sept. 17, 1987.

² See Caspar Weinberger, *Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1984*, Washington, 1983, p. 67.

³ *Ispasda*, Aug. 26, 1987.

⁴ *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, March 23, 1987, pp. 50-51.

⁵ *Technology Review*, January 1986, p. 69.

⁶ S. Melman, *An Economic Alternative to the Arms Race: Conversion from Military to Civilian Economy*, Washington, 1986, p. 3.

⁷ *Economic Report of the President*, Washington, February 1986, p. 288.

⁸ S. Melman, *op. cit.*, pp. 22, 23, 24.

⁹ See *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, February 1985, pp. 24, 25.

CHRISTIANITY TODAY AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE WAR DANGER

Vladimir GLAGOLEV

It has always been a major foreign policy objective of socialism to democratise and humanise international relations and, hence, to close the gap between political activity and universal moral and ethical standards. This goal, set in the early foreign policy documents of the Soviet state, has a much greater chance than 70 years ago of becoming a normal form of communication and cooperation between all members of the world community. There is definitely no other reasonable option, for the policy of diktat and force is ultimately a policy of courting universal disaster.

The new political thinking offered the world by socialism provides the most fitting solution to the eternal problem of aim and means. It implies that international relations should be democratised by precisely democratic methods, including promotion of the kind of diplomacy that has of late come to be called people's diplomacy. It envisages participation of the population of all continents in the global anti-war movement and the formation of a mighty coalition of peace forces. To ensure the unity and efficiency of this coalition it is necessary, of course, to take strict account of all its components and factors, some of which are far from simple. Religion is one of those factors.

A wise foreign policy demands that all present-day world realities be borne in mind, including the fact that believers constitute the majority of the five billion people inhabiting the planet today. Among them are Buddhists and Hindus, animists and Muslims, Christians and Judaists, and also people professing numerous other religions. While relevant statistics are approximative, there can be no doubt whatsoever about the leverage of religious people in the social and cultural spheres of civilisation. Political realities in many countries daily furnish evidence of the growing commitment of large groups whose thinking and actions are prompted by religious slogans and programmes directed at rebuilding life on religious-ethical principles. Alternative movements with a neo-orientalist trend, "Islamic revolutions", outbreaks of religious-ethnic discord are only some of the more striking indications of the nature of social and political processes taking religious forms.

Marxists are well aware of the fantastic, utopian content of programmes aimed at attaining the ideal of the "likeness of god" in heaven and on earth. However, the mass character of the movements concerned and, above all, the evolution of the social behaviour of the participants under the impact of revolutionary democratic transformations in various countries, scientific and technological progress, and the increasing interdependence of nations and the world as a whole in the economic, military, political, ecological, medical and cultural spheres and also in the matter of

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food supply—all this compels leaders and ideologists of religious organisations to take a stand on a whole range of present-day world problems.

To be sure, the need to update religious consciousness gives rise to controversy and, as a rule, to struggles in various churches between adherents of religious fundamentalism and advocates of modernism. Fundamentalism insists on preserving (and reproducing) the traditional forms of social life and, hence, the established stereotypes of religious consciousness; on the other hand modernism, which follows the principle of "facing reality", offers ways of mastering new social trends ideologically and organisationally from the standpoint of a modified system of religious concepts and values.

There is, however, a social reality—the threat of a nuclear catastrophe that could wipe out humanity—on which the approaches of religious fundamentalism and modernism are close, even though they do not coincide. None but ideologists of extreme religious isolationism, such as Jehovah's Witnesses, would bless that catastrophe. This explains why arguments to the effect that a nuclear conflict is "immaterial" to believers occur rarely in religious literature in comparison with what is said about "the end of time" on Doomsday. Besides, sober-minded religious leaders are quite aware of the great perils of dogmatic, selfish or propagandistic references to biblical prophecies in international politics. Metropolitan Paulos Mar Gregorios of India, speaking to the Fifth Round Table Conference of Theologians and Experts on Universal Security and Moral and Ethical Values, pointed out with some concern that US President Ronald Reagan "believed and may still believe that the final apocalyptic war (Armageddon) in Israel must break out in order to destroy the USSR and its allies and lead to the end of the world".¹

For the majority of religious trends aspiring to play an active role in public affairs and put at least some provisions of their programmes into practice as well as to enlarge their membership and win greater influence in society, preservation of peace is the paramount objective condition for their continued activity. This imperative is the main prerequisite for joint efforts by Christians and atheists, including Communists, in the struggle for universal security and prevention of nuclear disaster. So, given a knowledge of and respect for the religious motivation of policy, it is possible to reach mutual understanding in talks with party leaders and statesmen professing Christianity (every region has such leaders), cooperate with mass organisations fighting for peace under religious slogans and carry on a constructive dialogue with foreign intellectuals, who often defend universal values from positions of a humanist interpretation of individual Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox or other dogmas and enjoy moral prestige among socially committed population groups in their countries.

For Marxists the criterion of cooperation with diverse social forces, including those operating under religious slogans and programmes, is the degree of their joint readiness to place all achievements of humanist culture at the service of a common goal guaranteeing the survival of mankind in the nuclear age. "Policy," said Mikhail Gorbachev, stating the Soviet position on the problem, "should draw on all that constitutes the intellectual wealth of every nation and civilisation as a whole. A policy not fructified by reflections on human destinies is a bad, immoral policy, nor does it merit respect."²

Renouncing any pretension to "infallibility" or monopoly of the truth, and adopting a thoughtful attitude to the arguments and ultimate goals of every one of the partners involved in common action are a necessary condition for the consolidation of peace forces in the interest of solving the chief problem of today.

Christianity wields notable ideological, political and organisational influence primarily in Western Europe, the United States and Canada. The Christian sphere of influence—a sphere that has shaped up in the course of history and is conditioned both socially and culturally—includes the socialist countries of Europe, that is, a vast region where religious organisations still exert a considerable influence on the thinking and everyday lives of certain population groups. In other words, Christians are present in both social systems. It is, therefore, natural to ask: In what forms are their organisations unfolding the struggle to save civilisation from nuclear disaster? What is the impact of this struggle on international affairs? How does the distinctive character of religious—and, philosophically speaking, idealist—outlook manifest itself in it? Lastly, what are the opportunities (or, on the contrary, the limits) of Christian-Communist cooperation in defending peace?

These questions can hardly be answered correctly without regard to the far from explicit attitudes of certain religious organisations—in particular the Roman Catholic Church—to the problems of war and peace and of their own peace-making activities. This stands out especially where positions of principle declared from the outset are projected into the area of concrete actions.

The peace-making programme set out by Pope John XXIII in his encyclical, *Pacem in terris* (Peace on Earth) in 1963 had a widespread international impact. It was addressed to all people of goodwill, believers and non-believers alike, whom it urged to bring about concord in actions for the attainment of economic, social and political aims beneficial and useful to the common ideal. The Pope recognised the usefulness of close ties or meetings with historical movements compatible with the norms of common sense and expressing the legitimate aspirations of individual personality.³ The encyclical took into consideration the likelihood of these movements having historical roots of their own and a philosophy alien to religion. Similarly, the pastoral constitution of the Second Vatican Council, *Gaudium et spes* (Joy and Hope) stated that the church “sincerely professes that all men, both believers and non-believers, should contribute to the proper construction of the world in which they all live together. There is no doubt that this cannot be without sincere and sensible dialogue.”⁴ At the same time, as expected, the constitution repeated that the church was incompatible with atheism and rejected it.

Pope Paul VI, the successor of John XXIII, stressed throughout the decade and a half of his pontificate the indivisibility of peace and life as the highest interconnected values of society. The approach of the current Catholic Church Pontiff, Pope John Paul II, to international problems gives priority to their moral and ethical aspects and is characterised by the view that the capitalist and socialist countries are responsible in equal measure for all the negative trends in world development. Proceeding from the same premise, the Pope calls for the unity of mankind, as an atonement for the collective sin against “the ideal of brotherly love”, emphasising that all men “are sons and daughters of one God, brothers and sisters in one humanity”.

Similar words were spoken at the Vatican when, in June 1987, Pope John Paul II received President Reagan. Stating that “the Holy See has no political ambitions”, the Pope called on the governments of all countries to provide “a solid foundation for international cooperation which reaches beyond political, racial, geographical and ideological boundaries and forges new bonds of trust and mutual service. Even those who have

previously been labelled as enemies can be seen in a new perspective, as brothers and sisters in the one human family."⁵

Still, there is no ignoring the fact that this general theological and seemingly fruitful approach, outwardly free of any strictly political bias, often loses in practice its relatively constructive quality when it comes to taking an explicit stand on a specific problem. In such cases the doctrine of the Vatican's equidistance from the socialist and capitalist worlds assumes an illusory character. This policy of the Holy See was vividly illustrated by the visit of John Paul II to Poland in June 1987, when many Western media extensively covered the ceremony of beatifying Karolina Kozka, a Polish girl killed by tsarist army thugs during World War I, his meeting with Lech Walesa, his visit to the grave of Rev. Jerzy Popieluszko and other ceremonies, which necessarily stirred up nationalist and anti-socialist sentiment among the Polish population.

Further propositions at variance with declared impartiality are those of the 1986 encyclical, *Dominum et vivificantem* (On the Holy Spirit in the Life of the Church and the World). An image of socialism as an "offensive of flesh" and hence a "sign of death" is intended (even though the term "socialism" is not used in the encyclical) to put the blame for all adverse social phenomena in any given country and in international relations generally on the socialist countries, thereby stressing, by the principle of contrast, the Christian content of the Western nations' policy. This induced Patriarch Pimen, Metropolitan of Moscow and All Russia to voice in an interview his deep regret at that position and to note its departure from the principles of *Pacem in terris*.⁶

The authoritarian character of the Vatican's participation in the life of the international Catholic community also accounts for its reserve towards peace-making initiatives "from the grass roots". As for actions "from the top", especially actions carried out on the initiative and with the participation of the Pope himself, they get wide coverage in the Catholic mass media and Western propaganda media as a whole.

One of the events given a great deal of publicity was Day of Prayer for Peace in Assisi, Italy, on October 27, 1986. It was organised on the Pope's initiative as a symbol of consensus among leaders of the world's main religious organisations on joint peace efforts. The Day gathered high-ranking religious leaders but there was no discussion on current problems of peace-making activity; no joint document was issued, nor did the participants send any appeal to heads of state or believers generally on foreign policy problems. An action that had a strong propaganda impact was the papal mass and prayer for peace at the Cathedral of Rome on June 6, 1987. The service was broadcast over 18 communication satellites to five continents and simultaneously translated into five languages. Commentators set the audience at over one billion.⁷

Large sections of the Catholic community and national Catholic organisations generally prefer more concrete and effective peace-making actions. In 1983, a pastoral message from American bishops contained a number of propositions in favour of a policy of lowering the level of military confrontation and bringing about a US-Soviet agreement on nuclear missile problems. The purpose of the message was to support concrete actions by believers resisting the war danger. Many of these actions are widely known. In the United States, for one, a Catholic relief fund was set up for workers refusing, on religious and moral grounds, to work at plants manufacturing nuclear weapons. In the FRG, pacifist endeavours by Catholic and Protestant churches resulted in 44,093 people refusing in nine months of 1986 to serve in the armed forces. The year 1985 saw 53,907 such refusals. These are all signs of resolute action by rank-and-file Catholics and their immediate leaders; they are a factor of pressure on the Vatican from the grass roots to influence the shaping

of its foreign policy. This factor is bound to gain in importance as further groups of believers in capitalist countries, who are passive at the moment, join in the fight for peace.

Protestantism, unlike Catholicism, has no church hierarchy and lacks authoritarian propaganda mechanisms. This is why the orientation of Protestant churches in world affairs responds more readily to anti-militarist public sentiment than the orientation of the Vatican, with the result that many international actions and initiatives of the Protestants show a marked political trend.

Records of the research department of the Lutheran World Federation concerning Christian peace ethics deal not only with "biblical and theological principles" of activity for peace but also such problems as "the psychological and sociological outlook for (international) conflict", "the concept of peace in the political philosophy and ethics of the Soviet state", "arms buildup and control", the impact of symmetry and asymmetry factors in the military potentials of the two opposed systems on defence policy and mass peace initiatives, the peculiarities of the military political situation in Northern Europe, and so on.

A contribution to the peace movement of the religious public is also made by the World Council of Churches, on which Protestant organisations predominate. Characteristically, the WCC Central Committee meeting of January 1987 stressed the importance of the Reykjavik summit for nuclear disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons. Subsequently, the WCC came out in favour of a substantial reduction in strategic armaments and the elimination of medium-range missiles, against the development of space weapons and for consolidation of the ABM Treaty.

This position of the WCC concretises guidelines formulated by the Sixth WCC Assembly (Vancouver, Canada, 1983). The guidelines include recommendations to implement and support educational peace programmes on fair conditions as part of the UN world campaign for disarmament and to direct at all those engaged in military production and applied military research the following appeal: set up and support research centres evolving positive alternatives to militarism and military defence; continue firmly supporting and furthering programmes aimed at strengthening peace and studying conflicts; make statistical and factual data concerning expenditures on militarisation and on development widely accessible; establish links with movements opposing militarism and its social, cultural and environmental effects; support actions for a just world economic order as the basis for universal security.⁸

This position of the WCC largely coincides with or is very close to the guidelines of the secular anti-war movement and the programmes of many progressive, democratic forces. Thus it is a political fact that joint action has a common denominator.

It is also important to note that the above recommendations of the WCC reveal the absurdity of the allegation that the peace-making activity of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and other Christian organisations of the Soviet Union is a mere replica of the foreign policy initiatives of the Soviet state and lacks independence. The coincidence of the peace-making initiatives of the ROC with the main decisions of the WCC leadership refutes the assertion one hears occasionally that the Foreign Relations Department of the Moscow Patriarchy is a "subsidiary of the Soviet Foreign Office". Besides, it is ridiculous to imagine that one church (even granting that it is a major church) "imposes" its will on more than 300 affiliates of the WCC.

Such a loose interpretation of the facts cannot minimise the significance of what religious organisations of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have been doing for peace. One reason why their work is effective is that there exists no social base in these countries for war preparations or a militarist policy. Thus, the stand of this group of churches is rid of the contradictions, inconsistency and ambiguity typical of the political position of religious organisations of capitalist countries on the issue of combating militarism. Second, the tragic experience of the Soviet people, who went through the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 and, fairly recently, the Chernobyl accident, makes foreign religious leaders perceive the peace initiatives of representatives of our believers as formulas drawing on the lessons of history. To ignore these lessons would mean advancing towards catastrophe, which can result from the senseless arms race. Third, it is also important that in recent decades all religious organisations carrying weight among believers have shed fanaticism, intolerance of heterodoxy and aloofness. "All-embracing global compassion for the whole of mankind," ideologists of Orthodoxy stress, "should become an inseparable part of the teachings of all religions."⁹

This means emphasising the need to foster—in religious form, needless to say—a humane attitude to members of different races and nationalities holding different philosophical, religious and political views and differing in social status. Inasmuch as this attitude is promoted in the context of the task of staving off nuclear catastrophe, it constitutes an ideological platform for uniting all the anti-militarist forces still holding religious views. Atheists may argue—very correctly—that compassion is not enough for a "revolutionary transformation of the world". This is true, just as it is true that to transform the world without compassion would mean manipulating people like interchangeable parts of a lifeless machine. And this is impermissible according to both the spirit and the letter of the scientific materialist theory of society's development and the humanist message of Marxist-Leninist philosophy. From this point of view the appeal of the Russian Orthodox Church for activity based on "compassion for mankind" is akin, in effect, to the long overdue problem of "ending the dissociation of politics from universal moral standards", whose solution is objectively necessary as a means of averting nuclear disaster and humanising the whole spectrum of international relations.¹⁰

The 1000th anniversary of the adoption of Christianity in Russia, to be marked in 1988, and the Council of the Russian Orthodox Church to be convened on the occasion will enable all the religious organisations of our country to intensify and concretise their cooperation with all peace forces in the struggle for military and political detente, for greater economic security in the interest of all nations. The upcoming anniversary events will offer an opportunity to consolidate the system of joint action by Christians and atheists in providing favourable conditions for political understanding between East and West, North and South and for the solution of problems in which the whole of humanity has a stake.

The involvement of Christian organisations in a broad international movement against militarism and the threat of nuclear disaster required, understandably, a certain modification of the established system of confessional views. How should the significance of this change for the solution of pressing problems be assessed from the Marxist point of view?

The adoption and implementation of foreign policy decisions in class society are, admittedly, based on the economic and social interests of the

ruling classes and, in definite conditions, even on the narrow group interests and calculations of the ruling top. "...A conception—which regards religion as the decisive lever in world history—must finally end in sheer mysticism,"¹¹ Engels pointed out. However, with religion holding a dominant position in social consciousness and with the church playing a dominant role in socio-political life, foreign policy calculations were given a religious-mythical form and, consequently, a semblance of supernatural, divine origin and content. The religious form was actively used to unite ethnic groups and nationalities, and in some cases also to achieve a measure of interethnic and interstate consolidation of adherents of one and the same religion. In the process, the religious form did not, as we know from history, predetermine the content and aims of, or even the participants in, foreign policy combinations and military coalitions. Similarly, Charles de Gaulle and John Kennedy (Catholics both), Harry Truman (a Baptist), and James Carter (an Evangelist), like other political leaders of bourgeois states, were guided in their decision-making and activity by information, calculations and objectives of an entirely worldly nature.

The Marxist approach to politics—an approach demanding that Marxists should search the words of politicians for the concrete interests of social groups and for their interrelations and contradictions—has helped considerably over the past 150 years in devaluating the religious political rhetoric of bourgeois leaders in the eyes of large sections of the population of capitalist countries. This devaluation had its effect on those subjectively fair-minded clergymen and committed believers who saw, day after day, discrepancies between words and deeds in the daily manifestations of the foreign policy of bourgeois parties and governments. While sticking to their Christian religion, these people considered the discrepancy disastrous primarily to the destiny of their religion, justly seeing it as a permanent factor for discrediting Christian religion in the eyes of millions of believers. This gave rise to a programme for restoring the ideological and organisational influence of Christianity by applying in practice evangelical commandments of peace and brotherhood and renunciation of violence in conflict situations, the advocacy of the absolute value of human life and, consequently, the unacceptability of the policy of militarist preparations, war and plunder.

However, it is fair to ask: Are there in the Christian ideology fundamental tenets enabling the church to face present-day foreign policy problems?

Yes, consistent Christians do have such prerequisites within the framework of their own world outlook for a realistic approach to humanity's urgent needs. Moreover, these prerequisites are gaining importance. They include, first, worship of the spirit and, accordingly, respect for human life as a manifestation of this principle, as a "sacred gift". It is true that Christianity has stopped at the level of worshipping "abstract man", a worship which admits, now as in the past, justifying virtually opposed modes of behaviour—from passive resistance or selfless struggle against the war menace to a description of preparations for and recourse to aggression as "providence". Nevertheless, the idea of the universal significance of humanist values is expressed clearly in the Christian ideology, though in a religious, fantastic form. Prompted by this idea, Christian participants in the movement for the perpetuation of peaceful coexistence proceed in accordance with their religious conscience and are inspired by its incentives. This lends their peace-making activity emotional quality and moral firmness.

Second, the Christian ideology took shape on the basis of the universalist pretensions of the early generations of Christians. The "global", "planetary" approach to problems of human life and humanity is based

on the experience of ancient philosophy, and interprets the religious and ideological categories concerned in a distinctive manner. Hence the typically Christian principle of seeing the world in its entirety and unity, attaching universal significance to events that at first sight seem particular or secondary. Of course, Christianity has always interpreted the nature of this integral world in the light of mythological images and ideas. Nevertheless, fair-minded Christians consider it their duty to respond to the sorrow and suffering of all and sundry. Thus, they help overcome local and regional limitations in the approach to international political developments and treat economic, political, military, food, environmental and medical problems as a "package".

Third, the two-thousand-year history of Christianity has recorded many instances of selfless service to humanity by people professing this religion. (To be sure, there have also been many more examples of an entirely different kind but what we mean in this case is one of many socially conditioned trends.) The lives of A. Schweitzer and D. Bonhoeffer, Mother Maria (Ye. Kuzmina-Karavayeva) and Nobel Peace Prize winner Mother Theresa are evidence of the unity of thought and deeds, convictions and behaviour. Every fair-minded person who refuses to share the religious motivation of these peoples' heroism in times of war and peace respects and is grateful to them for their fortitude, loyalty to humanism and concrete good deeds. Under the influence of such behaviour, the idea that every person should participate in the historical process and is responsible for it (for the concrete situations it produces) is making its way into Christian theology. This idea, which implies that everybody is responsible for the destiny of the world and humanity, is equal to encouraging Christians as well to try harder to promote positive international trends.

At the same time, it should certainly be remembered that the pacifist ideas and policy predominating in Western Christian churches coexist with the militarist tendencies of individual church dignitaries and sizable groups of believers. Another reality to be borne in mind is that the emphasis which religious ideologists put on the moral aspects of the problem of war and peace is aimed both at uniting large population groups in the struggle against the threat of nuclear holocaust and raising the prestige of the churches themselves. The definition of peace as humanity's greatest blessing is accompanied in the process by the traditional religious idea of a likely dependence of mankind's fortunes on divine volition and preordainment. The theological doctrine of the inseparability of peace and faith in God supports the illusion that it is the believers' efforts that are particularly fruitful in the struggle against the war menace. Lastly, declaring that the road to peace lies mainly in prayer and moral, self-improvement makes difficult the formation of believers' social consciousness in resisting the imperialist policy of aggression. All this indicates that the religious conception of international affairs is not explicit and is inherently contradictory.

Thus, there is an imperative need for a judicious and dialectical approach to the task of analysing the contradictory and yet interconnected trends of social development. The problem of the rational and irrational certainly exists in today's world as well; it occasionally comes out in the most unexpected relationships, "with the very content of the two concepts being influenced very strongly by the peculiarities of the historical experience of peoples differing greatly in culture, tradition and much else. Reducing all this to a common denominator rational for all concerned is necessary, even if very difficult."¹² What we mean is also cooperation between religious groups and peace forces, with a common denominator in a form of fruitful effort by all participants in the struggle against war on an equal footing.

We are often asked: Doesn't the Soviet Union's readiness to cooperate in saving civilisation with all peace forces, including religious groups, mean renouncing the principle of partisanship in foreign policy? Isn't this position tantamount to discarding the criterion of class approach to the analysis of international problems? Shouldn't we sacrifice our ideological guidelines "in the spirit of perestroika and democratisation" in the interest of dialogue and constructive cooperation with church forces whose theological outlook prompts them to declare that the class and partisan approach is now "outweighed" by universal values as supernatural and hence supraparty, supraclass and even supraworld values?

To answer these questions in the affirmative or even to ask them is to pay tribute to a purely metaphysical approach to a problem requiring—more than any other problem—realistic analysis and dialectical assessment. Cooperation between consistent Marxists and various Christian forces, as we see it today, is an expression of objective development trends of civilisation. In carrying it out, Communists abide by their partisan approach, putting the fundamental interests of humanity's survival above class or group consideration. This approach is based on Lenin's view that "from the standpoint of the basic ideas of Marxism, the interests of social development are higher than the interests of the proletariat".¹³ Marxists select arguments in support of their approach as they reveal the objective logic of global trends of world development, dismissing religious and theological considerations about "providence" and "the devil's crafty designs".

The growth of the forces which help in bringing about favourable changes in international relations and averting a tragic change for the worse in the destiny of humanity adds to the prestige of the communist movement, which denies the fatal inevitability of nuclear catastrophe and is searching for effective ways of preventing it. Without forgoing the dialectical materialist content of their world outlook, Communists are extending, through cooperation with believers, the platform of the struggle to preserve civilisation as the prime condition for substantive and fruitful ideological discussion, and also for the multiplication and transfer of the values created by humanity from generation to generation.

¹ Журнал Московской патриархии, No. 6, 1987.

² Коммунист, No. 16, 1986, p. 11.

³ See *Pacem in terris. Encyclical Letter of John XXIII on Establishment Universal Peace in Truth, Justice, Charity and Liberty*, Vatican, Poliglott Press, 1963, p. 29.

⁴ See *L'Eglise dans le monde de ces temps Concile oecumenique*, Vatican, Documents conciliaires, Vol. 3, Paris, 1966, p. 244.

⁵ L'Osservatore romano, June 7, 1987, p. 5.

⁶ See Журнал Московской патриархии, No. 10, 1986.

⁷ See L'Osservatore romano, June 8-9, 1987, p. 7.

⁸ See *Gathered for Life. Official Report, VI Assembly World Council of Churches*, Vancouver, Canada, 24 July-10 August 1983, p. 77.

⁹ Журнал Московской патриархии, No. 6, 1987.

¹⁰ Правда, Feb. 17, 1987.

¹¹ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1973, p. 196.

¹² Правда, Feb. 17, 1987.

¹³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1960, p. 236.

Egypt's Foreign Policy in the 1980s

Vladimir YEFIMOV

When Hosni Mubarak became Egypt's new President on October 14, 1981, after the assassination of Anwar Sadat, he inherited difficult domestic and foreign-policy problems from his predecessor. By the turn of the 1980s Egypt had already entered a critical phase of its development as a consequence of Sadat's stake on close cooperation with the West, primarily the USA, and his separate peace deal with Israel. Egypt's relations with the socialist states had practically wound up, the country found itself isolated by the Arab world, its influence in the non-aligned movement had dwindled, and it was collaborating with the USA in its neoglobalist plans in the Middle East and Africa.

Evidently, President Mubarak saw that continuation of this course is not only fraught with even worse external consequences but could also cause serious destabilisation at home. In foreign policy the new president set out to lessen the country's one-sided pro-Western orientation and break out of isolation in the Arab world. But to do that quite a number of domestic problems had to be solved. In the first place, the persons who insisted on maintaining the Sadat political course had to be removed from the upper echelon of power and popular support should be secured for the new policy.

During the parliamentary elections in 1984 and 1987 many former notable figures of the previous regime were removed from the election lists of the ruling National Democratic Party. The ministers known to have maintained close personal ties with Sadat were gradually removed from the Cabinet. By the end of 1987, after seven cabinet reshuffles, the ministerial posts were taken up by nationalist-minded leaders who displayed a balanced and pragmatic attitude to the main internal and external problems.

President Mubarak effected a series of measures to democratise political life in the country to some extent.

On the whole, all these measures helped improve the political climate in the country.

In foreign policy orientation the changes were slower due to a number of objective and subjective difficulties.

Because of considerable financial and economic dependence on the West, Egypt's relations with the USA and Western Europe had a major influence of the general direction of its foreign policy. Having proclaimed a course of evening out the imbalances in foreign relations, President Mubarak began to tackle the most negative phenomena in Egyptian-American cooperation. But the US administration still regarded Egypt as its partner in the region and was trying to involve the country even deeper in carrying out its strategic plans in that region. Egyptians realised that the gratuitous military and economic aid did have some selfish strings attached. Ibrahim Nafia, editor-in-chief of the national newspaper *Al-Ahram*, wrote in his article "Egypt and the United States": "It is perfectly clear that the United States, as it gives us aid, pursues two main goals: first, to prevent Egypt's involvement in the strategy of the Soviet Union against the USA and its interests in the Middle East; and second,

to prevent a new war between Egypt and Israel whose security the United States committed to ensure."¹

Aware that it is quite difficult to get rid of the burden of financial and economic relations, with which the nation has been tied up by the Americans, the new Egyptian leadership has tried to diminish the military-political aspect of relations with the United States—a move supported by the country's patriotic forces.

The first disagreement between Cairo and Washington was felt already in the summer of 1982, when Egypt, availing itself of the situation around Lebanon, avoided taking part in the joint military exercises. During Mubarak's two visits to the United States in 1983 the Egyptian-American differences came to the surface. The Egyptian side showed dissatisfaction with the US administration's attitude to Egypt's request for more economic aid and with the entering into "strategic alliance" between the USA and Israel, while the American side was displeased with Cairo's refusal to place the Ras Benas military base at Washington's disposal and to grant America more military privileges on Egyptian territory. Later, differences were also revealed in the approach to the Middle East settlement. From 1982 to 1984 Egyptians, on the whole, supported the so-called Reagan initiative of 1982, whereas beginning with 1986, after the Hussein-Arafat agreement failed, the Egyptian leadership tended to increasingly favour the idea of an international conference on the Middle East.

The first deep rift in Egyptian-American relations appeared in October 1985, when the US Air Force intercepted an Egyptian passenger liner with the hijackers of the Italian cruising boat *Achille Lauro* on board. President Mubarak and the Egypt's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued statement qualifying the act as unfriendly on the part of Washington. The diplomatic crisis, which lasted over a month, was being kindled by mass anti-American demonstrations in Egypt.

Dissatisfaction with US policy was also observed during the events around Libya in the spring of 1986. In response to the US bombing of that neighbouring country, the Egyptian government issued a statement expressing concern over Washington's actions. Egypt also declared its readiness to render humanitarian aid to Libya. However, there was a degree of inconsistency in that move—pressed by the right-wingers within the country and by the United States, Cairo began to manoeuvre, maintaining that solidarity with the Libyan people did not mean support for the Gaddafi regime.

A significant point to note here is that in 1986 Mubarak, who had made five trips to Washington between 1981 and 1985, refrained from visiting the United States, for the first time since he assumed office. In 1987 he again refused to go to the USA under the pretext that Egyptians were displeased with the Irangate scandal. All this time anti-American sentiments were growing in the country. It was even accompanied by terrorist acts: in May and September 1987 two attempts on the life of US diplomats were made in Cairo. Besides, some articles in the official Egyptian press openly discussed differences in the interests of Cairo and Washington. Ismail Nafia wrote, for instance: "There are differences between some basic interests of Egypt and the USA. No doubt, it would be in the best interest of Washington to have American military bases in Egypt to be used in its strategy against the Soviet Union, while it would be in the interest of Egypt not to be part of the US globalist strategy against any country and to have no American or other foreign bases on its territory.... There also exist political differences in the approach to Arab rights, to the incessant Israeli aggressive sallies against Arab lands, and the constant use of the right of veto by America to prevent a condemnation of Israel."²

The 1980s have witnessed a notable evolution of Soviet-Egyptian relations and a growth of ties between Egypt and the socialist countries. The tide of anti-Soviet publications in the Egyptian press, which had been launched by Sadat, somewhat subsided as of late 1981.

In 1982 Egypt asked the Soviet Union to return its experts to Egypt to complete the unfinished projects of economic cooperation. But in the political sphere Soviet-Egyptian relations remained passive right until 1984. At the same time, Cairo came out increasingly for evening out disproportions in relations between the USA and the USSR in general, while retaining "special" ties with Washington. In an interview with the American TV company CBS Hosni Mubarak declared: "We have special relations with the United States, but this would not affect our relations with the Soviet Union."³

To justify such a "balance", Egyptian leaders referred to the example of India, which allegedly has "special" relations with the USSR and normal relations with the USA, and this does not contradict the principles of non-alliance. In an interview with the newspaper *As-Shark al-Awsat*, Hosni Mubarak declared: "We should have balanced relations with all, including the Soviet Union, which is a superpower and we cannot ignore this. We are a member of the non-aligned movement, just like India, which has special economic and industrial relations with the Soviet Union while maintaining relations with the USA."⁴ But he obviously avoided mentioning that the Soviet Union does not enjoy military privileges on Indian territory, does not have a military contingent stationed there, and it does not conduct joint military exercises with India, that is, all that is present in Egyptian-American relations.

At any rate, the statements that a balanced policy should be pursued reflected a positive evolution of the views on foreign policy in the new Egyptian leadership. This line was later formalised in the document The Egyptian Point of View on International Issues, which states: "Egypt's foreign policy is distinguished by balanced relations between the USA and the USSR. Egypt has strong relations with the USA, but normal relations has resumed with the USSR."⁵

Acting in accordance with this policy, the Egyptian leadership began in 1984 to normalise its relations with the Soviet Union. That step was welcomed by the broadest sections of the Egyptian population. In July 1984, it was decided to exchange ambassadors between the two countries. During the 39th Session of the UN General Assembly in September 1984 the foreign ministers of the two countries held a meeting (after an interval of many years) which marked the start of regular political consultations at the level of foreign ministries.

Soviet-Egyptian interparliamentary ties were resumed in 1985, and at the end of following year the Egyptian authorities decided to renew the activities of the Egyptian-Soviet friendship society. A protocol on settling problems associated with Egypt's earlier accumulated debt to the Soviet Union was signed in March 1987 in Moscow. In May 1987, the Egyptian authorities announced the opening of Soviet consulate offices in Egypt, and on September 23, Eduard Shevardnadze and Esmat Maghid held a meeting during the 42nd Session of the UN General Assembly at which they confirmed the intention of both sides further to promote bilateral relations.

So, by the end of 1987 Soviet-Egyptian relations were normalised and both countries came to a point when it became possible to develop all-round (including political) cooperation.

Hosni Mubarak sees the restoration of Egypt's position in the Arab world as a major task of his foreign policy. This meets his interest in attracting financial resources of Arab countries for Egypt's economic development and reflects the upswing of national sentiments among most Egyptians who had been embittered by their country's isolation from the Arab states.

Immediately after being elected president, Hosni Mubarak instructed the Egyptian mass media to end the noisy propaganda campaign which had been launched by Sadat against Arab countries. Early in 1983 he disbanded the League of Arab and Muslim Peoples, which had been set up by his predecessor to counterbalance the League of Arab States. At the same time, the Egyptian leadership stressed in no uncertain terms that Egypt's return to the Arab ranks could not be made conditional on renunciation of the Camp David commitments. The contradictory nature of this approach was reflected in *The Egyptian Point of View on International Issues*, in which it is stated, on the one hand, that the "thinking of the Egyptian leadership expresses the truth that we are Arabs, for Egypt is in the final analysis an Arab state with the common dreams and hopes with the Arab nation and Egypt's restoration to the Arab world is inevitable".⁶ The document also stressed that "Egypt's Arabism is not cloth to wear or discard at will".⁷ On the other hand, it states that "Egypt cannot go back on the Camp David agreements", that "Egypt is ready to re-establish its relations with the Arab world, but not at the expense of its relations with Israel". Therefore, the Egyptian leadership pursues the line of "silent" reintegration in the Arab world by searching for an acceptable basis which would enable Cairo not to renounce its Camp David agreements. In the above-mentioned document, issued by the Egyptian Ministry of Information, these tactics are interpreted in the following way: "Egypt is applying a policy of 'wait and see' to allow the Arab brothers to reassess their policies."⁸

These tactics have already yielded some good results. In September 1984 diplomatic relations were restored with Jordan, and in 1986 with Djibouti. At the conference of the authoritative Organisation of the Islamic Conference held in Casablanca in 1984 Egypt restored its membership. President Mubarak is engaged in both official and non-official contacts with the leaders of virtually all Arab countries. Thus, while there are no official relations between Egypt and Iraq, Hosni Mubarak visited Baghdad in 1983 and 1985. Of late, there has been rapprochement between Egypt and the oil-producing countries in the Persian Gulf region. On the celebrations of the 15th anniversary of Sultan Qaboos' rule in Oman the Egyptian President met with the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Qatar. In January 1986 Hosni Mubarak visited Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Oman. During his stay in Kuwait he was very active at the Fifth Conference of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference and made contacts with Arab leaders there. Egypt has shown the great interest in restoring financial and economic cooperation with the members of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (CCASG). In October 1986, a special seminar held in Cairo was attended by 40 major Saudi businessmen, who were received by President Hosni Mubarak. It is noteworthy that, despite the official boycott against Egypt, the volume of investments made by the CCASG members in that country in 1987 exceeded 1.2 billion Egyptian pounds (Kuwait accounts for 714 million, Saudi Arabia—264 million, and the United Arab Emirates—101.6 million pounds)⁹. Late in 1986 Egypt and the CCASG members resumed contacts on cooperation in military production. In December 1986 Cairo was visited by a Saudi military delegation. But, on the whole, the Arab countries, especially after the Egyptian-Israeli meeting in Alexandria, make the return of Egypt to the

Arab world conditional on a relevant decision to be adopted at an all-Arab summit.

Moreover, Egypt has made the best use of the Iran-Iraq war and of the apprehensions it caused among the Persian Gulf Arab states over a possible spread of hostilities to their territories. The Egyptian leadership made several statements expressing preparedness to come to their aid if the "Iranian threat" became a reality. In these conditions the extraordinary all-Arab summit in Amman passed a decision allowing Arab countries to restore diplomatic relations with Egypt on a bilateral basis. By the end of November, nine Arab countries—Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, the Yemen Arab Republic, Morocco and Mauritania—had taken that step. Nonetheless, the question of restoring Egypt's membership in the League of Arab States remained open, which shows that Arabs are unwilling to shut their eyes to the Camp David separate deal with Israel made in the past by Anwar Sadat.

The new approach of the Egyptian leadership to its foreign-policy orientation was notable in the evolution of Egyptian-Israeli relations. The assumption of power by Hosni Mubarak ushered in a period of the so-called cold peace in these relations. In protest of Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Cairo recalled its Ambassador from Tel Aviv and froze the fulfilment of over 50 agreements on cooperation in trade, economic, scientific and cultural spheres. Exchange of tourists became one-sided: Israel was sending its tourists to Egypt, while no Egyptian tourists went to Israel. Cairo began to accuse Tel Aviv of violating the main provisions of the Camp David accords and censured it for continuing aggressive acts against Arabs and for its unwillingness to solve the Palestinian question. Egyptian-Israeli relations also grew more tense because territorial disputes, (above all that pertaining to the Tabe region on the Sinai Peninsula) had not been settled. The Egyptian leadership reduced official contacts to the minimum and firmly resisted Tel Aviv's attempts to hold a bilateral summit. It advanced several preliminary conditions for resuming "normalisation" of bilateral relations, in particular, for a return of its Ambassador to Tel Aviv: 1) complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon; 2) improvement of the conditions of Palestinians on the West Bank of the Jordan River and in the Gaza Strip, and progress in the settlement of the Palestinian problem; 3) solution of the Tabe question.

The year 1985 saw progress in Egyptian-Israeli talks. In February that year Egypt was visited by Israeli Minister of Energy and Infrastructure Moshe Shahal and in April, by Israeli Minister Ezer Weizmann. In November Egyptian Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Abdel Kandil travelled to Israel and confirmed the obligation of the Egyptian side to continue oil supplies to the former.

In 1985 three rounds of talks on Tabe were held with the participation of US experts, but they led to no tangible progress in settling the issue. Israel's participation in the International Cairo Book Fair in January 1985, and in the International Trade and Industrial Exhibition in March that year was a sign of some departure from the "cold peace".

However, in 1985 the tensions in Egyptian-Israeli relations reached a new peak after two incidents—the assassination of an Israeli diplomat in Cairo and the killing of a group of Israeli tourists on Sinai by Egyptian frontier guard Souliman Khater. The Khater case was used by the opposition to rekindle anti-Israeli sentiments in Egypt. Mass committees were set up in his support, and after his suicide in custody massive student demonstration were held at the universities of Cairo, Zakazik and Mansura under anti-Israeli slogans.

Washington resorted to economic pressure and exerted every effort to make Cairo agree to normalise relations with Tel Aviv. A meeting between the President of Egypt and Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres was held on September 11-12, 1986. The outcome was that Egypt agreed to submit the Tabé question for international arbitration and to return its Ambassador to Tel Aviv in exchange for vague promises by the Israeli Premier concerning an international Middle East conference. Commenting on that event *The Financial Times* wrote that the Egyptian-Israeli summit, which had given no tangible gains to Cairo, was a good example of how poverty forced a country to take a path causing little enthusiasm. US pressure, which was crude at times, the paper wrote, resulted in a meeting between the two leaders who had little to say to each other.¹⁰

In the framework of further normalisation, the Foreign Minister of Israel travelled to Cairo in February 1987, and his Egyptian counterpart paid a return visit to Tel Aviv in July 1987.

Under President Mubarak the Middle East policy of Egypt has undergone a definite change. The new Egyptian leadership realised that Egypt's reintegration in the Arab world could not be rapid enough unless definite corrections were made in the Camp David course. Meanwhile, Hosni Mubarak had to consider the possibility of financial and economic pressure against Egypt by the USA, which wants a Middle East settlement in the interest of Israel and on a separate basis. Simultaneously, the President was under constant pressure from the opposition and the Egyptian public opinion, which demanded that he pursue a course meeting the national interests of Egypt and all Arab countries.

This explains why the changes that began to take place in the Middle East policy of Egypt after Mubarak came to power, were cautious and thoroughly camouflaged. The Egyptian leader tried at the initial stage not to annoy Washington. Thus, in 1983 Butros Ghali, Egypt's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, said in an interview with the *Cairo Today* magazine that in his opinion there could be no settlement of the Middle East crisis unless the role of the United States was taken into account and that the clue to the settlement was in the hands of the Americans. This position which had been assumed by President Sadat after his Jerusalem visit in November 1977 was a basic element of Egyptian foreign policy, he declared, and US diplomatic support was necessary for finding a solution, even if temporary, to the Middle East crisis. Egyptian diplomacy, he concluded, would have the special relations existing between Egypt and the USA remain for the sake of peace in the Middle East.¹¹

But Cairo began to avoid, whenever it could, direct references to Camp David. Therefore, in 1982 the Egyptian leadership readily supported the Reagan plan, seeing in it a possibility to modify the Camp David formula. But, faced with a negative response to it among the majority of Arab countries, it referred to the plan only as a "step in the proper direction" requiring further improvement. Besides, Cairo positively responded to the Middle-East settlement plan adopted at the September 1982 summit of Arab states in Fez, Morocco.

The Egyptian leadership came up with the idea that the USA should pressurise Israel into making concessions in its stance and abandoning an ostensibly anti-Arab course. Thus, Osama al-Bazz, chief of the presidential office on political affairs, said in August 1983 in an interview with the newspaper *Al-Ahbar*: "What is required of the USA is that it should use pressure and its authority... to make Israel give up its activities on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip."¹²

But even at that time the Egyptian leadership did not reject the idea of holding an international conference on the Middle East, though it suggested that its convocation was unrealistic because of the course pursued by Israel and the lack of agreement on the Middle East between the USA and the Soviet Union. Already then the possibility of drawing the USSR into the peace process was being considered in Cairo. Osama al-Bazz stated that "the Soviet Union is a superpower which directly or indirectly is present in the Middle East. It has interests in this region".¹⁸

At the same time, Egypt's position on the Palestine issue was changing, taking more account of the national interests of Palestinians. In the first place, the Egyptian side saw an opportunity in the June 1982 Israeli aggression against Lebanon, to discontinue the talks with Tel Aviv on "Palestinian autonomy", which were being conducted within the framework of the Camp David accords. It also began to interpret the term "Palestinian administrative autonomy" as a recognition of the right of Palestinians to "self-determination" within a federal association with Jordan. Then Egyptian diplomacy began to take practical steps in that direction.

In December 1983 Hosni Mubarak and Yasser Arafat met in Cairo during the pull-out of Palestinian armed groups from Western Beirut through the Suez Canal. This marked the beginning of active cooperation of the Egyptian leadership with the "moderate" Palestinian wing. In 1985, an official mission of the PLO was reopened in Cairo after Yasser Arafat's visit to Egypt. The Egyptians began to draw Jordan into its Middle East plans. Following this line, the Egyptian leadership readily backed up the "land in exchange for peace" formula, advanced by King Hussein of Jordan, because, in the final analysis, it did not bind Israel with any definite obligations as regards the formation of an independent Palestinian state.

Cairo stood up for the Hussein-Arafat agreement on joint efforts in Middle-East affairs, and in February 1985 Hosni Mubarak came up with an initiative (which was later called the Mubarak initiative) envisaging practical implementation of the Jordan-Palestine understanding in three phases. In fact, it meant direct Jordanian-Palestinian-Israeli talks under US aegis and with Egypt's participation. The United Nations was supposed to be invited to the peace talks only at the last phase.

In 1986 a new turn became visible in Egypt's Middle-East position. The Egyptian leadership declared its support for the idea of convening an international conference on the Middle East and responded positively to the Soviet proposal on setting up a preparatory committee within the framework of the UN Security Council to organise such a conference.

So, in the 1980s the foreign policy of Egypt underwent a definite positive change in the sense that it proceeded more from the country's national interests. Though the Egyptian leadership at that time failed to move away from the one-sided orientation on the West, nevertheless considerable accents were made in the political relations with the USA, and relations with the socialist countries, primarily the USSR, were normalised. Cairo tried as much as possible to slow down the normalisation of its relations with Israel and took measures to reintegrate Egypt into the Arab world, though adherence to the Camp David accords in general

THE FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY OF THE CPSU AND THE NEW POLITICAL THINKING IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF MILITARY-STRATEGIC PARITY

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Lenin's doctrine of peaceful coexistence, which determines one of the main aspects of Soviet foreign policy, namely, relations with the capitalist world, has been carried forward in step with the formation and development of existing socialism. It has gained in depth and relevance thanks to the increasing activity of socialist foreign policy, the growing role and international prestige of the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries and the creative character of the Soviet theory of foreign policy, of which this doctrine is an inseparable component.

"Naturally, there have been changes in the Lenin's concept of peaceful coexistence," Mikhail Gorbachev emphasised in his report at the jubilee meeting in Moscow on November 2, 1987. "At first it was needed above all to create a modicum of external conditions for the construction of a new society in the country of the socialist revolution. Continuing the class-based policy of the victorious proletariat, peaceful coexistence subsequently became a condition for the survival of the entire human race, especially in the nuclear age."

From the earliest days of the socialist revolution in Russia, Lenin and our party were building the foreign policy of the first socialist state with special consideration of the actual world situation and the exigencies of coexistence and cooperation with all countries. This found its full reflection in the very first foreign policy document of the Soviet state, the Decree on Peace, although the specific term "peaceful coexistence" was not directly mentioned. It was precisely Lenin's thesis about socialism's first country living peacefully with capitalist countries as well as the principle of proletarian solidarity with the working people of those countries that formed the essence of the Decree on Peace. Receiving widespread response among the people of the nations entangled in World War I, the ideas of this historic document and the October Revolution's principled orientation towards a democratic organisation of the world came to underlie Soviet international strategy and continue to determine its content and direction today.

The treaties and various agreements signed in the early 1920s by the Soviet state with a number of countries (Turkey, Afghanistan, Iran, Germany, Austria, Denmark, Italy, Norway, Czechoslovakia and others),

plus peace treaties with Poland and the Baltic states showed how Lenin's idea of peaceful coexistence was gaining ground in practice and how very correctly it reflected the requirements of the new historical period. The succession of recognitions which came in the mid-1920s was indicative of the triumph of our policy of peace and international cooperation and constituted a failure of the anti-Soviet, counter-revolutionary plans of imperialist reaction. All leading capitalist countries, with the exception of the United States, were compelled to establish political and business relations with our country.

The imperialist countries' negative attitude in prewar years to the new system developing in Russia necessarily affected both the formation and extension of business and political contacts between the Soviet Union and other countries and their attitude to the principles of peaceful coexistence. Non-acceptance of this idea was tantamount to non-recognition of the existence of our system itself. This explains why in the early years, or until World War II to be precise, such contacts were limited, the imperialist powers refusing to desist from attempts to restore capitalism in our country. Still, even that stage proved useful from the point of view of "accustoming" the rulers of the West to peaceful coexistence, to the historical inevitability of peaceful coexistence as the main line of development of international relations in the new, post-October period of world history.

Overall, this stage was successful. The rulers of Western countries, while claiming that coexistence was out of the question, were compelled to hold negotiations with the Soviet Union on many important world problems such as disarmament and the signing of a series of treaties and agreements, including treaties of mutual assistance with France and Czechoslovakia. All this laid a certain background for joint resistance to German fascism and for the formation of a powerful military-political alliance during World War II, the anti-Hitler coalition.

It follows that the policy of peaceful coexistence, which became an official foreign-policy doctrine of the Soviet Union, from the first days of its existence and despite desperate resistance from imperialist reaction operated as an important factor for international relations even before the war, reflecting the urgent problems posed by the situation in the world.

The vitality of peaceful coexistence was due to its being a product of world development and to the fact that immediately after the victory of the October Revolution it began to determine the nature and content of relations between the first socialist country and capitalist countries, irrespective of whether or not it was recognised by the West.

After World War II, the sphere of action of the policy of peaceful coexistence expanded considerably. The victory of socialist revolutions in several European and Asian countries and the emergence of a world socialist system lent the policy of peaceful coexistence a global dimension. Its principles provided the basis for the socialist countries' coordinated foreign policy and became a platform for their concerted efforts in the struggle for world peace and international security. Under changed conditions marked by a new alignment of class and political forces on the world scene, peaceful coexistence acquired a qualitatively new meaning. It opened the road to a peaceful settlement of world problems against a background of confrontation between the two ideologies—socialist and capitalist—and predetermined the prospects of the existence and development of world civilisation.

The struggle for the adoption of the principles of peaceful coexistence in relations between newly established socialist states and the old world was attended by formidable difficulties, for it coincided with the struggle of the peoples of these states for freedom, independence and the preser-

vation of their revolutionary gains. The United States and other imperialist powers responded to the socialist policy of peace and international cooperation with their notorious "position of strength" policy, a cold war policy which, being the antithesis of peaceful coexistence, placed the world on the brink of war and poisoned the international political climate to the utmost. This policy of confrontation, inspired and directed by the United States, was based on that country's temporary military-strategic superiority, which Washington owed to its arsenal of atomic weapons, a short-lived monopoly.

After pioneering the development of nuclear weapons and using them in August 1945 against Hiroshima and Nagasaki despite there being no military necessity for it, US imperialism pursued far-reaching global aims: cowering the peoples of the world by showing off its military might and using the threat of nuclear weapons to achieve world domination. However, the course of history after the war and the changes in favour of peace and progress that occurred in the international alignment of class and political forces turned these imperialist plans into a mere illusion.

The US monopoly on nuclear weapons was broken by the Soviet Union in the late 1940s, bringing an obvious end to US policy of blackmail and diktat. World events in the postwar period were conditioned by the laws governing social development and not by US ambitions. The principles of peaceful coexistence between the socialist countries and a number of Western countries were practically applied even in the cold-war years. In fact, the very idea of peaceful coexistence played a major role in paving the way for political detente in the early 1970s and in the rise and development of the general European process. After all, detente means the practical application of peaceful coexistence in international affairs. Detente was mainly a result of the military-strategic parity established in the early 1970s between the Soviet Union and United States, between the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and NATO, and of improved East-West relations.

Thus, despite stubborn resistance from imperialist reaction, peaceful coexistence between states of opposite systems became an objective law governing international development even before rough military parity was established between East and West. Whether or not the West cares to admit it, peaceful coexistence has come to condition the nature and substance of relations between socialist and capitalist countries; it has become a highly important factor contributing to overall world stability.

P eaceful coexistence is acquiring a new quality today, in the context of military parity. Hardly any sensible leader would now take a stand against it, since that would mean, in essence, coming out in support of nuclear war. The rough military-strategic parity existing at present is an objective reality which US and NATO leaders must reckon with. It leaves no reasonable alternative to peaceful coexistence.

In this situation, it is not only universal recognition and consistent implementation of the policy of peaceful coexistence that is of *particular* importance. It is vitally important that the countries of the two different social systems unfailingly respect all the principles of peaceful coexistence, which have become virtual standards of international relations in general. This, in turn, urgently demands a thorough restructuring of existing state-to-state relations; it calls for a new political thinking, for steps to bring military-strategic plans and military doctrines into line with reality.

"The policy of peaceful coexistence as understood by the CPSU," says the CPSU Programme, "presupposes: renunciation of war and the use or threat of force as a means of settling disputed issues, and the settlement of such issues through negotiations; non-interference in internal affairs and respect for the legitimate interests of each other; the right of the peoples independently to decide their destinies; strict respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and the inviolability of their borders; cooperation on the basis of complete equality and mutual benefit; fulfilment in good faith of commitments arising from generally recognised principles and norms of international law and from international treaties concluded."

Such are the fundamental principles on which the Soviet Union and other socialist countries build their relations with all capitalist countries. These principles best reflect the demands of the missile and space age and meet the interests of the whole of humanity, that of delivering it from a nuclear catastrophe. The terse and specific definition of peaceful coexistence quoted above also encompasses the main principles of present-day international law, which have long been universally accepted and which have, moreover, been written into many bilateral and multilateral agreements and accords and generally apply to all countries.

A further aspect of the principles of peaceful coexistence to be stressed is the way in which they are closely interconnected and interdependent. Infringement of one principle inevitably leads to the infringement of others and to a general departure from the policy of peaceful coexistence.

Naturally, it would be difficult to detail in a single magazine article the place, role and operation of all the component principles of peaceful coexistence, and so we will confine ourselves to a brief analysis of these principles and their interaction.

Renouncing war and the use or threat of force as a means of settling disputes, their settlement through negotiation. The special importance of this principle today is self-evident. This chief requirement of peaceful coexistence is prompted by the very course of historical development and the striving of the Soviet Union, other socialist countries and all peace forces to remove the threat of a nuclear catastrophe and preserve life on Earth. At present everyone, including Western governments, recognise that nobody could win a nuclear war and that it would result in the total destruction of civilisation.

This finds reflection both in joint bilateral and multilateral statements by governments and in personal statements made by prominent political and military leaders of the United States and other Western countries. Former US Defense Secretary Robert McNamara wrote that as his political thinking advanced, he felt more and more concerned because his country, like the whole world, needed to develop an attitude towards the long-term objectives of nuclear armaments levels, military strategy and arms control agreements which would reduce the risk that a conflict between the blocs of the superpowers in the nuclear age would lead to the destruction of civilisation.¹

The very recognition of this indisputable fact should presumably find appropriate reflection in both the policies and military-strategic plans of countries in East and West alike.

As far as the Soviet Union and its allies are concerned, they do not merely proclaim the principles of peaceful coexistence but are pursuing in practice and in concrete forms an international policy in keeping with a new political thinking. This is exemplified by numerous constructive initiatives in favour of ending the arms race, primarily in the nuclear sphere, and removing the threat of nuclear war.

All these Soviet initiatives are aimed at specific goals: the conclusion of treaties with the United States and the signing of international agree-

ments on the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear armaments everywhere; imposing a rigorous and universal ban on the deployment of any weapons in outer space; establishing a new international regime banishing chemical and other weapons of mass destruction from the world; lowering the levels of conventional armaments to the minimum levels needed for defence; establishing a comprehensive system of international security. "We are living in a world of realities and are building our international policy in keeping with the specific features of the present phase of international development," Mikhail Gorbachev said at the 27th CPSU Congress. "A creative analysis of this phase and vision of prospects have led us to a conclusion that is highly significant. Now, as never before, it is important to find ways for closer and more productive cooperation with governments, parties, and mass organisations and movements that are genuinely concerned about the destinies of peace on Earth, with all peoples in order to *build an all-embracing system of international security.*"

A fitting response to the exigencies of the nuclear-missile age came in the form of the *Military Doctrine* adopted by the Warsaw Treaty countries' Political Consultative Committee, which met in Berlin in May 1987. The document contains clear and precise fundamental provisions for the military doctrine underlying the activity of the WTO; it reflects the community of the defensive military-political aims and the national military doctrines of the member states.

Our approach to the issue of war and peace, our new political thinking and the stepped-up foreign policy efforts of our country in the recent period have had and continue to have a tremendous impact on the political climate of the world, on the positions of governments, political parties and public opinion in all countries. This is acknowledged even by our class adversaries. Over the past two years, wrote Jonathan Deane, former leader of the US delegation to the talks on a reciprocal and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, the Soviet Union had taken 25 very serious steps, mostly unilateral and unreciprocated, towards the US position on arms control, while the United States had taken fewer steps to meet it half-way. The record of these 25 or Soviet bigger initiatives taken in the space of a mere two years is both remarkable and positive. For the first time in the nuclear era, they offered an opportunity for agreement on a wide-ranging reduction of nuclear armaments.

The policy of peace and international cooperation, of curbing the arms race, achieving disarmament and doing away with the threat of a nuclear catastrophe—a policy being pursued by the Soviet Union and its allies—is thus an application of the new thinking in international politics, a contribution to the solution of pressing universal problems. Socialism has counterposed the militarist policy of the United States and NATO with a precise and entirely realistic programme for the survival of humanity in the nuclear and space age. This programme rests on a reliable *material* basis, the mighty military and economic potential of existing socialism, which guarantees military-strategic parity between East and West.

However, the rulers of imperialist countries, primarily the United States, reduce the revision of their own political thinking to demagogical rhetoric. In words, they admit that in today's world nuclear war is impermissible, for it could end world civilisation, but actually they go on escalating the arms race, especially the nuclear race, thereby bringing the world to the brink of disaster; militarism remains the decisive factor in the domestic and foreign policy of these countries and lies at the basis of the imperialist bourgeoisie's political and ideological thinking. "Modern militarism," Lenin wrote, "is the result of capitalism. In both its forms it is the 'vital expression' of capitalism—as a military force used by the

capitalist states in their external conflicts (*'Militarismus nach aussen'*, as the Germans say) and as a weapon in the hands of the ruling classes for suppressing every kind of movement, economic and political, of the proletariat (*'Militarismus nach innen'*)."²

Militarism is an inherent part of the capitalist system. Its internal and external functions have grown immensely and are particularly dangerous today, with the United States and NATO continuing to rely on armed force in international relations with the existing means of mass destruction, whipping up the arms race and literally making material preparations for nuclear and space war. Even now that imperialism is unable to dictate its terms to other nations and is threatened with self-annihilation, Lenin's remark that it is "distinguished by a minimum fondness for peace and freedom, and by a maximum and universal development of militarism"³ is most relevant.

And so, even under present conditions, the imperialist countries refuse to abandon militarism; on the contrary, militarism is assuming greater proportions, posing a real threat of nuclear disaster. It has outgrown its national framework and become a universal problem, since nearly all countries are now involved in the arms race at the fault of imperialism. Annual military spending in the world is close to one trillion dollars.

What is the basis for the unreasonable, to put it mildly, behaviour of the ruling US and NATO elite? Why does it persist in its policy of stepping up the arms race even in this nuclear-missile age? After all, the governments and militarists of imperialist countries have long been aware that there can be no winners in a nuclear war and that it would amount to self-annihilation. It is also clear to them that nuclear war can no longer be measured with the old yardstick, for it is no longer a mere continuation of politics.

The point is that the United States and NATO are using the *very process of preparations* for nuclear war to further the ideological, political and military-strategic interests of their ruling class. They have turned the arms race into the principal instrument of imperialist power politics and a means of social revenge to put pressure on both the socialist world and the revolutionary and national liberation movement. In other words, imperialism is trying to make the world and human progress dependent on the fate and cheerless prospects of capitalism, to reverse or stop the march of history.

Naturally, the threat of a nuclear-missile war is a tangible reality and it is wrong to underestimate this threat. However, it seems that an excessive emphasis laid sometimes by propaganda on the threat of a nuclear-missile catastrophe mostly affects both internal and external developments. This emphasis makes people, particularly youth, loose heart and, in any way, does not stimulate enthusiasm. As for the international situation here, too, this whipping-up of fear of the threat of a world catastrophe first of all plays into the hands of reactionary imperialist circles who have used this fear to weaken and undermine not only the workers' and revolutionary movements but also anti-war actions of the peoples and to instil despair and pessimism.

In this connection it should be noted that the ruling quarters of the Western countries are not in the least disturbed by the threat of a nuclear-missile war but also spare no effort to whip up the arms race, accelerate the implementation of war programmes, and first of all the notorious Star Wars programme. It seems that they shifted the care for the destiny of mankind onto the socialist countries. And, indeed, this can hardly be explained by naiveté, lack of foresight or the misconception of the realities. Obviously, this behaviour of the ruling elite of the imperialist states is nothing but an attempt to relieve themselves of the responsibility for creating a threat of a nuclear catastrophe and shift it to the

socialist countries or instil into the minds of the people the notorious concept of "equal responsibility" borne by the two superpowers. At the same time it means that the ruling circles in the West actually relieve themselves of the duty to wage a real struggle for the elimination of the threat of a nuclear-missile disaster.

Of certain interest in this connection are documents of the Pentagon and the US National Security Council which were declassified a fairly short time ago and give an idea of the aims and intentions of Washington, which continues to bank on the nuclear arms race. Two American authors, M. Kaku and D. Axelrod, have published a book based on these documents. A careful study of the documents, they write, shows that contrary to public statements about "containment" and "defence", the real nuclear policy of the US Defense Department provides for the use of nuclear arms to threaten with nuclear war, wage a nuclear war, survive in a nuclear war and even win a nuclear war. Generally speaking, the documents show that US nuclear strategy can be broken down into two principles borrowed from the strategy of conventional war: dominating at every level of the conflict and delivering a first strike. It would be wrong to say that US nuclear armaments were merely stockpiled year after year without being used in any way. Time and again, mostly without the knowledge of the US public, nuclear armaments have been used for totally different ends; they were used in the same way as you use a pistol, putting it to somebody's head, regardless of whether you intend to press the trigger in so doing.⁴

In our opinion, the authors' analysis of the Pentagon's documents reveals the essence of US nuclear policy, its long-term objectives and main direction. Indeed, at a time when war is inseparable from the hazard of self-annihilation, the nuclear strategy of the United States and its policy of arms race are aimed primarily at realising international imperialism's globalist plans serving its class ideology and military-political aspirations by totally militarising international relations. And so, by preparing for war in every way, Washington is out to achieve what in a different set of circumstances would have necessitated starting a world war, namely, to impose its diktat on all nations, pressure the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, undermine the working-class and revolutionary movement in developed capitalist countries and spread neocolonialism in Asian, African and Latin American countries.

Political thinking of this sort calls for certain comment.

First, imperialism cannot resolve its social and economic contradictions but only aggravate them by preparing for war, especially for a nuclear war. Second, experience has shown that it is illusory to expect to stop historical development by such methods. The existence of mighty forces--the Soviet Union, other socialist and peace-loving countries and progressive world opinion--guarantee humanity's further progress. Third, the nuclear strategy and militaristic policy of the United States completely contradict the interests of all peoples, including the American people, for such a course is hopelessly out of keeping with the spirit of our time and the realities of the nuclear and space age, with the requirements of international cooperation and peaceful coexistence between states with different systems.

Such an adventuristic policy only makes the peace forces intensify their activity and contributes to the growth of their potential in the struggle against nuclear warmongers and for the survival of humanity, all the more so since public opinion is becoming a major factor in world politics.

Our doctrine of peaceful coexistence comprises a whole series of universally recognised, general democratic norms and principles which must be respected in the interest of normal international development and stability in the world. In calling for the renunciation of war and the use or threat of force, the policy of peaceful coexistence proposes *constructive negotiations* as the *only* reasonable way of settling international problems nowadays. It is precisely through negotiations that the countries of the two systems should solve all problems, especially key problems of international relations such as curbing the arms race, reducing and subsequently eliminating weapons of mass destruction. Negotiations are an essential condition for applying all the other main principles of peaceful coexistence, for their implementation is directly connected with the negotiated settlement of all disputes.

The chief purpose of adhering to these principles of peaceful coexistence is to settle all questions of world politics by peaceful means, to provide by joint efforts the prerequisites for this and seek a radical improvement in both the political climate in the world as a whole and bilateral relations between countries belonging to different social systems. To successfully achieve such a goal there must also be true application of such principles and standards of peaceful coexistence as *non-interference in internal affairs; the right of peoples to be the masters of their own destinies; strict respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and the inviolability of frontiers; cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual benefit*, all of which have long been universally recognised principles and norms of international law.

What we mean here is not only a standard of conduct to be followed by countries of the two systems in relation to each other (although this aspect, too, is of paramount importance) but the fact that these principles, like the principles of renouncing war and the use or threat of force, are universally valid and therefore concern the whole range of world relations. In other words, peaceful coexistence is something more than the absence of war, as the CPSU Programme emphasises. "It is an international order," the Programme says, "under which good-neighbourliness and cooperation rather than armed force would prevail, and a broad exchange of the achievements of science and technology and cultural values would be carried out for the good of all nations. When vast resources are no longer used for military purposes, it would be possible to use the fruits of labour exclusively for constructive purposes. States that have embarked on the road of independent development would be protected from external encroachments, and this would facilitate their advance along the path of national and social revival. Favourable opportunities would also arise for solving the global problems by the collective efforts of all states. Peaceful coexistence meets the interests of all countries and peoples."

Many Western political scientists, while recognising the principle of peaceful coexistence, often interpret this concept as relations between socialist and capitalist countries in their "pure form" so to speak, that is, as relations enabling imperialism to exercise undivided domination in the non-socialist part of the world and, in addition, to reserve the right to interfere in the affairs of socialist countries. In other words, they virtually reduce peaceful coexistence to a simple recognition of the *existence* of the Soviet Union, to the need to develop relations with it and, in some measure, with other socialist countries.

It is common knowledge that the United States and other NATO countries persist in subversive actions against countries which chose a socialist path after World War II. The "differentiated" approach to the socialist countries advocated by the imperialist bourgeoisie as an all but official doctrine is evidence that the imperialist countries still aspire to

break up the socialist system, primarily the socialist community, and to undermine the system existing in the fraternal countries.

This induced the WTO countries to stress in their document setting out their military doctrine that they "regard ensuring the reliable security of their peoples as their prime duty. The allied socialist states do not claim greater security than other countries, but nor will they agree to lesser security. The existing military-strategic parity remains the decisive factor in preventing war."

Peaceful coexistence represents a universal norm for regulating relations between countries of the two systems. It rejects interference in the internal affairs of other countries in any form and is against extending ideological contradictions between socialism and capitalism to the sphere of these relations.

Peaceful coexistence fully coincides with the interests of solving universal problems. Its exigencies go further than class factors only. Therefore, attempts to adapt it to the class and ideological requirements of a particular social formation have nothing in common with the principles of peaceful coexistence. Yet such attempts are continuously being made by Western politicians and ideologists. A case in point is J. Wylie's book *European Security in Nuclear Age*. It falsifies the history of Soviet foreign policy and tries to establish a direct connection between peaceful coexistence and the class struggle. According to its author, the policy of peaceful coexistence, which refuted earlier Marxist-Leninist propositions about the inevitability of wars, was supposedly developed by the Soviet Union in 1956, in face of the strategic superiority of the United States. But, the author continues, since it concerns relations between countries and not between classes, the result is that the ideological struggle continues. And because this policy was designed to legitimise the Soviet Union's right to support national liberation wars of a class character, it follows that, unlike the strategy of containment, peaceful coexistence was aimed at upsetting rather than preserving the status quo.⁵

Problems of the Third World hold an important place in East-West relations. They are among the main factors aggravating the world situation and intensifying the confrontation between socialist and capitalist countries. The blame for this rests entirely on the Western powers committed to a neocolonialist policy in Asian, African and Latin American countries and constantly undermining the economic, social and political pillars of these countries' new regimes. To impose neocolonialism is not only to reject key principles of peaceful coexistence but to trample on the norms and general democratic principles of international law.

Thus what we have here is not a rivalry between the two systems in the Third World, as some in the West would have it, but the fact that the United States and other imperialist countries would like to impose on the developing world an order making it possible to continue mercilessly exploiting young national states and preserve what is, in effect, colonial rule in a neocolonial guise. Such is the meaning of "neogloba-lism" and other imperialist doctrines determining the character and content of the policy of the United States and other Western countries towards developing countries.

Needless to say, the Soviet Union, other socialist countries and all progressive and peace-loving forces refuse to be reconciled to this approach. They will not be diverted from their struggle for the free, independent development of all young states, for the right of every people to choose its own path of development. Our attitude to developing countries is part and parcel of our international policy. This policy is not prompted by a bid to divide the globe into spheres of influence, force any state out of the Third World or infringe on its vital interests. It is

directly associated with the formation and development of independent, sovereign states, with the task of eliminating such consequences of imperialist colonial rule as hunger and poverty, with the promotion of universal progress. This is why socialism and its ideas have such strong an influence on the peoples of newly free countries.

Socialism's powerful influence on the developing world infuriates the imperialists. They resort to every manner of economic, political, ideological or even military action to isolate the Third World from socialism or to neutralise it, to impose their diktat upon it for all time, to bring all developing countries under neocolonialist control.

In the US periodical *Globe Affairs* in the spring of 1987, it was noted that Ronald Reagan seemed to feel certain that the arms buildup benefited the world strategic balance and that the Soviet Union's internal economic difficulties and shackling commitments abroad had created a favourable climate for challenging Soviet influence in various Third World countries.

Power politics on the part of the United States and its NATO allies, measures to undermine economic security, and powerful ideological subversion are the main methods used by imperialism against developing countries. The US imperialists have declared nearly the whole Third World an area of the "vital interests". Hence their recourse to brute force and the tendency to create permanent crisis situations or virtual hotbeds of war in various regions of the world.

The Middle East, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, Central America and southern Africa are hot spots where the flames of undeclared wars have been raging for a long time. Such crisis situations as well as steps to create and fuel them are part and parcel of US and NATO neoglobalist policy. Imperialism needs them as a means of poisoning the international atmosphere and intimidating the peoples and countries seeking deliverance from the fetters of Western national and transnational corporations.

Today great importance is attached to the fact that the policy of peaceful coexistence requires *fulfilment in good faith of obligations arising from the universally recognised principles and norms of international law and from international treaties*. Its purpose is to call a halt to the arbitrary practices of imperialist reaction in international affairs, to ensure that all standards of international intercourse are strictly respected and to humanise international relations. This requirement proceeds from the assumption that the principles of international law are incompatible with power politics, with neoglobalist concepts of any sort, with notorious imperial policy. To honour commitments under international treaties is particularly important. It is well known that the degree of confidence between nations and the progress and prospects of negotiations on key problems of world politics depend on how international treaties are carried out, how strictly states respect the principles and norms of international law.

The US Republican administration's refusal to respect the terms of the SALT-2 Treaty, attempts to sacrifice the ABM Treaty impeding the nuclear arms race to insensate plans for the militarisation of outer space, departures from a number of important accords reached at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, plus moves by the United States and NATO which have created crisis situations in various parts of the world, not only add to international tension but erode confidence between states and complicate the negotiation and conclusion of accords. It is no accident that since the present US administration took office just one major agreement on curbing the arms race has been reached.

The CPSU and the Soviet government invariably adhere to the principles of peaceful coexistence in implementing their foreign policy. This policy has experienced a marked upsurge in recent years. The Soviet Union's numerous major initiatives on key world political issues, its constructive proposals for curbing the arms race, its programme for nuclear disarmament, its steps to bring about a radical improvement in East-West relations, and last but not least, the concept of establishing a comprehensive international security system worked out by the 27th CPSU Congress and widely discussed in the United Nations and the world public at large are only some of the measures recently adopted by the CPSU and the Soviet state in the spirit of Lenin's policy of peace and international cooperation, in the spirit of peaceful coexistence.

The Fundamental Principles of a Comprehensive International Security System are a *practical* expression of the policy of peaceful coexistence on a global level. They cover all aspects of present-day international relations: military, political, economic, humanitarian, and environmental. These Fundamental Principles, as it was stated at the 27th CPSU Congress, fully accord with our specific concrete foreign policy moves. "Guided by them it would be possible to make peaceful coexistence the highest universal principle of relations between states." Our party, carrying forward Lenin's teaching of peaceful coexistence with due regard to the current stage of international development, wants to contribute through its constructive policy to the solution of key problems of world politics, to the removal of the threat of nuclear war and the formation of a nuclear-free and non-violent world.

A new political thinking and a new political approach to the problems of war and peace in the nuclear-missile age offered by the Soviet Union to the world community are not only a further creative elaboration of the Leninist concept of peaceful coexistence but also a qualitative upgrading of the content and significance of peaceful coexistence. In our time it becomes an *imperative norm* (the only reasonable form) for regulating interstate relations of the two different systems, socialism and capitalism.

¹ See R. McNamara, *Blundering into Disaster. Surviving the First Century of the Nuclear Age*, New York, 1986.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1963, p. 192.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 28, 1965, p. 239.

⁴ See M. Kaku, D. Axelrod, *To Win a Nuclear War. The Pentagon's Secret War Plans*, Boston, 1987.

⁵ See J. Wyllie, *European Security in Nuclear Age*, New York, 1986, pp. 55, 58.

SPAIN IN THE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE

Yevgeni STAKHOV

The Soviet policy of asserting the new political thinking in the world, its innovative approaches to the solution of crucial internal and international problems have qualitatively enriched USSR foreign policy and expanded its scope. The 27th CPSU Congress pointed out that the European direction is a priority in its international activities.

The role of Western Europe in resolving global problems continues to grow. The extensive range of political, strategic and economic interests closely intertwined on the European continent, the instructive historical experience accumulated there, the level of civilisation and cultural traditions in the conditions of Europe's oversaturation with dangerous modern armaments—all this determines its particular sensitivity to the problems of war and peace. This continent, a cradle of detente, gave birth to the propitious Helsinki process. It is not by chance that a considerable part of Soviet peace initiatives is addressed to Europe: the treaty on medium- and shorter-range missiles and other measures to limit armaments and achieve disarmament have a direct bearing on Europe's vital interests.

All European nations, irrespective of their role on the international scene, of their size, population, economic potential, etc., are regarded in the Soviet Union as equal partners. This fully applies to Spain. That European and Mediterranean country's development vividly confirms the correctness of the thesis about the quickly changing, contradictory and yet interdependent contemporary world.

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Early in the 1970s Spain was considered a second-rate country which had been in international isolation for a long time. However, over the past 10 to 15 years it has achieved a marked progress in various spheres and reached the level of other West European countries.

Spain's economic performance was most impressive. It is a relatively large country by European standards, has a population of 40 million and ranks fifth in Western Europe in absolute GNP volume. It is the world's leader in many spheres of science, technology and culture. At the same time, the Spanish economy has a contradictory nature: high technological level of many branches coexist with obsolete, archaic forms, especially of land ownership.

The political panorama in Spain is heterogenous, too. Though Franco's dictatorship was replaced by a bourgeois-democratic parliamentary regime and some progressive reforms were carried out, the heritage of the recent past is still there. Spain's foreign policy is not uniform.

In an *El Pais* interview President of the Council of Ministers Felipe González said the major achievement of Spain's foreign policy of the last decade is that the country has emerged from international isolation, stepped on the international scene and determined its place in the world community.¹ This was no easy thing to do. The Franco regime tried to use its close military-political alliance with the United States to break the isolation in which it found itself after World War II as a result of its connivance with the Axis powers. Bilateral agreements signed by the USA and Spain in 1953 enabled the Americans to establish military bases on Spanish territory which were formally under joint control of both states. Washington also tried to make Spain a member of NATO but the hostile attitude of the West European public to the Franco regime prevented it from doing so at that time.

After Franco's death Spain faced the choice: either to remain formally neutral but actually tied to the "collective security" system of the West through bilateral military agreements with the USA, or to join NATO. After acute and prolonged struggle the Atlanticists emerged victorious and in May 1982 Spain officially joined NATO. However, with the advent to power of the socialist government in October of the same year the country's integration into NATO's military wing was suspended. At the national referendum in March 1986 Spain's participation in NATO was confirmed on the condition that it will not be integrated into the alliance's military structure, will ban the deployment, import and stockpiling of nuclear weapons on its territory and gradually decrease the US military presence there.

Today the framework of the NATO military structure does not formally embrace Spain. It is neither represented on the joint staff nor on the regional NATO command. It does not place its military contingents at the disposal of NATO nor are the forces of the latter deployed on its territory. At the same time, as a result of continuous attempts by foreign and home Atlanticists to ensure Spain's full scale participation in NATO, there has been a certain erosion of its position vis-à-vis the alliance.

To all appearances, Spain is not generally satisfied with the role of "obedient" ally of the USA and NATO. The country is trying to raise its prestige on the international scene and is seeking more independence and freedom in foreign policy manoeuvring. However, these aspirations are restrained by its one-sided orientation on the United States, inherited from the times of Franco. On assumption of power the Socialists adopted a policy of reducing American military presence in Spain.

At the talks started in July 1986, the Spanish side demanded that 79 American F-16s be removed from the air base in Torrejón de Ardoz (which became a sore in the eyes of the Spanish public due to its proximity to Madrid), along with five flying tankers from the Zaragoza base. It also demanded a "considerable reduction" of American military personnel in Spain (currently numbering 12,500 officers and men). The Spaniards insist that control over activities of the US military contingent in the country be increased, that its participation in operations which run counter to the interests of Spain be ruled out, and that a stricter control be exercised over the transit of armaments carried on board of US ships and aircraft. Americans have adopted a tough line in these matters and make the other side understand that they are prepared to render only partial concessions at best. When the seventh round of the Spanish-American talks in November 1987 brought no results, the sides agreed to meet again in January 1988.

The reduction of US military presence in Spain is not the only controversy between the two countries, but, no doubt, it is a major one. Spain's position on that issue resulted in the US reducing its military

aid to Spain from \$415 to \$105 million in 1987. Washington also has other political and economic levers of pressure on Spain, the Spanish mass media are dominated by the United States. These circumstances can hardly be ignored by the Spanish authorities.

Apparently, it is in this context that one should regard the statements made by some officials to the effect that Spain allegedly views US military presence in Western Europe as an "indispensable component of its defence". Many people in Spain believe that stronger ties with Western Europe are a means of weakening its dependence on the United States. The main stake is made on Spain's admission into the European Economic Community since January 1, 1986. Attaching great importance to economic aspects of its EEC membership, and often regarding them as a priority, Madrid also stands for wider political cooperation among West European countries, coordination of their foreign policy activities, and is ready to support the plans for building a "politically united Europe".

Spain's active involvement in West European integration processes is aimed at enhancing its role in adopting decisions on major global issues at par with leading Western countries, speeding up modernisation of its economy, and giving it access to the latest scientific and technological achievements. Madrid's policy of promoting political unification of Europe is becoming more and more clear-cut.

Spain is interested in the earliest admission into Western European Union (WEU) as it views it as a major, purely West European, body for discussing foreign policy and military-political issues as well as coordinating the policies of the countries in the region. At the same time, observers point out that the leaders of WEU are apprehensive of new troubles which could be spelled by Spain's entry into the organisation and which the latter would have to handle, in particular the dispute between Spain and Britain over Gibraltar. Apparently, there are plans to link Spain's entry into WEU with its involvement in NATO's military structure.

There are more and more indications that official Madrid wants closer cooperation with West European countries in the military sphere both on a bilateral and multilateral basis. The emphasis is laid on strengthening the so-called European component of the system of Western collective defence, which is viewed as going beyond the framework of NATO and bilateral military commitments with the USA. There is also the possibility of Spain joining the growing military cooperation between West Germany and France and its participation in setting up of a joint military brigade, training of Spanish military personnel in joint training centres of staff officers, construction of testing grounds for the West German Air Force and so on. There are rumours about Spain's participation, along with other West European countries, in the building of a military reconnaissance satellite.

As far as the economic aspect of Spain's participation in West European integration is concerned, not everything is running smoothly because the Spanish economy is experiencing difficulties in adapting to the conditions and demands of the EEC. Madrid is surely interested in joining projects aimed at enhancing economic coordination within the EEC, in particular the West European currency system, with the help of which it hopes to facilitate the country's transition to full membership of the Community. However, the plans to establish a "West European economic zone", "European internal market" and so on, are received with caution in Madrid. Today Spain is a party to 19 projects on Eureka programme, in ten of which Spanish companies and organisations claim to be leading as to their technological and financial contribution.

Alongside the "Western" direction, which is viewed as a priority in Spanish foreign policy, its "Eastern" direction is being increasingly developed, too. A major place here is held by Spanish-Soviet relations.

Restoring diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in February 1977, Spanish leaders obviously hoped that the very fact of it would help Spain break its international isolation and strengthen its independence on the international scene. Indeed, the establishment of effective bilateral cooperation with the USSR and, first and foremost, the development of fruitful political dialogue between the two countries, strengthened Spain's positions on the international scene and brought it tangible political and economic dividends. Spanish leaders also believed that promotion of all-round relations with the Soviet Union would improve the overall situation in Europe and this, in turn, would consolidate the democratic regime in Spain.

The Soviet Union and Spain belong to different social systems and military-political alliances. But things worked out in such a way that our nations have never been at war with each other. The infrequent attempts made in the past to make the Spaniards participate in all sorts of military ventures against our country invariably failed. It so happened during the Napoleonic invasion of 1812 that the Spanish legion formed in France from among Spanish POWs defected to the side of the Russian army in a body. The notorious Blue Division, sent to the Eastern front by the Franco regime, practically failed to help Hitler in any way.

In Spain people often point to general features in traditions, customs and character of both nations. Our compatriots who have been to Spain or known the Spaniards say that our peoples have much in common. Konstantin Korovin, a prominent Russian artist who visited Spain in 1888, wondered: "Why do these absolutely different people have so much in common with Russians?" Mutual sympathy and respect, entertained by the two nations throughout history, formed the basis for all-round and intensive Soviet-Spanish cooperation we are witnessing today.

In February 1987 the Soviet Union and Spain marked the 10th anniversary of the re-establishment of their diplomatic relations. Over this short period of time both countries have done more than just revive the political dialogue which is carried out at different levels, including talks by their top leaders. There are more extensive contacts between political parties and public organisations, municipalities, universities and friendship societies. Trade, economic, scientific and technological ties between the two countries are also strengthening. Cooperation in the spheres of tourism, navigation, fishing and civil aviation is becoming more fruitful. Mutual interest in the rich cultural traditions of both nations is reflected in intensive and fruitful cultural exchanges.

Success will largely depend on both countries' ability to search for and find new forms of businesslike cooperation. For its part, the Soviet Union is ready for a joint creative search which is corroborated by the restructuring of its external economic activities. New directions of economic cooperation, including industrial cooperation and establishment of joint ventures, are essential for ensuring stable development of Soviet-Spanish trade turnover.

Over ten years of diplomatic relations the Soviet Union and Spain have accumulated a rich experience in mutually beneficial and effective cooperation on the basis of bilateral contacts. It would be opportune to pose the following question: Are there real possibilities for the Soviet Union and Spain to cooperate on the international scene and not to confine their relations to bilateral ties? And how feasible is such interaction between the two countries which belong to different socio-political systems?

I believe that in this nuclear and space age, when the very survival of mankind is at stake, only one answer is possible. Today, even the most conservative circles in the West are coming to realise that the nature of modern weapons does not allow any state or military-political group to solve the problem of security by military-technological means: mankind's survival depends only on political decisions, agreements and mutual compromise. Even the US administration, despite all contradictions and difficulties at home and abroad, deemed it necessary to search for agreement with the Soviet Union. Is this approach unacceptable for Spain? The answer is "no". It should be mentioned here that Spain shows readiness to promote East-West dialogue and look for possibilities to cooperate with the Soviet Union on the international scene.

It is often said in Madrid that Spain belongs to the West, referring to its geographic location, specifics of historical development, and bilateral and multilateral commitments. This is quite understandable. What is more important, however, is not to slide down to bloc approaches or to proceed from the fatal inevitability of dividing the world and Europe, for that matter, into opposing military-political groups. The Soviet Union does not shut its eyes to Spain's statements about its belonging to the West and to its membership in NATO. On the other hand, Spain demonstrates a clear intention to have its say in international affairs and be guided by its national interests. The Soviet Union appreciates Spain's activities aimed at promoting East-West dialogue and lessening the level of military confrontation.

No doubt, relaxation of international tension is important for Spain. Detente creates prerequisites for Spain to conduct independent policy on the international scene, search for its own approaches to the solution of global problems with due account taken of its own foreign policy objectives. International stability and peace are the best medium for Spain to strengthen its democratic regime, overcome the heritage of the past, and modernise all political and socio-economic institutions of the country. Extremism, especially right extremism, feeds on the aggravation of tension, confrontation and the cold war. Spain knows it all too well from its own grave experience of the not so distant past.

Analysis of Spain's approaches to major international issues helps to make a definite conclusion that they have many points of contact with the position of the Soviet Union.

In general, Spain demonstrates a positive stand on questions of disarmament. Madrid stands for military parity at the lowest possible level, and opposes the deployment of new systems of nuclear weapons and the arms race with the use of modern technology. The González government states its commitment to the idea of universal and complete disarmament under strict and effective international verification, and stresses its readiness to work for the success of the talks on curbing the arms race with all the means available.

Unlike some other Western countries, Spain immediately supported the proposal to eliminate medium-range and then shorter-range missiles, and resolutely favoured the "double zero" option on these classes of armaments. The head of the Spanish cabinet Felipe González characterised the Soviet-American agreement in principle on medium- and shorter-range missiles as "a historic fact and an event of extreme importance"; he expressed confidence that this agreement would open up possibilities for achieving progress in such spheres as reduction of strategic offensive arms and conventional weapons, and also in the elimination of chemical weapons.

Spain shows a constructive stand on a 50 per cent cut in the strategic offensive arms of the Soviet Union and the United States. It is aware of the dangerous consequences of the US Strategic Defense Initiative. Spanish representatives have on several occasions stated their negative attitude to SDI which, they believe, would only escalate the arms race rather than consolidate peace. Doubtful of the alleged defensive nature of the Star Wars programme, Madrid does not believe either in the technological feasibility of the project or in its effectiveness. It is principally important that Madrid has no intention of negotiating any agreement with the USA which could be viewed as a "political support" for SDI.

Spain demands that all research within the SDI framework be conducted in line with the ABM Treaty and that no deployment of "strategic defense" systems be allowed under any circumstances without preliminary agreement between the USA and the USSR with due account taken of Europe's security interests.

We have dwelt in detail on SDI because, first, it shows Spain's independent approach to the problem which is crucial for its "senior partner", and, second, it reaffirms Spain's positive approach to this global problem affecting the interests of all mankind. Opposing the military aspects of SDI, Madrid advocates peaceful exploration of outer space. Thus, it showed interest in the Soviet proposal to establish an international space centre called upon to promote international space research, establish control over space exploration and prevent any race for space domination.

Spain's constructive approach to the problems of limitation of nuclear weapons logically stems from its non-nuclear status. In its time it managed to remove all nuclear weapons from its territory, and has continued to adhere to this course ever since. Spain's non-nuclear status is strengthened by its decision of November 5, 1987, to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Some people wonder: what can a medium-size country do for the resolution of major problems of war and peace if it does not have nuclear weapons, is not a permanent member of the Security Council and does not have a great power status? Life shows that the contribution of such a country to the removal of the nuclear danger can become quite tangible. Spain is trying in practice to find a place of its own in the world and enhance its prestige not by developing its own nuclear weapons, but rather through their renunciation. It sets a good example for other Western countries—Britain and France above all—which use the possession of nuclear arms as a factor determining their status and "position in the society".

The very logic of nuclear disarmament and US-Soviet agreement on medium- and shorter-range missiles increasingly pushes to the fore the question of conventional armaments reductions. The fact that this issue still remains unresolved is being used by the proponents of nuclear deterrence tactics, mainly Britain and France, as their trump card. The programme set forth by the Warsaw Treaty for the reduction of armed forces and armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals, and the socialist countries' readiness to balance out the asymmetry in various kinds of armed forces of both sides, cut the ground from under the feet of Western proponents of the above-mentioned tactics.

The new elements in the position of Warsaw Treaty member states on conventional weapons were positively met by Spanish political circles, which believe that it can stimulate corresponding peace talks. Welcoming the meeting between Warsaw Treaty and NATO representatives who began discussing the problem of reducing armed forces and arma-

ments in Europe, Spain is actively involved in unofficial consultations of the Group of 23 held in Vienna.

To have a better understanding of Spain's position on the disarmament issue, it should be borne in mind that, compared with a large number of Western countries—to say nothing of the USA—Spain's defence spending is considerably smaller. Its military expenditure amounts to \$4.5 billion or less than 3 per cent of the GNP (respective figures for Britain are \$23.3 billion or about 6 per cent of its GNP, for France—\$20.2 billion or over 4 per cent of its GNP).

There is another important point. Practically all leading political parties, including the conservative Popular Alliance, share the positive approach to the problem of medium- and shorter-range missiles and other issues related to the curbing of the arms race and promotion of disarmament. The aforesaid suggest the following logical conclusion: Spain's approach to problems of disarmament may be preserved in case the political leadership of the country changes.

The idea of a "common European home", advanced by the Soviet Union, is winning growing recognition in Spain. It implies that though Europe consists of states which belong to opposing military-political groups, the continent—from the Atlantic to the Urals—is, in effect, an integral whole with one common destiny. Unfortunately, some Western circles are trying to counterpose the idea of a "common European home" with that of a "West European home". We believe such attempts are both egoistic and unpromising.

It seems that Madrid does not share this unconstructive point of view. This is corroborated by Spain's vigorous efforts to promote the European process in all directions. The positive role of Spanish diplomacy at the Madrid meeting is well known. The country also supports compromise agreements at the Vienna meeting and wants it to work on a confrontation-free basis. It favours continuation of work on confidence-building measures, as well as talks within the framework of the European process on armed forces and conventional armaments. Madrid believes that maintaining military parity at the lowest possible level and balanced armaments cuts only enhance the West's security, rather than undermine it.

Spain also displays a constructive approach to the discussion at the Vienna meeting of the second "basket" questions, adhering to the line of more extensive cooperation between the East and the West in the economic, scientific, technological and ecological spheres. In the same vein, it tabled a proposal in Vienna to hold a meeting of experts to discuss measures to protect ecosystems in the Mediterranean, although many participants in the CSCE believe that it is not enough to lay emphasis only on the ecological problems of the region, practically relegating to the background major issues of safeguarding its security.

Spain also refrains from all kinds of speculations about human rights in the socialist countries. There are no disputable issues in this sphere in bilateral relations between the USSR and Spain. It seems that the latter does not have any objections against the former's proposal to hold in Moscow a conference on the promotion of humanitarian cooperation.

There are common features inherent in the positions of the Soviet Union and Spain on the settlement of regional conflicts. Madrid's policy in this sphere differs remarkably from the US "power politics". Spain opposes the stepping up of military presence of other countries in the Persian Gulf and believes that the situation there can escalate into

a major international conflict at any moment. The González government did not abandon this position despite the armed attack on a Spanish vessel (September, 1987)—an incident which Spain's "influential" NATO allies immediately exploited to exert pressure on Madrid to push it into despatching warships to the Persian Gulf.

The Spanish Foreign Ministry objected to suggestion by the Western media that the Spanish Navy in the Mediterranean could perform some of the functions of the US Sixth Fleet in the Persian Gulf. Spanish representatives stated on many occasions that their country is determined to strictly abide by the UN Security Council resolution 598. Madrid believes that the earliest cessation of Iran-Iraq conflict demands that all states pursue a policy of constructive actions, necessitated by the preservation of peace and strengthening of security in that region, rather than "gunboat policy".

The Soviet Union and Spain have close stands on the Central American problem. Latin American countries, except Brazil and a few other states consider Spain their "motherland". Although the direct descendants of Spanish settlers no longer constitute the image of those countries, and the majority of their population are of mixed origin, most Latin Americans speak Spanish and honour the heritage of the Spanish culture. Spain has long been trying to use its traditional ties in this region to play the role of a "bridge" between Latin America and Western Europe. Due to its ties and influence there, Spain has certain levers for promoting the positive process that has shaped up in Central America of late.

From the outset Madrid publicly denounced the US "power politics" as regards the Central American settlement and disagreed with Washington's allegation that the regional conflict is rooted in the political and geostrategic confrontation between the East and the West. All post-Franco governments, both centre-right and centre-left, maintained that the aggravation of the situation in Central America was caused by socio-economic factors: nations in the region are striving to do away with poverty and rid themselves of the US political and economic yoke.

Advocating for a regional settlement by political means alone, Spain supported the efforts of the Contadora Group and the decisions taken by the leaders of five Central American countries in Guatemala. Spanish Foreign Minister Francisco Fernández said that these decisions meet the Contadora principles in the main. Madrid believes that the document signed by the leaders of five Central American countries in Guatemala makes it possible to initiate a settlement of the regional conflict and establish stable peace in the region.

The Soviet Union and Spain have close stands on the Middle East settlement as well. As is the case with Latin America, Spain has long since claimed the role of a mediator in the ties between Western Europe and Arab countries based on its traditionally preferential treatment of the Arab world, wherefrom it imports over 50 per cent of oil it needs.

Spain's position as regards the Camp David accords was reserved because it did not believe it could resolve the Middle East problem. Madrid has always stood for the implementation of the UN resolutions on the Middle East and supported the right of Palestinians to self-determination. Today, the government of the Socialists favours the convening of an international conference on the Middle East, agreeing, in essence, to any form of participation in it of the Palestine Liberation Organisation. Yet it seems that Spain could play a more conspicuous role in the search for solutions to the Middle East problem and be more active in the preparations for such a conference.

There are opportunities for cooperation between the Soviet Union and Spain in the Mediterranean, too. Both countries want stability in

this region and favour a peaceful settlement of conflict situations arising there. They oppose such situations being transformed into a component of East-West confrontation. However, there are naturally some differences in the two countries' positions. Madrid shows a reserved attitude to the idea of convening a conference in the Mediterranean of the CSCE type, preferring the mechanism of cooperation within the framework of Western Mediterranean with the participation of France, Italy, Spain, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco.

For many years now Spain has been rocked by acts of terrorism which destabilise the political situation in the country and jeopardise the democratic regime. Hence Madrid's special interest in promoting international cooperation to combat terrorism. Spain has tabled proposals to this effect at various forums within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the European Economic Community. The Spanish government is ready for bilateral cooperation in combating terrorism with, for instance, France the territory of which was used by the Spanish Basques as a base for their armed operations in Spain.

The Soviet Union, which rejects terrorism from considerations of principle, is ready to cooperate with other nations, including West European countries and Spain, to put an end to this dangerous phenomenon. It is dangerous not only for the lives of people or for political stability of states, but also for peace on this planet since there is the danger of nuclear terrorism.

The Soviet Union stands for the elaboration of a reliable system of measures for preventing terrorism in any guise or form. Both the Soviet Union and Spain believe that bilateral agreements are some of the most promising ways of establishing such system. They could include commitments by the sides to cooperate in preventing and stopping nuclear terrorism by means of information exchanges and adoption of corresponding legislative, administrative and technical measures and by ensuring the inevitability of punishment for "nuclear terrorism".

The new political thinking urges that all European countries, large, medium and small, make not only parallel but also joint efforts to ensure that confrontation and military rivalry give way to peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial cooperation. Madrid seems to share these ideas. The analysis of Spain's foreign policy priorities shows that, though complicated and contradictory, it is aimed at searching for mutual understanding and cooperation with the other side.

No doubt Spain wants to make its contribution to the improvement of the international situation. At the same time, it is clear that this contribution could be more tangible. Spain has every opportunity to play an increasingly active role in promoting the East-West dialogue, in preserving and strengthening detente, removing the nuclear threat and ensuring peace on our planet. This is the imperative of the time.

THE CORRELATION OF POLITICS, WAR AND A NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE

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The process of analysing the nature of a possible world war with the use of nuclear weapons began immediately after the tragic August days of 1945, when the American A-bombs were dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. People representing various fields of knowledge started to discuss the unusual character of a nuclear war, for it was scientists who were first to understand its utterly disastrous consequences for mankind. Made public at the dawn of the Pugwash movement was the historic Russel-Einstein Manifesto, the centrepiece of which was a call to learn—in conditions of the incipient nuclear age—to think in a new way for the sake of preserving life on Earth. Scientists have discovered a nuclear winter, elaborated an ecological model of a nuclear holocaust, and predicted the possibility of creating the Judgement Day Machine; in a word, the natural sciences have given their assessment of many a facet of a possible nuclear conflict.

Against this background, the contribution made by representatives of philosophical and sociological thought appears to be rather modest. In point of fact, there is so far no scientifically substantiated concept of a nuclear-missile war that would shed light on the range of problems pertaining to this qualitatively new social phenomenon in its entirety and all its contradictions. The urgency of the task, however, becomes increasingly evident with every passing day.

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The works devoted to the analysis of the essence of a nuclear-missile war are overwhelmingly dominated by the unquestionable idea of its unconventional nature, which is, incidentally, what accounts for the emergence of such terms as the "irrational", "qualitatively different" war and others. In highlighting the correlation of such notions of war and politics in the context of the new political thinking, the 27th CPSU Congress provided a comprehensive validation for the conclusion that, in its very nature and implications, a nuclear-missile war cannot be an instrument of politics. As the CPSU Programme puts it, "there would be no winners or losers" in a global military conflict.¹

Of late this conclusion has been corroborated with new arguments and, what's more, further elaborated. It is stressed, in particular, that

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the well-known formula that war is a continuation of politics by other means cannot be applied to a nuclear-missile war. According to Academician Moisci Markov, with the advent of nuclear arms and other mass destruction weapons "war can no longer be a continuation of politics because after a nuclear war politics will cease to exist altogether".² This idea was expressed in a most clear-cut and complete form by Mikhail Gorbachev at the International Forum for a Nuclear-Free World, for the Survival of Humanity when he said that "after Hiroshima and Nagasaki the world war ceased to be a continuation of politics through other means".³

Thus, the new realities objectively account for the indisputable contradiction between the traditional interpretation of war as a continuation of politics and the incompatibility of that interpretation with nuclear-missile war. A solution to this contradiction, a way out of the impasse existing in science should certainly be sought not by revising the classical heritage or questioning the truth in the "war is a continuation of politics" formula. Attempts to mechanically apply this formula (albeit in a modified form) to a fundamentally new and previously unheard-of phenomenon are equally unavailing.

The sought-after clarity would hardly be added by attempts to provide a palliative "double" solution to this complicated problem when it is asserted, on the one hand, that should the imperialist forces unleash a nuclear-missile war contrary to common sense, it would be a continuation of their policy and, on the other, that since no purely political goals can be achieved in a nuclear war it cannot serve as a continuation of politics.⁴

The above contradiction cannot be resolved along these lines. The new phenomenon calls for a fundamentally new conceptual analysis. It is necessary to ponder, above all, over whether it is justified to apply the notion of "war" itself to a hypothetical phenomenon customarily called a "nuclear-missile war".

No matter how paradoxical it appears at the first blush, we hold the view that there are sound reasons—the relationship between the two notions notwithstanding—to give a negative answer to the above question. If we discard the burden of inertia and look at it through the prism of new political thinking, the nuclear-missile war lacks some substantial features characterising war as a specific social phenomenon.

It is well known that the classics of Marxism-Leninism treated war as a political phenomenon. Criticising Eugen Dühring for failing to understand the true nature of war, Frederick Engels wrote that an act of armed violence was a "political act".⁵ Building upon the dialectical materialistic concept of war, Lenin deemed it possible to apply the formula of Karl Clausewitz, who defined war as a continuation of politics through other means. Ridding that formula of its idealistic treatment of politics, Lenin invariably stressed the idea of the political nature of any war in all his works dealing with major and small wars in the age of imperialism. For instance, in his article "The Collapse of the Second International" he expressed his position in a clear-cut manner, saying that "with reference to wars, the main thesis of dialectics ... is that '*war is simply the continuation of politics by other [i.e., violent] means*'.... And it was always the standpoint of Marx and Engels, who regarded *any* war as the *continuation* of the politics of the powers concerned—and the *various classes* within these countries—in a definite period".⁶ Lenin regarded war not only as a sequel, continuation of politics but he also noted that the "war is politics from beginning to end. It is pursuit of the same old aims by .. classes using a different method."⁷

In the light of the aforesaid, it is easy to see that a nuclear-missile catastrophe has little in common with what is usually treated as war in

the science of Marxism-Leninism. Indeed, it can hardly be termed a war in the proper sense of the word if, unlike a war—major or small, world or local—a nuclear catastrophe cannot be a means of politics, if political goals are unattainable in it because politics per se would disappear together with its carriers in case of disaster. In other words, what would be left of the “war as a continuation of politics” formula if this is not a continuation but a disruption of politics?

In such a situation war nullifies itself in purely military terms since victory—the “natural” end result for which wars have always been started and waged—becomes impossible. Armed hostility is the distinctive characteristic of any war, the basic form of confrontation of the warring parties and of attainment of victory. It is conducted in accordance with its own laws and the principles of the art of war, using various forms and methods worked out either empirically or by a special branch of knowledge, namely military science. In the event of a nuclear war, armed hostilities as such would most likely take the form of a swift exchange of nuclear-missile strikes. Military art in its traditional sense would be shoved aside by a pre-programmed operation of technology.

Finally, war is not only an armed struggle. It provides for other relatively independent “non-military” forms—economic, diplomatic, intelligence, scientific and technological, ideological, etc.—supporting the armed hostilities. Because of total destruction of human and material resources a nuclear-missile holocaust will not leave room for those forms of struggle. Consequently, the “war as the continuation of politics” formula has been so much deformed by the realities of the nuclear age that, in terms of its essence, content and functions, it proves to be unfit for understanding what is usually termed a nuclear-missile war.

Indeed, the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the phenomenon of war has lost none of its significance and relevance. The formula of Lenin helped and continues to help define, describe and comprehend wars that have already passed into history, those currently raging on, or can be unleashed by aggressive forces. In all these cases, however, it is a question of war in its proper, traditional meaning.

In this particular case, however, we are facing not a version or a special type of war but a social phenomenon of a fundamentally different nature which mankind has not yet come across even theoretically or hypothetically, except in science fiction stories about War of the Worlds. If, however, we were to look for an analogue in the past, in qualitatively similar phenomena, this is not a question of war as such but rather of a special type of disaster.

Lenin's works contain a conclusion, striking in its accuracy, about an inevitable paroxysm of militarism when the latter, merely yielding to its own inertia, would objectively call into question the very survival of civilisation. Also well known is Lenin's idea about the implications of the use of modern scientific and technological achievements for military purposes, which would inevitably lead to undermining “the very foundations of human society”,⁸ with the war thus getting so destructive that it would become altogether impossible.⁹ Today, those words have been filled with a real, tangible content, when the dialectics of evolution of the institution of war has led to a situation where a conflict involving the use of nuclear weapons objectively becomes a self-negation of war, its evolution into a global catastrophe.

Yet, it would be a dangerous misjudgement to regard the aforecited words of Lenin as still another argument favouring the advocates of the nuclear deterrence theory and, consequently, champions of the usefulness

of nuclear weapons which—as asserted by their adherents in the West—have supposedly ensured peace for humanity over the past 40 years. That the idea finds its supporters at present is due, in no small measure, to the fact that far from everybody has realised the real meaning of a nuclear-missile conflict. Under present-day conditions such a conflict can be nothing else but a world cataclysm.

What is involved here is a special and unprecedented form of disaster. First, this is so because it is not only natural (ecological) but also social in character. Second, it can be triggered not by natural calamities as in the past, but by extremely irrational actions of men or particular social forces. Third, in the past nature always succeeded in finding a “way out” after the earthquakes, floods, droughts and other destructive cataclysms, rising anew and developing according to its own self-regulation laws. No matter how staggering the toll of devastation and human losses, mankind always survived. In case of a nuclear disaster, however, the historical process on our planet would be terminated and inhabitation would be disrupted in such a way that restoration of life could be contemplated only with a slight degree of probability.

Consequently, in its very essence a nuclear-missile catastrophe would be an extremely ruinous and, most likely, fatal form of social violence qualitatively differing from war in its usual meaning. As such, it has its “own” objective basis substantially different from the social foundations underlying wars. The latter, in the words of Lenin, are a sequel of a specific historical system of economic and political relations among states and classes, within which a given war germinates. As to the threat of nuclear disaster, it stands in a direct cause-and effect relationship with the sharply contradictory nature of the present-day stage of scientific and technological progress.

In the process of the scientific-technological revolution the numerous contradictions and problems with which the world is replete have been topped off with yet another and perhaps the most perilous one, namely that between the outstanding achievements which have released tremendous forces of nature, on the one hand, and the lagging social, intellectual and moral development of mankind, on the other. While socialism is capable of bringing the accomplishments of scientific and technological progress into accord with the needs of social progress, capitalism is not yet up to it. The social antagonisms tearing it apart, the cult of force, the spirit of profit and the orientation towards confrontation prevailing therein contain objective prerequisites for using the achievements of the scientific-technological revolution in ways catastrophic for mankind.

Therefore, while “excommunicating” nuclear-missile catastrophe from war and linking its threat to the contradictory nature of the scientific-technological revolution, it should not certainly be isolated from politics. Such dissociation fully satisfies ideologues and politicians who futilely try to absolve imperialism of the responsibility for the possibility of such a disaster and seek to shift the burden of blame onto scientific and technological progress alone or to some other non-political circumstances. In reality, the root causes of both nuclear-missile catastrophe and war are identical. Because of its nature, imperialism tends to generate aggressive policies. It is to blame for the two world wars, and is even now creating the threat of a third world war, and pursuing or encouraging numerous local wars.

By the same token, one cannot fail to see that the problem of the genesis of a nuclear-missile disaster cannot be resolved in ways similar to the tactics usually employed with regard to conventional wars. For instance, one of the distinctive features of a nuclear catastrophe is that its social basis is by far narrower than that of reactionary imperialist wars. A better part of even the monopoly bourgeoisie cannot fail to rea-

lise the fatal denouement of such a disaster, even more so because it calls into question the very existence of capitalism as a social system. Not only the catastrophe itself but also the race in the manufacture of its instruments no longer meet the interests of a substantial portion of the capitalist business. The greatest benefits from such a race accrue only to the producers of "nuclear death". As to its effects, which deform the economy as a whole, they impose a painful burden on all the other strata of society, including even the bourgeoisie.

Consequently, the peril of a nuclear catastrophe lies in the egoistical interests of all those directly involved in turning out its instruments and in the senseless policy of the fanatical quarters of imperialism, which think and act in line with the well-known formula: better dead than Red. One cannot rule out that in their unbridled yearning for a social revanche, desire to "contain" socialism and secure world hegemony, those forces might lose control over the mechanism of disaster created by them or deliberately resort to the extreme measure and throw mankind into the abyss of nuclear annihilation.

The genesis of a nuclear catastrophe also contains other elements which make it considerably different from the genesis of wars. It is common knowledge that the latter were usually prepared intentionally. As to a nuclear disaster, it can be triggered not only by a fiasco of political thinking, evil intentions or irrational decisions but also by a "twist of fate", contrary to the aspirations of political leadership.

The possibility of the mechanism of nuclear-missile catastrophe roaring into operation on its own accord lies even in its unprecedented technical complexity. This is why we cannot rule out possible design miscalculations, all sorts of technological defects, malfunctions, mistakes, failures, incorrectly deciphered signals, and even occasional neglect or dereliction on the part of administrative or maintenance personnel. Quite a number of major accidents have been recorded to date in missile silos or aboard submarines equipped with nuclear missiles, which only by a piece of luck have not produced fatal consequences. What's more, in the United States there was even a case of unintentional launch of three rockets, by good fortune meteorological, caused by a lightning stroke. What would have happened had it been strategic missiles with nuclear warheads?

Thus, we see that the mechanism of nuclear catastrophe can be set in motion both for political reasons and due to a whole set of technical and other factors. Since it has not yet proved possible to arrest the process of this machinery getting increasingly complicated, its relative independence with regard to political control tends to grow and the sphere of operation of unpredictable factors, including accidents, gains in scope. It is precisely this feature of operation of the nuclear disaster mechanism that is disregarded by the champions of the nuclear deterrence doctrine (in English it is called "clear nuclear deterrence"). They are blinded by anti-communism and anti-Sovietism to the extent that they cannot realistically assess both the utterly unusual nature of the situation, the dangers inherent in the dynamics of growth of the nuclear catastrophe machinery, and the totally untraditional character of the mechanism putting it into operation, which is very much different from preparations for and the launching of conventional wars.

Advocates of the nuclear deterrence concept assign to nuclear weapons a role which is little short of a peace-keeper. It is allegedly due to these weapons—the most fearsome means of annihilation in the entire human history—that mankind has been able to exist in peace for so long a period of time. They are not even disconcerted by the failure to find out, on the basis of this concept, why nuclear weapons have had no restraining impact on local wars and military conflicts. Since the inception

of those weapons, the number of such wars and conflicts has increased rather than gone down. While between the First and the Second World Wars imperialism unleashed 59 wars and armed conflicts, from 1945 to 1967 the number nearly doubled, jumping to 112.

Yet, this is not the main thing. Even assuming that nuclear deterrence has something to do with containment for instance, of a world war, a natural question arises as to what tribute mankind pays for such containment. It is fraught with an incomparably more perilous danger than any war, i. e., a global holocaust and the annihilation of the entire human race.

Besides, the Damocles sword of nuclear deterrence poisons, through the very fact of its existence, the atmosphere of interstate communication and erodes the moral and psychological foundations of humanity. The same soil procreates the seeds of mutual distrust, suspicion and rabid anti-Sovietism by virtue of attempts made to justify the nuclear deterrence policy through the spread of mythical fears concerning a Soviet military threat.

The arguments adduced in this connection with regard to the "conflict" nature of the Marxist-Leninist ideology which, as is alleged, automatically brings forth an expansionist foreign policy, are hundred percent spurious. The scientific substantiation of the conclusion concerning the historical foreordination of the triumph of socialism has nothing in common with the advocacy of a forceful export of revolution, attributed to Marxism-Leninism. It is only up to the people of a given country whether they opt for socialism or capitalism. The cornerstone of Marxism-Leninism is the provision that socialism stems from within by virtue of objective processes and cannot be imposed from outside. This principle has always been steadfastly complied with by Communists and is given particular significance today, when the world is replete and overflowing with conventional and nuclear weapons, when it is confronted with the real threat of a global catastrophe.

All sorts of anti-communist concepts, a crucial part in which is played by the unchanging premise concerning a special type of aggressiveness of the Marxist-Leninist ideology and, consequently, an alleged "expansionist" nature of Soviet foreign policy, rest on a perverted interpretation of the role of violence in this scientific concept of social progress. It goes without saying that violence and revolution are interrelated notions. From the standpoint of Marxism-Leninism, revolutionary violence can, in certain circumstances, play the role of a sort of accelerator of history, a midwife of an old society pregnant with a new one.

But, first, the founding fathers of scientific communism were very far from absolutising violence, regarding it as an inescapable evil; they stressed in every way the need to minimise revolutionary coercion and to apply the most rational and human forms of violence. Second and probably most important, speaking of the feasibility of measures of violence, we cannot treat it in a non-Marxist, undialectical way. In a given set of specific historical conditions, revolutionary violence is fully justified because it expresses the interests of the majority of people in a society and, therefore, has an objectively humane character while in other conditions, by virtue of the same reasons, it assumes the form of a struggle against reactionary violence resorted to by the classes which retire from the political stage. The latter acquires a special significance under present-day conditions when we are talking about preventing a nuclear-missile conflict, ensuring survival of humanity and overcoming the global confrontation fanned by the extremist imperialist quarters. The task becomes even more urgent because the new type weapons which are no longer weapons of warfare but of world holocaust, render the confrontation and its consequences truly apocalyptic in nature.

Under these circumstances, an integral component of the new political thinking is realisation of the fundamental truth that an alternative to war is not a nuclear deterrence machinery possessing a monstrous destructive power and, on top of everything else, prone to malfunction but the creation of a potent politico-legal mechanism for regulating international relations, which could find its point of departure in a comprehensive system of international security, the idea of which has been put forward by the 27th CPSU Congress.

The unique feature of the current stage in international relations is that the policies pursued by the most reactionary imperialist quarters occasionally result, and can well entail in future, in relatively traditional wars various in type and different in scope. By the same token, should the loss of reason prevail in those policies, they could plunge humankind into a nuclear catastrophe as well. The latter, as already noted, can also emanate from a range of non-political factors.

In this context, there is the need to theoretically analyse the issues of relationship between war and catastrophe, as well as some resultant implications for the defence of our socialist Motherland.

The difference between war and catastrophe notwithstanding, it would be a dangerous misjudgement to exaggerate, let alone absolutise, the line dividing them. Abstractly speaking, in conditions of today's explosive international situation and with due regard for the sophisticated instruments of warfare and the high mobility of armies, virtually every local war, no matter what region of the world it breaks out, can serve as the prologue to a nuclear disaster. This conclusion is not merely hypothetical. Facts show that in a good many wars and military conflicts launched or instigated by imperialism since World War II, the aggressors were quite often on the verge of resorting to nuclear arms. According to the Brookings Institution, on 19 occasions between 1946 and 1975 the United States was on the brink of employing nuclear weapons.

It would be logical to presume that in the future as well, should an aggressor resort to war, and particularly in case of the developments taking a turn unfavourable to him, he might extend his hands towards nuclear weapons and trigger a universal disaster. This is why an imperative of the new political thinking is the demand for extreme caution and prudence as regards any war that is waged or can be started by the reactionary forces, and in particular the wars which involve or can involve states possessing the means for waging a nuclear war.

The idea of difference and relationship between a conventional war and a nuclear disaster is present in the doctrines and strategies of the United States and its NATO allies. On the one hand, they are actively preparing for conventional wars; for example, the United States spends 80 per cent of its military appropriations on the manufacture of conventional arms. The May 1987 session of the NATO Defense Planning Committee decided to proceed with a large-scale buildup of conventional arms. The headquarters of the Atlantic alliance is vigorously engaged in hammering out countless scenarios of operations without nuclear weapons at different war theatres and searching for effective forms and methods of warfare, which are tried and tested during sundry military exercises and manoeuvres.

On the other hand, the US military and political leadership draws up scenarios of a nuclear attack against the USSR and other socialist countries. In late 1945, as is known, it nurtured plans of a surprise attack on the Soviet Unions—plans which in subsequent years were incorporated into detailed scripts of a nuclear aggression.

Nowadays, Washington has armed itself with a so-called new military strategy which has been described by the Pentagon as a strategy of "direct confrontation" between the USA and the USSR on a global and regional scale. It has formally confirmed the US position concerning the possibility and admissibility of a "limited" nuclear war. According to the Defense Guide for 1984-1988, the new nuclear strategy stipulates that the US armed forces should be capable of wiping out the entire Soviet military and political system as well as those connected with it. Pursuant to that strategic directive, the triad of the US offensive nuclear forces has marked more than 40,000 targets in the territories of the USSR, other socialist countries, and developing nations.

This is why the Soviet military concept takes account of the need to tackle two related tasks, i. e., to be prepared to wage any war that might be imposed on us by the militarist forces of imperialism, and to have everything essential for divesting those forces of the hopes of launching a first, disarming nuclear-missile strike against the USSR. In other words, our defence and related military policy, is the preparedness to defend the Soviet Motherland and, at the same time, to head off a nuclear catastrophe.

This is the position of the USSR. But an immediate question arises: what is the role played nowadays by the armies of the nuclear powers? In his remarks concerning the essence and mission of armies, Lenin pointed out their class nature. According to Lenin, militarism is the "vital expression" of capitalism, a "military force used by the capitalist states in their external conflicts", as well as a weapon employed by the ruling classes to suppress all types of liberation movements.¹⁰ The genesis and mission of the socialist army, as repeatedly emphasised in Lenin's works, are predicated on but one historically warranted need—protection of the revolutionary gains of socialism.

Thus, notwithstanding their social and functional distinctions, armies have always existed for wars, whether just or unjust, and have always been the main instrument of war. Since wars as a form of social violence have not yet become obsolete and there remains a far from abstract possibility of their breaking out in future as well, armies retain the aforementioned attributes.

The new realities of the latter half of the 20th century, however, have lied up the armies of the nuclear powers with a by far bleaker prospect. They can also evolve from an instrument of war into a means of nuclear disaster. This new circumstance has also affected the structure of armies which appear to have become bisected, with one, the most sizeable, part thereof, i. e. general-purpose troop formations, continuing to play the role of the instrument of warfare while another, armed with strategic nuclear missiles, being no longer related to war but to a nuclear-missile catastrophe. While organically integrated into the armed forces as a whole, strategic nuclear forces constitute a relatively independent entity and are controlled exclusively by the supreme political leadership of a given country. Furthermore, the strategic offensive triad of the imperialist armies is geared to pose a threat of nuclear strike and, under certain conditions, to translate that threat into reality.

As to the strategic nuclear forces of the USSR, they are called upon to fulfil the mission of averting such a catastrophe and to be an instrument of retaliation. It is, above all, these goals that are pursued by the military and strategic parity established and constantly maintained by the Soviet Union. Fully in keeping with the defensive thrust of the Soviet military doctrine and unlike the US triad, the strategic nuclear triad of the USSR is not called and does not constitute "strategic offensive forces". Its entire organisation, deployment and combat training fully accord with the obligation assumed by the Soviet Union in 1982 not to

be the first to use nuclear weapons. That obligation has been formally incorporated as a fundamental principle into the military doctrine adopted by the Warsaw Treaty member states at the Berlin meeting of their highest body in May 1987. The one and only mission of the strategic nuclear triad existing in the USSR is to ensure that the nuclear maniacs do not entertain the slightest hope of evading retribution should they, contrary to common sense, risk to resort to the first, so-called disarming strike.

The abovenoted division of armies into "conventional forces" and "nuclear strategic forces", with due regard to the peculiar character of the functions performed by each of them, is certainly very provisory and should not be absolutised. For, indeed, nuclear systems of various types and missions have already penetrated general-purpose forces as well. Yet, we believe that there do exist quite valid reasons to notice and take into account those distinctions.

Such an approach makes it possible to see the theoretical untenability and practical harmfulness of all sorts of pronouncements occasionally encountered in our press concerning a by now "pointless" military profession, a certain devaluation (either in progress or already in effect) of the art of command and warfare, and even something little short of "atrophy" of the need for military and patriotic education of Soviet people.

The concept of distinguishing war and nuclear-missile catastrophe from the related understanding of the functions performed by "conventional" and "nuclear strategic" forces enables us to gain a deeper insight into the objective need to find the best possible ways (taking into account the military policy of imperialism) of dealing with the tasks of maintaining the nation's defence and building the armed forces on a level that would enable us to avert a nuclear disaster and to repel any military attack on the USSR and its allies.

In the light of this concept, it is easier to see the profound meaning of the fundamental provisions in the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty member states. It accentuates a forced but essential effort made by the allied socialist states to maintain the type of armed forces that would enable them to repulse any outside attack against any state party to the treaty.

We are of the view that the further elaboration of the above concept of correlation of nuclear catastrophe, war and politics is called upon to expand philosophical and sociological knowledge of peace, war, army, defence of the socialist Motherland, the place and role of the human factor in coping with multifaceted defence tasks and to promote military science in keeping with the defensive military doctrine of the Soviet state.

An important consequence of the conceptual approach (in line with the new thinking) to comprehending the essence of a nuclear-missile catastrophe is the need for more closely coordinated steps towards resolving the theoretical and practical problems of foreign and defence policies. Never before have the related crucial tasks been so conjoined. The problems of averting a nuclear disaster, securing a nuclear-free world, of the readiness and ability to repel the aggressive designs of the militaristic forces of imperialism, and many other tasks related to reliable defence of the Soviet people's peaceful work can now be successfully tackled only through concerted efforts both in international affairs and in the military sphere.

To avert a nuclear catastrophe, to stem it through the creation of a comprehensive system of international peace and security is imperative,

as Mikhail Gorbachev stressed in a *Pravda* article on September 17, 1987, "because it is impossible to put up with the situation in which the world has found itself as the third millennium draws high—in the face of a threat of annihilation, in a state of constant tension, in an atmosphere of suspicion and strife, spending huge funds and quantities of work and talent by millions of people only to increase mutual distrust and fears".

¹ *The Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Moscow, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1986, p. 22.

² *Комсомольская правда*, Nov. 12, 1986.

³ *Правда*, Feb. 17, 1987.

⁴ See *World Marxist Review*, No. 5, 1987, pp. 17-18.

⁵ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1987, p. 147.

⁶ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works* Vol. 21, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1964, p. 219.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Vol. 25, pp. 32-33.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Vol. 36, p. 396.

⁹ See Н. К. Крупская о Ленине Politizdat, 1965, pp. 56-57.

¹⁰ See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, 1963, p. 192.

EGYPT'S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1980s

(Continued from page 74)

has remained. There are signs of change in the Middle East policy of Egypt, and advancing along this course will help further strengthen the country's position in the Middle East.

¹ *Al-Ahram*, March 14, 1986.

² *Ibidem*.

³ Quoted from *Al-Ahram*, March 12, 1984.

⁴ *As Shark Al-Awsat*, Jan. 22, 1983.

⁵ *The Egyptian Point of View on International Issues, Egyptian Moves in the International Arena*, Arab Republic of Egypt, Ministry of Information, 1986, p. 12.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16.

⁹ *al-Ahram*, Apr. 12, 1987.

¹⁰ See *The Financial Times*, Oct. 6, 1986.

¹¹ *Cairo Today*, August 1983.

¹² *Al-Ahram*, Aug. 20, 1983.

¹³ *Ibidem*.

EXPECTATIONS AND CONCERNS OF THE INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S MOVEMENT

Freda BROWN,

President of the Women's International Democratic Federation

Anniversaries are always a time to look backward and forward, especially when it is the anniversary of seven decades of the first socialist society. All honest thinking people must agree that these 70 years have seen spectacular achievements. That the Soviet Union is able to reassess its history, to discuss its mistakes is no sign of weakness but of a virile and strong society. A deep analysis of these problems revealed before the whole world will be of inestimable value to other states as they advance to socialism and help them to avoid the mistakes and errors that it was almost inevitable a new society would make as it charted for a first time a new path forward for humanity.

My interest in looking at these seven decades is to see how the position of women is evaluated after seven socialist decades, how socialism has striven to apply the teachings of Bebel, Marx, Engels and Lenin, and how the basic contradiction of women's role as mothers and workers has been and is being reconciled and to what extent equality is a reality, de facto as well as de jure.

A fundamental, and I believe still basically correct, analysis of women's position in society has been made by Marx, Engels, Bebel and Lenin. Much, since then, has occurred of relevance to women's position in society—the Great October Socialist Revolution, a socialist community of nations, the liberation of the colonies, the struggle against fascism and the development of the women's liberation movement in the 1970's. But little real fundamental study and writing has been produced on women's position.

Socialism has not automatically dispelled "sexism": although the very word is an anathema seldom seen in Marxist writings. Is it because it is not openly recognised that it does exist?

Women's oppression reaches back to the earliest historical era, women anthropologists have in recent years advanced some interesting theories based on their studies, they merit Marxist attention. Much has been achieved by and for women under socialism but their complete emancipation is not just an economic question, it needs to be analysed socially to be able to seek to root out the psychological forms of oppression, that are much deeper and more painful to confront.

It is now clear that the solution of "women's problem" (but why is it "women's problem", maybe it's better formulated as "society's problem") is no simple one. Even after 70 years of socialism the problem remains and today is widely and hotly debated.

It is wise that a mass women's organisation of councils is being re-established in the USSR, for it is clear that women do need their own organisation. While women are widely integrated into other mass public organisations—trade union, youth, etc.—just look at the balance in leadership in government and non-government organisations, look at the delegations. The preponderance of males gives answer to why women still need their own organisation.

It is often posed to me as to why this is so. Women do have specific problems, they need the confidence, the support and the assurance that an all women's organisation gives them for they still have not achieved equal or adequate representation in the organs of state or party power. Are not the professions where women dominate still the lowest paid? Even in professions where women dominate, are not men usually in the positions of leadership and power?

True facilities for child care and services under socialism are miles ahead of the capitalist world, legally and in practice women are entitled to equal pay, opportunity for education, but the problem in the family remains. Women still bear a double and often triple burden as worker, mother and social activist.

Some are seeing the solution as opting for women to stay home and mind the children. But the majority of women do not want this, nor is it desirable. But what women do need are improved services, maybe shorter hours while the children are young; it is good now that in some laws "paternal leave" as well as "maternal leave" is specified. Maybe after children have grown the special courses to retrain women so they can quickly regain their position in their profession should be extended and assured—we call it "affirmative action."

These questions are of vital concern not only to Soviet women but to women the world over. How the Soviet Union and other socialist countries solve these problems will be a yardstick by which women judge socialism.

I've been recently disquieted to hear and read statements by both Soviet men and women that women have "too much equality". Many women in the West and I fear in socialist society are opting not to have children because it interferes with advancement in their profession. This is a personal and social tragedy for to most human beings, especially women, fulfilment comes with children and grandchildren. Women should not have to choose, men do not have to choose between professional satisfaction and the joy of a family.

1976-85 saw the UN Decade for Women at its final Conference in Nairobi adopt a profound document, The Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women. In the historical background it states:

"In some countries and in some areas, women have made significant advances, but overall progress has been modest during the Decade, as is evident from the review and appraisal. During this period, women's consciousness and expectations have been raised, and it is important that this momentum should not be lost, regardless of the poor performance of the world economy. The changes occurring in the family, in women's roles and in relationships between women and men may present new challenges requiring new perspectives, strategies and measures. At the same time it will be necessary to build alliances and solidarity groups across sexual lines in an attempt to overcome structural obstacles to the advancement of women." This document, the Forward Looking Strategies, merits study by all seriously concerned with this problem.

None would challenge that today women play an increased role in the work force, in the peace movement, in the trade unions, youth and student movement and with great courage in the struggle for national

liberation. This was vividly reflected at the recent World Congress of Women in Moscow in June 1987 held under the motto Towards 2000 Without Nuclear Weapons, for Equality, Development and Peace.

Though initiated by the Women's International Democratic Federation, the Congress was prepared by consulting many organisations holding diverse political and social views.

National preparatory committees' work resulted in over 2800 women from 154 countries representing over 1000 organisations of different ideological orientation attending. Social Democrats, Communists, Christian Democrats, liberals, Feminists, trade unionists, peace, youth, religious workers, 52 MPs, 5 Senators, 17 Government ministers, over 100 scientists, writers, artists, 25 representatives from the UN system, and 820 from the mass media.

Over 50 consultations were held internationally, regionally and nationally. They did result in us making many changes, not just superficial or cosmetic changes. We really listened, analysed the criticism and reservations and sought to meet them.

We found many women had reservations, they feared they might be manipulated, pressured into voting when they had no mandate from their organisation or had personal doubts about being committed. After many consultations, and frankly after much agonising on our part, we decided to have no resolutions and no voting at the Congress. It was one of the reasons that such a broad spectrum of women attended. It may not apply in future but for that moment in history it was a correct decision to have no documents; so women felt quite free to say what they wished, 'to raise the most controversial of questions. And this they did, in the commissions and other Congress events and by spontaneously organising their own workshops on subjects of concern to them on which they wanted greater clarification after the commissions finished.

Congress organisation was flexible and reflected the results of the consultations. There were two quite short plenary sessions to open and close the Congress held in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses with 5000 participants, at which Mikhail Gorbachev welcomed the women and expressed appreciation of their role in the struggle against nuclear war. The chairman of the non-aligned movement, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, and leading women spoke Margaret Anstee, who conveyed the greetings of the UN Secretary General, Margaret Papan-dreou of Women for a Meaningful Summit; Ifigenia Martinez of Women Parliamentarians for Peace; Aruna Asaf Ali of India; Ruth Neto, Pan African Women's Organisation; Zoya Puchova, President of the Soviet Women's Committee; Freda Brown, President of the WIDF; Linda Matar, Lebanon; and Patricia Montandon and her Children as Peacemakers greeted the Congress.

The program was so arranged that every woman who wished could speak. The Congress worked in six languages, there were 8 commissions, 3 centres, 24 workshops, round tables, 70 spontaneous workshops and dialogues arranged on the initiative of the participants on the spot and 3 mass solidarity meetings with women of South Africa, Central America and the Middle East.

Hearings under a panel of women lawyers heard the testimony of over 50 witnesses on the violation of human rights, many themselves victims of mental and physical torture. The testimony has been sent to the Human Rights Commission and the UN Commission on the Status of Women.

The organisation of the Congress in so many different forms resulted from the many requests made to us to find the way to include all the subjects women wanted to discuss and in a way that they would feel comfortable and able to frankly speak.

There was no compulsion, no pressure, women attended what they wanted and when they wanted. Facilities were available day and night for workshops and informal discussions. Women were thus exposed to new ideas, they met with political prisoners just released from oppressive regimes, young women who came illegally from the apartheid regime, women who were war victims, unemployed women.

Many of the participants were in the Soviet Union for the first time, they joined the march through the Moscow streets, with their banners and shouting slogans, they attended a mass peace rally in Gorky Park, and they were invited into the homes of Moscow families for a meal and discussions. More than 100 national organisations brought exhibitions, films, videos, badges, leaflets, posters and a great solidarity bazaar.

The question inevitably comes: "What did the Congress achieve"? I find it rather politically naive to raise such a question. No one congress, no one meeting, one march can be said to accomplish great social advances. It is part of an ongoing process, it is part of organisations, education, mobilising forces, clarifying methods, finding ways through to confidence-building, a willingness to work together, building bridges and maybe finding a way to improving organisational forms, as women are sharing experiences.

The Women's International Democratic Federation is still in the process of analysing the results, and seeking the ways forward.

How we co-operate, with whom, around what issues is being analysed. To co-operate we must be willing frequently to compromise, to make concessions, to be wise enough to measure at what stage principles are involved and our concessions must cease. We must prove to our partners our willingness to listen and if necessary to change. And all this is easy to say but much more difficult to do.

It is time we looked again at the forms and methods of the WIDF itself, how to attract more national organisations, to broaden our base, to assist our national organisations, to work more openly with other organisations even if to begin we can agree on only one question.

The women's peace movement has many lessons. In the 1980's the creativity and courage of women spontaneously moved to action against the threat of nuclear annihilation saw the great peace marches across Europe, the women's peace camps in Greenham Common, Seneca Falls, Pine Gap and many others. These were not initiated by us and in the beginning were even regarded with some suspicion. The wisdom and creativity of women once moved has been reflected in their actions for peace, for their rights, and for solidarity with their sisters in other countries.

The peace actions of the USSR have had profound impact on women. The lie that "both super powers were equally to blame" was exploded with the Soviet moratorium on testing, their proposals to eradicate all nuclear weapons by the year 2000, their plan for "Space Peace".

Let us not underestimate women's capacity to grasp the essence of the changed climate. The challenge to us is to broaden our co-operation, seek to add new organisations as members of the WIDF.

USSR and UNESCO: Prospects for Cooperation

In the end of November 1987 the 24th session of the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) finished its work. It summed up the progress made, mapped guidelines for its work in the subsequent ten years, and elected a new Director-General.¹

In recent years the organisation has experienced serious political and financial difficulties caused, primarily, by the withdrawal of the USA and Britain from it, and the upset of the balance of member countries' interests. There appeared visible signs of its decline and stagnation, and its resources were not infrequently used to finance petty undertakings duplicating each other. Under these circumstances many states have increasingly come to believe that it is necessary and possible to reorganise its activities. A better functioning of this organisation would restore its status as a universal agency.

The Soviet Union regards UNESCO as a major and respected international agency within the UN framework which enjoys considerable influence among scientists and other intellectuals throughout the world. Cooperation within this organisation enables the states to most fully reveal their spiritual and intellectual potential, share their unique cultures and arrange scientific exchanges in various fields of endeavour. The Soviet Union believes that UNESCO has every opportunity to overcome its difficulties and achieve its goal of contributing to the consolidation of universal security by expanding international cooperation in such fields as education, science and culture. In this connection much depends on the willingness of states to display a concerned, competent and unorthodox approach to the problems facing the world community.

With these aims in view, the Soviet Union put forward a number of proposals intended to strengthen the UN and raise the efficiency of its specialised agencies. First of all, UNESCO has to raise its professional and intellectual level by contributing to a broader dialogue among politicians and promoting contacts between public figures, scientists and cultural workers.

To these ends the Soviet Union has expanded its commission for UNESCO affairs by including in it prominent scientists, education specialists, world-famous cultural workers representing all its union republics, and clergymen. The aim of this reorganisation is to make a greater contribution to UNESCO's activities and make the participation of the related Soviet agencies more efficient. This step is just a form of broader involvement of new creative forces in the activities of UNESCO.

The stand of the Soviet delegation at the recent UNESCO General Conference is a continuation of the Soviet foreign policy, which pursues the goal of consolidating multiform international cooperation. The Soviet Union proposed to hold in Moscow an international forum on humanitarian problems. The aim of this forum would be to elaborate a programme of cooperation which would help improve peoples' living conditions and ensure their social security and political rights. A world con-

sultative body under UN auspices proposed by the Soviet Union could encourage this cooperation. Such a body could also rally the efforts of the most representative and authoritative intellectual forces of the planet whose duty is to enrich the spiritual and ethical potential of world politics.

The Soviet Union proceeds from the premise that UNESCO's activities should be useful and recompense material and intellectual inputs by yielding political and economic benefits. That is why in the forthcoming period it will pay particular attention to scientific cooperation, especially in fundamental sciences. Soviet specialists are prepared to share their achievements which Soviet science is proud of. In this field it would be most appropriate to set up open scientific laboratories and international UNESCO-supervised teams of scientists who would tackle global problems.

UNESCO's terms of reference also include the task of ensuring international ecological security. Indeed, many of its programmes were initiated to ensure a more rational use of natural resources, the air basin and the oceans as the property of all peoples, and to avert their depletion and pollution. It is impossible to solve these problems without constructive world-wide cooperation. This interaction would be a tangible alternative to the squandering of the social and intellectual resources of humankind with the aim of improving weapons.

In the field of social sciences it would be quite useful to elaborate, within the UNESCO framework, the problem of promoting human rights in conditions of different socio-economic systems. Soviet specialists believe that the top priority in this field is the recognition of human life as the supreme value. States should not slacken their attention to the efforts to ensure appropriate conditions for a harmonious development of the human personality. The basic programme of UNESCO in this area could be the system of international agreements and obligations in the sphere of human rights that has evolved within the UN framework. A new interesting trend here could be research into, and the practical implementation of, the concept of peoples' rights and the study of the correlation between peoples' rights and human rights.

The importance of such research is confirmed by the fact that during the debate at the General Conference delegates from the developing countries, relying on the support of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, spoke in favour of expanding UNESCO-sponsored research and measures aimed at eradicating illiteracy in the world and at eliminating racism, apartheid and racial discrimination. Unfortunately, these initiatives have not always met with understanding on the part of the Western countries.

One of the main lessons to be drawn from the recent session is the recognition of the need to alter educational programmes to keep pace with scientific and technological progress. This problem is acute also in the Soviet Union. That is why it is advisable to direct the USSR's participation in relevant UNESCO activities at assimilating the experience of other industrialised states so as to utilise its positive elements.

The World Decade for Cultural Development (1988-1997), proclaimed by the United Nations, will be the cornerstone of the UNESCO programme in the field of culture. An appropriate use of this organisation's facilities and resources will aim this programme at breaking down the stereotype images conceived by peoples about each other. The Soviet Union can, and should, make a more efficient use of UNESCO's new ventures in order to learn to apply new forms of cooperation with cultural workers, the world public, and intellectuals.² It is expected that in this connection a great impact will be made by the celebration of the millennium of Christianity in Russia.

Interstate cooperation in the field of information is an important sphere of UNESCO's activities. In this field the Soviet Union favours humanising the information flows and ridding them of stereotypes and cliches which have been inherited from the cold war times. The USSR is prepared to engage in more exchanges of TV and radio programmes with the countries of the West as well as the non-aligned and neutral states on the basis of a balanced approach, equality, openness and respect for the laws and cultural integrity of nations.

UNESCO's participation in establishing a world information programme under UN auspices is of particular interest. It is planned to use TV channels and computer communications of UNESCO to bring together cultures of various countries on the principles of tolerance and non-violence, and by ensuring the right to live in peace and enjoy freedom.

The Soviet Union would like to see UNESCO as a truly modern and authoritative organisation enjoying support and pooling together the best intellectual forces of the world. This unity should stem from long-term creative efforts of states and carefully balanced interests of various countries striving to understand each other and cooperate on the basis of objectively growing interdependence and integrity of the international community.

The spirit of cooperation and constructive reciprocal understanding at the recent UNESCO session showed that this solidarity is not only possible but, indeed, indispensable for member countries at the present turning point in world development.

Marina VENYAMINOVA

¹ The new Director-General is Federico Major Saragoza, a prominent Spanish biochemist and a member of the Royal Medical Academy. Earlier F. Major had been UNESCO Deputy Director-General (1978-1981), special advisor to the UNESCO Director-General (1983-1984). F. Major is an author of many books and scientific works, and also an honourable member of the academies of sciences of many countries.

² The Soviet Union has already set up a national committee for holding the decade and elaborated a programme for its activities for the next two years.

FIRST OF ALL WE HAVE TO STOP THE ARMS RACE

Mário SOARES

President of the Portuguese Republic Mário Soares paid an official visit to the Soviet Union at the end of November 1987. *International Affairs* asked him for an interview which follows below

Mr. President, while in Moscow, you stated that Soviet-Portuguese relations have yet to reach the desired level. In your opinion, what can be done by the two countries to promote bilateral economic, political and cultural relations?

At present, both sides are displaying their political will to develop bilateral relations. We have already signed major economic agreements on cooperation in industry, trade, and technology exchange. In addition, we see the development of contacts between the Portuguese business community and Soviet enterprises. The Portuguese Foreign Minister invited a delegation from the USSR Academy of Sciences to discuss various matters and among them bilateral cooperation in science and technology. In my opinion, we have now established all necessary conditions to extend our relations, raising them to a qualitatively new level.

What is the opinion of Portugal as regards security and disarmament problems in Europe? What is to be done to make Europe a continent of peace and cooperation?

We believe that at present there is need for negotiations to be conducted in good faith with a view to concluding agreements. To the great satisfaction of all, December 1987 is to be marked for an event of truly historic magnitude—the signing in Washington of an agreement by Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan on the elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles. After this, further negotiations will follow.

The very fact that for the first time an agreement was signed on the reduction of nuclear missiles has in itself a great political and psychological effect. I believe that the accords will have a positive impact on the international situation. Other proposals are being discussed as well, for instance, on the elimination of chemical weapons, the reduction of conventional arms and certain other types of nuclear weapons.

It is possible that Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan will meet again in 1988. If this comes true the world will sigh with relief, for it will be a major stride in the field of disarmament and international detente. Portugal supports any efforts in the direction of peace, disarmament and security.

Probably, one can hardly expect to ensure lasting and secure peace unless the numerous problems facing the developing countries are resolved. What solutions could you propose to these problems?

As Willy Brandt said ten years ago, it is necessary to invigorate the North-South dialogue. The more economically developed countries of the North should render support to overcome the lag of the less-developed countries of the South in order to raise the standard of living there, to improve their health-care and education systems.

This dialogue cannot be viewed in isolation from the East-West relations, but it would be just idle talk if the arms race continues. When I am asked where is the key to the problems besieging the less-developed countries, I invariably answer: "First of all it is necessary to stop the arms race and develop international cooperation so that all nations would have ample opportunities to attain happiness and well-being."

REAL ALTERNATIVE

Taisto SINISALO.

In his report *October and Perestroika: The Revolution Continues* Mikhail Gorbachev substantiated the need for, and the feasibility of, creating a comprehensive system of international security in the context of disarmament. He stressed the need to "identify the laws governing the interaction of the forces which, through rivalry, contradictions and conflicting interests, can produce the desired effect". In this connection the report poses a number of theoretical problems of international development.

The editorial board of *International Affairs* requested Taisto Sinisalo, Chairman of the Communist Party of Finland (Unity) to comment on these problems. His opinion is published below.

First of all, I would like to say that the questions of creating conditions for the establishment of a comprehensive security system, posed by Comrade Gorbachev at the grand meeting dedicated to the jubilee of the October Revolution, will be a subject for a rather careful consideration. They will attract the close attention not only of Communists but also of the public at large. The very statement of these questions makes the problems of a new way of thinking deep-going and imbues them with special content. We are entering a new stage in the evolution of the Leninist theory and the policy of peaceful coexistence.

The further development and extension of the new way of thinking is also a challenge to the capitalist system. If it is a system which cannot function without militarism and the exploitation of the Third World then it will find itself in an ever more acute contradiction with the mounting aspirations of nations for freedom and peace. This crisis opens new prospects for peace-loving forces. The struggle for the global interests and security of mankind will increasingly intertwine with the class struggle led by the working class.

I regard all these questions as an integral whole and shall examine them taking into account the interests of a particular region: Northern Europe. The general train of thoughts makes me generalise the example and experience of Finland in peaceful coexistence and extend it to the prospects for ensuring security for Northern Europe as a whole.

The postwar history of Finland shows that capitalism is capable of major transformations in policy and economy. The bourgeoisie is capable of adapting to peaceful coexistence and of elaborating new class tactics. For instance, the pattern of our economy and foreign trade has noticeably changed since 1944. Cooperation with the Soviet Union has given a strong impetus to the development of our economy.

The postwar experience of Finland enables us to draw yet another conclusion: economy can expand without militarism. Despite the fact that the significance of Finland's experience is limited, a bold generalisation shows that capitalism can exist—and, indeed exist successfully—without militarism. For instance, in recent years Finland was among the leading developed capitalist countries in terms of its economic growth rates.

The impact of this experience is already visible in the discussions on the prospects for the development of Northern Europe. The broad programme for the ensuring of security and promotion of cooperation in Northern Europe, advanced in Murmansk by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, was a strong impetus to the continuation of these discussions. It became the basis for the proposal that the workers' parties in the countries of Northern Europe and other democratic forces should start identifying without delay the prospects for the improvement of cooperation in this direction. Such a proposal was put forward by Jouko Kajanoja, General Secretary of the CPF(U) at the meeting of representatives of parties and movements held in Moscow on November 4-5, 1987.

Even now one can see many opportunities for turning Northern Europe into a zone of peaceful cooperation. There are also grounds to believe that the level of the economy and the well-being of the countries, combined with the new prospects opened up by scientific and technological progress, enables us to give up militaristic features in the economy and renounce inequality in economic relations with the developing countries.

There are many opportunities for such peaceful economic cooperation. For example, cooperation with the USSR in the use of natural resources on the Kola Peninsula and in the Barents Sea could become a sphere of an extensive and long-term cooperation capable of exerting a positive impact on the entire economic structures of the participating countries. The political situation in the Nordic countries quite favours a transition to a mutually beneficial economic cooperation with the developing countries. A discrimination-free and truly all-European cooperation in economy, science, technology and culture depends entirely on political will. Speaking in concert against isolated economic blocs, the countries of Northern Europe could change the situation in the whole of Europe.

As far as north-European cooperation in this direction is concerned, we still have a long way to go. There are some obstacles such as the membership of Norway and Denmark in NATO. However, the requirements of cooperation in the humanitarian sphere can facilitate changes in the internal political situation and in the international climate. Public opinion which welcomed the ideas of peace and cooperation is an impressive political force.

It is possible to turn Northern Europe into a zone of security, a zone free of militarisation. Such a movement would be an important example even if it were limited to a specific region. Its influence could be particularly strong in Europe. And it would be a major step towards eliminating the military threat existing in Northern Europe—a threat caused by the spread of the arms race to this region.

It seems that now it is difficult to foresee the impact of such a process on the social structure. However, the emergence of such a new situation would be undoubtedly a victory for the process of democratic development. Taking into account the political situation obtaining in Northern Europe, one can conclude that this process will be strongly influenced by the development of the social-democratic movement.

In any case, a livelier debate on these questions shows that the interests of social progress are kept in mind. There is an alternative to war and annihilation of the world.

SOVIET PEACE EFFORTS MEET THE INTERESTS OF OPPRESSED PEOPLES

Alfred N Z O

International Affairs correspondent was granted the following interview on the situation in the South of Africa by Alfred Nzo, General Secretary of the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC).

Comrade Nzo, a year ago the African National Congress marked the 75th anniversary of its foundation. What are the results attained by the ANC over that period and its goals for the future?

Indeed, on January 8, 1987, the ANC celebrated a remarkable event: its 75th anniversary. One can say with confidence that over that period the ANC has traversed a road marked by major successes and achievements. Of course, that was a thorny path. However, our struggle has always been notable for its continuity and perseverance in striving for the strategic goals which our people have set themselves, namely taking over power and setting up a democratic community devoid of racial discrimination. The main goal is national liberation.

The experience accumulated by our movement once again confirms the indisputable fact that there is no force capable of breaking the will of a people resolved to attain its objective. Over the period of its existence the ANC has inspired and taught the oppressed majority in South Africa to wage an armed struggle for its rights, formulate clear-cut goals, clearly perceive the final result of its efforts and to grasp the political implications of various events.

The June 22, 1955 conference of representatives of all progressive and democratic organisations of South Africa, irrespective of their political or racial affiliations, became a milestone in our struggle. The Freedom Charter approved by the conference formulated the historic outlook for our movement. It states, in particular, that South Africa belongs to all its inhabitants, blacks or whites, and that no government could be authoritative or lawful unless it relies on the will of all people. In other words, we are fighting for a South Africa governed by democracy and where all the people, regardless of colour of their skin, would be equal in their quest for a new life.

Since the adoption of this major instrument no one has been entertaining any doubts as to the movement's goals and tasks. Moreover, the unambiguous wording of our goals so scared the ruling minority that immediately after the adoption of the charter the leaders of democratic organisations were subjected to severe reprisals. This is only too natural. Indeed, the racists are quite scared by the prospect of democracy for all. That is why even today, thirty years after its adoption, the Freedom Charter has retained its unfading value not only for the present but also future generations of patriots.

The ANC unites representatives of various strata of society—the working class, the peasantry and religious movements. It is composed of people of

rather diverse professions, indeed, all those who are convinced that their well-being can be assured only if the South-African state is remodelled on a democratic basis. Thus, the African National Congress embraces all willing to fight for a better future of the country and its people.

The seventy-five years of the ANC's existence are a vivid proof of the attractive power of our course towards establishing democracy for all. A people's power must be established.

What are the most characteristic features of the present-day situation in South Africa

First of all I would like to note that in my opinion the most tangible trend in the evolution of our struggle is the involvement of ever broader strata of society incorporating all social forces. The widening scope of this democratic process will inevitably erode the social basis of apartheid. And in its agony the regime has no other choice but to step up reprisals. Thousands upon thousands of people have been jailed. Recently a lot of children between 11 and 16 years of age have been thrown into prison. However, despite large-scale murders in prisons and in the streets, the democratic movement retains its militant spirit. The crisis of apartheid is exacerbating. Nowadays the regime is no longer sure of its foothold. It has discredited itself not only before the working masses but also in the eyes of the quarters which rendered it financial support. Of course, it would be naive to suppose that it has suddenly dawned upon the capitalists that democracy yields more profits. Nevertheless, they realise that democratisation is inevitable. They understand that for their own sake they have to abandon the sinking ship of apartheid.

At present, some transnationals have declared that they are discontinuing their operations in South Africa. Naturally, they hope for a come-back under changed circumstances. Whatever their reasons, this is an indication of their doubts as regards the stability of apartheid. Moreover, wittingly or unwittingly, by resorting to such measures they undermine the existing regime. Even if they do not dare to go beyond mere condemnation of the racists, this still makes many people ponder over the fact that the ship is really in peril as rats are jumping from it.

The present situation is like this: those who were previously the pillars of our society, i. e., the white minority, are beginning to realise the need for dialogue with the forces which are at the forefront of events taking place in the country, i. e., with the democratic movement. White representatives are increasingly establishing contacts with the African National Congress. Thus, all those who perceive reality in its true light are getting involved in our struggle.

While facing harsh reprisals and the ruling circles' attempts to lure some sections of the population to their side, the people are becoming convinced that whatever the tricks resorted to by the racists their life is deteriorating.

So, today, despite the harsh reprisals, the African National Congress is engaged in mobilising the masses for the struggle against apartheid. Despite everything, we have proved our viability and the efficiency of our actions already by the fact that we have succeeded in setting up cells of our organisation. Efforts to consolidate the activities of the opponents of apartheid are yielding more tangible results. Quite recently the coal-mining industry was hit by a strike involving a quarter of a million black miners. That strike has once again shattered the hopes of certain financial and industrial quarters that the apartheid system can protect their interests; it has shown that in South Africa the main and predominant factor in the country's political life is the expanding movement for democracy.

By now the regime has practically exhausted its ability to roll back this process. The offensive of the people is gaining momentum and the people

are beginning to realise the international implications of their struggle. We are aware that our eventual victory will not only open the way to broad democratic transformations but also help strengthen peace and security throughout the world and tangibly contribute to the efforts of the forces fighting for mankind's survival.

We believe that the present development will inevitably result in a mounting armed struggle supplemented by a broad offensive on the political front. This will result in the political and economic collapse of apartheid. The situation of those still clinging to power is hopeless.

South Africa is infrequently called "the second Klondike" for foreign monopolies. Would you, please, elucidate their activities in the country and the role assigned to apartheid by the imperialists in their global strategy?

It is impossible to overcome the crisis gripping the country unless political power goes to the people. That is a crucial matter of any revolution—the question of power. On the other hand, the successes achieved by the democratic movement would have been much more impressive but for the fact that our internal enemies enjoyed an unlimited support of their foreign patrons. Incidentally, this is one of the reasons why the conflict between the oppressors and the oppressed in South Africa has reached its pitch.

Foreign allies of the apartheid regime have resolved to assist it in every possible way. This programme was advanced by the US President who, just a few days after assuming office, declared that the USA would never abandon its South-African partner in need. This course implied that all commitment assumed by the previous US administrations to curtail contacts with South Africa become void, while the White House support for the racists was turned into a state policy.

Naturally, that decision was prompted by anything but altruistic considerations. It was assumed that the South-African apartheid system would firmly establish its place in the ranks of international reaction whose main goal is to prevent the triumph of people's freedom. It has transpired not so long ago that the apartheid regime and the CIA reached an agreement under which South Africa is to play a certain role in destabilising the government of Nicaragua and render assistance to the forces which have set themselves the goal of eliminating the people's achievements in this Central American country.

On the other hand, it is no secret that for a number of years there has existed a reactionary axis Pretoria-Tel Aviv under the US aegis. As American imperialists see it, this alliance is a reliable lever of the aggressive expansion in Africa. And now, what does indeed transpire? In the Middle East, for instance, the Israeli regime does not care for the interests of its own people: rather it acts in US interests which has turned Israel, incidentally, into an architect of aggressive policy in the region, into a tool for suppressing the Palestinians.

A similar situation is taking shape in the South of Africa, where the imperialists are rapidly losing their ground. The apartheid regime is needed by the USA as a springboard for launching a neocolonialist expansion against the newly free states. That is why the present-day situation there is characterised by the growing aggressiveness of racists whose troops have invaded the territories of the neighbouring states countless times.

It follows that the international aspects of the struggle against apartheid are acquiring greater significance. Obviously, the free African neighbouring states cannot fully utilise the advantages of their independence so long as South Africa remains under the heels of racists.

As for the activities of foreign monopolies in our country I would like to note first of all the following: they would like to perpetuate the system

which enables them to derive superprofits from South Africa by mercilessly exploiting the blacks. In other words, they want our people to exist exclusively for the sake of their own well-being. Clearly, by advocating this point of view they objectively collude with those who oppose the demand for independence coming from the overwhelming majority of the South African people. Simultaneously they are well aware of the need to strengthen the military might of the regime so that it could serve as a destabilising factor in the entire region and subjugate it to their hegemonistic course. Besides, South African racists and their overseas patrons realise all too well that only hegemony over the region can make it possible for them to impede the growth of the revolutionary trends on the continent.

In this sense the apartheid regime is becoming an important component in imperialism's system of expansion, which is called upon to perpetuate its world supremacy. However, today this course seems unrealistic. There has appeared a force on the globe whose backbone is the growing and strengthening socialist community drawing to itself the progressive and democratic circles of the entire world. It is they who exert the decisive influence on world developments.

Comrade Nzo, how do you appraise the movement of solidarity of the Soviet people with the just struggle of the people of South Africa for their rights?

Along with punitive measures, the racists resort to ideological subversion against the liberation movement of South-Africans. They attempt to besmear its democratic essence. In doing so, they use the hackneyed trick of tagging us as the fawners of some "evil empire". These tactics are a transparent disguise of their basic goal of isolating us from the Soviet Union. And here any slander will do. The racists are at pains to prove to our people that the USSR is our enemy.

However, we know well that the CPSU and the Soviet Union have always been our reliable allies in the struggle for liberation. A similar approach is typical of the USSR in its attitude to other national liberation movements. Suffice it to recall any major statements made by the Soviet Union on this score. In some cases they served as a foundation for UN resolutions as it was, for example, with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

Naturally, the people of South Africa do not want to be wiped out from the face of the Earth as a result of a nuclear cataclysm. That is why we believe that the struggle waged by the Soviet Union and other progressive forces for peace corresponds to the interests of the oppressed peoples, because it creates favourable conditions for bridling the aggressive ambitions of imperialism.

Thus, the solidarity of the Soviet Union with the struggle of our people is difficult to overestimate. This is true of its material assistance as well as political and moral support. The entire international prestige of the USSR is on our side. We hold in high esteem the support of public organisations such as the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, the Soviet Peace Committee and the Soviet Women's Committee. For this we express to them our heart-felt gratitude.

NICARAGUA: Problems of the "Miskito Land"

In the autumn of 1987 Nicaragua's National Assembly passed a law granting autonomy to the ethnic minorities on the Atlantic coast. This act was preceded by long and thorough study of the ethnic situation at various levels. For two years the bill was discussed in all the Amerindian Atlantic communities. Tens of thousands of citizens took part in drafting the final text of the law, which offers the indigenous inhabitants broad opportunities for preserving their age-old traditions, language, customs, and also for economic, social and cultural development.

According to the local press, the autonomy law is a major step towards promoting democracy in Nicaragua. At the same time, it is in keeping with the accords reached by the presidents of five Central American states at their August 1987 meeting in Guatemala, where they deliberated on ways to lasting peace and stability in the region.

One of the areas affected by the law on autonomy is the Miskito land. It occupies almost half of Nicaragua's territory, but accounts for only five per cent of the population. These are the Amerindian Miskito, Sumo, Rama and Garifuna tribes as well as blacks who call themselves Creoles.

I talked to the editors of the Sandinista newspaper *Barricada* who told me about the various aspects of the ethnic situation in connection with the reforms being carried out by the Sandinista government, and also the situation in the country.

"The Indians, especially those in the north and northeast of the country, have had practically no experience of Somocism," said Moralez, chief of the newspaper's information section. "The inhabitants of the Atlantic coast were spared Somoza's police terror and mass reprisals. In other words, the 'tyranny' from which the Sandinistas liberated the local population was only known to them through hearsay. The Miskito and Sumo tribes still earn their living by hunting, fishing and poaching, just like their ancestors did in the pre-Columbian times. Some of our 'hotheads' ignored that and wanted to implement a land reform at once, that is, to give the Indians plots of land and set up cooperatives. They didn't take the trouble to consider the reasons for the failure of the American Winter Project, worked out in the early 1960s by the Alliance for Progress. That project, too, provided for a land reform and the establishment of cooperatives. All this happened because we did not take into account the Indian peoples' historical past, their traditions and mores," said Moralez.

Life has shattered the illusions of the "hotheads", in Moralez's view. Before long the ethnic question came to the fore in all its complexity. This, probably, was why many Nicaraguans to whom I talked during my trip said that they only "came to know their own country" after the victorious Sandinista revolution.

"National liberation cannot be complete as long as there are groups and communities whose rights are being infringed upon, as long as the

Miskitos and Creoles are not allowed to bring up their children in the language of their fathers and grandfathers, as long as the small Rama and Sumo communities face extinction." These words belong to Tomas Borge, one of the leaders of the Sandinista revolution and member of the executive commission of the National Leadership of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (SNLF).

The Nicaraguan government declared as early as December 1983 that the political constitution would provide for the autonomy of the peoples living on the Atlantic coast. The idea, even at that time, was to create some autonomous government bodies vested with real political power.

"For us the nationalities question—we call it the ethnic problem—is a consequence of the country's historical development, its colonial past and the contradictions of the Somoza regime. It is symbolic that no one had ever managed to conquer or colonise the Indian peoples," said Manuel Ortega Hegg, a prominent economist, sociologist and ethnographer who was a member of the National Commission on Autonomy headed by Tomas Borge, and has studied the nationalities question in depth.

To understand the nature of the problem it would be useful to look at Nicaragua's past and examine some features of its political geography and history. Geography, both physical and political, was an important factor in the history of Nicaragua which is often called "a land of lakes and volcanoes". Nicaraguans are proud of the numerous small lakes and two large ones (which occupy an area of more than 9,000 square kilometres). The fact that their country, which has an area of 148,000 square kilometres, is washed by two oceans, is a source of even greater pride to them. But the presence of these oceans is, perhaps, the root cause of the ethnic problem which is now one of the challenges facing the country.

The majority of the three million Nicaraguans live on the vast, hilly Pacific plain. It is separated from the sparsely populated Atlantic coast by a mountain range running across the middle of the country. Sixty-nine per cent of Nicaragua's inhabitants are mestizos, descendants of Spanish conquistadors and local tribes. Whites account for 17 per cent, blacks—9 per cent, and American Indians together with the Creoles, sometimes called Afro-Caribbeans—5 per cent.

The Spanish conquistadors came to Nicaragua in the 16th century from Mexico along the western (Pacific) coast. Unable to conquer the war-like Indian tribes, the Spaniards pushed them to the Atlantic coast, and settled in the Pacific plain, which had a favourable climate and good lands for farming and cattle raising. In economic terms, the marshy and deserted Atlantic coast—the "Miskito land"—did not interest the Spaniards. (It was only much later that gold and silver were found there).

The British came to Nicaragua in the 17th-18th centuries. They were brave buccaneers who landed on the Atlantic coast, settled in the "Miskito land", and maintained contacts with the Miskitos who dominated the weaker and smaller tribes. The British encouraged the Miskitos to seek political independence. Until the beginning of this century the "Miskito land" was a kingdom.

As a result of the struggle and rivalry between the Spaniards and the British, the local Indians had over the centuries developed mistrust of the "Pacific whites", whom they regarded as conquerors and colonialists. It is hard to imagine that, according to my interlocutors, as late as in the 1970s English was prevalent on the Atlantic coast and the people there had greater allegiance to the British crown than to their own capital, Managua. The differences between the inhabitants of the two coasts in language, religion, culture, and way of life, are still striking.

Having gained independence from Spain in 1821, Nicaragua soon fell under the US influence. Like the British buccancers, the American occupiers also landed on the Atlantic coast. The first act of US interference in Nicaragua's internal affairs took place in 1855, when an adventurer by the name of William Walker landed in Nicaragua, seized its capital and proclaimed himself president.

The struggle for the "control over Nicaragua" intensified in the early 20th century because of the proposed building of a canal along the country's southern border to link the two oceans. After the Panama Canal was built, the USA used all its influence in the region to prevent any other country from building a similar one in Nicaragua. In 1909, when President Zelaya failed to renew the earlier-signed agreement on this score with the USA, secured a loan from Britain and started negotiations with Japan with a view to building an inter-oceanic canal, the United States dispatched Marines to Nicaragua. Zelaya "was retired", and in 1912 the whole country came under US occupation.

From the point of view of Washington's policy-makers, who followed the old "divide and rule" principle, bourgeois liberal Zelaya committed another unpardonable sin: his government launched a plan of national integration in the late 19th-early 20th centuries. This plan provided safeguards for the national borders on the Atlantic coast and was intended to integrate the Atlantic areas into the country's economic and cultural life. Of course, "integration" pursued by violent methods had little chance of success, especially bearing in mind that the Atlantic areas were increasingly being linked to the United States economically. The latter's mining, wood-working and banana companies were active in the Atlantic area; the Protestant Church was also gaining a foothold there, having launched charity activities by sending nurses who did what they could to bring medical aid to the locals, while missionaries taught them English.

In 1926, the USA felt that its positions were secure enough to withdraw its troops from Nicaragua. But the troops had to come back the following year because the patriots, led by Augusto César Sandino had commenced an active struggle against the Washington-imposed government. The occupiers were driven out after a six-year war. However, the Americans had managed to train a national guard headed by Somoza, on whose orders Sandino was murdered in 1934. The dark night of tyranny descended on the land. Washington gave that tyranny aid and succour until 1979, when the Sandinista revolution put an end to imperialist domination.

The power struggle between warring factions within the oligarchy and the long years of American occupation, followed by the "family tyranny" of Somoza forced the Nicaraguan patriots to rally to oppose foreign intervention and local reactionaries. As a result the Indians' regions were neglected for decades. Moreover, most Nicaraguans who considered themselves to be related to the Spaniards, treated the Indians as second-rate citizens. As a result of this, at the time of the Sandinista revolution the population of the Atlantic coast was isolated from the mainland and was still living in the pre-Columbian era.

All this goes to show that the ethnic question has deep historical roots in Nicaragua, as indeed in other Central American countries. From the time of the Spanish conquest of their country, the Indians have been the most downtrodden and miserable section of the population, denied the right to self-determination, their own culture and language. Not surprisingly, the victory of the Sandinista revolution increased the sense of ethnic identity among the Indian tribes and revived their hopes for autonomy and self-government. Subsequent developments have shown, however that in such a multinational country as Nicaragua the Indians'

question gives rise to new problems which the Sandinista government has to grapple with.

The Atlantic areas are divided into two "special zones". The first covers the northern part of the Zelaya province and has six municipalities. The other half occupies the southern part of the province and has three municipalities. It is not, however, the administrative division that gives rise to frictions. All ethnic minorities in Nicaragua are demanding self-government. They also believe that their right to autonomy is "in the final count an essential factor for establishing peace on the Atlantic coast", as the Indian organisation Misatan declared in a statement on the occasion of the ceasefire between the Sandinista People's Army and the MISURA and MISURASATA units.

However, different tribes read different meanings into national autonomy. For the 70,000 Miskitos, for example, autonomy means peace on the vast territory they occupy on both banks of the River Coco bordering on Honduras. The 15,000 Sumo Indians hope that autonomy will enable them to return to their homeland—the mining area south of the River Coco. The Creoles, who live in the Bluefields area (the administrative centre of the Zelaya province) and to the north of it around Perlas Lagoon hope that autonomy will meet their economic demands. The small Garifona tribe of 1,500 people inhabiting two villages, La Fe and Orinoco, near Perlas Lagoon (they are traditionally known as Caribs) feel that autonomy will offer them a chance to preserve their vanishing language. And for the less than 1,000 Ramas the question is one of retaining their ethnic identity (only half of them live south of the Bluefields on the Ram Cay Island while the rest are scattered in various places).

On top of that, all the five ethnic groups are engaged in frequent feuds although they live in different regions. The sixth and most numerous group (about 150,000) are the mestizos of the Atlantic, who are markedly different from the Pacific mestizos.

Thus, the inhabitants on Nicaragua's Atlantic coast now number some 300,000, that is, they constitute not five but 10 per cent of the country's population. And yet the Atlantic areas have no infrastructure, or integrated market; the traditional links with the Caribbean countries, often based on contraband, were snapped after the fall of the Somoza regime.

Generally, historical and ethnic roots are important for solving the nationalities problem, particularly so for Nicaragua. However, military and political considerations are even more important for the country. The people I talked to made no secret of the fact that anti-Sandinista propaganda was having some effect among the Indian tribes who are still backing the contras.

Why has this happened? The answer was furnished by the National Commission on Autonomy.

"The Indian tribes wanted autonomy immediately without waiting for the new constitution. Their chiefs declared that they would exercise their legitimate rights," said Manuel Ortega Hegg. "The authorities were slow to respond. This caused resentment among the ethnic minorities. The enemies of the Sandinista revolution were quick to take advantage of the situation. The US imperialists and their local agents fomented separatist feelings. For example, in 1980-1981 hostile radio broadcasts made great play of an 'imminent comeback of the Miskito King'".

"The problems in the Atlantic areas stem essentially from the mistakes we made in the early years when we tried to attack the ethnic problem 'head-on' and partly from what I would call mutual ignorance," said Manuel Ortega Hegg. "Most of the indigenous population stayed away

from the movement against the American occupiers and the struggle against the Somoza dictatorship. They had a very vague idea of the Sandinista National Liberation Front."

"But it was the front which was the first and only political organisation to admit in its programme back in 1969 the existence of the ethnic problem which referred to the gap in the development levels between different parts of the country, especially the backwardness of the Atlantic areas," I wondered.

"That is correct", replied Ortega Hegg. "And yet we were not fully aware of the seriousness of the problem. And our uncritical use of other's notions and methods led to frictions. The first envoys of the new government who went to these areas thought that the local population had to be merely 'organised', in order to 'pull them out of ignorance and help them develop'. They had expected to find numerous committees for Sandinista revolution and democratic organisations there. But they found nothing of the kind. The local people had nostalgic memories of 'good Americans'—teachers and doctors. The Indians did not understand that the US imperialists were plundering our national resources—timber, minerals, etc. What mattered for them, especially for the Miskitos, was that under the Americans they had jobs and could make a living. When the Americans left they were deprived of livelihood. And then came the Sandinistas—'the whites from the Pacific coast'—who told them: 'you have no committees in defence of the Sandinista revolution? So you are contras...'"

"What about your opponents? How did they counter your efforts?"

"Their main weapon was propaganda. It was crude but effective. The Indians were not told, as they are being told now, that the Sandinistas are Communists, and that the Sandinista regime was 'the Red menace in disguise', etc. They were brainwashed in different ways. 'The Spaniards are coming!'—our enemies whispered. 'A horrible thing is happening: the Pacific rule is being established'."

"How did it come about that the Indian organisation MISURA, which initially collaborated with the Sandinista government, joined an undeclared war against it, and took the side of the contras?"

"This was probably our most serious mistake," said Ortega Hegg. "It stemmed from our ignorance of the realities in our own country. MISURA was considered to be the only organisation via which it was possible to talk to the Miskitos. So it was made a representative of the Sandinista government. Thus the ethnic problem was entrusted to MISURA, which posed as the main champion of the interests of ethnic minorities while pursuing its own line. This led to some strange results. We set up medical centres, mounted literacy campaigns in the Miskito language, opened Miskito-language schools and set up radio stations which broadcast in Miskito. But for some reason the local 'did not respond' to these changes. As a result clashes occurred, and such situation continued for three years.

"At first we attributed the causes to the area's economic backwardness. But then we learned that MISURA's leader, Steadman Fagoth was a CIA agent. It was the CIA which dictated the strategy and tactical moves of the organisation. MISURA had its own teachers and it used the literacy campaign to further its own ends: it opposed the land reform plans and insisted on communal land-owning instead; later on it campaigned for autonomy of the Indian peoples and even their separation from Nicaragua. Not all the leaders of MISURA were contras. However, the US influence and the desires of the Washington administration to use the legitimate interests of the ethnic groups for their own imperialist aggressive ends and to destabilise the Sandinista regime, were making themselves felt," Ortega Hegg concluded.

Even as the Indian organisations, such as MISURA and MISURASATA, stepped up their counter-revolutionary activities, the Catholic Church became more active. The Protestant sects—Anglicans, Baptists, Evangelists, etc.—also mounted a massive propaganda campaign against the Sandinista revolution. The so-called Iglesia Morava was particularly hostile. Together with the leaders of MISURA, the Moravian Brothers devised a plan of subversive activities called Red Christmas and aimed at driving the "Spaniards" and the "mestizos" out from the Atlantic coast, toppling the Sandinista government and separating the "Miskito land" from Nicaragua. The conspiracy was unveiled, MISURA was disbanded and Fagoth was arrested and sentenced to several years in prison. However, a few months later the Sandinistas showed magnanimity, released him and allowed him to return to Puerto Cabezas from where he escaped to Honduras to join the CIA-trained contras.

Throughout the undeclared war against Nicaragua the CIA, which still keeps the contras under its wing, prevented direct contacts between the chiefs of the rebel Indian tribes and the Sandinista government. This is well illustrated by the story of Brooklyn Rivera, head of the Indian organisation MISURASATA.

In 1981, Rivera headed an anti-Sandinista armed uprising of three Amerindian tribes—the Miskitos, Sumos and Ramas. In late 1984, he started talks with the government to find common ground for a peaceful settlement of the armed conflict on the Atlantic coast. The CIA was so incensed by this that it ordered two organisations of the contras—the Nicaraguan Democratic Front and the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance—to liquidate Rivera. According to the leaders of MISURASATA, the CIA intended to put the blame for Rivera's death on the Sandinistas, causing discontent and mistrust of Managua's policy in the Atlantic areas, and thus to wreck the proposed agreement.

However, the CIA did not have to carry out its plan. Rivera "changed his mind". Later, in January 1986, he became the target of further pressure. Two leaders of Indian tribes in the USA—Russel Minz from South Dakota and Hank Adams from the State of Washington, visited Rivera in the Costa Rican capital San José. They promised Rivera that more than a hundred North American Indian fighters would be dispatched to Nicaragua to help in the struggle against the Sandinistas. From then on MISURASATA's leader stopped "being willful" and would have no truck with the Sandinistas.

Manuel Ortega Hegg and other people I talked to admitted that resentment among the ethnic minorities was also caused in part by ill-considered decisions of the central government and willful actions by some local Sandinista leaders. For example, many Sumo Indians crossed into neighbouring Honduras because they did not want to be forcibly resettled in areas unaffected by the contras military operations. The Miskito tribe behaved in a similar way: they were unhappy because in 1982 the Sandinista government, which tried to evacuate civilians from border areas where fighting was going on, moved 40,000 Miskitos within a few weeks into Puerto Cabezas area—some 200 kilometres south of the Honduras border. According to the journal *Afrique-Asie*, they were moved into five villages, and the whole large zone was named Tasba Pri ("free land" in Miskito language).

The practice of evacuating Indians en masse from the areas of hostilities did not yield the desired results, despite the fact that the Sandinista government gave them land, helped with housing and food and provide them with medical care. The fact is that bonds of kinship are still strong

in the Indian communities, which enabled the contras to penetrate Tasba Pri, and find refuge with their relatives and even engage in subversion. When the contras were arrested their relatives protested against "arbitrary acts" by the authorities.

Other reasons caused unrest among Amerindians and Creoles in different parts of the Atlantic coast.

Meanwhile, the US propaganda services and the mass media mounted a campaign of lies, accusing the Sandinista government of "human rights violations", of "infringements" upon the liberty of the indigenous Indians, of creating "strategic hamlets" (similar to the ones the Americans set up in Vietnam). In short, Washington cried: "Stop thief!". No wonder, when the MISURA conspirators tried to carry out their Red Christmas plan in late 1980 and early 1981, organised a series of sabotage acts and raids on Indian villages, kidnappings and killings—in short, when they began to create an atmosphere of terror and violence—American propaganda blamed it all on the Sandinistas. One can say that at this period it was the Indians' question that was used by Washington as a pretext to unleash a virtual "psychological war" against Nicaragua.

However, the revolution was learning and growing more mature. The Sandinistas took a closer look at the ethnic problem, revised their ethnic policies and immediately the situation in the "Miskito land" took a turn for the better.

Life started coming back to normal particularly quickly on the Atlantic coast when the National Commission on Autonomy, set up in late 1984, displayed a constructive approach to the nationalities question taking into account the interests of the Indian peoples. The seriousness of the new approach to the ethnic problem is confirmed, in particular, by the composition of the commission: it included, for instance, Ray Hooker, a Creole from Bluefields, Assembly deputy from the SNLF; Hazel Law, a Miskito, also a deputy of the National Assembly; Halio Gurdian, an anthropologist, Director of the Centre of Research and Documentation of the Atlantic Coast, other specialists.

The results of the government addressing itself to the ethnic problem were not long in coming. At the end of 1984 Amerindians started to return from Honduras, although an official announcement which allowed them to return was made only six months later—in June 1985. Since then thousands of Miskito and Sumo families have returned to Nicaragua. This dealt a serious blow at the plans of the contras and their Washington paymasters, who hoped they would be able to continue to use the Indian peoples as cannon fodder in the undeclared war against the Sandinista government.

The representative National Commission on Autonomy had worked hard to draft a new constitution. It conducted opinion polls on the Atlantic coast, examined the real situation and the development needs of individual areas. It changed its approach not only to the recruitment of cadres from among the local population, but also to local way of life. The focus shifted from large, long-term projects to the creation of infrastructure and opening of employment avenues.

The local population could now assess the policy of the Sandinistas with regard to the ethnic minorities not on the basis of their calls for normalisation of the situation, but from their concrete actions, the results of which soon became evident. A hospital was built in Bluefields, a small town inhabited by 30,000 people. Nearby a deep sea port is being built to receive fishing trawlers and ocean-going commercial ships. The landing strip at the local airport has been replaced with a new, asphalted one.

The current plans for the economic development of the Atlantic areas are specified and geared to local conditions and the population's needs. Three thousand African palms are to be planted on an area of 1,200 hec-

tares to produce palm oil. According to the Nueva Nicaragua news agency, there are plans to resume fishing for which purpose a well-equipped fishing fleet and a modern infrastructure will be provided. In order to integrate the Atlantic zone into the country's economy, experts are considering the possibility of building a railway to link Bluefields to Managua. There are plans to introduce telephone service and television transmitters that will link the people of Bluefields with the whole country and help overcome the area's cultural isolation.

The recognition that ethnic groups have their own legitimate interests and rights is reflected in the new constitution. The section devoted to political and administrative division of the country includes a chapter on the autonomy of the Indian peoples and communities on the Atlantic coast. So far it contains a single article which states that the Indian peoples "have the right to organise their social and production activity in accordance with their views and traditions". In the course of a referendum to be held later the Indian tribes will decide on the form of their autonomy, whereupon corresponding amendments will be introduced in the text of the constitution.

Of course, the final solution of the ethnic question in Nicaragua is still a long way off. But the correction of the mistakes made in the early years after the Sandinista revolution, and the broadening of the revolution's social base are already yielding fruit. In July 1986, representatives of the Sandinista government and the Amerindian organisation Kisan completed a year-long negotiation in Puerto Cabezas. In a statement published after the meeting the sides reaffirmed their commitment to the cease-fire and peace through dialogue. They also condemned Washington's continued financial assistance to the contras. The Kisan leaders appealed to all the Miskito communities to oppose the activities of those forces which are trying to wreck negotiations and disrupt a peaceful political solution to the problem of ethnic minorities.

More and more Amerindians, deceived by anti-Sandinista propaganda, are changing their minds and taking a new look at the situation in the country. They no longer respond to such ploys and the contras are losing their influence. There is growing discord among the counter-revolutionaries in exile. More and more of them are refusing to take part in the undeclared war against the country's legitimate government. By mid-1987 about 1,200 rebel Indians had laid down their arms and returned to their villages. Raymundo Hunter, a former contras and a former member of MISURA said, for instance: "With the help of lies and deception I, as many other Indians, has been induced to take part in counter-revolutionary activities. Since the time we found ourselves in the Somoquist camps on the territory of Honduras we were treated like animals. There was no end to humiliation and abasement. Having realised my guilt before the homeland, I decided to lay down arms and surrender to the authorities. I appeal to all Indians who are still in Honduras: lay down arms and come back home..."

The law on autonomy for ethnic minorities ushered in a new stage in the solution of Nicaragua's ethnic problem. Ahead lies a long and arduous road which will "require immense efforts of the whole country and genuine national unity", as commandante Lumberto Campbell, coordinator of the SNLF Committee in the second "special zone" of the Atlantic coast, said.

According to Campbell, the task now is to "create a region with its own identity", to restore a region which had been in total disarray for almost eight years. Two regional governments and two autonomous parliaments

are to be formed. The supreme body will be the regional council in which all the ethnic groups will be represented. The economic life of the Atlantic areas will be based on two forms of property—state and communal. One of the functions of regional governments will be to manage local enterprises. They will receive aid for local needs also from the national enterprises operating on the Atlantic coast. Some government institutions dealing with education, culture and sports are to be decentralised. In short, a social model is emerging on the Atlantic coast which will meet the aspirations and development needs of the Amerindian peoples.

Solving the problems of the "Miskito land" is undoubtedly an exceedingly difficult and slow process: it involves the struggle between the old and the new and demands time, patience, flexibility and competence. The fact that more and more Indians, Creoles and mestizos are coming to understand the Sandinista policy and are taking the side of the popular government holds out the promise that the Sandinista revolution will succeed in this important area as well.

Vadim LISTOV

A Vital Strategy for Europe

Socialistické společenství v boji za bezpečnost a spolupráci v Evropě (The Socialist Community in the Struggle for Security and Cooperation in Europe), Prague, Naše Vojsko, 1986, 232 pp.

This book is a joint effort by Soviet and Czechoslovak scientists. The composition of the team of authors, which included researchers and staff members of the Diplomatic Academy of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Czechoslovakia's Institute of International Relations, actually determined the scientific nature of their study on complex problems in the relations between states of the two opposite socio-political systems in Europe. I would like to mention at once the success and productiveness of this cooperative experience between Soviet and Czechoslovak specialists in International relations in studying a whole set of European problems: the different approaches to questions of European security; prevention of nuclear war in Europe; creation of nuclear-free zones; liquidation of chemical weapons; limitation and reduction of other types of weapons of mass destruction; reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe; confidence-building measures; the main directions towards promoting economic, scientific and technological cooperation; the current state and future prospects of foreign trade; the role of public forces and movements in the struggle for peace in Europe.

The authors proceed from the correct methodological thesis on the interconnection of European and world problems in present-day international life. It is stressed in the book that "the future of Europe and the prospects of its security are inseparably connected with world development" (p. 5). At the same time, the economic and political situation in Europe is an important factor influencing the "level of international relations and the alignment of economic and political forces on a global scale" (p. 5).

Europe's peaceful development in the course of the more than four postwar

decades is largely due to the efforts of the socialist community countries to safeguard peace and security in this region. A number of complex problems in relations among European states owe their solution to the vital strategy for Europe worked out by the socialist community and to the policy of peaceful coexistence between the two systems based on it. The development of European cooperation in the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s fully confirmed that the preservation of peace and security in Europe is quite possible. Even in the context of aggravated military confrontation, the initiatives of the USSR and other socialist countries made it possible to ensure preconditions for advance along the road of political and military detente and the strengthening of trust among European countries. It was reaffirmed that the transition from confrontation to the implementation of the principles of the Helsinki Final Act depends only on the policy of the NATO countries, on their responsible approach to the proposals made by the socialist community countries. The book describes in detail the activity of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation throughout the thirty years since its creation. And this activity has resulted not only in the preservation of peace in Europe but also in the creation of the mainstays for ensuring global security.

Coordination of the foreign policy of its members is one of the main conditions of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation's purposeful actions. This coordination, as it is shown in the book, is being improved year after year by expanding the sphere of mutual consultations, the planning of joint actions in the struggle against reactionary forces and the working out of common stands on key problems of world politics.

Mikhail Gorbachev noted the importance of the joint concerted actions of the socialist community countries in his interview with the Editor-in-Chief of the newspaper *Rudé právo*: "We set high store by and thoroughly take into account the opinion of our allies, and are fully determined to continue improving the mechanism and methods of consultations, of jointly formulating socialism's foreign policy. We highly appreciate the political initiatives of our allies and friends, their intensive effort to promote the new political thinking, their vigorous and equal participation in the joint efforts to solve problems of peace, security and disarmament."

The main goal of the socialist countries is to eliminate the threat of a global nuclear catastrophe and halt the arms race. Their concrete and feasible proposals serve to ensure peace, disarmament and better interstate relations.

In their foreign policy strategy, the socialist community countries proceed from the premise that genuine security in Europe and the whole world can be ensured not by the arms race, not by the striving to change in one's favour the existing rough parity of forces in the military field but by real concrete measures to reduce and then liquidate nuclear weapons, to reduce conventional armaments and armed forces and to promote disarmament in accordance with the principle of equality and equal security.

Comparative analysis of the approaches of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty to questions of European security gave the authors of the book the opportunity to make an objective assessment of the activity of these two military political organisations.

As they press for a reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe, the socialist countries have proposed in their time a detailed plan for such a reduction and have subsequently made many specifications and supplements to it taking into account the wishes of Western states. Here the Warsaw Treaty invariably proceeds from the premise that the levels of armed forces and armaments should be lowered without disrupting the existing balance on the continent and that the principle of the equal security of the sides be upheld.

At the same time, the aggressive circles in the West stir up both mistrust in the Soviet Union and the lie about a 'Soviet military threat', trying in every way, as the

authors convincingly demonstrate, to slow down the process of solving acute international problems and stubbornly continue to escalate the arms race (pp. 51-60).

The authors write that the countries of the socialist community are strictly observing and consistently implementing the Helsinki accords and devoting much attention to strengthening and expanding relations with West European countries, to developing all-round, mutually beneficial cooperation. The data in the book testify to the enormous and, alas, untapped possibilities for economic, scientific and technological ties between the East and the West in Europe, between CMEA and Common Market countries (pp. 181-195). Genuine and objective factors exist for their development but what is lacking is the necessary goodwill on the part of the West European countries, which erect discriminatory barriers that impede mutually beneficial European cooperation.

The book also deals with the Soviet Union's many-sided activities to maintain peace in Europe and notes that its Warsaw Treaty allies fully support the Soviet proposals aimed at safeguarding security in Europe and the whole world. As it was noted at the 17th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, "the USSR's peace programme offers mankind a unique chance. If the peoples of the world want to enter the third millennium without fear for their future they should not miss this historic chance. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the entire Czechoslovak people fully support this programme".

The book also gives much information about the activity of public forces in the struggle for peace in Europe. "The movement for peace, against the danger of nuclear war has become the most multifaceted public movement of our time, one of the main factors actively influencing the development of international relations. The participants in this movement express most diverse political and ideological views and are united by a common goal—to remove the danger of nuclear war, to preserve civilisation from destruction" (p. 197). The authors offer an interesting analysis of the social composition of the anti-war movement, its key actions and an evaluation of the latter's importance and the results achieved.

The thorough and well-rounded study of the lengthy struggle waged by the socialist community for peace and international

security, the authors' in-depth analysis of numerous documents and foreign policy actions of the socialist countries clarify and substantiate the essence of the vital strategy of peace formulated in the Warsaw Treaty Organisation's military doctrine. This is a purely defensive doctrine. It is a logical consequence of the entire previous activity of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and expresses the peace-loving strivings of the socialist community.

International life is developing so rapidly that even in the short period of time that has elapsed since the publication of this book, many events have taken place on the European continent substantially supplementing the picture of the all-European striving for peace. The trends analysed by the authors have not changed. On the contrary, they have been further strengthened by the new foreign-policy initiatives of the socialist countries.

Prof. Igor ORLIK,
D. Sc. (Hist.)

The Greens and Contemporary Problems

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Современный мир глазами «зеленых» (The Greens' View of Today's World), Edited by B. M. Maklyarsky, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya Publishers, 1987, 232 pp.  
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Among the mass democratic movements in the non-socialist world, the Green movement is of undoubtable interest. In many Western countries the Greens have their own organisations and independent political parties. In 1984 candidates of these parties, for the first time in history, won 11 seats in the European Parliament. In 1987 the Greens were quite successful in the Bundestag elections in the FRG; having received 8.3 per cent of the votes, they secured 42 deputy seats. The Greens are represented in the parliaments of a number of other states.

This monograph represents the first attempt by Soviet scholars to comprehensively analyse what is a relatively new political phenomenon in the capitalist world. The authors present the reasons for its emergence and thoroughly research the socio-economic, political and ideological views of the Greens.

The Greens emerged in Western Europe on the wave of the environmental movement in the 1970s. The ecological roots notably influenced the entire philosophy of this new form of social protest, and demands for environmental protection became the underlying principle of the Greens' programme.

The Greens' understanding that ecological problems are global in scale and affect all mankind was important in the formation of

their world outlook. Analysing the genesis and development of this movement, the authors note that it was this global approach which enabled the Greens to connect all the factors negatively affecting the ecosphere and its integral part—man. Thus, the Green parties' watchword is not only environmental protection, but also demands for nuclear disarmament, the creation in Eastern and Western Europe of zones free of nuclear arms, the curtailment of military production and cuts in armed forces.

Therefore, it is only logical that the Greens are concerned over the state of international relations and the continuing arms race. Comparing successive stages of development of the international situation, the book states, the various generations of Greens and similar movements become ever more convinced that the aggressive policy of the imperialist powers not only increases the threat of military confrontation, but also considerably hinders the solution of vital socio-economic and ecological problems holding back the development of world civilisation (p. 169).

In many capitalist countries Green organisations actively participate in the peace movement. This is especially so in the Federal Republic of Germany. According to a public opinion poll, in the FRG in the

early 1980s, seventy out of every hundred voters casting their ballots for the Greens are prepared to actively work for peace. Among supporters of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, this number is ten, of the Free Democratic Party—nine, and of the Christian Social Union and Christian Democratic Union—4 (p. 189). Members of the West German Green Party demand cuts in the Federal government's military spending, reductions in the Bundeswehr and insist on the elimination of those industries which are hazardous to life. They are also resolutely opposed to SDI.

The Greens believe that, besides the arms race, one of the main causes of international tension is the drive of the capitalist powers to strengthen their economic and political supremacy in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The Greens are concerned over the poverty in the developing nations and the problem of overcoming economic backwardness in these nations. They have a concrete programme for solving the difficulties facing the developing countries. In particular they propose granting a moratorium on debt payments, prohibiting the plunder of natural resources by the TNCs of foreign countries and cutting an economic and financial aid to racist regimes. The Greens support the UN recommendation to allocate at least 0.7 per cent of the GNP of the industrialised nations for the development needs of the poorest countries (p. 174).

The Greens' political platform is characterised not only by a more radical democratic approach to the solution of global problems but also by a negative attitude towards, and even the rejection of, many aspects of capitalism. The Green parties are often in opposition to the political "establishment" of the bourgeois world. According to the Greens, the reasons for such phenomena as the arms race and deterioration of the environment are not due to the activity of a particular ruling party but are rooted in the bourgeois system itself and in its inability to meet the aims and demands of social progress (p. 6).

The authors use ample factual material to reveal the Greens' critical attitude to private capitalist enterprise, to the activities of monopolies, the exploitation of hired labour and to the entire system of bourgeois values. Many opponents of the Greens note their anti-bourgeois thrust. For example, in his book *The Greens—An Alternative?* prominent West German theologian L. Gass-

man asserts that today the Greens in the FRG are not actually green, but "multi-coloured" with lots of red mixed in, at any rate at the Federal and Länder level. The Secretary-General of the FRG Christian Democratic Party even "enriched" the political lexicon by calling the environmental advocates "watermelons", that is, green on the outside, red within. Indeed, the Greens' ideology objectively facilitates cooperation with the working class and its organisations in the struggle for peace and disarmament.

It is true, the authors note, that the sharp criticism directed at capitalist regimes found in the Green Party's programme documents and ideological publications are often accompanied by superficial generalisations and conclusions, while demands for radical transformations contain elements of overt utopianism (p. 6). This primarily applies to their views on the political arrangement of the world, in particular, to the rejection of national sovereignty by states. They do not understand that only strong independent states are capable of opposing economic, political and, at times, direct military pressure by imperialist circles and the TNC's aggressive policy.

The immature and contradictory political views of the Greens can, to a large extent, be explained by the motley social base of the movement: It is composed mainly of youth, intelligentsia and employees, many of these people have never before been involved in politics, some were formerly active in reformist groups and bourgeois parties.

On the whole, the authors give an exact characterisation of the Greens, revealing the factors which unite their organisations. However, they do not explore the problem of the movement's heterogeneity, especially the differences existing between Green organisations of different countries. These differences are, at times, of an extremely serious character which markedly influences the ideological orientation and political tactics of certain ranks within the movement. The authors do not clarify the reason why the Greens hold such differing positions in countries like the FRG and France, Sweden and Britain, Italy and Spain.

The authors thoroughly explore the vital need to unite the activists of the entire Left, of all progressive forces, although one of the main aspects of this problem is not investigated, that is, the attitude of the Greens towards cooperation with workers'

and labour movements, and with the communist parties—an attitude which is not always constructive.

Of course the noted deficiencies can be explained, to a certain extent, by the fact that the authors in this case were dealing

with a phenomenon which is not yet completely formed and is in the process of constant change. This is precisely why a more extensive and thorough study of the Greens is needed.

Aleksandr BELCHUK,
D. Sc. (Econ.)

Collective Diplomacy of Newly Free Countries

Эдуард Обминский. Развивающиеся страны: теория и практика многосторонней экономической дипломатии (Developing Countries: Theory and Practice of Multilateral Economic Diplomacy), Moscow, Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya Publishers, 1986, 272 pp.

The book under review is an attempt to analyse the concepts and practical aspects of the developing countries' concerted efforts in the sphere of international affairs over the last 20 to 25 years in the context of their struggle for the establishment of a new international economic order (NIEO). The author pays particular attention to trends in the development of collective diplomacy since the late 1970s. It seems that the book quite convincingly shows the "internal" logic in the development of multilateral economic diplomacy of newly free state which "absorbs" heterogeneous changes in the Third World and reflects the general correlation of forces at present" (p. 3).

However—and this is buttressed by the material cited in the book—even a sufficiently stable programme of actions with its anti-imperialist conceptual basis which serves the interests of the developing countries' economic independence is not enough to solve all their problems. The main goal today is to strengthen the "negotiating positions" of these countries and equip their collective diplomacy with the means that would enable it to attain its goals (p. 4).

The author emphasises that the persistence and efficiency of the developing countries' concerted efforts to attain their objectives largely depend on the nature of their social development. The recent decade provided quite a few examples when the contradiction between the "internal order" of these

countries and the NIEO principles eroded the political will in conducting joint economic diplomacy.

Drawing upon documents and vast factual material, the author reveals the evolution of the theoretical foundation for the collective economic diplomacy of newly free states. What actually links the great variety of concepts entertained by the Asian, African and Latin American countries as regards the prospects for a just economic order in the world? The author believes that these are the advancement and defence of the general democratic thesis on the possibility of attaining real equality of the developing and industrialised nations in all spheres of world economic ties. It is the idea of attaining economic equality that serves as a conceptual basis underpinning the newly free states' multilateral economic diplomacy. And, as correctly stressed in the book, this idea has nothing to do with the bourgeois theory of equal opportunities concocted to cover up the lack of genuine equality.

The author cites many examples that show that the thesis of real equality for all countries involved in world economy is a guide which enables, in the most difficult periods, the newly free states to identify common interests, coordinate their positions and counter the mounting pressure of the West. Besides, this theoretical basis provides each developing country with a wide range

of arguments in defence of its natural right for equality.

The monograph analyses in detail the existing theories on the developing countries' struggle for their economic independence, in particular the NIEO concept and the view of the economists of the newly free countries on improving the NIEO programme. The book provides a well-argued analysis of Western doctrines of the world economic order (pp. 28-87). However, it is hardly justified that almost one-third of the book is dedicated to the general problems of the developing countries' struggle for economic independence because many of them have already been covered in other Soviet publications.

The highlight of the book is the problem of alignment of forces in multilateral diplomacy. By way of example the author gives the main socio-economic cross-section of the young states' collective diplomacy and shows how an extremely motley membership of its participants can influence the elaboration of a common stand (pp. 89-92). He shows specific elements in linking economic and political factors of collective diplomacy, the degree to which they supplement one another and the accompanying contradictions. This link is traced "as a *trend* which ultimately weaves its way through contradictions, deviations and dominance of this or that principle at certain periods" (p. 91).

The author analyses the developing countries' potential for the realisation of their common goals accumulated by their multilateral economic diplomacy. He examines various stages and particular features in the elaboration of a "common platform" of multilateral diplomacy since the early 1960s (pp. 103-115), as well as the methods this diplomacy employs in negotiating at international forums (pp. 115-126).

Also convincing is the section of the book dealing with the driving forces of the developing countries' concerted diplomacy. While creatively applying a well-known thesis advanced by Karl Marx on the contradiction between "the apparent and the actual movement of the system",¹ the author shows the flimsiness of the calculations of various Western brain trusts and theoreticians who claim that the "unnatural alliance" of the developing countries will not endure and will disintegrate as their interests grow increasingly diversified in the world capitalist economy. The "actual movement" of the system "shows that in the

struggle for their interests the developing countries, while loosening some of the former stimuli as a result of various socio-economic changes, will acquire from without new impulses urging them to continue their joint efforts on the international scene" (p. 129). This trend will reproduce itself as long as the newly free countries continue their struggle against exploitation and one-sided dependence.

How and in what forms will this trend be reproduced? The author shows that an answer to this question depends on what moving forces are going to gain the upper hand at various periods. And here "their socio-political orientation serves as a basis for interaction of the moving forces" (p. 134).

The author pays particular attention to the activities of the major "catalysts" of concerted diplomacy--the non-aligned movement and the Group of 77.

He reveals the irrelevance of protracted arguments between researchers in developed and developing countries, with some of them saying that in the concerted diplomacy of newly free states the primary role is played by the non-aligned movement rather than the Group of 77, while others believe the opposite. Relying on facts the author shows "a more substantial role of the non-aligned movement in elaborating concepts, while the Group of 77 is engaged in a more detailed drafting of the developing countries' positions on specific issues and guides their multilateral diplomacy at international forums" (p. 142).

We are witnessing the growing role of the local mechanisms of concerted diplomacy--dozens and hundreds of regional sub-regional and other organisations. The book comprehensively analyses the basic results of, and the prospects for their functioning (pp. 177-195).

The comprehensive approach to talks, which is advocated by the newly independent countries' diplomacy is increasingly opposed by the major Western states, especially since the present US administration came to power. Their diplomacy is pressured by the "super-urgent" problems facing the developing world as well. The reader of the book under review becomes convinced that rebuff to the Western attempts at making the developing nations sacrifice their united stand for individual partial approaches is one of the most vital tasks facing

the newly free countries' collective diplomacy.

Today, the multilateral economic diplomacy of the developing countries is in dire need of a clear-cut perspective for concerted efforts on the international scene and progressive socio-economic transformations. The newly independent states have two alternatives in meeting the "neoglobalist" challenge of the West. First, to implement the projects of "collective self-sustainment"; second, to strengthen cooperation with the diplomacy of the socialist countries. The theory and practice of the developing countries' multilateral economic diplomacy are analysed in the context of the invariable support rendered by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to all their progressive moves, in the context of the interdependence of peace, disarmament and development.

At the same time, the book has some shortcomings. It seems, in particular, that the author should have dealt more thor-

roughly with the existing tremendous potential for intensifying the activity and raising the efficiency of interaction between the multilateral economic diplomacy of the developing countries and that of the socialist states, particularly in the light of the ongoing sweeping reforms in all spheres of social life and the acceleration of the economic and social development of the USSR and other socialist countries. The author could, and should have dwelt more profoundly on the influence of the "new dependence" of the developing states from the West on their collective diplomacy, as well as the role of the "collective self-sustainment" projects in rendering this diplomacy more active.

Readers will like the book for the urgent problems it raises and the extensive factual material presented in it.

Sergei SHIBAYEV

¹ Karl Marx, *Theories of Surplus-Value*, Part II, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1978, p. 166.

Vote-Hunting

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W. Coxall, *Parties and Pressure Groups*, London-New York, Longman, 1986, 196 pp.  
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This book, in which the author purports to examine "questions about the character of parties and pressure groups and their respective roles in the political system", raises a number of topical problems of today's Britain.

General parliamentary elections, in the author's opinion, embody the sum and substance of the British political system and "are at the heart of the liberal-democratic process". Nevertheless, numerous facts indicate that election results are influenced by a variety of factors that have their own impact on electoral opinion. Among the most important he notes the position of the major mass media. Besides, since a considerable number of the voters make up their minds as to which party to vote for precisely during election campaigns, a powerful propaganda support can predetermine the success of a particular party (p. 2). Notably,

the fact that during the 1983 election campaign the overwhelming majority of the influential mass media supported the Conservatives and were hostile to Labour and the Social Democratic and Liberal alliance, accounted for the Conservative Party's victory.

It has become a tradition to enlist advertising services to propagate political objectives and programmes. In 1983 the Conservatives availed themselves of the services of the Saatchi and Saatchi firm, Labour—Wright and Partners, and the alliance—the Gold, Greenlees and Trott agency. There was a relatively new stratagem used in manipulating public opinion—the publication of the results of opinion polls conducted by the political parties "themselves" and which were, of course, anything but objective.

From an analysis of British elections W. Coxall moves on to consider the prob-

lems of the political system as a whole. In the last 15 years, he writes, there have been considerable changes in the nation's political life. Their totality warrants, from the author's point of view, the conclusion that the British two party system is declining. This is to be seen, first and foremost, in a telling drop in votes cast for the two main parties—Labour and Conservative—in general elections since the early 1970s. They polled just about 70 per cent of the total votes in 1983 as against 75 per cent in 1974 (p. 154). The author sees the basic reason for this in some "extremism" of both parties, which have been putting forward "unacceptable" programmes for the "average" voter, in the on-going process of "class separation" and in the fact that "the basis of the British electoral system" is losing its meaning.

The point, as far as we can see, is that rank-and-file voters are increasingly dissatisfied with the policy of the rotating party governments which are unable to cope with the economic and political problems of capitalist society. This also accounts for the declining turnouts—only 70 per cent of the total electorate in the 1983 parliamentary elections and just 40 per cent in the 1983 local government elections.

Another factor that is also attributable, in our view, to the growing public mistrust of the policies of the two major parties is the decline of their individual membership as well as the falling number of their "followers", that is, the electors who traditionally vote for "their" party. As a consequence, there has appeared a fairly considerable number of voters gulled during elections not so much by ideological, as by purely pragmatic considerations. It is they who are most vulnerable to campaign propaganda. So the parties have to watch out for the so-called floating or wavering votes.

The fact that the British electoral system, Coxall notes, traditionally presented as a model of bourgeois democracy, is glaringly malfunctioning is incurring not only the discontent of the masses, but the concern of the politicians as well. A modification of the electoral system and also a reform of the House of Lords are imperative planks of the programmes of the "third" parties, particularly, of the alliance.

The author considers that the inability of Labour and the Tories to resolve major economic and social problems is due, primarily, to the "selfishness" of the leadership

of both parties who put their own interests before those of the society. The main conclusion he makes in this connection is that the "effectiveness of governments was diminishing" (p. 155). This can be confirmed by the performance of the conservative government which "had continued the rightward shift under the leadership of Mrs. Thatcher".

The author is critical of such government measures as the consistent contraction of the public, and expansion of the private sector of industry; monetarism in economic policy, falling social expenditures, and the growth of the military budget (p. 160). Other negative factors he noted are the mounting taxation (from 34 per cent of GNP in 1979 to 40 per cent in 1983), the decline of industrial production by 10.2 per cent during the same period and a considerable rise of unemployment under the Tories. "The country had not been turned round," Coxall remarks, hinting at Mrs. Thatcher's campaign speeches. "The effectiveness of the British Government had not increased."

The book contains a detailed analysis of the role of the so-called pressure groups which the author defines as the second element of parliamentary democracy after the parties and essentially equivalent to them. The author offers his own classification of the pressure groups, considers their objectives, activities, methods and impact on political decision-making as well as the major issues "pushed" by pressure groups and also the relationship of the most influential of them with the parties, government and Parliament.

The author considers that the emergence of pressure groups has been an "indication of the responsiveness of the political system to developing social needs" (p. 167). However, Coxall's classification of pressure groups and assessment of their essence are rather objectionable. For instance, he puts in the same bracket the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, environmentalist groups and even the society for the prevention of cruelty to animals; he dumps into the same basket the Trades Union Congress and the Confederation of British Industries—organisations with opposite functions and priorities.

Far from all of the inferences in Coxall's book appear acceptable. I think that the rising role and influence of pressure groups in recent years is not one of the causes, as the author presumes, but an effect of the

British governments' incapacity for effective administration as well as a result of no more than nominal representation of the interests of the rank-and-file voters in Parliament.

Nor can one dismiss the operational crisis of the Parliament itself. As the author justly remarks, "Parliament has never been a governing body, but rather a forum for criticism and debate". This trend is becoming increasingly obvious today: the phrase "representative and responsible government through parliamentary institutions" now, in Coxall's opinion, seems to many political observers an inadequate description

of the system. "'Elective autocracy tempered by oligarchic pluralism' offers a more realistic and less complacent assessment of British political institutions" (p. 172).

The book reflects some other major political problems of Great Britain which provoke conflicting interpretations. And although the author suggests what are often illusory methods of dealing with them, the material he has collected and analysed does, by and large, essentially broaden our knowledge of the processes within the British political system.

Mikhail GONCHAROV

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REFORMS IN CUBA ★ IMPERIALISTS PROFIT
FROM THE ARMS SALES ★ SURINAME ★ THIRTY YEARS OF AAPSO

Economic and Social Reforms in Cuba

January 1, 1988 marked the 29th anniversary of the Cuban Revolution which toppled the country's pro-American military-police regime. The Republic of Cuba was the first state in the Western Hemisphere to begin the construction of a new, socialist society. Over the years of independent development the country has socialised all basic means of production, except an insignificant number of private peasant holdings, and implemented a genuine cultural revolution. Cuba has scored major successes in the elimination of its inherited economic and social backwardness. It has become an integral part of the socialist community of nations which has become a major factor in its progressive development.

At present, the country's main socio-economic development task is to complete the establishment of the material and technical base of socialism. In its economic strategy the Communist Party of Cuba persistently pursues the course of industrialisation and of laying down an optimum national economic complex.

From 1959 to 1985 the country's aggregate social product (ASP) expanded 3.5-fold, with the second five-year development period being especially notable for rapid economic growth. Thus, while during the first twenty-five years after the revolution (that is, till 1984) the annual ASP growth stood at 4.8 per cent, in the 1981-1985 development period it rose to 7.3 per cent, with per capita income reaching 3.2 and 6.9 per cent respectively. The volume of capital investments over the last five-year period has amounted to 18,000 million pesos, or about one-third of the total investments for the 1959-1985 period.

The industrial base developed rapidly. Over the first 25 years the increase of the annual gross output averaged 5.1 per cent,

climbing to 8.8 per cent in the 1981-1985 period. The greatest increases were recorded in the mechanical and electric power engineering, chemical, light, food, and ferrous metallurgical industries. All this was achieved against the background of the steady expansion of industrial capacities.

Steps were taken to modernise the sugar industry, the basic export sector of the national economy. This made it possible to stabilise higher sugar production: in the 1981-1985 development period annual sugar output was approximately eight million tons.

The share of industry in the national economy has noticeably grown. There have been some progressive shifts in the industrial pattern: sectors included in the A Group (output of the means of production) are going through a period of constant technological renewal and intensive development. Now the country has a more rational pattern of the distribution of productive forces, and this has made it possible to overcome the dispersion in their territorial distribution and create an optimal economic complex.

There have been substantial qualitative shifts in agricultural production which has led to the formation of agro-industrial complexes, and now this economic sector rests on a modern industrial base.

In this connection the construction of reservoirs and irrigation projects have been expanded. Suffice it to recall that the aggregate capacity of reservoirs in the country increased from 48 million cubic metres in 1958 to 7,000 million in 1985.

Ever more attention is being paid to comprehensive mechanisation of agriculture, and turning agricultural labour into a kind of industrial labour. In this field sugar-cane growing, which has traditionally relied on

the manual labour of hundreds of thousands of people, occupies a special place. At present sowing has been mechanised for the most part. In the 1985/86 *safrá* combines harvested 64 per cent of the sugar-cane, and loading operations were fully mechanised. There has been a corresponding decrease in the number of *macheteros*, which has made it possible to transfer many workers to other types of agricultural work.

There have been qualitative changes in the structure of agricultural production, with cattle-breeding playing an increasingly important role. Poultry-breeding and fishing are making sound progress. All this facilitates an accelerated solution of the country's food problem.

Cuba is building its material and technical base of socialism at a time when the world prices of sugar and other primary goods have plummeted, when imperialism leaves no stone unturned in its trade war against Cuba and spares no effort to impede the financing of the construction of major economic projects. Membership in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance enables Cuba to override these difficulties and, despite its geographic remoteness from the other CMEA countries which account for the bulk of its external ties, it can derive advantages from the international socialist division of labour for the planned construction of the material and technical base of socialism. Fidel Castro called cooperation with the socialist community "a pledge of the social and economic development of Cuba, of its future". The selfless labour of the working people, the creative interaction of the republic with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are the main factors in the steady economic development of Cuba.

The creation of a material and technical base of socialism in the country is most closely linked with the establishment and development of an economic mechanism. In the past decade, in accordance with the decisions taken by the 1st Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba (1975), the country adopted and put into practice a new system of economic management and planning which, on the whole, contributed to the development of socialist relations of production and helped build up the country's production potential. At the same time, as was stressed by the 3rd Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba (February 1986), the present stage of socialist construction

poses a number of major economic tasks the solution of which requires new approaches corresponding to the Cuban socialist society's level of maturity.

The 3rd Congress critically analysed the economic development of the country over the last two five-year development periods and exposed the shortcomings in this process, particularly in the establishment of Cuba's economic mechanism. Dwelling on the difficulties encountered in this field and their root causes, Fidel Castro noted in the Report of the Central Committee to the Congress: "We are well aware of the difficulties, impediments and shortcomings which can be overcome; particularly, we have realised the need for efficient, vigorous and persistent work. We shall not tolerate indifference, negligence, incompetence and irresponsibility. The stage of learning must recede into the past. Time has come to use the entire tremendous experience and knowledge accumulated over the years of the revolution. It implies the total dedication to work and doing everything in one's power!"

At the present stage of socialist construction it is especially important to tackle the entire range of problems which could help raise the efficiency of the country's economic management. It is stressed in the Programme of the Communist Party of Cuba, adopted by the 3rd Congress, that "the constant goal must be a further development of democratic centralism in economic management and planning".

At present, the Communist Party spares no effort to ensure the successful attainment of this vital goal. The system of economic management and planning must become a powerful lever in the construction of socialist society in Cuba. The basic task confronting the country is to align the system of economic management with the level attained in the development of productive forces and socialist relations of production, to ensure the full use of all the conditions and factors characterising the economic essence of the socialist system.

In the second five-year development plan period, due to the accelerated growth rates and better qualitative indices of material production, such as a greater role of labour productivity in the increment of the national income and a certain improvement in the pattern of social production, the country could ensure the implementation of planned programmes in the social sphere as well.

The main task in this field remains the fuller satisfaction of the growing material and spiritual requirements of the working people. Thus, over the 1981-1985 period incomes of the population rose by more than four billion pesos.

The party's policy aimed at improving living standards manifests in systematic increases of salaries, wages, pensions, allowances, grants, etc. The average monthly pay which was only 73 pesos in 1958 had risen to already 188 pesos by 1986.

A better diet of the people is a major achievement of the party's social policy over recent years. At present the republic is one of the leading developing countries in food consumption. Cuba has practically attained the scientific standard of food consumption for the tropical-belt countries: in 1986 the daily per capita consumption was 2,967 calories and 79.9 grammes of protein. Despite the rationing of some products, the national distribution and a high purchasing capacity of the population ensure a standard of living considerably higher than in other Latin American countries.

After the revolution the volume of state allocations for education, medical care, social security and culture has increased many-fold and in per capita terms is higher than in other countries of the region. Suffice it to say that in 1985 the country allocated 1,696 million pesos on education, compared with 79.4 million in 1958. One of the major programmatic goals of the Communist Party of Cuba is to raise the quality of education because education and, first of all, vocational training and higher education play a very important role in the country's socio-economic development. The rapid progress of higher education (in 1985 the country had 46 institutions of higher learning as against three state universities in 1958)

enabled Cuba to catch up with the other socialist countries in the number of students per 10,000 population, and in the 1984/85 academic year to leave them behind.

The state regards it as its paramount duty to pay particular attention to medical care along with the development of education, and to give the masses access to culture. Broad access to health services is one of the major achievements of the Cuban revolution. While in 1958 physicians numbered 6,000 (and half of them later left the country) the corresponding figure for 1986 was more than 25.4 thousand. Average life span, which was only 55 years before the revolution, reached 74.2 years in 1985.

Cuba has also achieved major successes in the sphere of social security. At present the social security system covers a million people, not counting members of their families. The minimum old-age pension is 64 pesos a month. This meets basic material requirements, particularly since medical care is free of charge in the country.

Housing remains one of the urgent problems. Despite an accelerated housing construction, there is still acute shortage of accommodation in the republic. To solve the problem it is deemed expedient to combine state support with the initiative and broad involvement of the masses.

After the revolution Cuba has impressively consolidated its positions in the world. Maintaining diplomatic and consular relations with 125 countries (1986), 17 of them Latin American, the republic occupies a prominent place in the system of international relations. The peoples of Latin America regard Cuba as an example of the realisation of Marxist-Leninist ideas, as a factor promoting their national and social liberation struggle against imperialism.

Kaliv LENO

Imperialists Profit from the Arms Sales

Israeli war planes raid the neighbouring Arab countries... Bandit contras troops sow death and destruction in sovereign Nicaragua... Armed to the teeth dushmans infiltrate Afghanistan from Pakistan... The South African army bombs the neighbouring African countries... Pinochet soldiers shoot peaceful demonstrators.

All this happens in different parts of the world but these seemingly unrelated events have a common denominator: all these crimes are perpetrated by the people armed with the weapons bearing the "Made in USA" trade mark.

For decades now the United States has been holding the dubious honour of being

the world's largest "death merchant", and this business is now thriving as never before.

Washington's current policy in arms sales is largely based on a relevant presidential directive. It is quite indicative that the President signed that document on July 10, 1981, just a few months after his inauguration. According to the directive, the USA regards the supply of arms and military services as a major element of its global defence system and an inalienable component of its foreign policy. As *The New York Times* noted on this score, the document did not mention human rights even once. Why did the newspaper draw attention to this fact? Because this directive rescinded its precursor, a similar directive of May 13, 1977 initiated by President Jimmy Carter. The latter document stipulated that recipients of American weapons could use them exclusively for individual or collective defence.

It seems that the Republican administration which came to power in the early 1980 opted to put it on the line, do away with even the scanty limitations and give a still greater leeway to the military-industrial complex in building up its "death exports". Moreover, the President did not content himself with the cancellation of the limitations: he outlined a series of measures intended to expand the exports of American weapons. In particular, US officials abroad were instructed to assist, in every possible way, military industrial corporations in selling their products on the world market.

The assertions of the White House to the effect that its policy should not be construed as a declaration of a period of unlimited military supplies look especially pliant and cynical, if contrasted with the US promise to spare no effort in expanding arms exports to its partners. In 1981 American weapons and military advice were given to 63 countries; in 1982 the figure was 73. True, data indicating annual American deliveries of weapons abroad are quite contradictory. For instance, in 1983, according to estimates released by the research service of the Congress, the USA sold arms worth \$ 9,700 million, while the US weekly *Parade* reported that in 1982 alone the arms sales hit a record-high of \$ 22,000 million. The magazine listed Saudi Arabia, Australia, Egypt, Israel, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey among the major customers.

At the end of October 1985 the latest information was released on Washington's arms deals. For instance, in 1984 the aggregate sum of these sales amounted to \$ 14,500 million, and over 35 years, to \$ 164,000 million. According to observers, this huge sum did not fully reflect the actual state of affairs because that aggregate indicator failed to record a sizable part of US military exports to other NATO members, Israel, Japan and a number of other countries since such sales are entered in "ad hoc" records.

If one is to trust official reports or the data released by the quarters close to US government offices, in the last two or three years the volume of US arms deliveries has been declining. Press reports have it that in 1986 Washington sanctioned sales worth \$ 14,900 million. Simultaneously, *The New York Times* wrote that in 1986 the volume of Pentagon's deliveries amounted to \$ 8,000 million. Experts doubt these estimates, to say the least.

Indeed, these years were marked by the notorious Irangate, a sensational scandal over the illegal deliveries of American weapons to Iran with part of the money received thereby finding its way to the Nicaraguan contras. With White House blessing top US officials established a network for covert overseas deliveries of weapons. Special undercover organisations, lots of planes, secret bank accounts, globe-trotter jet trips by administration's emissaries, forged passports—all this looks more like a detective story than real life. Nevertheless, this is the story of arms deliveries to other countries in violation of the generally-recognised norms of international law as well as American laws—and these actions were carried out by sidetracking the US Congress and cheating the public. And how much did it all really cost? The ABC TV network estimated that 34 million dollars' worth of deliveries was involved. Other experts put the figure much higher. In what budget item are these American arms exports recorded? They are recorded nowhere.

One of the biggest recipients of US arms was, and is, Israel. In 1987, the United States granted Tel Aviv military "aid" to the tune of \$ 1,800 million. Pakistan is another client: in October 1987 Washington launched a six-year programme of military and economic aid to Islamabad running in excess of \$ 4,000 million. In 1987 alone Pakistan received \$ 665 million.

For many months now South Korea has been the scene of mass protests against the anti-popular regime. However, official Washington is least of all worried over the harsh reprisals unleashed by the Seoul rulers. Rather, it is anxious of its positions in this country which has long been regarded by Washington's military-political strategists as a major prop of the US policy in the Far East, as a bulwark "repelling communism". Here are the facts. In 1986 the USA extended \$ 164 million to Seoul in military aid. In the autumn of 1987 the press reported Washington's plans to deliver 24 F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers to South Korea.

All in all, according to the research service of the Congress, between 1982 and 1986 the Third World countries alone received American arms worth approximately \$ 25,000 million. Unwittingly, one draws the conclusion that the "death merchants" are not at all ashamed of the seamy side of this dirty business. They are not shamefaced by the fact that thousands of people are killed by American weapons. The press cited horrible figures: more than two-thirds of all people killed in armed conflicts since the Second World War were killed by American weapons. The destruction of a large number of people and the allocation of tremendous sums of money for the acquisition of weapons are not the only results of Washington's wide-scale trade in arms. It is difficult to overestimate the harm caused by this trade through the militarisation of the developing countries' economies, disproportions in their economies, policy and ideology.

Not without reason people say that a bad example is infectious. Initially, the developing countries who received American weapons in large quantities had to develop the production of spare parts and equipment for US hardware to the detriment of the civil economic sectors. Later on they were drawn in the production of their own weapons. Israel, Chile, Brazil, South Africa, South Korea and a number of other countries are already major producers of weapons and traders in them. Some of these countries are on the threshold of producing their own

nuclear weapons. The magazine *Forbes* believes that from 1979 to 1986 South Korea sold arms to the Third World countries alone worth \$ 2,700 million and the corresponding figure for Brazil is \$ 2,200 million. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in 1986 twenty-six developing states sold arms abroad worth \$ 11,000 million. As reported by *Forbes*, in Brazil alone about 350 companies produce planes, tanks and armoured troop-carriers. These companies employ more than 200 thousand people.

All these are quite modest figures compared with the tremendous share of the arms trade in the world which is accounted for by the leading imperialist powers. Let's take Britain, for instance. Foreign experts estimate that in 1986 British military exports were valued at \$ 8,600 million, and put 1986 US exports at \$ 14,000 million. In the spring of 1987 SIPRI experts published a report stating that the USA accounts for a third of all arms exports in the world. Britain sells arms to 90 countries. In 1986, France sold arms to its foreign clients to the tune of \$ 3,500 million. West Germany exports weapons to more than 70 countries. According to press reports, Italy ranks fourth among the biggest arms exporters.

The unrelenting large-scale arms trade involving primarily the United States and its closest allies fans up the existing conflicts and engenders new ones. Even a superficial analysis of this most dangerous business makes one conclude that it is like adding fuel to the fire.

The Soviet Union and other countries have more than once drawn attention to the need to find ways of curtailing military supplies to third countries. However, talks on this problem were disrupted several years ago by the present US administration. The world public hopes that Washington will listen to the voice of reason, stop building up arms deliveries abroad and agree to resume the search at the negotiation table for the ways of limiting and then stopping this dangerous business.

Yevgeni MENKES

Suriname


The Republic of Suriname is situated in the North-Eastern part of South America. With an area of 163,265 sq. km (63,037 sq. miles), it borders on French Guiana in the East, Guyana in the West, Brazil in the South, and its shores are washed by the waters of the Atlantic in the North. The capital is Paramaribo. Suriname's population of approximately 400,000 consists of the following ethnic groups: people of Indian extraction (36 per cent), Creoles (30 per cent), people of Indonesian extraction, mostly Javanese (17 per cent), Negroes (10 per cent), Amerindian Indians (3 per cent), Chinese (2 per cent), Europeans (2 per cent). Dutch is the official language, but English is widely spoken.

The territory of Suriname was first explored by the Spanish seafarer Alonso de Ojeda in 1499. For a century and a half, Suriname was a bone of contention between three colonial powers: Spain, England and Holland. Eventually, in line with the treaty of Breda, England ceded the territory in 1667 to the Netherlands in exchange for New Amsterdam (now the Manhattan district of New York).

Suriname became independent on November 25, 1975. On February 25, 1980, a coup was staged by a group of progressive minded non-commissioned officers and sergeants. The Supreme Council, led by Dési Bouterse, became the highest organ of state power in the country.

Suriname is one of the economically advanced countries of South America. Its economy consists principally of a mining industry—bauxite, alumina and aluminium production. The country is the world's fifth biggest bauxite producer. This industry is under the control of the Suriname Aluminium Company (Suralco) which is a subsidiary of the American ALCOA corporation and the Billiton-Mulshappey Suriname—a subsidiary of the Royal Dutch/Shell. Suriname receives only 6 per cent of the total profits of the mining companies. Oil industry has been developing in recent times. Heavy oil is extracted in the Tamborjo area (40 kilometres from Paramaribo) and used as fuel at thermal power stations. Its production in 1986 went up by 67 per cent on the preceding year and now meets a quarter

of the country's need in petroleum products.



Agriculture is an important industry. The gross harvest of rice, which has become the country's staple export item next to bauxites, increased from 173,000 tonnes in 1974 to 280,000 in 1985. Bananas and sugar-cane are grown, and fishing has been making headway. The agrarian reform, which has given land to thousands of peasant households, is an important factor behind the stable growth of agricultural production. Under the Reform Act, small farms are to be progressively amalgamated into cooperatives.

The independent policy of Suriname's new leadership has been clearly displeasing internal reactionaries and external imperialist forces. For instance, following the death of 15 opposition leaders in an abortive right-wing coup attempt in December 1982, the Netherlands suspended "aid" to Suriname until "the country's democratic development" was ensured. The USA has joined in exercising economic pressure on Suriname. That compounded the financial and economic problems of the republic. Industrial production fell off. Unemployment rose to 20 per cent of the labour force. According to IMF estimates, Suriname's gold and foreign exchange reserves dropped from \$176.3 million in 1982 to \$23.9 million in 1985.

To offset the negative developments in economic life, the military leadership has fo-

cused on a diversification of Suriname's economy. Over 50 new enterprises were built in various sectors of the economy in 1982-1985. There have been more and more of locally manufactured goods on sale. The public sector is now producing 25 per cent of the GNP and provides employment for 37 per cent of the economically active population.

In spite of economic difficulties, the ruling regime has taken a series of measures to improve the lot of working people. Two thousand homes were built in the first eighteen months after the military took over—more than during five years of rule by the preceding bourgeois government of Henck Arron. Suriname has an old age and disability pensions scheme. Medical aid is offered at the lowest cost to all who need it.

Suriname's leadership is actively working to unite all the country's patriotic and democratic forces. The February 25th Movement was launched in November 1983. The new organisation proclaimed its major objectives to be: the defence of the revolution and the territorial integrity of Suriname, a restructuring of the economy in the interest of working people, and consolidation of links with progressive international forces. The Movement is headed by the former Chairman of the Supreme Council Daysi Bouterse. In December 1984 it was decided to convene the National Assembly to draft Suriname's new Constitution. It comprised representatives of the armed forces, trade unions and some members of the business community.

Suriname's progressive social reforms have been handicapped since mid-1986 by the eruption of a dangerous hotbed of war in the country's eastern areas on the border with French Guiana. Armed rebel groups made up of ex-servicemen have seriously disorganised the economy and complicated the internal political situation. The bandits have the backing of right-wing Surinamese emigres and external imperialist elements. The country's relations with Holland, strained as they were, worsened drastically in early 1987. The Hague was accused in an official note of Suriname's Ministry of Foreign Affairs of supporting "terrorist activity" on

Suriname's territory in violation of international law, and Netherlands' Ambassador to Suriname was asked to leave the country. Pressure on Suriname is being exerted by other Western powers as well.

The country's foreign policy has been appreciably active since the progressive military regime came to power. It has established diplomatic relations with more than fifty countries, including the USSR (since 1975) and many other socialist countries. Suriname is a member of the OAS, the Amazon Pact and the non-aligned movement since 1979. It is also an associate member of the EEC. Suriname speaks out for an end to the arms race and elimination of nuclear arsenals, against militarisation of space and for equal relations among nations. In the opinion of the Suriname leadership there must be a zone of peace in the Caribbean, and all foreign interference in the affairs of the peoples of Central America should stop.

A programme for scientific and cultural cooperation between Suriname and the USSR was signed in Paramaribo in December 1984. It provides for extension of friendly ties between the two countries in such areas as higher education, vocational training, culture and sports. The links of the Suriname trade unions with the trade unions of the USSR, established as early as in 1978, are strengthening. Prospects for further development of bilateral relations were discussed during an official visit by a delegation of Suriname's National Assembly to the Soviet Union in September 1985.

A national referendum in September 1987 approved the redrafted Constitution. There was a further polarisation of political forces in the run-up to the November general election. For instance, three leading bourgeois parties formed a coalition called the Front for Democracy and Development.

At the elections to the National Assembly (Parliament) and the local bodies this coalition has won almost 90 per cent of the votes, thereby gaining, in fact, the right to decide who will be President of Suriname the next five years.

Yevgeni PASHENTSEV

Thirty Years of AAPSO

Thirty years have passed since the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) was established by the constituent conference of representatives of socio-political forces and the national liberation fronts of African and Asian states. The conference was held from December 26, 1957 to January 1, 1958 in Cairo. The AAPSO aims to consolidate and coordinate the struggle of the peoples of Asia and Africa against imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, racism, Zionism and fascism, and for ensuring their economic, social and cultural progress.

At present, the AAPSO comprises mass organisations, political parties and movements of more than 80 Asian and African countries. It cooperates with public organisations in a number of countries of Europe and America, the United Nations and its specialised agencies and enjoys the observer status in the non-alignment movement. The AAPSO coordinates its activities with the World Peace Council and other mass international democratic organisation.

Since the inception of the Afro-Asian solidarity movement the Soviet public has been its active participant. The Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee is a full-fledged member of the AAPSO. It takes an active part in all its undertakings and believes that its main purpose is to strengthen solidarity between the peoples of Asia and Africa and to promote social relations and cooperation between the USSR and the countries of the two continents. The Committee renders for moral, political and practical support to the peoples fighting for their freedom and independence, and against imperialism, colonialism and racism.

The AAPSO resolutely supports the struggle of the South African patriots against the apartheid regime in South Africa, the struggle of the Arab peoples, including the Palestine Arabs, for the liberation of the territories occupied by Israel. The AAPSO advocates a political settlement of the Middle East crisis and the problems around Afghanistan and Kampuchea. It comes out for an immediate cessation of the Iran-Iraq war and the normalisation of the situation in the Per-

sian Gulf area. Among the major recent undertakings by the AAPSO are an international extraordinary conference in support of the peoples of South Africa (Addis Ababa, 1985), the International Conference for Peace, Disarmament and Development (Brazzaville, 1986), the International Seminar on Ending the Iran-Iraq War (Cairo, 1987), the International Conference for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, for Peace and Anti-Imperialist Solidarity in the Asia-Pacific Region (Pyongyang, 1987).

In different periods of its activity the AAPSO had different political, social and economic priorities on its agenda depending on the international situation. Since the early 1970s these were the aversion of the threat of war, the struggle for the prohibition of nuclear weapons, the promotion of disarmament and the establishment of a comprehensive system of international security and peace. In its strategy the AAPSO pays particular attention to the problems of development, economic decolonisation of the developing countries, the establishment of a new just international economic order.

The documents adopted by the supreme AAPSO bodies—congresses of solidarity of the Asian and African nations (called conferences till 1984)—invariably linked the problems of disarmament and economic development and exposed the destabilising role of the military-industrial complex in the imperialist powers and transnationals.

Over the 1958-1972 period five AAPSO conferences had been held: the second, 1960 (Conakry, the Republic of Guinea); the third, 1963 (Moshi, Tanganyika); the fourth, 1965 (Accra, the Republic of Ghana); and the fifth, 1972 (Cairo, the Arab Republic of Egypt). In 1984, in Algiers (the Algerian People's Democratic Republic) the Sixth AAPSO Congress approved its new charter.

The AAPSO has become an influential international democratic centre and marks its 30th anniversary on the eve of the Seventh Congress which is scheduled to be held in Delhi in November 1988.

Salander KALANDAROV

THE FIRST REAL RESULT OF THE PERESTROIKA

Soviet foreign policy and diplomatic activity have assumed new dimensions tangibly benefiting our country and the world. Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to the United States and its results amounted to scaling the highest point ever reached by Soviet-US relations and international relations generally.

A stage of paramount importance set in in our diplomacy, one based on new thinking. The developments preceding it added up to a logical series of consistently purposeful decisions and actions by the Soviet leadership.

Back in April 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev told a plenary meeting of the CPSU CC that confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States "is not fatally inevitable" and that "the most reasonable thing is to search for ways leading to a levelling out of relations, to build a bridge of cooperation, doing it, however, from both sides". On the same occasion he said: "The Soviet Union will perseveringly seek in Geneva concrete mutually acceptable agreements making it possible both to end the arms race and take the cause of disarmament further."

Thus the advance to what has been achieved began in April 1985. Foreign policy and practical diplomacy were set big tasks. A reliable guideline was formulated whose true realism sets it apart from directives of the past. We can no longer build our policy on the premise that our country must be as strong as any possible coalition of states opposing us.

A comparison of the economic potentials of our country and the United States, Western Europe and Japan left no room for doubt that the motto "We can meet any challenge" was becoming adventuristic, dooming us to economic difficulties and ultimately failing to safeguard our security. No ideals, however great, can be above common sense. To ignore this is to take a barren stand.

Bald pragmatism is alien to our policy inspired by new political thinking. The task assigned to Soviet diplomacy is prompted by a lofty goal, for it consists in providing proper conditions in which our people can work at an increasing tempo to raise the level and quality of their life. In practice this means ending confrontation, stopping the arms race, embarking on real disarmament and asserting the principle of peaceful coexistence and cooperation, giving it a specific content.

The components of new political thinking were introduced into Soviet foreign policy as at once theoretical guidelines and political and diplomatic actions and found reflection in practical positions. There was the moratorium on nuclear testing. There was the Geneva summit. There was the statement made by the General Secretary of the CPSU CC on January 15, 1986. The 27th CPSU Congress set out in precise terms the principles of Soviet foreign policy and announced its concept of a comprehensive international security system.

There was Reykjavik, an intellectual breakthrough in the concept of the possibility of nuclear disarmament. There was Stockholm, which confirmed the feasibility of confidence-building measures in the military-political sphere.

And there was a long series of political and diplomatic actions and initiatives. They assumed a truly global scale. Vigorous work was carried on with India, China, France, Great Britain, the FRG, Italy, Spain,

South American and ASEAN states, Australia, Zimbabwe and many other countries. The world community now has the Vladivostok programme for the Asia and Pacific region elaborated in the *Merdeka* interview, the Delhi Declaration, two UN resolutions in support of the concept of a comprehensive system of international peace and security. The UN was given a powerful spur with the appearance of Mikhail Gorbachev's article "Reality and Guarantees for a Secure World", which is rich in creative ideas.

Nor should anyone forget our principled advocacy of democratising international relations, raising the role and prestige of the UN and shaping a new international economic order, any more than our offer of participation in the activity of international financial and economic organisations.

The CPSU leadership comes out with constructive ideas regarding conventional armaments and armed forces, chemical weapons, measures for military detente and greater confidence, on-site inspection, verification and control generally. The context of humanitarian problems has changed. There is controversy over the convocation of a conference on these problems in Moscow, and it shows that socialism is a bona fide champion of human rights.

All this is taking place against the background of a marked upturn in effective activity by the socialist community. The latter's military-political alliance is not nominal; it is functioning dynamically and harmoniously.

Developments in the Soviet Union following the April 1985 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU CC, the perestroika and the formation of a new image of our country abroad may be seen as a particularly important factor. They were taken into account when planning our country's foreign policy for the long term, a policy that is now being steadfastly pursued under the leadership of the CC Political Bureau. This should be borne in mind in analysing the evolution of Soviet-US relations, for the changes coming about in them were largely predetermined by our foreign policy on the whole range of international problems.

A definite policy requires a definite atmosphere and a definite degree of public support. A militarist policy necessitates a climate of confrontation, suspiciousness, incomprehension, hostility. Militarism's "incandescent lamp" can burn only if tension in the circuit of political relations is high.

Our foreign policy is invariably aimed at lowering this tension. As a result, Washington's policy shows the early signs of realism. They did not come of themselves; our efforts played a part in this development.

Mention should be made of another factor conducive to mutually acceptable solutions in the matter of security and in political relations. We mean the development trend of the world economy and the state of the US economy.

Ronald Reagan's years in office have shown that stepped-up defence spending has dire consequences for the economy of even a powerful industrial country such as the United States, which it fails to serve as an incentive to scientific and technological progress. This is seen in the declining share of US high-tech products on the world market.

Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to the United States was dominated by new political thinking. From the Geneva summit onwards, the Soviet Union had worked hard to bring about an agreement with that country on intermediate-range missiles.

There are those who think that the agreement signed with the Americans is based on the latter's "zero option". Indeed, the United States proposed this a few years ago without believing in it and expecting it to be rejected out of hand. Its calculation proved justified for a long time.

THE FIRST REAL RESULT OF THE PERESTROIKA

The new Soviet leadership approached the situation in terms of our fundamental military and political interests. From this point of view, our country is the sole author of the "zero option".

What is it to have 100 Pershing-2s in Europe? It means that the United States could at any moment pose an extremely unpleasant military threat to us. Our SS-20 missiles, four times greater in number, had no such capability with regard to the United States. Politically, the IRMs became a factor complicating relations in Europe and with the United States.

It is perfectly obvious that the less the US military presence in forward positions in Europe and Asia, the better for our military and political interests. And this implies that the political goal should be to seek the removal of all US IRMs from Europe and prevent the deployment of shorter-range missiles in Europe and Asia.

New thinking manifested itself in our looking at the relative value of this class of weapons in a new way, from a realistic standpoint, and in adopting as a criterion their ability to accomplish definite tasks and not their quantity. It is only from this angle that the "exchange rate" of the agreement signed in Washington should be assessed.

The security interests of our country call for weighing various moves more carefully, for proceeding from our political concept and not from the aggregate capability of the armed forces, and for applying our concept with due regard to our real national interests in the broad sense of the term. Military power as a factor needs to be reappraised. The first-ever meeting between Soviet and US military men in the Pentagon fits into this philosophy.

There is a further important circumstance, namely, the treaty provisions for overseeing the elimination of Soviet and US IRMs and SRMs. The accords reached on this point are unique. It is safe to say that from the point of view of our future policy what has been achieved in the area of verification is comparable and possibly superior in significance to the treaty on IRMs and SRMs. The groundwork has been laid for progress on other lines of disarmament, primarily as regards limiting and reducing strategic offensive weapons and banning chemical ones. Many in the West did not think we could go as far as that in openness over military matters. The recent past gave them some cause for scepticism. Our bold steps in the sphere of control and our determined renunciation of what would have seemed to be rigid stereotypes disarmed the sceptics. The initiative in this respect is entirely in our hands now. The extent of control on both Soviet and US territory is unprecedented. It involves other WTO and NATO countries, with some exceptions. In short, a valuable basis is being built up for confidence on a higher state-to-state plane.

The military and political significance of the IRM-SRM Treaty is beyond question. The treaty meets our military and political interests and has some other dimensions.

It is the first real result of the perestroika and the first result of new political thinking. It is a fruit of intensive talks by the Soviet leader and US leaders, talks serving a far-reaching goal. Mikhail Gorbachev said from the outset that the purpose of his visit was to make policy, not to squabble or to go back to old disputes. That was how the Soviet leader actually proceeded throughout the three exacting days of his visit. An accord was reached in principle on the central issue, that of an agreement on strategic offensive weapons and the ABM Treaty. Good prerequisites were created for a fruitful dialogue on this matter, with the prospect of a concrete agreement being signed during President Reagan's planned visit to the Soviet Union.

The discussions held in Washington on reducing conventional armaments, banning chemical weapons, limiting and discontinuing nuclear explosions paved the way for more vigorous joint efforts at relevant forums. The other side is now agreeable to discussing and comparing military doctrines. The problems of human rights and humanitarian cooperation were discussed calmly and constructively. Mikhail Gorbachev's proposal to form a team of experts at parliamentary level for a detailed discussion of every aspect of human rights came as a surprise to the Americans. We do not fear a public debate on this issue, which the West saw until recently as a winning game for it and a losing one for us.

The exchange of opinion on regional situations during the Soviet-US summit followed a generally constructive and businesslike course. There was a very concrete and open conversation on Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq conflict, Central America, the Middle East. It covered practically all regional conflicts and could not have produced any immediate results, nor was it expected to. But now there is reason to expect it, since various specific actions were proposed to the US side.

The Soviet Union hopes that the year 1988 will be the last year of the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. When intervention from without has stopped we will pull out of the friendly neighbouring country with a clear conscience and a sense of fulfilled duty. The withdrawal of Soviet troops is to be effected within 12 months but may come sooner depending on circumstances. The important thing is that a political solution has been achieved even though it was hard to arrive at and took long. New political thinking carried on a sustained search for ways and means ruling out a military solution. This is also the purpose of projects for a political settlement around Afghanistan and the policy of national reconciliation.

Of course, much remains to be done for a complete settlement of the situation in Afghanistan. Among the necessary conditions for this is a constructive political dialogue between the opposing forces, with neither side laying claim to a monopoly of power. The formation of a coalition government on the broadest possible basis is visualised as no more than a first step towards an all-Afghanistan consensus on the future development of the country. In the integral and interconnected world of today, a general improvement in the international situation is also bound to have a beneficial effect on the situation around Afghanistan. However, there is undoubtedly feedback, as Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, who visited Afghanistan in January 1988, has stressed. A political settlement of the Afghan problem would in turn benefit the international climate. What is more, the policy of national reconciliation being followed in Afghanistan could provide a basic model for settlement in other trouble spots on the planet.

With the visit over, we are compelled to call attention to the interpretation by Washington officials of certain matters discussed during the visit. For instance, it is alleged in US quarters that during the conversations held in Washington the Soviet side said it was willing to refrain from all military assistance to the Sandinist government of Nicaragua. The allegation has nothing in common with reality. Actually the Soviet side repeatedly suggested during the conversations with the President that the Soviet Union and United States should agree on a reciprocal basis to consider the possibility of contributing in practice to a peaceful settlement in Central America. This applied to, among other things, the idea of supporting the efforts of the Contadora Group and the parties to the Guatemala agreements.

Such an accord, the Soviet side stressed, could include reciprocal commitments by the Soviet Union and United States to limit arms deli-

THE FIRST REAL RESULT OF THE PERESTROIKA

veries to Central American countries. Thus our idea concerns the whole of Central America and, secondly, provides for reciprocal undertakings by the Soviet Union and the United States to refrain from supplying arms to that area.

It is not easy to renounce nuclear missiles. Some look on them as a symbol of the strength of a country, of its control of circumstances. They believe that a country which were to give them up could thereby rob itself of the attributes of a great power. This is an absolutely erroneous notion. The real strength and prestige of a power should be gauged by its ability to contribute to the stability of the world and the prosperity of both its own people and the world community as a whole.

In this sense Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to the United States led to the emergence of a new world reality.

Summit meetings are said to lower the blood pressure of the planet. Such meetings have taken place before yet "pressure" stayed at a dangerously high mark. We must say that in Washington it was artificially kept up even at the threshold of the visit.

A diplomatic battle was fought over the possibility of the CPSU CC General Secretary addressing a joint meeting of the houses of Congress. Right-wingers fiercely opposed the idea, fearing the impact of the Soviet leader's personality on the Americans' thoughts and sentiments. On December 6 there were demonstrations by the most diverse anti-Soviet elements, and they drew many thousands of participants.

But December 7 was described by *The New York Times* as an amazing day marked by satisfaction and optimism. Washington often looks only at the shady side of events involving the Soviet Union. This time, however, there were few people in the American capital who did not rejoice. From that day on, television ushered the Soviet leader into American homes as it were. And on both sides of Washington's streets along which the Soviet delegation's motorcade moved, many thousands of people shouted greetings, waved their hands and smiled. It was a spontaneous expression of sentiment reflecting the transition of Soviet-US relations to a new quality.

Politics has no right to give in to euphoria. But neither may it ignore the people's mood. Foreign policy today is more personified than ever. There is no concealing the real merits of a man representing his people and country. Charisma, a keen intelligence, readiness of repartee play their role along with political arguments.

The visit cannot be assessed properly without regard to the work which Mikhail Gorbachev did in addition to the official talks. The general public was barred from the conversations in the Oval Room but the General Secretary had meetings with the public, making a strong impression and evoking an enthusiastic response. His audiences included public figures, editors, publishers, businessmen, spokesmen of youth.

Americans got a better idea of what our policy is really like, what we really want, what our perestroika is aimed at. They satisfied themselves at first hand of both the reality of Soviet society and our respect for the American people.

It would be unpardonable to oversimplify the situation. Our two countries belong to different social systems. Their mutual relations are part of a wider and more complex spectrum of relations between the two systems. Either country has a unique record and adheres to its own ideology and way of life. Either one has its allies and its long-standing relations with numerous countries, primarily countries close to it in social system. But in this age it is essential—and is a pivotal exigency of new thinking—not to seize at distinctions and contradictions as a pretext and excuse for confrontation. This would be particularly wrong now that renewal, democratisation, openness are generating trends favourable to

contacts between East and West and making possible an entirely new stage in their mutual relations.

To be sure, it would be self-delusion to imagine that America was transformed in those three days. However, many things did change. Our country as it has been developing since the April Plenary Meeting of the CPSU CC gained in prestige. Americans came to trust us and our leadership more than before.

The Right now finds it harder to cultivate the image of an "evil empire", all the more since the man who has coined the phrase admits that he no longer believes in the Soviet Union's bid to achieve world domination or destroy the Western community.

The US visit was a historic event holding a big promise. This is true primarily of the prospect of an agreement on strategic offensive weapons. The momentum gained in Soviet-US relations must be maintained. It will be no easy task. The Americans may be expected to back down on some point or points, as they occasionally do after uncommonly important developments marking a gain for us. Nor will it be easy for the IRM-SRM Treaty to win ratification in Congress.

High-ranking Washington leaders have so far abided by the common approaches worked out during the visit. Statements (in public and in private, such as become known to the press) indicate that the White House, the State Department and other high echelons of power appreciate the importance of carrying forward and implementing the line adopted by the leaders of the two powers. This was, in particular, the meaning of the article contributed by US Secretary of State George Shultz to *The Washington Post* in January.

One has the impression that many propositions of the article were prompted by the conversations which the Secretary of State had had with Soviet leaders. He touches on questions raised in Mikhail Gorbachev's article "Reality and Guarantees for a Secure World". While many of the points made by Shultz in his article are debatable, most of his arguments are realistic and acceptable. Shultz commented that in the spirit of radical change, stereotypes of thinking should be discarded to make way for new opportunities. The Soviet Union is of the same opinion. Orientation to new political thinking offers a reliable prospect of normalising Soviet-US relations and the situation throughout the world.

What was achieved during the visit is a tremendous asset to be used wisely. To consolidate the results of the visit means proceeding in the spirit of what Mikhail Gorbachev did in Washington, that is, pursuing a more active foreign policy in all areas.

We did not give in to excessive Americanism before the visit, nor are we going to do it now. The Soviet Union considers every line of foreign policy activity important. Our country and the United States are occasionally called superpowers in a sense which we refuse to accept. While we realise our international responsibility, we are far from imagining that everything in the world, including East-West relations, depends solely on Moscow and Washington.

New political thinking rejects that simplistic old rule which says that you cannot have good relations with anyone other than to someone else's detriment. Our time demands a different moral code and a different set of laws. It shows that nowadays there is no framing a long-term policy at others' expense and that we all need to search for a balance of interests, not against someone, but together with everyone. This path, while arduous, is the only one leading to universal security and equitable cooperation.

MIGHTY FACTOR FOR WORLD PEACE

Colonel-General Nikolai CHERVOV,

Chief of Department, General Staff, Armed Forces of the USSR

Seventy years have passed since the Armed Forces of the USSR were organised. They were formed by the Communist Party, by Lenin, shortly after the founding of the world's first socialist state, as an instrument for defending the revolutionary achievements of the people. "This army," Lenin wrote, "is called upon to safeguard the gains of the revolution and our people's power, the Soviets of Soldiers', Workers' and Peasants' Deputies, the whole of this new and truly democratic system, against the attacks of all the enemies of the people, who are bending all efforts to destroy the revolution."¹

Following the victory of the October Revolution, for as long as the class struggle in our country continued, our army had to perform an internal function for a time by defending the people's revolutionary achievements against the plots of the overthrown exploiter classes and by suppressing their armed actions.

With the triumph of socialism and the formation of a state of the whole people the internal function of the army ceased. From the standpoint of the country's internal conditions our society does not need an army. It is noteworthy that none but the army of a socialist state loses its internal function at a definite stage in its development. Objectively, no bourgeois army can undergo this kind of evolution, for the ruling class of a society rent by class antagonisms always needs a military force as a means of putting down the people's revolutionary movement. The only function of the Soviet Armed Forces today is external.

The historical mission of the Soviet Armed Forces is to reliably defend the country of the October Revolution and developed socialist society against the aggressive schemes of imperialism and its accomplices, and ensure favourable external conditions for communist construction.

The Soviet delegation led by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, vigorously worked during its official visit to Washington from December 7 to 10, 1987, to promote disarmament, remove the nuclear menace and relax tensions and lessen confrontation in the world. Why were these problems given so much attention? Aren't we much stronger than, say, 15 or 20 years ago? Aren't the peace forces superior to the forces of war? And then don't the imperialist have an idea of what nuclear war is like?

Yes, our country is far stronger than at any time in the past. There exists world socialism—a powerful international formation backed by a highly developed economy, solid scientific facilities and a dependable military-political potential. The Soviet Armed Forces and the armies of the other socialist community countries are not inferior in strength to the armies of the main imperialist powers. Our country has many allies and supporters abroad, many partners in the struggle for peace, freedom and progress. The 27th Congress of our party came to the conclusion that nuclear war can be staved off. "The CPSU," we read in the party Programme, "proceeds from the belief that, however grave the threat to peace posed by the policy of the aggressive circles of imperialism, world war is not fatally inevitable. It is possible to

avert war and to save mankind from catastrophe. This is the historical mission of socialism, of all the progressive and peace-loving forces of the world."²

But we are realists. The socialist world, a world looking ahead, is faced with a strong and dangerous capitalist world. Capitalism's general crisis is deepening, the sphere of its domination is shrinking irresistibly and the policy of its reactionary forces remains hostile to the peoples' interests. Imperialism is bitterly resisting social progress, trying to stop or even to reverse the course of history, to undermine the positions of socialism and take social revenge on it at world level. By virtue of its social nature, it is constantly generating a reckless policy of aggression. "The roots of war lie in the very essence of capitalism," Lenin pointed out. The record of today's US administration includes acts of aggression such as the invasion of Grenada, the bombing of Lebanon, the aggression against Libya, the undeclared wars against the peoples of Afghanistan, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique.

The threat of nuclear war persists. While there are encouraging signs of a healthier situation in the world, the policy of bellicose imperialist forces willing to further their selfish interests by sacrificing the destinies of whole nations threatens the use of nuclear weapons. This is fraught with a global nuclear cataclysm in which there would be neither victors nor vanquished, and all life could be destroyed.

The bellicose policy of US imperialism finds clear expression in America's military doctrine, in the arms race being escalated by the US imperialists, in their bid to deploy weapons in space, to upset in their favour the military strategic parity existing today, to control world developments.

The US military doctrine of the 1980s openly declares that it is aimed at achieving "complete and unquestioned military superiority for the United States", "restoring America's leading role in the world" and "actively resisting the Soviet Union in every part of the globe". These official guidelines, which are being enforced under cover of the myth of the "Soviet military threat", serve as a political rationale for the arms race and fully suit American reactionaries and the US military-industrial complex, which makes bigger profits than any other sphere of material production.

The offensive character of the US military doctrine expresses itself in the building of the country's armed forces, in which emphasis is placed on preparations for a strategic (world) nuclear war. The United States assigns the chief role in attaining its objectives in such a war to its strategic offensive forces, which include over 2,200 delivery vehicles with a lift capacity of more than 14,000 pieces of nuclear ammunition at one launch. The buildup of these forces is continuing. The Pentagon is adding the most dangerous and destabilising weapons to its armoury: MX ICBMs tipped with 10 warheads each and many hundreds of long-range sea-based cruise missiles. Besides, it is going to test Trident-2 SLBMs equipped with 12 warheads.

The Pentagon is now concentrating on ensuring that in the event of war it can neutralise Soviet retaliation. To this end it is carrying out the Star Wars (SDI) programme, that is, setting up a comprehensive anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system on earth and in space guaranteeing the destruction of enemy missiles. In other words, it wants to create a "reliable shield" and an "irresistible sword". Were the idea of this ABM system to materialise, it would tempt lovers of armed adventure to risk "pushing the button" in the hope of getting away with it, since the "reliable shield" (or space strike weapons) is intended to destroy in space the Soviet missiles which survive an American nuclear first strike. By way of preparing to wage a "preventive war", the Pentagon is studying the possibility of developing a nuclear bomb with reinforced electromagnetic impulse. Its experts estimate that if exploded over Soviet territory, such a bomb could knock out the country's entire communications system.

Both the projected "anti-missile solution" and the development of a new nuclear bomb with reinforced electromagnetic impulse pursue the one aim of

making it possible for the United States to deliver a nuclear first strike with impunity and to prevent the Soviet Union from retaliating; in other words, the idea is to disarm our country in the face of the US nuclear menace. This is the true purpose of the Star Wars programme.

The Soviet leadership holds that in this nuclear and space age no one can benefit politically from either the arms race or the aspiration for military superiority. Reciprocal security should be based on lowering the level of military confrontation and on reducing and ultimately eliminating all nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. The military potentials of nations should be reduced to limits sufficient solely for defence.

Why do we approach the problem in this way? Because the arms race has reached a stage where weapons, no matter how powerful or numerous, can no longer be used for attaining political ends; still less can they be used in the foreseeable future. The old notion of war as a means of achieving political objectives has had its day. With due regard to this reality, the Soviet Union is doing all that is needed to help ease confrontation, start real disarmament and advance towards a safe world with armaments at the lowest level. It backs up its proposals to this end with practical deeds.

We carried out no nuclear tests for eighteen months while the United States stepped up its nuclear blasts in Nevada. The Soviet Union is ready even now to suspend nuclear testing any day on a reciprocal basis. Not so with the United States. We propose coming to terms on a substantial reduction of the power of nuclear blasts and a drastic cut in their number. But the United States refuses to meet us half-way on this proposal as well.

The Soviet Union has made compromises on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles: we are eliminating more missiles and warheads for them than the United States (of course, under the IRMs-SRMs Treaty, the USA has made certain compromises too); we have agreed to discount the nuclear missiles of Britain and France; and we have put off decision on intermediate-range aircraft nuclear weapons. Thanks to the Soviet Union's initiative, a treaty has been signed for the first time in history on the elimination of two classes of nuclear weapons: IRMs and SRMs. This treaty is important from the military as well as from the moral and political points of view. It paves the way for new and farther-reaching accords, and can lead international relations out of the vicious circle of outdated thinking, suspiciousness and distrust.

Of particular importance in this connection is the solution of the problem of a tangible cut in strategic offensive weapons (SOW). The Joint Soviet-US Summit Statement reflects the agreement of principle of both sides to cut their SOW by 50 per cent, given the ABM Treaty is observed as signed in 1972.

What progress has been made at the Washington summit in the SOW problem? While in Reykjavik the parties agreed to reduce the strategic offensive weapons of the two countries to the levels not exceeding 1,600 strategic offensive delivery systems and 6,000 warheads on them and reached accords on the limitations on heavy missiles, on the rule of account for heavy bombers, the Washington meeting supplemented the above accords with new provisions.

The USSR and the USA leaders agreed to introduce the ceiling of 4,900 on the aggregate number of ICBM and SLBM warheads within the 6,000 total. They specified the sub-levels for heavy missiles (1,540 warheads and 154 heavy missiles). It was a compromise on the part of the Soviet Union meeting the US interests half-way.

The parties also agreed that it was necessary to elaborate an accord which, as was indicated in the joint statement, would make it binding on the Soviet and American sides to comply with the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972, which also covered research, development and, if necessary, tests allowed

by it, and not to withdraw from the treaty within a specified period of time. The joint statement also says that if the USSR and the USA fail to come to an agreement by the time the specified period of the non-withdrawal from the ABM treaty expires, each side will be free to decide its course of action.

Another step forward has been made in the problem of limiting the deployment of nuclear-armed sea-launched long-range cruise missiles. The USA had to agree to establish ceilings for such missiles (besides 6,000 warheads) and search jointly with the Soviet side, for mutually acceptable methods of verification of such limitations. This is a substantial concession of the American side to the Soviet Union. Until then the United States flatly refused to impose limitations on the sea-launched cruise missiles.

As the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee pointed out, persevering and purposeful efforts by the Soviet delegation in Washington resulted in considerable progress on the problem of a radical reduction of strategic offensive weapons in the context of preserving and strictly respecting the ABM Treaty. This problem remains central to Soviet-US relations, and the Soviet Union considers it feasible to draft a relevant treaty, to be signed in Moscow during the US President's reciprocal visit to the Soviet Union in the first half of this year.

Now some politicians in the United States attempt to interpret in their own way the essence of the Joint Soviet-US Statement claiming that the elaboration of accords on strategic offensive weapons can be carried out without linking it to the problems of anti-missile defence and that the Washington summit has removed all disagreements on the SDI. Consequently, they say, the United States can accelerate the implementation of this programme. All this does not contribute to a constructive dialogue on strategic offensive weapons. The Soviet Union believes that in this field the parties should not lose time, and act constructively making progress in the search for mutually acceptable solutions on the basis of the accords reached by the Soviet Union and the United States in Washington.

One of the priority problems, along with that of nuclear armaments, is the problem of banning and destroying all chemical weapons under strict international control. In November-December 1987, another round of multi-lateral negotiations and Soviet-American consultations on the prohibition of chemical weapons was held in Geneva. The USA has claimed for a long time that successful talks were impeded by the Soviet Union's unpreparedness to consolidate mutual trust by exchanging information on chemical weapons. The Soviet side took major steps to meet the US side half-way by proposing to effect the first stage of exchanging data on chemical weapons and on the facilities for their production as early as the closing stage of the talks—to inform each other of the available reserves, the number and location of the facilities for the production and storing of chemical weapons—and to effect the second stage, prior to the signing of a convention, by supplying still more detailed information (the composition of chemical weapons in every depot, production capacities, the characteristics of the facilities to be used for destroying chemical weapons; disclosing the laboratories, testing-grounds, and so on).

We confirmed our invitation to visit the facility for the destruction of chemical weapons in the area of Chapayevsk after it has been built, that is, in 1988 as planned.

We note with satisfaction that the reserve of confidence between the parties to the talks is growing. In October 1987, we demonstrated at the Shikhan military installation standard models of chemical ammunition of the Soviet Army and the technology of destroying them, using a mobile complex for the purpose. In November our experts visited, on invitation, US and

West German facilities for the destruction of chemical weapons at Tooele (Utah) and Münster, respectively.

One would have expected the talks on banning chemical weapons to move fast to a close. But the nearer the finish, the more numerous the obstacles and the attempts to drag out the talks, to get away from a comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons. Voices are now raised in favour of regulating chemical armaments and not of banning them, of partial measures instead of a global solution. The US delegate said so outright in the First (Political) Committee of the UN General Assembly.

The problem at the moment is to write into the future convention provisions ruling out any revival of a military chemical potential anywhere. It is precisely on this point that the United States is trying to secure unilateral advantages. It intends to keep its facilities for the development and production of chemical weapons by leaving intact laboratories, commercial chemical enterprises and transnational corporations. That is evidently why the USA insists on a dissimilar approach to control exercised over state and private sectors of science and economy of the states parties to the convention. According to this approach in the case of the Soviet Union all facilities—even those having no relation to chemical weapons—should be involved while in the case of the United States the majority of private chemical enterprises and transnationals, including their subsidiaries outside US territory, would be exempt from control.

What would that cover? Everything in the case of the Soviet Union and hardly anything in that of the United States and other NATO countries. So where does an equal approach come in? What kind of partnership would that be? The Soviet Union proceeds from the necessity of making legally binding on-site inspections on request regardless of the forms of property of the participating states. Thus, the Soviet Union believes that the problem of verification has been settled irrevocably.

The answer to the question why the talks are marking time lies evidently in the military sphere. The United States, far from preparing to eliminate chemical weapons, has launched the programme for the production of new lethal arms known as binary weapons. The political impact of this programme on talks is definitely negative, to say nothing of its militarist essence, which was emphasised by the Statement of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on December 26, 1987. Besides, it sets a bad example for countries still lacking chemical weapons, which may lead to the latter's proliferation. It is fair to ask: in what way do all these moves of Washington square with its official statements about the United States seeking an effective global ban on chemical weapons?

At this crucial stage in the drafting of a convention on eliminating chemical weapons, we cannot help being surprised at the attitude of some other parties, such as France, to the Geneva talks. The proposals concerning a so-called "security reserve" submitted by that country in the summer of 1987 militate against the objectives of the convention being drafted, for they envisage the possibility of producing these weapons even after the convention comes into force.

In accordance with the Soviet-US statement adopted at the Washington summit, it is now important that the Soviet Union and United States take a common stand on the adoption of the requisite measures at the Disarmament Conference with a view to successfully completing the drafting of a convention on banning and eliminating chemical weapons by the time the 3rd Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament opens (May 1988). Other parties to the talks should likewise contribute their share to the attainment of this lofty goal. As for the Soviet Union, it is willing to do all in its power to this end.

The Soviet Union assigns a special place in its practical moves to Europe, a region where the two alliances have major armed forces directly facing each other, and where two world wars broke out. In June 1986, with a view to lowering the level of military confrontation, the WTO countries proposed talks on cuts in armed forces, tactical nuclear and conventional armaments in Europe (from the Atlantic to the Urals). Now that the treaty on eliminating IRMs-SRMs has been signed, the problem of reducing armed forces and armaments in Europe, along with cuts in SOWs, is coming to the fore in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, and between the WTO and NATO.

Why do we think so? First, because confrontation in Europe is dangerous. Second, because the buildup of a non-nuclear destruction potential continues unabated, with this potential gaining in speed and range in the same way as the destructive consequences of conventional war, which is increasingly comparable to nuclear war due to the impossibility of limiting it, to its intensity, the likely casualties and the impossibility of winning it. There is reason to believe that a hypothetical war using conventional forces only would be disastrous to Europe in view of the density of its population and the existence of about 200 atomic power stations and numerous chemical enterprises. All this objectively makes future European talks more pressing.

The balance of the armed forces and armaments of NATO and WTO makes it possible to set out reducing military confrontation in Europe on an equal basis and without detriment to each other's security.

Guided by their Budapest Appeal, the Warsaw Treaty countries propose: to begin with, one reciprocal reduction of the strength of the NATO and WTO troops from 100,000 to 150,000 on each side, to be accomplished in one or two years; in the early 1990s, a reduction of the ground forces and tactical strike aircraft of both military alliances in Europe by 25 per cent (a total of more than one million officers and men) in comparison with their present level; subsequent cuts in the conventional armaments of all European countries, the United States and Canada. The procedure and technicalities of reduction and questions of control are set out in the Budapest programme.

What is the outlook for talks? In view of the state of affairs at the Vienna meeting, there is hope that a mandate for European talks will be agreed upon, for both sides have a stake in them. Should such a mandate be given, the talks could begin in 1988. They would be complicated and difficult. It is now hard to say how they would proceed. We think it is particularly important for the parties to come to terms on exchanging initial figures (overall ones and figures relating to each component of the talks) and on their content. This is what threatens a "controversy over figures", a threat which had better be removed at the beginning of the talks. This is no easy task but it can be accomplished provided the parties have the political will.

The Western propaganda media talks about so-called superiority of the Soviet Union in conventional armaments, which is said to imply that our country ought to carry out unilateral reductions. This assertion does not stand up to criticism. The West is careful not to make an in-depth analysis of the actual capabilities of the armed forces of the two sides, to examine the problem by comparing the military potentials in their entirety and not selectively, not by individual components of the armaments.

Confronting each other in Europe today are more than three-million-strong armies. They are roughly equal in combat capability. There is no complete symmetry between the armed forces, nor is it really possible. But there exists rough parity. In the opinion of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, the overall balance of forces in conventional armaments is such that neither side commands sufficient aggregate power to guarantee victory. This is the main criterion of assessing the balance of NATO and WTO forces.

Indeed, what is the general balance of forces?

NATO and the WTO have a roughly equal strength and the number of artillery pieces. The WTO has more tanks than NATO which is superior in a number of combat-ready divisions and fighter-bombers. However, on the whole there is an approximate parity in conventional weapons.

Naturally, a question arises: what is to be done about imbalances? NATO has more warships, combat helicopters and strike tactical aviation, while the WTO has more tanks. The USSR is prepared to discuss the ways for eliminating this imbalance so as not to upset the military parity. In this field, too, we strive to be realists. It seems that this process will have its stages. Not everything can be settled at once. But we have, first of all, to begin negotiations with the view of finding solutions allowing to eliminate the asymmetry and disbalances and cardinaly reduce confrontation on a reciprocal basis and lower the level of the military balance. It would be a major achievement.

This approach invites the fundamental conclusion that talks in Europe (from the Atlantic to the Urals) have meaning only if they involve reciprocal and simultaneous reductions, the removal of imbalances and asymmetries.

We cannot but point to certain alarming trends that have lately made themselves felt in Europe.

The NATO countries are responding to the agreed elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles by planning to replenish the nuclear arsenal of Europe. Plans provide for deploying additional US nuclear-capable aircraft in Britain, the FRG and elsewhere, plus many hundreds of long-range cruise missiles on ships; retargeting part of the Poseidon and Trident SLBMs as well as heavy bombers equipped with cruise missiles for operations in Europe; stationing in West European countries new missiles with a range of up to 300 km; modernising the nuclear arms of Britain and France; building up other armaments, including fundamentally new conventional weapons.

The US and NATO leadership consider that additional arming should prevent any reduction of the saturation of Europe with arms. It follows that while removing intermediate-range missiles with one hand, the United States wants immediately to replace them with other nuclear weapons. This approach is at variance with the spirit of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles and will not strengthen European security.

The Soviet Union is a peaceful country. Its Armed Forces have never threatened anyone, nor have they ever raised the sword first. Our people are fully committed to peace and are doing all in their power for the defence of world peace. They are working steadfastly for the prevention of nuclear war, for limitation and reduction of armaments, for complete elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.



The Soviet Union is building its armed forces on the principle of adequacy for defence. What does this imply? As Soviet Defence Minister, General of the Army Yazov, noted, at the present stage adequacy of strategic nuclear forces is determined by the ability not to allow our country to be attacked by means of nuclear weapons with impunity in any situation, no matter how unfavourable. In the case of conventional armaments, adequacy implies the quantity as well as quality of armed forces and armaments that can reliably ensure the defence of the country. The limits of defence adequacy are condi-

(Continued on page 55)

GOVERNABILITY OF THE WORLD

Georgi SHAKHNAZAROV

I

At every new stage of history there accumulate numerous facts and phenomena of diverse kinds that gradually transcend earlier, traditional and habitual concepts and theories and hence cannot be explained within the latter's framework. It becomes urgent to search for a common idea making possible a rational explanation of the changes which have come about and, more importantly, serving as the basis for authentic forecasts. The need for such an idea is now felt in many spheres of public life and is probably all the more necessary as a means of understanding the meaning and trend of changes taking place in the world.

The pace of economic, scientific, technological and social progress in this century is admittedly much faster than in the last century. But even against the background of this dynamic advance one is struck by the whirlwind of events and abrupt turns which international relations have abounded in over the past decades. Ruthlessly scuttling dogmas and prejudices, reality asks theoretical thought one puzzle after another and imperatively demands a creative renewal of it.

Such renewal was led off by the new concept of foreign policy advanced at the 27th Congress of our party. Here are its fundamental ideas: "...for all the profound contradictions of the contemporary world, for all the radical differences among the countries that comprise it, it is inter-related, interdependent and integral.

"The reasons for this include the internationalisation of the world's economic ties, the comprehensive scope of the scientific and technological revolution, the essentially novel role played by the mass media, the state of the Earth's resources, the common environmental danger, and the crying social problems of the developing world which affect us all. The main reason, however, is the problem of human survival. This problem is now with us because the development of nuclear weapons and the threatening prospect of their use have called into question the very existence of the human race."

It is a matter of principle for both theory and practice to ascertain the relation between a new theoretical concept and its predecessors. Dominant in Western politology until recently was the great power theory, which attributed all world developments to rivalries or a struggle for control within a large group of countries commanding the greatest economic and military strength. This theory has many modifications (such as the pentapolar and bipolar, or "superpower" one) but they are all equally vulnerable, for they approach the world mechanistically, ignoring the vast variety of the factors shaping it today. Important though the role of the great powers is in international relations, the world political atmosphere is now tormented by all countries, big and small alike. It is highly sensitive to the attitude of major political movements and parties and even of individual authorities, that is, of political or spiritual

leaders of world stature. Hence the great-power concept, while it may be helpful in interpreting certain situations traditional in world politics, generally distorts reality and must therefore be treated as a thing of the past.

Not so the concept which sees the pivot of world development in struggle and competition between the two opposed social systems. It should be noted to begin with that this Marxist concept was occasionally interpreted simplistically. The concept of systems was virtually replaced by a concept of states belonging to different social and economic formations. As a consequence, the idea of competition inevitably acquired all the characteristics of state-to-state relations. The progress of socialism at world level was gauged chiefly by the growth of the economic power of socialist countries and by mounting crisis phenomena in this or that area of the capitalist economy. It was also judged according to the changing balance of military might. Cumulative social changes in capitalist countries were practically dismissed as "small quantities". This mechanistic notion of competition between the two systems was an extremely primitive reflection of reality and largely distorted it, making it difficult to see this most intricate socio-economic process in all its aspects.

In addition, this approach had a negative effect on the sentiments of the social forces siding with socialism and prevented them from seeing and making a realistic appraisal, not only of their weak points and setbacks, but of their tremendous potentialities. For instance, the fact that in the previous decade the one-time superiority of the socialist countries in economic growth rate began to decline due to well-known causes was interpreted out of hand as a sign of the decline of socialism and all but a general failure of the global socialist experiment. Yet the formation of socialism and its succession to the capitalist system is an all-embracing historical process that manifests itself in something more than the development of the socialist countries. It finds expression in numerous social phenomena of the most diverse kinds ranging from revolutionary changes in the productive forces to anti-imperialist liberation movements and from the accumulation of what Lenin described as the prerequisites for and elements of socialism in capitalist countries to the appearance and growth of global problems many of which can only be solved on the basis of a collectivist, socialist approach. Nothing could be more absurd than the notion that the historical process of succession of formations is something of a fist fight.

It is now necessary to investigate this process in all its magnitude and all the diversity of its components with special regard to far-reaching changes in the conditions of world development created by the nuclear and other threats to the existence of humankind. Evidently, the problem of the future of humanity cannot now be approached in the same way as in the prenuclear era. The struggle between the two socio-economic systems is unquestionably a constant in our theoretical concepts of world development but it is no longer the only one—not at this stage of history, anyway. Nowadays social progress should also be assessed according to such criteria as disarmament, a lessening or the elimination of the nuclear menace, the prevention of ecological disaster, a marked change in favour of a gradual narrowing of the gap between developed and developing countries, and so on.

II

We are now beginning to really appreciate the prophetic significance of Lenin's idea of the primacy of the interests of social development over class, national and all other interests.² The concept of interdependence carries forward in present-day conditions in point of fact one of

the fundamental Marxist-Leninist ideas, that of the internationalisation of the economic and all other spheres of humanity's life.*

An inevitable and most important result of this process was to be a *more governable world*. First to speak of this were the philosophers, as usual, even though they used hazy terms such as "universal spirit", "reason", and so forth. Then came authors of science fiction. In his novel *The World of the Free* Herbert Wells not only depicted an atomic explosion as if he had seen it with his own eyes but wrote how the inhabitants of the Earth, shocked by the horrors of a total war, mustered enough common sense to stop the carnage, form a world government and begin at long last to act in concord. The message of the science fiction writers was understandably borne further by scientists; after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, many of them came to the conclusion that from then on none but a world government could save humanity from annihilation.

There can be no doubt that Albert Einstein, Bertrand Russell and other eminent scientists who held this view were motivated by the best intentions. This also goes for their predecessors. The fact is that the idea of a world government was conceived and gained notable popularity as early as the end of the last century. The hope that the formation of a centralised international authority would help avert world war was fostered by the founding of the League of Nations and the signing of various agreements which contributed to the gradual transformation of international law into an integral system. But this trend of political thought, known as mondialism, did not peak until the 1950s and 1960s, when dozens of monographs were published in the West. They contained numerous proposals ranging from proposals for extending and strengthening the functions of the UN to projects for an international confederation or even a unitary world state under a strong central government. This went hand in hand with the formation of numerous non-governmental organisations championing this goal, such as the Campaign for a World Government (USA), the League for a Universal Government (FRG), the World Parliament Association (Britain) and others.**

In the 1950s, the attitude of Soviet foreign policy theory and practice to mondialism was outspokenly negative. There were serious reasons for that. Most advocates of a world government emphatically rejected sovereignty, seeing this principle as the source of nearly all evils, as a phenomenon responsible for wars and all other conflicts and abnormalities in the world. They did so at a juncture in history where dozens of one-time colonies and semi-dependent countries were shaking off the fetters of imperialist bondage as they exercised their right to self-determination and political independence. Needless to say, attacks on sovereignty were

* Here is how this question was treated by some theorists in the early years after the October Revolution: "The largest political entity today, if still an amorphous one, is the community of sovereign states, a concert of powers united by so-called international law, which is bloody and barbarous but still indicates the inevitability of permanent relations. While powers are considered sovereign, they do not really enjoy complete freedom or independence from others. There is a virtual interconnection of separate communities. And the connection between seemingly separate and strictly delimited political wholes is now stronger than ever. It is more 'inherent' than before, because exchange encompasses all of society from top to bottom. Whereas ancient world empires fell apart for lack of connections, these are now so dependable and are growing so steadily along with an undoubtedly growing exchange economy that they may be seen as the best guarantee of the future merger of humanity into one organisation." (B. Лоратский, *О государстве*, Moscow, 1923, p. 93.)

** The aims of the biggest American organisation of this kind (United Universal Federalists) were substantiated by referring to *The Anatomy of Peace*, a popular book at one time, which said, in part, that wars were waged between groups of people comprising social entities such as tribes, tsardoms, the Churches, cities and nations when they established their unlimited sovereignty; those wars ended as soon as the sovereign power had been transferred to a larger or more supreme in nature entity. (Emery Reves, *The Anatomy of Peace*, New York, Pocket Book, Inc., 1946, p. 38.)

doubly reactionary in this context, since they met primarily the interests of imperialists desperately resisting the national liberation revolution or working to devise an ideological "rationale" for the replacement of colonial by neocolonial practices.

Another, equally important reason was that the United States fully dominated the capitalist world at the time and had considerable economic, political and military superiority at world level. In those circumstances the idea of a world government could have translated into nothing but a legalisation of the world supremacy of US capital. Indeed, some proponents of a universal state made no secret of this; US politicians, including President Harry Truman, declared unabashedly that God himself had entrusted America with the leadership of the world. But probably the most obvious indication that a world government implied Pax Americana was its advocacy by ultra-patriotic organisations, such as the American Legion.

The situation in the world has undergone a drastic change in the two-odd decades that have gone by since then. In the case of the inner capitalist dimension, a serious redistribution of might has occurred between the United States, on the one hand, and Western Europe and Japan, on the other. While retaining the position of leader of the capitalist world, the United States can no longer lay claim to absolute domination; it is forced to reckon with the interests and will of both imperialist and so-called new industrial countries. And in appraising changes at world level, it is essential to take account primarily of the Soviet Union's achievement of military strategic parity with the United States, the overall growth of the economic might and political influence of the socialist countries and the visible advances and consolidation of the political positions of the developing countries, the non-aligned movement, and a number of other factors.

In short, one of the main arguments against a world government is no longer there. As for the other, it could also have been eliminated had not realisation of the idea involved encroachments on sovereignty. Is this possible? Is there no objective contradiction between sovereignty and a world government? Such a contradiction exists but then the concept of an integral and interdependent world supplies the key to resolving it. The solution lies in establishing a new international political order not denying the sovereignty and independence of national states (this demand is as reactionary as ever) but taking account of and coordinating their interests. It is a *balance of interests* that constitutes the centre-piece of the concept put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev.

As far as the essence of the idea of a world government is concerned, Marxists have never opposed it, since it fully accords with our idea of the internationalisation of the social life of humanity.*** This is not to

*** Shortly before Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to the United States, President Reagan stated in an interview with US television companies that over past years Soviet leaders one after another had pledged to abide by the Marxist concept of expansionism according to which the future belongs to an integrated world communist state, but now there is a leader who has never made such claims and, it seems, his message is that he is prepared to coexist with other philosophies in other countries. What we have here is a typical instance of both distorting and misunderstanding the essence of the Marxist approach to the problem. First of all, Communists have never proclaimed their goal to be the founding of an integrated world communist state, if only because communism implies the withering away of the state. Second, it is a pity that the President's advisors did not tell him that Marxists have never been the most active advocates of the idea of a world government or a world state. And third, now that we have come to the conclusion that a world government could be formed in the future, it is not an "integrated communist state" that we have in mind but an international body based on a voluntary agreement between states, including states belonging to different social and political systems. This reservation is necessary to discourage people overseas from misinterpreting this article, too, as an indication of the Communists' "plans for expansion".

say that one can now forecast its realisation in full measure, for reality does not yet offer any opportunity to transfer this idea from the category of a promise to the category of something that can be put into practice in the foreseeable future. However, we believe that in terms of theory it is right to move in this direction even now.

III

There can be no doubt that the world community is already being governed by the joint efforts of its members. Otherwise no trains would cross frontiers, the seas would be the domain of pirates, aircraft would collide in the air now and then, and nobody would be able to outshout anybody else on the air. However, it is more likely that the world would have gone out of existence long since, being destroyed in a nuclear war.

To govern, one needs law and a government. International law, which is based on treaties and agreements between states, began to take shape in remote antiquity and has by now become so elaborate that its standards help regulate practically every sphere of international relations. There is no government as yet but we have every reason to speak of its making in the form of numerous international organisations with the UN in the lead, which perform the most diverse administrative functions even though their powers are limited.

How far does the governability of the world achieved to date go? Is it adequate? Does it fully meet humanity's requirements at this stage of its development? These questions cannot be answered simply, for in some cases the answer must be yes and in others, no.

For obvious reasons, international government has gone farthest in shipping, air, motor and other types of transport, communications, trade, finance, money circulation and, to a greater extent, the international division of labour; in other words, in the traditional interchanges of material and cultural values and in the joint maintenance of public order, which is necessary if international relations are to stay normal. Of course, this sphere of activity, which has long been regulated by common standards and rules, requires constant renewal like others. But the existing international mechanism makes it possible to tackle and solve such problems promptly enough. By and large, governability in this respect is not too far removed from what is habitual in confederate states.

The situation is much worse with regard to international relations over so-called universal problems (that is, problems which are common in a measure to all countries but which each country solves only as far as it can) and global problems. There are considerable gradations. Whereas one may speak of a degree of governability or rather regulation of actions by states on a bilateral, group or collective basis in the health services, public education, emergency aid for victims of famine or natural calamities and effort to combat crime, joint protection of the environment, a matter of vast importance to humanity, has yet to become a common concern.

This assertion may seem debatable. After all, there are dozens and hundreds of international agreements regulating, say, the use of this or that waterway and the amount of industrial waste dumped in the oceans plus fairly rigid rules of burying radioactive material. All sorts of Red Books are published, there exists a Society for the Protection of Animals, natural reservations are set up, poaching is combated, ecological seminars, round tables and congresses are held. But achievements in these fields can be properly assessed only in comparison with the dimensions of the problem. As it happens, the problem is so formidable and poses so many dangers to the future of humanity that it can with

good reason be equated to the danger of nuclear war. In view of this there is no reason to speak seriously either of governability or even of a reasonably effective regulation of the effort to preserve man's natural environment. Drawing a parallel with the physical phenomena described by the second law of thermodynamics, we may say that the protective measures being adopted by humanity lag behind entropy.

The situation is just as sad as—or even worse than—in the case of another big problem, the gap between economically developed and underdeveloped countries. Nor is this problem outside the realm of international cooperation. There are many aid programmes at regional and global level, the UN holds so-called Development Decades, progressive opinion considers itself in duty bound to sound an alarm so as to draw the attention of peoples and governments to the need to proceed without delay to bridge the gulf between the rich North and the poor South, a gulf that is a crying shame and spells great trouble for the world community. The fact that in the 1980s the gap between developed and underdeveloped countries began to widen again indicates how negligible all those efforts are and how very far from meeting requirements. The developing countries' debt to imperialist countries and banks, which topped one trillion dollars, played its fatal part in this. The greed of usurers granting credits at exorbitant interest caused embolism in world finance and now causes panic on the stockmarkets of the capitalist world's own financial centres. These realities show how governable or rather ungovernable the problem of development is.

However, it is clearly the problem of war and peace that was in a particularly grievous state until recently.

In this sphere as in others, good intentions are plentiful. The most ancient norms recorded in the annals of international law include peace treatise and agreements on exchanging prisoners of war. There is now so impressive an array of rules designed to curb militarism that this area of international law is probably ahead of all others. However, there is no ignoring the extremely low, almost non-existent governability of this sphere which is so important to humanity. Postwar history is very poor in examples of nations preventing or stopping war by joint efforts. The world community has enormous difficulty in settling by peaceful means dozens of conflict situations on the globe. And particularly alarming was, of course, the steady escalation of the arms race which could dash all of humanity's hopes of a future and doom it to inevitable disaster, if continued.

It is the extent of the danger that determines the measure of our satisfaction over the fact that thanks to sustained efforts by the Soviet Union—we can say so with a clear conscience—and ultimately to the wisdom of both sides, the recent Soviet-US summit succeeded in stopping the arms race in at least one type of weapons and came to terms on scrapping it. Small though the quantity of the arms to be destroyed is, it indicates a notable increase in the governability of the issue of war and peace, primarily because the two sides found solutions to many specific and exceedingly complicated problems that are inevitable concomitants of the disarmament process. Permanent control in munitions factories, inspection upon request and exchange of experience in destroying at least individual types of nuclear missiles plus other important details of the treaty signed in Washington are important both in themselves and because they facilitate further progress in the same direction.

But while the agreement on the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles is very important, it is too early to consider that the issue of war and peace has become governable enough. The explosion of activity on the part of the militarists, who are out to more than compensate for the agreed elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range

missiles by fielding new means of mass destruction, gives an idea of the obstacles that will yet have to be overcome.

IV

The success of future peace efforts will depend to a decisive degree on whether the development of cooperation, or what we call an increased governability of the world, can subsequently be made spontaneous.

It was noticed long ago that ever more or less appreciable advance along this road required much effort and, moreover, came only as a result of a previous cataclysm. The 1962 Caribbean crisis, which put the world on the brink of nuclear war, led to the establishment of a "hot line" of communication between Moscow and Washington and the adoption of certain other important preventive measures. The Chernobyl tragedy gave a strong spur to cooperation in the management of and control over nuclear power. The birth or awakening of the virus of AIDS, that plague of the 20th century, forced physicians to sharply step up cooperation. Indeed, the recent Washington agreement had its dramatic prelude, for it was not until Europe bristled with missiles that the two sides convinced each other by great efforts of the need to get rid of them in the interest of all.

What is to be done to ensure that henceforward the need for cooperation and joint control of developments does not have to be demonstrated by dangerous incidents? After all, one of these may well result in nobody being left to draw the lessons and shake hands. Is it possible at all for common sense to keep ahead of prejudice and for constructive thought to outpace and prevent cataclysms?

The answer must certainly be "yes". But this means losing no time to begin with. Now that the first success has been scored in both containing and rolling back the arms race, it is important to keep up the momentum, for every major agreement, every big step forward along the road to greater international cooperation provides opportunities for progress in other fields. To put it in simple terms, more peace means more development, more of joint care for nature, greater safety at atomic power stations, a bigger chance of deliverance from epidemics, and so on.

Hence the need to take advantage of the momentum gained, not to allow ourselves to sit back but to push on. This was the approach that prevailed in Washington, where the agreement on eliminating intermediate- and shorter-range missiles was followed up by an understanding to negotiate a 50-per cent cut in the strategic offensive weapons of the Soviet Union and the United States.

The possibility of raising the governability of the world to a level meeting humanity's requirements depends on many things, primarily on the willingness of every member of the world community to place universal interests above class, national, group, ideological or other interests. In the multiform, motley world of today there are social entities more prepared than others to accept this imperative but there are also social entities which will have to travel an arduous path and go through serious internal struggles to this end. The latter applies above all to the developed capitalist countries, which the problem of ensuring the survival of humanity binds to desist from building their prosperity at the expense of their neighbours on the planet, to renounce extreme selfishness and contribute far more generously to the formation of a new international economic order. In this connection imperialism must be presented with many further legitimate demands.

The task of making the world more governable presents demands to us as well. To be sure, the socialist world is better prepared than others for the solution of this problem. The idea of internationalism is inherent

in the very nature of our system. Our Marxist-Leninist world outlook, the traditions of our multinational state and our foreign policy orientation all make our active participation in world affairs natural and logical.

However, it would be hypocritical not to add that along with the excellent internationalist qualities of our society there is evidence of negative things which are due to years-long propaganda in glowing terms suggesting that our country is always and perfectly right as regards its actions on the international scene and to incomplete, often biased information on the response of this or that section of international opinion to Soviet foreign policy moves. And it is particularly intolerable that, contrary to the Leninist tradition in literature, especially in historical novels, attempts were made to revise from a chauvinist position principled class assessments of various events of the pre-revolutionary past and to justify or even to praise this or that manifestation of the policy of oppression and conquest pursued by tsarism and the rulers of the states which formed part of the Russian empire.

It goes without saying that real Soviet, socialist patriotism has nothing to do with nationalist self-delusion. Nothing elevates a people, doing it credit in the eyes of other peoples, so much as its ability not only to pride itself on the glorious accomplishments of its ancestors and do good deeds of its own but to judge its history objectively and to admit its mistakes honestly and courageously. A good example of this Leninist approach of our party to its past and present was set by the profound and impartial analysis of Soviet history which Mikhail Gorbachev made in his speech on the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution.

In short, the task is to learn to take a detached view of oneself, to see one's merits as well as demerits. This is important if one wants to contribute more actively and purposefully, with a sense of fulfilled duty, to the solution of the historical problems set for humanity by the course of development.

Human rights are a particularly hard nut for the international community to crack. Everything else, all that has so far belonged or is beginning to belong in the sphere of joint government by the world community—disarmament, security, regional conflicts, and so on—may be described as a legitimate aspect of international relations and a prerogative of international law. As for human rights, that is, ultimately, the position of the individual in this or that society, this problem belongs by nature in the category of internal affairs. To make it by common agreement an object of international settlement would mean accomplishing a breakthrough to a higher plane in the governability of the world. One could not but welcome such a development, since it would be in keeping with the character and possibilities of the epoch and should serve as a new important instrument for humanising the world community and international relations.

This is not a problem that can be solved by means of one agreement; it is a process which will apparently last long enough and during which the political principles and legal standards of cooperation should be worked out. Our attitude to this process is predetermined by the fact that Marxism-Leninism sees the ultimate goal of the socialist and communist transformation of society in paving the way for the all-round development of the individual. We should take an active part in the promotion of cooperation on human rights, nor should we do so merely because socialism has tangible advantages in this respect. The point is that the very participation in this process enables us to improve our own practice. Lenin considered it necessary to heed criticism coming from the enemy camp provided it was correct at least in part. By removing its short-

comings, extending the area of social justice and offering the individual greater rights, socialism will demonstrate its superiority over capitalism in everything.

But cooperation on human rights can and should proceed on an equal basis. This is lacking for the time being, which reveals the hypocritical nature of the exploitation of this theme by the West, the aim being to make propaganda capital. In the final analysis, it is a sign of the weakness of capitalism as a system. Indeed, were the United States and other imperialist countries to present to themselves the claims they make on human rights, as they will have to do sooner or later, they would come up against problems that are virtually unsolvable under capitalism, such as the need to end unemployment. And what about the three million homeless in the United States, racial discrimination, the continuing abatement of repressive regimes, the dozens of political prisoners in the United States? The West will have to answer all these questions in no uncertain terms, since it has thrown down the gauntlet. The problem is not one of propaganda gains for one or the other side but of extending human rights in the world as a result of cooperation on them.

Lawyers and philosophers will have to work hard in order to take proper account of the new conditions shaping up in today's world and, above all, to desist from a primitive counterposing of sovereignty and joint government by the world community. The starting point should be, I believe, the simple truth which has been known for a long time: sovereignty, the people's will is not infringed in any way by the voluntary delegation of part of one's powers to an international or supranational agency. The important thing is voluntariness. However, theorists must hurry, for life and practice are surpassing them. Human rights were a concomitant theme at the Washington summit. And while the US side tried to solve the problem in such a way as to score a propaganda gain, this experience warrants the opinion that given a reciprocal desire, normal cooperation can be brought about.

Thus we are entitled to infer that the world is becoming more and more governable, if slowly, in spite of its contradictoriness. This is a process benefiting humanity, and it can be lent proper dynamism solely by the joint efforts of nations. While the constructive initiatives of ruling parties and governments play a big role, they have a chance of translating into reality only if accepted and supported by the international community and if they become an expression of humanity's will.

In his article "Pax Americana Is Dying—What's Next?", the British politologist E. Mortimer ponders: if the 18th century was French, the 19th—British and the 20th American, will the 21st century be Japanese? It may be so. In any case the transfer to a new hegemony will take several decades and meanwhile we shall live in a multipolar world; but how shall we govern it taking into account the fact that the existence of nuclear weapons excludes the traditional process of registering shifts in the geopolitical balance, that is, wars? Frankly speaking, we have no idea.³

I think Mortimer finds himself in a cul-de-sac precisely because he cannot break out of the limits set by an old logic. Yet looming larger and larger is not a further variety of great-power hegemony but a "world concert" without a conductor.

¹ Mikhail Gorbachev, *October and Perestroika: The Revolution Continues*, Moscow, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1987, p. 59.

² See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1960, p. 236.

³ *Financial Times*, Nov. 11, 1987.

THIS SEEMED UNATTAINABLE

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The accords reached by the Soviet and American leaders in Washington have much broader, universal dimensions than just an agreement to dismantle two classes of missiles and plan ahead new steps in disarmament and other fields. The principles of trust have been laid. And these principles do not rest on words: they are backed by legally-binding obligations assumed by the parties as regards extensive and detailed verification measures. The thoroughly elaborated provisions of the treaty on the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles¹ dealing with verification are relevant not only to the treaty. They facilitate the solution of the problems involved in a radical reduction of strategic offensive weapons. They become particularly meaningful when we see on the agenda the problem of prohibiting chemical weapons and there is a chance of agreeing on the limitation and eventual elimination of other weapons. Only yesterday accords of this magnitude would have seemed unattainable.

The history of disarmament negotiations shows that the issue of verification has always provoked sharp confrontation and has been repeatedly used by arms race supporters to disguise the undermining of agreements. Quite often the West alluded to the fact that the Soviet side, due to the alleged "closeness" of its society, has more opportunities to conceal violations than Western countries, where an almost absolute "openness" in the realm of military affairs exists. On the basis of this they concluded, in effect, that what is needed is the most stringent intrusive verification system, and that it should be applied first and foremost to the Soviet Union. They accused the USSR of being unwilling to accept all embracing verification. Time and again, the baselessness of such accusations has been exposed. Let us cite one example here. The American author J. Newhouse, in his well-known book *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT*, cited a senior American official involved in arms control talks saying that by suggesting the proposals for verification the USA on many an occasion "sought to satisfy the rhetorical commitment to arms control while using verification as the means of assuring that nothing would happen."²

The present American administration, soon after coming to power announced a "new" approach to verification which in practice was embodied in attempts to discredit (as not guaranteeing adequate verification) arms limitation negotiations and agreements in force as well as signed but not enacted (due to the failure of the USA to ratify them) agreements:—the SALT-2 Treaty, the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes. Spreading doubt towards the Soviet Union as a negotiating partner and a party to a treaty has become an integral part of the US administration's policy in the sphere of verification. This was demonstrated by the reports by the US President to Congress which contained unfounded allegations about the "noncompliance" by the Soviet Union with the arms limitation agreements. These accusations were soundly refuted by the Soviet Union and sharply criticised in the

United States.³ According to the logic of the "new" approach, the lack of evidence on the US part about the Soviet Union's violations of its obligations does not mean that no violations take place, it means their skilful concealment. As a conservative organisation, the Heritage Foundation complained in one of its publications: "We have never found anything that the Soviets have successfully hidden".⁴

The concept of effective verification referred to the US desire to acquire a unilateral and absolute capability to detect all kinds of agreements' violations. As the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) said in one of the annual reports: "In order for the arms control process to remain viable, verification must be properly addressed and compliance with arms control treaties must be assured with high confidence."⁵ Former ACDA Director Kenneth Adelman expressed himself more explicitly: "Elimination of nuclear weapons would require the most extensive and intrusive system of on-site inspections anyone could imagine. It is hard to think of a major military or even industrial installation that could be legally exempted from inspection on demand. That would mean, in turn, unprecedented openness to foreign intrusion on the part of all nations".⁶

However, when it came to the practical implementation of the verification concept advanced by the USA it surfaced that this concept was lopsided allowing only the USA to check whether the other side complies with the accords and did not take into account the legitimate concerns of the partners. This is illustrated by the position taken at the negotiations to prohibit chemical weapons when the United States put forth a so called double standard in relation to inspections on request. Demanding on the one hand that the right to conduct inspections at state enterprises and installations be made legally binding, the American delegation on the other hand made an effort to introduce provisions in the future convention which would make it possible to exempt from on-site inspection the installations owned by private companies and transnational corporations, using as a pretext the necessity to protect commercial and industrial secrets. In this way, the United States would deliberately limit the verification over a considerable segment of the powerful chemical industry in capitalist countries while at the same time placing under control all the chemical enterprises in socialist states.

Another example is the change in the US delegation's attitude to the issue of verification of the elimination of the intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. At the course of negotiations the American side placed demands for verification for which, as it became clear later, it was not ready to comply itself. The Soviet Union was expected to reject those proposals. Instead, the USSR spoke out in favour of a strict and comprehensive verification and demanded verification and inspection everywhere: at the sites of missiles' dismantling, at the sites of their elimination, at test sites and military bases (including those in third countries) and at both private and state-owned storage sites and production facilities. At that point, the US delegation hastily amended its position, by having removed a number of earlier-put proposals and failing to agree on them.

These examples show what was behind the attempts to accuse the Soviet Union of being unwilling to accept the required verification measures and allegations that the United States is a champion of verification.

The need for accelerating the elaboration and putting into practice of arms limitation and disarmament measures acquires particular significance due to the fact that the arms race has reached a critical point:

the development of military technology increasingly complicates the problem of the verification of arms limitations and elimination. Taking into account the fact that the time factor has become critically important and that some countries are apprehensive at the thought that the verification issue may be relegated to the background, the USSR proposed that verification issues simultaneously be addressed at the disarmament talks to preclude delays in working out comprehensive agreements.

On a number of occasions, in an effort to reach early agreement on disarmament goals, the USSR expressed its willingness to make the elaboration of verification measures a priority. For example, as is stipulated in the joint Soviet-American statement on the beginning of full-scale negotiations of the limitation and ultimate cessation of nuclear tests, "in the course of these negotiations the sides, as the first step, will agree upon effective verification measures which will make it possible to ratify the Soviet-US Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (1974) and the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (1976), and proceed to negotiating further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing with the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of nuclear testing as part of an effective disarmament process... For the purpose of the elaboration of improved verification measures for the Soviet-US treaties of 1974 and 1976 the sides intend to prepare and conduct joint verification experiments at each other's test sites. These verification measures will, to the extent appropriate, be used in further nuclear test limitation agreements which may subsequently be reached."⁷

The accuracy, reliability, and absolutely strict and stringent nature of measures which ensure one hundred per cent guarantee that the weapons are eliminated, that obligations concerning remaining weapons and allowed military activities are complied with, and that no loopholes exist,—this is how the Soviet Union perceives the parameters of verification. In particular, in implementing *a programme to eliminate nuclear weapons*, the Soviet Union deems it advisable to work out special procedures to eliminate nuclear weapons and to dismantle, convert or eliminate delivery vehicles. Verification of the armaments subject to elimination or limitation can be exercised by both national technical means and on-site inspections. Other verification measures are also feasible.

The problem of *preventing the arms race from spreading to outer space* can also be solved provided there is an understanding that neither side will allow arms in orbit. In an effort to prohibit the arms race from spreading to outer space, the Soviet Union proposed to institute a system of international control to ensure the non-emplacement of any type of arms in outer space. This proposal envisages the establishment of an international inspectorate authorised to have access to and conduct on-site inspections of all installations designated for deployment in space, as well as corresponding delivery vehicles.

The very technology of launching objects into space involves a launch complex which is impossible to conceal. This determines a relative simplicity of verification and its high efficiency. There are but a few launching sites in the world and the presence of international inspectors there would guarantee that objects launched into space are no themselves weapons, nor do they carry weapons.

Guided by the desire to securely block this channel of the arms race, the USSR is prepared to go even further by proposing not only that inspections be conducted but also that inspection groups be permanently present at all space launching sites. The Soviet proposal also envisages the right to conduct an on-site inspection if a launch is suspected from an undeclared launching site. Provided there is complete prohibition of space strike weapons, the Soviet Union is prepared to extend inspection

to storage facilities, industrial production facilities, laboratories, testing centers, and so on.

The USSR attaches particular importance to the earliest possible completion of the elaboration of a draft convention on *the prohibition and complete elimination of chemical weapons* as well as the industrial basis for their production. Recently, at the Conference on Disarmament, the USSR introduced additional far-reaching proposals aimed at providing effective verification, including verification of the elimination and dismantling of chemical weapons production facilities. The statement made by Eduard Shevardnadze, the USSR Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the effect that "the Soviet delegation at the negotiations on the issue *will proceed from the need to stipulate in legal terms the principle of mandatory inspection on demand without the right to refuse such inspections*"³ removes all possible objections which cast doubts on the effectiveness of verification in this area.

As nuclear disarmament gradually becomes a reality, the issue of *conventional armed forces and armaments limitations and reductions* acquires particular importance. The Warsaw Treaty member states have come forward with a broad initiative which envisages drastic reductions in all components of the armed forces and armaments in Europe—from the Atlantic to the Urals—tactical strike aviation included.

The reduction in armed forces and conventional armaments would be conducted under effective and reliable verification using both national technical means and international procedures up to on-site inspections. In addition, verification measures are proposed to monitor military activities of forces remaining after the reductions. Adequate verification methods for mutual confidence-building measures exercised in accordance with the agreements would be applied. Notification of the start and completion of reductions would be made. For verification purposes an international consultative commission would be instituted with the participation of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO member states as well as interested neutral and non-aligned countries and other European states. On-site verification of reductions in armed forces and elimination or storage of armaments could be conducted, when appropriate, with the participation of representatives of the international consultative commission.

There is such aspect of verification as verification of the non-conduct of prohibited by a certain probable agreement activities at military bases located on the territory of foreign states. The USSR maintains that access to these bases should be guaranteed so that both sides are sure that the assumed obligations are being observed. This will undoubtedly require the cooperation of those states on whose territory these bases are located. The fact that such verification is feasible is confirmed by the treaty on the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles which provides for the reciprocal on-site inspection of military bases and other facilities of the USA and the USSR deployed on the territory of their European allies.

The philosophy of the new Soviet approach to the problem of real verification is based first and foremost on the fact that because at present there exists a deficit of mutual trust, verification measures should become an integral part of a comprehensive system of international security, and a guarantee for its strength in the military area. As we move along the road of reducing and eliminating some classes of nuclear weapons and limiting military capabilities to the levels of reasonable sufficiency, the importance of verification will continue to grow. Without verification there can be no sufficient confidence in the observance of agreements,

and, consequently, trust, without which further breakthroughs in disarmament are inconceivable. At the same time, verification measures should not turn every party to the agreement into a suspect. Control should become a positive factor; it should be not only a measure allowing the detection of possible violations but also a confidence-building measure. It must be a guarantor of "natural" observance of voluntarily assumed obligations.

The Soviet Union is for a businesslike, factual and serious approach to numerous verification issues, both political and military and technological in nature. These issues should be resolved in a spirit of cooperation, through joint efforts, taking into account mutual concerns and pursuing the main goal—to guarantee the strict observance of assumed obligations. To follow such an approach means to ensure the fruitful resolution of the most complicated and sensitive items on the disarmament agenda.

The main function of verification is to guarantee to a maximum degree the strict observance of an agreement by all the parties concerned. This function defines the main requirements to be met by verification measures and verifying bodies.

First of all it is indispensable that the establishment, structure and function of any verification system correspond to the generally recognised norms of international law stipulated in the UN Charter and other major international legal documents. These principles in their totality constitute a single legal basis of contemporary international relations and some of them play a primary role in the area being examined. These are the principles of non-interference into internal affairs, sovereign equality, bona fide fulfilment of obligations under international law, cooperation between states, and peaceful settlement of disputes.

Hence, verification should correspond to *the principle of legitimacy* which means that verification measures must not harm the security of either side, endanger their economic and social development, or be of a discriminatory nature. The legitimacy of verification is also embodied in the equality of rights and obligations of parties to an agreement which means the legal protection of the interests of all participants in the verification process, both verifying and verified sides.

As we speak about measures which affect the most sensitive area—national security of states, the verification system agreed upon must ensure timely detection of violations which may endanger both the supreme state interests of the parties to an agreement as well as the fate of such an agreement itself. That is why verification should correspond to *the principle of effectiveness*. The effectiveness of verification is a guarantee of stability for any agreement. If there is full confidence that the assumed obligations are observed, the agreement will be stable.

In negotiating verification measures the issue of proportionality between the scope of verification and the scale of practical disarmament measures acquires a particular importance. Dependent upon the specific nature of an agreement conditioned by the armaments' characteristics, nature of measures (freeze, limitation, reduction, elimination), composition of participants, different corresponding verification measures can be used. This is the essence of *the proportionality principle* which was stipulated in the Final Document of the First Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament, which stated in this regard: "The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon the purpose, scope and nature of the agreement."⁹

The history of arms limitation and disarmament negotiations and the practice of fulfilling the reached agreements prove that putting into practice the proportionality principle contained in specific agreements is a difficult matter, especially if complicated technical issues are touched

upon. In such a situation what is essential are political will and seriousness of purpose to negotiate an end to the deadly arms race.

The importance of strict observance of agreements on disarmament measures for the security of an individual state and international peace and security in general stipulates the equal right of every party to an agreement to verify the observance of the agreement. This is the essence of *the principle of the universality* of verification. The capabilities of different states to exercise verification measures vary, and this determines their participation in corresponding types of activities. But, as was noted in the Final Document of the First Special Session on Disarmament, arms limitation and disarmament agreements must envisage the participation of sides directly, or through the UN system in the process of verification.

The principle of the universality of verification can be applied in different ways. Sometimes, as for example, in the bilateral Soviet-US SALT-1 treaty, the universal nature of verification is ensured by the independent execution of measures based on the use of national technical means of verification or, as it is provided for by the treaty on the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, on the combination of national technical control means and reciprocal inspections. When it is required to verify the observance of multilateral agreements, e. g., the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, the importance of joint measures (consultations between the participants) as well as the implementation of international procedures in the framework of the United Nations grows.

In this connection it is worth mentioning one of the conclusions of a working group instituted in the framework of the UN Disarmament Commission to study all the aspects of verification problems: "To include direct participation of all States in every aspect of verification activity could result in unworkably complex and cumbersome procedures. In addition, duplicating the capabilities already possessed by some States may be unnecessary and costly".¹⁰ A reasonable conclusion can be drawn on the advisability, on the one hand, of entrusting a group of countries, which have at their disposal the appropriate national means, with the main responsibility of conducting verification, and, on the other, of intensifying international verification efforts.

A positive experience in this area is that of the history of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the observance of which is verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA provides verification opportunities to all parties to the treaty. This experience shows that as we move towards a nuclear-free world, the universality of verification could be ensured by the application of comprehensive international procedures and mechanisms.

As is stated in the above-mentioned Final Document: "Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed."¹¹ This provision embodies *the principle of complementarity* of various verification means and methods which are employed either simultaneously or stage-by-stage. Such a combination is, for example, envisaged in the document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, in accordance with which verification can be carried out by national technical means as well as through conducting inspections in the zone where the measures envisaged in the document are to be executed.

Specific verification means and methods can be successful if the principles mentioned above are applied in an integrated and interdependent manner complementing each other.

Arms limitation and disarmament agreements provide for various verification measures, and specific means and methods of their application. The vast array of verification techniques includes national technical means and, if necessary, additional measures undertaken on the basis of cooperation, including on-site inspections carried out by both national and international groups of inspectors representing, in particular, international organisations.

Experience of verification of compliance with existing arms limitation agreements proves the effectiveness of national technical means of verification. An objective analysis shows that the creation and development of these means played a major role in the conclusion of such major agreements as the ABM Treaty, the US-Soviet Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and the SALT-2 Treaty. Precisely these verification techniques made it possible to reliably verify compliance with the agreements.

The reliability of national technical means of verification is constantly growing as they become increasingly more sophisticated. According to some sources, by the mid-1970s the resolution of photo-equipment installed on board low-orbit observation satellites was 5 to 15 cm under perfect conditions (i. e., good visibility, high-quality film, negligible vibration of a satellite) and made it possible to detect from space objects on Earth of a size slightly larger than a tennis ball.¹² And a joint Soviet-US experiment, in the course of which scientists of the two countries tested seismic equipment in real conditions, demonstrated the ability to record and identify nuclear explosions with a yield of 10-20 tons of TNT equivalent. The progress made by Soviet science and technology in creating verification means made it possible to establish the presence and yield of nuclear charges on surface and undersurface vessels without resorting to on-board inspection. It removes a major impediment to resolving the problem of limiting sea-based long-range nuclear-armed cruise missiles.

The effectiveness of national technical means of verification is augmented by introducing special provisions in agreements, which prohibit both interference with their functioning and attempts at deliberate concealment. The unimpeded functioning of national technical means of verification are made possible by other measures such as: agreed rules of counting systems covered by agreements; exchange of quantitative data on armaments; notification of upcoming activities regulated by an agreement, for example, test launches of missiles.

The Antarctic Treaty and the document of the Stockholm Conference demonstrate the feasibility of working out and, on a cooperative basis, implementing such measures as on-site inspections, i. e., visits of groups of experts-observers of one side to the territory of the other side for the purposes of verifying compliance with the obligations. Far reaching measures of this kind are provided for in the Soviet US Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes and Protocol thereto, which did not come into force due to the refusal on the part of the United States to ratify them. The measures agreed upon in these documents would guarantee the effectiveness and reliability of verification, as well as its legitimacy, and prevent it from being used as an instrument of interference in internal affairs of other parties to the agreement.

And finally there is the discharge of verification functions by an international body—the IAEA safeguards and international inspections carried out by the agency for the verification of compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The IAEA control over the non-employment of nuclear materials and peaceful installations for military purposes effectively prevents the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Nikolai Ryzhkov, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, emphasised in his message of greetings to the IAEA General Conference

that nowadays the IAEA is "the sole verification mechanism in the area of nuclear weapons limitation. The experience accumulated in this area can be used when dealing with other problems of nuclear disarmament".¹³

In the area of verification the task of uniting the efforts of all countries, and putting together rational ideas and proposals has increasingly come to the forefront. Verification as a part of disarmament, which is by its very nature and scope a global problem, requires an international solution.

Consequently the role of international organisations grows, especially that of the main universal instrument for maintaining peace and security—the United Nations. In order to strengthen trust and mutual understanding it might be advisable to institute under the UN aegis a comprehensive international verification mechanism to check compliance with agreements on easing international tensions, on arms limitation, and to control the military situation in the Earth's hot spots. Such a mechanism would use various forms and methods of verification for information gathering and its prompt presenting to the United Nations. This would make it possible to objectively look at events, to detect military preparations in time, to thwart a surprise attack, and to take steps to prevent an armed conflict, its possible escalation and aggravation. The feasibility of a constructive, non-confrontational approach to verification issues was demonstrated at the 41st and 42nd General Assembly sessions which adopted by consensus the resolutions Verification in All Its Aspects, the drafts of which had been jointly tabled by the delegations of Bulgaria and Canada.

Within the system of disarmament talks the USSR attaches particular importance to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament—the sole multilateral negotiation body for the elaboration of treaties and agreements limiting the arms race. Unfortunately, we have to state that considerable potentialities of the conference, particularly in the area of verification, are not used to their full extent.

A practical step proposed by the USSR at the Conference on Disarmament to promote the elaboration of a comprehensive treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests was the establishment of a special group of scientific experts which would be entrusted with the task of presenting to the conference substantiated and mutually agreed upon recommendations on the structure and functions of a verification system for any future agreement on the non conduct of testing of such weapons.

The Soviet Union pays great attention to the proposals of other states, examining them first and foremost in the light of their practical value. The USSR has backed the proposal of Finland to establish a UN data base on the verification of compliance with arms control agreements. The fulfilment of this plan would not only facilitate the solution of verification issues, but provide the United Nations with the opportunity to play an effective role in the area of verifying compliance with disarmament agreements, and would promote trust among states by collecting, storing and disseminating information received from the UN member states. There are other positive proposals in the area of verification, in particular, those put forth by the Delhi Six—participants in the initiative for peace and disarmament. The USSR has repeatedly expressed its willingness to accept the verification measures for the non-conduct of nuclear weapon tests proposed by this group and to take part in a joint meeting of experts. Such practical cooperation and the carrying out of joint experiments in the area of verification could bring the attainment of the objective of the complete, effectively verifiable cessation of nuclear weapon tests closer.

Global public opinion is a major source of ideas and proposals. Being aware of this, the USSR advanced an initiative to hold a confe-

rence in the Soviet Union in 1988 with the participation of public figures and representatives of non-governmental organisations devoted to the problems of verifying compliance with arms limitation agreements, and in 1989 to hold an international symposium on the issue of verification of the prevention of the arms race in outer space with the participation of state representatives, prominent scientists and public figures. We believe that scientists should actively participate in tackling many problems connected with disarmament control. They could make a serious assessment of the methods and means of control and make relevant recommendations. In Washington, Mikhail Gorbachev proposed to set up a Soviet-American commission composed of scientists which would present its considerations and recommendations to the US administration and the Soviet leadership.

The ancient Greek fabelist, Aesop, asserted that if a person tried to do two things at a time, one contradicting the other, he would invariably fail. It seems that this wise saying reflects a necessary precondition for solving the verification problem: it is impossible to accelerate the arms race, to spread it to qualitatively new areas and at the same time push for elaboration of verification measures. Verification would be meaningless, turning into a passive mechanism to monitor the arms race instead of an active instrument to construct a safe and stable peace.

The large-scale provisions contained in the USSR-US treaty on the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles open the door for trust. It seems that the situation in this field is getting better. Be it verification using national technical means or international verification, it should be verification in the interests of specific agreements, in the interests of real disarmament.

¹ *Pravda*, Dec 9, 1987.

² J. Newhouse, *Cold Dawn The Story of SALT*, New York, 1973, p. 70.

³ *Analysis of the President's Report on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements -- Arms Control Today*, April 1987, p. 1A-12A.

⁴ A. Katz, *Verification and the SALT The State of the Art and the Art of the State*, Washington, 1979, p. 81.

⁵ *U.S. ACDA 1983 Annual Report*, Washington, 1984, p. 82.

⁶ *Department of State Bulletin*, January 1987, p. 36.

⁷ *Pravda*, Sept 19, 1987.

⁸ *Pravda*, Aug 7, 1987.

⁹ UN Doc A/S-10/2.

¹⁰ UN Doc A/CN.10/89, p. 10.

¹¹ UN Doc. A/S-10/2.

¹² See *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 1985, No. 1, p. 37.

¹³ *Pravda*, Sept 22, 1987.

Nothing Is Simple in Europe

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The signing of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles and the prospect for an agreement between the USSR and the USA on a 50-per-cent cut in strategic offensive arms, with both sides pledging to comply with the ABM Treaty for an agreed period, create an entirely new situation in Europe.

In its long history, Europe has seen plundering raids and military campaigns organised well in accordance with the art of warfare; the thud of horses' hoofs and the roar of tanks; polygons and axes of political and military alliances. Now, for the first time in its long and complicated history, Europe is at last on the verge of a good chance for a peaceful future. Will this chance be used? One could, of course, quote the old saying that only the future will tell. But the future depends above all on the present, on the policy to be pursued by all the forces at work in Europe—the United States and the Soviet Union, and all the Europeans living in the western, eastern, northern, southern and central parts of the continent. A common peaceful home can be built only through the joint efforts of all.

So what will the Soviet-American Treaty bring to Europe? What will change in the European strategic situation? In what direction will the situation on the continent develop and what role will be played in this by the European nuclear states?

Under the treaty signed in Washington, the Soviet Union will eliminate 1,752 intermediate- and shorter-range missiles aimed at targets in European states, leaving only central strategic systems, the air force and tactical nuclear arms. The Americans will eliminate 859 similar missiles, also leaving central strategic systems and tactical nuclear weapons, including forward-based systems, that is, fighter-bombers stationed at US bases in Europe and on board aircraft-carriers plying the seas and oceans washing Europe.

Both supporters and opponents of the treaty say that its chief strategic meaning for the West is that it reduces the chances of giving effect to the officially canonised military doctrine of NATO—the doctrine of "flexible response", since its intermediate component—the US Pershing 2 and cruise missiles—are to be removed.

But does this mean that these types of weapons are going to vanish? No, it doesn't. And will they disappear from Europe altogether? Again, no. An interesting episode occurred in November 1987, when the French Parliament was discussing the military budget for 1988. When a speaker complained that NATO's "flexible response" doctrine was being undermined (incidentally, Paris had been officially dissociating itself from the doctrine until recently), Senator Yvon Bourges, former Defence Minister, spoke up. Evidently struck by the incompetence of his colleague in military political matters, he exclaimed: "But the French forces remain!".

True, the French forces do remain: 130 intermediate-range carriers with 297 warheads.

This force is rapidly being built up. An analysis of French military programmes has shown that the number of warheads on French land sea- and air-based missiles may exceed 500 by 1992, and by 1997, when the planned "nuclear modernisation" will be completed, a total of over 700. A large portion of this potential will be placed on land-based mobile S-4 intermediate-range missiles, which are almost fully equivalent to the American Pershing-2s, but with a range twice as long. And although the parliamentarians are still arguing over the number of future missiles, it is yet entirely possible that it would closely approximate the number of Pershing-2s to be eliminated under the Soviet American Treaty.

Another area of modernisation is the replacement of old megaton monoblocks on submarines with missiles of enhanced accuracy fitted out with six, and later with twelve, warheads specially designed for hitting protected targets. Their technical properties make their capability similar to that of the cruise missiles now being dismantled.

Another nuclear power, Britain, is also modernising its nuclear force, not to lag behind in the ascent to nuclear "summits". The replacement of Polaris with Trident-2 missiles on British submarines will increase the British potential many times over, bringing it to 576 warheads. Thus the total nuclear potential of Western Europe will grow to roughly 1,300 warheads as opposed to 400 at present, that is, it will be increased by 900 warheads. One wonders if the Americans agreed to the "double option" and "double zero", with the French and British "modernisation" well in mind?

As a result of the removal of US missiles from Europe, there may occur a "changing of the guard" in NATO, with its European members assuming "Eurostrategic" nuclear-missile functions. Their nuclear potentials will not be limited by any treaties. A similar situation is arising with regard to European research and development in the area of ABM technologies, and the Americans evidently deliberately gave the French a free hand, having dissuaded them from concluding an inter-governmental agreement on participation in SDI.

US monopoly on engaging in dialogue with the USSR consolidates American leadership in the West, leaving Europe a secondary role in world politics. In our view, we largely facilitated this ourselves. Bewitched by the industrial and military might of the United States, we failed to notice or, to be more precise, did not take fully into account, the fact that Pax Americana was shaking and had begun to crumble, while other imperialist centres, including Western Europe, were becoming more active in world affairs.

Meanwhile we continued to think in the strategic categories of global parity and stability, above all with regard to Soviet-American relations, not paying the French and British nuclear forces the amount of attention their strategic capability deserved. But the situation is changing, which requires new approaches to the problem.

Even having recognised the "equalising power of the atom", it is hard to compare figures like 400 and 10,000, which reflect the present correlation of the nuclear potentials of Britain and France, on the one hand, and the USSR, on the other. But in future the correlation may be 1,300 to 6,000, and these figures will already be relatively comparable. All the more so since the functions of these 1,300 warheads become far broader than it was intended when the French and British nuclear forces were being formed.

From previously being a last resort in defending national territory they are obviously turning into an active factor of European and world

strategy. This can be seen from Franco-British cooperation in organising a missile-carrying submarine patrol and the cover-up of a future Franco-West German brigade by an "echelon" of French nuclear deterrence, and from the Hague Declaration of the Western European Union issued on October 27, 1987, which makes it binding on each member state to defend the others along their borders with all available means.

Western Europe, where military integration has grown more dynamic of late, is becoming an ever more active factor in the European and world strategic balance. It seemed that the voting at the French parliament on August 30, 1954, buried the project of a European Defence Community once and for all. It is likely that the ideas of military integration were somewhat premature when American leadership was still too strong, and American nuclear guarantees seemed firm. The strategic parity era was still a few years away.

But in the 1986-1987 period, when the military programme for 1987-1991 and the 1987 military budget were discussed in the French Parliament, three-quarters of the deputies and senators spoke one way or another in favour of invigorating West European military integration. About 90 per cent of the French electorate today vote for the parties they represent. It is safe to say therefore that the course for building a "military Europe" will remain constant in French foreign policy in the near future, no matter what party or coalition of parties is in power.

Without delving deeply here into the roots of the capitalist integration processes, including the military sphere (this question should be examined thoroughly and separately), we shall merely mention that these processes are going on, and these must not be ignored. One should obviously not overestimate the difficulties they are faced with. Recently newspaper headlines like "The Common Market -Why the Deadlock?", "Failed to Come to Terms", "Differences Remain", "Quagmire of Contradictions", "Disunity of the 'Common Market'" were quite common. And now in the EEC the tendency is to form one market: a powerful and effective mechanism of specialisation and cooperation and a single currency system are being created, and programmes of fundamental and applied research are put forward. The EEC countries ever more often act in concord in international matters. Integration is beginning to reach into the military sphere as well.

Military development in Europe has picked up speed since Reykjavik, and France has clearly had a hand in this. Commenting on this development, the French Foreign Minister said that "Europeans have felt that the world of security, in which they have gotten used to living, is falling to pieces". Therefore, they must join together to resist a "Soviet military threat", which is allegedly growing with every new Soviet peace move. There is an impression that the tendency to call on the citizens of their own and other countries to "take up arms" is ever present in public speeches made by certain French leaders.

At any rate, military integration has again been given a boost. But what will it lead to?

In military-economic terms, cooperation and specialisation in building up the military industrial potential of Western Europe, which make up the economic basis of integration, will render it far more effective. They make it possible to either step up the rate of military technological progress without having to increase spending, which will bring about an acceleration of the qualitative race in non-nuclear arms, or to limit military spending and use part of the released funds for stepping up the development of civilian industries.

In political terms, a compact and organised group of West European countries can take shape within the NATO framework. Will it become a "European buttress" of NATO, a mechanism of toughening "discip-

line" among some members of the bloc in American interests, and a means of redistributing roles between the USA and Western Europe? Or will it become a means of influencing the USA, an organisation for expressing special interests of West Europeans, different from US interests?

Passivity and attempts to ignore the tendency towards creating a "European defence", let alone the very process of shaping such a defence, will inescapably lead to a situation in which European defence will be fashioned according to American formulas, to the prejudice of the USSR. In that case Western Europe will develop even stronger ties with the United States politically and militarily. Meanwhile the number of Soviet partners in a dialogue on major political issues will dwindle, and we shall have to deal with a joint NATO position (a US position in this case), just as we increasingly have to deal with the joint "European" position of the EEC member countries.

It seems, however, that the negative tendencies in the processes under way in Western Europe can be neutralised, if due account is taken of the Europeans' growing striving for greater independence in security matters and if the Europeans are offered a chance to begin a search for new mutually acceptable ways of determining their place in the European and world strategic balance. This would give strategic parity a clearer structure and open the door to direct talks with European nuclear countries on a liquidation of nuclear weapons through a mutually agreed lowering of the parity level. In this way Europe could find its place in the general process, for without its participation this process is inconceivable, as we shall see later, and could only move in a direction harmful to European interests.

The Soviet programme of a complete elimination of nuclear weapons, advanced by Mikhail Gorbachev in the Statement on January 15, 1986, offered a real prospect of delivering mankind from the threat of a nuclear catastrophe and directed into the practical sphere the search for ways of lowering the level of nuclear confrontation and formulating principles of ensuring strategic stability in the new conditions. Therefore it is quite easy to understand the interest of many researchers, Soviet researchers above all, in solving these problems. Only a few years ago these problems were regarded as mere scholastic questions, while today they are the focus of topical discussion.

Programmes are being outlined for reducing nuclear arms to a minimum level of nuclear parity, for making a transition from nuclear to non-nuclear strategy, for developing concepts of reasonable sufficiency, non-offensive defence and others. The search in this direction is all the more urgent since the acceleration process has extended to world politics as well.

There is a great urge to look into the near and more distant future to see what the decisions made today will lead to in ten, fifteen and later years. Indeed, our current actions are laying the foundations of the political and strategic situation of the 21st century. Therefore it is more important today than at any time before to avoid an oversimplified attitude to nuclear disarmament and strategic stability. These matters must be studied thoroughly, with all circumstances and factors taken duly into account.

In the study of ways to ensure strategic stability in the process of nuclear disarmament,¹ published in the summer of 1987, the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defence of Peace, Against the Threat of Nuclear War suggests a programme of a "sub-zero" nuclear balance. The plan

gives rise to a number of questions and should, in our view, be a subject of serious discussion which would be useful in technical and political terms.

The authors of the publication believe that after deep cuts (95 per cent) are made in the strategic offensive arms of the USSR and the USA, it would be possible to achieve stability and parity, provided the naval and air components of the present strategic triads are eliminated, that each side leaves 600 light monoblock inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with mobile launching, and that the nuclear arsenals of third countries are liquidated.

The suggested minimum of nuclear sufficiency (the remaining number of weapons) is not in question; though the French leadership, which bases its nuclear strategy on causing unacceptable damage to the Soviet Union, believes that about 300 warheads reaching targets on Soviet territory would be enough.² All targets of French (and British) nuclear missiles are in the European part of the USSR.

This cannot be said about the choice of only ground-launched mobile ICBMs as the basis for the "sub-zero" strategic nuclear balance scheme. When detected, a ground-launched mobile missile is vulnerable not only to nuclear, but also to conventional weapons. Whereas submarines, silo-based missiles and strategic aircraft have a considerable reserve of active or passive protection against these weapons, this reserve is obviously much lesser in mobile missiles. A mobile ICBM detected by the enemy can only be launched to the target if the missile is threatened with destruction.

Naturally, in the event of a real or hypothetical enemy attack, each side would seek to launch its missiles before they are destroyed. Thus, contrary to the opinion of the "strategic stability" authors, an immediate nuclear escalation of any "ordinary" incident or even a crisis is being programmed, since the top-priority military goal of each side in a critical situation will be to neutralise the enemy's nuclear potential. It would be not necessary to deliver a nuclear strike in order to accomplish this.

We can imagine the use of conventional arms of increased effectiveness as well. The *World Economics and International Relations* journal wrote in its September 1987 issue "The saturation of modern weapon systems with electronic devices can cause greater instability and a temptation to start an operation by 'clever weapons' to incapacitate the enemy nuclear potential by a pre-emptive strike with conventional arms."³ In the above-mentioned study by Soviet scientists this version is not considered.⁴

If we assume that this hypothesis is correct, it will be clear that the Americans, who have air bases all along the Soviet border and have forward based airborne means, would be in a more advantageous position, especially since the flight range of their air-strike means is being increased and "stealth" technologies are being perfected.

In this context the mobility of ICBMs, that is, their ability for considerable movement unpredictable by the enemy, cannot be regarded as the basis of invulnerability of "sub-zero" strategic nuclear potentials, for a greater density of the satellite network would clearly limit the concealed movement of missiles. Thus a supposedly stabilising satellite control may become a destabilising factor.

These are mainly technical problems. But the main drawback of the scheme suggested by the committee of Soviet scientists is a political one, in our view. It disregards too easily the nuclear weapons of third countries, those of European countries especially, in the general strategic balance. Not analysing the motives which could encourage Britain and France to join nuclear disarmament, and not evaluating their place in

the general balance of forces, the authors take it for granted that the nuclear potentials of these two countries would disappear before the Soviet and American potentials are liquidated; or that before the latter takes place, the former would be reduced in a proportionate way. But is it reasonable to neglect the third countries only because they just do not fit into the "sub-zero" balance scheme?

Furthermore, to back up the advanced ideas in other studies, the committee of scientists approaches the problem of third countries from an entirely different angle. For instance, the study *Space Weapons—A Dilemma of Security*, published in 1986 under the aegis of this committee, said: "Some American advocates of building a large-scale ballistic missile defence believe that the deployment of such systems by both the United States and the Soviet Union would allegedly solve some problems of East-West strategic balance—at the cost of devaluing the French and British nuclear forces. But this would be a mistake, considering the task of strengthening mutual security and stabilising strategic equilibrium. One would arrive at this conclusion only because one can hardly expect France and Britain to remain passive, if the events take this course. Evidently many of... the anti-missile means, including both the modernisation and buildup of nuclear offensive arms and special means of neutralising and destroying some elements and sub-systems of the ballistic missile defence, would be accessible for each of the two states, not to mention a larger West European union."⁶

The promises by West European 'statesmen not to "stay aloof" and to join nuclear disarmament "in due time" can hardly be regarded as serious political commitments, because neither the specific terms nor ways of their joining this process, nor even the general basis for this have ever been determined. Here is a fresh example of the French approach to the problem of eliminating other means of mass destruction—chemical weapons. It is believed in France that until these weapons are totally eliminated, each country, including France, can retain a so-called safety margin—a sufficient military potential.

The idea of the "safety margin" fits well into the political and military concepts of Paris, and no one can guarantee that France will not display the same approach to the elimination of nuclear arms. The "safety margin" in this case would be at a level ensuring an unacceptable damage to the USSR, that is, those very 300 warheads capable of reaching their targets. This rules out a possibility of reducing the nuclear potentials of third countries proportionately to Soviet and American cuts and undermines the scheme suggested by the committee of Soviet scientists. There is no way a "sub-zero" equation of sub-strategic stability can be purely Soviet-American.

A nuclear balance at a minimum, "sub-zero" level should be multi-lateral and take into account the potentials of all nuclear states. Attempts so far to ignore the realities of the nuclear world in which we live, and the desire to remove "redundant" buttresses from the nuclear parity system, just to make the whole thing easier destabilise parity and at a certain stage will block the reduction and elimination of nuclear arms.

Such a balance, no doubt, cannot be purely arithmetic. It is hard to imagine a US president who would agree that after deep cuts in strategic offensive arms, the USSR would be left with considerably more strategic missiles than the USA. It is likewise hard to imagine a European bourgeois politician agreeing to unilateral nuclear disarmament. But a way out of this situation can be imagined, if the East-West strategic nuclear parity would be divided, at least at the beginning, in two parts - between the USSR and the USA, and between the USSR and Western Europe.

Evidently a purely administrative division is not enough here. There should be a material basis for mutually restricting nuclear balances. Evidently this can be done on a geographic principle in combination with corresponding changes in the structure of strategic nuclear arsenals—by reducing them to missile-carrying submarines. If intermediate-range missiles are eliminated, other strategic systems, including mobile ICBMs suggested by the committee of Soviet scientists, cannot be deployed so as to guarantee their being aimed only at the United States or at West European nuclear countries.

In this case the present vast areas patrolled by nuclear-missile submarines (SSBNs) could be limited on a mutual basis in order to confine them to adjacent sea or oceanic regions under an effective military control of the countries concerned. The USSR could have two patrol regions—one, say, in the Barents Sea, and the other at the Kamchatka shores. The submarines patrolling in the Barents Sea would ensure European nuclear parity by carrying on board missiles of the appropriate range. Remaining within their region, they would be of no danger for the USA due to the limited range of their missiles.

Nuclear parity with the United States would be ensured by the submarines patrolling at the Kamchatka shores. Their missiles, though of greater range than those in the Barents Sea, would not be able to reach Western Europe and therefore could not be regarded as a threat to it.

Considering the great territorial expanse of the Soviet Union, we would have to offer Americans two patrolling regions—one covering the European part of the USSR and the other, its Asian part. Britain and France could confine themselves to one patrolling region each, or use one common region, because all the targets of their strategic nuclear forces are in the European part of the USSR.

To secure the compliance with an agreement, the sides should give up on a mutual basis anti-submarine activities in the patrol regions of other sides and substantially limit such activities in the zones bordering on these regions. Additional guarantees would be ensured by deploying in patrol regions naval and air forces of the country conducting the patrolling. Besides, in this situation the back-up groups would be a long distance apart, which would reduce even further the danger of an incident.

Such an agreement could be complemented by a number of verification measures, including inspections at submarine bases to specify the parameters of submarine-based ballistic missiles, devising a corresponding regime of oceanic straits and passages, establishing, when necessary, international inspection stations, etc. It would be required, in particular, to elaborate reliable control measures ensuring that the SSBNs do not leave agreed-upon areas, but not ruling out unhindered movement of attack submarines outside these regions. This could be facilitated, for instance, by deliberately increasing the noise level of the SSBNs, which would not matter in the agreed-upon areas closed to anti-submarine activities, but would make their detection easier if they were to leave these regions.

Reducing strategic nuclear potentials to nuclear submarines would render the first nuclear strike practically meaningless, for its chief target—the strategic nuclear potential of the enemy—would be transferred from a country's territory into the seas and, remain intact for adequate retaliation. A pre-emptive large-scale nuclear strike at large areas would thus be rendered impossible, since a submarine launches its missiles one by one with an interval of about one minute. It would take a US SSBN 15 to 25 minutes to fire all its missiles, depending on their number.

All this, plus the limited area of a patrol region, which would mean immediate knowledge of who launched a missile, including a non-san-

ctioned launching, and a high degree of predictability of missiles' trajectory, would make it possible to take measures to prevent an incident within the shortest possible span of time. And the incident itself would in this case be developing far more slowly than if land-based weapons were being used. ICBMs hit targets about thirty minutes after launching, while the last warhead launched to an utmost distance from a US Ohio-class SSBN will reach a target more than an hour after its first missile is launched. All this excludes the offensive use of the remaining potentials, and so strategic offensive arms would become strategic defensive arms. In this way the non-offensive character of military doctrines would be convincingly confirmed.

In purely technical terms, the fact that all nuclear powers concerned will thus have more submarines and corresponding missiles than is required for a "sub-zero" balance will make it unnecessary for them to develop and manufacture new nuclear missiles, which takes up a large portion of military budgets.



The formula offered here may be not impeccable. This is merely an attempt to take a look at nuclear disarmament not in the traditional Soviet-American context, but considering the interests of the European policy pursued by the USSR. More likely the analysis of this problem from other angles will bring out new aspects in it, which have not been covered in this article. But it is vitally important that this problem be studied comprehensively in a situation allowing for a constructive exchange of views.

Today, when the world has, at last, begun to move towards nuclear disarmament, we cannot be content with a limited choice of alternatives. The long experience of elaborating the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles is a progeny of difficult mistakes made in our policy in Europe. The period of stagnation at the talks on intermediate-range missiles was, among other things, a result of underestimation from the start of the military-strategic situation in Europe. The decision to replace SS-4 and SS-5 missiles with more sophisticated SS-20 missiles was motivated by technological advances rather than by political analysis.

Now that nuclear arms are being reduced, it is more important than ever that military decisions be motivated by political decisions based on a strict account of the balance of interests. War is said to be too important an issue to be entrusted to the military. However, at the time when this phrase was first coined, a war could be lost. We have no right to lose the historic chance of survival for the whole of mankind offered by nuclear disarmament. This is impermissible.

¹ *Стратегическая стабильность в условиях радикальных сокращений ядерных вооружений*, Adapted Version, Moscow, 1987 (Later in the article referred to as *Strategic Stability*)

² See *Journal officiel de la République Française. Débats Parlementaires. Sénat*, Nov. 28, 1986, p. 5367.

³ *Мировая экономика и международные отношения*, No. 9, 1987, p. 73.

⁴ See *Strategic Stability*, p. 21.

⁵ *Космическое оружие: дилемма безопасности*, Moscow, 1986, pp. 153-154.

LOYALTY TO THE VICTORIOUS FEBRUARY

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The February 1948 events found me, a student of 18, on holiday in the mountains, far from the maelstrom of political struggles. When discussing those events with my father, who was 50 years old at the time, I announced with youthful confidence that "my" postwar generation had had everything done for it. It seemed to me that the political battles were coming to a victorious close and that my father's generation, those who had "stormed the skies", had fulfilled the historic task of overthrowing capitalism, leaving nothing undone; and that our generation, their sons and daughters, had only to busy ourselves with the day-to-day job of building a new society.

The four decades which our society has lived through in a world divided along class boundaries have shown with extraordinary clarity how very wrong I was in my youth. Our people's revolutionary struggle for socialist changes and against internal and external enemies is evidence that every generation must do its share in waging a revolutionary struggle for social progress.

The Czechoslovak working people's victory over domestic and international reaction 40 years ago, late in February 1948, largely predetermined the international and socio-economic situation of our country in today's world. That victory was the culmination of a growth process which turned the people's democratic revolution into a socialist revolution. The fundamental issue of this revolution, the issue of political power, of who would win, was settled in favour of the workers, peasants and working intelligentsia, and against the capitalists.

An important aspect of the February events in terms of international politics was that the revolutionary assumption of power by the working class took place peacefully, in strict accordance with the Constitution of the Republic and without altering the constitutional forms of the state.

It was equally important that the socialist revolution triumphed in an industrialised country where state power had for two decades been held by a politically and economically powerful bourgeoisie relying on the support of a numerous petty bourgeoisie and deep-rooted bourgeois democratic parliamentary traditions.

A circumstance of strategic importance was the fact that the victorious working class of Czechoslovakia relied in its political struggle on alliance with the Soviet Union. This reduced to the minimum world imperialism's possibilities of adversely influencing the inner political evolution of our country which the defeated bourgeoisie, being prompted by the instinct of self-preservation, had hoped for.

The socialist transformations effected in Czechoslovakia rested on a fairly advanced material and technical base in industry, the revolutionary consciousness of a large body of the working class and a well-organised Communist Party. This still holds true today. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, steelled by long years of class struggle and aware of its responsibility to its own people and the international revolutionary mo-

vement, has proved its worth as a proletarian vanguard. It has shown itself equal to overcoming the most formidable barriers, carrying forward the revolutionary teachings of Marxism-Leninism, mobilising the working people for the implementation of revolutionary changes and accomplishing the historic task of building socialism.

After February 1948, it took Czechoslovakia a historically short time to lay the material and technical foundations for socialism, with public property of the means of production in industry and cooperative property in agriculture as its mainstay. The socialist collectivisation of farming thoroughly transformed the life in the countryside and the character of agricultural production. The industrial potential of the country increased many times over. The people's standard of education went up, and socialist culture was given a powerful spur. Czechoslovakia won greater international security and its close cooperation with the Soviet Union and other WTO allies and CMEA partners grew deeper.

One of the main sources of our people's achievements in socialist construction was the leadership provided by a politically mature and ideologically reasoned party adhering to revolutionary Marxist-Leninist theory. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, led by Klement Gottwald, carried forward the scientific theory of socialism and evolved a strategy and tactics for the class struggle with due regard to the history and distinguishing characteristics of our country.

In November 1947 the CPCz Central Committee, analysing the rapid development of the political situation in Czechoslovakia, came to the conclusion that the bourgeoisie's tactics would be aimed at "paralysing the government, parliament and other popular bodies to provoke a government crisis and try to form a bureaucratic government". It would be "an attempt at a reactionary putsch, an attempt to accomplish a reactionary coup d'état".

That was when home reaction was given the famous warning: "Gottwald isn't Tusar." In the early 1920s, Tusar came to personify reformists capitulating to the bourgeoisie. A Social Democratic leader, he relinquished of his own accord the functions of chairman of the government of that time, which included several Social Democrats, and in doing so made way as a result of this sharp social conflict for a bureaucratic reactionary cabinet. That cabinet subsequently resorted to brutal reprisals against the revolutionary workers who, in following the example of the October Revolution, demanded social transformations and the nationalisation of industry. The Tusar government thus predetermined the fate of the young Czechoslovak state for the next 25 years in favour of capitalism.

The liberation of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Army gave a chance to solve national democratic and social problems. Shortly after the adoption of the first postwar government programme (Košice, April 1945), the CPCz demanded the nationalisation of banks, mines and key industries. It perseveringly advocated the implementation of a government programme for consolidating the gains of the people's democratic revolution and for bringing about its gradual development into a socialist revolution. During its first test of strength—in the May 1946 general election—the CPCz won 38 per cent of the vote. Together with the Social Democratic Party, it secured over half the seats in the National Assembly. Klement Gottwald, a leader of the CPCz, the strongest political party, became Prime Minister.

The bourgeois parties within the government coalition of that time did their utmost to paralyse it, to destabilise the economy, impede land reform and reprivatise nationalised property.

Ultimately it was the forecast of the November Plenary Meeting of the CPCz Central Committee that came true. In February 1948, a group

of cabinet ministers belonging to reactionary parties took an open stand against the revolutionary processes gaining momentum in the country; they tried to provoke a government crisis so as to undermine the ruling coalition. The aim was to remove Gottwald from his post as the head of the government by means of a "palace revolution" (through the voting mechanism) and bring into being a bureaucratic cabinet with the aid of the then President, Edvard Beneš, just as bourgeois parties had done when Tusar capitulated in 1920.

However, the Communists' warnings that Gottwald was not Tusar were not just empty words. The CPCz, led by Gottwald, responded to the attempt at a "palace" counter-revolutionary putsch with widespread mobilisation of the working class. It invited as allies other parties whose members were in the government coalition, for it wanted the Communists and left-wing Social Democrats to form a broad popular front against the intrigues of reactionary politicians.

Politically conscious members of the working class promptly formed armed units, and while not a single shot rang out during the February events, the very fact that it involved armed working people was an unmistakable indication that this time the working class was not going to miss its historical chance.

The formation of action committees of the National Front—entirely new political organs of popular, anti-reactionary unity—played an important part in the development of events.

Reaction in the capital and the provinces surrendered to the working people's united will. President Beneš submitted to it as well; he accepted the resignation of reactionary ministers and approved after some hesitation the government formed by Klement Gottwald.

The anti-government putsch fell through. The achievements of the national democratic revolution were successfully defended and consolidated by democratic, constitutional means. All political power passed into the hands of the working class and all working people, with both Czechs and Slovaks united in the National Front.

The idea of a national front as the basis for the political system of contemporary Czechoslovakia has deep roots among the people and was conceived in the form of united popular anti-fascist action by diverse patriotic forces of the country. The Communist Party relied on the support of the National Front by the people in February as well. It was the National Front, an alignment of Communists and non-party people, Christians and atheists, trade unionists, members of youth organisations and others, that helped beat off the attack of reactionary elements, effect reconstruction and renew the government on the principles of socialist pluralism.

In fighting for the establishment of working-class power, the CPCz used the most diverse democratic methods to encourage the involvement of the working people. We are also carrying forward this tradition at the new stage in the life of our society, in the course of the daily tasks of building socialism, at a time when the problems of furthering democracy are coming to the fore in the struggle to strengthen socialism. This underlies the Programme adopted by the 17th CPCz Congress, which set the task of "achieving the highest level in the development of socialist democracy" and promoting "the elements of the Leninist conception of the people's socialist self-government".

Lately there has been new impetus in the development of legislative bodies, national committees and other organisations united in the National Front. The principle of electing economic executives is being ap-

plied ever more widely. An extensive public debate on the draft law on enterprises brought out full support for the idea of socialist self-management of work collectives. The idea of competitive examinations in management and of elections involving several nominees for one office is steadily gaining ground in different spheres of life.

The development of democracy is based primarily on the extension of democratic relations in society and finds reflection in the political parties and public organisations united in the National Front. The Communist Party, as the leading force of society, sees to it that the National Front serves as a broad basis for the increasing unity of Communists and non-party people as well as members of other parties, for the cooperation of classes, peoples and nationalities, and between various social and professional groups.

In the course of Czechoslovakia's postwar evolution, the national question has been settled on fair principles. To fully appreciate this, it is necessary to recall that in the prewar republic the Czech bourgeoisie flouted the rights of the Slovak people. This was also the official policy of the state. On a Communist initiative the political parties affiliated to the National Front included in the Košice government programme a provision saying that relations between the Czechs and Slovaks in the reborn nation would develop on principles of equality. "On ending all old disputes and proceeding from the recognition of the Slovaks with their national identity," the programme states,—"the government will work perseveringly from the first to ensure that the principle of 'equal with equal' is realised in the Czechoslovak state and that truly fraternal relations are established between the two peoples."

However, the most decisive factor in carrying out a proper nationalities policy was to create the necessary economic conditions, that is, the prerequisites for raising the economically more backward part of the republic, the Slovak provinces, to the same level as the Czech provinces of the common Czech-Slovak state. The Czech working class helped Slovakia carry out widespread industrialisation. Today Slovakia, whose people make up one-third of the population of the CSSR, accounts for over 30 per cent of the country's industrial output.

The 16th CPCz Congress (1981) stressed that the "historical distinctions between our peoples in regard to the economic, political, social and cultural standards of life have been eliminated". This statement implies amazing, unprecedented progress in an incredibly short time by a people who, starting from a marginal existence, from poverty and backwardness, rose to a highly advanced level of development. Slovak industrial products today include motor vehicles, river boats, TV sets, transistors, robots and microelectronic circuits.

The Czechs, Slovaks and members of other nationalities living in our federative state are linked together by bonds of friendship and brotherhood. This is socialist internationalism, one of the most important results of the victorious February.

The conditions of the Czechoslovak peasantry have undergone a decisive change in the years of socialist construction. The Ninth CPCz Congress (1949) adopted a general programme for building socialism which, along with socialist industrialisation and a cultural revolution, provided for the accomplishment of a historic task—collectivisation of the countryside.

In solving this problem, our party guided itself by Lenin's work "On Cooperation" as well as by the concrete experience of the CPSU. With due regard to prevailing internal and external political conditions, as well as to the specifics of rural Czechoslovakia, this experience was further developed. The working class also played an important role in the reorganisation of our agriculture; it helped the cooperative peasantry

not only by influencing it politically, but also by rendering concrete assistance, primarily in fulfilling the mechanisation programme.

Our collective and state farms today till 95.9 per cent of the country's arable land. Modern methods in large-scale farming have made it possible to double output in comparison with 1948. The collective and state farms guarantee the republic self-sufficiency in food products.

Large-scale socialist farming has transformed rural Czechoslovakia. When, at the height of the internal political crisis of 1968, anti-socialist forces extended their attacks to the achievements of cooperative peasants, the latter put up strong resistance. Not a single collective farm fell apart in that troubled year. Large-scale socialist farming is one of the main revolutionary gains made since 1948, and the class of cooperative farmers has become a dependable pillar of the socialist state.

The people's government has made its most significant progress in the matter of improving the position of the country's working people. Our society has put an end forever to the exploitation of man by man and to the debasement of human dignity that is so much a part of capitalist exploitation. The social policy of our country is marked by ample guarantees of social protection for the people; they comprise free medical aid and medicines, free secondary and higher education, aid to families with children, paid maternity leave and non-repayable credit for newlyweds. The state extends financial support to the population in housing construction, including cooperative housing, which has assumed a mass scale in the country. It provides old age pensions to all working people, and hence to cooperative peasants as well.

Experience has shown that the policy of the party and the people's state produces excellent results when it adheres consistently and in a principled manner to Marxism-Leninism, carrying it forward with due regard to national conditions and traditions and relying on the working class and the unity of the party and the people for support.

The experience of Czechoslovakia has also shown that every time the party's policy departed from these principles for some reason, mistakes were made and society found itself beset with unease, social conflicts and tensions and even with crisis phenomena.

The history of our state is evidence that to build socialism is not to walk down a broad, straight avenue or a well-paved road. Socialist construction in our country has been a struggle of ups and downs, a struggle in which no major gain was made easily.

Adherents of socialism in Czechoslovakia had to carry on a particularly hard class struggle within the country in the 1950s. They had to resist all that came from abroad with the cold war, during which period international imperialism tried to apply in the most diverse ways its sadly notorious doctrine of "rolling back communism". The CPCz, being the leading political force of society, had to solve many problems such as it had never encountered before. It was advancing over largely unexplored ground. Regrettably, its activity followed for a time the "theory" of the "aggravation of the class struggle in the process of socialist construction", which the subsequent course of history exposed as false.

Many dire consequences of the personality cult, which was condemned at the 20th CPSU Congress, had their effect on the CPCz leadership's decisions at that time. Decisions bearing such an imprint resulted in gross errors involving violations of Leninist standards of party life and socialist legality and inspired political trials that ended in tragedy for many of those unjustly accused. In the 1960s, the records of these trials were re-examined and those who had been unjustly accused and convicted were rehabilitated. The party also condemned the methods and practices that had led to breaches of the law; it removed the effects of

the personality cult in party and state and restored Leninist norms and principles.

A certain harm was also made by subjectivist approaches in our party's policy in the form of overestimating the moral and political unity of society, setting tasks that could not be accomplished and slacking off in ideological work. It was these tendencies and inconsistencies in solving current problems that led to growing crisis phenomena from the 1960s on. In 1968, these precipitated a crisis which paralysed the party and society as a whole.

The CPCz analysed developments of that period in the document "The Lessons of the Crisis Development in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and in Society After the 13th Congress of the CPCz". This document contains a comprehensive review of the causes of the 1968 crisis, and the conclusions drawn in it are still valid.

"The Lessons of Crisis Development" points out that "an objective appraisal and explanation of the causes and interconnections of the deep crisis in which the CPCz and the whole of our society found themselves in 1968 furnish irrefutable proof that the internal forces, being paralysed by the policy of representatives of the right in the party leadership, were unable to mobilise themselves in order to stop the frontal attack of the counter-revolution. In these circumstances it was necessary either to wait until the counter-revolution unleashed a fratricidal struggle spelling thousands of deaths and to render internationalist aid only after that, or to act in time to prevent a bloody tragedy even at the price of the action being misunderstood at first both at home and abroad. The entry of allied troops into Czechoslovakia on August 21, 1968, staved off such bloodshed and was therefore a necessary solution, the only one that was correct."

The counter-revolutionary attempt to divert Czechoslovakia from its socialist path came to be called "anti-February" in our country. The internal political forces that refused to resign themselves to the nationalisation of the means of production formerly owned by the capitalist class or to the loss of their privileges, imagined that in 1968 they had a chance of taking social revenge, of restoring the order that had existed in the country prior to the victorious February. What happened was in effect a clash of class interests: the interests of the defeated exploiter class and those of socialism. In the past 40 years, international anti-communist reaction has repeatedly tried to find a "weak link" in the socialist community and cause it to break away. This was also the aim of world imperialism with regard to Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Czechoslovakia's postwar international orientation was understandably a thorn in the side of international reaction. Against their will, the one-time "loyal ally" of France and Britain had ceased to be a pawn in the imperialist game in Central Europe. What is more, Czechoslovakia had resolved in complete accordance with its national interests to build security on a fundamentally new, dependable basis, namely, on an alliance with the first country of victorious socialism—the Soviet Union, whose disinterested friendship with our people was sealed with the blood that had been shed jointly in liberating Czechoslovakia from fascism.

It is hard to describe the terrible tragedy that befell our people when, in the autumn of 1938, our former allies—Britain and France—signed an anti-Czechoslovak pact with Hitler and Mussolini. Afterwards, when fascist Germany had completed the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union remained the only real hope for the rebirth of Czechoslovak statehood. This is why all patriotic and democratic forces of Czecho-

slovakia, ranging from Communists to the national bourgeoisie, associated alignment with the Soviet Union with the restoration of their state. They saw the Munich deal not only as a collapse of the Franco-Anglo-American orientation of the bourgeois governments under Tomáš Masaryk and Edvard Beneš, but as a fiasco of the bourgeoisie in general as a ruling class.

In the grim years of struggle against fascism, the people arrived spontaneously at the resolve to revive the Czechoslovak Republic on new international political principles, to restore the Czechs' and Slovaks' common state in the form of a just social and national political formation.

The liberation of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Army gave rise to a powerful revolutionary wave in the country. In the course of this development, the Czechoslovak-Soviet alliance was recognised to be the principal guarantee of an irreversible change, a guarantee of the territorial integrity and state sovereignty of the country. Klement Gottwald had expressed this new political quality in the slogan "With the Soviet Union for All Time". The victory of the socialist revolution in 1948 made the new foreign policy orientation of Czechoslovakia irreversible.

The progress achieved by the Czechoslovak people after 1948 was made possible by the fact that our state developed as a component of the world socialist system and cooperation with the Soviet Union in every sphere was the decisive factor. Our country acquired reliable guarantees for its international security by joining the WTO, a defensive coalition of states, while membership in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance opened up reliable prospects for our economic development.

Czechoslovakia plays an active part in the coordination of the socialist countries' political actions on the international scene, in their struggle for the removal of the nuclear threat, for disarmament and the provision of solid prerequisites for lasting peaceful relations between countries belonging to different social systems. The 17th CPCz Congress gave its full support to the CPSU programme calling for the destruction of the nuclear weapons by the end of this century. Czechoslovakia's Communists unanimously approve of the principles of new thinking in international relations, which are prompted by the fact that today the very existence of civilisation is at stake.

Our country is striving in unison with its allies for a new quality in the interaction of socialist countries in every field and for a restructuring of the mechanism of economic cooperation within CMEA, a matter discussed at the 43rd Extraordinary Session of the Council. Priorities include the Comprehensive Programme of Scientific and Technological Progress of the CMEA Member Countries up to the Year 2000, the promotion of specialisation and cooperation in production, direct ties between enterprises and work collectives and the formation of joint enterprises and associations.

Generally speaking, relations with socialist countries hold a central place in our international ties. They are based on principles which have passed the test of time: unity, cohesion, mutual confidence, understanding and respect, interaction, equality, non-interference in internal affairs.

The dynamic economic development of the CSSR and its ability to withstand international competition as well as changes in the world economy constitute the mainstay of both the growing international prestige of our country and its further role in the promotion of international socialist economic integration. The restructuring of the economic mechanism mapped out by the 17th CPCz Congress is an important condition for accelerating the social and economic development of the republic.

The December 1987 Plenary Meeting of the CPCz Central Committee, at which Miloš Jakeš was elected its General Secretary, adopted a comprehensive programme for this restructuring. The programme indicates

ways and means of changing the management system, removing the delaying mechanisms that have shaped up over the years, going over from the predominantly administrative methods of management to economic ones and discarding established practices and stereotypes of thinking typical of extensive methods of management. A Plenary Meeting of the CPCz Central Committee stressed that this is the biggest reform since the nationalisation of industry in the 1945-1948 period. The reform is off to a good start. In 1987, new management methods were tested for efficiency on an experimental basis in a number of enterprises. It is in the next five-year period (beginning with 1991) that the economy will fully adopt the principles of the new economic mechanism.

The stage which we have entered since the 17th CPCz Congress is characterised by the interaction of the economic reform and socialist democracy, by their interconnection and interdependence, which the December Plenary Meeting of the CPCz Central Committee rightly pointed out. The economic reform is based on reforms in public life, and developing socialist democracy encourages people to advance the economy and society as a whole.

This is why the Czechoslovak public follows with such keen interest all new developments in Soviet life since the 27th CPSU Congress, in particular all that is new in the economic sphere, in culture, and in democracy. We are anything but indifferent to the changes coming about in nearly every sphere of Soviet life. The slogan "The Soviet Union Is Our Model" has played its role in our society since the earliest days of liberation. It is particularly valid today. The innovative steps of the CPSU and the whole of Soviet society, the significance of which reach far beyond the Soviet Union, are a source of inspiration to our party and society, which see them as guidelines for their creative development and an incentive to action.

Communists of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union strive to further improve socialism by carrying out comprehensive perestroika and democratisation. The General Secretary of the CPCz Central Committee stressed at the meeting in Kremlin on January 11, 1988: "We realise our common internationalist responsibility for making full use of the tremendous potential of the socialist system in the interests of improving the quality of people's life and raising in the world the authority and attractiveness of socialism."

In the course of profound and pithy talks held in Moscow during Miloš Jakeš' visit to Moscow the participants gave a high assessment of the level of internationalist relations established between the fraternal communist parties of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, the comprehensive cooperation and extensive ties between public organisations and peoples of the two countries. An analysis of their relations revealed new great opportunities for extending cooperation in the political, economic, scientific, technical, cultural, other fields and rendering them efficient.

The programme for reshaping life in the CSSR in the economic, political, ideological and social spheres is far-reaching. It meets the requirements of the revolutionary changes for which the Communist Party is working steadfastly in our society. We see an example for us in the revolutionary élan with which the Communists and all the working people joined in political struggle 40 years ago, in the name of a radiant future for our society.

Every generation has its place in this political struggle. So it is for the present generation, whose task is to contribute its share to the strengthening of the role played by Czechoslovakia in the socialist community and in the struggle of progressive, peace-loving forces for the preservation of mankind, the establishment of a comprehensive international security system and the triumph of the ideals of peace and social progress.

Perestroika Is Still in Its Early Stage

Aleksandr VAKHRAMEYEV

The formation of the community of socialist states, the fact that socialism moved beyond the boundaries of a single country to become a world system is an historically significant event of the 20th century, second only to the Great October Socialist Revolution. The rise and development of the world socialist system has exerted and continues to exert tremendous influence on social processes throughout the planet. There is now no country or group of countries, no ideological or political trend, that is not influenced by existing socialism to one degree or another. No aspect of present-day world politics can be understood or assessed correctly without taking socialism's influence into account.

First, the very existence of the world socialist system exerts tremendous influence on social processes and politics in today's world. Nearly one-third of humanity is building a new life. The countries forming the world socialist system account for 26.2 per cent of the area and 31.9 per cent of the population of the globe; they account for over 40 per cent of world industrial production and one-third of the world national income.¹

The attainment of rough military strategic parity between the Soviet Union and the United States, between the WTO and NATO, is a historic achievement of socialism. The overall result is a change in the balance and alignment of world political forces, the fact that capitalism is no longer the dominating socio-political system in the world and that developing successfully alongside it is the system of socialist countries, which is becoming, to use Lenin's expression, an international force capable of exerting decisive influence on world politics.²

Second, existing socialism influences the social progress of humanity by its policy of supporting revolutionary and democratic peace forces and by actively resisting anti-democratic, imperialist, aggressive, neocolonialist forces in the non-socialist part of the globe. "The Soviet people's heroic resistance to counter revolutionary armed intervention and to fascism," said Nicaraguan leader Daniel Ortega in his address to the meeting dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, "inspired the struggle of the peoples of Europe, Asia, Africa, North America, Latin America and the Caribbean. This made possible new revolutionary victories based on the firm will of peoples resolved to smash the chains of exploitation, on the generous and determined solidarity in struggle shown by the Soviet Union."³

Other socialist countries show similar solidarity with the revolutionary, democratic and liberation movements, with the peace forces throughout the world.

Third, existing socialism exerts positive influence on social progress by its example, by the successes of its domestic and foreign policy.

Socialist construction in the Soviet Union and the fraternal countries was hardly an advance along a straight road. It proved incredibly difficult, as Lenin had predicted. As well as achieving victories, the peoples of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries suffered reverses. They had to overcome difficulties, do away with deformations and crisis situations in their development, all of which substantially reduced the impact of existing socialism's example and distorted its image in the eyes of working people, the public at large, progressives and democrats in the non-socialist world.

There is a whole set of both objective and subjective reasons for the occurrence of negative phenomena in the development of socialist countries. First among them is, beyond all question, the low economic, political, social and cultural level at which most of the countries which chose socialism had to begin building the new society. It should also be borne in mind that the Soviet Union had to pioneer socialist construction, that there were no previous models to go by. As for our followers, they occasionally lacked the ability to apply the Soviet experience to the specific historical conditions existing in their countries. The theory of socialism showed a serious lag. Theoretical concepts of it remained largely at the level of the 1930s and 1940s, that is, a period when society was wrestling with entirely different problems; developing socialism, the dialectics of its motive forces and contradictions and the actual state of society were not made an object of in-depth research.

Strictly administrative forms of economic management and the administration of society were identified with the essential features inherent in the socialist system. These forms were presented as petrified dogmas leaving no room for an objective scientific analysis. There has emerged a fossilised image of socialist production relations and their dialectical connection with productive forces was clearly underestimated. The structure of society was dogmatised, and the diversity and dynamism of the interests pursued by various layers and groups composing that society were ignored. There were simplified interpretations of such basic problems of the theory and practice of socialism as public property, class relations and relations between nations and nationalities, the correlation of labour and consumption, cooperation, economic management, government by the people and self-government, the struggle against bureaucratic excesses, the revolutionary role of socialist ideology, the principles of education and upbringing, safeguards for progressive social development. There were in vogue stilted versions of communism, prophecies and ideas totally divorced from life. This situation in theoretical thought negatively affected the solution of practical problems.

In recent years the socialist countries came up against certain unfavourable circumstances due to changes in both the internal and external context of their development. Life demanded that they switch over from extensive to intensive economic development, which implied a radical restructuring of their economies and understandably lowered the growth rate. Furthermore delay in embarking on intensification and an effort to keep the growth rate from declining by continuing extensive methods led to excessive spending on the buildup of the fuel and power industries, to an accelerated involvement and irrational utilisation of new natural resources in production, an excessive increase in labour demand, a bad shortage of it in the economy and a decrease in returns on assets.

There were also subjective reasons for the inadequate use of the potentialities and advantages of socialism, for the mistakes, miscalculations and deformations that discredited the new social system in the eyes of the world public. The ways and means of effecting urgent reforms did not always fully correspond to socialist principles, socialist ideology and theory. It was mostly due to the external conditions: a war threat was

hanging over the country. And there were excesses of its own, with administrative pressure and human sufferings. This is the reality. This is the fate of the people with all contradictions and great achievements, with dramatic mistakes and the tragic pages of the past."⁴

The 'years of stagnation and conservatism in Soviet society also witnessed serious miscalculations in the Soviet Union's approach to relations with other socialist countries. Particularly in the late 1970s and early 1980s the inter-party ties of the socialist countries became largely formal and affected. An in-depth high-level joint discussion of the pressing problems in the development and cooperation of the fraternal states was conspicuously lacking.

There were serious shortcomings in the field of economic, scientific and technological ties. Little care was shown for establishing vigorous cooperation and profound specialisation needed to satisfy the internal demand and the demand of the fraternal countries for machinery, equipment and technologies. That is why the necessity appeared to turn to the West with all ensuing negative consequences which is convincingly confirmed by the experience of Poland and some other socialist countries in the 1970s.

All this encouraged reciprocal negative attitudes, and relations began lacking trust, frankness, interest in jointly discussing and tackling pressing problems of development. As it was noted by Mikhail Gorbachev, "there emerged trends to isolationism that became a fertile soil for subjective estimates and actions. In a number of cases it led to the situation when the ruling party and the leadership failed to timely notice objective processes and ripe problems. And the friends in the socialist community, even if they saw something causing concern, would rather keep it to themselves—trusting frankness was not popular. It could be 'misinterpreted'."⁵

Ill-considered and occasionally erroneous foreign policy moves were made as well. Mistakes, failings, unsolved problems and a general decline in socialism's economic, scientific, technological, moral and political potential and prestige constituted what Mikhail Gorbachev described in speaking before staff members of the Soviet Foreign Ministry on May 23, 1986, as one of the reasons for imperialism's increased aggressiveness on the international scene, for the West's swing from detente to a stepped-up policy of confrontation and attempts to impose a new version of the cold war on the world in the late 1970s and early 1980s.⁶

Ideologists of imperialism, as well as Western propaganda in general, took advantage of the complications and difficulties attending the development of socialism as proof of the system's permanent and insurmountable crisis, of its inability to cope with the problems facing humanity at the end of the 20th century. In their estimate, it was only socialism's growing military strength that enabled it to influence—negatively and dangerously—social processes going on in the world. Zbigniew Brzezinski, for one, wrote that the Soviet Union, lacking a reasonably tangible economic, scientific and cultural potential, was unable to set up an international system by which it could dominate in the event of victory in a world war. It therefore posed a threat as a destroyer of the contemporary international system, which could only be supplanted by greater global anarchy injurious to all countries.⁷ And M. Ledeen, consultant to the US Secretary of Defense, claimed that the Soviet Union had entered on a period of vastly significant and potentially explosive structural crisis and that the gravity of this crisis compelled the Kremlin to take increasing international risks. He went on to say that for the Soviet Union, the "ability to export communism" in this case was the chief indication of the legitimacy of its existence; that the methods used for such export in the past were, however, ineffective today, and that the

Soviet Union was casting about for new methods, specifically by supporting international terrorism and using its services.⁸ For all their bias, the above allegations unquestionably had their effect on the Western public by undermining its confidence in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and in their foreign policy.

The trend towards stagnation in socialist society necessarily had an adverse impact on the prestige of existing socialism in the eyes of working people and of progressives in capitalist and developing countries. This, in turn, created serious problems for the communist parties and other revolutionary and democratic forces of these countries and tended to reduce their prestige and influence. It was then, that in a whole number of Western communist parties, there arose a trend towards searching for ways to a victorious revolution and a new society by means differing from those used in the countries of existing socialism. This trend gained in strength and one of its outcomes was the concept of "Eurocommunism". It complicated relations between the ruling communist and workers' parties of the socialist countries and the communist parties and progressive and democratic movements of a number of non-socialist countries creating a real danger to the unity of the revolutionary forces fighting for peace, democracy and social progress.

Attempts to resolve the resultant contradictions solely by calling for solidarity with existing socialism irrespective of what it was like in practice could hardly have served any purpose. The CPSU and the ruling parties of other socialist countries needed to thoroughly reappraise the content of socialist reality, to make a critical analysis of it and renew it on revolutionary lines.

The CPSU's strategy of speeding up the social and economic progress of the country and the perestroika of the economic and other spheres of public life which stemmed from this strategy arouse immense interest in the world, primarily in socialist countries. This is understandable, since many of them are faced with problems similar to those of the Soviet Union and the revolutionary changes taking place today in our country are a powerful stimulus for their solution. As Wojciech Jaruzelski, First Secretary of the PUWP Central Committee, President of the Council of State of the PPR, has said: "The overcoming of dogmatic stagnation in the sphere of theory by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, glasnost and the democratisation of public life, the new dynamism in the economy, science and technology and in meeting people's social requirements, the changes in cultural policy and the major peace initiatives are prerequisites for strengthening the impact of the ideas and practices of socialism on today's world."⁹

The ongoing perestroika and revolutionary renewal of socialism in the Soviet Union arouse great interest in the non-socialist part of the world as well. The communist and workers' parties, national democratic parties, the forces championing peace, democracy and social progress, the working people of capitalist and developing countries all see in the beneficial changes coming about in Soviet society a powerful spur to their own activities, to their struggle against imperialist and neocolonial exploitation and for the national liberation and social emancipation of their peoples. The peace initiatives and actions of the Soviet Union, which are accompanied by an increasing assertion of the new image of socialism, said Louis van Geyt, President of the Communist Party of Belgium, "have gone a longer way than anything else towards giving the peoples, especially those of European capitalist countries, new hope for the future. Without such hope, which was increasingly eroded by the

stagnation of earlier years in countries like mine, the only choice left to the popular forces, to the whole of democratic public, would have been either dismal resignation or generally hopeless revolt".¹⁰

The processes involved in the Soviet perestroika are a subject of lively discussion in capitalist countries, in political and academic quarters and by the media, with the overwhelming majority commenting favourably on these processes and on the efforts of the leadership of the CPSU and the Soviet state.

At the recent meeting with Eduard Shevardnadze in Bonn, Vice-Chancellor, FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher said the following: "We are closely following your efforts to carry out reforms with understanding and sympathy on our part. We expect that social and economic reforms undertaken by the Soviet Union will make it an open society. That is why we believe that the principle of glasnost should be extended to the Soviet Union's relations with the West as well." And in an interview with Reuters last autumn he stressed that the Western countries should evolve a common strategy for action aimed at improving relations with the Soviet Union. This is now more important than ever.

However, Western comments on the perestroika also betray certain other sentiments. Some allege that by virtue of its "inertness and conservatism", the Soviet system is incapable of radical reforms and that should it try to effect them, the "Soviet bureaucracy", which is not interested in such changes, would hasten to label them as convergence or even a "restoration of capitalism". Those who express this view add that the Soviet leadership, realising the strength of its bureaucracy, will attempt no radical reforms so as to avoid a conflict with it; that, as in the past, what is now being done in the way of economic changes, democratisation and glasnost in Soviet society is mere camouflage intended to curry favour with the West, obtain credits on favourable terms and lift the ban on deliveries of high technology to the Soviet Union so that with their aid another attempt can be made to solve the social and economic problems of Soviet society.

The West also says that should the perestroika succeed after all, with the economic and social development of the Soviet Union gaining in dynamism and with the country moving to the forefront of economic, scientific and technological progress, this would be extremely dangerous to capitalism, for it would draw the attention of large sections of the population of Western countries to the Soviet Union and make it more sympathetic to socialism as a real alternative to capitalist exploitation. Some Western analysts claim that advances in economic and public life and in democratisation and glasnost would strengthen the international positions of the Soviet Union and socialism as a whole to the detriment of the security interests of the United States and other capitalist countries. Opinions of this nature were voiced at, among other things, sessions on Gorbachev's Economic Reforms held by the Joint Economic Commission of the US Congress in September 1987.

The participants in these sessions came to the conclusion that failure of the Soviet perestroika would meet US interests. To hasten it, they recommended escalating the programme for costly ABM systems within the framework of SDI and drawing the Soviet Union into the arms race to shackle its perestroika; appropriating still greater funds for the development of high-precision weapons and space based weapon systems; increasing for the same purpose military and other aid to alignments and regimes carrying on an active struggle against Soviet-backed governments; resisting the extension of the Soviet Union's international trade and economic ties; ruling out any possibility of supplying the Soviet Union and other socialist countries with high technology; tightening control over the functioning of COCOM and the activity of its member

countries. In other words, the militarists and other anti-Sovieteers are terribly concerned lest the interest which the people and political quarters in the West show in what goes on in the Soviet Union and their growing appreciation of Soviet foreign policy should efface the artificial image of the enemy that has shamelessly been exploited for decades.

However, it is becoming harder and harder to do it. Approaching the turn of the 20th century, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are again demonstrating the vitality of the Marxist-Leninist theory and practice of existing socialism. Perestroika has dug into the upper layers of the enormous political, moral and material reserves of the Soviet society. Practical results confirm correctness of the path to bringing about a society based on social equality and justice, humanism and universal well-being, a society in which the free development of each will be a condition for the free development of all.

¹ СССР в цифрах в 1986 году, Moscow, 1987, pp 22-23

² See V I Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol 31, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1974, pp 148-149

³ *Правда*, Nov 4, 1987

⁴ Михаил Горбачев, *Перестройка и новое мышление для нашей страны и для всего мира*, Politizdat, 1987, p 37

⁵ *Ibid*, p 167-168

⁶ See *Вестник Министерства иностранных дел СССР*, No 1, Aug 5, 1987, p 4

⁷ R. O'Neill (ed) *The Conduct of East-West Relations in the 1980s* London, 1985, p 8

⁸ See M Ledeen, *A Grave New World The Superpower Crises of the 1980s* Oxford, 1985, pp VII, 152, 196

⁹ *Коммунист*, No 11, 1987, p 66.

¹⁰ *Правда*, Nov 5, 1987.

MIGHTY FACTOR FOR WORLD PEACE

(Continued from page 15)

tioned by the actions of the United States and NATO. The Soviet Union neither seeks military superiority nor greater security, but it will neither accept lesser security for itself nor allow the other side to gain military superiority over it.

The Soviet Union is working to help reduce military potentials on a reciprocal basis to a level at which neither side, while seeing to its defences, will have the strength and means for a surprise attack or for offensive operations generally. It acts from these positions both at disarmament negotiations and in the international arena.

The Soviet Armed Forces are entrusted with the task of historic magnitude that of defending the gains of socialism and the cause of peace. They carry out their duty together with the armies of other socialist community countries. The defensive alliance of the fraternal socialist countries, the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, is a reliable proponent of the interests of peace and socialism. The Soviet Army vigilantly guards the peaceful creative labour of the Soviet people.

¹ V I Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol 26, Moscow, Progress Publishers 1964 p 420

² *Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Moscow, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1986, p 23

³ *Правда*, Dec. 18, 1987.

CAN THE RUBLE BECOME A CONVERTIBLE CURRENCY?

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Perestroika has become yet another international word. It is not only a matter of intense public interest across the world in the economic reform under way in the Soviet Union, but also of significant transformations in the national economic mechanisms and external economic ties of other socialist countries. The renewal is being effected on a socialist basis which is common to all our countries and has one and the same purpose: fully to bring out the immense potential and advantages of the new social system.

Many approaches to the solution of internal economic problems in our countries are similar, and on some other issues, like the convertibility of national currencies, most socialist countries take a common stand. A solution of this problem is ever more necessary, for without it the socialist countries can achieve neither full-scale socialist integration nor vigorous involvement in the complex of international economic ties.

Speaking at the 43rd (extraordinary) session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in October 1987, Nikolai Ryzhkov, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, emphasised that the Soviet Union supports the understanding of most socialist countries on introducing mutual convertibility of national currencies and the transfer ruble for servicing direct production ties, joint economic activity, and scientific and technical cooperation. He said: "Our long-term goal should be a gradual transition, as the necessary conditions take shape, from mutual convertibility of national currencies to a collective currency unit, eventually convertible into hard currencies."¹

Various questions arise in this context: when and under what conditions do currencies become convertible? What is implied by the possibility of selling, say, Soviet rubles to other states and using them to buy the latter's currencies? How will the ruble be used in international settlements? What are the advantages and the possible material losses or other adverse effects? To give a correct answer to these questions, one should evidently examine the concept of convertible currencies and the mechanism of their operation under capitalism (however paradoxical that may seem) with its laws of market regulation. A knowledge of the weak and strong points of this or that economic instrument used in the opposite economic system can to some extent serve as a "pointer" in its use in our economic mechanism, which requires organic unity of plan and market.

In the broad sense of the word, currency convertibility means that the currency of a given country can be exchanged (converted) into the currencies of other countries in accordance with the existing exchange rate. In capitalist practice the criterion of convertibility is the degree of

exchange restrictions or their total absence. Thus, currencies can be fully convertible, partially convertible and inconvertible. A currency is regarded as fully convertible if the country's legislation allows its free and unlimited exchange (without any special permits) into any other currencies and its export to any other countries for all categories of holders and all types of operations. If the state or its authorised organ controls and restricts the bulk of operations in the exchange, import and export of foreign and national currency, then the latter is inconvertible.

In 1976, as a result of a massive renunciation of the fixed-parity system, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) excluded the definition of "convertible currency" from the new edition of the Articles of Agreement. It introduced a new concept, "freely usable currency", which means a national currency which is being widely used in international settlements and operations on the leading exchange markets. By 1986, the IMF had declared the US dollar, the FRG mark, the Japanese yen, the pound sterling, and the French franc to be freely usable currencies. However, the term "convertible currency" is still being used in practice and so also in specialised literature.

Present-day capitalism needs convertible currencies in view of the vigorous transnationalisation of its economy, and also in view of the largely cyclical character of its development, as expressed in crises of overproduction, which often take the form of major economic slumps. As capitalist experience shows, states cannot make their national currencies convertible simply by wishing to do so. There are binding conditions, whose observance is absolutely necessary for the normal operation of the convertibility mechanism. This primarily applies to countries which intend to use their currency as an international means of payment.

First, such countries should have a sufficiently high level of commodity convertibility, so as to be able to meet the demand for actual material goods and services without interruption, at any time and in any quantities required by the holders of the given currency. Only then will these holders accept that convertible currency by way of payment, keep it on bank accounts and use it in international settlements. For the owners of a currency, its broad commodity convertibility is an economic guarantee of its trustworthiness. In the capitalist world, such a guarantee can naturally be given only by the leading economic powers, which have something in the nature of two economies: a national economy and what one might call a second, external economy, which they use in their own interests through a network of enterprises in other countries run by transnational corporations (TNCs). Thus, by the early 1980s, US production abroad was five times as high as US exports proper, that of Japan was 40 per cent higher than its exports, and that of Western Europe, more than a quarter higher.²

Second, countries which intend to use their national currency as an instrument of international settlements should maintain a high level of its convertibility into other currencies. Thus, the holder of their currency should be able freely to exchange it at his own discretion for any other currencies. In other words, he should be confident that if he is unable, for some reason, to convert it into goods and services in the country, he will be guaranteed its free exchange into other currencies, enabling him to obtain the required material equivalent on another market. And this means that in order to create a currency convertibility mechanism the state should possess not only commodity reserves, but also more or less sizeable reserves of foreign currency, because, Marx emphasised, that money and commodities must "always remain convertible into one another".³

Third, if a national currency is to remain convertible, it should have a realistic and relatively stable exchange rate. Its holders should be guaranteed against a sharp depreciation of their currency holdings,

against material losses as the result of a decline in the currency's exchange rate. Real economic benefits in this case are to be derived from a currency which is not simply convertible, but which is being widely used in international settlements, i. e., a reserve currency like the US dollar.

Fourth, a point to bear in mind is that under the non-plan capitalist economy, currency convertibility is also fraught, as a rule, with serious adverse effects. These are usually connected with the need to accumulate sizeable gold and currency reserves and periodically to sell out a part of these reserves in order to keep the currency's exchange rate within the established limits. As the outlook on the money market changes, the terms of sale are often unfavourable. Thus, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the US government sought to maintain the dollar's exchange rate by selling large amounts of gold at the existing official price of \$35 an ounce. With the same aim in view, the US administration began accumulating foreign currency reserves, whereas in the past the USA had no need of such reserves and did not build them up.

Much of what can be gathered from capitalist experience proves that it is inexpedient to use the national currencies of capitalist states as the only means of international settlements. Specialists point to the ever more obvious lack of correspondence between national currencies and the international nature of global economic relations. Attention is drawn to the fact that the exchange rates of national currencies are much too sensitive in responding to changes in world economics, politics and diplomacy. That is seen as fresh proof of the existing view that national currencies, however convertible, cannot function as world money. Hence the quest for an intrinsically international means of payment, whose role is now performed and will apparently be performed for a long time to come by the US dollar.

The EEC countries and the CMEA member states have taken different ways in shaping their currency systems. In the postwar period, the capitalist countries advanced from clearing and use of mutually convertible national currencies to parallel use alongside the latter of collective currency units, with the ultimate aim of converting these into regional or even world credit money. As for the CMEA countries, in the early 1960s they went right over from the postwar clearing system of mutual settlements to the use of a collective currency, introducing the transfer rubles as their international currency unit. So, in that sphere the CMEA countries in effect missed out the intermediate stage of mutually convertible national currencies, creating a one-currency system to service credit and settlements operations in trade and economic relations in the CMEA region.

Was that a mistake? After all, a collective currency is theoretically conceivable only as a logical result of highly developed and all round economic integration between the cooperating countries. If there is no such integration, the same theory requires an intermediate stage in the course of which the trade and economic relations between the countries involved would be serviced by mutually convertible national currencies. Such is the dialectics of the movement towards international credit money: from fuller use of all the functions of the national currencies, which come to play an international role, to the formation of a collective currency proper. In accordance with such logic, the road travelled by the CMEA countries, which "skipped" that intermediate stage, could be regarded as erroneous. In this case, however, it is the formal approach to the history of the CMEA countries' currency system that should be seen as erroneous.

The point is that in the early 1960s, when the socialist countries established their collective currency, they had no alternative. There was

no question of a choice between a multicurrency and a one-currency system. That was a period when many CMEA countries got down to reforming their economic mechanisms, aiming, in particular, to bring these into fuller accord with their national peculiarities. Each country was in quest of its own forms and original economic solutions, which, in turn, led to significant differences in the structures of the economic mechanisms. The differences were particularly pronounced in their domestic price-formation systems, which was bound to deepen the distinctions between price proportions in the CMEA countries. In that period, these proportions differed significantly from the proportions both of world capitalist prices and of the contractual prices that had already taken shape in the CMEA countries' mutual trade.

Under these objective conditions of economic exchange, use of national currencies as a standard of value and means of payment on the international socialist market would have considerably complicated price formation and the centralised regulation of the credit and payments systems. It was then believed in the CMEA region that full equality among the partners, their equivalent and mutually advantageous international economic exchange could only be ensured, in principle, by prices representing international value and by a collective currency based on that value.

When CMEA analysts speak of the one-currency system of international settlements and of the need to supplement it with settlements in national currencies, which would amount to a multicurrency system, they mean the sphere of the trade and economic turnover. There is yet another sphere of international ties, called the non-commercial turnover. Monetary operations in that sphere service political, scientific and cultural ties between states, their institutions and individual citizens. In that sphere of the money turnover, CMEA currencies have long been convertible, so that the task of making them convertible does not arise.

For individual citizens of the CMEA countries, convertibility of their national currencies in that sphere is still limited. It is mostly limited by factors relating to the quantity and quality of the goods and services which a given country can offer to foreign citizens: providing them with hotels, camping sites, goods sold in retail shops, and various services. As the necessary prerequisites are created, the CMEA countries will be able to meet domestic demand to a fuller extent. It will then be possible gradually to lift both currency and commodity restrictions, so that the convertibility of national currencies in the sphere of the non commercial turnover will become full and unlimited.

The very concept of the convertibility of the CMEA countries' national currencies was formulated by the CMEA's Standing Commission on monetary-financial matters back in the early 1970s. Convertibility is defined as the possibility of exchanging, on certain terms, sums of money received as a result of trade, non-commercial and other operations and expressed in the currency (collective or national) into equivalent sums in other currencies in accordance with mutually agreed exchange rates or coefficients. It was also emphasised that in order to spell out the currency convertibility concept under the planned socialist economic system, balanced economic cooperation among the CMEA countries, and government foreign-trade and currency monopoly, one should start from a number of basic propositions, according to which the convertibility of socialist currencies is essentially different from capitalist convertibility and cannot exert an independent regulating influence on currency, trade and production ties. The purposes of using convertible national currencies in CMEA trade are directly connected with the reasons for making them convertible. At the present stage of socialist economic integration, these reasons include the need for more efficient monetary-financial servicing of new and progressive forms of economic cooperation. Among these are,

in the first place, development of direct ties between production collectives and scientific and technical organisations, and broader activity of joint enterprises.

All these areas of economic cooperation require day-to-day decision-making in economic matters and adequate financial backing of the decisions taken. Now that the production collectives themselves are the active subjects of the socialist division of labour and enter into direct ties among themselves, there is an objective need for them to settle their accounts in their own mutually convertible national currencies. This will enable economic organisations to settle their accounts with their partners directly and without delay, and also to assess the efficiency and profitability of their operations. It will also make it possible to increase the volume of non-quota commodity exchange between the CMEA countries through the purchase of some types of goods and services on their domestic markets.

The initial steps have been taken towards a practical system of settlements in convertible national currencies. In 1987, bilateral interbank agreements on the use of national currencies within the framework of direct ties were signed between the USSR and Bulgaria, the USSR and Mongolia, and the USSR and Czechoslovakia. A specific feature of that kind of convertibility is that it does not rule out, but supplements the system of settlements in transferable rubles. Settlements connected with mutual trade are to be mostly serviced, as before, in a centralised way, through the International Bank for Economic Cooperation (in transferable rubles), while payments in national currencies will only supplement the transferable-ruble system wherever this is economically expedient. Economic organisations are entitled to an independent choice of the form of settlements (in national currencies or in transfer rubles), depending on the concrete circumstances.

In order to ensure equal use of national currencies in mutual settlements between banks, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Mongolia and Czechoslovakia have agreed to pay for exports in the currency of the exporter, and for imports, in the currency of the importer. This means that when, for instance, a Soviet enterprise sells a batch of goods to its Bulgarian partner, it will be paid by the latter in Soviet rubles. And when, on the contrary, it buys a batch of goods from its Bulgarian partner, it will have to pay for these in Bulgarian leva. The transition by these countries in certain types of operations to the practical use of their national currencies in mutual settlements should make it clear how widely and efficiently it is possible to use such a category as currency convertibility in the trade and economic turnover under the planned socialist economy.

There is hardly any doubt now, however, that a crucial condition of success in that innovation is full commodity backing of the currency declared to be convertible by its issuer-state. Without that, it will be very difficult to correct the existing imbalances in mutual trade. Evidently, it is necessary to recognise one indisputable fact: a convertible currency can realise itself as such only when its "conversion" into commodities is guaranteed, since money which cannot buy the necessary goods is of no interest to any business partner. A currency should have real backing, as it is evident, incidentally, from the example of the USA, which at one time used gold (for central banks), as well as goods to guarantee the dollar's convertibility.

To ensure the normal convertibility of national currencies under a planned economy, it is also important to create conditions for a free movement of goods, services, manpower and other production factors between our countries. That is primarily dictated by the mounting qualitative changes in socialist integration, as economic-calculus (*khozraschyot*) enterprises and associations operating on the principles of economic incentive and competitiveness become its active participants.

If that process gathers momentum, prerequisites could eventually emerge for the formation of a common international market of the CMEA countries. In that case, their domestic markets could develop more intensively, mostly through the use of such forms as wholesale trade in the means of production, measures enabling foreign enterprises to buy goods on the domestic market, and a corresponding extension of the possibilities for a free purchase at the banks of the partner-countries of the latter's national currencies. Tighter connections between domestic and world prices and approximation of the currency regimes and customs rules of different countries could also help to develop national markets. Naturally, formation of a common market of the CMEA countries and introduction of broad mutual convertibility of their national currencies and the transferable ruble primarily call for internal prerequisites, including an improvement of the planning and management system in the USSR and other CMEA countries, a reform in price formation, more efficient credit and financial instruments, etc. With the same aim in view, the socialist countries should consider the question of setting up their own international money market, where national and collective banking institutions could perform credit, settlements and conversion operations with national currencies, using exchange quotations taking shape in the market.

So, development of the convertibility of socialist currencies (even within the CMEA framework) is a complicated and multifaceted problem. Apart from the factors listed above, its practical solution requires a number of other conditions in production, distribution and exchange, including a resolution of the contradictions between plan and market both on a national and an international level, adequate interaction of national economic mechanisms, and harmonisation of currency and customs legislation.

The problem of convertibility of socialist currencies into capitalist ones is even more complicated. Its solution has a temporal aspect: a short, medium and long-term perspective. One should think that over the short term there will be no economic conditions for making the Soviet ruble or the currencies of other CMEA countries (at any rate, most of these) broadly convertible into capitalist currencies. But that does not apparently rule out the possibility that under certain conditions this or that socialist country will introduce limited convertibility of its national currency into the currencies of non-socialist countries in accordance with the tasks of developing external economic ties and the requirements of monetary-financial policy.

One of the binding conditions for the convertibility of socialist currency into capitalist currency is vigorous development of economic ties between the two socio-economic systems. Such ties open up a steady source of foreign exchange and help to form foreign-exchange reserves necessary for the normal functioning of the convertibility mechanism. Such a mechanism implies uninterrupted exchange of a given socialist currency into dollars, FRG marks, Japanese yen and other convertible currencies.

Meanwhile, not all the socialist countries have such a level of economic relations with capitalist states. The Soviet Union, for instance, now accounts for over 20 per cent of world industrial production, whereas its share in international trade, say, in 1986 did not exceed 4 per cent of the total turnover. This not only indicates limited supply or even a shortage of competitive goods in the USSR, but also shows that many of the goods produced in it are consumed within its own vast economy. Moreover, the Soviet Union is actively involved in socialist economic integration and meets its CMEA partners' import requirements for basic goods and re-

sources to a considerable extent, which also serves to reduce the commodity potential that could be realised in the world market for convertible capitalist currency. The US drive to politicise virtually all international economic ties is another essential factor which continues to hold back the development of the USSR's trade and economic ties with a number of capitalist states.

Some other socialist countries have more developed external economic ties with capitalist states than those of the USSR. But that is far from sufficient for making socialist currency convertible into capitalist currency. It is important to produce ever more high-quality goods which would be competitive in the world market. Naturally, the capitalist partner can be interested not in convertible socialist currency as such, but in the concrete goods that can be bought with it.

That is why it is necessary to improve the structure of the socialist countries' exports and imports, for not all of the countries now have a favourable structure. Thus, fuel, raw materials and downstream products still prevail in Soviet exports, and high-technology and consumer goods, in Soviet imports. Such an export structure does not correspond to the general patterns of demand on the world market, with its steady tendency to an increase in the share of the manufacturing industry. Manufactures now account for roughly 70 per cent of world trade, engineering products, in particular, come to about 30 per cent, and by the year 2000 are expected to exceed 35 per cent. In Soviet exports, however, machinery and equipment have over the past few years come to no more than 15 per cent, while raw materials have accounted for over 60 per cent, with energy-bearing materials constituting nearly one-half of the country's total commodity exports.

In these conditions, a convertible ruble, which implies convertibility into goods, would naturally serve to worsen rather than improve the structure of Soviet exports and imports. After all, importers holding the convertible ruble would primarily seek to redeem it for fuel and raw materials, since Soviet exporters cannot as yet provide sufficient amounts of other competitive products. So, the USSR would be obliged to produce ever more fuel and raw materials for export in order to ensure the ruble's uninterrupted convertibility into material values.

Some find it paradoxical that the ruble of tsarist Russia was convertible, while the currency of the USSR, whose potential far exceeds the "value" of the Russian empire, does not as yet have the necessary conditions for that. But the paradox is a false one. True, the currency of Russia, a country with medium-developed capitalism, was convertible. But one should bear in mind here at least three circumstances. First, the ruble was convertible when Russia had a gold standard. This means that the ruble could buy not only conventional commodities, but also gold, a specific commodity which served as a solid economic guarantee of the ruble's convertibility. Second, Russia was a part of the world capitalist economic system, whose other participants had convertible currencies as well. And since in Russia, with its market economy, there were no restrictions on the movement of goods or capital, and domestic price formation was also of the market type, the convertible ruble was well in accord with world capitalist practice at that time. Third, although Russia maintained a steady exchange rate of the ruble relative to foreign currencies, that was primarily done by attracting foreign capital to the country.

The convertibility of national socialist currency into capitalist currency will apparently be effected step by step. It is just as important to ensure the convertibility of the CMFA countries' collective currency (the transfer ruble) into capitalist currencies. The collective currency rests on the common and most significant economic potential of the socialist communities. However, bearing in mind the objective economic difficulties

and the problems of economic restructuring that face our countries, for the time being it can only be a matter of partial (intermediate) forms of the transferable ruble's convertibility into capitalist currencies. In the immediate future, these temporary forms could function within the CMEA framework alongside the existing transferable ruble. It will take time for the varieties of the transfer ruble to merge together into a qualitatively new collective socialist currency, readily convertible into hard capitalist currencies.

To introduce such convertibility, the CMEA countries will apparently have to carry out a package of interconnected measures in order to ensure the equivalence of the money turnover in their convertible collective currency. Under socialism, it is also important to ensure stability of mutual credit and settlements, their balanced regulation. Another important point is to prevent any possible disruptions in the convertibility mechanism under the impact of crisis phenomena in the global capitalist currency system, and also any discrimination on the part of imperialism. The convertibility mechanism should ultimately help to strengthen the collective currency and increase its role.

In view of the importance of the CMEA countries' collective currency and its convertibility into hard capitalist currencies, it could in future be necessary to set up a monetary union of the socialist community states. Such a union would formalise in organisational and juridical terms an international monetary-financial system which would be qualitatively distinct from their present system. It would no longer be a one-currency, but a truly multicurrency system, based on simultaneous use within the CMEA and in the CMEA countries' relations with third states both of their convertible collective currency and convertible national currencies.

As a result, three spheres of currency convertibility would be in operation, and this would necessitate their mutual dovetailing, juridical formalisation and concerted collective action by the CMEA states. All of that could be realised through the above-mentioned monetary union, whose rules would list the socialist countries' rights and duties in ensuring the smooth operation of their common multicurrency system and its stability.

Convertibility of socialist currency into hard capitalist currencies cannot, of course, rule out a possible adverse effect of such convertibility on the planned economy of the CMEA countries. Once their currency enters the spontaneous money turnover of the world capitalist market, it will have to adjust to that turnover, just as today the socialist countries are obliged to adjust to the economic mechanism of the world market as a whole. There is no doubt, however, that their currency monopoly will enable them to control the convertibility of their currencies, both national and collective.

The problem of convertible socialist currency has a definite political, as well as an economic dimension. The socialist countries have tackled the complicated problems of renewing their national economic mechanisms and reconsidering their habitual and seemingly abiding concepts, categories and economic methods in a far from simple, contradictory external political situation. Although the idea of an integral and interdependent world meets with ever wider recognition, far from all have come to terms with it: there are still many attempts to politicise and ideologise world economic relations, to turn them into yet another instrument of confrontation. That approach is outdated and holds no promise.

¹ *Правда*, Oct 14, 1987.

² *Мировая экономика и международные отношения*, No 7, 1987, p. 24.

³ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1986, p. 88.

THE QUEST FOR ALTERNATIVES

Andrei ZAGORSKY

The state of affairs in Europe will be undoubtedly influenced by the position taken by the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) on major political problems. The SPD has a wealth of positive experience in promoting European detente. In the early 1970s, it played a prominent part in normalising the FRG's relations with European socialist states by recognising post-war realities on the continent. Willy Brandt, who headed the party for almost 25 years, is the Chairman of the Socialist International.

But as the world situation grew more tense at the turn of the 1980s, militaristic overtones were increasingly discernable in the policy of the SPD leadership, which was then in power in the FRG. This is in the situation when among the West German population, including the social democratic masses, there was a growing concern over the hopeless course for escalating the arms race and East-West confrontation. The new sentiments, which reached the SPD as well, were clearly displayed in the resolute opposition to the deployment of US medium-range missiles in the FRG, expressed at the social democratic congress held in November 1983 in Cologne.

The statements and official documents issued by the SPD, and the decisions adopted at its congresses in the 1980s have demonstrated that the approach of West German Social Democrats to pressing international problems was increasingly marked by realism and common sense. At present, the SPD supports practical disarmament measures; it demands that the government consider Soviet peace initiatives in a positive way and back up the idea of clearing Europe of nuclear weapons.

The leadership of the party has unambiguously approved the results of the Washington meeting of the CC CPSU General Secretary and the US President who have signed a treaty on the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles.

Rejecting plans for the militarisation of space (SDI), the Social Democrats demand that any agreements signed by the government with the USA on the FRG's participation in this militaristic programme be dissolved and insist on a strict observance of the Soviet-American ABM Treaty.

Nuclear disarmament, in the opinion of the Social Democrats, must be followed by a reduction in conventional means of destruction, and not by their buildup, as it is demanded by the militarist quarters of the FRG and NATO. The SPD believes that it is time an agreement be signed between the member countries of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty on the non-use of force and that the North Atlantic alliance give up the nuclear first-strike concept. The party also demands a general and complete ban on chemical weapons. The Social Democrats believe that the creation of a zone free from chemical weapons in Central Europe and the renouncement of improving chemical weapons both in the East and in the West would be useful measures to that end.

As we all know, the value of any political statement is tested by practical deeds. It is evident, at the same time, that the policy-making state-

ments by the SPD and the broad discussion of international security questions going on in the party in recent years reflect deep-going processes of reassessment by the Social Democrats of the principles of their foreign policy. The SPD has also made some practical steps to back up its statements, though, not being in power at present, it has no possibility of giving effect to its slogans and demands.

It is hard to tell now, of course, what the ultimate results of the search by the West German Social Democrats for a new credo in foreign policy will be. Despite the substantial difference in the guidelines mapped out by party congresses in recent years, as compared with the preceding decade, the official documents of the SPD do not allow one to make a clear forecast in this regard. A good deal here will depend on the alignment of forces within the party and on external factors, above all on the level reached by the public and the anti-war movement in the FRG, which is prodding the Social Democrats to search for a new philosophy of security.

Many SPD members spoke for a renewal of the party's foreign policy even before it became oppositional in October 1982. Upon leaving the government, the SPD was free to raise international security questions more squarely. At their Cologne forum in November 1983, the Social Democrats did not merely say "No" to US Pershings and cruise missiles. The congress decisions included the main conclusion made by the "new strategies" group. The task of preventing war, it said, demands above all a "departure from the policy and strategy of nuclear confrontation pushing the arms race to an ever more dangerous level. It should give way to a policy and strategy of partnership in security matters, taking into account the fact that today the nations can ensure their survival not at the expense of each other but only through joint efforts".¹

At the next two party congresses—in Essen (May 1984) and in Nuremberg (August 1986)—the concept of "partnership in security matters", proposed at the Cologne congress, was further elaborated. (A number of its provisions are yet to be specified, and there is no unanimity in interpreting certain new slogans which have been included in the policy-making documents of the SPD. Their contradictory and compromising character is admitted by the Social Democrats themselves). The Social Democrats oppose NATO's "nuclear deterrence" strategy with the term "partnership in security matters" (which is often used as a synonym to "equal" or "common" security). In the draft of the new programme of SPD principles, advanced at the Nuremberg congress, the delegates openly demanded a rejection of the former policy of Western countries. "We want to replace nuclear deterrence by common security,"² the draft stated.

The revision of the SPD's conceptual approach to international affairs began, in fact, with the criticism of NATO's deterrence strategy. According to Egon Bahr, the party's main theorist in international affairs, this strategy of NATO is the continuation of power politics in the nuclear age. It inherited from the past the traditional way of thinking a country's security can allegedly be ensured only to the prejudice of the interests of one's partners in international relations. Those feel secure who have greater military might. But nuclear weapons radically changed the situation, Bahr declared. "We live," he said, "in the age of mutually guaranteed destruction. This means that he who shoots first will die second, and there is no more hope for victory."³ The development of military technology, and with it the possibility of universal destruction, insistently demands that people's way of thinking be changed, he says.

The nuclear deterrence strategy is criticised in the SPD from different points of view, including the point of view on the historically proved futility of attempts to lead in the arms race, even for some time, in order

to dictate one's will to a rival, or at least to exhaust him economically. "Technologically, there is no way to achieve a breakthrough which the Russians could not achieve as well," warned former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. "It is a mistake, an underrating of the psychological power innate in the Russian people, to believe that they could not stand up to an economic race of attrition. The Soviet Union will maintain its equality. Since this is so it would be better if both sides understood that it is to their mutual advantage to reach an arms control agreement."⁴ The continuous improvement of weapons of deterrence, the ex-Chancellor noted, is ruinous for the Western countries themselves, because it deforms their social and economic development.

Every new round in the development of military technology, the Social Democrats point out, makes it still harder to keep armaments under control. The solution of the war and peace issue is being increasingly shifted onto computers, which bring into play an unheard-of potential for overkill. "Man is excluded from the process... and becomes a slave to machines which dictate him when to push the button, including cases when machines are mistaken," stated Egon Bahr.⁵

Emphasising this danger, the Nuremberg congress of the SPD had this to say in its resolution: "The East-West conflict cannot be resolved through a military conflict. Nuclear deterrence is incapable of staving off nuclear war for long. New breakthroughs in military technology jeopardise stability in the area of security and are a waste of the resources vital to the peoples."⁶ This explains why the Social Democrats have come out to oppose NATO's nuclear deterrence, which only perpetuates a balance of terror, with their "partnership in security matters" formula and seek a new philosophy of security which would deliver mankind from the reckless stockpiling of weapons. If it is true that security can only be common, they reason, then the potential enemy should be recognised as a partner in ensuring one's own security. We cannot demand for ourselves greater rights than those we are prepared to recognise for others. One should consider the legitimate interests of the security of his partners. Consequently, security can be achieved solely by political means.

"War would destroy the basis of existence. Europeans in the West and the East have a common threat, and they can maintain security only through joint efforts.... One's own security inevitably presupposes security for others. Though their political systems are opposite, the states involved in the East-West conflict should mutually admit their elementary interests of security. Attempts to achieve peace through technical means are reckless for they only create an additional threat to peace. Peace is a political goal,"⁷ the Nuremberg congress declared.

One cannot fail to note that these ideas of the SPD are consonant with the principles of new political thinking advanced by the 27th Congress of the CPSU and consistently implemented by the party in its international activities. As we see it, different political forces today arrive, each in its own way, proceeding from the objective realities of our time, at the conclusion that it is impossible to win the arms race and a nuclear war or to base security on a doctrine of deterrence. They recognise the need to consider the interests of the partners in international relations, and to build the edifice of universal and equal security by political, and not military, means.

But the awareness of the existing realities does not in the least mean that each of these political trends should renounce its own ideological principles. Certain politicians in the FRG have not abandoned the hope that European detente will open the way for a "convergence" of the two different social systems which, they expect, will allow to demonstrate the advantages of the capitalist system not in the arms race but in a peaceful competition with socialism.

It is most important that the West German Social Democrats have agreed that the difference in ideologies cannot be a barrier to accomplishing the common task of preventing nuclear war. The recognition of the supreme priority of safeguarding peace, irrespective of existing differences, is the main positive result of the discussion conducted in the SPD on ways of renovating its foreign policy. This offers Social Democrats real possibilities for discarding former stereotypes of hostility and joining the processes of asserting new political thinking.

The concept of "partnership in security matters", being developed by SPD theorists, implies a cardinal change in the entire system of international relations in Europe. A number of social democratic analysts have declared it to be a long-term goal of building a system of collective security which would replace the present division of the continent into opposing military-political alliances. This requires promotion of broad economic, scientific, technological and cultural cooperation among all European countries. The urgent need, however, to offer a reasonable alternative to NATO's policy of nuclear deterrence focuses the SPD's attention on problems of lessening military danger, reducing conventional arms in Europe, and making an assessment of the alignment of forces of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty.

Thus, the Essen congress of the party issued a call for a "realistic analysis of the existing threat".⁸ "Self-delusion by a superiority of the Warsaw Treaty in conventional arms is a major obstacle to reassessing the policy of security. That is why the criticism of NATO's analysis of the existing threat is not merely a desire to insist that one is right—it is a political necessity,"⁹ said retired Brigadier-General C. Krause, an associate of the Ebert Fund which has close ties with the SPD.

Quite a few Social Democrats, including C. Krause and A. von Bülow, former parliamentary high-ranking official of the FRG Ministry of Defence, have contributed to the exposure of NATO propaganda stories about a "vulnerability" in the North Atlantic alliance. In a much-talked-of study (published in the autumn of 1984) of the NATO and Warsaw Treaty military potential A. von Bülow said, in part: "The Soviet Union possesses great might, but it is not strong enough either in conventional or nuclear aspects to expect to gain some advantage as a result of military actions so long as... the NATO alliance exists."¹⁰ This publication by a prominent West German analyst evoked a controversial response in the SPD, which again demonstrated with what difficulty new thinking is making its way in the FRG, especially when it comes to the axioms of the military policy of the West, which had long seemed unshakable. Incidentally, some experts of the SPD continue to talk about an alleged Soviet offensive military doctrine.

But, on the whole, the SPD has not been unaffected by the animated, and at times stormy, debate in the party. "The social democratic policy of security proceeds from the premise that the Soviet Union will not strive for war in Europe and is therefore greatly interested in arms control measures and disarmament," says the "new strategy" commission of the Baden-Württemberg Land organisation in its documents.¹¹ Positive effects became clearly obvious when the SPD actively joined the debate on practical ways of creating a "non-offensive defence" which does not envisage anyone's deterrence.

"We want a structural incapability for attack," stressed the Nuremberg congress of the SPD. This would require not only that armed forces be really "incapable of conducting an offensive deep into the enemy territory", but also a corresponding "political climate and a policy void of the images of an enemy, of irrational ideas of an existing threat, and of an inclination for settling conflicts by force".¹²

That congress also advanced several principles for changing the NATO strategy in order to render the military potential of the Atlantic alliance "structurally incapable for attack". The character of the NATO armed forces, according to these principles, should not cause any doubt that these forces are meant exclusively for defence; they should be built on the sufficiency principle and not alarm the Eastern neighbours of the FRG; defence spending should not use up the resources required for maintaining economic and social stability; the strategy and structure of the NATO armed forces should be designed with a view to possible reductions of military potentials in Europe. These are the main principles in brief.

Parallel with quantitative reductions of the armed forces and armaments in Europe, the social democratic champions of "non-offensive defence" emphasise a change in the structure, composition and deployment of the armed forces so that neither side would be able to launch an aggression even theoretically, remaining at the same time confident in the reliability of one's own defence.

In his proposals on Bundeswehr development (September 1985) A. von Bülow recommends giving up reliance on tank formations. His defence concept is based on creating a strip of anti-tank barriers along the frontier between the FRG and the GDR, while the armour will play merely the part of operative reserve.¹³ If the Bundeswehr in general would perform a purely defensive function, this would make it possible, in his opinion, to drastically cut its numerical strength in peacetime.

Of course, this and other versions of "non-offensive defence" suggested by the Social Democrats require more detailed analysis and explanation. Suffice it to say that in his concept, A. von Bülow proceeds from the possibility of preserving tactical nuclear arms, even if at a "minimum level". One can discern in the SPD proposals a danger of a further buildup of conventional weapons. At least this is how one can interpret the following thesis of A. von Bülow: "The military missions traditionally given to short- and medium-range nuclear weapons... should now be given to conventional arms."¹⁴ But this is precisely the pretext used by the militarist quarters of NATO and the FRG as they insist today on strengthening the armed forces of the alliance by a new generation of "classical" (that is, conventional) means of mass destruction which differ little from tactical nuclear weapons in their characteristics and functions.

Other provisions of the "non-offensive defence" concept, too, call for criticism, mainly due to the difficulty in defining "purely defensive" types of armaments and a "purely non offensive" structure of the armed forces. And still, the search of the West German supporters of the slogan "structural incapability for attack", which is consonant with the concept of reasonable sufficiency in the military sphere advanced by the socialist countries, should be, in our opinion, duly appreciated.

The picture of the debate on international security would be incomplete, unless yet another aspect is taken into account—the attitude of the Social Democrats to the slogan of a so-called self-assertion of Western Europe. The interest in this concept is quite understandable. It is accounted for by two objectively existing, though different, factors. On the one hand, there is the newly emerging tendency of the diminishing role of Western Europe in the world economy and politics. On the other, there is an intensive growth within the region of economic and political integration processes stimulating the enhancement of the weight of a "united" Western Europe, acting as a relatively independent centre of world politics which is free to a greater extent than before from the tutelage of the "senior" partner in NATO.

However, during the SPD debate on ways of West European "self-assertion", the outdated stereotypes of military might allegedly determining the weight of a state or a group of states on the international scene still made themselves felt. For instance, Horst Ehmke came up with the theory that "America should recognise Europeans to be a truly equal partner in the alliance and resist the temptation of turning Western Europe into an instrument of its great-power policy", and called on the countries of the region to assume a greater burden of responsibility for the "defence of Europe".

Now that Franco-West German military-political cooperation is expanding, the activities of the Western European Union are intensified and projects of Anglo-French "nuclear guarantees" are emerging (if not instead of, then in addition to the American "nuclear umbrella"), some Social Democrats even raise the question of giving Bonn the right of veto in these matters. Such moves obviously run counter to the demands of SPD members to place the "self-assertion" of Western Europe into the context of the policy of detente and "partnership in security matters". It is quite evident that if "self-assertion" develops in the direction of further expanding military cooperation among West European states, then many sensible ideas of the Social Democrats about lessening military confrontation in Europe will be reduced to naught. Therefore, a number of prominent SPD leaders deem it necessary to base the "self-assertion" of Western Europe not on spurring the arms race, but on the main task—elimination of the threat of a new war. Egon Bahr, for instance, associates the "self-assertion" of Western Europe with the prospect of peaceful international competition, with its (Western Europe's) reliance on economic might and also on the ability for innovation in science and technology.¹⁵

Though most West German Social Democrats stand up for preserving in the foreseeable future the military alliances of European states and for the FRG's remaining in NATO, the SPD policy-making documents admit that the interests of the partners in the North Atlantic Alliance—the USA and West European countries—are not the same. Membership in NATO can satisfy the Federal Republic only if it will be able to uphold its national security interests within the alliance, the Nuremberg congress declared.

However, the Social Democrats expressed a fairly broad range of opinion on the issue: from the alleged need of Western Europe to continue relying on US military might, to entirely giving up American "security guarantees" to the allies directly associated with going over from NATO's "deterrence" doctrine to "structural incapability for attack". Thus, K. Fuchs, a member of the Bundestag's disarmament commission, suggests a kind of a "positive" variant of the FRG's participation in NATO on the condition that the policy of the Atlantic alliance would change and the concept of "partnership in security matters" be advanced in its framework. This implies also preparedness, when necessary, to "end our (FRG) participation in those plans and military programmes of NATO and the USA which contradict the concept of general security".¹⁶

It is likely that the reform of NATO, proposed by the author, including a revision of its military strategy on principles of "non-offensive defence" can provide a real basis for pooling the efforts of the European NATO members for the "self-assertion" of Western Europe. Such a reform could also play a definite role in solving cardinal problems of European security and simultaneously enhance the international prestige of the countries in the region. All that has been said here is not, of course, intended to prompt the West German Social Democrats in what they should do. But so long as the FRG remains in NATO, one should bear in mind that any political party in power there would be faced with the choice—either to

acquiesce to NATO discipline, that is, to obey Washington, or to defend before the leader of the alliance its own idea of priorities in the policy of Western countries.

The SPD upholds its position on the key problems of foreign policy, including its new substantial elements, also in the process of cooperation with other Social Democratic and Socialist parties. It has established interaction on these issues with the British Labour Party, and a dialogue with the French Socialist Party is under way.

The SPD's contacts with the communist parties of European socialist states, including the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, are expanding, acquiring a new content. The projects of creating a zone free from chemical weapons and a nuclear-free corridor in Central Europe, designed jointly by the SPD and the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) have won broad international recognition. The first of these detailed proposals, which the members of the Social Democratic Bundestag faction had helped to formulate, acquired the status of a party decision at the Nuremberg congress in 1986. This is part of the practical deeds which the SPD has to its credit to date.

Contacts and relations between the SPD and the CPSU have been developing for several years now. In October 1987, a communique on the results of the joint activities of the CPSU-SPD working group was published in Bonn. Since June 1984 the group had been studying the possibilities of using part of the funds saved on arms reduction in the interest of developing countries. It was decided to submit the joint conclusions to the UN Secretary-General for their practical implementation. In future the group is planning to continue to study the relationship between disarmament and development and concentrate on the key problems of security, above all, European security.

The meeting of representatives of parties and movements, held in Moscow during the celebrations of the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, confirmed, despite the difference of views and assessments, their common striving for peace and the need for joint actions to safeguard it. It also showed that it is gradually becoming possible to establish a dialogue between Communists and Social Democrats, while each of these political trends would retain its independence and its own specifics.

All this is clear evidence of the usefulness of the gradually expanding international dialogue, during which the principles of new political thinking are filled with real and increasingly significant content. Only through the joint efforts of various political forces and through their growing cooperation on key issues of world and European development can the ideas of new thinking, throughout the world today, materialise in practical deeds. The current SPD discussions on problems of international politics show that the West German Social Democrats wish to find their own place in this process and join in the active creation of a new, nuclear-free and non-violent world.

It is necessary to settle the problems of the European continent such as security and cooperation in various fields taking into account the interests of each other. In this context nobody doubts the need to develop all-round relations between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany, to deepen and expand their political dialogue. There is no doubt that a major step taken by the sides to raise its efficiency was the official visit of USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to the FRG in January 1988, and the concrete accords to expand contacts and ties,

mutually beneficial business cooperation contributing to the strengthening of trust in Europe in general.

¹ Antrag 318. Friedens- und Sicherheitspolitik (angenommen).

² *Entwurf für ein neues Grundsatzprogramm der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands*, Bonn, 1986, p. 10.

³ E. Bahr, "Die wirkliche Chance in Genf. SDI, Sicherheitspartnerschaft und die Genfer Verhandlungen", *Konzepte zum Frieden. Vorschläge für eine neue Abrüstungs- und Entspannungspolitik der SPD* (henceforth *Konzepte zum Frieden...*), Berlin/West, 1985, p.10.

⁴ H. Schmidt, "Europe, the Superpowers and the Arms Race", *International Security and the Arms Race*, PSIS Occasional Papers, No. 2, December 1986, p. 38.

⁵ E. Bahr, *Op. cit.*, p. 16.

⁶ "Unser Weg zu Abrüstung und Frieden Beschluß zur Friedens- und Sicherheitspolitik der SPD". Parteitag in Nürnberg 25-29.8.1986 (henceforth "Unser Weg..."), No. 8, *Politik*, September 1986, p. 3.

⁷ "Unser Weg...", pp. 3, 5.

⁸ Antrag 259, Parteivorstand. Für eine neue Strategie des Bündnisses (angenommen).

⁹ C. Krause, "Konventionelle Überlegenheit als Argument der Sicherheitspolitik", *Die Neue Gesellschaft*, No. 7, 1986, p. 629.

¹⁰ A. von Bülow, *Alpträume West gegen Alpträume Ost Ein Beitrag zur Bedrohungsanalyse*, Bonn, 1984, p. 40.

¹¹ SPD Landesverband Baden-Württemberg. Kommission *Neue Strategien Arbeitspapiere zur aktuellen sicherheitspolitischen Diskussion*, No. 5, p. 3.

¹² "Unser Weg...", p. 4.

¹³ See A. von Bülow, *Strategie vertrauensschaffender Sicherheitsstrukturen in Europa Wege zur Sicherheitspartnerschaft Entwurf eines Antrags zur Sicherheitspolitik für den Bundesparteitag 1986*, Bonn, 1985, pp. 10-11.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 20, 21.

¹⁵ See *Der Spiegel*, No. 21, May 20, 1985, p. 127.

¹⁶ K. Fuchs, "Frieden ist möglich—durch Abrüstung und Entspannung", *Konzepte zum Frieden...*, p. 66.

ASEAN: A Political Palette of Many Colours

Valentin ANDREYEV

Last year the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) marked its 20th anniversary. This was an occasion for numerous statements by state and political figures, commentaries of the press within and outside the ASEAN countries which gave different, sometimes diametrically opposed assessments of the results of the activities of this organisation and the perspectives of its further development. Western press which for years has advertised the member states of the association as a model for the development of other states spares no praise for them. Thus, *The Financial Times* of London, while noting the high rates of industrial development of ASEAN countries and the fact that the association has become a considerable factor in the international arena, expresses the view that it has passed the test of maturity and by the end of the century it would enter the age of prosperity. Much more modest comments are made in ASEAN countries themselves where the results achieved in different spheres of cooperation are estimated more realistically, and the considerable difficulties which they encounter now and which are in store for them in the future are recognised. One of the leading Indonesian political analysts Soedjati Djiwandono believes that a "jol of work needs to be done to raise the effectiveness of ASEAN. Prejudices and shortsightedness interpreted through national interests should be discarded. Serious efforts should be made to develop more extensive and intensive cooperation within ASEAN". There are other views on the subject as well. In a word, the vision of the past, present and future of ASEAN is far from homogeneous, which has quite good reasons.

The association consisting of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand (in 1984 Brunei was added to the list) was founded in August 1967 at the conference of foreign ministers in Bangkok and promulgated as its official aim the development of economic, social, cultural and other kinds of cooperation. It was underlined specifically that the sphere of economics was a priority direction of their cooperation.

It should be admitted that in the past years each member of the association has scored quite impressive, though far from identical, results in its economic development. Thus, from 1970 to 1982 the average annual industrial growth rate reached in Indonesia—13.4 per cent, Malaysia—10.6 per cent, the Philippines—6.6 per cent, Singapore—9.3 per cent, Thailand—9.9 per cent, which gave on average 10 per cent for the ASEAN members. During the 1960s and 1970s the aggregate industrial potential of the member states of the association has grown at least six to seven times. In some of them during that period the basis for medium and even heavy industry was laid. Indonesia, for example, has witnessed the development of not only the oil-refining and mining industries, but also of engineering, electronics, shipbuilding, auto-assembly and the first steps of nuclear power industry. On the whole, the per capita production of the manufacturing industry in the countries of ASEAN has grown 5.5 times during those years.

Foreign observers and economists while pointing at the noticeable changes in the economic development of the Six, note that they occurred mainly due to such factors as an extensive use of foreign capital and generally favourable conditions at that time for the traditional exports of those countries. However, the cooperation itself within the association has played a minor role in that process. In general opinion, it was very modest by its scope and negligible by its end results.

In analysing the reasons for relative setbacks in the field of trade and economic cooperation among the members of the association it should be pointed out that a substantial difference in the levels of their economic development is a major impediment to its development. It is not hard to see that the interests of, for instance, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines which in 1983 had an annual per capita income of \$575, \$770 and \$785 respectively, are far from identical with those of Singapore which has long ago joined the group of the so-called new industrialised states with its per capita income of about \$6,000. There are fears in Indonesia, which to all appearances are not groundless, that its economy can find itself defenceless in the face of cheaper products from Singapore as well as Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines that have higher economic indices than Indonesia. Due to that Jakarta cautiously views the idea of the ASEAN common market actively pursued by Singapore and Manila considering that the time for its establishment is not ripe yet. One can also see the effect of the similarity of structures of the national economies in which a considerable role is still played by agriculture and mining in spite of certain successes in industrialisation. Thus, Indonesia and Malaysia compete in the rubber, tin, copra and other markets. And, without doubt, the main obstacle in the implementation of the economic and social plans of the ASEAN countries lies in their considerable economic dependence on imperialist powers.

The scope of such dependence is evidenced by the following facts. US investments in the economy of the ASEAN countries total \$8,000 million. More than 5,000 American companies operate there and dominate in many sectors of their national economies. Thus, in Indonesia 19 US oil companies control 80 per cent of oil extraction in the country, and the USA accounts for 17 per cent of the ASEAN trade turnover.

Having invested in the economy of ASEAN countries more than \$10,000 million, the companies of the Country of the Rising Sun have successfully competed lately with the Americans more and more pushing them to the background; in 1983 the share of the Japanese companies in trade turnover of the Six reached 22.7 per cent.

In view of the strong anti-Japanese sentiment in ASEAN countries generated by Japan's trade and economic expansion and restoration of its military might, Tokyo acts more often than not under the pretext of rendering assistance and establishing genuinely equal cooperation. Almost every Japanese Premier of the recent years considered his duty to emphasise in his programme speech that ASEAN is assigned a priority place in the policy of Japan. These statements are backed as a rule by promises to extend new large easy-term credits to the members of the association. Such "charity" does not in the least deter the Japanese business from pumping billion profits out from them. Certain Japanese companies in Indonesia get profits ten times the invested capital.

In favourable conditions of the world economy close economic ties of the members of the association with the West, negative aspects of the injurious activities of foreign capital were somehow camouflaged. However, the crisis which in the early 1980s hit the world capitalist economy to which the Six are closely tied has highlighted these aspects. A slump in prices for oil, rubber and tin, which are staple exports of the ASEAN countries, has led to considerable decline of their export revenues. Thus,

in Indonesia oil and gas revenues alone dropped from \$19 billion in 1983 to \$12 billion in 1985/86 fiscal year. The situation is exacerbated by the huge external debt (Indonesia and the Philippines—about \$26 billion each, Malaysia—\$13 billion) and by protectionist policies of the United States and Japan that erect protectionist barriers on the way of exports of these countries. As a result, the members of the association in the 1980s had to sharply curtail national construction programmes, seek new loans and conduct the policy of "tightening belts" imposed by international banks and monopolies. The attempts to influence Western states so that they relax their protectionist measures, channel their capital to those sectors that are of most interest to the members of the association themselves and share high technology have brought, to put it mildly, quite modest results leading to sharp criticism of the West on the part of the Six.

The serious situation in which the countries of the association have found themselves in the beginning of 1980s also gave new ground for a self-critical appraisal of the low efficiency affecting intra-ASEAN trade and economic links as the factor which is weakening their dependence on imperialist powers and the whims of the world capitalist market. At the annual conference of the ASEAN foreign ministers held in Manila in June of 1986 President Corazon Aquino of the Philippines criticised the association for its inability to really consolidate intra-regional links in almost the two decades of its existence. She appealed to pass from words on desirability of cooperation to practical deeds.

The main goal of the association, that has been openly recognised today, was and still remains political cooperation. The first ASEAN summit was held on the island of Bali in 1976 during which the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in South East Asia and the Declaration of Concord formalising that aspect of cooperation were signed. At annual meetings of foreign ministers the members of the association coordinate their foreign policy, formulate common position for use in the United Nations, the non-alignment movement and other international forums.

Quite often the coordination of positions is not running smoothly due to the fact that the views of the ASEAN states on many problems and general world situation are far from identical. This was especially evident at the initial stage of association's existence when the consequences of the membership of some ASEAN states in Western military blocs were felt. This is true of Thailand and Singapore, which for a long time viewed the developments in South East Asia mostly through US eyes. Their foreign policy carried a considerable anti-Vietnamese as well as anti-Soviet charge and was oriented at the maximum weakening of Hanoi. After the victory of the peoples of Indochina Bangkok's and Singapore's policy of confrontation with Vietnam, Laos and later with Kampuchea has continued.

At the same time Malaysia and especially Indonesia as non-aligned countries attempted not to allow the association to slip down to bloc policies, to make its activities more versatile, independent and constructive. The fact that Kuala Lumpur's and Jakarta's assessment of the regional situation was to a large extent different had certain importance. Their foreign policy concepts were and still are based on the assumption that China poses the largest threat to the countries of South East Asia. Because of that, the Indonesian leadership has hitherto refrained from restoring diplomatic relations with China which were frozen in 1967. At the same time Jakarta keeps a suspicious eye on the Thai-Chinese rapprochement mostly based on "Kampuchean ground".

These differences and disputes, quite critical at times, have never assumed the pitch which would threaten the existence of the association. Each time they faded into the background being replaced by the main thing: the common apprehension as to the impact of political changes in the countries of Indochina on the situation in the region as a whole. In that sense the political analysts of the ASEAN countries consider the Kampuchean problem consolidating rather than undermining the unity of the association.

The United States of America has tried, and is still trying, to use differing orientation of the foreign policy of the ASEAN states to promote its policy in South East Asia. For the USA the association is not only a source of valuable raw materials but also an important market for its products and investments. Washington would like to use ASEAN as an efficient instrument of US policy in the strategically vital area of South East Asia where the Pacific Ocean meets the Indian Ocean, where the international sea routes lie and, finally, where the USA has the largest military bases in Asia. After their defeat in Indochina the Americans have attempted to restore their military and political presence in the region first and foremost with the help of ASEAN which they urged in every way possible to confrontation with the countries of Indochina and turning into a military bloc. It was reckoned that this process under the rising tensions would be running on "naturally smoothly and would not take much time". In Washington's opinion, the existence in several ASEAN countries of authoritarian regimes with strong anti-communist tint was a favourable precondition for that process.

Under the present US administration activity in South East Asia has sharply intensified. As the Secretary of State George Shultz admitted, this part of the Asian Pacific region with the growing "American security interests" attracted the strongest attention of official Washington. The significance of the association under its plans has increased correspondingly. The President says that ASEAN is the mainstay of the US policy in South East Asia. Certain pronouncements in the US press indicate that some people in Washington have up till recently viewed the ASEAN countries as a new area for deploying US forward-based forces and hoped to draw them into establishing a "broad Eastern front of confrontation with the Soviets".

To realise its plans Washington assisted by Tokyo and other allies has noticeably increased its economic, political and ideological pressure on the Six as well as resorted to military "aid". In the last decade alone the volume of the US military "aid" to the members of the association exceeded \$3 billion. It is meted out on a strictly measured scale depending on the loyalty of a partner. Up till recently Bangkok enjoyed greatest favours and was granted annually hundred millions of dollars for its military needs. At the same time Washington gradually paves the way for restoring its direct presence in Thailand. In this respect the Thai-American accord on storing US weapons on Thai territory had special importance.

One could not fail to mention as well that under pressure from the United States and their allies ASEAN has become more aggressive in its policy towards the countries of Indochina. The association's insistence on a unilateral withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchean territory and even on the elimination of the PRK as a precondition has practically blocked the road towards a political settlement of the Kampuchean problem. Parallel efforts of military, political and economic pressure on Vietnam aiming to force it to capitulate made the situation even more explosive and led it towards a deadend.

Against this background voices in support of endowing ASEAN with the functions of a military alliance and creating "new regional security" in South East Asia grew stronger and stronger within the association

itself. Simultaneously, bilateral and trilateral military cooperation within the association was expanding, taking new forms.

At the same time it should be admitted that on the whole the plans that the West had for ASEAN have fallen short of the mark. The association has managed to safeguard its unacceptance of the idea of being turned into a military bloc. With a small share of embellishment of the real state of affairs, *The Financial Times* wrote at the end of 1987, that while developing active bilateral cooperation in the field of security, ASEAN leaders were carefully ignoring the idea of the association acquiring the traits of an openly military alliance. And although some of ASEAN's "hawks" from time to time call for "closer military integration", their voices are drowned in the assurances of ASEAN leaders that the "way of a military alliance contradicts the spirit of ASEAN".

A sort of allergy to military alliances developed by the majority of the organisation's members was seen in their cool reaction to the idea of creating a Pacific Community under the aegis of the USA and Japan in which they rightfully noticed a recurrence of bloc fever, and the poorly hidden desire of the West to lure them into forming an alliance of a new mold—another variation of an Oriental NATO.

Looking back at the road traversed by the association it should be noted that despite dissimilar appraisals of the results of the association's activities on the whole it proved its viability. To a great extent this could be explained by its members' apprehension of the benefits of such membership although each of them on certain occasions had to sacrifice their own interests and make a compromise.

Then what is it that makes the organisation so attractive to the Six, what are the benefits that they derive from their membership in it?

First of all the association helps to smooth out and sometimes even eliminate the differences and prejudices existing between them, helps solve numerous territorial disputes. A bright perspective seems to have emerged even in the acute and protracted conflict over Sabah (North Borneo) between Malaysia and the Philippines.

However, this seems not to be the main point. The major benefit of the association as its members see it is that it helps each of them—relatively weak militarily, politically and economically—to counteract outside pressures, first of all the diklat of the West. In spite of all its attempts, which are by the way not always futile, to politicise dialogues with ASEAN, its members are acting more decisively in giving priority to economic issues. The recent dialogues and meetings between leaders, for instance, the 1986 Bali meeting between US President Reagan and President Suharto of Indonesia are vivid examples of the case.

A greater emphasis on the economic aspect of the relations of the Six with the West in recent years stems from their growing awareness that genuine national interests of association's members can be guaranteed only by way of economic development, and from their increasing confidence that intra-ASEAN cooperation is to play its role in the process. The national doctrines of ASEAN member states reflect this viewpoint.

A certain re-evaluation of priorities in the activities of ASEAN, which began in the 1970s is reflected in a visible growth of its activity in international affairs as well. The strengthening of peace and security, above all in South East Asia, is justifiably viewed by the Six as a major prerequisite for achieving their goals in the economic field. It is in this context that one must evaluate the important initiative on the establishment of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality put forward by the association in 1971, followed by proposals to turn the region into a nuclear-free zone and further steps in the same direction enhancing the international pres-

tige of the organisation and testifying to its significant anti-war potential.

The positive aspects in the activities of the Six have recently seen further development. Its members are more often rising above the narrow nationalistic anti-communist approach to world events and beginning to demonstrate an understanding of the real causes of the arms race and increased international tension, their close interrelation with the conflict in South East Asia. Under such circumstances different anti-Soviet concoctions devised by Washington, in particular its thesis that Soviet presence in South East Asia is the root-cause of tension in that region, more often skid and sometimes even backfire. Commenting on such allegations, Malaysian Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad stated that the threat to the countries of ASEAN came not from the Soviet Union. In his turn, Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja stressed that Indonesia had no enmity towards the Soviet Union and could not advise one side to have bases in the region and the other not to have them.

Statements of this kind, above all in the press, have recently appeared much more frequently especially after Mikhail Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok in July 1986 and his last year's interview to the Indonesian newspaper *Merdeka*. Soviet initiatives on peace, security, and peaceful cooperation in Asia and the Pacific were met with great interest in the ASEAN member countries and are viewed as being in tune with their national aspirations. The idea of the necessity of urgent measures for curbing the arms race and resolving conflicts in the region commands their respect. So is the USSR's readiness to take an active part in the process of establishing cooperation among Asian countries in various fields. It is also not accidental that the leaders of all the six member countries have in one way or another voiced their support for the "spirit of Vladivostok".

Noteworthy are the recently intensified efforts of the association's members to promote the idea of establishing a nuclear-free zone in South East Asia. Some encouraging signs showing a certain positive evolution of ASEAN's position in the Kampuchean problem have emerged. The understanding that this problem can be solved only by political means, through dialogue, is slowly taking its hold in the association; so is the apprehension of the futility and even danger of the military solution, for it would lead to a greater involvement of outside forces in the conflict. In this connection also worth noting is the positive reaction of the Six to the recent meeting between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the PRK Hun Sen and one of the leaders of the Kampuchean opposition Prince Norodom Sihanouk held in Paris and their agreement for further meetings. Bangkok's decision to withdraw a considerable number of its troops from the border with PRK should also be viewed as a step towards improving the situation on the Thai-Kampuchean border.

There is no doubt that Indonesia makes a considerable positive contribution to the activities of ASEAN. Being one of the active participants in the non-alignment movement whose soil gave birth to the "spirit of Bandung", Indonesia restrains the extremist circles and promotes a spirit of realism and a trend to independence in the association. Jakarta is the most consistent opponent to the militarisation of ASEAN and advocate of a nuclear-free zone in South East Asia. There are constructive elements in its position on the Kampuchean problem. Stating that Vietnam does not pose a threat to the countries of the region, Indonesian leaders actively contribute to the dialogue between the two groups of states. "For the sake of establishing peace and stability, I hope that we would cooperate with Vietnam on a regular basis because Indonesia acts as a go-between for ASEAN and Vietnam is an important mediator speaking on behalf of the countries of Indochina", said Mochtar Kusumaatmadja. As a follow-up to

this line during his visit to SRV this year the so-called formula of Ho Chi Minh has been worked out that envisages the establishment of a dialogue between PRK and various factions of Kampuchean opposition with Vietnam itself joining at a later stage. In addition, besides the contacts within the framework of their dialogue Jakarta and Hanoi actively develop bilateral relations in political, commercial and even military fields.

A similar position in many aspects, at least in respect to the assessment of the whole situation in South East Asia and the Asian Pacific region, is taken by Malaysia.

The Philippines, where one can observe a complex and contradictory process of the struggle for national consolidation and the strengthening of the anti-nuclear movement, is going through a period of important changes. The government of Corazon Aquino subjected to considerable pressure from the USA and the internal conservative circles attempts to pursue a more balanced policy, strives to differentiate external ties, to activate its policy in formerly non-priority areas.

Certain positive changes are taking place in the foreign policy of Thailand where the conservative sentiments and prejudices are being gradually replaced by greater realism and attempts are made to depart from one-sided orientation.

Obviously, it would be a mistake, at least an exaggeration, to think that the evolution of the political image of the association is a straightforward process. Yes, in the motley political palette of ASEAN there appeared lately much more lighter hues. At the same time even now one can see a strong economic dependence of the Six on the West, the activities of internal conservative forces unwilling to abandon its positions and attempting to put the association into the military uniform.

An acute struggle over the course of the Six and their future political line continues. The repercussions of that struggle were felt during the debate in the countries of the association on the eve of the 3rd summit meeting of ASEAN (held in Manila on December 14-16, 1987) on the expediency of preservation of US bases in the Philippines and the collective responsibility of the association's members for them. And though the discussion showed that the approach of the organisation's members to the problem of US bases is still dissimilar, the very fact that it failed to be placed on the agenda of the Manila summit is viewed as a victory for the advocates of the anti-base, anti-military course.

It seems that to a very large extent the same is true of the results of the ASEAN summit itself during which a constructive exchange of views on the issues of the international situation and disarmament took place. For example, in their joint statement for the press the heads of state and government of ASEAN countries hailed the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles signed by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the US President, describing it as an important step on the way to a genuine reduction of nuclear weapons and disarmament. Having expressed their hope that the treaty would give impetus to the multilateral negotiations on disarmament in Geneva and to future agreements on strategic nuclear arms, the ASEAN leaders reaffirmed their devotion to the idea of establishing a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South East Asia and pointed to the necessity of urgent measures aimed at its realisation.

A conviction was also expressed in Manila that the declaration of South East Asia as a nuclear-free zone would be an important step in that direction and also the region's contribution to the efforts aimed at bringing about a general and complete disarmament.

The foreign ministers who participated in the Manila summit signed a protocol to the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in South East

Asia giving access to ASEAN for other states, including those situated outside the region. Though this decision is intended primarily for the accession of Papua-New Guinea to ASEAN as an associate member, some observers believe that it was taken with a view of a possible future participation of the countries of Indochina.

As expected, much attention was paid in Manila to promoting trade and economic ties and combating the policy of protectionism practised by the major partners of the Six. It was generally recognised that a good foundation for it is created by the protocols on cooperation in industrial construction, on mutual guarantees in capital investments and on considerable expansion of tax benefits for trading within the association.

The participation of the new Japanese Prime Minister Noburo Takeshita in the Manila summit gave rise to lively commentaries and differing assessments. His pledge to grant over three years to the ASEAN states via private sector Japanese government credits totalling \$2 billion could not moderate the serious discontent of the association over Tokyo's trade and economic policy in general. Nor has it dissipated the suspicion and uneasiness caused among the public of ASEAN states by the growing buildup of the Japanese armed forces despite the assurances about the unwillingness of Japan to become a "military power".

In general, the summit in Manila can be viewed as an important step towards raising the level and effectiveness of cooperation within ASEAN. In spite of the lingering differences and disputes among its participants the main thrust of their activities is directed towards taking into account to a larger extent the interests of each other. The meeting has also confirmed that the Six are becoming a more and more significant element in the structure of international relations. Its participants strive to pursue an independent course. Not willing to reconcile itself to the role of a passive object of international politics, the association makes efforts so that its voice in the international arena expresses in the first place the national interests of its member states.

The Soviet Union sympathises with the activities of ASEAN, pays tribute to the results achieved by its members in national construction and the establishment of cooperation within the association. The efforts of the Six aimed at the preservation of peace and prevention of nuclear war are greatly appreciated. The USSR has repeatedly expressed its positive reaction to the constructive ASEAN proposals envisaging a transformation of South East Asia into a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality and a nuclear-free zone. The Soviet Union believes that the member states of the organisation can make a considerable contribution to a speediest resolution of the Kampuchean problem and to paving the way for the realisation of the idea of national accord in Kampuchea.

It is gratifying to note that recent years have witnessed a noticeable development of bilateral relations between the USSR and the ASEAN members.

The USSR's relations with Indonesia are becoming more dynamic; the visit of the Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to that state in the spring of 1987 served as a powerful impetus to their development. The forthcoming visits to Moscow of President Suharto and Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja would undoubtedly strengthen the co-operation between the two countries.

The negotiations with Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad held last August in Moscow demonstrated the willingness of both sides to broaden the scope of Soviet-Malaysian interaction.

The contacts at various levels which have taken place lately revealed considerable opportunities for strengthening the relations between the USSR and the Philippines. In his recent message addressed to the President of the Philippines Corazon Aquino the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Andrei Gromyko reaffirmed the intention of Soviet side to contribute to their realisation.

After years of stagnation positive changes in Soviet-Thai relations have taken shape. They are evidenced by the exchange of messages between Mikhail Gorbachev, Nikolai Ryzhkov and Thai Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda, reciprocal visits by foreign ministers of both countries in 1987, parliamentary contacts and contacts in the military field.

During the consultations which took place last autumn between foreign ministries of the USSR and Singapore the Soviet side had once again emphasised that trade and economic cooperation was not the only sphere in which the two countries could effectively cooperate.

It should be noted that the relations between the USSR and the ASEAN states in general have lately noticeably developed to the better and last year was remarkable in this respect. In the message of Mikhail Gorbachev to the President of the 3rd ASEAN summit Corazon Aquino, which had wide response, it was noted, inter alia, that "the Soviet Union is open to various, including collective, forms of relations with the ASEAN countries, is ready to maintain relations with the association as such". It seems mutual efforts in this direction would correspond to the fundamental interests of both the peoples of the USSR and member states of the association, to the interest of strengthening peace in South East Asia and the whole world

NEW LEADERS IN TOKYO

Konstantin DERIBAS

The new Japanese Prime Minister, Noburo Takeshita, said in his policy speech to the extraordinary session of parliament late in November 1987 that the country's foreign policy would be geared towards maintaining the "Japanese-US Security Treaty system" and, along with this, towards building up the defence potential. A few days before the Prime Minister's "speech from the throne", some details of the main lines of Japanese external security policy were outlined in a report prepared by the Strategic Research Centre, something of a brain trust of the new head of government. The report indicates that the defence of Japan is to be centred around a blockade of the Tsugaru, La Perouse and Korea straits by Japanese self-defence forces with a view to "locking up" the Soviet Pacific fleet in the Sea of Japan and assuring the US Navy freedom of action in the Pacific and Indian oceans.

The foregoing suggests that the new cabinet intends to abide by the military policy framed in the previous period. It may be worth recalling its main aspects.

The closing period of the Yasuhiro Nakasone government's terms in office was marked by a visible rightward drift in foreign policy. In those days it was announced that Tokyo was joining up with the United States' SDI plans, and an intergovernmental agreement was signed in Washington on the terms of Japanese participation in the implementation of these plans. The Japanese government adopted a decision on a new principle for fixing the level of military spending with due regard to the total amount of defence appropriations up to the year 1990 envisaged by the current five-year plan. This step, which followed on the heels of a decision to end the policy of limiting military expenditures to one per cent of the GNP, virtually gives the Japanese Defence Agency free rein in establishing spending levels.

In the context of war preparations, joint Japanese-US exercises close to the Soviet frontier are gaining in intensity. Late in the summer of 1987, the United States completed the deployment of 50 F-16 nuclear-capable fighter-bombers at its Misawa base on Honshu Island. The Defence Agency and the Pentagon are working on various joint operations in the Pacific. To this end the United States has effected a major reorganisation of land forces by setting up a single US Pacific Command with headquarters in Fort-Shafter on the Hawaii Islands.

For an insular country such as Japan, security at sea is certainly very important. Virtually lacking natural resources of its own, Japanese industry has always had to rely on unhampered deliveries from abroad of practically all raw materials, including oil, gas, coal and iron ore, as well as on the imports of food and other products by sea. Japan accounts for approximately one quarter of the world's shipping done by sea, half of which is carried on in the Asia and Pacific region. This circumstance is exploited by those members of the Japanese ruling classes who tend to rely on armed force rather than steps to make the overall situation in the world healthier as a means of settling various international problems, including that of achieving and strengthening security.

In launching a large-scale naval modernisation programme, Japanese strategists do not deny that the Western Pacific is seen as the future zone

of operations. In spite of renewed attempts by Tokyo to present the programme as a means of countering the "Soviet military threat", its obvious aim is to regain its one-time influence in this part of the globe. Anyone who doubts this has only to read what Ryohei Ogha, ex-chief of naval staff of the "Self-Defence Forces", writes more than frankly. This man, who recently worked in Japan's Strategic Research Centre, states that the 1,000-mile defence zone will extend from the Osaka Bay to the Bashi Channel, which separates Taiwan from the Philippines. If counted off from the Tokyo Bay, the defence line will reach as far south as 20° N., to the sea space between Ogasawara Island and the Marianas. Geographically this area encompasses the 200-mile economic zone of Japan and includes part of the Japanese sector of aerial tracking of civilian airlines. All this is so, but there is no more to it than that. Nevertheless, Ogha sees it as quite enough to allege on the strength of these facts that Japan has a moral right and ought to assume "responsibility" for the 1,000-mile zone and to proceed accordingly.¹ This is reminiscent of the Japanese militarists' talk in the past about "responsibility" for the "New Order" in Asia and of their slogan "Eight corners under one roof", calculated to disguise somehow their imperial ambitions.

Japan's actual preparations for the role of "military policeman" began at a time when the ANZUS alliance (Australia, New Zealand and the United States) was still a functioning mechanism. Even at the first stage, in the early 1980s, attempts were made to join together Japan's "Self-Defence Forces" and the military structure of ANZUS, in particular by bringing Japan into the Rimpac naval exercises. In those days, many zealous strategists saw the western Pacific as a zone of joint naval operations by the countries listed above, after the example of NATO. Men in the lobbies of the war ministries discussed the possibilities of forming joint naval forces under the leadership of the United States and possible plans for anti-submarine operations. The "patrol" zone mentioned by them was expected to extend from the Strait of Malacca to the seas washing the shores of the Philippines, including the southeastern Pacific.²

To judge by the latest events taking place against the background of a deep crisis in ANZUS, the capitals on either side of the Pacific now count on strengthening and improving the Japanese-US security treaty. *The Mainichi Daily News* wrote that the task of the Japanese defence potential was not restricted to defending territorial waters, Japanese air space and Japanese territory itself, but would extend in an emergency to the high seas and hence the potential itself would be built up with an eye to joint operations with the United States.³

This primarily implies Japanese participation in US nuclear strategy. The United States has long since turned the territory of Japan into a bridgehead in the Far East; 127 of its 300 bases and other facilities in the Pacific are situated on the Japanese islands. According to William Arkin, Director of the Arms Race and Nuclear Weapons Research Project at the Institute for Policy Studies, virtually all Pentagon projects in Japan are involved in preparations for global or regional conflicts with the use of mass destruction weapons.

Indeed, US military airfields in Japan can accommodate strategic bombers; the US bases have special storerooms for nuclear arms as well as strategic communication and control centres fitted out for nuclear war. F-16 nuclear-capable planes are permanently stationed in Japan and submarines equipped with Tomahawk cruise missiles dock in Japanese ports roughly once every ten days. Lately vigorous efforts have been made to reinforce the US bases on Okinawa; missile facilities are to be deployed and new military installations built.

All these facilities will be ready for combat action in the event of an "unforeseen conflict" in the immediate vicinity of Japan or far from its

coast. In such a contingency, the "Self-Defence Forces" are to operate according to a scenario that has already been worked out.

All this understandably causes concern in Southeast Asian countries hit by Japanese aggression during the Second World War. It is no secret that the likelihood of the "strategic sea communications defence line" stretching as far as the seas washing the coasts of the ASEAN countries will depend on where Japan begins counting off the 1,000-mile zone. When the idea of this zone was still only in its initial stages *Asahi*, for one, wrote that "both the Philippines and Indonesia are fearful lest their territorial waters should be violated".⁴

To defuse tension over this issue, Japanese strategists would like (judging by what has been published on the subject) to entangle the ASEAN countries by drawing them into military cooperation with their country. The patented aim here is to involve young states in the quagmire of war preparation so as to spare Tokyo accusations of "reviving militarism", which is the principal impediment to its expansion in the region, and to secure a powerful means of pressure on Japan's partners from among these young states by supplying them with arms if possible. A revealing admission was made by B. Kono, one of the directors of Mitsubishi Zuko, a major arms manufacturer. "Japan," he said, "has no stronger negotiating weapon (for use in talks with exporters of raw materials—K. D.) than arms exports."⁵

Predictably, arms exports assumed a covert character, which makes no difference as far as their substance is concerned. Hearings held in the Japanese Diet have shown that over the past few years Japanese business has participated, with the connivance of government officials, in the construction of about ten naval bases abroad. Significantly, these facilities are all situated in the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific, along the route of raw material exports from the Middle East to Japan. Japanese "economic" diplomacy must have been looking far ahead in choosing strong points for "cooperation".

During the hearings S. Kusakawa, a parliament member from the Komeito party, revealed amazing facts. It transpired that from 1978 to 1981 the Saeiki Konsetsu Kogyo company had participated under a contract with the Defence Ministry of Malaysia in the equipment of a major naval base at Lumut, on the coast of the Strait of Malacca. To ensure that the Japanese Ministry of Construction approved the 91-billion-yen contract, the company simply replaced in the papers the phrase "construction of a dock" by the perfectly innocent words "building a lumber-processing terminal" and substituted "administrative buildings" for "barracks".⁶

In a similar way, the Goyo Kensetsu firm participated at about the same time in the construction of a 300,000 ton dock at the US Subic Bay base in the Philippines. In this case the contractors had to show the utmost inventiveness to cover up their tracks. First a Japanese-Philippine company was set up, with Kawasaki Zuko, a big arms manufacturer, owning 40 per cent of the assets. The latter was immediately supplied with 11.1 billion yen by the government's Foreign Economic Cooperation Fund, whose statutes forbid it to use aid for military purposes. Only after this did the Goyo Kensetsu construction company step forward, being entrusted with building a giant dock for the repair of aircraft carriers.⁷

However, the biggest news which members of the Diet heard was that in the early 1980s the same firm had taken part in the construction of the US naval base at Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean. Among other things, the firm built an anchorage for US aircraft carriers, a project which cost a total of two billion yen. Apparently satisfied with the firm's performance, the Pentagon has since been doing its best to attract Japanese capital for the construction of a naval base, this time on the Marianas, tempting Tokyo with the prospect of joint exploitation of the base.

Experience has shown that Japan uses the security treaty with the United States as cover for its illegal military deals, including arms exports, and as a loophole not only for making up-to-date dual-purpose Japanese technology for the United States and collaborating in the implementation of the SDI programme but for exporting arms to third countries. This was the case with the repair and transfer to the Philippines of 14 warships of the "Self-Defence Forces", including LST landing craft. After having them repaired in the Sasebo Zuko shipyards, the Defence Agency transferred them to the Philippines through the US Armed Forces Command in Japan. "For all that everything was nominally done with the aid of the US forces," wrote *Asahi* on the occasion, "there is still a strong suspicion that the Philippines was virtually rendered military aid."⁸

With such a military strategic record to refer to, ex-foreign minister of Japan Tadasu Kuranari toured southern Pacific countries from January 6 to 16, 1987. He was followed by a representative mission of Japanese government officials and businessmen, who visited nine countries of the region. In mid-December the same year, in an obvious attempt to stress the significance of the "southern neighbours" for Japan, Noburo Takeshita paid his first official visit in the Premier's capacity to the Philippines to participate in the third conference of the heads of state and government of the ASEAN countries. Tokyo was predictably trying to win greater influence on the Pacific islands by promising to double economic assistance as well as on the ASEAN countries having granted them a loan of \$2 billion. Committed to the policy of the carrot and the stick, which they have sufficiently tested in Southeast Asian countries, Japanese strategists are apparently clearing the decks to extend their 1,000-mile "sea communications defence" zone.

It is no accident that Japan has once again returned to the debate on the legitimacy of sending Japanese "Self-Defence Forces" abroad. That there are grounds for this is shown primarily by certain facts. During a parliamentary debate in August 1987, Tadasu Kuranari said it was "necessary to study the problem of sending Japanese servicemen abroad for use in rescue operations". The then Prime Minister was even more outspoken on August 29. For the first time in postwar Japan he said that the Constitution, which rejects war, allowed the country to send mine-sweepers to... yes, the Persian Gulf. "I don't think," he declared, "that there is any difference from the legal point of view between the removal of mines by naval 'Self-Defence Forces' in the high seas off Maidzuru and the removal of mines in the Persian Gulf."

Japanese leaders so far have stressed that the Constitution forbids them in any circumstances to send armed forces or war materiel to any long distance from Japanese shores. But what Nakasone said when he was Prime Minister might, in the opinion of *The New York Times*, turn out to be the first step towards the Japanese agreeing in the end to certain forms of overseas military operations.

The problem of security in the Asia and Pacific region is a focal point of Soviet diplomacy. The Soviet Union would like to see this vast region join in the effort to establish a comprehensive international security system. With this aim in view, it has repeatedly made proposals for adopting confidence-building measures, reducing naval activity in the Pacific, restricting the anti-submarine operations there and limiting the sailing areas of nuclear-capable ships.

Greater mutual confidence could be brought about by limiting the scale of naval exercises and manoeuvres in the Pacific and Indian oceans and the adjacent seas. This model could first be tested in the northern Pacific.

where it would involve few protagonists, and afterwards the practice could be extended southwards, to other countries of the region.

The Soviet Union welcomes the establishment of nuclear-free zones and is the first nuclear power to have signed Protocols 2 and 3 of the Rarotonga Treaty. To meet Asian countries halfway, it furnished renewed proof of goodwill in July 1987 by signifying its readiness to destroy its intermediate-range missiles in the Asian part of its territory as well as to eliminate its shorter-range missiles. This state of affairs was legalised in the Soviet-American treaty on the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles signed on December 8, 1987. The Soviet side could take yet another step forward by pledging not to increase the number of its nuclear-capable aircraft on its Asian territory provided the United States refrained from deploying in the area further nuclear weapons capable of reaching Soviet territory.

The Soviet Union proposes bilateral and multilateral consultations as a means of settling disputes, achieving better mutual understanding and building confidence. A conference of Pacific countries to discuss problems of security, including economic security, could contribute greatly to this. From the point of view of safeguarding sea routes, the Soviet Union considers that greater stability could be brought about by "limiting rivalry in anti-submarine weapons, in particular by agreeing to refrain from anti-submarine activity in certain zones of the Pacific".⁹ This offers a sound basis on which to work out constructive measures aimed at reducing the spirit of confrontation in the Pacific.

It is only by moving forward to good-neighbourliness and cooperation, that genuine security can be attained. One should not look at the future of the Asia and Pacific region from a standpoint of struggle between countries or the buildup of military muscle under the guise of defence. The task is to seek mutually acceptable solutions, dialogue on an equal footing and mutually beneficial partnership.

¹ See Ryohei Ogha, *Seairen-no himitsu*, Tokyo, 1983, p. 185

² See Tetsuo Maeda, *Nihon boei sinron*, Tokyo, 1982, p. 146

³ *Mainichi Daily News*, Aug. 11, 1986

⁴ *Asahi*, Jan. 22, 1983

⁵ *Asahi*, Feb. 5, 1976

⁶ See Tetsuo Maeda, *Op. cit.*, pp. 158-159

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 158

⁸ *Asahi*, May 14, 1986

⁹ *Сборник материалов о пос.юке М. С. Горбачева на Дальний Восток*, Politizdat Publishers, 1986, p. 30.

Cheddi JAGAN:

THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF NEW THINKING OPENS THE WAY TO A LASTING PEACE

International Affairs asked Cheddi B. Jagan, General Secretary of the People's Progressive Party of Guyana, for an interview. The text of the interview is printed below.

QUESTION: Comrade Jagan, do you believe that the hopes entertained by the peoples for a nuclear-free and non-violent world are justified?

ANSWER: The 20th century is capable of greatly benefiting mankind. In the final count, everything depends on whether states and nations display an ability to grasp the essence of the Soviet Union's innovative approach to international problems. The Soviet concept of new thinking makes it easier to mitigate international tensions, and to rid the world of mistrust and opens the way to a lasting peace. It is very important that this approach has been initiated by a prominent politician representing one of the most powerful nations in the modern world. New thinking is an expression of creative approach and political boldness in tackling the major problem of our time, the problem of war and peace.

The successful fulfilment of the plans embarked upon by the Soviet people will undoubtedly have far-reaching consequences both inside the country and abroad. In recent years Soviet foreign policy has become more vigorous and dynamic. First of all, I would like to mention Gorbachev's proposal to create a nuclear-free, and non-violent world by the end of this century, a proposal distinguished by its advanced humanism. It stems from the peaceful policy pursued by the USSR over many years, a policy which is directed towards attaining the most cherished dream of humanity: a life of peace based on social justice. This initiative is in accord with the realities of the modern world and is inseparable from the socialist principles of civilisation's development. Humanity should be eternally grateful to the Soviet Union, who took upon itself the difficult task of being the bulwark of universal peace.

Thanks to this initiative we have seen somewhat of a respite after the tensions of recent years. I believe that this programme is quite realistic, for it relies on reason and logic. Despite the tough stand taken by the United States on a number of international problems, Soviet proposals give us hope that there is a way out of the nuclear impasse. Of course, the road to the realisation of these goals will not be an easy and smooth one. And yet, any number of barriers can be overcome for the sake of saving human civilisation.

The creation of a nuclear-free world by the end of this century will prompt the elimination of all mass-destruction weapons, including biological and chemical weapons. In this case an opportunity will present itself to proceed to a total and universal disarmament, which will open unlimited prospects for all nations. Then the tremendous resources presently squandered on the production of terrible and destructive instruments of death will be turned to the benefit of mankind. The irreversibility of social progress will be ensured.

QUESTION: In your opinion, what are the most potent dangers posed by modern militarism to the peoples of the world, including Latin America?

ANSWER: First of all, it is the Strategic Defense Initiative which is the basic impediment to mitigating international tensions and attaining nuclear disarmament. It has become the last item in an extended list of the latest weaponry designed to upset the East-West strategic parity and violate the principles of equal security. In this way the United States seeks to acquire an advantage by being able to deliver a first nuclear strike on the Soviet Union. The Star Wars programme is also carried out in the interests of monopolies, who reap enormous profits from the production of lethal weapons. At the research-and-development stage alone, those corporations of the military-industrial complex working on SDI will be able to get contracts totalling \$70,000 million. Having no opportunity, due to the exacerbation of the general crisis of capitalism, to win in peaceful competition, US strategists count on drawing the Soviet Union into a costly space weapons race to divert the resources earmarked for the modernisation of the economy and the solution of social problems.

The United States also attempts to drive the states of Latin America and the Caribbean into a deadly trap of militarisation. Beginning in 1947, when the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance—the Rio de Janeiro Treaty—was signed, the USA spared no effort to get them involved in its plans for the fight against communism on both the internal and external fronts, in actions to suppress the national liberation movement.

At present, the USA has about 130 military bases and other military facilities in Latin America, where some thirty-three thousand servicemen are stationed. The island of Puerto Rico has been turned into a nuclear arsenal of the Americans, and close to its shores the US Navy regularly holds war games with the participation of nuclear-capable ships. Hundreds of Pentagon subcontractors participating in the implementation of the Star Wars programme operate in this American colony and other Latin American and Caribbean states. All this is a gross violation of the spirit of the Treaty of Tlatelolco (the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America). It also disregards the demand of the Caribbean countries to declare this region a zone of peace.

The Caribbean states, which the USA refers to as its "backyard", are constantly victimised by US policies of dumping and protectionism, by the militarism and direct interference practised by the USA. The region serves almost constantly as a stage for military manoeuvres of US troops. About forty thousand US servicemen, together with the Honduran army, participated in the Solid Shield manoeuvres, which bore an undisguised anti-Nicaraguan thrust. It was an imitation of a landing operation in the north of Honduras. And in the Eastern Caribbean region Camel-87 manoeuvres were held. Simultaneously, the United States insists on setting up a regional security system for the states of the region. US military aid to the countries of the Caribbean is expanding. While in 1980 it stood at \$13.8 million, in 1983 it amounted to \$106.2 million.

QUESTION: What are the most serious economic and political problems facing the Caribbean countries?

ANSWER: At present, the states of the region are experiencing a serious crisis. They are saddled with a tremendous external debt reaching \$9,000 million, Guyana and Jamaica being the largest debtors. We see unemployment growing everywhere: in some states it amounts to 30 per cent of the labour force. It is interesting that about two years ago "twelve wisemen" from Caribbean countries were commissioned to make an analysis of the situation and draft recommendations. However, they failed to offer anything concrete, confining themselves to the conclusion that development prospects were rat-

her bleak and forecasting that unemployment may reach 40 per cent. In their opinion the situation is explosive. Leaders of the Caribbean countries meet from time to time but their meetings, too, yield, as a rule, no results. It is nothing but talk. See for yourself.

Trade between the states of the region is declining. True, compared to the previous year, this year we have seen a slight improvement, but the general unfavourable trend persists. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that some countries erect customs barriers. At present, there is hope that some of these barriers will be removed by mid-1988. Such was the recommendation made by a recent meeting of the leaders of the Caribbean countries. They also adopted a decision to set up an export bank to invigorate regional trade.

The Caribbean countries also discuss the problems of balanced industrial development on a planned basis. Although some people oppose it, there is at least hope for a kind of coordinated effort. It should be remembered that under the provisions of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the region grants wide access to foreign capital. And foreign investors would like to play off some Caribbean countries against others in order to gain all sorts of advantages and privileges and derive maximum profits. The CARICOM, meanwhile, attempts to spread investments evenly and use them more rationally in conformity with available resources.

It is difficult to say whether success will be achieved in this direction. For instance, there once existed the Caribbean Food Corporation. It was expected that it would be financed by the CARICOM and private investors. But in Guyana, which was traditionally assumed to be the granary of the region, these plans failed to materialise. As usual, there was not enough money. Guyana owed Trinidad and Tobago a large sum for oil and could not service the debt. Now we receive oil from Venezuela in exchange for bauxite. All this gives rise to problems. There is too little bauxite to offset oil imports. As a result, Guyana is bogged down with debts, which negatively affects regional projects and destabilises the CARICOM.

It is appropriate to mention various projects for the political unification of the countries of the region. First of all we are speaking of a union of Eastern Caribbean states, which could be joined later on by other territories, probably except for Jamaica. However, so far things have been moving slowly. I would like to recall that back in 1958, a Caribbean Federation was set up, which only lasted until 1962. From 1968 to 1974 a Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) was in operation. The early 1970s witnessed the birth of the CARICOM and the Caribbean Common Market.

However, all these projects failed to resolve the problems of our peoples. That is why today we have on the agenda the problem of setting up a political union. We believe that it would be a good idea to establish a union for the purposes of development. However, large economic associations do not always pay off. They offer certain advantages and show full results only when their activities are in line with the national requirements and are distinguished for their democratic content. Without this there will be no progress. At present, this problem is the subject of lively discussion in the Caribbean.

UN statistics show that from 1981 to 1985, \$36 billion was pumped from Latin America in profits, interest payments, etc. This is the source of our poverty. Salvador Allende and Velasco Alvarado were right in strengthening the Andean Pact, taking into account the fact that in the interests of their peoples it was necessary to strictly supervise the activities of transnational corporations.

Latin America and the Caribbean have experienced the most profound impact of the process started by the Great October Revolution. First and foremost, I am speaking of the triumph of the revolution in Cuba, which, enjoying the selfless aid and active solidarity rendered by the Soviet Union

and other socialist countries, has led to the creation of the first workers' and peasants' state in the Western Hemisphere. Cuba has provided an example of how to overcome the backwardness from which peoples still suffer, finding themselves in the grip of a dependent capitalist development.

The present situation in the region confirms the irreconcilability of the vital interests of our countries and imperialism, primarily American imperialism. This is why the peoples of the Caribbean states have stepped up their struggle for economic independence and against neocolonialism. The vanguard revolutionary parties equipped with the ideas of scientific socialism play an active part in the political life of many countries, and their influence and popularity are steadily growing.

The revolution in Grenada was the peak of the revolutionary struggle waged by the Caribbean peoples. True, the US military intervention made us retreat temporarily. However, with every passing day it is becoming increasingly obvious that for imperialism, theirs was a Pyrrhic victory. The struggle for the vital requirements of the peoples—democracy, peace and social and economic justice—is gathering momentum.

QUESTION: Tell us about the present situation in Guyana and the prospects for its development.

Answer: To answer this question it is necessary to recall that in 1970 the ruling People's National Congress advanced the concept of cooperative socialism, and at that time the country was named the Cooperative Republic of Guyana. The government declared that cooperatives would become a motive force which would lead Guyana to socialism. It was planned to eventually make cooperatives the basis of the economic structure of society.

Already at that time our party criticised the concept of cooperative socialism. Guided by the well-known thesis of Frederick Engels we said that cooperatives were not enough to build socialism, for they could not be the locomotive of development. It was the state sector which should become the leading sector in the economy, while cooperatives should play an auxiliary role.

At that time we predicted that that model would not strike root in Guyana. And that is exactly what happened. Initially the government spared no effort to organise cooperatives and in line with its concept make them the basis of the economy. I believe that one of the reasons behind this was a basic unwillingness to nationalise enterprises in the sugar and bauxite-mining industries, which were in the hands of foreign monopolies. It seems that they wanted to use the cooperatives as a smoke screen, behind which it would be possible to sidetrack the issue of nationalising the commanding heights of the economy.

Eventually, the government was nevertheless compelled to make that step, due to which the state sector became the leading sector in the economy of Guyana, while most of the existing cooperatives turned out to be unviable. For instance, this is what happened in rice-growing. At the beginning, from 1957 to 1964, under the government of the People's Progressive Party, rice-growing cooperatives functioned successfully: over this seven-year period, rice production in the country increased by 72 per cent. Meanwhile, in the more than two decades under the present government, about a third of the rice paddies have been abandoned; correspondingly, a third of the farmers no longer grow rice, and many cooperatives have disintegrated. Now we see in the press reports that consumer and credit cooperatives are closing down. Thus, it is possible to say with confidence that the very concept of cooperative socialism has failed, as well as the methods of organising cooperatives, especially in the countryside.

It should also be noted that in addition to the concept of cooperative socialism, the People's National Congress, again in 1970, advanced the slogan "Every little man will become a real man", promising that by 1976 every

citizen would be well-fed and would have a roof over his head. Actually, we are quite far from this goal. The country is experiencing constant shortages of the barest necessities. Electricity cut-offs are all too common, and there are problems with water supply. Many enterprises stand idle for months because of the short supply of spare parts from abroad. Industry is operating at only 40 per cent of its full capacity.

All this is happening mainly because last year the government decided to pay large sums of money to clear off the foreign debt. It has been planned to transfer to foreign bankers \$150 million. Therefore, we do not have enough foreign currency to import consumer goods and equipment.

Furthermore, the negative processes in the economy are accompanied by anti-democratic measures taken by the authorities in all spheres of social life. Racial and political discrimination is rampant in the country. We are ridden with corruption and bribery. This was admitted by the governmental commission on ethics, which has compiled a serious report on this matter. The commission stated that since the mid-1970s the flouting of democracy, political and racial discrimination, as well as corruption, have become an impediment to the development of the productive forces of the country, which has led to stagnation.

Since 1976 our party has advocated a political settlement of the internal problems on the basis of a programme comprising seventeen items. We warn that if this programme is not adopted, the advantages derived from the nationalisation of the sugar and bauxite-mining industries will be forfeited, while the anti-imperialist trends in the policy of Guyana will diminish. The documents of the above-mentioned commission actually confirm our analysis: the country has acquired a "get-rich-quick" syndrome, while bribery and other kinds of corruption have reached epidemic proportions. Many high-placed officials no longer draw a line between their own pocket and that of the state. The commission noted that it has become a regular practice for people to be promoted not by their performance and merits but by principles of personal loyalty, favouritism and bribery. On this report alone, it is clear that Guyana needs restructuring. We need to improve the entire society.

QUESTION: Comrade Jagan, in conclusion we would like to know how you visualise the world in ten years.

ANSWER: As for the Third World countries, their situation will be deteriorating. The UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean made some estimates for the 1985-1995 period. It arrived at the conclusion that poverty will increase and unemployment will grow by 50 per cent. The problem of foreign debt, which was quite acute in 1985 (having reached \$370 billion) will become still more acute. By 1995 it will amount to an estimated \$672 billion.

Proceeding from this fact, it is to be expected that the struggle of the Third World peoples will become more acute. We saw the signs of this phenomenon in the days of the Malvinas crisis. At that time the indignation of Latin America knew no bounds, for its national pride had been hurt. Anti-imperialist and anti-American sentiments sharply increased. There were even calls for expelling the United States from the Organisation of American States because it had rendered military and other aid to the British aggressors.

The situation with the foreign debt will develop in the same direction. I point out that in Cartagena eleven Latin American states adopted a resolution stating they would channel no more than 20 per cent of their foreign currency receipts towards the repayment of debts. Since then Peru has limited that lever to ten per cent, and Brazil has imposed a moratorium on interest payments. Of course, some countries will agree with the prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund and will attempt to repay their debts by lower-

(Continued on page 158)

The February 1988 issue of our journal carried an article entitled "The Correlation of Politics, War and a Nuclear Catastrophe". Its authors, Boris Kanevsky and Pyotr Shabardin, senior researchers at the Institute of Military History, USSR Ministry of Defence, examined the changed interrelationship of these notions today. The article evoked a broad response among our readers. Many have sent their comments. In this issue we publish a few letters best reflecting the readers' opinion.

NUCLEAR WAR AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

IN HIS ARTICLE "The Attitude Towards Bourgeois Parties" Lenin said: "...who tackles partial problems without having previously settled general problems, will inevitably and at every step 'come up against' those general problems without himself realising it. To come up against them blindly in every individual case means to doom one's politics to the worst vacillation and lack of principle." I think that the same fate overtook Boris Kanevsky and Pyotr Shabardin as they attempted to solve the "general", theoretical problem of explaining the essence of nuclear-missile war in the February issue of the *International Affairs* journal.

The CPSU solved this problem effectively in due time. It formulated a military defence doctrine on a truly scientific basis, built the country's defences accordingly, and thus achieved military strategic parity between the USSR and the USA. It is precisely this that enables our country to implement firmly and consistently, without "vacillations", a policy of averting a third world war, which can result only in a nuclear catastrophe.

And today, when the struggle for mankind's survival has grown so intense, an attempt has been made to negate, without offering an alternative, a Marxist-Leninist methodological proposition which is most important for understanding war in general, and nuclear-missile war in particular. The social scientists who have made that attempt are misleading public opinion.

How can one struggle to prevent a world war and not know what it really is, not seeing ways of cognising it?

I think an unacceptable method is employed also in a discussion on the essence of nuclear war by Danil Proektor and Anatoly Ulkin in their articles "The Absurdity of the Classical Formula .", "... And the Absurdity of Refurbishing It" carried in the *Moscow News* weekly (No. 17, 1987) under the common heading "Europe and Clausewitz". As they criticise Karl von Clausewitz, they mean Lenin, in fact.

The formula expressed by Clausewitz and the one expressed by Lenin, that war is a continuation of politics by other, violent means are similar in form, but basically different in content. They differ chiefly in the way the essence of politics is understood. According to Clausewitz, politics is something non-class or supra-class, which expresses the interests of society as a whole, and is an embodiment of the state's wisdom. According to Lenin, politics is relations between classes, states, and nations, the epitome of economics, and participation in the affairs of the state. The formula evolved by Clausewitz, who was the first to point out the relationship between war and politics, grew outdated not because mass destruction weapons were developed and used, but because politics began to be viewed in a scientific way. In exploring the essence of some or other wars, the CPSU has never proceeded from the Clausewitz formula which, being non-class and above classes, suited only militarists, who disguised their aggres-

sive intentions. Mass destruction weapons, which threaten the whole of mankind, have failed to make the policy of war an expression of the interests of mankind. So Clausewitz has nothing to do with this.

It is our, Leninist formula that has always indicated, and will ever do, the way of cognising the essence of any specific war. Lenin paid attention to its methodological character, noting that with reference to wars, *the main thesis of dialectics* is that war is simply the continuation of politics by other violent means. "And it was always the standpoint of Marx and Engels, who regarded any war as the *continuation* of the politics of the powers concerned—and the various classes within these countries—in a definite period." (V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 219.) This fundamentally dialectical proposition leads us to a scientific understanding of nuclear-missile war, which otherwise can never be properly understood. So it is not without reason that covert militarists, trying to prove that bourgeois politics has nothing to do with nuclear war preparations, maintained that mass destruction weapons had made the Clausewitz formula outdated.

As we all know, mass destruction weapons have not upset the relationship between politics and war, between the political goals of war and the means of achieving them. On the contrary, this relationship has been growing ever deeper: nuclear missiles have been developed, perfected and stockpiled to the order of politicians and are therefore an expression of a thoroughly considered policy. As they have become a reality, mass destruction weapons have had an unprecedented influence on the political goals of war, making them global in scope. This close unity of the political goals and means of a nuclear-missile war convincingly confirmed one of Lenin's most important ideas on war. Arguing against Clausewitz, who maintained that the stronger the motives for war, the more war seemed purely military and less political, Lenin remarked, "Seemingness is not yet reality. War seems to us the more 'military' the more profoundly it is political; and the more 'political' the less profoundly it is political" (*Lenin Miscellany XII*, Moscow-Leningrad, MCMXXX, p. 397, in Russian.)

It is not technological progress but politics that prepares a nuclear-missile war, or is opposed to such preparation. It is politics and not technology that has always decided, and will decide in future, the question of whether mass destruction weapons are to be used or not. The aggressive forces in the United States have wished dozens of times to use nuclear arms against the USSR and other countries. And nothing basically significant has happened to make it so that these weapons would cease to be instruments of war. And the fact that a nuclear war can be triggered by a technical fault does not strip it of its political content, for it is politics, in the final analysis, which has prepared a war. All the more so since retaliation in such an unintentional beginning of a war will not be accidental and will be decided by political leadership.

No matter what a nuclear-missile war may lead to, and whether it is a protracted war or a blitzkrieg, the preparations for it, its outbreak and its use are all a matter of politics, a task of achieving political goals, no matter if these goals are attainable or not. This is the way the aggressive forces of imperialism behave in the hope of satisfying their hegemonic ambitions and doing away with socialism with the help of nuclear weapons. No one can deny this.

If a nuclear-missile war is ever unleashed, it will be a continuation of the aggressive policy of achieving world domination by using the means of mass destruction. For the other side, which will not wish to be unavenged, war will be the continuation of a policy of resisting the aggressor and routing it. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union understands that such a war would be insane, for "there would be no winners or

losers" in it (*The Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, p. 22). Such a war would cease to be a means of achieving political ends, but it would still be war. To look for a replacement for the term "nuclear-missile war", or to substitute the consequences of a war for a war itself is theoretically wrong and practically harmful.

In the article "The Correlation of Politics, War and a Nuclear Catastrophe" Boris Kanevsky and Pyotr Shabardin suggest that the term "nuclear-missile war" be replaced by "nuclear-missile catastrophe". These terms can be used loosely, one instead of the other, in an ordinary conversation, but it is unpardonable for a scientist. Can a consequence of an event replace the event itself, or can goals be used instead of the means of achieving them? No, they can't. A nuclear-missile catastrophe is neither war nor what is meant instead of war. A catastrophe is a result of a war; it is death, dead bodies, ash-heaps, a "moonscape". Can ashes be the same as what has made them ashes?

Nuclear-missile war, for all its horrible effects, has its own dialectics and logic, its own contradictions, laws and principles according to which it is fought. Those who are preparing such a war and those who fight to prevent it think about war not merely as an exchange of strikes, as Kanevsky and Shabardin maintain. The aggressors are not going to ignore the principles of warfare, in particular, the surprise effect in a nuclear-missile war, pre-emptive strikes, gaining superiority in strength, concentration of efforts on the main directions, and so on. We all know that their missiles are aimed not just at the territory of the USSR and its allies, but, at our vital political and economic centres, at our most densely populated regions. Why should we ignore this? The authors are also wrong to assert that a nuclear-missile war is something which does not need to be provided for economically, scientifically, technologically and ideologically, that forms other than armed struggle are not typical of such a war. These forms have changed in content compared with non-nuclear wars, but they have not disappeared.

A catastrophe has no logic, laws or principles, nor can it have any. Trying to prove this is the same as forcing an open door. A catastrophe is a result of a war. The idea of a nuclear-missile catastrophe can only enlarge our notion of a nuclear war, helping us to see how senseless and monstrous such a war is. But it will not help us to see its essence. Ashes on the one side will not differ at all from ashes on the other side. A catastrophe is a catastrophe, whatever has caused it.

It is sometimes alleged that Lenin's formula of war as the continuation of politics cannot be applied to a nuclear-missile war, because such a war would spell the end of any policy and that victory cannot be its logical end. This assertion is also obviously untenable. There are quite a few examples in history showing that wars were an end to, a failure of, some or other policy. For instance, World War II proved the failure of the policy pursued by Nazi Germany. It did not occur to any one to argue that the war waged by the fascist bloc ceased to be a war just because its policy had failed, but remained a war, as we understand it, for the anti-Hitler coalition.

Denial of Lenin's methodology of understanding war in the nuclear-missile context is harmful in practical terms as well. It disarms ideologically all who come out against the threat of such a war. Such denial exonerates the policy of war preparations and renders meaningless the policy of struggle against the forces stepping up the arms race in an attempt to upset the present parity of forces and secure for themselves conditions for dealing nuclear strikes at the USSR and its allies with impunity.

Certainly, we should not think in terms of the prenuclear era today. New thinking is necessary today. But to adopt new thinking one is to approach the truth, not to depart from it. By offering the notion of "nuclear-

missile catastrophe" instead of "nuclear-missile war" Kanevsky and Shabardin move away from the truth. Therefore, not having solved the main problem for themselves, they "at every step come up against those general problems" when examining partial problems. They went so far as saying that "there is so far no scientifically substantiated concept of a nuclear-missile war". How can one, being ignorant of the existence of such a concept, talk seriously about present-day war and peace issues? What is the use, then, of all our military policy of preventing a nuclear-missile war, our military doctrine, all our practical measures without such a scientifically-grounded concept?

The concept of nuclear-missile war does exist and is being constantly developed on the basis of Lenin's methodology of understanding war. The Soviet people know the main things about nuclear-missile war. They have an idea of its possible causes, its essence, its social character and sources, its scope and consequences. Invaluable work has been done by Soviet scientists and their colleagues abroad to study and describe the consequences of a possible nuclear war. Their analysis provides a convincing confirmation of Lenin's provision that the use of the latest achievements of science and technology for military purposes would undermine the very foundations of human society (V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 219) and it bears out the conclusion made at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU that war cannot and must not be used as a method of settling international disputes.

Nuclear-missile war is an unusual, exceptional, phenomenon, whose features, as regards both politics and mass destruction weapons, are changing rapidly. Therefore the study of war, which presents the greatest threat to mankind today, is an extremely important task. And one of the main conditions of accomplishing this task is the dialectical proposition that "war is simply the continuation of politics by other [i. e., violent] means".

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THERE IS NOTHING OF BETTER PRACTICAL VALUE THAN GOOD METHODOLOGY

THE PUBLICATION OF THE ARTICLE "The Correlation of Politics, War and a Nuclear Catastrophe" by Boris Kanevsky and Pyotr Shabardin has placed the February issue of *International Affairs* among current bestsellers. It is good to know that not only illustrated magazines but also theoretical political journals are becoming widely read. This is not accidental, for the subject of that article transcends the limits of problems that are of interest to experts alone and is at the crossroads of many sciences. It has evoked interest and set off heated debate among political scientists, sociologists, philosophers, and military researchers.

Among the undoubted merits of the article is that its authors have displayed creative quest, have abandoned declarative interpretations, and have shown a constructive approach and a wish to examine their arguments from all sides and soundly substantiate them. In this connection I should like to stress the methodological responsibility of the authors who have approached in a new way the problem which is not only of interdisciplinary value, but also is most significant for a theoretical comprehension of the top-priority issue of our time, as well as for formulating the defence and foreign policies of the socialist state in the nuclear and space

era. In this context the authors' attempt to prove that war fought by conventional weapons cannot be identified with nuclear war looks productive.

Evidently the development of a theoretical concept of war in the nuclear and space era should be based on a fundamental methodological principle, on an approach which would perform the role of a universal platform for comparative analysis of war and a nuclear catastrophe as social phenomena. Such a principle, assumedly, may be a principle of activity; and such an approach may be a so-called activity approach.

The essence of the principle of activity and of the activity approach, widely applied by the classics of Marxism-Leninism in studying social phenomena and processes, is that, as is known, the mode of the existence of society is the activity of people. Outside activity no society can exist in whatever state. That a nuclear-missile catastrophe can only be the activity of social forces (in the event such weapons are deliberately used) is beyond doubt. But, perhaps, the authors of the article were not exactly correct to assert that nuclear-missile catastrophe "is not only natural (ecological), but also social in character" (p. 98). To be sure, mass use of nuclear weapons would have irreversible environmental and social consequences, but in essence such a catastrophe is regarded only as social. This being so, the activity approach is not merely applicable but serves as the basis for revealing some substantial characteristics of nuclear-missile catastrophe as a social phenomenon. In particular, it allows one to perceive its main structural elements as variants of the activity process and to determine its specifics with regard to non-nuclear war.

Structural elements of any specific activity are the subject, the object, the goal, the means, and the result. These elements are invariant and are present in any activity, including a nuclear-missile catastrophe. If we make a comparative analysis of war and catastrophe according to these structural elements, it will become obvious that their goals, means and results differ, or at least are not identical. The authors write about this convincingly to prove that a nuclear catastrophe cannot be a means of politics, that political goals are unattainable in it, and that it cannot result in a military victory (p. 97). But the authors have not resolved the question of the subject and the object of a catastrophe. Moreover, when catastrophe is viewed by them as a "fatal form of social violence" (p. 98), their concept leads to the conclusion that such violence has no object. And this means that either nuclear catastrophe is not violence at all, or that violence itself is something abstract and void of content.

By applying the activity approach this problem can be solved, if the indisputable fact that precisely imperialism and the military-industrial complex are the subject of catastrophe is substantiated. This has become even more obvious after the USSR assumed an obligation, formalised in the military doctrine of our state and the Warsaw Treaty as a whole, to refrain from the first use of nuclear arms. The object of catastrophe is the whole of mankind, entire civilisation. I believe that some contradictions in the article can be removed and explained, if we reason this way. Unfortunately, in the authors' conception there are quite a few contradictions that need to be specified or given more substantiated argumentation. Some of them are a matter of principle.

As they set out to prove, for instance, that nuclear-missile catastrophe is not a continuation of politics by violent means (pp. 97, 98), that it has its "own" objective basis (p. 98), the authors at the same time make a diametrically opposite assertion that "it [nuclear-missile catastrophe—V. L.] should not certainly be isolated from politics" (p. 98), and that "in reality, the root causes of both nuclear-missile catastrophe and war are identical" (p. 98). But the profound source and the basis of non-nuclear war are politics and, therefore, a nuclear conflict is linked with politics. Evidently the relationship among politics, war and nuclear-missile ca-

tastrophe is nonetheless more changeable and more dialectical. Meanwhile the rejection of the political component of this catastrophe by the authors, who name as its direct cause the contradiction "between the outstanding achievements... and the lagging social, intellectual and moral development of mankind..." (p. 98) leads to rejection of political goals also in the imperialist military activities in peacetime to prepare such a catastrophe, in nuclear militarisation, in the arms race, and so on, that is, it gives grounds for talk about "equal responsibility" of the forces of socialism and those of imperialism for a possible catastrophe.

Despite all these flaws, the article, apart from its theoretical importance and timeliness, is, I should say, of consolidating value. The demand placed by the 27th CPSU Congress on social scientists to elaborate fundamental questions of our time pertains in full measure to the problems examined in the article. Now that political and military problems become increasingly intertwined and merge together, it is most important that military theoreticians and civilian political scientists pool their efforts in formulating a comprehensive theoretical concept of military-political activity and of the interrelationship between military and political factors in the nuclear and space era. Problems of war and nuclear-missile catastrophe are not a "special issue" which is of interest only to specialists in military science. Today, priority is given to a comprehensive analysis of the essence of nuclear conflict, to a theoretical substantiation of the principle of sufficiency for defence and to other aspects requiring a theoretical breakthrough in the framework of new political thinking. Such a breakthrough can and should be made not by making retaliatory accusations of militarism or pacifism, but in productive joint work. And *International Affairs* has made an important step in this direction.

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A CAUSE FOR REFLECTION

THE ARTICLE "The Correlation of Politics, War and a Nuclear Catastrophe" by Boris Kanevsky and Pyotr Shabardin, in our opinion, signals a definite breakthrough of new political thinking also into the sphere of theory, which, as we all know, deals with categories like essence and regularities. In fact, this is a military-philosophical article. However, philosophical analysis based on the dialectical materialistic method is effective above all in that it allows one to study paradoxical situations and "borderline" phenomena, that is, boldly to intervene in the sphere of transformation of more profound essences which previously seemed unchangeable.

We agree with the central idea of the article: world nuclear-missile conflict, as it is seen today, is not war, but *socio-ecological catastrophe*, a catastrophe caused by a definite policy. Furthermore, if such a catastrophe does erupt, it will spell a catastrophe of politics, no matter what would cause it—either the decision of a subject of politics or uncontrolled functioning of the technical systems nurtured by those politics.

It is necessary to single out from the vast variety of past, present and, alas, future wars the *type of war* which was, but which now ceases to be (or has already ceased to be) a continuation of politics by means of armed violence, that is, which is no longer a war but is turning into a different phenomenon with a different essence. We mean, of course, the notion of modern world war with a broad use of so-called nuclear strike weapons. Naturally, we do not speak here of a world war without the broad use of this type of weapons, or without nuclear weapons altogether, which is

theoretically possible at present or in the future (taking into account also the consequences of the destruction of nuclear power plants). Moreover, the same theory does not rule out the possibility of waging, in a not so distant future, a world war with entirely different kinds of new-generation strategic arms. Then such a war may again become a war in the old sense, that is, a continuation of politics by the means of armed violence of such a quality that it can be hoped that the human race would survive. But in this case we think the authors are right as they say that nuclear-missile catastrophe is a fatal form of social violence with regard to the whole of mankind, namely, a form of suicide committed by those who would start this violence (the militarists and the big military-industrial bourgeoisie) and of a forceful destruction of the remaining, overwhelmingly greater part of mankind.

The evolution of military-technical thought in the era of the scientific and technological revolution has taken modern nuclear-strike technology beyond the limits of political acceptability. But the problem is not only that nuclear-missile war has grown out of the limits of the phenomenon of war and of politics that have caused it and has become a socio-ecological catastrophe. In the new conditions we are faced with the task of determining a proper correlation between purely political thinking and military-technical thinking. The two world social systems are trying to solve this problem in two basically different ways. Socialism and other progressive peace forces see that it is possible in principle for the world community to prevent a nuclear conflict, and therefore they seek to design appropriate measures and find means of *averting* such a catastrophe. To imperialism the problem is to find *ways of putting the world war back into the framework of politics*, above all by improving the existing and developing new military weapons and equipment as well as by political measures. The advocates of this approach refuse to recognise that it is impossible to by-pass the nuclear dead-end by using technical means, and that to stake on some evolution of world nuclear conflict is no less dangerous than to plan a nuclear conflict.

The CPSU has advanced the only acceptable, that is political, way of preventing a nuclear catastrophe by establishing a comprehensive system of collective security. It fits well into the conception of a law-governed, irresistible and irreversible process in which the very system of relations in the world community will reach a level at which world war will be politically impossible for our civilisation. Today, we already see how world politics is going over slowly and painfully to a new attitude to present-day realities. But mankind will evidently have to exert immense efforts to make this new attitude yield the anticipated results—universal peace as a consequence of complete disarmament. It will be then that policy-induced socio-ecological catastrophe, set off by the operation of nuclear-strike systems, will become nothing more than a frightening fact of our past.

Socialism is faced with the problem of defending itself not in a nuclear world war, as it is believed by some, but of defending itself and the whole of mankind from such a war, or, as we know now, from a nuclear catastrophe. The defence of the gains of socialism and the world revolutionary process from attacks by reactionary forces can and should be conducted in all its main forms—political, economic and intellectual. This defence is never to be carried on by military means, unless, of course, the socialist countries themselves become an object of an armed attack.

As the historical competition between the two socio-political systems has been expanding and growing deeper, greater significance is attached to defending socialism in the other spheres. And the more the effectiveness of the economic growth of the USSR and the other socialist countries approximates world standards, the firmer their positions in the scientific and technological contest with modern capitalism, the more daring and better

argumented the advocacy of the ideals and advantages of socialism, the more secure the defence of socialist gains will be. To achieve this, the social and economic development of our countries and the restructuring process in them should be speeded up. All this demands peaceful conditions.

To rule out war and establish peace on earth is a major task of socialism. Socialism, according to its nature, does not need wars and never associates its future with a military solution of international problems. It stands for settling all international disputes only by peaceful, political means.

The Warsaw Treaty countries, admitting that mankind has been confronted with the problem of survival and aware that a world war, particularly a nuclear war, would be catastrophic not only for the countries directly involved in a conflict, but also for life on Earth are responding to the demand of the times, to the needs of defending socialism and peace, by adopting a defensive military doctrine. Based on the principles of justice, humaneness and sufficiency, it is, in fact, an anti-war doctrine. The purpose of this doctrine is that war must be prevented and in future be ultimately eliminated from the life of humanity. Our military doctrine confirms once again that the vigorous and realistic peace-keeping foreign policy, pursued by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, plus their military might serving the positive purposes of defence are in dialectical unity. Therefore the authors of the article are quite right to say that our defence policy and the military doctrine that follows from it mean that we should be prepared for defending the socialist Motherland and at the same time work to prevent nuclear catastrophe.

So we consider the article by Boris Kanevsky and Pyotr Shabardin most timely and important, not only making it possible to overcome the present difficult situation in military philosophical knowledge, but initiating also a new trend in it.

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NO MORE WINNERS, NO MORE WARS

NOW THAT ABOUT 50,000 warheads have been stockpiled in the nuclear arsenals of the world, their total yield being equivalent to 13 billion tons of TNT, or one million "Hiroshima bombs", life insistently demands that the old notions of war and peace be given up and a new approach be adopted to the problems on whose solution the very existence of mankind depends. In this context the *International Affairs* journal displayed a useful initiative when it launched a discussion on its pages of problems concerning the interrelationship of war and politics in the nuclear age. Not all the positions of the authors who started the discussion are indisputable, of course, and there is a good deal in their article that requires additional research. But it is not the nuances that matter today. The main thing is that the approach adopted by the authors allows one to have a clearer idea of the contradictory realities of the modern world, helping to develop a correct socio-political orientation of the popular masses. Therefore I would like to support the concept put forward by the two authors and give additional arguments in its favour.

It is most important in this case to stress the initial idea of the authors—the building of a new storey in the edifice of a theory should not

be started with destroying its foundation. For it has been proved on many occasions that current social phenomena and processes unknown in the past do not in the least disprove the fundamental conclusions made by the classics of Marxism-Leninism, but only require their deeper analysis. One such conclusion is the characteristic of interrelationship of war and politics given by Lenin, in particular, the recognition that war is the continuation of politics by other, violent, means (See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 219). This clear-cut formula has a very rich content, and can not become a thing of the past though some authors declare it outdated.

First, the close attention which is quite understandably being paid to ways of averting a nuclear conflagration cannot make one forget that the world still suffers from regional conflicts. In the period between 1945 and 1986, about 250 wars erupted in the world, involving almost 90 states and causing death to over 35 million people. Therefore one should not adopt an attitude of "nuclear haughtiness" and forget about local wars, or regard them merely as a prelude to a possible nuclear conflict. All the more so since so-called "low intensity conflicts" figure prominently in the aggressive strategy of imperialism and in the neoglobalist course pursued by Washington.

Besides, according to the military strategic views current in the United States and NATO, a world war fought only by conventional weapons is admissible. This is precisely the meaning of the Rogers doctrine envisaging a massive strike against the troops of the USSR and the Warsaw Treaty throughout their echelons in order to incapacitate them before they can fight back.

Second, the very scientific methodology of cognising war and peace issues, epitomised in the above-mentioned formula, is not reduced to this formula alone. "War is the continuation of politics", stressed Lenin. This means that it is inseparable from social contradictions in the world. And therefore one should be able to see clearly those quite definite social forces, groups and organisations that create the war threat.

The policy pursued by imperialist circles, which are prepared to sacrifice the future of whole nations, threatens mankind with a global armed conflict in which there would be no winners or losers and in which world civilisation would perish. A comprehension of the political essence of war explains why the struggle against it, as it was noted at the 27th CPSU Congress, is a political task.

Today's existing weapon systems seriously limit the possibilities for political decision making in crisis situations and increase the risk of a non-sanctioned conflict. As a result of the continued stockpiling and improvement of nuclear arms "the situation in the world may assume such a character that it will no longer depend upon the intelligence or will of political leaders" (*Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress*, p. 83).

But it would be entirely wrong to conclude that war is being "depoliticised". On the one hand, the emergence of such weapons and the development of new ones, including the notorious SDI programme, are a result of political decisions. Incidentally, to determine the scope and methods of using them is also the prerogative of politics. And even a non-sanctioned conflict would still develop according to the scenarios designed by man and fed into computer memory. The concepts of "massive retaliation", "flexible response", "limited nuclear war", "direct confrontation", "star wars" and others had been conceived precisely in politics. The Soviet Union has always been strongly opposed to any kind of nuclear conflict.

On the other hand, the danger that a technical fault may bring about a worldwide conflict is directly proportional to the level of world tensions.

Therefore it is important to stress the proposition formulated in the CPSU programme: "It is not science and technology in themselves that pose a threat to peace. This threat is posed by imperialism and its policy, the policy of the most reactionary militarist, aggressive forces of our time" (*The Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, p. 22).

A definition of war as the continuation of politics means that its outcome—the victory of one side and the defeat of the other—consolidates the changed balance of strength and produces a new political situation. Yes, this is the way it has always been in wars, and will be, until it comes to the use of nuclear weapons. In the latter instance confrontation may culminate in apocalyptic disasters. That is why Boris Kanevsky and Pyotr Shabardin are absolutely right to say that nuclear-missile conflict *is not war*. What can be said in support of this conclusion? Without claiming to have all the answers, I should like to draw your attention to the following two arguments.

First, the main content of the war concept is armed struggle in which states use in an organised way their military might, above all weapons and troops. Meanwhile the realities of the nuclear age are increasingly being recognised in public consciousness. This is how these realities have been formulated by International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War: nuclear bombs are not weapons, they are instruments of genocide; to possess them does not mean to possess military might; their stockpiling does not guarantee superiority.

Second, by contrast with a war, in a nuclear-missile conflict there can be neither winners nor losers. It will not only wipe off whole cities and countries, but will destroy man's habitat. Our planet would never again be fit for life. The situation in the nuclear age is such that the one who pushes the "button" to launch a massive nuclear strike is sure to die himself of its consequences later, even if the enemy does not strike back.

The historical challenge of the times is that "at a certain point (and mankind has evidently reached it) there comes a limit to war" (D. Volkogonov, "Nuclear Age Imperatives", *Krasnaya Zvezda*, May 22, 1987). Beyond that limit, power politics grows into a qualitatively different phenomenon which lies outside the "war-peace" dichotomy. War and peace are two opposite states of society. But a nuclear-missile conflict is an end to any state of society—it is self-destruction of society.

In the present day conditions victory by one and all states is determined not by the capability of defeating the enemy in armed struggle but by the art of avoiding it. So the nuclear danger can be lessened, and then averted, only through joint efforts. This prompts us to reach the only logical conclusion: ideological and political differences should not block the way to a dialogue and agreement among different social and class forces for the sake of mankind's survival.

Mankind is worthy of a better fate than to be a hostage, or even a victim, of nuclear horror and despair. But to prevent the coming of a "doomsday", the policy of detente, disarmament and destruction of lethal arsenals must prevail in the world. Such is the imperative of the nuclear age. As socialism follows this imperative, the class interests of socialism as a new social system merge with the common interests of the whole of mankind. And for capitalism there is no reasonable alternative other than coexistence and competition.

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TAKE A FULLER ACCOUNT OF NUCLEAR AGE REALITIES

THE CONCISE DEFINITION of war as a continuation of politics by other means, presented by German military theorist Karl von Clausewitz, had long been used as a category of military-political thinking by many generations in the 19th and 20th centuries. Having filled this formula with class content, the founders of Marxism-Leninism made wide use of it. It proved to be correct when the military-political events of the two world wars and many local conflicts of our time were analysed. And still, this definition "works" only in a concrete historical context. Therefore we consider it useful that Boris Kanevsky and Pyotr Shabardin assert that "the war as the continuation of politics' formula has been so much deformed by the realities of the nuclear age that, in terms of its essence, content and functions, it proves to be unfit for understanding what is usually termed a nuclear-missile war" (*International Affairs*, February 1988, p. 97). One cannot help agreeing with their approach to nuclear-missile war as a special kind of catastrophe and the relevant conclusions about the different purposes of the structural elements of the armed forces of nuclear states. The article is to some extent a departure from a number of stereotypes that had been adopted in this sphere and stimulate further quest, comparison of different opinions, and discussion. In this connection we should like to express a few of our own ideas.

1. To make an in-depth analysis of the problem raised in that article, one must fully overcome the desire, which some researchers still have, to place armed conflicts and military strategies in the Procrustean bed of the traditional definition of war as a social phenomenon. Such an approach leads to many negative results: a) development of scholastic military-political conceptions isolated from reality and practically void of specific historical analysis; b) support for military doctrines oriented towards conducting wars at present and in future, including nuclear wars, which influences the building of corresponding structures of armed forces; c) piling up of unresolved theoretical and practical foreign-policy problems; d) emergence of negative phenomena in social consciousness, such as pseudo-pacifist tendencies, a declining level of military-patriotic education, etc.

Scientific analysis shows that war as a phenomenon in constantly changing socio-political and military-technical conditions is also changing, both in essence and in its manifestations. This complex and contradictory process is expressed by two interrelated tendencies.

First, at present, wars, including "conventional" ones, cease to be a reasonable means of achieving political goals. The existence of two opposite systems and the military strategic parity between them ensured by nuclear missiles have made it absurd to stake on a victory in a world and nuclear war. Moreover, in these conditions the possibility of achieving political ends even in limited wars and conflicts is called in question. War, wrote Clausewitz, is a serious means of "achieving a serious political goal". (Karl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1936, Vol. I, p. 52, in Russian.) But setting such goals protracts a war for many years, with ever diminishing chances for success. Even civil wars, being waged in many developing countries, are becoming ever more protracted and ineffective, especially if the belligerents are supported from outside. War tends to "die down", turning into a kind of "semiwar", and often becomes a risk factor, which can spark off a conflict between nuclear powers.

Second, war is evidently approaching a limit in its development, including global war. And if it is unleashed after all by the extremely reactionary forces of imperialism, it will be the last war in the history of our planet. Thus, in the conditions when the emergence of nuclear weapons and the threat of their being used jeopardize the very existence of mankind, war can become a form of social violence capable of deforming or losing altogether its political content.

2. One should more resolutely overcome the traditional views on nuclear war as almost a usual thing. And these views are being spread not only by ill-intentioned militarist propaganda men in the West, but, unwittingly, also by those who talk much of its specifics, as if they speak not about a hypothetical phenomenon, but about a real war of a classical type, waged strictly in accordance with the rules of traditional warfare.

Something altogether different is required of those who are concerned in earnest over the fate of peace: they must fully acknowledge the undeniable truth that a possible nuclear war will be most harmful for civilisation, that no policy must be pursued in such a way, for in this case mankind will see that "absolute image of war" about which Clausewitz had spoken. "If it [war] would be a perfect, unrestricted and absolute manifestation of violence," he wrote, "as we defined it on the basis of an abstract notion, then from its very beginning it would take directly the place of the policy that had caused it, to become something entirely independent of it. War would oust the policy and then, following its own laws, it would, not be subject to any control or guidance, like an exploded mine, but would depend entirely on the organisation given to it at the time of its preparation" (Karl von Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 53).

One can hardly doubt today the correctness and relevancy of this observation. Nonetheless, some insist in earnest that even in the new conditions nuclear war remains a continuation of a policy, a policy that is reckless and venturesome. One can understand the wish of these authors to point out with the help of a traditional formula the source of nuclear danger, such as the policy pursued by the ultra-right imperialist reactionaries. But in that case one would expect them to speak only of the cause-and-effect relationship, which, naturally, does not in the least reflect the whole essence of a possible nuclear war. As we see it, the chief purpose of scientific studies in this sphere is not in elaborating in detail, on a military theoretical and military doctrinal level, the concept of waging a nuclear war, but in elaborating a theoretical political concept by pointing out the possibility of a nuclear conflict as a possible variant of developing international relations, a concept which would block the operation of factors that can lead mankind to self-destruction.

In this context the nuclear deterrence concept, which still underlies the military policy of the United States and NATO, looks profoundly immoral. Preparedness to wage nuclear wars and the very possibility of such wars are regarded in this concept as a factor of "safeguarding peace", while the nuclear potential is seen as a factor of "containing aggression". Due to this, the nuclear disarmament process is slowed down, and the USSR, having pledged itself not to be the first to deal a nuclear strike, is compelled to adhere to the strategy of a retaliation nuclear strike.

Current literature in the West on military theory is full of ideas about a limited or unlimited war, nuclear deterrence, nuclear strategy, and so on. All sorts of theories can be found in it—from attempts to prove that a nuclear war can be won to a detailed description of, for instance, what the USA would do after a "World War III". But whenever Soviet authors present their own interpretation of nuclear war problems, they are immediately accused of the greatest of all sins—of orienting the army towards nuclear war preparations, toward delivering surprise nuclear strikes, etc. One can read about inconceivable horrors as regards the "true aims" of

Soviet military policy in publications by Western authors. Here is but one example. The Soviet leadership is alleged to believe that "an atomic war will be followed by a revolution" and to admit the possibility of a "destruction of the proletariat of all countries" as a result of a nuclear war, and so on. These and other provocative lies can be found in a book by Hans Jurgen Schulz of the FRG, entitled *Soviet Military Might* (Hans Jurgen Schulz, *Die sowjetische Militärmacht*, Frankfurt am Main, 1985, pp. 192, 213).

All who are aware of their responsibility for the fate of mankind should resolutely oppose scholastic exercises and speculations with regard to nuclear war issues. In this sense an idea in the article which caused this reasoning sounds wise and thoroughly considered: "...the dialectics of evolution of the institution of war has led to a situation where a conflict involving the use of nuclear weapons objectively becomes a self-negation of war, its evolvement into a global catastrophe" (p. 97).

3. The realities of the nuclear age insistently demand that military political thought be redirected towards the problems of preventing war. Following the decisions of the Berlin meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty, this problem has been given the status of a doctrinal principle. Despite the desire of the extremist circles in the imperialist states to preserve the policy of confrontation in the near future, there is a possibility of restraining the more dangerous forms of militarism. This was convincingly demonstrated in the report made by Mikhail Gorbachev at the celebration meeting devoted to the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

The ultimate goal of the war prevention strategy is to create a system of universal international security. This system must be built under conditions of military and political detente, ensuring security by political means while the military mechanism will still be preserved if only for defence by the means sufficient for repelling aggression. Security, if it is achieved through building up military might, not to mention the use of this might in the international arena, becomes a military danger to all. Brinkmanship, mutual intimidation through retaliation strikes, and military confrontation are alien to civilised relations among states.

In the new political thinking "war" should be an alarming word left over from the confrontational past of mankind's history. Even now war is often viewed as an object of influence by the policy of security with the aim of ruling out violence from the life of the world community and from interstate relations in general. War can be eliminated as an outdated phenomenon only through the joint efforts of all nations. And then peace, as a natural state of civilisation, will take its place.

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UNTAPPED OPPORTUNITIES

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Mutually beneficial economic cooperation between countries with different social and political systems is both an important factor for the normal functioning of the world economy and a major prerequisite for the establishment of a system of international economic security. Proceeding from the objective need for the further development of the international division of labour conditioned by the growth of the world's productive forces and the internationalisation of economic life, the Soviet Union seeks more extensive business contacts with all countries without exception, and hence with developed capitalist countries as well. Generally speaking, participation in the international division of labour is today, in the age of the scientific and technological revolution, a universally important means of accelerating scientific and technological progress and promoting on its basis the growth of productive forces and social labour productivity.

The Soviet Union's experience of foreign economic activities has confirmed the existence of a certain interdependence. as a rule, the more fruitfully economic relations with a country are developed, the more favourable the climate of political relations with it becomes. By the same token, higher-level of political relations make for stronger economic ties. Soviet-US trading and economic relations are a striking example of how politics influences the economic sphere.

Available statistics indicate that Soviet-US trade is far behind our trade with many other industrialised capitalist countries. In 1986, the US share in Soviet foreign trade turnover did not exceed one per cent and as for our country's share in US foreign trade, it fell short of 0.5 per cent. Trade turnover hit a record low, dropping from 31 billion rubles in 1984 to 1.5 billion rubles in 1986, according to preliminary data. In the first eight months of 1987, the United States exported 995 million dollars' worth of goods to the Soviet Union while its import of Soviet goods amounted to a mere \$257 million. The *San Francisco Chronicle* noted that this was roughly 39 per cent less than in the corresponding period of 1986. Reciprocal trade in 1987 amounted to nearly one-third of the 1984 volume.¹

Soviet exports to the United States and US export to the Soviet Union have followed a definite pattern due to a number of economic and political causes. Over the past several years, more than two-thirds of Soviet imports from the United States consisted of grain (primarily fodder grain) and soy-beans. True, while in 1979 the USA accounted for 70 per cent of Soviet grain imports, in 1984 its share dropped to 40 per cent. Whereas in 1984 and 1985 the Soviet Union was the second biggest importer of US grain, in 1986 it slipped to twelfth place. The value of grain deliveries declined from \$1.9 billion in 1985 to \$650 million in 1986.² This was due primarily to high prices for US grain and

the US administration's refusal to subsidise grain exports to the Soviet Union. In part, it was also the result of a Soviet effort to extend the range of its grain suppliers so as to safeguard itself against attempts made in the past to use deliveries as a means of political pressure.

The share of machinery and equipment in Soviet imports from the United States fell from 31 per cent in 1976 to four per cent in 1984. In 1986, US exports of machines and transport equipment to the Soviet Union cost \$160 million only.³ In addition, since the late 1970s over half this amount consisted of spare parts for machinery and equipment delivered earlier. In the same period no major order for a complete set of equipment was placed with the United States.

Ammonia is the chief Soviet export to the United States; deliveries in 1985 amounted to a value of \$131 million.⁴ Soviet exports to the USA also include carbamide, light fuels, palladium, leaded gasoline, naphthas, heavy fuels, rhodium, orthoxylene, crabmeal products and certain other items.⁵

A substantial part of trade (about 20 per cent) has been carried on in recent years under long-term compensation agreements signed in the 1970s with Occidental Petroleum (on US deliveries of superphosphorous acid and Soviet deliveries of mineral fertilisers) and Pepsico (on Soviet deliveries of spirits and US deliveries of soft drink concentrates). Here, it must be noted that all Soviet deliveries under these agreements were at various periods either restricted by the US administration or banned altogether. In 1980 there were bans on deliveries of ammonia, superphosphorous acid and vodka; in 1985 the ban affected the export of potassium chloride and in 1986, that of carbamide. Soviet-US trade is still imbalanced due to a considerable excess of US exports (a value of \$1.2 billion in 1986) over imports from the Soviet Union (\$605 million).⁶

Such a situation in trade and economic relations with the United States is due to the virtual absence of an appropriate contractual and legal basis and to the US side's discriminatory policy towards the Soviet Union. As a consequence of the adoption of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the US Trade Act of 1974, which made most-favoured-nation treatment of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries conditional on changing their emigration regulations in a direction acceptable to certain US legislators, Soviet commodities are at a clear disadvantage on the US market. Specifically, customs tariffs on a fairly large group of items which we would like to and could supply to the United States are from two to five times higher than those imposed on countries enjoying a most-favoured-nation status. As a result, the Soviet Union is compelled to export to the United States mainly raw materials which are subject to either no duty or to payment of minimum duties. Another amendment, known as the Stivenson Amendment, reduced to the minimum the opportunities for the US Export-Import Bank to grant credits for trade with the Soviet Union.⁷

Recent years have witnessed a trend towards raising further obstacles to the export of certain Soviet commodities and services to the United States; time and again, various bans have been imposed on them. There were periods when the United States banned imports of Soviet furs, nickel, gold coins and prohibited American companies from accepting Soviet offers to launch commercial satellites by means of Soviet carrier rockets. Our country has repeatedly been accused of "dumping" potassium chloride, carbamide, and other items on the US market, subsidising potassium chloride exports and breaking market rules in selling ferrosilicon.

Some people in the USA argue that reciprocal trade is much more important to the Soviet Union than to the United States since it allegedly enables the former to build up its economic and military potential. This explains why the United States, which regards trade and other economic relations as an instrument of political pressure, had tried to establish a pattern of bilateral trade which would deny the Soviet Union access to latest equipment and technologies, make our country increasingly dependent on US grain deliveries and preserve a solid US advantage in trade with the Soviet Union.

Discrimination expresses itself in the US side offering trade credits on extremely unfavourable terms, refusing to grant the Soviet Union a most-favoured-nation status, raising all sorts of barriers to imports and imposing rigid export controls.

The changes in export controls which the present US administration introduced consist primarily in switching from bans on sales of equipment and other items to curbing the transfer of technological know-how and excluding from authorised exports those items which reflect the latest achievements of science and technology.

In 1986, the United States passed an Export Administration Act extending the President's powers regarding the application of diverse discriminatory measures in trade and economic relations against socialist countries and shutting the US market to the products of foreign companies guilty of breaking US legislation concerning deliveries of sophisticated equipment to socialist countries. The act provides for stricter rules of operation rendering the Coordinating Committee for Control over Strategic Exports to Socialist Countries (COCOM) more efficient. Lastly, under the new act a department is to be set up in the Pentagon for the express purpose of overseeing the export activities of US companies.

Revealingly, the Pentagon's role in the regulation of US exports has visibly increased in the past few years. A directive issued in March 1984 vested the Department of Defense with greater power to decide on the requests of companies wishing to export products of potential military significance to 15 non-communist countries.⁸ The Pentagon has long exercised the right of control over such exports directly to socialist countries.

Acting on the initiative of former Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle, a COCOM meeting in October 1985 resolved to set up within that organisation a special agency called the Security and Technology Experts Meeting (STEM), and to empower it to make recommendations on banning the export of various equipment or technologies to socialist countries in accordance with its own estimation of their "likely military employment". And whereas earlier COCOM revised only once every three years its lists of items "not recommended" for export to socialist countries, now the time period between revisions will be reduced to several months.

In trying within the framework of COCOM to induce the West to adopt a "common" position on trade and economic relations with the Soviet Union (that is, a position based on that of the United States), Washington is also out to prevent its allies and competitors from expanding trade with the Soviet Union, rob them of markets and profitable contracts and weaken them economically. US curbs cause telling damage to West European and Japanese business. This is why the question on the binding nature of US export control legislation for all Western countries has lately turned into a particularly pointed issue. For instance, the Swedish public and business circles plainly resented the new rules which were imposed on Sweden by the United States in 1986 aimed at influencing that country's foreign trade. These rules prohibit,

among other things, transit through Sweden of US high technology products and deliveries of Swedish-made equipment to socialist countries if so much as one part of it is of American make.⁹

In May 1987, Washington accused a Norwegian state-owned company, Kongsberg, and the Japanese mechanical engineering firm Toshiba Kikai of violating COCOM bans by selling the Soviet Union technology which allegedly made it possible to reduce the noise of Soviet submarine propeller screws, thereby complicating their detection in the oceans.¹⁰ The Norwegian government was forced to promptly reorganise its company in order to safeguard it against likely US attacks. In Japan it was not only Toshiba Kikai that was victimised but mediating firms, Ichochu Shoji, Wako Koeki and others; the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry took harsh disciplinary action against them.

Many experts believe that the policy of tightening export controls and economic sanctions ultimately runs counter to US national interests, causes material and moral damage to American companies and deprives them of profitable contracts, most of which go to competitors. Besides, such a policy undermines the reputation of American companies as reliable partners. According to data released by a number of US Senators, export control measures rob the United States of 188,000 jobs and translate into a \$9 billion reduction of foreign trade turnover.

Within US business community there has lately been evidence of a certain recognition of the adverse effects of this trade policy, with the result that those in favour of liberalising trade with the Soviet Union are becoming somewhat more vocal. Major organisations of American business and a number of industrial associations insist on adding to the draft of a new export administration act a reservation about the inviolability of the earlier contracts.

In view of the growing sentiment among US businessmen in favour of greater cooperation with the Soviet Union, the US administration has somewhat relaxed its uncompromisingly tough position on its trade and economic policy. On January 15, 1987, it announced a decision to lift its nine-year-old restrictions on deliveries of oil and gas equipment to the Soviet Union. It admitted that control over the export of such equipment and technology was not in keeping with the country's national interests, since it had worsened the position of the gas and oil machine-building industries of the United States.

The United States' partial revision of its doctrine of economic relations between East and West was no doubt conditioned by the growing instability of the world capitalist economy, the exacerbation of economic contradictions both within the United States and between imperialist countries, the mounting deficit of US foreign trade and the fact that US business is drawn to the capacious Soviet market with its promise of profit.

US experts believe, nevertheless, that an appreciable expansion of trade between the two great powers in the foreseeable future is unlikely. Many of them allege that this is because the Soviet Union produces very little of what the United States needs. They believe that Soviet goods are still no match to Western products as far as quality is concerned and that the Soviet Union has yet to organise a proper study of foreign economic information, thereby making it difficult for Soviet foreign trade organisations to operate successfully on the US market.¹¹

It should be admitted that Soviet industry does not use the potentialities of the country's economy effectively enough to make its output more competitive. "The share of the USSR in world trade," says the Decision of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers On Measures for a Radical Improvement of Foreign Economic

Activities, "does not correspond to the level or the requirements of economic development. The utilisation of the export potential of the manufacturing industry, primarily mechanical engineering, is unsatisfactory. The changeover to extensive scientific, technological and production cooperation is proceeding too slowly."¹²

In step with the adoption of intensive methods of development by the Soviet economy, the pattern of trade with foreign countries should be improved primarily by exporting more machinery, equipment and other products with a high standard of processing. This was noted in the Guidelines for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1986-1990 and for the Period Ending in 2000.¹³

Our country has recently adopted large-scale measures to greatly improve the quality of output; the number of products meeting the highest standards of quality and sophistication is to double in the next few years. "We have increased investments in our mechanical engineering two-fold, and as for computers, we have in some cases invested as much as from five to seven times more than before," Mikhail Gorbachev told American businessmen during his Washington visit. "We are developing all these advanced technologies and progressive lines to end the lag."¹⁴

Yet even now the Soviet Union could supply the United States with perfectly competitive products: metal-working, power-generating and mining equipment, some types of passenger cars, farm machinery, research instruments and certain consumer goods. However, US legislation still in force virtually bars these products from the country's market.

Many US experts agree that the Soviet Union is equal to overcoming its economic difficulties. They point out that we export tractors to Britain and the United States, supply hydro-foils to 40 different countries and sell nuclear reactors, hydroelectric power stations, steel plants, digital programmed control machine-tools, integrated circuits, etc. US firms have purchased Soviet licences for new technologies used in welding and in the smelting and casting of iron, steel and aluminium. They are also showing an interest in Soviet achievements in electric machine engineering, in which our country is ahead of the West on some items.¹⁵

US companies would like to purchase Soviet licences for the manufacture of coke ovens, the resistance welding of large-diameter cross-country pipelines, underground coal gasification, and a most recently developed unique method of surgical stitching. It is indicative that the rails of the Washington subway were welded according to a technology purchased in the Soviet Union, that Soviet methods of aluminium smelting are used in the US aircraft industry and that American university laboratories use Soviet microcalorimeters.

When reducing economic, scientific and technological ties with the Soviet Union (late 1970s-early 1980s), the US administration made sure to leave intact ties in certain spheres of practical interest to the United States, that is, metallurgy, thermonuclear fusion and mining. The USA's deep interest in Soviet fundamental research is exemplified by the prompt and complete translation of over 100 Soviet scientific periodicals into English.

Kiser Technologies, an American independent technological agency, persistently recommends its country's firms to pay special attention to Soviet licences on the US market, seeing them as a rich source of revolutionary technological ideas. Kiser Research President has stated: "The Russians are offering us their best technology. We will ignore it at our peril."¹⁶

Sophisticated Soviet technologies are purchased by major US companies such as Kiser Aluminum, Olin Corporation, Dresser Industries and McDermott. Argus Trading is selling Soviet integrated circuits LS-74

on the US market. Bristol-Myers, Du Pont and ZM import new patent medicines and surgical instruments from the Soviet Union. Medical Technology Development promotes unique medical equipment in the United States, as well as licences for fundamentally new methods of treatment evolved at the Moscow Research Institute of Eye Microsurgery. Bilateral talks with US companies have produced agreements on cooperation in oil and gas processing, the exploration of the continental shelf, glass ceramics production, and medicine. In 1985 an agreement was signed on resuming PANAM flights to Moscow and Aeroflot flights to the United States as of April 29, 1986. Late in September 1987, the two countries signed an agreement in Moscow on the joint commercial exploitation of Boeing-747 aircraft on the Moscow-New York route. In December 1986, the two countries signed memorandums on their intention to conclude agreements on economic cooperation between Soviet foreign trade organisations and the US firms Monsanto (fertilisers and pesticides) and Philip Morris (tobacco products). The Soyuzplodoimport association has concluded a major long-term contract with the Coca Cola Company for the advertising and sale of Soviet Lada cars in Western Europe, including Britain, with the proviso that the resulting proceeds in foreign exchange will be spent on building a new apple juice factory in Lithuania and on purchasing Coca Cola and Fanta soft drink concentrates.

Many American businessmen are of the opinion that the current five-year plan for the social and economic development of the Soviet Union offers considerable opportunities for more extensive Soviet-US trade. Specifically, the US side has noted the existence of favourable prospects for cooperation in agriculture, including interchanges of technologies for increasing grain crop productivity in difficult weather conditions and the trade of various high-efficiency machinery for the agroindustrial and closely related branches of production. The light and food industries provide substantial opportunities. Agreement has been reached with the firm Fleet Street on cooperation in the manufacture of footwear for work in aggressive environments and in the Far North.

Interest in cooperation with the Soviet Union grew among American businessmen with the adoption of measures for radical improvements in Soviet foreign economic activities. An indication of this is the fact that in 1986 nearly 20 corporations joined the American-Soviet Trade and Economic Council, including giants like McDonald's, Bankers Trust, Sun Oil Company and the Westinghouse Electric Corporation.

Some American firms are quite keen on the prospect of setting up joint enterprises on Soviet territory. The only joint enterprise formed to date is the one involving Combustion Engineering (instruments and components for automated chemical process control systems). In addition, there are protocols or letters of intent to set up joint enterprises with Occidental Petroleum (polyvinylchloride resins and potassium fertilisers, fuller extraction of oil from operating and exhausted wells), Monsanto (admixtures for the rubber and tyre industry as well as plant protecting agents), Felton International (aromatic substances and conservants), Singer (industrial and household sewing machines), and Eli Lilly (pharmaceutical preparations). Recently Occidental Petroleum, Montedison (Italy) and Marubeni Corporation (Japan) signed with Soviet foreign trade organisations a memorandum envisaging the construction of a petrochemical complex that will be the biggest in the Soviet Union.

The year 1987 was chiefly taken up with preparations for the formation of joint enterprises. Only in 1988 and 1989 will it be possible to assess the performance of such enterprises and to judge their viability.

The far-reaching plans for social and economic development being carried out in the Soviet Union and the adoption of new forms of business cooperation with other countries provide new opportunities to extend economic relations between the USSR and the United States. However, these opportunities can only be realised if a healthy political climate is created. Furthermore, it is important that the United States renounce its policy of discrimination, all sorts of bans and sanctions, and desist from attempts to use trade for political ends.

A small part of the road to a healthier political situation has already been travelled. But to quote from what Mikhail Gorbachev said at his press conference in Washington, "we cannot allow a slackening of the trend in any direction if our choice in favour of a change for the better in our relations is serious. Little has so far been done in practice to extend economic cooperation and trade. There is no reason to hope that we can carry on the political dialogue successfully without reshaping economic ties, economic relations".¹⁷

It was hardly accidental that a revitalisation of contacts between the two countries in trade and economic ties coincided with the beginning of progress at the Geneva talks on medium- and shorter-range missiles as well as with a certain overall thaw in Soviet-US relations. And it is perfectly logical that the Joint Soviet-US Summit Statement adopted during Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Washington gives notable space to trade and economic ties along with the military-strategic and political aspects of bilateral relations. The document confirmed their political will to firmly support a mutually beneficial extension of such ties.

It follows that there is now a favourable political situation in which the objective prerequisites for the development of extensive long-term trade and economic relations between the two countries can be realised in the interests of the American and Soviet peoples. Extensive trade, for its part, could become a stabilising factor in the general system of bilateral relations and help in restoring and building mutual confidence, curbing the arms race and using the scientific and technological potentials of the two countries in the interests of peace and the whole of humanity.

¹ *San Francisco Chronicle*, Dec 17, 1987

² *Business America*, March 30, 1987

³ *Ibidem*

⁴ *US Foreign Trade Statistics*, February 1986.

⁵ *Ibidem*

⁶ *Business America*, March 30, 1987

⁷ See *The New York Times* March 6 1987

⁸ *The New York Times*, Jan 13, 1985

⁹ *США экономика политика, идеология*, No 8, 1986, pp 75-78.

¹⁰ *The New York Times*, May 1, 1987, May 14, 1987

¹¹ *International Herald Tribune*, Sept 27-28, 1986

¹² *Pravda*, Sept 24, 1986

¹³ Nikolai Ryzhkov, *Guidelines for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1986-1990 and for the Period Ending in 2000*, Moscow, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1986, p 52

¹⁴ *Pravda*, Dec 12, 1987

¹⁵ G Rostizke, *Managing Moscow Guns or Goods*, New York, 1984, pp. 228-229.

¹⁶ *The New York Times*, Dec 16, 1986.

¹⁷ *Pravda*, Dec. 12, 1987

IMPORTANT PROBLEMS OF A LARGE COUNTRY

Leonid GEVELING

Nigeria is often called a "scaled down copy" of Tropical Africa. There is good reason for such a comparison since Nigeria is the most populous African country, with a population of about 100 million, and takes up an impressive area of 924,000 square kilometres. As in no other country of the continent, one clearly sees here (because of the diversified economy, uneven development of various regions, complex ethno-linguistic situation, etc.) many common features of the economic and socio-political changes taking place throughout the entire area of Africa south of the Sahara. At the same time, Nigeria is one of those African countries which are vigorously searching for an optimal model of political development. This is evidenced by the fact that during a recent nation-wide discussion of this question many proposals on Nigeria's future political system were suggested. The special attention paid by Nigerians to the prospects of their country's political development is explained, firstly, by the firm promise given by the present military administration of Major-General Ibrahim Babangida to hand over state power to a civilian government early in the 1990s and, secondly, by the hopes to put an end to the series of political cataclysms that have abounded in modern Nigeria's history.

Having gained political sovereignty, Nigeria withdrew from the British colonial empire in 1960. But under pressure from the former metropolitan power, the main principles and institutions of bourgeois parliamentary democracy were mechanically transplanted on Nigerian soil, although they did not accord either with the specificities of the population's political culture or with the level of development of social relations. The Westminster Model of state development, reflected in the Nigerian constitutions of 1960 and 1963 (the latter cancelled dominion status and proclaimed Nigeria a republic), began to function in a country where the processes of class-formation and national consolidation were by far not yet completed, where ethno-confessional problems had not been fully solved and a very wide spectrum of ideological and political trends and groupings existed.

In the first half of the 1960s, a time which would later be called the period of the First Republic, the local parties strove to form their political base essentially on a purely ethnical basis and this encouraged ethno-regional isolation and, in the end, political separatism. The profound political crisis that gripped Nigeria in the mid-1960s ended with the fall of the Alhaji Balewa government and the appearance of the military in the country's political arena. Starting in January 1966, state coups became rather frequent events in Nigeria's political life. In the twenty years between 1966 and 1985, there were five military coups, se-

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veral aborted attempts at overthrow and a number of plots revealed. As a result, three of the eight heads of government in Nigeria perished at the hands of conspirators.

The 30-month-long internecine war waged in 1967-1970 by the federal government of General Yakubu Gowon against the separatist forces of the country's Eastern Region, which proclaimed the "independence" of the so-called Republic of Biafra, became a real tragedy for the Nigerian people. Unleashed largely because of secret scheming by Western oil firms, this war claimed some two million lives and considerably slowed down the country's economic development. At the same time, the war proved once again, though at too high a price, the need for the peoples of Nigeria to coexist within the framework of a united federal state.

The 1970s became a period of reconstruction for the Nigerian economy, which developed at a comparatively high rate, due most of all to the "oil boom". An important administrative-territorial reform was carried out in the country, resulting in the formation of 19 states. The judicial system was restructured and local bodies of government reorganised. The military regime itself went through a fairly rapid evolution (especially in the second half of the 1970s). While remaining on the whole pro-bourgeois and authoritarian, it gradually acquired a liberal-nationalistic colouring. The creation of a commission to draft a new constitution (put into effect in 1979) and the gradual legalisation of political activity became an important milestone in the democratisation of Nigeria's political system.

The largest of the five officially registered political parties, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) won the general elections in 1979 and its leader Shehu Shagari became the first president of the Second Republic.

The new civilian regime was based on a system of strong presidential power, modelled after the American system. The Nigerian constitution proclaimed the equality of citizens, the main bourgeois-democratic rights and freedoms, and the aims of the country's home and foreign policy. An important feature of the 1979 constitution was the idea of the unity of the Nigerian state under conditions of a substantial autonomy for the subjects of the federation.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s the possibility of reviving a system of ethnical and regional parties was formally eliminated by provisions of the 1979 constitution which allowed the registration of only "nation-wide" parties. But, for objective reasons, the Nigerian parties could not find a broad and permanent social-class base and instead relied on temporary alliances of "pressure groups" and on the personal allegiance of supporters of a certain party leaders. The amorphous organisational structure of the parties and their insufficiently elaborated ideological and political platforms combined to determine the instability of Nigeria's party system.

The weakness of the Second Republic's (1979-1983) socio-political foundation was demonstrated by the 1983 general elections, which ended in a formal victory for the National Party of Nigeria. Its leader Shagari was re-elected president, receiving four million votes more than his main rival, the leader of the Unity Party of Nigeria Abacha Awolewo. But the NPN's triumph was short-lived and illusionary. The election campaign showed that the ruling party's leaders abused their office and sanctioned the rigging of election returns in a number of districts and also used unlawful methods to disrupt the activity of opposition organisations. There was a spate of violence during the elections, especially in the states of Oyo, Ondo, Plateau and Kwara. Another negative feature of the 1983 election campaign was its great "capital intensive-

ness". According to most credible assessments, the cost of the general elections in 1983 exceeded two billion naira.¹

The mounting political crisis was deepened by an economic depression caused by the multi-billion external debt, the low productivity of the agrarian sector and the slump in the price of oil, the export of which accounted for more than 90 per cent of the state's foreign currency earnings. In social terms, corruption in all echelons of government, unemployment and the high crime rate also gave rise to growing dissatisfaction.

On December 31, 1983 the Shagari government was toppled by a military coup engineered by representatives of the army command headed by Major General Muhammadu Buhari. The bourgeois-democratic system of government in the country was abolished, the constitution suspended and political parties dissolved. Legislative, executive and actual judicial power were put under the control of a military junta that incorporated the Supreme Military Council, the National Council of States and the Federal Executive Council.

In its form of organisation of supreme power, the Buhari regime was a military dictatorship designed to ensure a strictly centralised management of the Federation's affairs. Rigid, though at times purely formal control over the leading groups of the state apparatus was introduced in the country, and within the framework of the state apparatus the personnel of agencies performing direct functions of suppression began to dominate. At the same time, the prerogatives of the executive branch and the powers of the head of state were expanded.

As a result of the December coup, state power was redistributed in favour of a comparatively narrow group of the military who monopolised the process of adopting serious decisions. The new ruling group was rendered unstable due to the infighting between supporters of moderate and tough political lines and by its insufficiently balanced composition (in ethno-regional and religious respects). Buhari's supporters had a very limited social base represented by sections of traditional rulers and religious leaders as well as a part of the army and the civilian bureaucratic apparatus.

During the first months of the Buhari government's rule, workers, businessmen, students and other groups viewed the military regime as a factor of positive change in the political system's aims and values. But in its political activity the Buhari administration limited itself to a series of half-measures (low fixed prices of prime necessities, arrest of the leaders of the Second Republic, etc.) which did not solve a single serious problem.

On the whole, a number of reasons worked against the stabilisation of this regime. Firstly, the Buhari administration failed in its attempts to fully legalise the new system of state leadership, the legal foundation of which was challenged by various groups of society. Secondly, the Buhari government's objectively progressive policy of liquidating political corruption (illegal brokerage, bribe-taking, tax evasion, etc.) began to be pursued under conditions in which there was a dominance of traditional customs and norms of political behaviour. As a result, the values and many already-established elements of tradition in Nigeria's political life, which the leaders of the Second Republic manipulated with success at the beginning, were disrupted. Thirdly, soon after the December coup the Buhari regime began to act not only as a military but also as an anti-civilian regime. This expressed itself in its refusal (as opposed to Nigeria's former military governments) to set the time and terms of transition to a democratic system of government. Members of the country's leadership usually limited themselves to statements of the unacceptability to Nigeria of the Westminster and presidential models

of state organisation. Thus, in the final analysis, the survival of the Buhari regime depended on a balance of political forces which was unstable and transient in conditions of the procrastinated economic crisis and stepped-up activity by the opposition.

A new military coup took place in Nigeria on August 27, 1985 and brought to power a group of senior officers headed by Major-General Ibrahim Babangida. The new administration headed by the Ruling Council of the Armed Forces chose a moderately authoritarian form of rule and retained Nigeria's capitalist orientation. The "new style of government" introduced by President Babangida is characterised by processes of liberalisation of the military regime, search for political compromises and a noticeable expansion of a number of the democratic rights and freedoms of citizens. For instance, the present administration has loosened control over the mass media and reorganised the law-enforcement agencies which had tarnished their reputation under the previous regime. The Babangida government is trying to avoid violent methods of suppressing social and political movements and neither is it arbitrary or voluntaristic in solving economic problems.

Public discussions and what can be described as referendums on key issues of the country's development are, in effect, a new phenomenon in Nigeria's political life. The government usually takes into account the results of such debates when adopting major political decisions. Suffice it to recall that the Babangida administration came to power with the intention of taking from the International Monetary Fund a loan of 2-2.5 billion naira on rather tough terms (devaluation of the naira, liberalisation of trade, reduction of government subsidies of a number of prime necessities, etc.). But the unpopularity of such a move in virtually all sections of Nigerian society was an important consideration that prompted the military government to abandon this idea, even though several of the Fund's recommendations were nevertheless fulfilled.

The debate on the question of the model of state organisation for the future Third Nigerian Republic became another act of the expression of public attitudes. Soon after coming to power the Babangida government set up a special commission, the so-called Political Bureau headed by S. Cookey, consisting of about 20 prominent representatives of scientific, public and other organisations. This commission was instructed to ensure the holding of a nation wide discussion, systematise its results and then prepare a report with appropriate recommendations.²

A programme for the gradual handing over of state power to a civilian administration was worked out in 1987 on the results of the discussion. The main provisions of this programme were formulated in a number of Babangida's public statements, in a White Paper put out by the Ruling Council of the Armed Forces and in the demands made of the committee for revising the Constitution of 1979. The military government supported the plan to create the Third Republic in 1992, with a political structure based on strong presidential powers and a two-party system "cleansed of corruption". The Nigerian leaders objected to the "imposition" on the population of any ideological and political concept (while preserving a capitalist economic orientation) or the introduction of a state religion even though Nigeria had only recently joined the Organisation of the Islamic Conference. It appears that with the aim of neutralising the political activity of the leaders of some ethnic groups and religious communities, the ground was prepared for a discussion of the creation of new States and such discussions were resumed in the

country after a long interval. At the same time, the government began to emphasise its respectful attitude to traditional rulers who were instrumental in settling conflicts between various communities in the Anambra, Imo, Cross River and Rivers States.

In 1987 the Babangida government began to set up a whole network of special organisations, with the aim of gradually handing over state power to a civilian administration. This includes: a Directorate of Social Mobilisation, the National Electoral Commission, the Code of Conduct Tribunal, the National Revenue Mobilisation Commission, etc. In addition to this, the military authorities have planned certain large-scale political steps, including the holding of a national population census in 1991 with the help of the United Nations.

It should be stressed that the choice of the political model and the problem of handing over state power to civilians is being linked in present-day Nigeria with the state of the economy.³ Very often measures to improve the economic situation are regarded as a top-priority political task. The economic crisis that struck the country already early in the 1980s brought to light the main negative points of its development—dependence on the oil sector, low rates of agricultural growth, idle facilities in the processing industry, inflationary processes and unemployment. One should add to this the burden of the external and internal national debt, the weak development of the economic and social infrastructure and the distorted pattern of internal consumption.

In combination with the extremely unfavourable (for Nigeria) situation on the world oil market, the effect of these factors resulted in an annual reduction of the country's gross domestic product since 1980. In 1986 Nigeria's gross domestic product dropped by 3.3 per cent as compared to 1985 and amounted to 25.3 billion naira in the rate set for 1977/78. The drop in price on a barrel of Nigerian oil to an average of 14 dollars almost halved the state's foreign currency earnings. As a consequence, economic activity again declined in the country. Housing construction was cut by 10 per cent, industrial production by 6.4 per cent and wholesale and retail trade by 5 per cent. There was a certain growth (2.2 per cent) only in the sphere of agricultural production.

To overcome the economic crisis the Nigerian government introduced in October 1985 an economic state of emergency for a period of 15 months and then extended it to the end of 1988. Somewhat later it was supplemented with what is called a structural adjustment programme, conducted under the slogan "liberalisation, rationalisation and optimisation". This programme envisages what actually amounts to an abandonment of state regulation in the field of export-import trade and price-setting; the handing over to private persons enterprises of the state sector that are either small or raise little profit; and the introduction of an "optimum tariff regime" to speed up industrialisation.

The strategic aims of managing the national economy—an eleven-point programme—were formulated by President Babangida in his speech devoted to the budget for 1987. As in the past, the administration will pay special attention to the problem of foreign debt, which by the end of 1987 amounted to some 20 billion dollars. To postpone certain payments and get new loans, the government is conducting productive negotiations with its foreign creditors, including representatives of the Paris and London clubs. Nigeria is getting "limited support" from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which has agreed to give it a loan to conduct its trade policy, finance some agricultural projects, maintain the system of controlling the foreign debt, etc.

The known oil reserves in the country amount to at least 16.7 billion barrels and the government looks first of all to a rise in oil prices as a way of improving the financial situation. Lately Nigeria worked

actively with OPEC to achieve an increase of its oil extraction quota, which was 1.3 million barrels a day in 1986. Furthermore, the Nigerian government is one of the initiators of creating an organisation of African petroleum-exporting countries and proposed early in 1987 to introduce a fixed price of oil—18 dollars per barrel.

The Nigerian government has decided to reduce taxes levied on the export of products of the oil sector, taxes on the profits of companies, and also to change the formulas for income tax in order to improve the material situation of the poorer sections of society. The government's agrarian policy was directed at developing small-scale farming and increasing the production of food. The problem of developing industry holds an important place in the programme of economic recovery. The Babangida government strives to encourage the use of local resources in national industry, the fuller use of production capacities (more than half of which were idle in 1986) and to increase the competitiveness of Nigerian enterprises. The "second-tier foreign exchange market" was set up, in part, to solve these tasks. This state-controlled agency is called upon to achieve a more realistic exchange rate on the naira and liquidate "excessive administration" in the field of foreign currency dealing.

It should be noted that social processes, just like economic ones, determine in many ways the choice of the optimal model of Nigeria's political development. The Babangida government has stated its intent to set up a "new social order", the attainment of which is to be determined by the solution of three main tasks—economic rehabilitation, social justice and reliance on one's own resources. The present administration has achieved noticeable successes in fulfilling individual social-development programmes. A reform of public education has been carried out in the country and government institutions are continuing to move to Abuja, the new capital of Nigeria. This will make it possible to somewhat reduce the social problems in Lagos, one of the most overpopulated cities in Africa. The first positive results have been produced by the National Orientation Movement, a government campaign designed to struggle for new morality and discipline.

Nigeria's social and political development faces many difficulties, some of which are caused by the voluntaristic policies of former regimes and the complex ethno-confessional situation. A group of politicians from the time of the Second Republic, possessing impressive financial means and the support of emigre leaders, stands out among the social forces which are instigating anti-government actions. Also siding with the opposition forces are certain high-placed officials who have lost their former "feeding troughs" and certain sections of the business community that are not happy with the government's economic policy. While brokers who used to make huge profits on foreign currency speculation are not pleased with the new rules of controlling such deals and officials pine for the times when they could line their pockets by "selectively" granting import licences, Nigerian industrialists are worried by the declining rate of the naira and the strengthening of economic power belonging to a small group of local multi-millionaires and subsidiaries of transnational corporations.

The situation of the Nigerian working class is rather complex. In order to somehow solve the problem of unemployment, the government set up an employment agency and was forced to cancel, as a temporary measure, the minimum wage (125 naira a month) at small and medium enterprises. In addition to this, because of the economic slump the ad-

ministration has given the governments of States the right to make compulsory deductions from wages "for needs of economic recovery". These measures, along with the suspension of some articles of the labour code, the decline of the labour force in the state sector and inflation have raised protests from the country's biggest trade union association—the Nigerian Labour Congress. Its leaders have repeatedly objected to the wage freeze policy, the adoption of laws on labour relations without consultation with trade union leaders and have demanded the granting of allowances and benefits to wage and salary earners.

Today Nigeria plays an active role in the United Nations, the non-aligned movement, the OAU, the Economic Community of West African Countries and a number of other regional organisations. Nigeria is making a noticeable contribution to the struggle for the establishment of a new international economic order, against the neocolonialist activities of transnationals, and also against "information" and "cultural" imperialism. The country has played an important role in developing the North-South dialogue although, according to President Babangida, today this form of contact between imperialist and young independent states has become obsolete for all practical purposes.⁴

Africa's problems are the central aspect of Nigeria's foreign policy activities. Having high political prestige and great economic potential, Nigeria can really claim the role of leader not only in the West African region but also in Africa as a whole. Present-day Nigeria supports the African countries' struggle for the strengthening of political independence and the attainment of economic independence, and works to further the peaceful settlement of conflicts between African countries. In 1987 the Babangida government spoke out for "new realism" in the practice of granting foreign aid. This concept is based on the principle of providing economic and scientific-technical assistance on the basis of the "realised needs" of its recipients. At the same time it was decided to set up a "technical aid corps" to give assistance to those African countries which regularly ask Nigeria to help them with specialists in agriculture, education, medicine, etc.

All Nigerian governments have more or less consistently supported the liquidation of the racist regime in South Africa, the democratisation of life in that country and the granting of independence to Namibia. Nigeria also gives moral and material support to the frontline states such as Angola.

Although Nigeria is deeply integrated in the world capitalist economy and the United States, Britain and France are its main trade and economic partners, Lagos is sharply critical of a number of imperialist countries for their policy of "constructive engagement" with Pretoria, of linking the problem of granting independence to Namibia with the withdrawal of Cuban internationalists from Angola and for their refusal to introduce comprehensive sanctions against South Africa. Nigeria demonstrated its disagreement with Britain's African policy when it refused to take part in the Commonwealth Games. As the visit to Nigeria by US Secretary of State Shultz showed, the Nigerian government objects to Washington's policy regarding Angola.

Nigeria maintains rather extensive political, economic and cultural ties with Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and other countries of the socialist community. It has firm and diverse contacts with the Soviet Union. In the 1960s, during the internecine war, the USSR firmly supported the Federal government in its fight against separatists, which facilitated the preservation of Nigeria's unity. Later, in the 1970s, the

Soviet Union helped Nigeria build the largest metallurgical plant in Tropical Africa when all of Nigeria's Western partners refused. In the opinion of prominent representatives of Nigeria's government and business circles, the construction of the first section of the plant displayed the vast organisational and technical possibilities of Soviet external economic organisations.⁵ It is planned to complete the construction of the plant's second section in 1991. After that, Nigeria will be able to produce 1.3 million tons of sheet steel annually, about half of its domestic requirements.

Early in 1987, President Babangida said he wanted to assure the nation that his government's commitment to create a viable and stable political system oriented towards the people's interests and not subject to constant erosion remained immutable.⁶ So far, Nigerians are just beginning to create the groundwork of their Third Republic. At present it can only be conjectured that its political model will correspond more closely than the previous ones to the specificities of Nigeria's social and economic development.

¹ *Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Approved Budget 1983 Fiscal Year*, Lagos, 1983 p 565, *West Africa* London, Jan 9, 1984, p 54, Sept 6, 1984, p 257

² *Econotrack*, Lagos, 1986, Vol 1, No 8, p 27.

³ *This Week*, Lagos, 1986, Vol 2, No 8, p 8

⁴ *New Nigerian*, Kaduna Jan 1, 1987

⁵ *Business Concord*, Aug 1, 1986

⁶ *New Nigerian*, Jan 1, 1987

THAT DIFFERENT, DIFFERENT, DIFFERENT AMERICA

The US Constitution, whose 200th anniversary was pompously celebrated in 1987 by Washington, does not contain a single word outlawing or censuring racism, despite the fact that this phenomenon tarnishes all stages of American bourgeois democracy, from the times of slavery to the present. Today, racism American-style can be seen not only in the policy pursued by the Right and in the sophisticated and deeply-rooted system of racial discrimination; it is also reflected in more vigorous activities of ultra-Right groupings resorting to armed terror in order to instill their crazy ideas of "white supremacy".

Burning Ku Klux Klan crosses and lynchings of Blacks and people from other minority groups are not a thing of the distant past. The "invisible KKK empire" established 122 years ago as a clandestine terrorist organisation is no longer underground. Thugs in white robes are marching on the streets of American cities and towns. With permission from authorities and under police protection, they stage provocative assemblages and sabbaths, enjoying without any restraint the rights and freedoms which were incorporated in the basic law of the country, by the "founding fathers". The First Amendment to the US Constitution profess the "freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably assemble" was turned long ago into a convenient smoke-screen for actually making the criminal activities of the ultra-Right legal.

Yet another feature of American racism in the 1980s is the emergence of a more pronounced fascist tinge to this phenomenon, with neo-Nazi groupings becoming ever more vocal in the movement. Some of them are taking it upon themselves to act as centres for coordinating the activities and elaborating a common "ideological platform" of Right extremism, combining elements of "racial theory", rabid anti-communism, religious fanaticism and chauvinistic ideas of "American exclusiveness".

MORE DANGEROUS THAN KU KLUX KLAN

Until recently there were few people besides the local residents who knew of a little town called Hayden Lake, situated somewhere among the green fields and wooded hills in the north of the Idaho State, 90 miles from the Canadian border. Tourist routes sidetracked this little town, which is not so easy to spot on the map. This picturesque locality became famous not for its clean air or the mirror-like surface of its nearby lake. Rather, it is now notorious as the suspected source of a series of grave crimes, ranging from armed robberies to gruesome murders, which had stirred up the public and distressed authorities in many towns and districts of California, Washington, Idaho, Colorado and Oregon.

There is a signpost on the deserted Rimrock Road pointing to the Church of Jesus Christ Christian. The fact that this God's temple is not quite what is to be expected is proved by two other signs on each side of the road. One of them sternly warns "Whites Only", while the other bears the greeting "Welcome Kinsmen".

The pastor is also unusual. Richard Girnt Butler, once an engineer at the military-industrial concern Lockheed, is 67 years old. In 1970

he became the head of a neo-Nazi group called The Aryan Nations, which began to operate under the guise of a religious sect in southern California. Three years later the Church of Jesus Christ Christian moved its headquarters to Hayden Lake, where it bought up a 20-acre plot of land, erected its "temple" and settled in.

The sermons preached by Butler to his flock were filmed and screened by newsman Peter Lake who managed to penetrate the Aryan Nations several years ago. Essentially, these sermons are akin to the fanatical heart-rending speeches of the leaders of Nazi Germany. The "Reverend" calls for the "purification of the superior white race" from the "inferior races", and the large-scale extermination of Blacks and Jews. His parishioners are thugs with swastikas pinned to their sleeves, and instead of saying "amen" they salute in the fascist manner. At an altar draped in Nazi symbols and banners of the slave-owning South, they pray for the success of the "White revolution" in the USA and the restoration of Nazism at the state level in countries of "Western democracy".

After and between the sermons, the thugs of the Aryan Nations learn the skills of professional killers and are trained to shoot at a firing range situated close to the temple. They study guerrilla warfare and practice firing various types of weapons at plywood targets cut out to represent human figures of Jews and Blacks.

Since the mid-1980s, Butler readily talks to the press and, remarkably, openly attempts to use the media to advertise his ideas. This "preacher" believes that it is high time to put these ideas into practice. As he said to a *Boston Globe* correspondent, the "ultimate purpose is to establish a white state for our nation", and to this end "violence is quite necessary". These words ring a sinister note as they are voiced by this silver-haired man with an oblong angular face. The desk in his study is overflowing with samples of subversive Nazi publications and among them one glimpses a brand-new edition of *Mein Kampf* in English. A colour photograph of burning Ku Klux Klan cross is prominently hung on one of the walls.

The defiant tenor of Butler's statements and his confidence when meeting pressmen are not incidental. One could think of them as mere affectation if it were a decade ago, when the Aryan Nations were just a little-known sect mostly engaged in "enlightening" and recruiting new converts to their "faith". As the *Boston Globe* writes, the Butler's "church has become a spiritual center" of ultra Right extremism in the USA; a movement which began to ride the crest of a new wave of militarism and anti-communism raised by Washington as against a background of economic failures and the declining living standards of the masses, and intensified repressions against those fighting for the civil rights of Coloureds. Playing on the racial prejudices and chauvinism of narrow-minded people and the fears of the "little man" facing the ungovernable economic and social cataclysms in the capitalist system, the Church of Jesus Christ Christian extolls the reactionary and racist religious doctrine of Christian Identity, which serves as a "spiritual foundation" for the misanthropic ideas of Nazism, racism and anti-communism.

The basic concepts of the Christian Identity doctrine are rooted in so-called Anglo-Israelism, which originated in Britain in the 19th century and is a revised version of the Bible. Its main assertions are that the Ten Lost tribes, or the Chosen People were of Anglo-Saxon rather than Jewish origin, that "Jews are the offspring of Satan of the line of Cain and should be exterminated". These ideas were introduced in America in the 1920s by one of the Ku Klux Klan's leaders, Wesley Swift, who founded the movement for Christian Identity. His theoretical "innovations" essentially claimed that from that time on the United States were

declared to be the Holy Land rather than Israel. His theories substantiated the "supremacy" of white Americans as the descendants of the Anglo-Saxons and Aryans.

Butler was a close associate of Swift for some time. Using his "theoretical" heritage, the Aryan Nations leader supplemented it with the myths of the cold war period about a "world-wide communist plot" and concoctions fabricated by the reactionary US circles which asserted that the Soviet Union would inevitably attack the United States. He also hammered into the heads of his followers the crazy idea of the inevitability of a racial war in the USA which would be survived only by disciples of the Christian Identity and after which the second advent of Christ could be expected.

However, Butler resorts not only to fanaticism and neo-Nazi obscurantism to draw new converts. He himself and many of his followers—the former Grand Dragon of the Texas Ku Klux Klan, Louis Beam, an ambassador at large of the Aryan Nations; the leader of the Ku Klux Klan in Michigan and, simultaneously, a representative of the Aryan Nations in the Midwest, Robert Miles; leaders of Posse Comitatus; the American Nazi Party; White Patriots Party; Nazi SS Action Group; NSDP-Ausland and many other fascist racist gangs—thrive on the tangible acute problems of America today.

Thus, the racists explain the distress of many unemployed white Americans by saying that the "coloureds" (Blacks, Puerto Ricans, and Mexicans) are competing with them for jobs. The racists are not embarrassed by the fact that the unemployment rate among non-whites is more than two times as high as that among the white population. As for inflation, the Reverends like Butler blame it on Jewish-American bankers and shop-owners.

The weakening global positions of the USA and the growing resistance to its neo-globalist policy by the peoples of Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and other regions are explained as being caused by "intrigues of the Reds".

According to Butler's prophecies, Christian Identity "is the little stone that's going to grow and fill the whole earth". His claims are no less than those of his European forerunners from Munich beer pubs. True, so far this is mere bravado, stirring up emotions. As for the United States, it was said by Stand Anderson of the Anti-Defamation League—an organisation watching the activities of the ultra Right, that the Christian Identity doctrine "is the modus vivendi of the Right wing now".

This, in particular, explains the fact that representatives of ultra-Right organisations which are much larger than the Aryan Nations go on pilgrimage to Hayden Lake. The führer of the Church of Jesus Christ Christian admitted that for a number of years he recruited followers from among the convicts of American jails who, when released, became Aryan Nations thugs. Shock groups of this organisation now number over 500 people, while its total membership, according to Butler, runs to over 6,000.

The composition of Butler's congregation and his instigatory sermons calling for violence and the establishment of a white state at whatever price is necessary have led to the formation of an autonomous, well-armed gang, the Silent Brotherhood, within the bowels of the Aryan Nations. Later on this gang renamed itself the Order and opted for terrorism as the basic means for its activities. Robert Mathews, the leader of the Order, does not share Butler's view that before getting involved in decisive actions one has to amass forces, create a powerful financial backing and set up a system of well-equipped nationwide "strongholds" enjoying broad support among the local population. Members of the

Order profess more extremist views than their "spiritual pastor", taking into account the connivance of American authorities to neo-Nazi activities.

WHAT KIND OF "ORDER" DO THEY WANT?

On November 23, 1984, 13 members of the leadership of the Order signed a Declaration of War against Blacks, Jews, the Left and the "Reds", as well as all those, including officials, who would fail to render them support in this "war". In their "manifesto" these neo-Nazi thugs, calling themselves the "soldiers of the Aryan Resistance Movement", speak in no uncertain terms about a possible forcible overthrow of the Federal government and a seizure of power by "white patriots", who would establish their order throughout the "entire North American continent north of Mexico".

Mathews writes in the Declaration that the "Aryan yeomanry is awakening. A long forgotten wind is starting to blow. Do you hear the approaching thunder? It is that of the awakened Saxons. War is upon the land".

By the time this programme document was released, the activities of this gang were already under investigation by a task force of FBI, agents of the Secret Service ensuring the protection of the President and government officials, and agents of the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms which is entrusted, in particular, to combat smuggling and transgressions of laws connected with illegal possession and trafficking of arms. These urgent and extraordinary measures were being taken following the wave of brutal murders, synagogue burnings and audacious professionally-staged hold-ups of banks and armoured cars being committed in western States by "Aryan warriors" from the Order and provoking panic in a number of areas.

Thus, the FBI established that at the end of 1983, Mathews himself robbed a bank in Seattle (Washington) for \$25,000. In April 1984 his gangsters held up an armoured car and got away with half a million dollars. They snatched even more, \$3.6 million, two months later when they robbed another armoured car in Ukiah (California). *The New York Times* reported that "both armoured car robberies were carried out in a paramilitary style by armed groups, of up to 17 persons. In both cases the groups brandished automatic weapons". Randall Evans, the California director of the Aryan Nations, took part in these raids.

It also surfaced that members of the Order were also issuing counterfeit money, and one of the presses was subsequently found in Hayden Lake in Butler's "temple".

Investigators also found "the statute" of the gang, under which any potential "warrior" first had to score a certain number of "points" awarded for killing Blacks, Jews, Communists, and Federal judges.

The Federal authorities became particularly vexed when FBI informers reported on the plans of neo-Nazi ultras to carry out "guerrilla raids" on strategic Pentagon facilities with the probable goal of seizing modern, including nuclear, weapons.

FBI special agent Norman Stephenson reported that a novel *Turner's Diaries* had become the singular "bible" of the Order. In the novel, its author William Pierce describes how a clandestine armed group of "white race defenders", which, incidentally, also calls itself the Order, is getting ready to seize power in the United States. What is most notable here, is the fact that the actions of Mathews' gang are a carbon copy of the tactics employed by the group described in the novel. The "heroes" of the neo-Nazi bestseller begin their "white revolution" with the establishment of a financial base by carrying out armed robberies,

engaging in the counterfeiting of money and committing other crimes. According to the novel, the second stage is terrorist raids, including bombings and assassinations of officials and journalists, blastings of power stations, communications lines, radio and TV stations. The list of the white revolution's enemies, besides representatives of national minorities and liberals, includes even conservatives who refuse to cooperate with the ultra-Right "patriots". As Pierce sees it, the "revolution" in the USA begins in 1991 and ends in victory eight years later, at the cost of an incredible number of deaths, including by nuclear weapons seized by members of underground organisations, i. e., neo-Nazis.

In their attempt to put an end to this scenario, special FBI detachments stepped up their efforts to track down Gary Yarbrough, one of Mathews' main accomplices. Through Yarbrough, a former hardened criminal and a Ku Klux Klan "knight", they managed to locate the leader of the Order.

On December 7, 1984, more than a hundred FBI agents, using helicopters and armed with sophisticated automatic weapons, laid siege for 36 hours to a cottage on Whidbey Island (Washington), where Mathews and several members of his gang had taken cover. Mathews was killed in a shoot-out. The rest laid down their arms: submachine guns, grenades, semi-automatic rifles.

A vast amount of explosives and various arms, amounting to a value of more than \$15,000, was confiscated at Yarbrough's lair in Sandpoint (Idaho). Among the weapons found in the arsenal was a MAC-10 submachine-gun which, as was subsequently established, had been used in the killing of Alan Berg, a Denver radio talk show host, who exposed the criminal Klan and neo-Nazis activities.

A few months later a real battle was raging in the mountainous Ozark region of Arkansas. Some 300 special agents of the FBI and officers of the National Guard encircled and stormed a paramilitary camp situated there. Encompassing a vast territory, this was the camp of a group called The Convent, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord, which had given refuge to four "Aryan warriors" of the Order. When the resistance was finally overrun, the agents discovered a cache of hundreds of small arms, several large-calibre machine-guns, a minefield, a small factory for manufacturing explosives, anti-tank shells and even an armoured car.

Similar camps, also with huge arsenals, belonging to the Order and their like-minded allies from Posse Comitatus were discovered by Federal authorities in Rulo (Nebraska), in Idaho and Missouri.

Reports on these discoveries evoked such a response that the US Senate was compelled to conduct special hearings. Speaking to a Senate subcommittee on April 3, 1985, then FBI Director William Webster, who is now the Director of the CIA, had to admit that "the right-wing terrorist groups have demonstrated a substantial propensity for violence. They are more dangerous and more significant than the old Klan groups".

Exactly ten day later, the Department of Justice reported that a guilty verdict had been passed on 23 members of the Order and hastily declared that one of the most violent neo-Nazi organisations in the USA had been neutralised. With that, the matter was, for all intents and purposes, closed. However, it later developed that far from all the "Aryan" terrorists detained in this small group were punished. Many in the USA were perplexed and asked why the authorities did nothing to prosecute the other ultra-Right extremist organisations which had, in every way, assisted the Order and had been involved in the crimes, and above all why the Aryan Nations and the "guru" of American neo-Nazism, Butler, were allowed to go scot-free. Incidentally, the latter did not even try to deny that the ringleaders of the Order were all his people.

Later on, certain clues to the riddle appeared when the press began to publish reports that the American "brown shirts" had found influential patrons in the upper political echelons of power who succeeded in squelching further investigation.

This turn of events boosted Butler's image among the ultra-Right as an "ideologist" and a shrewd tactician who avoided open conflict with the authorities and deftly resorted to a strategy of compromise and reliance on the support of reactionary ruling circles. The experience of the Order proved that the policy of the "Reverend" führer turned out to be quite far-sighted.

"WHITE BASTION" UNDER THE BANNER OF RACISM

Butler's growing prestige was clearly demonstrated when he presided at the annual session of the National Aryan Congress, held in July 1986 at Hayden Lake. The American press noted that this was one of the largest neo-Nazi gatherings in the United States in recent years. It was attended by 400 delegates representing more than 20 American racist and neo-Nazi organisations, or about a half of all extremist ultra-Right groups operating in the United States, which, according to recent data, currently number somewhere around 50. Their ideological confederates from Western Europe and Canada were also present.

American authorities permitted the gathering, despite wide-spread public protests by citizens of the western States staged in Coeur d'Alene, near Hayden Lake. Mass rallies were organised under the slogan "Stop Fascism!". Speakers read some 200 resolutions which had been adopted at various meetings by people living in different towns throughout the Northwest, demanding a halt to the unbridled propaganda of Nazism and racism and denouncement of the ultra-Right terror against national minorities and democratic and Left-wing organisations. In response, the authorities took measures to ensure that the "right" of the fascist obscurantists to hold "gatherings" would not be infringed upon. They dispatched reinforced police patrols to block the roads leading to the Church of Jesus Christ Christian, where the National Aryan Congress was scheduled to be held.

Butler, who opened the gathering, said that the main goal of the congress was to demonstrate to all the existence and consolidated positions of forces in the USA opposing Communists, Jews and Blacks. He also said: "We are here today because there were those who fought and gave up all they had for the preservation of our race." Among other names, besides the ringleaders of the Third Reich, he mentioned the raving Senator McCarthy. The participants swore to continue their "cause" and stated that they regard violence as one of the basic methods of their activities.

The National Aryan Congress in Hayden Lake discussed plans submitted by the Aryan Nations to turn five American States (Washington, Idaho, Wyoming, Montana and Oregon) into a so-called white bastion which would serve as a bridgehead for an offensive against the entire United States. The participants had in mind not only an extension of their propaganda and the expansion of traditional terrorist activities, but also territorial claims.

This issue was raised once again at a special gathering called by Butler in October of the same year in Jerome (Idaho). At this gathering neo-Nazis and a number of Ku Klux Klan organisations declared a "crusade for the white America". They adopted a resolution to spare no effort to establish a "separate state" in the Northwest, where there would be no place for those who did not belong to the "supreme Aryan race".

They planned that initially the new "Reich" would encompass the territories of five States. However, Wayne Johns, a representative of the Aryan Nations, stated after the gathering in Jerome that it may subsequently expand beyond these borders.

More detailed plans for the formation of the Northwestern Mountain Republic were discussed at the annual National Aryan Congress in Hayden Lake in July 1987, where Butler presided once again. The country heard an appeal from the "temple" to all "heirs of the Führer" to move to the Northwest in order to begin work on establishing their own state. In this connection particular attention was paid to the coordination of efforts in the "battle for hearts and minds" of white Americans, as well as to a more active involvement of the ultra-Right forces in the political life of the country, in election campaigns in particular, from Presidential elections to elections to local administrative bodies.

In other words, it was a matter of combining the "traditional" forms of terrorist activities against "the enemies of the white revolution", which the neo-fascist ultras had never shied away from, with a more extensive use of the legal opportunities granted by the American political system for engaging in open political actions, and with a maximum use of advertising and large-scale propaganda to attain their ends.

As it was noted in this connection by a public anti-racist organisation called Klanwatch, "white supremacists are utilizing two new tactics: cable television and computers". At present, in many localities in the West, Midwest, the South and even in the Northeast the Aryan Nations has established and operates a costly computer network shared jointly by neo-Nazi and racist organisations. Private citizens living in the USA and Canada who have personal computers and telephones can switch into this system. The *Boston Globe* writes that all they have to do is to dial the necessary phone numbers of the headquarters of this computer network in Idaho, Texas or North Carolina and say that they would like to receive the information spread by the neo-Nazis. Expenses are minimal. Louis Beam, an Ambassador at Large of the Aryan Nations, is responsible for the operation of this network. It runs a bulletin of actions recently carried out by ultra-Right groups, publishes all sorts of racist appeals and messages, as well as a constantly supplemented "enemy list" of the White Patriots Movement which supplies the names and addresses of Jewish organisations, Communist Party branches and civil rights activists of the national minorities who should be "neutralised". The computer memory also stores detailed instructions on how to plant bombs on the premises of democratic organisations, how to arrange terrorist acts against individuals, and so on.

A TV network operates continuously in Texas, Michigan, California, Idaho and other States. It broadcasts racist programmes and sermons. Daniel Miller, sponsor of the programme "Race and Reason" TV programme aired in Dallas (Texas) and San Diego (California), says: "We're going around the establishment media to tell people that race is the key issue in this country."

Considerable sums of money are invested in large-scale publications of subversive misanthropic literature. The largest publishing house belonging to the neo-Nazis is located in West Virginia. It is headed by businessman George Dietz, who maintains close relations with Butler. His company publishes "works by the classics of the Third Reich", as well as brochures and bulletins of Hitler's followers. In addition, there are several dozens of newspapers and magazines sympathising with the racists and neo-Nazis. They are openly and unrestrictedly distributed in almost all major cities of the country. Several samples of this Nazi poison are published in various languages to be distributed in Western Europe and Latin America.

WHO ASSISTS THE NAZIS?

Many people in the United States, worried by the growing threat of Right extremism and the intensified aggressiveness of dyed-in-the-wool reactionaries in the 1980s, ask the question: Why does it happen? Indeed, at first glance the share of racist and neo-Nazi organisations as an independent military and political force in the USA is insignificant. Even the highest estimates put their membership at several dozen thousands.

However, at the same time, people are undoubtedly worried by the trend towards a consolidation of the ultra-Right forces in the United States and their expanding ties with the major neo-Nazi organisations in Western Europe, primarily in West Germany, Britain and Italy, whose representatives regularly visit the USA, while delegations of the American neo-Nazis and Ku Klux Klan "knights" attend the gatherings of their confederates in the Old World.

The democratic public in the USA is also alarmed by the fact that over the last seven years there was a considerable growth in the number of "sympathizers" who, while not being formally committed to the extremist Right-wing groups, support them and render them assistance. The New York Times Magazine reported that in 1979, one-hundred thousand well-to-do and influential Americans made financial contributions to the Ku Klux Klan and neo-Nazi extremists and participated in their propaganda activities. Today, judging by the number of subscribers to Nazi subversive literature, there are half a million such people. And the American press indicates that among them are people whose duty is to protect law and order. For instance, there are quite a few cases of policemen and even judges taking off their uniforms or cloaks after work to attend gatherings of Klanmen and neo-Nazis.

But the American ultras have even more influential patrons. Quite indicative in this respect are the revelations of Jim Ferrands, the Imperial Wizard of the Invisible Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, a Klan organisation in the eastern part of the country. In an interview to newsmen he openly stated that the Klan receives substantial contributions from quite respectable people and added that certain people in the government show an understanding of their goals.

At the same time, as was noted by John Jacob, former President of the National Urban League, "the resurgence of racist feelings ... are fostered by the Administration's efforts to give tax-exempt status to segregated schools, its fight against extension of the civil rights law [the law of 1965 formally granting Blacks equal voting rights, to which the White House has attempted to introduce racist amendments.—A. S.], its efforts to destroy the Civil Rights Commission, to stack the courts with Right-wingers, its support for South Africa's apartheid government".

In analysing the causes of the intensifying racist sentiments in the country, Roger Wilkins, senior research fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies, wrote: "Whites get the message that the leader of this country, the moral beacon, is saying it's all right to be racist."

The Philadelphia Enquirer noted that in the USA over the 1980-1985 period, the number of terrorist acts nurtured by racism had more than doubled. According to police records for 1987 in many major cities, including New York, there were in some months up to ten such cases weekly. And many crimes are committed not by members of ultra-Right extremist organisations but by "unorganised" whites sharing their views. Police arbitrariness was on the rise, too. Even according to official statistics, almost one out of every two Americans shot by the "guardians of order" was a Black. Summing up the cause-and-effect links of this disquieting phenomenon in the political life of the USA in recent years, a professor of political sciences at Purdue University, stresses that terrorism practi-

sed by the Ku Klux Klan, neo-Nazis and other similar organisations is an extreme form of manifesting the essence of the policy pursued by the US administration.

At the same time, the Republican administration from the moment it assumed office launched a campaign of mass persecutions and repression of human rights champions. It cruelly suppressed the actions of Black Americans coming out against inequality, lawlessness, arbitrariness of police and the racist terror of unrestrained white chauvinists. In this campaign the Federal authorities often relied on the help of the reactionary forces. We may recall, for instance, the carnage in the "Black ghettos" of Miami (Florida) in 1982 and 1983, when special detachments of the police and National Guard suppressed spontaneous "riots" of the desperate residents. In these *pogroms* several people were killed, more than a hundred were wounded, and dozens were arrested. After one such *pogrom*, the Overtown district of Miami was visited by Klanmen who threatened the inhabitants with new reprisals.

Noting a considerable growth in the Black "population" of American prisons over the last six years, Steven Whitman, a professor at Northeastern University, noted in *The Chicago Tribune* that the multiplying number of Black prisoners is in direct proportion to the rise in the activities of racist groups and that, feeling themselves immune from punishment, the white racists arrange virtual massacres.

However, the US ruling circles use Right-wing extremism not only to intimidate the activists of the civil rights movement and progressive Left-wing organisations. The ultra-Right also act in collusion with certain Washington officials in an attempt to split the workers' and trade union movement.

Ku Klux Klan and neo-Nazi leaders have often stressed their "spiritual affinity" with some high-ranking politicians in Washington. They see as an obvious sign of sympathy and approval of their deeds, the position of the federal authorities on the matter of some 10,000 Nazi war criminals and their hangers-on who found refuge in the United States after the war. Despite the resolute demands of the American and world public to extradite for prosecution these werewolves hiding under the guise of American citizens, only about ten of them have been deported from the country.

According to *The Washington Post*, the administration not only encourages and defends but also subsidises racism. Such policies are partly clarified by the contacts maintained by the CIA and the Pentagon with a number of ultra-Right organisations which support American armed interference in various regions of the world.

Since 1983 the United States began to set up under the aegis of the CIA various "centres" and paramilitary detachments of "volunteers" from among mercenaries and Right extremists. The Imperial Wizard of the Alabama Klan, Donald Black, said to journalists in 1984 that the statement of the White House to the effect that the struggle against communism in Central America is an American tradition, inspires in them a militant spirit. He reported at that time that he was recruiting a "volunteer" brigade whose aim was to carry out subversive terrorist activities against Nicaragua.

At approximately the same time, Tom Posey plunged into active efforts in Alabama. He formed a paramilitary legion called Civilian Material Assistance, numbering more than a thousand professional cut-throats, which, as the *Philadelphia Enquirer* reported, was equipped on CIA money. Since then many Posey thugs, together with Nicaraguan contras, took part in bandit raids against Nicaragua. "Volunteers" also transferred hundred of thousands of dollars allegedly donated by private American citizens to the contras.

Particular attention was paid to groups like Civilian Material Assistance when the US Congress, in October 1984, temporarily suspended direct, or indirect, American aid to the anti-Nicaraguan terrorists. This measure was the result of the persistent demands of many voters, in an election year, and the apprehensions of many law-makers that a further escalation of US interference in Central America could draw the country into another Vietnam. However, as Irangate demonstrated two years later, the White House never intended to heed the new law. And here a special role in providing military and financial aid to the contras was assigned to "volunteer" organisations. All of them were found to be controlled by the World Anti-Communist League, connected with the CIA and headed by a retired Pentagon General, John Singlaub.

It is indicative that even before the first shocking disclosures of the Irangate scandal in the autumn of 1986, the French *Le Monde diplomatique* reported that the diversified network of "private organisations" headed by Singlaub was financing the contras by circumventing the US Congress.

These facts expose just one of the links between the authorities and extremist groups. It is these links that are fraught with the main danger posed by the intensified efforts of the ultra-Right quarters. These forces are not only an undisguised threat to human rights and the evolution of democratic processes in the USA, but also impede mutual understanding among peoples and make it difficult to create conditions in the world conducive to the establishment of a comprehensive system of international security worthy of modern civilisation.

Andrei SIDORIN

IMPRESSIONS STORED UP OVER DECADES...

It is easy to write about a country in which you have spent only a few days. You describe the places you saw, give an account of the talks you had with local people and that's it. It is far more difficult to write about a country where you have lived for many years. Impressions stored up over decades crowd in on you. You are in a position to compare the way things were twenty or thirty years ago with the way they are today.

One of my most vivid impressions of last summer was a parade to mark the 750th anniversary of Berlin. The procession stretched ten kilometres and lasted five hours. It was a vivid and imaginative testimony to the Berliners' love of their city. History marched down Unter den Linden, Karl-Liebknecht-Strasse and Alexanderplatz: from the pre-historic Berliners clad in animal skins and mediaeval knights to people of our own time. At one point there was a gap in the procession and we saw a hulking black slab come moving gloomily forward. On its surface was an imitation of the war flames set afire by the Hitlerites and words that ring a sinister bell for people everywhere: Buchenwald, Oswięcim, Sachsenhausen. The grim period of fascism symbolised by the black slab was followed by a new chapter in history as Soviet liberation forces marched hand in hand with the former inmates of fascist prisons and concentration camps. This group was followed by a column of people carrying posters which proclaimed the establishment of the German Democratic Republic, a state of German working people.

I recalled the first time I saw the streets and squares along which the procession was now moving. The war had backfired and brought great suffering to the German people as well. The centre of Berlin lay in ruins. The destruction stretched along Unter den Linden to Alexanderplatz and rimmed what is today's Karl-Marx Allee. Fires had left their sooty black marks on the walls. The central quarters of Dresden, Magdeburg, Chemnitz (now Karl-Marx-Stadt) also lay in ruins. People's minds were in ruins: leftovers of fascist ideology were mixed with a skepticism that the future could bring no change for the better.

TRACTOR AS A MONUMENT

The people of the GDR remember with gratitude that at that difficult time the Soviet people extended a helping hand to them. They not only supplied them with food, but sent a thousand tractors as well, one of which now stands as a monument in the town of Angermünde. They helped restore German industry and freely shared their expertise. It was a powerful example of internationalism in action.

All major enterprises in the GDR have small museums ("rooms of tradition") which trace the history of the integrated works. The exhibitions invariably feature items which tell how business ties and friendly contacts with Soviet counterparts were initiated. The museum at a plant in Erfurt which produces pressing and forging equipment has an old document on display. In the mid-1930s a notice came from Berlin that a group of Soviet engineers would be visiting the plant and that they were to be shown "only what was absolutely necessary". Today the plant, enlarged with the help of credits from the CMEA International Invest-

ment Bank, is a reliable partner of Soviet enterprises. I have seen its lathes at the KAMAZ truck plant and other factories in the USSR. The partners have no secrets from each other. They have come a long way.

The people in the GDR have a deep respect for the Thälmann Communists, men and women who have no thought for their lives in the struggle against fascism. Factories, schools, streets and squares have been named after them. Also remembered and honoured are the "first-hour activists", those who were the first to respond to the Communist Party's call and took part in clearing the rubble and in building a new anti-fascist socialist state. Their portraits are featured prominently in the "rooms of tradition".

The leading force of the people of the GDR is the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED). It has played an outstanding role in creating and strengthening the German state of workers and peasants. Faithful to the traditions of Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Ernst Thälmann, and under the able leadership of Wilhelm Pieck, Otto Grotewohl and Walter Ulbricht, it has marched confidently along the path of socialism opened by the October Revolution seventy years ago. Headed by the SED, which adheres steadfastly to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian socialist internationalism, the country traversed a vast distance—from post-war economic disarray to a dynamic modern economy, from vanquished fascism to socialism, from spiritual emptiness to the triumph of the most humanistic ideology and culture.

The SED and the CPSU have a common banner and great common goals; they are steadfast partners in the struggle for lasting peace and the strengthening of socialism's international positions. I have attended several congresses of the SED and can attest to the fact that each of them has reaffirmed these principles. Addressing the 11th Congress of the SED held in 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev said: "You well know that throughout the postwar years our party and our people have been next to you, always ready to help the young state of working people. We have been loyal friends and allies of the SED and the German Democratic Republic and will continue to be such forever." It was a moving moment when the delegates to the congress greeted these words with thunderous applause.

The sincere and fraternal friendship between the two peoples is a great, truly historic asset. At its well-spring stood outstanding leaders of the German workers' movement. Ernst Thälmann said that the attitude to the Soviet Union was a touchstone for every Communist. The Communists led by Thälmann remained true to the idea of friendship with the USSR and solidarity with the Land of the Great October Socialist Revolution in the grimmest years of Hitler's rule. I was lucky enough to meet some of them. I had a long talk with Heinz Kessler, General of the Army and Defence Minister of the GDR, who told me about his life. He was born into a working-class family. His parents were Communists. During the Second World War, Heinz was conscripted to the Wehrmacht. After Hitler Germany attacked the USSR he defected to the Soviet side at the first opportunity. He was active in the Free Germany National Committee and after the defeat of fascism he became one of the leaders of the Free German Youth Union. He took part in the creation of the National People's Army. His story is a testimony of loyalty to the socialist cause and of strongly held internationalist ideas. Another memorable meeting I had was with Klaus Trostorf, Director of the National Memorial in Buchenwald, formerly an inmate of that Nazi concentration camp. He did not succumb to torture and humiliation and remained a Communist and an internationalist. Many former soldiers who were prisoners of war in the Soviet Union returned to their country with a conviction that friendship with the USSR was very important for the German pe-

ople. What was at first realised by tens of thousands came to be shared by hundreds of thousands and then by millions. The extensive and ceaseless ideological work conducted by the SED has brought rich results.

The people in the GDR show a deep interest in the perestroika taking place in the Soviet Union. The report to the June 1987 Plenary Meeting of the SED Central Committee noted: "We follow with great interest and a feeling of fraternal solidarity the efforts of the CPSU to implement the programme of perestroika launched by the 27th Congress of the CPSU which is aimed at improving the living conditions in the Soviet Union, further strengthening socialism and constantly increasing the weight of socialism in the world in favour of peace".

Presenting the Report of the SED Central Committee to the Party's 11th Congress, Comrade Erich Honecker outlined the policy for the next five years. The main element in that policy is to harmonise economic and social policies, to ensure that every advance in the economic field leads to better living conditions. The validity of this policy has been fully vindicated. Delegates to the congress received pamphlets containing statistics of the country's economic development. National income in 1985 was twice the size of that in 1970. More than 90 per cent of this increase was due to higher labour productivity. More houses were built and incomes per capita have been increasing from one five-year plan period to the next. During the past 15 years the economy's basic assets have almost doubled. The achievements are indisputable.

The Congress of the GDR Communists again reaffirmed the importance of close cooperation with the Soviet Union.

The GDR was assured of Soviet support at every stage in its economic development. Many industrial projects in the GDR are joint German-Soviet projects. They were built in those places where they were most needed. The GDR's post-war difficulties stemmed not only from the fact that major plants had been destroyed. They could be restored. Another and more difficult problem for the GDR was that, through the fault of the Western powers which had split Germany, the country's former economic ties had been disrupted.

Here is a fact that speaks for itself. West Germany had 120 blast-furnaces and the GDR only four, which meant that the latter's industry was deprived of its life blood. The Soviet Union came to the rescue. The Ost Iron-and-Steel Works has been operating in Eisenhüttenstadt since 1951. Soviet-designed and Soviet-equipped, it was built with the assistance of Soviet experts. Its six blast furnaces get iron ore from the Soviet Union. Subsequently a cold rolling mill, also made in the Soviet Union was added to the blast-furnaces and open-hearth furnaces. The Ost works continues to expand and to contribute more and more to meeting the country's economic growth needs.

The GDR was faced with the need to create its own petrochemical industry. The Soviet Union built the oil trunk pipeline Druzhba (Friendship), which stretches over thousands of kilometres from the USSR to the Oder. It provided raw materials for the petrochemical industry complex in Schwedt, a major jointly-built enterprise. I recently visited that complex. It occupies such a large area that a car was needed to make the rounds. It is a veritable city with streets, squares and blocks which house various shops—catalytic cracking, aromatic hydrocarbons, source materials for synthetic fibres and chemicals used in the production of consumer goods. All in all, the Schwedt complex produces 450 types of goods.

Many people here know that a half of all the electricity produced in the country comes from Soviet-made generators. I remember that in the mid-1950s the republic was desperately short of energy. To prevent factories from coming to a standstill, power had to be cut off from entire cities, which were plunged into total darkness at night. Since then,

power stations have been built in Lübbenau-Fetschau, Tierbach, Boxberg, Hagenwerder, and Jenschwalde. There is also an atomic power-plant named after Bruno Leuschner...

BYPASSING THE INTERMEDIARY STAGES

Soviet assistance made it possible for GDR industry to stand on its feet. However, the cooperation between the two countries has never been a one-way street. The restored industry of the GDR began to manufacture goods which the Soviet Union needed. Martin Hesse, General Director of the Ernst Thälmann Heavy Engineering Works in Magdeburg, told me that when the former Krupp-Gruson plant was restored its first order came from the USSR. The works was to produce equipment for 15 cement factories.

Individual enterprises in the GDR and the Soviet Union began to establish close friendly ties. They signed contracts and exchanged production teams. There was a large-scale exchange of experience at all levels—on the factory floor, in the design and managerial offices, in party, Young Communist League and trade-union committees. This paved the way for another step forward—specialisation and cooperation in production within the framework of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

"Close cooperation between the GDR and the Soviet Union", said Martin Hesse, "is of particular importance for us. Under the specialisation and cooperation scheme we provide the USSR with rolling and wire-drawing mills, machines for making cable and steel ropes, bridge cranes and a lot of other equipment".

In Dresden, Hans Joachim Hahn, Director General of the Sachsenwerk Electrical Engineering Complex told me how his complex established cooperation with the Leningrad association Elektrosila. Soviet experts lent a hand in designing the new Sachsenwerk plant. The two plants, in Dresden and Leningrad, coordinated their production programmes. The work force in both places see themselves as fellow workers for scientific and technological progress. Many other enterprises which are part of the Sachsenwerk complex are cooperating with Soviet partners. Examples in point are the plants in Turin and Mogilev respectively. They began by thoroughly studying and comparing each other's technologies. They found that some things were done better in the GDR and others in the USSR. So they set out to learn from each other. They compared economic performance data—how many working hours it takes to manufacture a particular article. This prompted concrete targets: which methods should be adopted from whom and what shortcomings needed to be eliminated. The important thing is that by pooling efforts production is made more effective.

My work as a correspondent took me to many integrated plants in the GDR. I was told everywhere that close association with Soviet partners was an important factor: the more fully this potential is tapped the easier it is to solve important economic tasks together. I remember a conversation at the motor works in Ludwigsfelde, which manufactures the W-50 truck—"the work horse" of GDR transport. The plant has long been a partner of the ZIL Motor Works in Moscow. Both enterprises had been working on a new truck model. They compared their newly-designed gear boxes and were surprised to discover that designers in Ludwigsfelde and in Moscow had been working along the same lines—their new gear-boxes were of the same size and had the same gear ratio. It was a pity they had not coordinated their efforts before. This is just one of many examples demonstrating the need to place collaboration on a businesslike day-to-day level.

Both countries feel that the time has come to elevate cooperation to a qualitatively new and higher stage. They would like to establish direct links between enterprises and associations so it would be possible to solve current problems of cooperation by just picking up a phone and calling the partner, bypassing the intermediary stages of government ministries and departments.

The establishment of direct links—not a statement of intent but concrete agreements—are now on the agenda. Already more than 100 pairs of enterprises, plants and associations in the GDR and the Soviet Union have signed such agreements. I was shown the text of such an agreement at the Planet Offset Printing Machines Plant in Radebeul. Signed jointly last year by the Werner Lamberz Printing Equipment Complex, of which Planet is a part, by a Soviet production association in Andropov which produces printing machines, and by the Moscow science-production association Poligrafmash (printing machines), the document clearly shows that cooperation is assuming new forms from which major mutual benefits can be derived. The agreement provides for a joint programme for research and development including the building of pilot models and their launching into commercial production. It emphasises the quality of goods, to which end both sides are to inform each other of shortcomings and try to eliminate them. Quality inspection departments are also pooling their efforts. There will be closer links between designers. Planning departments on both sides will come together to agree on the volume and deadlines for mutual cooperative supplies.

Let's face it, in former times it was not uncommon to hear complaints in the GDR enterprises that if they needed an expert from the FRG to debug West German equipment he would arrive at a day's notice, a specialist from Czechoslovakia needed a week's notice and an expert from the Soviet Union several months' notice. It is true that bureaucratic barriers were a hindrance to cooperation. Times have now changed. People at the GDR industries which I visited in recent months were happy to say that during the current restructuring in the USSR a number of important decisions were made which untrammel cooperation. This is particularly important for direct links between enterprises. The change for the better was immediately felt at a tube-rolling mill in Riesa. It has a newly-pioneered mill for the continuous cold rolling of thin-walled tubes, which is ten times more productive than the ordinary kind. It is a brainchild of the two countries' specialists. However, work at the mill was often relayed while waiting for a Soviet engineer or scientist to arrive. This artificial barrier has now come down. All issues are resolved promptly. Interaction is becoming more flexible and efficient.

The new quality of cooperation engenders new forms. The GDR and the USSR are setting up joint research teams to work in key areas of high technology. Prospects for building joint enterprises are under discussion. People in the two countries are putting their minds together to find the most effective ways of using the achievements of science and technology.

A measure of the extent to which the economies of the GDR and the USSR are intertwined is the fact that trade between them reaches 15 billion rubles a year. An impressive figure. The two countries are each other's No. 1 partners. Cargoes flow in each direction day and night. The growing flow of trade brought up the problem of transport capabilities to handle such an increase. A solution was arrived at jointly.

A new sea port, Mukran, was built on Rügen Island in the north of the GDR. It has been linked by a ferry line with the Soviet port of Klaipeda. I visited Rügen shortly after the construction of the port began. Rudolf Sickert, head of the building project, showed me a scale

model: the northern and southern malls, piers, two loading-unloading ramps, numerous railway tracks and offices. I recently had a chance to revisit Mukran. There I found what I had previously seen as a model, already built and operating. Three ferry vessels, *The Mukran*, *The Klaipeda* and *The Vilnus*, operate between the two ports. Each carries more than a hundred railway freight cars. Three more such vessels are being built at a shipyard in Wismar. The ferry line will carry millions of tons of Soviet-GDR freight every year.

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS IS THE WATCHWORD

The GDR's economy is developing steadily, as witnessed by the annual reports of the National Statistics Board. The interim reports published every three and every six months also indicate a high rate of growth. Here for example, are the figures for the first six months of last year compared to the same period of the previous year. National income has increased by 3 per cent due entirely to higher labour productivity. Labour productivity increased by 6.8 per cent in industry and 4.7 per cent in building. The housing construction programme is proceeding apace. More than 100,000 flats have been built.

Each socialist country determines its own pattern of development in keeping with its historical and national traditions and the specific conditions in which the new society is built. In this way each fraternal country gains its own experience which adds to the treasurehouse of the common experience of socialism. The GDR, one of the world's top ten industrial countries, has much to offer in that respect.

The GDR's economy switched from the extensive to the intensive mode of development two decades ago. It was then that scientific and technological progress became the watchword and the task of boosting labour productivity was set. The 11th Congress of the SED reaffirmed the prime importance of these factors. The economic management system has been restructured to meet these demands. The main element in all branches of industry are the integrated plants, regarded as the backbone of the national economy. They number more than 150 and are directly accountable to government ministries. They are roughly similar to the science-production associations in the USSR. Each integrated plant has extensive powers and great responsibilities. It is responsible not only for producing goods but for expanded reproduction. It also takes care of balancing its different lines of goods. As the saying goes, it is a master in its own house. Targets set "from above" for such a plant are few: net profit, net output, exports, production output of consumer goods and the loading of basic production assets.

During my work as a correspondent in the GDR I had an opportunity to study the work of production complexes closely. I was able to look "behind the scenes" to find out how they manage to maintain the high level of output and quality of goods. The people I talked to did not hold back any "secrets". If you want to achieve world standards you must know what has been achieved in other countries. Studies along these lines are conducted by the integrated plants themselves, by government ministries, and by the Department of Standardisation, Metrology, and Quality Control. At the Werner Lamberz Printing Machines Complex in Karl-Marx-Stadt I was able to trace how a new idea materialises—from the setting of the target, the so-called "table of duties" comparing the projected new item with similar items produced abroad, to the launching of commercial production, which is always preceded by setting up the needed technology to ensure good quality and reliable operation. The new item is okayed for commercial produc-

tion only if there is full confidence that it will be competitive in the world market.

A complex is usually comprised of 10-30 similar or related enterprises and a research centre. There is one leading enterprise which is the biggest and possesses the greatest expertise. Its director is at the same time the general director of the whole association and its head office serves as headquarters for the complex. Each enterprise is legally independent and has its own financial dealings with suppliers and buyers. But the general director has extensive powers: he can change the specialisation of enterprises and redirect investment.

Of late the practice has been for one of the plants in the complex to specialise in the production of new machinery and equipment commissioned for other plants in the complex. Is that the best way? Would it not be cheaper to place orders for new machines and equipment with machine-tool plants? I put that question to Armin Karl, Director of the Tisora plant which manufactures equipment for the Textima complex in Karl-Marx-Stadt.

"The practice makes sense", he replied. "It is true that our own machines cost more than the commercially produced machines by one third. But we can tailor them better to the needs of our complex and, most important, we can build them quickly and thus save time".

Every complex operates under the strict control of the State Bank, which has a branch at each complex. Its main task is to monitor economic efficiency. The branch uses financial and credit levers. Heinz Warzecha, General Director of the October 7th Machine Building Complex in Berlin, explained to me how these economic levers are used. Every complex has its own financial plan agreed upon with the ministry and the State Bank. Half the cost of raw materials and other supplies is covered by credits. The same is true of circulating capital. If the complex meets the plan targets, credit is offered at small interest rates. The worse the performance, the costlier the credits, the less the profits and the bonus fund. The levers used by the bank seem to be effective. They are an incentive for the enterprises to cut production costs, to save energy, metal and other materials.

Microelectronics is rightly seen in the GDR as the key to a rapid rise in labour productivity and economic performance. It has been the fastest growing industry in recent years. Between 1980 and 1985 the output of semiconductor electronic instruments increased four-fold and of integrated circuits by 630 per cent. The GDR is cooperating extensively with the other members of CMEA, especially with the Soviet Union. The foremost microelectronics complexes in the GDR are Microelectronics, with its main factory in Erfurt, and the Dresden-based Robotron.

Electronics is invading all areas of life. It is used to automate production. Emphasis is placed on introducing automated systems for designing and preparing future production. This speeds up the development of new technology several times over. The efficiency of the work of engineers in shipyards, for example, will increase six-fold. This will make it possible to rival the performance of the world's leading firms. Already the country has more than 30,000 automated design and technology work places.

The output of personal computers is rapidly increasing thanks to the efforts of two plants of the Robotron complex, one in Sömmerda and one in Dresden. In 1986 the Sömmerda enterprise was set the target of manufacturing 11,000 personal computers. But knowing that the demand for them was far greater, the factory committed itself to exceeding that target by 10,000 computers. To do that, factory floor area was increased, people were retrained for work in this new field and links were es-

established with the suppliers of components, which was an essential condition of success. Last year, Robotron-Elektronik plant has pledged to produce 10,000 personal computers over and above the planned target. The Robotron-Elektronik model operates on a 16 bit information mode, twice as large as that manufactured in Sömmerda. Meanwhile the Dresden plant is preparing to launch a 32 bit computer. This fact gains in significance when it is remembered that the USA has banned the export of this type of computer to socialist countries.

Computers are used everywhere in the GDR. In factories they help designers and managers; in trade, they monitor the flow of goods. Computer displays are used by shop assistants and bank clerks. They are to be seen more and more often in agricultural cooperatives, where they are helping to boost crop yields.

The wide introduction of microelectronics confronts party, government and economic personnel with new tasks. They must have a clear idea of the vast opportunities opened up by the use of microelectronics in solving economic and technological problems. For this purpose there is a system of training and refresher training courses to advance their qualifications. At the head of the system is the Institute of Socialist Economic Management attached to the Central Committee of the SED.

Stressing the importance of matching economic progress with social improvements, the SED set an ambitious task: to solve, in the main, the housing problem by 1990. The scope of housing construction is enormous. It is particularly striking when you think back to the past. Walking in the streets of Berlin today I can't but recall how its face has changed over the years. The first to rise from the ruins were the residential houses along Karl-Marx Allee. New buildings have gone up on Unter den Linden. A wonderful architectural ensemble in Alexanderplatz, erected almost twenty years ago, includes the modern Berlinstadt Hotel, the Centrum Department store, the House of Teachers and the Travel Bureau.

One of the famous landmarks on Marx and Engels Square is the State Council building, whose facade incorporates the balcony of the Royal Palace from which Karl Liebknecht proclaimed the formation of the German Socialist Republic in 1918. Another landmark is the Republic Palace, which is open to the general public. There are just some of the remarkable buildings in Berlin. New housing developments have sprung up in the suburbs of Marzahn, Hellersdorf, and Hohenschönhausen. Vacant lots on the old streets of Friedrichstrasse, Otto-Grotewohl-Strasse and Wilhelm-Pieck-Strasse in the central area are being developed. Architects see to it that the new houses match the architecture of the old. The new houses are built from prefabricated blocks and then get "period" decorations: mouldings, stained glass, the cut Berlin Corner, which usually serves as an entrance to a shop, and penthouses under tiled roofs. A colleague of mine who recently came from Moscow couldn't believe that a building had been built from prefabricated blocks until he discovered a carefully hidden seam linking two blocks.

Among other cities restored to their former splendour are Dresden, the centres of Magdeburg, Karl-Marx-Stadt, Halle and Rostock. At the same time, old residential houses are being overhauled; their flats are being redone with modern layouts and new furnishings.

INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE

The formation and consolidation of the GDR dealt a serious blow to imperialists' plans in the centre of the European continent. It became clear that those who had hoped in the course of the cold war to gobble up the first socialist state on German land and to get back the "lost territories

in the East" had failed. In the late 1960s and early 1970s Bonn realised that recognition of the GDR could not be avoided, that it was an independent and sovereign state. The FRG has no right to be the "sole representative" of all the Germans. But that is not to everyone's liking in Bonn. I was among those present during the signing of the Treaty on the Basic Principles of Relations Between the GDR and the FRG. When the West German Secretary of State Egon Bahr put his signature to the document, one of the journalists who accompanied him shouted into the TV cameras: "Does that mean, Mr. State Secretary, that a German living in Frankfurt-on-the Oder is no longer a German?" He was one of those who did not understand that the watershed between the two German states ran not along national but along class lines. Nationalist-minded politicians continue to claim that the "German question is open".

One of the new buildings in the centre of the capital, facing the square with the monument to Marx and Engels, proclaims the words: Berlin is a City of Peace. There is deep meaning in these words. What a long and glorious path the German socialist state has had to cover in the past decades in order for the name of its capital to become associated with a consistent policy of peace! Together with the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Treaty States, the GDR is making a maximum effort to improve the international atmosphere and establish good-neighbourly relations in Europe. It takes part in all the major joint initiatives of the fraternal socialist countries. It also comes up with its own proposals pursuing the same noble goals. For example, the GDR and Czechoslovakia have proposed to set up a nuclear-free corridor in Europe as well as a zone free of chemical weapons.

In late May last year the words claiming Berlin as a city of peace acquired a new significance for people on all continents. The capital of the GDR was chosen as the site for the meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee. Hundreds of correspondents from dozens of countries eagerly awaited the news from the Palast Hotel, where the top leaders of the Warsaw Treaty were in conference. People tried to guess what could be important positive international developments. The expectations of the press were justified. The media were able to report to the world community on the position of the Warsaw Treaty on key international issues. The Warsaw Treaty countries published a document on their military doctrine—a convincing proof of their commitment to lasting peace and readiness to do everything they can to promote an atmosphere of trust and to eliminate the nuclear menace threatening mankind.

The GDR pursues a dynamic foreign policy. Gone is the time when the revenge-seekers in the FRG tried to impose a diplomatic blockade on the German socialist state. The joint efforts of the socialist countries and the growing international prestige of the GDR have secured the country's recognition in the world. The republic has emerged on the international scene, and is a full-fledged member of the United Nations. It has diplomatic relations with more than 130 states. The GDR is contributing to the coordinated foreign policies of the socialist countries. GDR leaders have visited a number of West European, Asian and African countries. The republic has played host to major statesmen and political leaders from the West.

The German Democratic Republic is on the march. As its national anthem says, it looks towards the future. Its history contains no black abysses, its policy is humane and committed to peace. Difficulties and problems do, of course, arise in the process of its rapid growth, but it

TODAY'S SWITZERLAND

The ruins of Aventicum look like stage sets against the background of a peaceful Swiss landscape. The remains of the town walls and a solid gate and lone straight columns of what once was a Roman theatre are like messengers of those distant centuries in the midst of lush meadows at the foot of blue mountains. Large, well-fed cows graze on the site of a former circus arena that once upon a time witnessed gladiators fight and die. Nothing but a melodious ringing of their bells breaks the silence.

Avenches, the former Aventicum, in the beginning of the first millennium was a flourishing city, the chief town of the Roman province of Helvetia. The war-crazy Celts, whose descendants live quietly in the valleys of the Jura today, having occupied Switzerland, moved on to the West only to be defeated by the legions of Caesar. The Romans, the victors, built their stone cities there, laid good roads and established rational, if strict, order. One relic of their rule is the Raeto-Romansch language which is now spoken in the villages of the Graubünden canton.

The crushing defeat at Marignano in the Po valley in 1515 made the Swiss forever averse to incursions into foreign lands. It has certainly been a commendable act by the inhabitants of this austere and picturesque country well versed in the art of counting their credits and debits, to chalk down the defeat they sustained in North Italy as a gain rather than a loss. For centuries, the nation committed itself exclusively to domestic affairs. In what country would you see a monument to commemorate a... defeat? Switzerland has one. It is in remembrance of the defeat that Napoleon inflicted on the Bernese in 1798.

But does this mean that a Swiss can't take up arms or that he doesn't care about a feat of valour? Not at all. You can see that by one symbol of this nation's love for freedom—the legendary Wilhelm Tell, a master archer, who led the Swiss in their struggle against Austrian feudal rule early in the 14th century. Legend has it that he struck an apple off his son's head with one arrow and the heart of the tyrant Gessler, a viceroy of the Habsburgs, with another. The Tell Museum at Bürglen is a place of pilgrimage. You can see his bearded face on coins and postal stamps. His life story is diligently studied at school.

The veneration for Wilhelm Tell is too strong to be ever shaken by any doubt, verging on heretical, as to whether he ever lived at all. The Zurich dramatist Max Frisch once noted with a touch of humour: "Whether Tell existed is unprovable, but that he struck Gessler dead is definite." Well said: a tyrant was destroyed by the hand of the people, that is beyond all doubt.

Inside the congress-hall of Parliament in Berne is a huge mural. It shows a lake, Alpine meadows, and snow-capped mountains. But it is not out of aesthetic considerations that it has been painted there. The meadow is the famous Rütli, sparking like an emerald carpet, overlooking the transparent waters of the Vierwaldstättersee Lake. It was there that on August 1, 1291, the men of Uri, Schwyz and Unterwalden (the women had no suffrage in this land until our times) took the Rütli Oath to establish a Swiss Confederation, declaring as its purpose the defence of its sovereignty against the voracious Habsburgs. Incidentally, it was Schwyz that gave the name to the whole country.

The present peculiar forms of Swiss life—the autonomy of the cantons and the militia-type structure of the Army, and the coexistence of four

different language groups and "referendum democracy" are not a tradition, nor a relic of the past. These are most living forms of social organisation, which are distinguished as stable and dependable. Switzerland has no common climate, language, mental image, habits, or mode of life for that matter, but still it is one country.

"Take a look at our direct democracy," the Chairman of the Aargau Canton Government, A. Schmid, proposed to the members of the Soviet delegation that visited Switzerland. Aargau is one of the 26 cantons and half-cantons of the Confederation. Its small ancient towns lie among meadows covered with dense sown grass and wheat fields interspersed with yellow rectangles of rape. This harmonious landscape "incorporates" factories and plants producing excellent silk fabrics, fine, durable and rather expensive Bally shoes, and high-precision machinery.

The canton has its own Constitution, Parliament and government. Every Tuesday the MPs assemble in an austere 18th century classic building. When we were there, we found them discussing tax matters. Many spoke in a local dialect incomprehensible even to a "normal" Swiss. A parliamentary decision is brought before the bar of public opinion through an indispensable referendum.

"Of course, this is an unwieldy system. But we are a small nation, and we can afford it," A. Schmid remarked.

There have been about 200 referendums in Switzerland since 1950. What have the election issues been? Was summertime to be introduced? The answer was "No". Should pedestrian crossings and promenade paths be laid? The answer was "Yes". Should women be given voting rights in federal elections? The answer was "Yes". Should that apply to 18-year olds? "No". Should the opening day of a school year be the same for the whole country? Yes. Should Switzerland enter the United Nations? No...

It must be noted that the number of referendums is growing, but the turnout is waning. They involve between 30 and 50 per cent of the adult population, and in the cantonal ones an even smaller proportion.

Nevertheless, it must be admitted that Switzerland's political structures are stable. As a rule, parliamentary elections never produce any major change in the alignment of political forces; this was reaffirmed by the October 18, 1987 elections.

Switzerland's major political parties—the Radical Democratic Party, the Christian Democratic Party and the People's Party—are in sure control of the government and parliament. The Social Democratic Party co-operates with them. The four parties of the coalition won 158 of the 200 seats in the Lower House of the Parliament and secured 42 of the 46 seats in the Upper House. In the context of favourable circumstances, a relatively stable economic situation and a high standard of living, the ruling parties, relying on the middle and upper class, succeed in their policy of collaboration between labour and capital and in dampening the intensity of social conflicts. They benefit in doing so also from the political indifference of various population groups and the reformist tactics of trade unions.

A progressive I talked to said that conservative forces are using the favourable economic situation to strengthen their positions. There is a growing anti-communist and anti-Soviet mood, increasing US predominance in intellectual and cultural life and spreading xenophobia and nationalism.

The ruling circles reject the initiatives and proposals of left organisations and parties for defending the social gains of working people and extending democracy in the state. Suffice it to recall the outcome of the parliamentary debate in March 1987 on the application of the principle of male-female equality, which was written into the country's Constitution as late as 1981. By a majority vote, the Parliament turned

down the motion for drafting a law to ban discrimination against women. Yet, women get only two-thirds of men's wages for equal work, and in the Appenzell Canton they do not even have suffrage in local government elections.

There are about a million foreign workers in Switzerland—nearly 15 per cent of the population. They are employed in the hardest and lowest-paid jobs. They act as a damper in the economic set-up. In the event of an economic downturn, they are laid off and quite often sent packing. The Swiss organisation of democratic lawyers has called for the foreigners' legal and social status to be squared at least with the standards in operation in other European countries.

The communists have an uphill job to do. The Swiss Workers' Party is fighting for the democratic and social rights of labour, for peace and faithful adherence to the policy of neutrality and for the country's larger role in resolving the overriding issue of modern times—that of safeguarding and strengthening peace and security in Europe and in the world. The Communists are working hard to reinforce the party membership in class and internationalist positions, to overcome difficulties and carry through its platform planks. Beyond question, this is a difficult task, considering a certain social inactivity of large groups of the population.

And yet political indifference is being washed up by the flow of time. Even the dominant position of the bourgeois parties is being gradually eroded by the course of events. The Greens have become more prominent on the political stage especially following the ecological disaster on the Rhine, when a Sandoz chemical company warehouse burned down, causing pollution in the river which killed a large amount of fish. Up to 15 per cent of the electorate vote Green in cantonal elections, and in the October 18, 1987 parliamentary elections the Greens won 16 seats in the Lower House, thus doubling the total number of mandates.

Incidentally, Switzerland has the strictest environment protection rules in Europe. It spends 2.5 billion francs every year for the purpose. All cars are fitted with catalysts, as indicated on their rear windows, which reduce the exhaust gas amount to one-tenth of what it normally is. In a small and densely-populated country environmental protection really is a life-and-death issue. That is why there is a response to the slogans of the Greens. Their programme is based on such vague principles as "decentralisation, humanity and repudiation of technocracy". The party puts mental before material values and considers environmental protection more important than economic development.

Economic growth has been and still is the main concern of the people of Switzerland. The scarce land has hardly ever fed them. They emigrated by the thousands, ploughed the wasteland of America and Australia and fought as mercenaries in the armies of European kings. But at home, too, they have shown a good deal of business skill and dexterity.

Somebody said: the Lord has given the Swiss the mountains; and they have themselves created everything else: the bridges, viaducts, roads, dams, giant tunnels, cities, resorts, museums, schools, hospitals, first-class industry; in short, they have with their own hands and intelligence created one of the best provided, best-kept and best-cared for countries of the continent.

...A kind of a box rolls upon a string of metal plates laid on a shop-floor; it crawls under a machine, lifts quite a heavy piece and carries it over to another machine. A whole company of units are at work in perfect order. There are no people to be found here. This is an automated shop.

Dr. Herbert Gassert of the board of the Brown Boveri Concern (BBC) tells us about the production programme of this leading Swiss firm. It comes third after such transnational giants as Nestlé (food) and Ciba-Geigy (chemistry). Close to 100,000 people are employed at the 36 factories of this concern scattered all over the world. The products they make are involved in the production, distribution and use of electric energy, including the designing and construction of electric power stations, comprising atomic plants, the manufacture of equipment for the mining, steelmaking, chemical, petroleum, printing, and construction industries, ship engines, information science and control facilities. The capital turnover of this enterprise is 14 billion francs. Almost ten per cent of that is spent on research and development. There is no time to waste. The rate of innovation grows faster. The term of product-range renewal has been cut from 20 to 3 years.

The BBC is building up its muscles. In the summer of 1987 it "married" one of the biggest electrical engineering firms of Sweden to form a truly giant corporation leading the field in this industry throughout the capitalist world.

The firm is closely watching the progress of engineering all over the world, including the USSR. It is participating in all major international exhibitions arranged in our country, such as Electro-87. As its owners told us, the BBC is planning to extend links with Soviet organisations. There have already been symposia on the processes of chemistry development and on electrical insulation materials; an accord has been concluded to develop a high-temperature reactor and there has been an exchange of licences.

Switzerland is exporting not only well-made goods, but technical ideas, too. The Basler und Hofmann AG in Zurich, which we visited, "produces" designs, plans and estimates, and provides production engineering for construction projects. It occupies a modern building of glass and concrete, with a small yard inside and in the middle a structure which looks like a cascade of flowers. Neither those rampant colours nor, indeed, the numerous paintings hung up in halls and corridors, seem to distract the 130 engineers and technicians from their computer games. The exhibition is constantly replenished. Customers are welcome to spot a painting that they may like and afford to buy, and, of course, the firm, acting as a patron of art, does a good deal of publicity for itself.

The common brain trust of the enterprise is a computer, stationed in the basement, capable of performing 200 million operations. It produces the most sophisticated blueprints and amazing calculations, stores thousands of cadastral books and communication lay-outs of all the cities and towns of the country, obviating the necessity of digging up one and the same pavement three times, predicts even earthquakes and identifies seismically dangerous zones.

Naturally, electronic computers are dead without men to operate them. They fuss around personal computers and leaf through technology journals from nearly all the countries of the world. The cafeteria is also a meeting place for consultations and conferences. The managers encourage staff intermingling—exchange of opinion is thought-provoking.

In many countries of the world, Swiss machinery is weaving, knitting, drilling, planing, controlling production processes, producing electric energy and chocolate, grinding grain and churning butter, curing ailments and navigating ships. Adaptability to the market, specialisation in small-lot production to meet the customers' particular desires, high technical standards and impeccable quality ensure ready sale.

Some see it like a riddle that the 6 million Swiss, with practically nothing but bare rock to live on and few natural resources to speak of, could

have achieved the highest Western per capita income and retained it in spite of the upheavals in the world economy in recent years. Inflation and unemployment are under 1 per cent. But every Swiss realises that even his country's prosperity is vulnerable in the present unsettled world. The waves of a crisis and monetary vicissitudes do not stop in the foothills of the Alpes.

The ailing American dollar and the high exchange rate of the Swiss franc hold up the exports that feed the nation. That applies, first of all, to the watch, footwear, textile and, more recently, engineering industries. Quite a few problems come from the Common Market which absorbs over half the exports. Plans for establishing a single domestic EEC market by 1992 threaten to leave Switzerland behind a high fence of customs duties and quotas.

In short, there may be some difficulties ahead. Economic growth rates are slowing down. The order book is thinning out. Naturally, vigorous action is being taken to counter this process. Special attention is given to the electronic industry. (Its exports expand by 10 per cent a year.) Much is being done to rationalise production, increase the capital-labour ration, renew manufacturing capacities (for instance, in watch-making).

Watch-making is a special branch of the Swiss economy. In their day, the French Huguenots, in flight from Catholic fanatics, moved to Switzerland. They brought with them their knowledge, experience, and craft without which it would have been impossible to develop this industry which earned the glory of Switzerland. The Swiss added to that their own ingenuity, knack and good faith, and so the time keepers of the Alpine valleys and the shores of mountain lakes won the whole world.

But somewhere in the 1970s, Swiss watches began to fall behind the times. The demand for clocks and watches in the world was rising, but the sales of "Made in Switzerland" timers fell off. One of the main reasons behind the crisis was foreign competition, above all, that of Japan which was using up-to-date belt conveyers at its watch factories and quickly readjusted production to meet the variable consumer demand. The competitors offered quartz-crystal clocks (a Swiss invention, incidentally), by the way, for the same price as the Swiss charged for most of the makes of their mechanical watches. The contest was clearly not on equal terms.

A radical reconstruction of the watch-making industry, with the introduction of new technology, began in the mid-1970s. This industry recovered from the attacks of Japanese competition and went on the offensive. At present the country is exporting 60 million clocks and watches annually, with mechanical ones accounting for only 10 per cent of the total. Apart from making what are known as respectable watches, like the expensive Omega, Rados, Longines and Rollex, it has launched the mass production of relatively cheap Swatch time keepers (Swiss watches).

In a museum in Neuchâtel, you can see 18th century automatic dolls with some elements of "memory". Two boys in velvet jackets are drawing a portrait of King Louis XV and calligraphically spell out a programmed text, while a laced lady plays an unsophisticated organ tune. Neuchâtel has long been famous as a town of master watch-makers. The watch industry, employing about half the local workforce, is basic to the region's economy. But today it is not the deft hands of wonder watch-makers, but the iron clutches of robots that create the wealth of the canton. They are arranged in rows on all the floors of the ETA factory in Fontainemelon, turning out movements incorporating microelectronics and up-to-date chemical processes. The factory supplies movements to a dozen world-renowned firms.

While we were in Switzerland we were more than once told about traditional Swiss accuracy. In Zurich, you see this quality embodied in granite, glass and aluminium. There are high bank buildings on either side of Bahnhofstrasse, with paintings and objects of art in their window-cases (financiers have turned patrons of art). You can also see shops with the most exquisite articles. Some are really priceless: there are no price tags on them; they are of no interest to those who drop in.

The confidentiality of bank deposits is the most zealously guarded secret in Switzerland. Clerks may even be jailed for disclosing it. Therefore, individuals like ex-President Marcos of the Philippines (he has a billion-dollar bank deposit in Switzerland), or the deposed Haitian dictator Duvalier, or the family of the expelled Shah of Iran are perfectly sure of the safety of their "savings". Their money is really safe in the coffers of Bahnhofstrasse with special locks made for them by a thriving firm.

Zurich's banks are crammed with deposits and gain record profits just because the financiers can guard the confidentiality of deposits. Other factors of no mean importance are stable political and economic conditions, the policy of neutrality, close links with the world economy, low lending rates, hard readily convertible currency and the country's advantageous geographic position. The banks have the most up-to-date computer system and well-trained staff. The owners of the firms on Bahnhofstrasse prosper not only as treasure guardians, but as major international creditors. The total sum of the loans granted to foreign nations has topped 52 billion francs.

Zurich is a major world gold trade centre: 80 per cent of the world gold operations are performed by the Swiss Gold Pool grouping three major banks of the country, with their headquarters in Bahnhofstrasse: Schweizerische Bankgesellschaft, Schweizerischer Bankverein and Schweizerische Kreditanstalt.

A gold bullion marked with a standard of 999.9 weighed my hand down. It was exactly a kilogram and cost upwards of 20,000 francs. Bullions and coins of various denomination are on sale, just like chocolates or bonbons, at the bank entrance.

Gold is an object of accumulation, investment and speculation. The yellow metal serves well for applied uses. According to Swiss estimates, about 100 tons of gold are used every year for electronics and electrical engineering in the capitalist world, over 50 tons for dentures, 30 tons for medals and 165 tons for coinage. The greatest amount—about 600 tons of gold—is used, of course, for jewelry.

Switzerland is not only a buoyant gold market. Its own cellars are packed with gold. By its stock—2,600 tons—this small nation comes third after the leading industrial powers of the West—the USA and West Germany.

We were invited into the monetary transactions room of Schweizerischer Bankverein. There was no rustle of banknotes nor any jobbing passions in evidence. All was quiet. About a dozen men, with their jackets off, were sitting in front of their monitors watching the whole world at once. It is enough to press a button for this fully automated system to inform you of all foreign exchange positions around the world. Passionless clerks were buying or selling hard currency: in a year they will have handled some SFr 6 or SFr 7 billion a year.

Of course, there is a lot of speculative and dishonest dealing that goes on. But, as our hosts assured us, that is part of the inevitable overhead expenses involved in this business, something the economy of the "free world" could not function without.

What we saw at the Zurich Stock Exchange, however, was completely different what with excited men, clustering at a round stand, like so many toy soldiers, shouting and poking their pencils into each other. In the

centre of a circle, a young woman excitingly called out share rates either to an uproar or to dead silence. The woman hastily notes down the order for a purchase or a sale of shares, while brokers are in a hurry to key their code on their personal computers and to fix the order. Errand boys rush to and fro.

"Of course, to a stranger all this fuss seems strange," our hosts told us, "But the Exchange is a market with the law of demand and supply reigning supreme, a market that is essential for redressing the imbalances of economic development."

"The bank performs a certain social function. It is responsible for the social order in our country," said Herr G. Condrau, First Vice-President of the financial giant of Schweizerischer Bankverein which is Switzerland's second biggest bank, one of the top ten in the capitalist world. Indeed, banks, closely connected as they are with the key sectors of the economy—chemical, electrical engineering, electronic and machine-building—do certainly play a major part in regulating and balancing the spontaneous processes of the capitalist economy, thereby fulfilling a certain social function.

Referring to the bank's international operations, G. Condrau emphasised "very good relations" with the banks of the USSR and other socialist states. "I go to Moscow four to five times a year. We are doing a lot of business in terms of credit, monetary and gold operations."

We left the bank after it was closed already. But the office went on operating—through computer machine at the entrance. By inserting your personal bank card into it and keying your code, you can withdraw money from your account.

Then we were on the move again. And once more we saw attractive rustic landscapes on either side of the road, villages and big farm houses *Einhäuser*, that is, a single building housing the entire local farming clan, a cowshed, and storage capacities for hay and feed. The fields, meadows and structures are all in tiptop shape. The land is not particularly fertile, and it is scarce in this highland country. But it is used efficiently, particularly for fodder production.

Statistics show that Switzerland's farming, employing five per cent of the population, meets two-thirds of the nation's demand for foodstuffs. For example, it produces enough milk, cheese, potatoes and pork to meet the actual requirements in full, and 82 per cent of the required amount of butter, 85 per cent of grain and 90 per cent of beef.

We went to a farm "deep inside" the Solothurn canton. We were welcomed in a spacious barn, with a small tractor and basic tools. There was quite a crowd to meet us and a table laid with various kinds of locally baked bread and jugs of milk. Junior schoolchildren sang a song "I wear only green" and then danced imitating mowing, threshing and milking.

That was quite a big family farm, by Swiss standards: 32 hectares of land and 20 hectares of forest, 40 cows and several sows. Livestock productivity is high.

We were given a simple and warm welcome. In fact, we found no evidence to justify the warning that the Swiss were restrained to the extent of being inhospitable. Our hosts turned to history over and over again to recall facts attesting to the old connections between the two countries. Russian arms of the late 18th century are well kept in museums. We were shown some amulets of the dead Russian soldiers—miniature crosses. We found that everyone knew about Suvorov and his unmatched march across the Alps. The Russian Army came there to liberate the country from the French invaders. Local inhabitants in the

Schwyz Canton still perform dances and songs that Suvorov's men taught them. More than once our hosts mentioned the names of Franz Lefort, a native of Geneva, an associate of Peter the Great, a full General and Admiral of the Russian State; Leonard Euler, an outstanding mathematician and physicist, who worked for the Petersburg Academy of Sciences in the 18th century; and other Swiss who lived in our country.

Lenin lived in forced emigration in Switzerland for a total of about seven years (with some breaks)—in Geneva, Bern, and Zurich. He went to Basle and other cities.

"That is something worth recalling in particular because of the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution," said the President of the National Council J.-J. Cevey. "Closer cooperation will lead us to peace and progress," he added. "The USSR's role in strengthening peace is tremendous. The Soviet Union paid dearly for the victory over fascism. Its glory is everlasting. Our systems differ essentially from each other. But our nations are daughters of one mother Europe. The numerous initiatives inspire hope for a more secure peace. Switzerland takes a positive view of this. The potential for cooperation between our peoples is great," Cevey said.

Contacts at all levels have demonstrated a mutual desire for consolidating and building of everything good and positive that has been achieved in relations between the two countries. Soviet-Swiss links are growing in scale and value, including as they do meetings between the leaders of the two countries, exchange of parliamentary delegations, cultural links and contacts between public organisations.

Trade and economic relations as well as scientific and technological links are advancing to mutual benefit, by and large. Over 300 Swiss firms are cooperating with Soviet foreign trade associations. We sell Switzerland energy resources, chemical products, precious metals, machines, machine-tools and instruments, while buying mostly machinery and equipment, chemical goods, dye-stuffs, medicines, and clothing. There is an accord for an automatic mixed fodder plant, a knitted fabrics finishing flowline, foundry and printing equipment to be supplied to the USSR.

Our countries cooperate in the production of machine-tools and coffee-grinders and in the markets of third nations, notably, in the construction of thermal power-stations and grain elevators.

This is by no means the limit, of course. Both Soviet business executives and Swiss employers have yet to work hard to improve and enhance business contacts. This means, primarily, the use of new forms of business cooperation, including production and scientific and technological cooperation, joint ventures and exchange of licences. The current sweeping changes being made in our country's machinery of external economic relations is designed to promote promising business links.

The two countries have quite a few points of contact in respect to ensuring a secure peace. There is the realisation in Switzerland of the gravity of the threat that the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, poses for mankind and of the danger of it being extended into outer space.

There is invariable respect in the Soviet Union for Switzerland's traditional status of neutrality and its instrumentality in keeping up the East-West dialogue. Until quite recently many of the Swiss regarded neutrality as a form of self-isolation and abstention from international politics. Now things are appreciably different. The growing tension in the world is beginning to seriously worry ordinary citizens and political circles. They are coming to realise more and more, evidently, that neither neutrality nor the strongest possible defence can guarantee genuine security in this age. Hence the interest in the European process and Switzerland's generally intensified activity in the group of neutral and non-

A VIEW FROM BEIJING

Our journal carries a full text of an interview by Huan Xiang, director of the Centre for International Studies at the State Council of the People's Republic of China published in *Renmin ribao* on December 31, 1987. Here are some biographical facts about Huan Xiang for the reader's information. He was born in 1910 in Guizhou Province, and graduated from several educational establishments of China as well as the Waseda University in Japan. He worked as a journalist during the war against Japan and the war for the country's liberation from the Kuomintang rule. When the People's Republic of China was formed, Huan Xiang occupied several high posts at different times in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and took part in several major international conferences and meetings. Since the mid-1970s he served as Ambassador to Belgium and as China's representative to the European Community.

The interview published in this issue will give the reader first-hand knowledge of how last year's international developments are assessed in China and what China expects of the future.

Setting aside the motives named by Huan Xiang to explain the positive changes in international relations, the fact is that he highly estimates the current process as being significant in itself. He emphasises that after the signing of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (IRMs-SRMs Treaty) "for the first time since the emergence of nuclear weapons a whole class of these weapons is to be liquidated". The foreign-policy concept, based on the widely known theory of "two superpowers" which serves as a starting point in his analysis of the international situation, has clearly left an imprint on the interview. But let the readers see for themselves, without our polemic commentary, what is what in the judgements by Huan Xiang, which are undoubtedly of considerable interest.

There Is a Possibility for a New, Comparatively Long Stage of Detente Within Definite Limits

QUESTION: Comrade Huan Xiang, your recent visit to the United States coincided with the Soviet-American summit meeting and with the signing of the IRMs-SRMs Treaty. We think that you, of course, felt the intense atmosphere of the summit. Could you share with us your impressions about that?

ANSWER: At the exact time the IRMs-SRMs Treaty was signed, I was attending a meeting in the USA on issues concerning the Pacific Ocean. Judging by the response of the American and world public, people are quite elated over the signing of the treaty. During the summit the Americans gained the impression that Mikhail Gorbachev is a very business-like and clever leader. They think it is not easy to confront such a worthy rival.

The IRMs-SRMs Treaty is significant not in the number of nuclear missiles to be destroyed under this document but in that for the first time since the emergence of nuclear weapons a whole class of these weapons is to be liquidated. Speaking from the point of view of the present day, the signing of the Soviet-American treaty signals only an improvement of the atmosphere in the relations between the two countries. However, in the long-term prospect this document can start a whole new stage of detente between the USSR and the USA. If this forecast is correct, then the present detente differs

from what it was in the 1960s and the early 1970s, because the conditions that were the cause of detente then are not the same as they are now. In the first place, both the USA and the USSR are faced each with its own economic problems. So they need talks, a respite, to concentrate mainly on the economy.

Second, both sides conducted in the past a large-scale arms race and now feel they are getting worn out. Speaking about the American arms race, \$2 to \$3 trillion have been spent for these purposes during the Reagan presidency alone. And one should remember other economic factors due to which the deficit doubled and the national debt increased. This cannot go on.

Within the United States the conservative forces have grown weaker and are fragmented, and most Americans can no longer insist on the arms buildup and a tough position in relation to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union also felt that once it had reached nuclear parity with the United States its economic might was petering out. It, too, felt that this could not go on.

Third, the USA and the USSR need reforms, renovation, and economic modernisation. But both countries are faced with rather vast difficulties, and the forces of resistance are considerable. The internal political factors in both countries made the continuation of the former ossified policy impossible for them, and so they cannot but make fresh steps to occupy new, more active political positions. Precisely because the IRMs-SRMs Treaty has such deep causes, I think that its signing may be followed by definite action next year (that is, in 1988—Ed.) and further improvement of the atmosphere may occur, which, possibly, will signal the start of a new and comparatively long stage of detente. As distinct from the past, during this detente there are little chances that any of the sides can set out to undermine it. There is a possibility for a new, comparatively long stage of detente within definite limits. Besides, a notable and distinctive feature of this detente is that it began with a practical deed—the signing of the IRMs-SRMs Treaty, which is a central element in the struggle between the two sides for hegemony. This detente differs from the previous ones, which had begun with politics. A sure and solid start is the new feature of it.

US-Soviet Rivalry Is Increasingly Acquiring a Character of an All-Around Competition of the Strength and Possibilities of States. There Is a Chance That Military Forces of Secondary Importance Will Be Liquidated

QUESTION: What changes have occurred in the strategy of the USA and the USSR in the conditions of the new detente? Can the centre of gravity in their rivalry shift to some extent?

ANSWER: Both dialogue and confrontation are present in Soviet-American relations. Of these, however, confrontation still prevails. Because the two sides have different systems, many factors behind the rivalry for hegemony between them remain. However, in the conditions of detente, Soviet-American rivalry is no longer purely military rivalry, but an all-around competition

of the strength and possibilities of states. Therefore some military forces of secondary importance can be liquidated. Intermediate- and shorter-range missiles can be dispensed with and there is a possibility of a 50-per cent cut in strategic nuclear arms, but, in my view, the main things, as, for instance, SDI, will not be eliminated.

Considering the limited economic and financial opportunities, the USA will possibly slow down the SDI deployment. The Soviet Union, too, cannot, as before, fully develop its version of SDI, but will build it selectively, to be able to concentrate on the all-around competition. The military rivalry between the two sides will proceed along the path of developing sophisticated weapon systems. Therefore I am convinced that as the dialogue on the SDI issue goes on, both sides can to a certain extent agree to a compromise, which, however, will not affect the main matter. This is evidenced, among other things, by their mutual understanding of the need to comply with the ABM Treaty.

The Growing Tendency Towards Multipolarity of the World. A New Situation Is Taking Shape in the World

QUESTION: The new detente in US-Soviet relations will inevitably influence the world situation. What, in your view, are the main signs of this influence? Can it affect the multipolarity of the world, which you always speak about?

ANSWER: The IRMs-SRMs Treaty will inevitably lead to the ever greater multipolarity of the world, because the forces of both sides, especially economic ones, have grown weaker, and therefore the sides cannot concentrate entirely on the drive for hegemony, as before. This is precisely why both sides have been willing to make a compromise by signing the treaty. Besides, the weakened positions of the two superpowers will bring about a loosening of their control over their allies. As a result, the tendency towards the political and economic multipolarity of the world will increase.

As for the American side, its military bases in Europe may remain, but Europe, alarmed by a prospect of the USA going back on its defence commitments, is now contemplating independent defence. The growing tendency in Europe towards reliance on its own defence potential can inevitably increase the political and military independence of Western Europe. To be sure, the situation in that region is comparatively complex, and internal contradictions exist.

The Soviet Union's control over and influence on Eastern Europe have already weakened, and so political independence of Eastern Europe may also increase.

Within the next five years the present status of the USSR and the USA in their military blocs may remain unchanged, but it is hard to tell what will happen later. It is a long time since economic multipolarity emerged in the world. Now political multipolarity is taking shape. This has not happened yet in the military sphere, but in the future, developments may follow precisely this course.

The Tendency in the Subsequent Course of World Events Is This: All Countries Will Be Concentrating More On Their Own Economic Growth. Comparatively Big Changes May Occur in the Asia and Pacific Region

QUESTION: Besides the US-Soviet summit, there were, of course, regional conflicts on the international scene this year, for instance, the crisis in the Persian Gulf, the crisis caused by indebtedness, and the stock exchange crisis. The Soviet Union and East European countries are carrying out reforms, and the economic contradictions among the USA, Europe and Japan are growing increasingly acute. The world is living through troublesome times. What is your view on the main tendencies in the international developments?

ANSWER: One of the major tendencies in the course of world developments is the possibility of a further decline of the dominating positions of the two powers. Second, the tensions and failures in the world economy cannot but compel the two powers, as well as all industrial and developing countries, to concentrate more on their economic development. Due to the advance of science and technology, national productive forces will be built up, and the reforms of systems and structures will ensure an accelerated growth of the productive forces of states.

As the two superpowers grow weaker—though one cannot entirely rule out the possibility that a new world war may break out—it still can be said that possibilities of preventing a world war have increased considerably. In the conditions when countries are seeking to build up their aggregate might, there seem to be smaller chances of starting war. To make still bolder forecasts, the possibility of unleashing a world war before the end of this century does not exist.

As regards certain local regional conflicts, especially the regions behind which the superpowers stand, or the regions they are reaching out for, their military actions can be somewhat contained after a Middle East settlement is achieved, although political settlement of problems associated with conflicts takes some time. The Iran-Iraq war may be an exception, for there are historical, religious and national factors involved in that conflict. Therefore it is hard to end it immediately. But other regional conflicts may become less acute, and more possibilities for political settlement will open up.

Speaking about the Big Triangle—China, the USA and the USSR—it is evident that Sino-American relations have remained comparatively stable in the last few years. However, recent months have revealed destabilising factors. For instance, Congress and the US administration wanted to use a suspension in high technologies transfer as a means of pressure and interference in the internal affairs of China, which set off popular protest. Sino-Soviet relations have been improving, but three big obstacles are yet to be removed. In my opinion, within a certain period after the establishment of detente between the USSR and the USA, no dramatic changes can occur in Sino-American and Sino-Soviet relations, contrary to what some people believe, for the strategic position and role of China have not changed. And this will continue to rivet the attention of various countries in the world.

After the signing of the IRMs-SRMs Treaty, disarmament remains the main issue for Europe. At present there already exist three negotiation channels to this problem. These talks must be specific, they are difficult and therefore will take time, and they will require courage and wisdom. Therefore there cannot be big changes in Europe within a brief span of time.

By contrast, in the Asia and Pacific region (APR) the situation can develop considerably. Japan has already become one of the biggest financial and economic powers in the world. Making use of its economic advantages, it invests capital in the USA, Western Europe, as well as in the APR countries and is struggling for superiority, which is a source of concern for the United States. Relations of economic rivalry and, simultaneously, cooperation have already been established between Japan and the USA. Can political relations change between them while Japan has economic advantages over the USA? I would say no, since Japan does not have enough prestige and is compelled to remain the USA's junior partner. But the next decade will be decisive in Japanese-American relations.

It is difficult for the Soviet Union to play any role in the APR, since it lacks economic influence there and it will not be able to gain it to any significant degree for a foreseeable period. Its only influence is its Pacific Fleet and a naval base in Vietnam. But in the absence of a world war, military influence cannot play a very notable role. If the Soviet Union managed to carry out its *perestroika* by the end of this century, its economic role in the Asia and Pacific region will have grown considerably which may substantially alter the economic situation in the region. *

It is noteworthy that the four "little tigers" ** in the APR and the fact that the ASEAN countries have already realised the importance of economic development, provide favourable conditions for the advance of science, technology and economy in these countries. Under conditions of an easing of international tensions, Japan has increased capital investments in these countries. It is possible that by the end of the 1990s these countries will be among the prospering industrial powers. Especially Thailand and Malaysia by that time will also become "little tigers", thus increasing the number of these "little tigers" in Asia to five or six.

The Present Era Is an Era of Competition and Coexistence

QUESTION: You said that the present era is an era of competition and coexistence. Would you comment on this in more specific terms?

ANSWER: I believe that the specific feature of the present era is: "One world—two systems; political and economic multipolarity, and all-out competition".

If this problem is viewed from various angles, one would see that the modern era is an era of striving for peace and development. However, the specific feature of the present era is the striving for coexistence in conditions of political and economic multipolarity. Competition exists not only between the USSR and the USA, or between the East and West, but also between states having the same system, as, for instance, between the USA and Japan, between the USA and Europe, and between Europe and Japan. On the one hand, the world economy is evolving towards internationalisation and, on the other, different countries of the world now consider various questions by proceeding mainly from their own interests. Therefore now that competition prevails, and as long as this competition presents a threat to all, there is no other way than to sit down at a negotiating table. But soon after the positions have been coordinated, frictions will reappear in the process of competition. That is to say, a formula of development may be like this: "competition—frictions—consultations—new competition—new frictions—new consultations".

* This phrase was added by Huan Xiang specifically for this article — *Ed*

** The reference is evidently to South Korea, Singapore, the Philippines and Indonesia — *Ed*

For instance, the regulation of the exchange rates of the US dollar, the West German mark and the Japanese yen in the past two years makes this situation clear. If such a situation had developed a few decades ago, clashes would have been inevitable.

At present, the peoples are aware that the price of using the A-bomb is too high. Therefore international problems today cannot be solved by war. Under the condition of the war threat, all had better coexist, and coexistence also means competition, at least in one sphere, and consultations in order to avoid war by all means.

Comrade Deng Xiaoping said that the present era is an era of peace and development. I think that the meaning of this statement by Deng Xiaoping is that the present era is an era of struggle for peace and development—not that it has already become an era of peace and development.

In the Present International Situation We Should Be Prepared for Crises, Abrupt Changes and Hard Times

QUESTION: In this international situation what, in your opinion, should we do to speed up our development?

ANSWER: At present there are more opportunities to turn to international community and that is very beneficial for effecting the "four modernisations" in our country. Even though protectionism in trade and the currency fluctuations still exist in the international economy, the importance of the potential Chinese market is becoming increasingly revealed. China is becoming an ever more important market for the USA, Europe and Japan. Our current policy of expanding ties with the outside world and effecting reforms helps us to make use of the present times. Speaking about unfavourable factors, it must be noted that the USA, Japan and other countries have assumed a position concerning the transfer of technologies to China which does not facilitate our modernisation. But the main thing is that we should rely on the policy of expanding ties with the outside world, a policy of reforms, that we should rely on the wise guidance by the party, on the traditional spirit of intensive struggle, on our own resources, and carry on economic development on that basis.

The important thing is that at present the superpowers, the industrial countries and the Third World states regard reforms or the improvement of their economies as a central task. Reforms have become a major trend in the world today. And the spirit of the recent 13th Congress of the Communist Party of China fully corresponds to this general world tendency.

Speaking again about the situation in Asia, in the Pacific region, we must be prepared for crises, for abrupt changes and hard times. Because at present certain countries and regions around us are developing rapidly with the financial and technical aid of the United States and Japan, and will possibly become the prospering industrial states by the end of this century. If we again fail to use our chance, we may be lagging far behind in ten years time. We should use foreign aid for our development, but at the same time we must realise that some people in the United States, Japan and other countries are still taking measures to contain China. Therefore we must stress the need to pursue a course of accelerated advance, relying on intensive struggle and on our own resources. In doing this, we should also make wide use of foreign capital and technologies for deepening our economic and political reform. The 1990s are a key decade. Most probably the greatest changes in

An Irreversible Choice in Favour of Peace

Борьба СССР против ядерной опасности, гонки вооружений, за разоружение. Документы и материалы. (The Struggle of the USSR Against the Nuclear Threat, the Arms Race, for Disarmament. Documents and Materials), Moscow, Politizdat Publishers, 1987, 559 pp.

The Soviet Union, conscious of its responsibility for the destiny of the world and the prevention of a world nuclear holocaust, pursues a consistent, dynamic and vigorous policy in the world arena. This is the sentence gained from the collection of documents and materials published by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The book comprises the most important proposals the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have advanced in the 1977-1987 period, as well as other bilateral and multilateral agreements and documents of the same period on the problem of the arms race prevention and disarmament.

It is indicative that the collection was published on the eve of the Soviet-American summit of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the US President, where the agreement was signed on the elimination of medium- and shorter range missiles and the foundation was laid for a future treaty on a 50-per cent cut in strategic offensive weapons with the ABM Treaty remaining in force.

From its inception the Soviet state made an unambiguous and irreversible choice in favour of peace, arms limitation and disarmament. Today it regards the attainment of these goals as the most important pledge for the preservation of peace, as a foundation for the edifice of reliable security for all. In its Programme the CPSU stated: "There are no weapons that the Soviet Union would not be prepared to limit or ban on a reciprocal basis with effective verification" (p. 212).

The cardinal goal of Soviet foreign policy is to curtail and eventually discontinue,

by the end of this century, the nuclear arms race which drives civilisation to a nuclear abyss. Soviet initiatives in the field of disarmament are extensively covered in the collection under review. The programme of security through disarmament expounded by Mikhail Gorbachev in the Statement of January 15, 1986 has become a starting point in the search for a way out of the impasse (p. 180).

The agenda of the Washington summit reflected a search for approaches for tackling the most acute problems in international development engendered by the nuclear-space era. Today's world, with all its diversity and inherent contradictions, is becoming increasingly integral and interdependent. At the same time we see the exacerbation of global problems, when the very survival of earthlings is put into question. We urgently need new rules of conduct for states which would take into account the changed conditions and requirements. It seems that the first major success of new thinking is the results of the Soviet-American meeting in Washington, which produced a significant step in real disarmament when the participants agreed to scrap thousands of warheads and two types of nuclear weapons. Indeed, just recently this would have seemed like a pipe-dream.

The significance of the treaty is most clearly realised if one reads the documents included in the collection. Indeed, with all their significance, all previous treaties in the field of nuclear disarmament only set certain limits and restrictions on the buildup of lethal arsenals. Today disarmament comes into its own and becomes a tangible

efficient factor of world politics. Undoubtedly, the elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles is just the beginning. And, as Aristotle said, the beginning is more than a half of everything. A qualitatively new stage in nuclear disarmament serves as an impetus to the unceasing quest for a nuclear-free world.

The Soviet Union attaches great significance to the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world as an interim measure in attaining this goal. This is confirmed, in particular, by such documents included in the collection as protocols to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) (p. 431) and the treaty on a nuclear-free zone in South Pacific (Rarotonga Treaty) pp. 530, 531, 533; proposals of socialist countries on the establishment of nuclear-free zones in Northern Europe and on the Balkans, and a nuclear-free corridor in Central Europe (p. 221).

The prevention of the arms race in outer space and the adherence to the ABM Treaty are the cornerstones of strategic stability in the movement towards a safe world free from nuclear weapons. That is why so much attention is paid in the book to the treaty itself and to UN resolutions prohibiting the launching of nuclear weapons in outer space. Taking into account the particular significance of the 1972 US-Soviet Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, the collection includes, also joint Soviet-American declarations, previously unpublished in the Soviet Union, adopted in connection with the signing of these two documents (pp 362, 367).

The prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons could play an important role in improving the international situation. The documents included in the collection show that a lot has been done in this direction. For instance, the multilateral negotiations at the Disarmament Conference are drawing to a close. All participants made their contribution to the elaboration of a convention on the elimination and prohibition of chemical weapons. The time has come for definite results which would meet the interests of all.

Besides the elimination of all types of mass-destruction weapons it is necessary to reduce conventional armed forces and arma-

ments. An accord on the "defence strategy" and "military sufficiency" and the comparison of military doctrines could serve as a strong impetus in this direction. The position of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries on this matter is reflected in the published appeals of the Warsaw Treaty member states to the NATO countries (pp 243, 535).

In conclusion, we would like to dwell on three ideas which arise when one reads the collection.

First, on the universality of the disarmament efforts. The establishment of a nuclear-free and safe world, the search for balanced interests is a global task. The elimination of nuclear weapons would be a major step towards a genuine democratisation of relations between states and their equality. Correspondingly, the collection vividly presents the "geography" of Soviet efforts in the field of arms limitation and reduction: in the USSR-US relations, on a European scale, in the Asia and Pacific and the Northern regions, as applied to all continents, and sea and ocean expanses.

The collection stresses the importance of multilateral efforts of the UN and the Geneva Conference in the process of disarmament. And this is natural. Many multilateral agreements and documents on disarmament included in the collection were drafted and approved by the UN itself or with its assistance by other international forums. The Soviet Union advocates a comprehensive consolidation of the authority of this unique international organisation and spares no effort to make the work of the Disarmament Conference more productive. We believe that at present it is necessary to radically invigorate the activities of the latter, while rendering it more fruitful. The Conference has proved its ability to work efficiently, which is confirmed, in particular, by the documents included in the collection. However, a lot is yet to be done. There is no doubt that the Conference will be recognised as the initiator of major multilateral agreements on disarmament.

Second. A few words on the cardinal Soviet approaches to disarmament. The documents included in the collection show that there exists a direct link between Lenin's appraisal of the problems involved in international security and disarmament and the policy of the Soviet Union, aimed at establishing the nuclear-free world and reducing under strict control the levels of military

potentials of states to the level of reasonable sufficiency. The Soviet Union unswervingly pursues the goal set by Lenin "Disarmament is the ideal of socialism".¹

The April (1985) Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee and the 27th Party Congress were the starting points in the formulation of a new Soviet concept of a lasting peace and a world secure for all which would rest on the priority of human values. This concept is reflected in the activities by the Soviet Union on the world scene in its foreign policy, its business-like proposals, the striving for an open and honest dialogue and joint search for solutions. Thus new political thinking is a philosophy of action and it continues to develop. The content of the collection is a convincing testimony to this.

Third The publication of the collection is another contribution towards making the Soviet and world public better informed and towards the consistent application of the principles of *glasnost* in diplomacy introduced by Lenin at the very outset of Soviet power. Today, when the problems of preserving peace have become the daily concern of millions of people, a broad involvement of the public in discussing the problems of foreign policy and in the process of its formulation is an indispensable part of the efforts in the quest for reliable peace and the security of each and every country.

Pyotr VOLODAROV

¹ V I Lenin *Collected Works* Vol. 23 Moscow, Progress Publishers 1964, p. 95.

The Aftermath of Unemployment

H. Hemmer, I. Wahle-Homann (Hrsg.), **Auf den Schrott geschmissen! Arbeitslose zwischen Resignation und Selbstfindung** (Thrown on the Junk Heap? The Unemployed Between Resignation and Self-Awareness), Cologne, Bund-Verlag, 1986, 196 pp.

Massive unemployment in the FRG with its unprecedented duration and scope does not surprise anyone. The problem is being widely discussed, studied and analysed. The conclusions drawn are far from consoling: so far there are no signs of an end to unemployment though moderate economic recovery has been registered in the country in recent years. The fact that it exists is a source of concern to many in the FRG: what if it is carried away by the demagoguery of the neo Nazis who keep growing in number and strength with the connivance of the authorities? Will the tragic past repeat itself?

There are also apprehensions of West German trade union leaders. So they instructed the editors of their monthly to find out what the unemployed really think about their plight. The authors of the book under review set out to learn the attitude of the unemployed to the West German state and where they could swing—to the right to join the neo Nazis or to the left forces to the Communists. Hans Hemmer, editor-in-chief of the trade union monthly *Gewerk-*

schaftliche Monatshefte says it is hard to judge by official statistics or by statements made by politicians and sociologists who tend to embellish the problem. The trade unions were interested to know the state of mind among the unemployed.

So what is the conclusion made by the editors after the opinion poll conducted by journalists among the unemployed? One clear-cut conclusion is massive unemployment having become a part of social and economic life in the FRG ruthlessly shatters the illusions about a "prosperous state caring for all its citizens", illusions that had long been spread by the bourgeois mass media. This course of events, the authors say in the foreword to the book, "is not only dangerous or even tragic, for the individual—it is fraught with a political explosion. One can see this if one reviews the past, the tragic chapter in German history. This is seen also from what is **going on today**" (p. 7).

What do the trade unions suggest in order to help the unemployed in this situation? They say it is necessary to cut work-

ing hours, with some loss of wages, of course; reduce the number of years one has to work before retiring on pension; find additional possibilities for offering temporary jobs; create new jobs, especially in social services; open a labour market for office workers; and tax instruments of labour (p. 13).

However, judging by what the unemployed themselves say, they do not believe that all this can be done. Projects of this kind are often declared during election campaigns by nearly all social-democratic and bourgeois parties in Western Europe. For instance, Helmut Kraayvanger, who worked at a copper-smelting works in Duisburg, said: "As far as I know from history, wars were waged actually every quarter of a century, and what had been created in-between was destroyed by these wars. The economy needs a kind of pressure valve, so to speak. The situation today, as I see it, is this: the world market is oversaturated and, besides, factories are fitted out with modern machines and computers. Ever more working hands become redundant. If nothing intervenes, I think there will be a tide of radical sentiment. Mere talk and election propaganda are of no use—it is time to act" (pp 45, 46).

It is not without reason that Kraayvanger mentioned a possible "tide of radical sentiment". The West Germans remember how in the Third Reich the Hitlerites crushed the trade unions. Therefore the leaders of the present trade-union centre fear the frenzied neo-Nazis who also remember examples of history and are recruiting unemployed.

"This gives rise to the question of the system," said Erich Sieben, chairman of a factory workers' council. "You will not achieve much by cosmetic touch-ups, and no one has a programme, nobody knows what to do, what will be in the future. We must always remember that fifty years ago a turn in people's minds occurred within a few weeks. When I think that what happened under the Nazis may happen again, it gives me shivers. Though, now we have well-established political parties, which did not exist then, and we have one trade-union association, while at that time there were several trade-union centres. But, nonetheless, I do not completely rule out that something of the kind may happen in our day as well. Our society will not be able to endure such strain for long" (p. 49).

Speaking on the problems of the youth, Sieben remarked that after leaving school many boys go into the army and thus they can delay unemployment for some time, nothing more, though it is easier for them to find a job than for girls. In general, Sieben sees no prospects before the young.

The authors of the book interviewed unemployed office workers and clerks. These people are politically indifferent, for the most part, but they, too, are alarmed by neo-nazism, by the danger that those who have inherited Hitler's ideology may come to power. For instance, a former high-placed financial official of a medium-sized firm, who did not wish to give his name, said the following: "We know from the history of the Third Reich that a handful of people did manage to lull the popular masses by their rhetoric. Just a handful of people, and the masses followed them. The masses today are the same as in the 1930s. If 'right people' turn up, it is hard to tell what the future of our state will be" (p. 36).

However, the utterances cited in the book show that many unemployed seek other ways of solving their problems. "As distinct from the prewar time," said Jürgen Dzudzek, secretary of the trade union at the joint-stock company Metall Duisburg, "the present young generation does not show preparedness to stand up for its interests at enterprises. The young are more drawn to the environmental movement, to the peace movement, believing that they would be more useful there.. It is different with the young. They say: we can do with less, and we can imagine a society organised otherwise" (pp 48, 49).

The concluding articles in the book, written by Professor Thomas Kieselbach, a psychologist, and Ingeborg Wahle-Homann, secretary of the monthly's editorial board, describe the consequences of unemployment on the health of the population, on its social welfare. Kieselbach writes that in the conditions of the continuing crisis in the FRG the further growth of crime is inevitable, especially among the youth, of drug addiction, alcoholism, mental disorders, suicides, child mortality, break up of families, depression, apathy. Wahle-Homann admits that the protracted crisis in the country has given rise to a crisis also in the trade unions, whose activity proves ineffective, for the trade unions are losing the confidence of the population.

The book under review is an alarming signal of rising public concern in the FRG over the hard situation in the labour market, over the poor socio-economic develop-

ment of the country, and over its political future.

Sergei LOGINOV

In One Spacecraft to Mars?

S. Matsunaga, *The Mars Project. Journeys Beyond the Cold War*, New York, Hill and Wang, 1986, 216 pp.

The author, Spark M. Matsunaga, a US Congressman from 1962 to 1976 and Senator since 1976, is an opponent of the cold war and sponsored several proposals on Soviet-US cooperation in outer space to counter the Star Wars programme. In his book he writes in detail of how many in the USA oppose this programme and support peaceful cooperation in outer space through joint international efforts for solving the problems challenging mankind. The author writes about his own initiatives to promote US-USSR cooperation in outer space and the roadblocks erected before these endeavours by the American side. He believes that relations between the USSR and the USA can be improved through the efforts of scientists since the very nature of their activities is international and, sometimes, they reach the goals which the politicians vainly aspire to (p. 5).

US initiatives, including those put forward by Senator Matsunaga, aimed at promoting US-USSR peaceful cooperation in outer space, are supported by many American prominent scientists and some NASA officials, astronauts and industrialists, as well as by progressive-minded Americans opposing Star Wars.

The author reminds readers that bilateral cooperation of the two countries in outer space began in May 1972, when their governments signed an agreement in Moscow on their cooperation in this field and undertook to carry out the Soyuz-Apollo programme. The joint work on this project, the launching of Soyuz and Apollo, their docking in the orbit and the flight demonstrated the tremendous opportunities for international cooperation in exploring outer space for peaceful purposes. The Senator notes that the world cheered that flight "as the

cold war briefly gave way before a higher purpose" (p. 4).

However, the next joint programme, Shuttle-Salyut, was frustrated by the USA. The USA and the USSR held divergent views regarding this project. While the Soviet Union upheld the idea of equitable partnership, the United States attempted to use cooperation in outer space to put political and economic pressure on the USSR.

In 1982, Matsunaga writes, he submitted to the US Congress a resolution inviting the President to "initiate talks with the government of the Soviet Union, and with other interested governments of countries having a space capability, with a view toward exploring the possibilities for a weapons-free international space station as an alternative to competing armed space stations" (p. 9). However, the US administration failed to give a positive response to that idea, and, in the same year, refused to prolongate the agreement on space cooperation with the Soviet Union.

In early March 1983, Matsunaga introduced another resolution in the US Congress on the renewal of the US-USSR cooperation in space. However, the author notes, his initiative was at variance with the administration's efforts to deploy space weapons. A fortnight after the resolution was submitted, on March 23, 1983, the US President called for the creation of a "space era" weapons system, that is, for the realisation of the SDI programme.

The author is worried by the administration's efforts to turn outer space into a theatre of war operations. He is also disturbed by the increasing expenditures on the militarisation of outer space. He notes a sharp tendency in US space research to cater to the Pentagon's interests. The author

writes "A Shuttle was meant to lead us to Mars. But, the fastest-growing and surest customer for the Shuttle is turning out to be the Department of Defense, which has a different agenda and a much roomier budget" (p. 49). Matsunaga dwells on the correlation of US space research and the interests pursued by the military industrial complex.

In the chapter "The Mountain Moves" Matsunaga describes certain progress made in joint Soviet American outer space cooperation. In September 1984 both Houses of the US Congress passed a resolution advising a resumption of cooperation with the Soviet Union in outer space use and exploration. The resolution was subsequently submitted to the President for signing. The author stresses that the bill was submitted just at the right time, that is on the eve of the election campaign.

On October 30, 1984, the head of the administration who wanted to pose as a man striving to improve relations with the Soviet Union, signed the resolution calling for renewal of bilateral space cooperation. This opened the gates for new proposals on the content and time table of implementing Soviet American space projects. Among them, the most ambitious was a resolution approved by the US Congress in February 1985. The resolution provided for cooperation in flights to Mars.

To celebrate the anniversary of the Soyuz Apollo flight a conference was held on July 17, 1985 on Matsunaga's initiative. The conference was sponsored by American In-

stitute of Aeronautics and Astronautics and attended by the Soviet participants of the flight. Timed to this event, a resolution was drafted on marking the International Space Year in 1992, the 500 anniversary of the discovery of America by Columbus and the 75th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. It is planned to time a joint Soviet American manned flight to Mars to mark these anniversaries. On November 21, 1985 the resolution was passed by the Senate.

In conclusion, the author recommends that a special "space policy" should be conducted in the "space age". He says that it is impossible to lump in one basket exchanges of dance troupes or symphony or choruses and large scale joint research in outer space (p. 159). More than once the USA has broken off current or planned joint space projects to put pressure on the Soviet Union and as a result has proved to be an unchangeable partner. However, if these moves do not do particular harm to cultural or other ties, joint space flights are a totally different matter here "distances are measured in millions of miles, missions take years and decades from conception to execution" (*Ibidem*). The author stresses that outer space should not be used as an instrument of the cold war. Cooperation in outer space research should be carried out for peaceful purposes to provide greater opportunities for all Earthlings.

Pyotr VARES,
D. Sc. (Hist.)

IMPRESSIONS STORED UP OVER DECADES

(Continued from page 137)

is not these problems that determine the atmosphere in the country. The people of the GDR are unstintingly pursuing the course of socialism charted by their Marxist Leninist vanguard - the Socialist Unity Party of Germany.

Berlin

Mai PODKLYUCHNIKOV

THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF NEW THINKING OPENS THE WAY TO A LASTING PEACE

(Continued from page 90)

ing the standard of living of the working people. However, most of them will have to adopt some radical measures. In general, the Third World problems are growing more acute, a circumstance which is fraught with unpredictable consequences since various reformist projects already cannot improve the situation.

TODAY'S SWITZERLAND

(Continued from page 145)

aligned countries. There is a growing realisation that an improved international political climate today depends on the active and resourceful position of every government and state, irrespective of its size and status.

Our tour of Switzerland ended on the shores of Lake Geneva, in the Vaud Canton, a kingdom of wine-growers. From the terrace of a small roadside cafe, we contemplated a broad panorama of the lake and the mountains skirting it. Igor Stravinsky frequented this cafe once and eminent Swiss intellectuals met there.

Bidding us farewell, V. Ruffy, a member of Parliament, said: "We are eagerly following the changes in the Soviet Union. Encouraging shifts are taking place all over the world. Mankind will overcome the difficulties in its way. It will break out of the darkness of fear, mistrust and wars..."

Albert GRIGORYANTS

A VIEW FROM BEIJING

(Continued from page 151)

the international situation will take place precisely in the 1990s. If we fail to make proper use of this decade and if we fail to solve our problems within this period, that would be very dangerous. We cannot afford to waste time. We must understand the tendencies in the evolution of the world situation, be prepared for struggle, and exert efforts to build a modern economy in our country, to occupy our appropriate place in international affairs and play a role befitting us.

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS GUEST CLUB

For many years past **International Affairs** has occupied an old mansion on a side-street meandering through an historical Moscow neighbourhood. Luckily enough, time has spared the beautiful building.

The mansion rises in a district where Muscovites and guests from foreign lands used to meet in bygone days to discuss common problems.

It is time for **International Affairs** to sponsor exchanges of views on problems of interest to all in which people from our country and elsewhere can join.

The first discussion of this nature was prompted by the paramount event of recent date, the Soviet-US talks in Washington and the accords reached by the leaders of the two countries, with the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (IRM-SRM Treaty) the most important of them.

The participants were:

PIETER ARNETT, Moscow correspondent of CNN, one of the four US television giants. The company's owner, energetic and ambitious Ted Turner (he partly financed the Moscow Goodwill Games), is working hard to move into first place on the US television market.

ATANAS ATANASOV, head of the Moscow bureau of **Rabotnichesko Delo**. The Bulgarian Communist newspaper is now one of the most influential dailies in the Balkans.

YOSHISUKE NIIZUMA, a distinguished journalist is the Moscow correspondent for **Asahi**, one of Japan's major dailies.

VSEVOLOD SOVVA, recently appointed Deputy Head of the Information Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. His commentaries and assessments are precise and well worth heeding.

GEOFFREY TRIMBLE, who arrived in Moscow not so long ago to replace Nicholas Daniloff as the Moscow correspondent for **U.S. News & World Report**. The weekly may be said to express the views of those right of the US political centre, which often bear the imprint of the military-industrial complex. As for its Moscow correspondent he wants to gain a clear understanding of our affairs, to grasp the meaning of perestroika.

MARTIN WALKER of **The Guardian**, who may be described as a typical exponent of traditional British journalistic intellectualism. His paper gravitates towards liberalism, and his judgements are therefore balanced, circumspect and invariably interesting.

VALENTIN ZORIN, a political commentator whom few on Soviet television can match for knowledge of US affairs.

The host was **BORIS PIADYSHEV**, Collegium member of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Editor-in-Chief of **International Affairs**.

THE WASHINGTON PROLOGUE

Piadyshv. It's time to look back. And time to look ahead. The visit of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee to Washington was truly historic. The Washington prologue to the process of far-reaching and consecutive disarmament brought out the possibility of an East-West dialogue aimed at achieving major political results.

We in the Soviet Union think highly of the IRM-SRM Treaty. The treaty meets the most important national interests of our country. It is consonant with the military priorities of the Soviet state, with its defence requirements

to be exact. Also, it is entirely in harmony with the interests of perestroika and may, indeed, be described as its first practical result. This is not to say that there are no nuances in our people's attitude to the treaty. But all Soviet people agree that the treaty is an outstanding international development, and this fact serves as the main guideline for the USSR Supreme Soviet in the ratification of the treaty.

Now for our discussion. I would like to ask Geoffrey Trimble, Moscow correspondent for **U.S. News & World Report**, how the treaty is being commented on in his country.

Trimble. In the very short time that has elapsed since the summit meeting, there has been rapid movement in all areas of our relationship. Of course, the current issue, the one we are discussing most closely, is ratification of the INF Treaty. My colleagues from **U.S. News & World Report** in Washington are writing consistently, based on their sources in Congress and elsewhere, that the treaty will be ratified and the question now seems to be how long the process of ratification will take.

International Affairs. Valentin Zorin broadcast TV reports on the visit from Washington. How would you, Valentin, comment on the state of Soviet-American relations today?

Zorin. Television brings response in many forms of feedback, such as, say, letters or interviews with viewers. It is true that there are nuances in our people's reaction to the treaty. There are those who want to know whether the USSR hasn't made too many concessions, whether those concessions are not unilateral. But even doubters support the treaty, considering it an event of immense historic significance. Our Western colleagues like to portray us as people who always vote unanimously. There may have been some reason for painting such a picture in the past. But now I must say that this is somewhat at variance with the truth. People know more and think more, and therefore they also ask more questions. Standing on solid ground based on facts, we say: There are no losers as result of the signing of the treaty in Washington because both sides have won.

I would like to ask my American colleagues about some of the US President's latest speeches representing the conclusion of the treaty as a result of US firmness and not as a result of a new process, of an effort to meet each other half-way. Is that a remnant of earlier rhetoric, is it prompted by political considerations of some sort or is that how Washington really sees the situation?

Trimble. In the case of what President Reagan says, I would suggest that you watch what he does rather than listen to what he says. My colleagues in Washington look at the summit meeting as the biggest event in many years. We had a case where there was some questioning of the INF details, where you had some Republican candidates indecisive apparently about whether they would support the President. I think it is quite clear now that not only are all the Democratic candidates in favour of the INF agreement, but most of the Republican candidates have come out in favour of it. Public opinion is for the signing of the INF agreement. I would suggest that President Reagan in his comments is probably looking towards the next watershed in the relationship which would be the attempts to have a 50 per cent reduction in strategic weapons.

International Affairs. The Balkans have long been called a powder keg. The region is now threatened with an even more unenviable situation. The cruise missiles deployed in Sicily, if launched, would fly over Bulgaria. What is the Bulgarians' reaction to the Soviet-American accord on eliminating those missiles?

Atanasov. I'm sure both the Bulgarians and other Balkan peoples, including the Greeks and Turks, see the event as promising. Prospects seem to have opened up for East-West relations to develop in a somewhat different atmosphere. Everybody must have noticed that this time Ronald Reagan and

Mikhail Gorbachev talked more frankly and in friendlier tones than ever before. That was certainly indicative. The talks lasted longer than planned. That means there is confidence. They talked like friends, like "Mikhail and Ronny". Those were signs of a new atmosphere of confidence. And where there is confidence you can establish a balance of interests. Of course, this is not to say we have no doubts or questions. True, there will be no missiles in Sicily. But several American military bases will remain in the south, not far from Bulgaria.

International Affairs. Were Soviet intermediate-range missiles to be deployed in the Far East, they could also reach the Japanese islands. Now that this has been ruled out, what is the public mood like in Japan?

Niizuma. We Japanese pay much attention to the SS-20 missiles deployed on Asian territory. That is why our people showed such interest in the Washington summit. Frankly speaking, the idea of eliminating nuclear weapons advanced by Mikhail Gorbachev on January 15, 1986, struck me as nothing more than a beautiful utopia. But that programme is becoming reality. The signing of the INF Treaty brought about an historic turning point in disarmament talks. It's the beginning of the end of the cold war, or so I hope. The fundamental change of position on the issue of verification is particularly important. Too bad the Japanese government goes on increasing military spending.

International Affairs. The Thatcher government called quite emphatically in favour of eliminating intermediate- and shorter-range missiles and backed the treaty. But now the mood in London is somehow subdued, with fewer signs of enthusiasm.

Walker. I once heard Mrs. Thatcher observe in a private meeting that twice before in her lifetime people had prophesied the end of the cold war. And she referred to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That was twenty-five years ago. And then she referred to the second occasion, to the ABM Treaty, and that was fifteen years ago. And afterwards the world was disappointed because the cold war had not fully ended. We welcome the INF Treaty as a classic example of perestroika, new thinking, the remarkable initiatives that have been coming out of Moscow for the past three years. However, there is some lingering fear that it might be too good to last. As you know, there is widespread speculation in the West about how much support the current Soviet leadership has got, about how much support there is for its foreign policy. There is a doubt that should not surprise you. If this is another false dawn, a third brief ending to the cold war before things turn bad again, that would be disappointing. But we can only really talk about the end of the cold war if we move on from this four per cent of missiles that are being scrapped to 50 per cent, to 95 per cent of missiles and to a new kind of a world and a new kind of international relations altogether. Now I am sure which direction it is going to take. It will mean an end to the world we have been accustomed to for the past forty years, and that's the world of bipolar control, because the two superpowers have shaped the planet's fortunes. We will not be able to judge for another few years.

Zorin. But, Martin, can humanity afford to wait, say, ten years to see whether it's a false dawn or not? Isn't the planet's stockpile of nuclear weapons too large? Aren't there too many economic and ecological complications spelling disaster? Isn't it time to quicken the pace of detente?

Sovva. Our colleague Martin Walker has put quite a heap of questions on the table. I wonder if that's really how everybody in Western Europe feels. It would apparently be more correct to say that the overall reaction to the treaty is favourable although opinions differ greatly. Moscow hosted Franz Josef Strauss, generally regarded as one of the most conservative leaders. The Bavarian Prime Minister told journalists at the Press Centre of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs that he took a positive view of the treaty but thought it was only a beginning. Of course it is. When Martin Walker said

that it was necessary to wait for another few years, I thought that it would be better to devote these years to implementing the programme put forward on January 15, 1986. It's interesting to look at what has been done to date. The talks now going on and the discussion of regional conflicts show that the general trend is headway in all areas. This is an indicator of hope and of looking ahead. I wouldn't like to set off our programme, to advertise it by turning more light upon it, but it seems to me that the document is unprecedented in concentration. It's a package of proposals each of which can be dealt with separately. There has never been such a thing before. To be sure, it doesn't expect everybody to do things our way but it certainly offers a very suitable route for common advance.

International Affairs. The February Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee has creatively developed a whole range of international aspects of the ideology of perestroika. A basic urgent problem facing both Marxists and their opponents is to correlate the class and common human principles in world development and politics. One should in no way underestimate our goodwill, our new style of conducting international policy, our striving to maintain a frank and fruitful dialogue for the sake of ensuring at least minimal trust which can exist in relations between two opposite social systems and our sincere refusal to infuse ideology into interstate relations and readiness for a compromise of equal partners.

Piadyshev. During George Shultz's visit to Moscow on February 21-23 this year the attention of the American side was drawn to these major problems of international realities. The Soviet leadership stressed that in current world affairs the USSR and the USA bear greater responsibility. Over the last forty-five years bilateral relations were marred by the concept of confrontation. Is it not high time for the two great powers to make an attempt to fulfil their international responsibility by trying to identify coinciding interests? The Soviet Union and the United States should set an example for the world by co-operating in major spheres of international life on the basis of considering the interests of all.

We are witnesses and participants of an unprecedented phenomenon created by the dialectics of world historical development. The accelerated internationalisation of many processes on the global scale is accompanied by a growing number and an expanding diversification of the national and regional development patterns. However, both these factors serve to consolidate the integrity of the world. It is our serious task to tackle these things in theory and subsequently translate them into policy. This is a theoretical and practical task which has many outlying aspects.

The Soviet Union offsets the militarist doctrine underpinning the policy of strength by advancing its own concept of "balanced interests" and reciprocal equal security. Its state interests are not at variance with those of nations and the working people in any other society. Without peace there can be no progress, and it is empty talk to speak about anybody's interests if this problem remains unresolved.

The same applies to the problem of settling regional conflicts. The present situation favours a peaceful resolvment of crises. Here there are internal factors at work on the part of those directly involved in these conflicts, as well as general factors—the positions which now prevail in the world community. If one is oblivious of this and does not take any steps it is possible of course to hold out twenty or thirty years, thereby exacerbating the risk of missing the moment when the turn of events may take everyone unawares and the world community begins to disintegrate. The situation in Afghanistan is the most acute. However, it is the most promising for a settlement. We would like to see the March round of the Geneva talks to be the last. The Soviet Union will act firmly and consistently in accordance with the statement made by the CPSU Central Committee General Secretary of February 8.

I hope that the readers of *International Affairs* will be able to learn more

about the views held by the US administration on these issues. State Secretary George Shultz has agreed to contribute a detailed article on this issue which will be in the section "The Leaders of World Diplomacy" soon-to-be introduced into the journal. Half-joking the State Secretary asked whether we would publish every word of his article. I replied: "Every word and every comma will be there because I am sure that your article will be just fine."

ON THE WAY TO MOSCOW

International Affairs. We hope Moscow will soon be welcoming the President of the United States, that is, of course, if things go as we would like them to.

Niizuma. I think that with the signing of the INF Treaty the order of the day is a 50 per cent cut in strategic nuclear weapons. Now is the time to take a close look at the real meaning of the concept of nuclear deterrence. In this connection I was particularly interested to read the CPSU CC General Secretary's answers to the Chinese weekly *Lyaovan*. They described the concept of nuclear deterrence as dangerous and outdated. I think it's important to get the governments of all countries to renounce that concept.

Arnett. What would Americans expect from the next summit? I think that a visit by President Reagan would cap the American re-evaluation of the Soviet Union. I think that the "enemy image" definitely is eroding. Both sides are to blame, possibly to differing degrees, for the unfavourable idea they have formed of each other. The visit of President Reagan, the most conservative American President of recent times, to Moscow would cap a reappraisal of American views towards the Soviet Union. I think the visit itself will be of great significance in relations between the two countries for the future.

Piadyshev. If the "enemy image" is eroding, as Pieter says, I think it's a good omen. But see how old stereotypes hang on. Here's an example. The Soviet people responded favourably to the fact that *Time* magazine declared the Soviet leader "Man of the Year". His portrait takes up the whole cover. But the same issue carried a selection of readers' letters about the Washington visit. There were six letters, and they were all negative. One of them said: "The leopard never changes its spots, and neither does the Russian bear. Americans will come to regret this encounter". *Time* didn't publish a single favourable comment. Was that the price it paid for the cover? That brings us to the problem of the journalist's responsibility.

Walker. As a journalist I get worried when politicians start moving too fast towards major agreements. Something as historic as the disarmament agreement we are all talking for has got to be absolutely copper-bottomed, reliable and nailed down. It seems to me that one of the crucial issues in Soviet-American relations was papered over. There is still a big hole in Soviet-American understanding on the issue of SDI. Behind that lie two different interpretations of what the ABM Treaty permits and does not permit. Perhaps the Soviet Union is right to assume that once President Reagan leaves the White House the SDI programme will slowly collapse.

Sovva. As far as SDI is concerned, I would like to point out that the Joint Soviet-US Summit Statement of December 10, 1987, instructed the two countries' delegations in Geneva "to work out an agreement that would commit the sides to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, for a specified period of time". It is well known that the ABM Treaty explicitly prohibits the development of components of a space-based anti-ballistic defence system.

Piadyshev. Soviet people are looking forward to the next Soviet-US summit. As I see it, we will welcome the American President's visit to Moscow in any case, that is, irrespective of whether or not a treaty on a 50 per cent reduction is signed. The American side was told that we didn't look at Rea-

gan's visit in the context of a treaty on cutting SOWs but would like the coming Moscow summit to be as valuable as the Washington meeting. What could lend the summit such value would be an agreement on cutting SOWs by half while preserving the ABM Treaty. Our delegations are now working hard in Geneva, continuing to formulate the provisions of various documents. Our impression is that the difficulties shouldn't be exaggerated. I would go as far as to say that the contours of a SOW treaty are in effect coming out already as far as its essence is concerned. The IRM-SRM Treaty provides a model for the solution of the problem of control, which is the most complicated. The Soviet leadership has made a principled choice in favour of openness on both internal matters and foreign policy issues, meaning also delicate ones like those relating to the military sphere. The scope of inspection is unprecedented. Under the IRM-SRM Treaty, about 400 inspections will be carried on our territory and in CzSSR and the GDR and about 240, on American territory and in Western Europe. Incidentally, our people are asking why an imbalance exists both in the number of missiles to be scrapped and the number of inspections. These questions are being answered in the course of ratification in the USSR Supreme Soviet. The process of ratification is going on in a way enabling diverse sections of the Soviet public to express their opinions. According to the procedure established by the Constitution, there is no need to submit questions concerning ratification to a plenary session of the Soviet parliament. True, we've had precedents, such as in the case of the Soviet-British treaty of alliance in the war against Hitler Germany, which was submitted to a plenary session. In short, a treaty on strategic offensive weapons is taking shape already, and the task is to make it as workable as possible.

International Affairs. Many of you will recall the telecast from the Vienna palace in 1979, when US President Carter gave in to emotion right after signing SALT-2. Well, it was understandable. A major task had just been accomplished, and so there was nothing wrong with showing one's feelings. But what happened in American politics after that was something unacceptable to common sense. SALT-2 literally stood trial on Capitol Hill and was never ratified.

I have no intention whatever of drawing a parallel between that situation and the present situation with the IRM-SRM Treaty. Still, could something prevent ratification by the American Congress?

Trimble. The process of ratification is generally going on as expected. The SALT-2 Treaty was in trouble in the Congress but it was the intervention of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan that killed the ratification of that treaty.

Zorin. May I remind you of the fact that there was an interval of several months between the Senate attack on the treaty and the events in Afghanistan? When the Senators still had no Afghanistan to seize upon they invented a "Cuba brigade". A hue and cry was kept up for a whole month over the "Soviet brigade in Cuba", and meanwhile the treaty was knifed. And when Afghanistan happened the "Cuba brigade" was forgotten and has remained forgotten ever since. The fate of SALT-2 was sealed in the US Congress long before Afghanistan. Afghanistan and SALT-2 have nothing in common.

Trimble. There is criticism of the treaty from concerned conservatives who genuinely discount the possibility of any real rapprochement. You may have some political opportunists, a couple of Republican candidates who are making announcements about some kind of trickery being pulled across the eyes of the Americans. I think this is all pretty small potatoes. And I don't perceive any event, short of a disaster, that could affect the signing of the INF Treaty.

Atanasov. No matter how favourably the external situation around the Washington accords shapes up, we must remember that, after all, the American and NATO military-industrial complexes still exist. And for some reason we hear no cheers for the treaty from those quarters. People there are pretty quiet at the moment and careful not to attack the agreement openly. But that

doesn't rule out the possibility of military-industrial groups mounting a frontal attack later on, with support from conservative politicians.

Arnett. If the INF Treaty is not ratified by the time the American President arrives in Moscow it will be a catastrophe. I don't think, however, that this could happen. Of course, there is still the problem of a settlement in Afghanistan but ratification must not be held hostage to it. The INF Treaty was signed without any real consideration of Afghanistan or human rights. I mentioned it simply to say that if the USSR pulled out of Afghanistan it would be an impetus towards approval for the INF agreement which is certainly not subject to it. However, I think that with a larger, more significant agreement on a 50 per cent cut the American Congress would be looking beyond this simple military equation.

Piadyshev. At briefings in the Press Centre of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs I have said that the war going on in Afghanistan was an American war. What I meant was that peace in Afghanistan could have been achieved long ago but for America's interference in Afghan affairs, the lavish funding of the *dushmans* and the arms they get. Let us hope that after the Washington dialogue a change in favour of realism will come about in the political stance of the United States.

As regards the Soviet Union, we took a fresh look at the situation in Afghanistan and came to the conclusion that the conditions for pulling out were there. Our troops will leave Afghanistan. It would be better if this were done through the Geneva mechanism. It would be better if it came about with the United States and other countries showing understanding. But the knot will be undone in any event. Those who imagine that by making such a solution difficult they can bring about a situation in Afghanistan more favourable to them than now are wrong.

International Affairs. In London and other NATO capitals there is now quite a lot of talk about NATO having a stake—with due regard to the agreement on the elimination of two classes of nuclear missile—in re-equipping itself with other weapons to make up for the loss of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles.

Walker. This is certainly true. In NATO there are a series of plans under way for the improvement and, indeed, extension of nuclear capacity. There are also, particularly in Britain and France, plans for the modernisation of the independent strategic deterrents, as they are called. At the moment Britain has the Polaris submarine system which consists of four submarines, each with 16 rockets. We are about to deploy a Trident system which will be four submarines, each with 24 missiles, each with 8 warheads, which is a massive increase in the nuclear capacity of Great Britain. The French are deploying a similar modernised system. Decisions to do this were taken some time back in the 1970s. The problem is that we are now, I think, in a very unfortunate out-of-step phase between the fruitful development of relations between the two superpowers and the growing self-confidence of Western Europe and of Japan. My colleague Mr. Niizuma referred in his opening remark to the increase of the Japanese defence projects, and indeed to the current plans for specific naval deployments. Something of the same kind is happening in Western Europe, where the traditional junior partners of the Western alliance are flexing their muscles. They are already much richer and I think they are looking forward to the day when they can have a military weight to match.

Sovva. The signing of the treaty caused something of a psychological shock to some in NATO. They seem to ask: "If I had a Pershing near my home in, say, West Germany, but it's now being taken away what is going to be put in its place?" This is apparently an inevitably initial reaction. The treaty and subsequent steps were conceived as interconnected measures. All weapons are considered together. And now the time has come for a close look at Vienna.

The IRM-SRM Treaty has created more favourable conditions in Europe for a drastic cut in armed forces, conventional armaments and tactical nuclear weapons. We believe we should ascertain and eliminate imbalances and asymmetries in this field and remove the danger of surprise attack. There is certainly no discounting the fact that tactical weapons are a component of a general European equation. This is all the more so because a substantial proportion of them, namely, tactical striking aircraft, tactical missiles and nuclear artillery, is in the category of so-called dual-purpose weapons which it is hard to set apart in practice from conventional armaments. It is therefore our firm opinion that the elimination of all tactical nuclear weapons would be in the interest of all European countries.

I wish to call your attention to the proposal made by the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs during his visit to Bonn and Madrid. He proposed reaching agreement at the Vienna meeting to begin talks on reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, including dual purpose weapons, which can deliver both conventional and nuclear warheads. The nuclear component of these weapons could be dealt with at separate talks, preferably in the near future.

Nilizuma. The Asia and Pacific region still lacks a system of negotiations or exchanges of opinion on disarmament comparable to the one existing in Europe. The Soviet Union, the United States and the European countries are working together in Vienna and Geneva. There is no such thing in Asia. I think it's very unfortunate and, indeed, dangerous. This is why I attach importance to a likely Soviet-Chinese summit. The Soviet Union and China could play an important role in the Pacific with regard to disarmament and the solution of other acute problems. Japan is an economically powerful country but I regret to say I feel that the Japanese government still reacts to important issues too slowly.

Arnett. The comments of my colleagues about European or Japanese disarmament are interesting but I don't think that is the major concern to the United States today. The United States has been trying to lay off some costs of its security forces and the security costs overseas for some years now, encouraging the Japanese or the Europeans to take up some of the burden.

I think we've got a real economic factor in arms control coming up; certainly it is apparent in the Soviet Union, where perestroika seems to be dependent on arms control, and in the United States. We are all well aware of the very decrepit state of the American economy. We are really concerned about it and I think more and more Americans are perceiving military costs as affecting their budgets, their pocketbooks. In addition to the economic cost, we are not discounting the moral force of the idea of peace that in the Soviet Union you attribute to Mikhail Gorbachev. There is no doubt that he has brought the idea of peace and nuclear disarmament to the world as few leaders have.

Walker. There is no prospect of any British government led by Mrs. Thatcher giving up the concept of nuclear deterrence. Mrs. Thatcher believes wholeheartedly that nuclear deterrence has preserved peace. I can't say I agree with her. I indeed agree with my colleagues that this is a very dangerous position to hold. Nonetheless, this is the one in which Mrs. Thatcher believes. She has won three general elections in Britain. Every attempt to fight a general election in Britain upon a disarmament platform has been defeated. I think you will find the same phenomenon in France. What is remarkable about France, whether led by Gaullists or by Mitterrand, is that there has never been the slightest success for a peace movement in France. West Germany is a more complicated phenomenon. I agree that the visit here by Mr. Strauss was a breakthrough and, indeed, that the decision of Mr. Kohl's government to surrender its own Pershing missiles was of enormous importance. Nevertheless, I think that there are dangerous tendencies in Western Europe and Japan and the prospect of Western Europe and Japan

trying to increase their weight, taking advantage of the wisdom of the Soviet Union and America reducing their arms, is one that should give you food for thought.

Zorin. Regardless of whether it's good or bad, the crucial stage of the work on treaties coincides with the US election campaign. And we all know how the laws of election campaigns deform many normal political processes in both the home and the foreign policy of the United States. The question arises: What will the effect of Reagan's visit to Moscow be when the battle between contenders for the Presidency comes out into the open, with the rivals letting fly at each other? I would like to ask how far the contenders are interested, since the President isn't going to be re-elected, in giving away a prize like a treaty on a 50 per cent reduction? Wouldn't it be better for, say, Bush, should he be lucky, to begin his term in the White House by signing such a treaty? It would be logical to assume that the Democrats, who have all declared in favour of the Washington treaty, would not be eager, either, to offer political gifts to their rivals from the Republican administration. My feeling is that this factor, which isn't being discussed in public just yet, may seriously compound the situation.

Sovva. Time is inexorable, and indeed, one year from now, the furniture and personal belongings of the new President will be carried into the White House. This should certainly draw our attention to the President's personality. Nevertheless, I will voice a dissenting opinion. Soviet people are less interested in the President's personality than before. When listening to some commentators, I get the impression that we have a bigger stake in the American presidential elections than the Americans themselves. This is reminiscent of the times when those "piqué vests" passed judgement in *The Golden Calf*, saying that Hoover was a clever guy and the other was clever too. This approach has nothing to do with the competent public opinion of today.

Arnett. It seems to me that quite a lot will depend on the results of this year's presidential elections in the United States as to what course the future East-West relations will take. It is difficult to say now what the American position, the political scene, will be like one year from now. We are going to have to wait and see on that, although we are seeing for the first time in many years a coincidence of political interests in the United States and the Soviet Union that is allowing for at least the beginning of cooperation, and perhaps even understanding, that we have not seen for quite a long time between these two countries. We saw it to a certain extent in the 1970s, under detente, a bit in the early 1960s, when some important agreements were reached, and we saw it during the Second World War. But it's been a long time since we've seen it, and I think we are seeing it now. I am not sure how much would change as a result of the coming to office of a new American President. It is simply very difficult right now to make any kind of prognosis.

Trimble. I think a presidential candidate would take a pretty strong risk, whether he be in Congress voting on ratification of INF or whether he be campaigning for the post of President, to be put into a position of being seen as slowing the arms control process. There are candidates who are against an agreement on strategic arms. This is a minus in their campaigns, with most American people supporting arms control.

It's a good thing that Reagan comes at this point in his administration because he isn't concerned about his political future and is not acting out of concern for it. He isn't trying to get re-elected. You may cast a scenario in which he is trying to help Bush get elected. But Reagan himself has other reasons for coming to Moscow and for making arms control agreements. Some people believe that he is looking for his place in history. Nonetheless, he comes to Moscow possibly to sign a strategic arms agreement with his hands really untied in the political process in terms of his own future. I think in many ways that's a positive thing.

CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM

International Affairs. Our discussion is drawing to a close. Each participant is offered a couple of minutes' time for concluding comments.

Zorin. I think we've had an interesting discussion. We touched on important problems and voiced interesting ideas. The discussion was a reflection of the intellectual contradictions of today, for while there were comments on very big and important problems we also heard echoes of old views, there were signs of distrust and of prejudice, to put it frankly. It's amazing that many of our Western colleagues can't seem to realise that the world has changed. I recall Swift's Lilliputians, who fought between themselves because they couldn't come to terms on which end they should break an egg at. Some comments remind me of the problem of the egg. Yet we have reached an entirely new stage in history where humanity's millennia-long experience appears in a different light and is largely losing its validity.

Not long ago I heard in London alarming remarks by a British scientist, who said he couldn't understand what missiles politicians were talking about since ecologically humanity would only have another ten or twelve years to live if things went on in the same way as now. What about the terrible diseases which dwarf the plague that raged in the Middle Ages? And what about the population explosion or the problem of millions of starving people? Besides, it is now obvious that we were awfully smug in imagining that we had accomplished a scientific and technological revolution. Why, we are only just at its threshold. The watershed has turned out to be between common sense and a lack of it, not between ideologies or systems. The question is whether humanity can muster the intellectual resources needed to meet the challenge of the third millennium, which we have come close to.

Walker. It was very interesting that at the same time we had the Washington summit, Wall Street was still recovering from its collapse. The dollar was diving to unprecedented depths. America can no longer afford its role of leading the West, cannot even afford President Reagan's fantasy of Star Wars. Western Europe and Japan are increasingly at odds with America in terms of their own defence, their own identity, and that means also their own defence identity. It seems to me we are moving towards a world where we will have five or six power centres: the Soviet Union, the USA, China, Western Europe, Japan, perhaps the Middle East. Only the Soviet Union seems to have thought much about the implications of this so far. There is a good deal about it in Gorbachev's speech to the 27th Party Congress. Until we can see more clearly how this kind of world is emerging I would not like to say the Washington summit was a great success. My own question to Mr. Gorbachev at the press conference was: "You have always said the important thing is to stop the extension of the arms race into space. Has your meeting this week made this less likely?" He said: "No, it hasn't." So I am not too optimistic and want to reserve my judgement until we see how things develop in the future. I am rather less confident than my American colleagues that we will have a ratified INF Treaty by the time of the Moscow summit. I've never thought the Senate would reject the INF Treaty, but I fear it will be easy for conservatives in the Senate to delay it. And if we don't have this treaty ratified by the time of the Moscow summit I can't see the Moscow summit leading to another treaty to reduce strategic arms by 50 per cent, and that would be a tragedy.

Sovva. Allow me to quote some conclusions drawn by Soviet scholars who take public opinion polls. "There is an increasing awareness of the undeniable fact," they write, "that the range of mutual understanding between the Soviet Union and the United States has widened considerably as a result of the visit. A practical incentive was provided for serious changes in areas of Soviet-American relations which for decades had been characterised by seemingly insurmountable obstacles to cooperation in the military, political

and humanitarian spheres and the sphere of interchanges of information, which is of no small importance." (True, cooperation between the Frunze Academy and West Point is still lacking.)

International Affairs. However, ambassadors have already spoken there: Yuri Dubinin at West Point and Jack Matlock at the Moscow Military Academy.

Sovva. We recently met with Mr. Carlson of the Voice of America. You know of the reaction that station evoked until recently. But this time we discussed interchanges of information in the wake of Charles Wick's mission. Many new qualitative changes have occurred. Our scholars exploring public opinion consider that the leaders of the two major powers have already taken a decisive step towards reshaping relations on the basis of a joint approach and are determined to go further. With regard to the United States this is not personified, isn't associated with the coming departure of the President from the White House and the arrival of a new person.

Atanasov. Had anybody claimed three or four years ago that late 1987 would see the signing of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, this would for sure have been dismissed as wishful thinking. The programme advanced on January 15, 1986, was perceived as utopian, yet there has since been real progress in every sphere. The first step has been taken. Whether we should describe it as an historic step, a turning point or something else is another matter. But it is a qualitatively new step indeed. A treaty on a 50 per cent cut in strategic arms is to be signed in Moscow. There is a basis for it. And the important thing is that humanity has come to look at international problems and relations between countries in a different way. We derive optimism from this, although I cannot say it's boundless optimism. If the Soviet Union continues at such a pace there is bound to be a breakthrough.

Arnett. I concur with much of what my Bulgarian colleague has just commented upon. I have reached the Soviet Union as a reporter by the "secur-rest" route that took me through Indonesia during the time of rebellion in the late 1950s, to Thailand and Laos during the civil war, to Vietnam for a decade, to Cyprus when the Turks invaded, to Central America where there is still a conflict, to Ethiopia and all over the place. I see the INF agreement and the summit as being much more than reaching a consensus and agreement that nuclear weapons are dangerous. I see what is happening now as confidence between the two superpowers that can assist in stopping, preventing in the future, such regional conflicts that, let's face it, in the last thirty years have taken literally millions of lives. I think that the fact that the superpowers are confident enough to reveal to each other their own weapons factories and can verify what they are doing, has led to a new thinking. It will give a more positive look at regional areas where for years we were terribly unsure and uncertain about the motives of the other side. I can look back at my years in Thailand and Laos and Vietnam where the appearance of any Soviet individual, including a TASS correspondent, would raise fear in the eyes of any American walking by. Not so now. The summit represents, indeed, a new thinking which could lead to a more basic understanding of each other's motives.

Niizuma. The Western powers, including Japan, refer to a whole number of reasons to justify their policy of armament. They affirm that in the socialist camp there is a lack of freedom of speech and information and the concept of "communist" doesn't imply civil freedom. They claim there is no right to appeal against decisions made by the leadership, with the result that there are political prisoners. They say that under socialism it is hard for ordinary people to participate in politics on their own. All these factors have led to economic stagnation and account for the low level of the productive forces.

But now perestroika is going on in the Soviet Union, a process characterised by openness, democratisation, changes in economic management. Spe-

cial importance is attached to the Soviet leadership's declaration that disarmament is necessary for the success of perestroika, of reform in the Soviet Union. Under these circumstances I think the Western camp, including Japan, should take the Soviet proposals very seriously.

Trimble. We cannot underestimate what's happening inside this country. There is a tremendous interest towards what is going on in this country on the part of my American readers. At a time when our foreign correspondents in Latin America, Asia and all over the world are screaming because they cannot get stories into their magazines, anything I send across my telex is published immediately.

I am constantly surprised by the ignorance of Americans about the Soviet Union because there is so much information available to them, but for some reason they don't seem to avail themselves of it. This is extremely important to international relations, the Western perception, the American perception of what is happening here in the area of human rights, what's happening with the situation in Afghanistan. You see where you will whose fault it is that Americans pay so much attention to it. The next couple of years, that Mikhail Gorbachev has said himself are so crucial for perestroika in this country, are also crucial to perceptions internationally. That's why I think my job is to talk, try to tell my readers about what's happening inside this country.

Piadyshev. Looking back at the history of Soviet-American relations, we recall the fact that more than once there arose hopes that a sunny day would break very soon and real detente would set in between the two powers. But various events would occur as time wore on, and everything would vanish. We may well wonder now whether the current changes, which are received with such satisfaction, are really so lasting that our hopes will not be shattered? An analysis of developments in our country, the United States, Western Europe and Japan alike would seem to indicate that today there is a much more solid basis for hopes of a favourable trend in Soviet-American relations than ever before. There are sufficient arguments in favour of optimism, of cautious optimism. We have never lapsed into Americanism even while regarding the American sector as a foreign policy priority. The Soviet leadership also attaches great importance to other sectors, such as Europe and Asia. We are willing to act all over the foreign policy spectrum.

We certainly don't always have to agree with each other, but we should give careful consideration even to opinions we don't share, and should respect them. This is the essence of dialogue, which we cannot possibly dispense with in today's world.

THE MILITARY BALANCE OF STRENGTH AND NUCLEAR MISSILE PARITY

General of the Army Dmitri YAZOV,

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The signing of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles was one of the main results of the Soviet-US summit in Washington. The CPSU CC Political Bureau meeting on December 17, 1987, described the treaty as historic, since recorded in it for the first time ever is a decision by the sides to really destroy two classes of nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union and the United States. The strictest control measures envisaged by the treaty reliably guarantee verification of its implementation.

A most important result of the Washington talks was considerable headway towards realising the need to drastically reduce the strategic offensive weapons of the sides while respecting the ABM Treaty as signed by the Soviet Union and the United States in 1972. Conclusion of an appropriate agreement on this chief problem would constitute a major advance in the matter of disarmament, of bringing about a nuclear-free world in the future. Progress was made in some other areas: the banning and elimination of chemical weapons, ending nuclear tests.

World opinion thinks highly of the outcome of the Soviet-American summit. A beginning has been made in delivering humanity from the heavy burden of the arms race and the war menace, which are holding up and often throw back the economic development of peoples and countries, shackling the freedom of peoples, their culture, their creative effort in the intellectual and social spheres.

But not everybody takes a positive view of the event. It is disturbing that the opponents of detente and cooperation are trying to prevent improvements in the international situation, demanding that the US leadership not go too far, that it stop the process of disarmament. They insist on prompt measures to "compensate" for the US intermediate- and shorter-range missiles to be scrapped under the treaty and propose diverse variants of additional arming of NATO by bringing new US nuclear forces to Europe and the vicinity of Europe and by hastening the buildup of the nuclear and conventional armaments of West European countries. The pretext used for all this is the allegation that the WTO countries have "overwhelming" military superiority over the NATO bloc in conventional armaments, that the IRMs-SRMs Treaty upsets the strategic balance in favour of the Soviet Union and that therefore measures are needed to end the "military lag" of the West. This is an old device and so is its aim: the current propaganda campaign in the West is designed to get more concessions from the Soviet side.

Actually military parity has not been upset either in the world as a whole or in Europe. The Soviet Union is ready to seriously examine questions relating to conventional armaments in Europe in view of the fact that they have now come to the fore alongside the problem of stra-

tegic offensive weapons. We consider that this should begin with assessing the balance of armed forces of the two alliances.

An objective assessment of the military balance of the WTO and NATO is perfectly feasible. In accomplishing this task, it is necessary to put together and take into account political, economic, physico-geographical, psychological and purely military factors. Using this method for comparing all factors, military and political leaders and research centres of a number of leading countries (such as some former US defence secretaries or the London International Institute for Strategic Studies) have come to the following unanimous conclusion: at present one may speak of the existence of rough parity in strategic forces between the Soviet Union and the United States, of military equilibrium between the WTO and the NATO bloc.

Strategic parity between the Soviet Union and the United States shaped up in the first half of the 1970s, when the Soviet Union, concerned with strengthening its security, developed a nuclear capability comparable to that of the United States. The existence of strategic parity between the two countries was repeatedly verified and confirmed in

Strategic Offensive Weapons of the USSR and the USA
(as of January 1, 1988)

	USSR	USA
ICBM launchers	1,390	1,000
including ICBM launchers equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs)	812	550
SLBM launchers	942	672
including SLBM launchers equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs)	388	640
Total of ICBM and SLBM launchers including ICBM and SLBM launchers equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs)	2,332	1,672
	1,200	1,190
Heavy bombers (HBs)	162	588
including HBs equipped for cruise missiles	72	161
Total of CBM and SLBM launchers and HBs	2,494	2,260
including MIRVed ICBM and SLBM launchers and HBs equipped for cruise missiles	1,272	1,351
Total of warheads on strategic delivery vehicles	roughly 10,000	roughly 14,000-16,000

drafting SALT-2 and in the subsequent course of Soviet-US talks. The US administration has no reason to assert that the Soviet Union has ever infringed the principle of equality and equal security. This has never occurred. The existence of strategic parity is borne out by the quantitative data on the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and the United States given in the table on page 16.

The table shows that the Soviet Union has somewhat more delivery vehicles (Soviet Union, 2,494; United States, 2,260), but then the United States retains a considerable margin in warheads on them, and it is the warheads, not delivery vehicles themselves, that strike. Altogether there is rough parity.

It would seem that the truth is evident and should be recognised. Nevertheless, in estimating the strategic forces of the sides in the course of propaganda, some US administration spokesmen ignore certain figures while accentuating others or even resorting to outright distortions. They declare, for instance, that about 70 per cent of the Soviet Union's nuclear warheads are intended for ground-launched ICBMs against about 20 per cent in the case of the United States. But they fail to mention that this does not upset the overall balance of strategic capabilities, since the United States has over 80 per cent of its nuclear warheads mounted on the ballistic missiles of submarines (SLBMs) and on heavy bombers (HBs), or several times as many as there are on the corresponding components of the Soviet strategic forces.

Washington's array of arguments often includes speculations about the particularly "destabilising" role of Soviet ICBMs. But they are perfectly groundless. About twenty years ago, when the United States had considerable superiority over the Soviet Union, it never described such missiles as "destabilising". But when the Soviet Union acquired the capability for responding adequately to a strike against its territory by striking at US territory the Soviet heavy ICBMs came to be called the "chief source of instability".

All these propaganda "arguments" are intended to justify US military programmes, to upset strategic parity and gain positions of military superiority. However, the US line of undermining the strategic balance has no prospect of succeeding. The military-economic and military technological potentialities of the sides today are such that no amount of effort by either of them to attain superiority in the military field can succeed, for the other side will not allow it. This proposition was written into the Joint Statement of the Soviet and US leaders in which they committed themselves not to seek military superiority. The arms race cannot be won in present day conditions. "Both sides", Mikhail Gorbachev has said, "ought to get accustomed to strategic parity as the natural state of Soviet-American relations. The only thing that should be discussed is how to lower this parity by joint effort. In other words, to take real measures to reduce nuclear armaments on a reciprocal basis."

The Washington summit brought the leaders of the two countries closer to solving the central problem of Soviet-US relations, that of effecting a drastic reduction in the strategic offensive weapons (SOWs) of both sides while observing the ABM Treaty. The outlines of an agreement providing for a 50 per cent cut in SOWs have in fact been worked out.

Just how wide-ranging will the agreement on reducing SOWs be? It is well known that at Reykjavik the sides reached agreement on reducing strategic offensive weapons to limits not exceeding 1,600 units for means of delivery (strategic delivery vehicles) and 6,000 warheads upon them; they agreed rules for counting HBs and some other matters. The Washington summit added much that was new to these accords.

First, the sides agreed on limits totalling 4,900 warheads for ICBMs

and SLBMs within the aggregate level of 6,000 warheads. Simultaneously they agreed on sublevels for heavy missiles (1,540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles). This fairly substantial progress was made possible by the Soviet side meeting the United States half-way.

Second, during the Washington summit the sides came to terms on the need for working out an agreement committing them both to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and for not withdrawing from this treaty for a specified period of time. This is recorded in the Joint Statement. It was also decided that unless the Soviet Union and the United States agree on the terms of non-deployment of national ABM systems before the end of the specified period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, each side will be free to decide its subsequent course of action regarding both the ABM Treaty and, needless to say, the SOW treaty.

Third, the Washington summit made progress on the issue of limiting the deployment of sea-based long-range cruise missiles with nuclear warheads. The sides agreed to set limits for such missiles above 6,000 warheads and to search for mutually acceptable and effective methods of control over the implementation of such limitations. This was a step taken by the US side to meet the Soviet Union half-way. Prior to the Washington summit the United States had been against any limitations on SLCMs, something which made it difficult to work out an accord.

And so, on the basis of the existing parity and as a result of persevering and purposeful efforts by the Soviet delegation, appreciable headway was made in Washington on the problem of a drastic cut in SOWs. The Soviet Union considers it feasible to prepare a relevant treaty and all the documents relating to it for signing in Moscow during the US President's return visit in the first half of 1988.

Some people now try to distort the meaning of the Soviet-US Joint Statement. SDI advocates in the United States claim that the drafting of the SOW treaty can be done without regard to its connection with the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972 and that with the preservation of the ABM Treaty during the specified period there is freedom of action as concerns the testing of components of an ABM system in space. These are all dangerous speculations aimed at undermining the constructive dialogue that has begun on the solution of the problem of strategic offensive weapons. The important thing now is, in our opinion, to maintain the pace set, to proceed consistently and constructively, advancing step by step as we search for mutually acceptable solutions on the basis of the existing strategic parity and the impetus provided by the meeting between the Soviet and American leaders in Washington.

After we had agreed to eliminate the IRMs and SRMs and apparently moved up in a constructive spirit to solving the problem of a drastic reduction in strategic weapons, *the importance of questions concerning cuts in armed forces and in tactical nuclear and conventional weapons in Europe came out more clearly.*

Why are talks on these questions necessary? The level of military confrontations in Europe is too high and hence dangerous. Facing each other here are huge armed forces of NATO and the WTO. Besides, the buildup of the non nuclear potential is continuing. The development of conventional weapons is rising to fundamentally new planes as they gain in power, accuracy, operational time and range. The destructive effects of a war using conventional arms have practically become comparable to the effects of nuclear war. A war using conventional weapons lends itself less and less to any limitation as to both gravity of aftermath and proportions of losses. It is becoming clear, if gradually, that this kind of war, too, would be hard to win. A war using solely conventional forces,

if started, could prove disastrous to Europe in view of the great density of its population and the existence on its territory of numerous atomic power stations, chemical plants, major hydroelectric power stations and other installations, which would greatly endanger people's lives if destroyed. In the light of this prospect, the importance and urgency of European talks are evident.

The state of the armed forces and armaments of NATO and the WTO makes it possible to considerably lower the level of military confrontation in Europe on a reciprocal basis, provided the principle of equality and equal security is respected. In what way can this be done?

In conformity with the Budapest Appeal of the leaders of the Warsaw Treaty countries, the members of our defensive alliance declare for effecting an initial single reciprocal reduction within one or two years in the strength of the NATO and WTO forces by between 100,000 and 150,000 men on each side; for reducing *in the early 1990s* the ground forces and tactical strike aircraft of both military alliances in Europe by one quarter (by a total of over one million men on both sides); for continuing *subsequently* to reduce the armed forces and conventional armaments of all European countries, the United States and Canada.

There is much talk in the West about the WTO's so-called "overwhelming superiority" in conventional armaments, which is to imply that they should agree to unilateral reductions. This allegation is at variance with reality. NATO experts make a point of accentuating WTO superiority in individual conventional weapons, such as the number of tanks. But they refuse to compare the quantity and quality of the armaments of both sides as a whole, to compare their military doctrines. They are against a bilateral in-depth analysis of the real potentialities of the armed forces of the sides, against comparing military potentials in their entirety and not individual weapons.

Yet it is well known that none but a comprehensive approach can produce an objective picture because the armed forces of the WTO and NATO are most varied and heterogeneous and differ in structure and organisation. The NATO countries are superior in some fields and the WTO countries, in others. However, the particular imbalances existing objectively on both sides do not upset the overall military balance.

Let us take, for instance, the naval forces of the sides. On this component the armed forces of NATO are considerably superior to those of the WTO, nearly three times in major surface ships (battleships, cruisers, destroyers, missile frigates), 25 times in naval aircraft and twice in aggregate naval tonnage. A White House report dated January 28, 1987, said that naval superiority enabled the United States to take advantage of the geographical vulnerability of the Soviet Union and pose a global threat to Soviet interests.

The NATO countries are quantitatively and qualitatively superior in combat aircraft, which cannot be concealed. According to the Pentagon booklet *Soviet Military Power* published in 1986 this superiority amounts to 1,150 aircraft exclusive of the air forces of France and Spain. According to our estimation NATO has 1,400 more strike aircraft in Europe than the WTO.

Why is it, then, that the United States and NATO do not call for an end to "imbalances" in naval and air forces? Surely this presents a threat to us. Disarmament talks have been going on for twenty years, and never in this period have the United States and the NATO bloc as a whole agreed to discuss the problem of reducing and limiting naval and air forces. What is the reason? Why do they put the emphasis on ground troops only? Every military expert knows that in analysing the balance of armed forces, their diverse components must not be separated. The point is, however, that this NATO line is aimed at weakening the

Soviet Union while enabling the United States and NATO to keep their strongest components (naval and air forces).

This is betrayed by the NATO countries' position at the Vienna meeting of the participating states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, at which NATO delegates have been trying hard to prove something which cannot be proved, alleging that the WTO is greatly superior in conventional armaments on land and is threatening Western Europe. The conclusion they draw is that the WTO should unilaterally reduce its ground forces in isolation from their nuclear component and tactical strike aviation. This is an incorrect and unfair approach. This kind of action by the United States and NATO is directed towards winning military superiority over the WTO and is an obstacle to the formulation of a mandate for European talks at the Vienna meeting.

What NATO representatives say about the so-called superiority of the WTO in conventional armaments on land is unsubstantiated. How can anybody speak of "superiority" since calculations discount in the case of NATO the armed forces of France and Spain (one million men, or 20 divisions)? On what grounds does NATO exclude from the balance of forces that part of the armed forces which are under NATO countries national control? Why does it discount reserve formations and stockpiles of arms and equipment? Why does NATO deliberately understate data on its armed forces while overstating data on those of the WTO (by counting servicemen engaged in building and construction works, frontier guards, militia men, members of the Voluntary Society for Assisting Army, Air Force and Navy)? The result is a distorted picture of the balance of forces, a lie which is made out to be proof of the overwhelming superiority of the WTO in conventional armed forces and armaments.

In this connection it is interesting to note an article carried by *The Guardian* in November 1987, under the title "Warsaw Pact Military Superiority 'Exaggerated'". The article summarised a report by the Military Committee of the Western European Union (WEU) refuting the allegation of the governments of NATO countries that the WTO has overwhelming superiority in non-nuclear forces. "The report," *The Guardian* wrote, "is clearly cynical at the way NATO has massaged statistics on the balance of forces with the Warsaw Pact. It concludes that 'the committee could not fail to notice over the years the way in which official Allied statements concerning the levels of some weapons systems held by the Soviet Union have lacked consistency and in some cases have ranged so widely that their credibility is jeopardised.'" Clearly, it is not by accident that the WEU military committee's report on the correlation of the NATO and WTO forces which was published in the press alarmed some Western politicians.

What is the actual balance of forces? The armed forces of NATO and the WTO are roughly equal in strength. Facing each other in Europe today are three-million-strong armies.

The NATO has nearly one and a half times as many combat-ready formations (divisions and brigades) as the WTO. What is more, a US division is from 16,000 to 19,000 strong and a West German division, up to 24,000 whereas a WTO division is from 11,000 to 12,000 strong at most.

As for tanks, the Warsaw Treaty has roughly 20,000 more of them in Europe than does NATO. But then NATO has nearly 50 per cent more combat helicopters, including helicopters equipped with anti-tank weapons, and roughly twice as many anti-tank missile complexes.

We are told that the WTO countries have an advantage in Central Europe. If they have, it is only without counting French troops. But NATO has an advantage on the southern flank of Europe, the ratio being

2.6:1 in personnel and strike aircraft, 5.8:1 in combat helicopters and 1.9:1 in artillery.

The balance of forces in Europe as a whole is as follows: NATO and the WTO are roughly equal in personnel and artillery. The WTO is superior to NATO in armour. NATO has an advantage in combat-ready formations and fighter-bombers. Altogether there exists rough equilibrium, rough parity, in conventional armaments. According to data released by the London International Institute for Strategic Studies, the overall balance of conventional arms is such that neither side commands sufficient aggregate strength to guarantee victory.

With regard to imbalances and asymmetry in conventional armaments resulting from historical peculiarities of the development of the armed forces of the sides, it is fair to ask: What is there to prevent solution of this problem? The Soviet Union is willing to discuss ways of eliminating the imbalances in question at the level of the military alliances but it would expect this to be done in a manner not upsetting the overall balance, which is now characterised by rough parity.

The Soviet concept on this score has been formulated by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU CC, as follows: "We should lay our cards on the table, exchange all of the relevant data, assess that data, identify the asymmetry in the arms and armed forces and embark upon a search for solutions. This is our approach."

"As far as we are concerned, let me say right out that we are prepared to adjust ourselves to that task immediately, and we shall insist on that being done. That is the opinion of our allies too. So I am expressing our common view on this matter."

"Moreover, we are prepared for most radical reductions. Here too, we are trying to be realists. Most likely, this is a process that will have to go through certain phases. You can't resolve everything just like that. But we have to start by sitting down at the negotiating table and beginning to eliminate asymmetry and imbalance in order to drastically lessen the confrontation. That would be a significant achievement. And that could be accomplished in the near future."

Hence the need to respond attentively and in a businesslike manner to the concern shown by the sides over the problem of conventional arms. Future European talks on this problem would have every chance of success provided they concerned reciprocal and simultaneous reductions and reciprocal elimination of asymmetry and imbalances.

The success of new talks could be fostered by confidence-building measures, in particular by solving so very important a problem agitating the peoples of Europe as that of lessening the danger of a surprise attack. To this end the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Treaty countries propose specific measures: reducing the concentration of armed forces and armaments in the zone of contact between the two military alliances to the lowest specified level; withdrawing the most dangerous offensive weapons from this zone, establishing a nuclear-free corridor along the line of contact between the WTO and NATO 300 km wide (150 km in each direction), from which all nuclear arms must be withdrawn on a reciprocal basis; establishing in Europe zones free from nuclear and chemical weapons, and zones of lower concentration of armaments and greater confidence, comparing military doctrines and discussing "imbalances" at the level of experts. We are waiting for the United States and other NATO countries to respond at last by stating their position on these proposals of ours.

The Soviet Union, prompted by its defensive doctrine, is building its armed forces on the principle of adequacy for defence. In the case

of strategic nuclear forces, adequacy today is determined by the ability to prevent the launching of a nuclear attack on our country with impunity in any situation, no matter how unfavourable. In the case of conventional weapons, adequacy implies the *minimum* necessary quantity and a high quality of armed forces and armaments capable of reliably defending the country. The limits of defence adequacy are also determined by the activity of the United States and NATO. To be sure, the Soviet Union is not seeking military superiority, nor does it lay claim to greater security than is sought by the other side, but neither will it accept lesser security nor allow military superiority over it. We have no intention of competing with the West in the development of specific weapons; we choose those measures that safeguard the security of the Soviet state and its allies.

In line with the principle of adequacy, the Soviet Union is working to bring about a decisive lowering of the level of confrontation and a reduction of military potentials, with the West and the East retaining only the forces and weapons needed for defence. But this should apply to all.

The Soviet Armed Forces have marked the 70th anniversary of their formation. They are fulfilling their historic mission—defending socialist achievements and peace—shoulder to shoulder with the armies of other allied countries. The Warsaw Treaty Organisation as a defensive alliance of fraternal socialist countries dependably serves the interests of peace and socialism. Soviet soldiers see their internationalist duty in intensifying and carrying forward the all-round cooperation of the allied armies. They vigilantly stand on guard of the Soviet people's peaceful constructive labour. Our Army and Navy have always been and remain a powerful factor for peace and international security.

Правда, Dec. 12, 1987.

UNITED NATIONS AND REALITY

Ednan AGAYEV,

Andrei KOZYREV

The 42nd session of the General Assembly of the UN member states' plenipotentiary representatives, convened in New York, was an important event. Twenty nine heads of state and government and 124 ministers for foreign affairs addressed the Assembly. But most important were the results of the work of the world forum which mirrored the invigoration of international life, the complicated, multifarious and contradictory nature of today's world.

At the 42nd session of the General Assembly discussions were dominated, not by fruitless polemics and political confrontational rhetoric, but by the spirit of sober examination of arguments and positions and the search for common ground. At the same time, the forum was unequivocally striving for consensus, for unanimous adoption of decisions. Naturally, it increases the prestige and the practical importance of adopted documents and, on the other hand, permits an objective judgement to be made on the priority international problems and on ways of solving them. These favourable signs show that the history of both the United Nations and international relations seems to be entering a new stage about which many participants in the session spoke.

Which specific factors determined the nature of the session's work

The new political thinking has won more and more supporters. In accordance with the dual nature of the new thinking the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are restructuring their home and foreign policies. It is precisely the rejuvenation and democratisation of socialism, its greater openness and ability to generate a truly up-to-date philosophy of international intercourse which allow relations between the two different social systems be elevated to a qualitatively new level.

Even Western representatives deemed it necessary to officially acknowledge the intrinsic interconnection between the propitious transformations taking place in the USSR and other socialist countries and their more constructive policies. The words used by the Soviet Union that could point "towards a more open society" were directly linked in the statements of the delegations of the twelve EEC member states with the prospects for better mutual understanding among states, for less distrust and fear. Hans van den Broek, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, applauded the "so-welcome improvement in the East-

Some resolutions adopted by the session are published in the "Documents" section of this issue.

West climate", emphasised that the "quest for new approaches in the Soviet Union and the East European countries is creating prospects for a more fruitful dialogue. We should make full use of the opportunities which now appear to present themselves." Geoffrey Howe, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of Great Britain, also presented his understanding of the foreign aspect of domestic policy (undoubtedly, in full conformity with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's opinion). He said: "We believe that a more prosperous and efficient Soviet Union will be easier for the world to live with." The importance of perestroika was underlined at the session by representatives of socialist and non-aligned countries. We can assert without any exaggeration that the words "perestroika", "glasnost", "Gorbachev's policies" have become a part of the international political vocabulary as synonyms of the aspiration of international community for the improvement of international relations.

Many delegates associated the new political thinking with the signing of the Soviet-US treaty on the elimination of two classes of nuclear missiles and the preparation for an agreement on 50 per cent cuts in strategic offensive arms of the two sides on the basis of stringent observance of the ABM Treaty over an agreed period of time. Giving credit to progress of Soviet-US disarmament talks, the delegates nevertheless pointed out that it is of paramount importance that progress should be made in the whole spectrum of relations between the two major powers, that mutual understanding in their approaches towards regional problems, urgent economic and humanitarian issues be attained. This would create the necessary preconditions for improving the overall international situation, for establishing and developing mutually beneficial international cooperation,

Within the context of restructuring international relations a special role should be played by the non-aligned movement and neutral countries which stand for overcoming bloc-oriented approaches, developing cooperation and mutual understanding among all groups of states on the basis of generally recognised norms and principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. Representatives of the developing countries legitimately demanded that they not be viewed simply as an object of "global confrontation between East and West", that relations be maintained with them, not on the basis of political and ideological protectorate and military aid, but rather on the basis of mutually beneficial economic, scientific, technological and cultural exchanges. Such a position seems to be a far-sighted one: theoretical postulates of the new political thinking in this case clearly coincide with the practice of international intercourse when the objective interest of the Third World countries objectively turns them into advocates of restructuring international relations. Thus, perestroika acquires still another guarantor which is instrumental for making it irreversible.

Time has passed when the acute political, ethno-cultural, social and economic problems and contradictions besieging the Third World countries can be viewed as a factor benefiting one of the two contending social systems, for this could lead to major miscalculations and bring the problems to a critical point. To tackle these problems the developing countries are primarily interested in an efficient functioning of a system ensuring world order provided for in the UN Charter. Protracted and more devastating wars and conflicts between developing countries such as those between Iran and Iraq, Libya and Chad, as well as the impunity with which South Africa is committing its aggression, are a tragic testimony to the shortcomings and deficiencies imbued in this system. Many speakers at the session believe that these shortcomings are mostly due to the fact that any of the major powers would rather support its "cli-

ents" than cooperate with other countries in upholding the UN principles. Thus, the demand of the medium-sized and small countries for a genuine respect of their interests and an international climate conducive to their socio-economic development organically blends with the trend of infusing new vigour into international intercourse, an effort which requires the participation of all states and nations.

The vitality and the irreversible nature of perestroika require the plurality of its subjects. That explains the wide interest shown in Mikhail Gorbachev's article "Reality and Guarantees for a Secure World" published in the first days of the 42nd General Assembly's session. The article contains an appeal to all peoples to act jointly for the sake of creating a system of truly comprehensive security. Delegations of many states rightfully interpreted this appeal as the Soviet Union's willingness to improve the entire range of Soviet-US relations as well as to develop international cooperation; to involve all states, large, medium-sized or small, in the solution of long-overdue problems; to intently overcome the stereotypes of a great-power and bi-polar vision of the world in international politics.

Looking for approaches to a nuclear-free world, Moscow addresses not only the major powers, members of the nuclear club, but all countries, large or small. The Delhi Declaration on Principles for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free and Non-Violent World reflected a democratic approach to today's urgent problem. According to the head of the Indian delegation at the session, the significance of this document consists in the fact "that a major nuclear-weapon Power, the USSR, joined with a major non-aligned country, India, to announce 10 principles that could pave the way to a nuclear-weapon-free civilization".

There is no doubt that joint actions of all countries without exception against the nuclear threat possess enormous latent potentialities. Observers pointed out that the difficult task of organising the work of the session for the sake of common interests rather than discords was skilfully exercised by the Deputy Foreign Minister of the GDR Peter Florin, a representative of a socialist state, elected the General Assembly's President.

The new thinking is no longer just a slogan. In one form or another this idea was mentioned in the statements of the majority of delegates—sometimes as a bone of contention, sometimes—in an off-hand manner against the background of traditional stereotypes. Others centred their speeches on it. The FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher said that "new thinking that stems from the knowledge that we can only survive with one another, not against one another, governs our actions more and more". On the whole the dynamics of understanding new philosophical categories is complicated and contradictory. There appeared a new, unusual alignment of forces. The demarcation line is ever more often transferred from the sphere of bloc relations into the area of relations common to all mankind. On the one hand, there exists the understanding of the imperative notions of the interdependent nature of the modern world, common values of civilisation, the necessity to be tolerant and to live together in peace with one another as good neighbours as is envisaged in the UN Charter, and, on the other, ideological intransigence as a foundation of state policy, arrogance of crude power and a selfish bloc-based approach.

The confrontation of two approaches was focused on examining the initiative of a group of socialist states to establish a comprehensive

system of international peace and security. The main drive of the initiative is to get rid of nuclear deterrence, balance of power, confrontation between East and West, North and South; to replace them by the balance of interests of all states on the basis of priority of common human values and norms of international law, confidence, democratisation and glasnost in public life. The gist of the initiative manifests in a concentrated form the necessity of revolutionary changes in political concepts and in the existing practice of international intercourse. In fact, no one (and the discussion in the UN confirmed it) rejects the necessity to comprehend global problems and potentialities. The interdependence of political and economic spheres of state functioning, which demands non-traditional solutions, is being broadly recognised. There is a growing understanding that no single state, even the most powerful, or group of states can solve single-handedly the problems of survival and progress.

At the same time, the obstacles in the way of a new world philosophy are being felt. Despite the fact that the General Assembly session approved the resolution forwarded by the socialist countries and almost a half of the participants voted for it, we should bear in mind that 12 states voted against it and a considerable number of states abstained from stating their position on that issue. This is something to be carefully analysed, along with the specifics in the understanding of the idea of universal security by many countries.

The leading non-aligned countries, including India, Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe, Algeria, Nigeria, Indonesia, Mexico and Brazil, supported the resolution. But it was seen even in the statements of some of the aforementioned states that they have yet to fully comprehend the new realities through a complicated and prolonged process and to identify national and regional priorities in the emerging new international structure. The difficulties of adjusting to the changing environment came to light in the positions taken by small developing countries. Many of them still do not see concrete ways of overcoming confrontational approaches as well as the confrontation itself in their respective regions.

The impression exists that certain countries are inclined to urge only their neighbours to display tolerance, flexibility and readiness for compromise, considering themselves holier than the Pope. There are also some states which are used to fishing in troubled waters of contradictions between major powers and the two opposing systems. Backing, mainly in words, either one or another power or system in the ideological or political polemics, including at the UN forums, some smaller countries try to obtain certain advantages, to exchange their votes for pledges of economic or military aid. Finally, a number of states, especially those economically or otherwise dependent on the West, sit back and observe the position of the United States and its closest allies preferring to take a wait-and-see stand as regards prospects for improving relations between East and West.

The position of the United States and other Western countries is an ambiguous one. The US delegation sharply criticised the draft resolution of socialist countries on a comprehensive system of international peace and security. On the whole, it repeatedly voted against initiatives of socialist and non-aligned countries, despite the fact that the delegations of socialist and non-aligned countries and other states made efforts to reach a consensus. In such conditions, Washington's deliberate self-isolation looked especially unseemly. It became clear as never before that US policy in the United Nations is influenced by past prejudices, by the desire to show its disrespect for the organisation, by the arrogant attitude to the positions taken by many of its member states. Evidently the proponents of the militaristic policy are appalled by the idea of developing multilateral cooperation. They are obsessed with the old logic of

confrontation: everything which comes from the other side must be rejected.

At the same time, a number of US allies, in particular the FRG, Denmark, Greece, Canada, Spain and Australia, were displaying interest for the new Soviet proposals on strengthening security and the role of the United Nations. This group of states preferred to abstain from voting on the above-mentioned resolution dissociating themselves from the extremely negative stand of their senior partner. The statements of the representatives of a number of Western states in the UN as well as articles in the US press contained a clear-cut appeal to take advantage of the opportunity to move from confrontation and propaganda strife in the United Nations to cooperation as proposed by the Soviet Union. A *New York Times* editorial pointed to the USSR's willingness to use in practice peace-making potentialities of the UN and called on the US ruling circles to reassess the emerging situation, to "explore the viability and seriousness of Soviet proposals" and to test "Mr. Gorbachev's intentions" regarding the development of world-wide cooperation and to introduce appropriate amendments into US policy.¹ Similar ideas began to appear in the statements of the US political scientists.

On the whole, it can be said that an intellectual and political breakthrough occurred at the session pertaining to the understanding by the international community of the concept of a comprehensive international peace and security system, to the maintaining and strengthening of appropriate dialogue in the United Nations and at other international forums. This concept was further developed in the document adopted by the General Assembly. The document recognised and defined its interconnection with the UN Charter. This fundamental document, which is a constitutional foundation for contemporary international relations, embodies purposes and principles which are in full consonance with the goal of ensuring comprehensive security.

The time has come to put these Charter concepts into international practice with account taken of nuclear and space realities, to most efficiently use the mechanism of international cooperation—i. e., the United Nations. This will be in fact the practical establishment of a comprehensive system of peace and security.

The notion of a comprehensive system of security is interpreted in the document as the goal of ensuring *overall* security for *all* states through their joint actions in *all* spheres. Besides, a thesis on the need to move simultaneously along vitally important directions of achieving disarmament, defusing crisis situations, developing economic cooperation, protecting the environment, promoting and protecting human rights and developing humanitarian cooperation has gained international recognition. Efforts along all of these directions should be undertaken in parallel on a mutually supplementing and mutually strengthening basis.

Undoubtedly, despite the importance of the document on a comprehensive peace and security system adopted by the General Assembly, we deal here only with the first step of turning the concept of security for all into a subject of a broad international dialogue. At present, the opportunity exists for transforming this dialogue into practical deeds, for reaching agreement among all groups of states with the aim of producing concrete results. A system of comprehensive security, by its nature, as it was stated above, cannot be constructed through the efforts of just one state or just one group of states, even if they constitute the majority of the world community. That is why it is instrumental to involve the USA and its closest allies in a productive dialogue on the issue. This is a complicated but feasible task.

The signing of the Soviet-US IRM-SRM Treaty proves that it is possible to find a balance of interests on all of the most sensitive security is-

sues through purposeful efforts, mobilisation of international public opinion and compromise with the moderate wing of the Western ruling circles. This can become true if there exist "unconditional conditions": absolute honesty in relations with due regard for the legitimate security interests of partners, respect for their interests, glasnost and openness in the whole process which will allow the international public as well to express its opinion on that issue.

The issue of confidence building acquires special importance. To start with each participant must put his own home in order. The experience of negotiations on Euromissiles and Stockholm accords clearly has shown this. In other words, while starting a dialogue it is important to display the willingness to revise one's own opinion in accordance with the exigencies of the new political thinking, to introduce into one's positions amendments taking into account the opinion of one's partners in negotiations, to present exhaustive appropriate information, to recognise the necessity for comprehensive and stringent international control.

As for a comprehensive system of international security, these principles should be observed in military as well as in all other spheres, including the problems of regional conflicts, human rights and humanitarian cooperation. It is crucially important that universal human values and norms of international law are recognised as top priorities. The standards for such behaviour should be set by socialist countries which put forward the initiative of restructuring international relations on the basis of a comprehensive peace and security system. That is why the task of practical, comprehensive and strict implementation of universal criteria of this concept in all areas of the socialist countries' activities comes to the forefront nowadays. In this case it would be realistic to count on due interest to the values of the new thinking on the part of both non-aligned and Western countries.

The realistic approach which was present throughout much of the 42nd session became apparent during the discussion of disarmament issues. The key role was played undoubtedly by the Soviet-US IRM-SRM Treaty. The concluding stage of its preparation and signing coincided with the General Assembly's session. It is symbolic that the General Assembly supported the agreement by practical actions by unanimously adopting the resolution which named the complete elimination of nuclear weapons as the ultimate objective of the ongoing disarmament negotiations.

Evidently, this agreement does not mean that mankind is on the threshold of a nuclear-free world. All variations on the theme of "roar the thunder of victory!" would mean the return to the spirit of the outdated policy when numerous resolutions condemning the arms race were adopted each year and the appeals were made to declare almost immediately a nuclear-free world at the time when production lines working for the Day of Apocalypse were gaining speed. Sweeping and deliberately unrealisable statements led as a result to the devaluation of the very concept of nuclear disarmament. The opinion became established that the elimination of nuclear weapons was a Utopia and that the UN discussion on the subject was a contest in polemics and a means of gaining political dividends. Truly enormous efforts had to be taken and great courage exhibited in order to awaken the international public's "optimism of the will" towards nuclear disarmament, to show that it can be translated into the language of specific proposals which take full account of the contemporary realities and are also aimed at their transformation.

Consistent realism requires first and foremost taking full account of

difficulties in the way of nuclear disarmament as well as the whole process of reducing armaments in general. Agreeing upon the ultimate objectives of disarmament is a major, though only a first, step forward. The attainment of those objectives requires laborious work to create a propitious political climate, to strengthen mutual confidence and eliminate suspicion syndrome. In fact, disarmament is nothing but the supreme material embodiment of trust. That is why it is not accidental that it was namely this problem which came to the forefront at the 42nd General Assembly's session. It is clear that confidence, especially in the military area, is based first and foremost (as it was emphasised at the UN) on full mutual access to information, on complete confidence in the absence of evil designs on the part of the other side. And though there is no complete mutual understanding as yet of the problems of openness and glasnost, the states succeeded in moving much closer to each other at the session. For the first time in the history of active interaction of states belonging to different alliances (mainly the USSR and Great Britain) a resolution was worked out and adopted which expressed deep conviction that the dissemination of objective information concerning military issues could promote the lessening of international tensions, confidence building in interstate relations and the conclusion of concrete agreements on disarmament. At present, it is important that besides reflecting the principled rapprochement of positions, the agreed provisions become guidelines for practical actions paving the way for promoting disarmament.

Confidence building and the development of the disarmament process are unthinkable without appropriate control. Evidently it is very difficult, or rather impossible, to work out universal verification measures for all possible cases. The specific nature of each concrete agreement requires specific verification measures which guarantee the confidence of everyone in the observance of the agreement. At the same time, the objective necessity arises in establishing common parameters not only in the field of disarmament. The Soviet Union proposed establishing under the UN aegis a mechanism for broad international control over the observance of agreements on lessening tensions, limiting armaments and monitoring military situation in hot points. Such a mechanism could use various means and methods of collecting information and presenting it immediately to the United Nations. This would allow the obtainment of an objective picture of events, the discovery of military preparations in time, the prevention of a surprise attack and military conflicts and the preclusion of their widening and aggravation. It is most important that the very existence of such a mechanism would not only extend cooperation between states and strengthen confidence but create necessary preconditions for the spread of international glasnost. All suspicions of any kind of violations would immediately become the subject of broad and democratic international debates.

It is clear that a new approach to disarmament issues is not gaining currency as quick as we would like it to. If some signs of understanding begin to show on such issues as nuclear disarmament, reductions of conventional armaments, verification, confidence, openness and some others, it is still not possible to arrive at mutually acceptable points of departure on a whole range of other problems. Thus, for example, US policy is the only impediment in the way of reaching an agreement on measures to preclude the arms race in outer space, to embark at long last on multilateral negotiations within the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. Despite the UN appeals, there are no palpable changes in the area of a nuclear test ban.

It is significant that at the 42nd session the United States and France opposed even the recommendation to notify the UN on nuclear explosions

which undoubtedly would have promoted glasnost in international affairs. Only Washington does not recognise the existence of such an acute problem as curbing the race in naval armaments.

Nowadays when the consensus on the disarmament issue is broadening, it is important not to lose what has been accumulated, not to devalue the unanimously adopted resolutions by the policy of "double standards". That is why, e. g., the consensus resolutions of the 42nd session on the prohibition of chemical weapons should be put into practice at the appropriate negotiations within the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. Moreover, the international community expects all participants in the negotiations, in particular, the USA and France, to refrain from producing binary weapons and to complete the elaboration of a convention. The difficult process of working out elements of consent in the UN must not be undermined by bombastic window-dressing initiatives in order to produce the "hit of the season" which are forgotten as easily as they are declared.

The forthcoming third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should deepen the understanding that disarmament requires a comprehensive approach combining confidence-building, elaboration of an effective verification mechanism and realistic programmes, based on the balance of interests, for reducing and eliminating specific types of weapons. Only then will the special session be, not merely a ritual, but a truly significant event which will chart the way towards a nuclear-free and secure world towards confidence-building and democratisation of international relations.

The unity of words and deeds and strict compliance with the agreed principles and objectives are instrumental for other areas besides disarmament. Without these conditions it is hardly conceivable to expect any progress in the settlement of regional conflicts, development of normal political interstate relations. As a result of work conducted over many years, the Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations was adopted at the 42nd session. This important political document of a target-setting nature orients the states to the intensification of efforts aimed at lessening world tensions. But the mere fact of unanimously adopting such a document does not resolve the problem itself. It is important, taking into account the bitter experience of the past, that this document not be filed away in the diplomatic archives but be made into a code of conduct governing relations between states.

The session has demonstrated that within the international community there exist prerequisites for the elaboration of a common approach towards regional conflicts and crisis situations. The tendency became clearly visible in the process of unanimously adopting the resolution in support of peaceful settlement in Central America, worked out by the states of the region. All states, at least in words, agreed that there is a need to prohibit outside interference, to provide peoples with the sovereign opportunity to independently solve their own problems. Presenting the plan of settlement, the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs Sepúlveda Amor said: "Those agreements mark a new stage in the life of the region and reflect the fundamental commitments of those of us who have struggled to carry out our task of mediation: national reconciliation through dialogue and political action; pluralistic democracy that guarantees human rights and promotes social justice; free exercise of the right of self-determination; the cessation of support for irregular forces and the corresponding obligation to refrain from the use of one's own territory for the

illegal activities of those groups; and a decision to continue negotiations on security and arms limitation."

It is becoming increasingly clear that democratisation and respect for human rights are a vital factor for settling conflicts. When rights and freedoms of peoples are trampled underfoot, then democracy is suppressed, the concepts of peaceful settlement of disputes do not find any response. It is quite logical that the Israeli government, flagrantly violating the rights of Palestinians, stubbornly opposes the idea of an early convocation of an international conference on the Middle East which is supported by the whole international community with the exception of the United States.

The idea of national reconciliation, which is backed in many hot spots of the world, has significant potentialities which have not been fully revealed yet. The idea began to bear fruit in Afghanistan, for example. But the process of reconciliation is going on with great difficulty and will require, as it seems, time-consuming and truly heroic efforts by all people because the burden of the past errors is too heavy. These difficult circumstances were taken into account by some participants in the session who welcome both the efforts of Kabul to carry out national reconciliation and the USSR's political decision to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan within a year.

But, in fact, the majority of delegations present at the forum adopted the resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops and, at the same time, reaffirming the sovereign right of the Afghan people to decide its destiny without any interference and subversive activities. The document was backed by 123 states. The USSR and some other countries which voted against it were outnumbered. The overwhelming majority of the UN member states consider that most important in this situation is the observance of the principles of the non-use of force and non-interference in internal affairs of other states which are in fact the fundamental provisions of the UN Charter. Any violations of these principles, no matter what are their justifications, undermine, as it was stated at the session, the foundations of international trust and order, escalate the arms race and aggravate the division of the world into opposing military blocs.

Evidently it is inconceivable to speak about the unanimity of participants in the session regarding the Afghan issue. But nevertheless, no matter how paradoxical it may seem, there exists a certain moral consensus. All states recognised the need to settle the conflict by political means and consequently to score an early success at the Geneva negotiations which are being conducted with the participation of the personal representative of the UN Secretary-General. And this is the main result which inspires hope.

The constructive spirit has begun to force its way into debates on economic problems. Interest has considerably grown in elaborating the concept of economic aspects of international security which was supported by the overwhelming majority of countries. New important resolutions were adopted which call for joint efforts to solve problems such as: foreign indebtedness; outflow of resources from developing countries; non-use of economic measures as a means of coercion in relations with developing nations; and elaboration of the international strategy of development of the United Nations for the 1990s. On the whole the 42nd session reaffirmed the increasingly constructive nature of the UN activities in the economic sphere, its ever more active engagement in the solution of international economic problems.

The session devoted much attention to streamlining the flow of information, i. e., a problem over which opinions clash. Many developing countries are legitimately concerned about the prevalence of Western mass

media which often underestimate the Third World countries' interests and interpret their problems as they think fit. Major Western states in their turn, while seeking to secure their predominance in this area, come forth under the slogan of freedom of the press against any regulatory measures. So there is a need for a new approach in this area as well, which would regard universal human interests as of paramount importance. It is clear that in the age of information science it is impossible to solve a problem by way of prohibition. But restrictive measures must be taken in order to rid the flow of information of the propaganda of war, racial and other kinds of intolerance, stereotypes of the "image of the enemy".

A genuine solution to the problem should be searched with reciprocal regard for each other's positions and by increasing the humanistic content of information flow. Considerable interest was evoked by the Soviet proposal for elaborating a world information programme of the United Nations for the purposes of familiarising peoples with the life of one another with life as it is and not the way they are trying to present it sometimes). Today there is an urgent need to fill this concept with practical content and to bring the activities of all Western and Eastern mass media into conformity with the criteria of the new political thinking.

The session approved the thesis put forward by the Soviet Union to the effect that the world cannot be secure if human rights are violated. There seem to crystallise two main courses of international efforts aimed at strengthening the existing system of state obligations in the field of human rights and humanitarian cooperation. Firstly, the accession of all states to fundamental international agreements in this field. Secondly, all states should bring their legislation and administrative rules in the humanitarian field into conformity with international obligations and norms. It should be underlined that this is a minimum requirement and in case it is not fulfilled it is hardly possible to talk about real movement towards a comprehensive system of international security. The UN faces the task of promoting everywhere respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms—political, civil, social, economic and cultural on the basis of generally recognised international documents in this field. It is no accident that the inclusion of the problem of human rights and openness of international life as an integral part into a comprehensive system of security arouses sharp irritation on the part of repressive regimes.

The 42nd session of the General Assembly has shown that a new approach towards the UN as a mechanism of multilateral interaction is being shaped by the international community. Its essence is in turning the organisation from mainly propagandistic into a working forum of states which participate on an equal footing in harmonising their international positions and actions. Many delegations, including those of some Western states, emphasised that this tendency is at variance with the violation by the United States of its financial obligations towards the UN which is the main cause of the organisation's protracted budget crisis. Against this background special prominence is gained by the USSR decision to pay its arrears to the United Nations. It was emphasised that financial contributions confirm in practice the USSR political statements regarding its willingness to breathe new life into the world forum, to elevate its standing in international affairs.

The sentiments of the overwhelming majority of delegations found their reflection in the words of the Zimbabwe Foreign Minister (Zimbabwe

TURNING POINT

The Brest Peace in Retrospect

Abdulkhan AKHTAMZYAN,

Nikolai KAPCHENKO

The Brest Peace Treaty was signed seven decades ago.

To understand events like Brest, it is necessary to adopt a multi-dimensional approach. Looking at them through the eyes of contemporaries, one gets an impression consonant with the period. And looking at them from the point of view of posterity, one sees new facets and shadings brought out by the march of history, which throws light on the essential while pushing the insignificant into the background. A scientific assessment of an historical event is authentic only if it inherently links together, by virtue of its logic and not artificially, the point of view of contemporaries and a sober assessment based on the experience gained since the event took place. The method of retrospect rules out subjectivist attempts to assess complex and contradictory developments according to a preset pattern.

It is in this context that we would like to look back at Brest, that is, the peace treaty which enabled the young Soviet Republic to safeguard its statehood and break out of the noose of war with which imperialism tried to strangle it in the very first weeks after the October Revolution.

For contemporaries and posterity alike, Brest is one of the most dramatic, most difficult and painful chapters of Soviet Russia's history. At the same time, for contemporaries and especially for posterity, it is one of the most unforgettable chapters of Soviet history. Its every line bears the imprint of the genius of Lenin, who charted the route of the ship of state in the incredibly complicated early months following the revolution.

OBVIOUS TRUTHS AND REALITY

The Brest epic showed more clearly than any other period of our history the role which a political leader can play at crucial stages of development. The historical background of Brest set off, possibly more than anything else, the intricate interplay of objective and subjective factors which predetermined the transition of our state from war to peace. If there is now a need to touch once more on the role of political leaders, it must be because Brest supplies historically exceptional material for appreciating this role.

In terms of principle, Marxism-Leninism answered the question about the role of the individual in history long ago. It is the people who really make history while individuals play an important historical role in it as exponents of objective trends of social development and the requirements of society. This question has been settled as far as its theoretical aspect is concerned. Concrete situations, however, often pose so many problems in the matter of interpreting diverse periods of history as to lend renewed urgency to the question of the role of a particular individual.

Moreover, certain obvious truths of Marxist theory are presented in such a way that they are reduced to a pattern which makes it difficult to properly evaluate historical events and complex, contradictory facts of our past. Sometimes we come across the affirmation that the objective

laws governing historical development operate irrespective of the will or wish of individuals, whose role is conditioned by the extent to which they apply these laws in practice.

This proposition is outwardly correct. It stresses the primacy of objective laws paving the way for the process of history. But a closer look reveals it a variant concept of historical determinism. From a means of cognising and explaining life it becomes an abstract pattern preventing cognition. It wrongly understates the role of the individual, who emerges as a programmed proponent of objective law-governed processes. Reality is not as simple as this.

Indeed, phenomena of our life such as the personality cult and the period of stagnation are entirely out of keeping with the objective laws governing the development of socialism. And yet they existed, and they will not disappear from our past merely because they contradicted these laws. It is apparently necessary to reckon with the possibility of the defective operation of objective laws for a period of time, if a limited one. On the other hand, the activity of parties and political leaders can contribute to the most efficient operation of objective laws. This applies to both protracted processes and specific events, such as the Brest peace.

In those days the party and the people followed Lenin, who looked far ahead as a leader and revolutionary and foresaw many further steep turns on the difficult road to building a new society. In speaking of new political thinking today, we realise that its purpose is to carry forward Lenin's political legacy and Leninist tradition. Lenin's own political thinking has always been truly revolutionary and new, one which made it possible not only to preserve socialism but to make it a mighty force.

Each turning point in the destiny of a country has its inner logic with its objective circumstances reflecting the distinctive character of the period concerned. However, turning points have something in common. Every decisive period makes it necessary to overcome established views and stereotypes of thinking, to break the resistance of forces, including some allies and associates, who are unable or refuse to realise the historical necessity for a radical change in political strategy. There is really no ignoring the inherent, logical interconnection of major developments such as the April Theses put forward by Lenin in 1917 to direct the party's efforts towards accomplishing a socialist revolution; the struggle for the Brest peace; the adoption of the New Economic Policy, which played a key role in the party's formation of a realistic policy for building a socialist society in the backward country that Russia was after the Civil War. Those were unprecedentedly radical changes in our history whose outcome directly influenced the destiny of our country and the development of socialism generally.

Now, many years later, it seems that in all those situations developments followed the only possible course and that any other choice was automatically ruled out. Actually the choice made in each instance was a result of overcoming the stubborn resistance of those in the party itself who did not realise the need for and the correctness of that choice. Translating an objective law of development into reality necessitated a titanic struggle by Lenin with his clarity of vision, his determination to uphold his concept to the last, his political realism and his ability to think as a true revolutionary and even to impose his will, doing it, however, with such force of conviction that it became the will of the party.

BATTLE OF CONCEPTS

Much has been written about the Brest peace, the context of its conclusion and the sharp controversy it occasioned in the Bolshevik Party. Numerous documents, books, articles and memoirs have been published. But it is probably fair to say that the key aspects of all that had to do

with Brest found the fullest and most dramatic and truthful reflection in the shorthand report of the Seventh Extraordinary Congress of the RCP(B), called in March 1918 to adopt a difficult decision in favour of ratifying the treaty signed at Brest-Litovsk.

The shorthand record paints a historical picture of impassioned political arguments. It reflects one of the deepest and perhaps most painful crises in the history of our party. But then, to quote the Preface to the first edition (1923) of the congress minutes, "no party is safe from grave crises. But while some parties are killed by crises, others emerge from them the richer in experience and the stronger. Since the revolution began, we have seen many parties to which crises proved fatal. It is only the RCP that marched on then and is marching on now in spite of everything, for this party rests organisationally on a class of the future, the proletariat, and has its ideological basis in revolutionary Marxism. These two principal elements make our party *invincible*".¹

Looking back, we cannot but think how fast the historical setting changed as acts of epic force and tension unfolded one after another. The course of development outpaced time. It seemed that the formula describing revolutions as the locomotives of history had acquired its direct meaning. None but a man of genius was equal to grasping the trend of that mighty stream, detecting its undercurrents and ascertaining the resultant force which interlinked the destinies of both individuals and the whole country, roused to action by a revolution unparalleled in history. In those years people were not only rejecting the past (they knew this very well) but creating the future in whose name they were accomplishing a great revolution. They were making history with their own hands. It was an hour of triumph whose real significance would not be appreciated until later on.

At that time, the grim realities of life were both amazingly simple and unimaginably complicated. There were heated debates in the trenches but the dominant mood was in favour of an immediate peace. The home front was in the same mood. The people were eagerly looking forward to the realisation of the programme envisaged by the ideals of the October Revolution, whose main slogans were peace, bread, land and freedom. Their sentiments conditioned the social atmosphere. Even so, many petty-bourgeois leaders and even parties were seeking popularity by resorting to all sorts of political speculations. Calls for war "to the victorious end" were not merely an anachronism but amounted to advocating a restoration of tsarism. The people wanted peace but it had to be a just, real peace whose signing would reward them for their untold suffering in the war years. The masses felt that they were entitled to a just and democratic peace. Everybody had had his fill of war, both those who were attacking and those who were defending themselves, both the allies and their enemies. The revolution was largely accelerated by the war, since it was the revolution that showed the longed-for and only possible way out of the war. But as so often in history, it was the revolution which paved the way for peace that became the prologue to a war which its enemies tried to use as a means of strangling the revolution.

Imperial Germany's rulers, whose policy was a combination of the blindness of kittens and the arrogance of aging lions, came to the conclusion that they had a unique opportunity to improve their affairs at the expense of revolutionary Russia. They decided to secure through military pressure and diktat what they had been unable to achieve on the battlefield, that is, to impose on the Soviet Republic a treaty that would fulfil two strategic tasks: undermining the foundations of the new, socialist system and realising the Reich's long-standing expansionist aspirations. This would have meant attaining the great-power and expansionist aims of German imperialism while at the same time solving the social problem

of defeating the revolution in Russia (it being considered that this could stop revolution in other countries, primarily in Germany itself).

An intricate set of international and domestic problems tied together many countries in those days. But its impact was probably strongest in the situation in which our country found itself at the time of the signing of the Brest peace. The victorious advance of the October Revolution made the Bolsheviks, or at least many of them, confident that our revolution would be followed almost immediately by similar fast-developing processes in other countries. Revolution was no longer a spectre haunting Europe and other continents. It was assuming the character of a mighty social movement transforming the continent if not the whole planet.

Lenin brilliantly grasped the imperatives of the dialectics of life: consolidating the gains of the revolution and strengthening workers' and peasants' power by concluding a peace treaty, even an annexationist, predatory, "obscene" one. He rejected the simplistic and dogmatic notion of the alleged incompatibility of revolution and peace on the terms of Brest and succeeded in combining them in a truly revolutionary spirit. The conclusion of the Brest Treaty became an instrument of consolidating the working people's socialist achievements; it did not amount to surrender contrary to what its opponents affirmed, who saw the laws of dialectics as patterns circumscribed in advance, as a combination of black and white and not a whole spectrum.

We believe, therefore, that the Brest period should be looked at, not primarily in the context of a struggle between individuals (although this aspect was by no means of secondary importance), but in terms of confrontation between fundamentally different political and theoretical concepts, of dissimilar approaches to the basic principles of the foreign policy strategy of the Soviet state. As for individuals, it would apparently be right to judge them in the context of events and the views they held.

We must make right away a reservation of fundamental importance by stating that neither in the period of the Brest peace or afterwards, in Lenin's lifetime, none of those involved in the controversy who were against Brest were tagged with any political labels. The controversy was sharp yet comradely; it was kept within the bounds of party principles and had nothing in common with what was subsequently represented as a clash between enemies. After all, those who took an incorrect stand included Felix Dzerzhinsky, Mikhail Frunze, Valerian Kuibyshev, Inessa Armand and many other noted party leaders rightly seen, both then and now, as loyal Leninists. In short, the attitude of any leading member of the party in the Brest period should be assessed according to the facts and not to who turned out to be who afterwards.

In the party Central Committee as at the congress later on, there emerged three contending trends. One of these, personified by Lenin, considered that it was in the interest of advancing and consolidating the socialist revolution in Russia to sign a peace treaty with Germany. Another trend, with Nikolai Bukharin as its exponent and champion, was against Brest and insisted on waging a revolutionary war. The third trend, represented by Leon Trotsky, upheld the slogan "Neither war nor peace", meaning that the country should neither wage war nor sign peace.

Lenin was a consistent revolutionary and a determined opponent of revolutionary talk, avant-gardism, attempts to rush events, impatience in politics, especially in the case of a party which had assumed the responsibility for governing the state. An urgent and difficult task facing the party at the time was to go over from views formed in the years of the revolutionary underground activity to the political realism befitting a government in power.

Lenin approached the issue of concluding the Brest peace from the standpoint of the historical perspective. "This objective situation," he

pointed out, "caused us to experience an extraordinarily sharp and difficult turn in history".² "Yes, the turns taken by history are very painful. All such turns affect us painfully," he said at the Seventh Party Congress. But the difficulty of effecting historic changes is by no means an argument in favour of avoiding them, of entertaining illusions. "Abandon illusions for which real events have punished you and will punish you more severely in the future," he urged his opponents.³ Lenin saw the important thing in basing the party's political strategy on objective prerequisites and the solid foundations of reality.

The "Left Communists" could not understand that to sign peace in that situation meant continuing the cause of the October Revolution, if in a different form. They described readiness to sign a peace treaty as surrender of the "vanguard of the international proletariat to the international bourgeoisie". "We consider," they declared, "that with power taken and with the last bastions of the bourgeoisie completely defeated, the proletariat is inevitably faced with the task of developing the civil war at international level, a task which it must accomplish undeterred by any dangers. To abandon it would lead to death from internal decay and would be tantamount to suicide."⁴

This position fully revealed their line of pushing the revolution, a line that was untenable both theoretically and politically and threatened the cause of the revolution with disastrous consequences.

Trotsky took a destructive stand, which he formulated as follows: "It is not true that there is only one way out of the situation. The facts intercross, and so there can be a middle position. Lenin's position is largely subjectivist. I am not sure that his position is correct." In the same speech he uttered words sounding sacramental: "History will put everything right."⁵

However, it is most risky to hope that history can amend or put right a fallacious political strategy, that it can undertake what must be done by political leaders, by the party itself. History does not rectify major political mistakes but merely records them. For Soviet power in Russia, the question was, in fact, to be or not to be. The refusal of peace was fraught with danger. In the situation of the time, to hope that history would put things right was to make a great sacrifice to tempting yet unrealistic hopes or, in other words, to desist from a steadfast struggle for the preservation of the achievements of the October Revolution and accept political bankruptcy.

The struggle was difficult. After all, it was not so very easy to virtually renounce what the Decree on Peace proclaimed, that is, peace without annexations and indemnities, by agreeing to sign a treaty providing for the most shameless and undisguised annexation, the payment of enormous indemnity, and so on. Lenin's opponents tried to score points on this. In reality, however, acceptance of Brest did not at all imply repudiating the ideals and principles written into the Decree on Peace. The point was that Brest was posing in a new way the question of further struggle for these ideals and principles without removing this task from the agenda.

The Brest period is occasionally represented as a triumph of Lenin's idea of peaceful coexistence. We think that to interpret it in this way is to oversimplify it. Where did peaceful coexistence come in since the Brest Treaty flouted by virtue of its essence the most elementary concepts of law, peace and coexistence in general? The treaty was a forced concession on our part not prompted by the principles of peaceful coexistence but imposed by a stronger adversary who wanted to strangle our young republic. Hence Brest can hardly be described as an embodiment of peaceful coexistence without ignoring the facts.

The Brest period may evidently be seen as one in which the theoretic-

cal principles of socialism's foreign policy crystallised and the strategy of Soviet foreign policy as a whole began to take shape. It was only logical that this aspect of the matter received attention in the Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress, which said: "As distinct from imperialism, which is trying to halt the course of history by force, to regain what it had in the past, socialism has never, of its own free will, related its future to any military solution of international problems. This was borne out at the very first big discussion that took place in our Party after the victory of the Great October Revolution. During that discussion, as we may recall, the views of the 'Left Communists' and the Trotskyites, who championed the theory of 'revolutionary war' which, they claimed, would carry socialism to other countries, were firmly rejected. This position, as Lenin emphasised in 1918, 'would be completely at variance with Marxism, for Marxism has always been opposed to 'pushing' revolutions, which develop with the growing acuteness of the class antagonisms that engender revolutions'. Today, too, we are firmly convinced that promoting revolutions from outside, and even more so by military means, is futile and inadmissible." ⁶

Thus there is a fundamental community between the approach to key problems of international politics which Lenin worked out and upheld in the Brest period and the present-day policy of the party and the Soviet state, a policy based on Lenin's ideas.

THE HARDEST WEEK

The severe crisis in the Bolshevik Party caused by the formation of a "Left" opposition was fraught with a split and loss of the position of the ruling party. The fact is that the Left Socialist Revolutionaries' party, which was represented in the Soviet government, was biding its time to seize power under pseudo-revolutionary slogans while "left-wing" phrasemongers in the Bolshevik Party were willing to accept the "loss" of Soviet power in the event of a peace treaty with the imperialists. Lenin and his supporters on the party CC had to patiently carry on a difficult struggle.

The hardest week was February 18-24, 1918. Lenin considered that it would go down in the history of the revolution as one of the greatest turning points. "In the course of its history it has progressed, has ascended several steps at once," he said. ⁷

What happened in those days? Why did Lenin take such a view of the outcome of that crucial week?

— On February 19 German troops, availing themselves of the break-off of negotiations on Trotsky's initiative, launched an offensive on Russian territory to deal the Soviet Republic a death blow.

— The same day, Lenin proposed resuming the negotiations and agreeing to sign a peace treaty. However, he failed to win support from the majority of the party CC.

— On February 19 the Council of People's Commissars (CPC) sent the German government a wireless message protesting the German troops' violation of the armistice and their advance; at the same time it confirmed its readiness to sign a peace treaty on the "Brest terms".

— On February 20 the CPC heard a report on the situation at the front and decided to set up a Provisional Executive Committee under Lenin (empowering it to make decisions on all pressing matters) and to publish an appeal to the population.

— On February 21 the CPC published the appeal "The Socialist Country Is in Danger" urging the people to put up resistance to the German invaders. The German government sent Soviet Russia an ultimatum demanding that it accept within 48 hours the peace terms dictated to it, send delegates to Brest-Litovsk for talks, sign peace in three days' time

and ratify it within two weeks. A Revolutionary Defence Committee was set up in Petrograd.

— On February 22 Trotsky resigned from the post of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, refusing to answer for the situation he himself created.

— Nikolai Bukharin announced his withdrawal from the party CC, resigned as editor of *Pravda*. Lenin published in an evening issue of *Pravda* an article under the heading of "The Itch" which sharply criticised the "Left" for its pseudo-revolutionary rhetoric.

— On February 23 Red Army units offered grim resistance to the German troops, which had advanced through territory inhabited by Estonians and Russians as far as Pskov and Narva. That day the text of the German ultimatum of February 21 was delivered to Petrograd; Yakov Sverdlov read out Germany's demands at a meeting of the party CC.

On February 23, 1918, during the vote taken at the CC meeting on the most important item—on whether the German proposals should be accepted at once—Lenin's platform was supported by Stasova, Sverdlov, Zinov'ev, Stalin, Sokolnikov and Smilga; Trotsky, Krestinsky, Dzerzhinsky and Ioffe abstained; Bukharin, Buhnov, Uritsky and Lomov voted against.⁸ In these circumstances Lenin found it both possible and necessary to put the question in the most emphatic manner. "The policy of revolutionary talk is over," he said. "If this policy continues I will withdraw from the government and the CC. To wage a revolutionary war, we would need an army but we have none. It follows that the terms must be accepted."⁹ "I have not the slightest hesitation," Lenin stressed with the firmness proper to him. "I am not presenting an ultimatum to retract it."¹⁰

There was no other way to uphold the policy line in which Lenin believed, to correct the course of the ship of our state and steer her in the right direction. He did not shrink from announcing his intention to resign in the form of an ultimatum because the very existence of the Soviet state was at stake and nothing could be more important than this. "Some have reproached me for by ultimatum," he remarked. "I am offering it as an extreme way out."¹¹

Dzerzhinsky said: "There will be no respite. Our signature will, on the contrary, strengthen the hand of German imperialism... We cannot save anything by signing this peace". He agreed with Trotsky, saying that "were the party strong enough to withstand disruption and Lenin's resignation, we could adopt a decision but we cannot do it as matters stand".¹²

CC member Lomov (Oppokov), who adhered to the platform of the "Left", said: "Although Lenin is threatening to resign there is no reason to be scared. We must take power without V. I. [Lenin]. We must go to the front and do everything possible."

"We can refuse to sign but begin peace talks," Stalin said at that meeting.¹³ Lenin condemned this stand because it was half-hearted and politically wrong under the circumstances. "Stalin is wrong to say: we can refuse to sign," he said. "These terms are to be signed. If you don't sign those terms you will sign a death sentence on Soviet power three weeks from now. The terms do not affect Soviet power."¹⁴

Even these brief extracts show how intense the struggle became at the CC meeting and what hung in the balance. Lenin's line won the upper hand in the CC. But eight of the 15 who voted were virtually against signing the Brest peace.* What played the decisive role was the truly

* The view which some Western Sovietologists take of this episode in the history of our country is most typical. Robert Daniels, for one, writes that "Lenin had survived the first and biggest political crisis of his career as head of the Soviet state" (Robert Vincent Daniels, *The Conscience of the Revolution. Communist Opposition in Soviet Russia*, Cambridge, Mass., 1960, p. 76).

mighty political will and revolutionary firmness of Lenin, who not only went against the stream but succeeded in upholding his position and in bringing about a decision which he considered correct and whose real worth he was well aware of.

It was a victory but not a complete one. Lying ahead was an equally hard period of struggle for the ratification of the Brest peace, signed on March 3, 1918. Nor was it to be a mere formality. It was necessary to convince the party rank and file and the population of the country of the need to ratify the treaty. Also, a struggle had to be waged for Lenin's line to win the support of the Seven Party Congress and then of the Fourth Extraordinary All-Russia Congress of Soviets.

At the Seventh Party Congress the struggle occasionally took a dramatic form. The gist of the "Left Communists'" arguments was probably formulated most fully by Bukharin. "There can be no peaceful coexistence between us—between the Soviet Republic and international capital," he said.¹⁵ He believed that by signing the treaty, "we are not only compromising with capital but destroying our own socialist essence", "not getting a respite but undermining our very essence", "destroying ourselves as vanguard of the international socialist revolution. We cannot pay such a price for a two-day respite that will get us nowhere."¹⁶

According to a formula accepted by historians and publicists until recently, Lenin was for signing peace, Bukharin and his followers insisted on declaring a revolutionary war and Trotsky took a loosely intermediate stand. Outwardly that was how matters stood (to judge even by the minutes of the Seventh Congress). Actually Trotsky's position was the main counterbalance to Lenin's. First of all, because it was he who had conducted negotiations on instructions from the Soviet government but had failed to meet the fundamental requirement. Second, because his line followed directly from his anti-Leninist theory of "permanent revolution", which cynically refused to leave room for Russia's concrete interests. Trotsky's line was based on the following postulate which he formulated in his speech to the Seventh Party Congress: "For a revolutionary class, deals with the imperialists are impermissible, and this is where the centre of gravity lies."¹⁷ One of his supporters, Ryazanov, was even more outspoken in setting out the point of departure of the theory of "pushing the revolution": "...We must build our policy on fanning the flames of a world revolution, for it is only with support from the proletariat of Western Europe that we can induce the peasant masses to follow us."¹⁸

The differences between Lenin and Trotsky were strategic in character whereas those between Lenin and his followers, on the one hand, and the "Left", on the other, were mostly tactical.⁴ "Ilyich hoped strongly for a word revolution," wrote Nadezhda Krupskaya.¹⁹ He hoped as much as the "Left" for revolution in European countries, primarily in Germany. A European revolution, particularly a revolution in Germany, seemed to be the only salvation for the Russian revolution. A ray of hope came with the January events in Germany and Austro-Hungary. However, estimates of the likelihood and feasibility of revolution in other countries varied. Many left-wingers were undoubtedly influenced by revolutionary talk and gave in to wishful thinking. The slogan of revolutionary war against the Kaiser's Reich carried not only hotheads but many of Lenin's closest associates off their feet. Bukharin's stance was manifestly wrong and was aggravated by an attempt to discredit Lenin's approach by using revolutionary rhetoric.

Lenin gave priority to saving the revolution in Russia by signing

* At the Seventh Party Congress Lenin made a remark that is worthy of special note in this connection "The fact that we are together," he said, "shows that we are ninety per cent in agreement with Bukharin" (V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, p. 110).

peace. What made his position difficult was that while it was he who had called for struggle against imperialism, he was now compelled to persuade his comrades to conclude a peace treaty with imperialists. As for Trotsky, he was convinced that Russia's interests could be sacrificed to the prospect of world revolution. It was during the Brest-Litovsk negotiations that the antithesis between Lenin's approach and that of Trotsky transpired and then became more marked. **

The controversy between Lenin and Trotsky bore not only on the attitude to the Brest Treaty but on questions of principle concerning the very essence of the foreign policy of a socialist type of state. This is why Brest both focused and reflected the polarity of the theoretical and political positions from which the struggle in our party over fundamental foreign policy issues was really carried on.

POLITICAL AND MORAL EXPLOIT

The historic lessons of Brest have a tremendous political potential that is still valid. They are manifold theoretically, methodologically and historically. We would like to emphasise what we see as particularly important and what makes those lessons relevant to this day. First among them is Lenin's application of revolutionary dialectics in practice. This dialectics, Mikhail Gorbachev said in his speech on the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution, "is characteristic of all of Lenin's post-revolution activity. It helped accomplish the political and moral exploit of the Brest Peace literally on the edge between the possible and impossible, saving thousands upon thousands of lives and securing the very survival of the socialist Motherland."

The example of Brest provided our party with a lesson in how to accomplish tasks of strategic significance in a situation where room for manoeuvre was limited and time was a factor of vital importance. Operating amid world-shaking events, the party worked out its long-term line in international affairs, primarily a general concept of foreign policy towards countries belonging to a different social system. Lenin considered the lessons of Brest of fundamental importance for Soviet foreign policy and stated this explicitly, saying that "our policy will be correct, if we draw on the experience of the Brest peace".²⁰

Lenin's strategy in the Brest period was recognised as correct even by some of its "Left Communist" opponents; true, they did so afterwards, when developments showed their arguments against signing peace to be wrong. One of the noted exponents of "left-wing" communism, Andrei Bubnov, wrote in his *Outline History* of the party: "The beginning of armed intervention by the Entente, the Left Socialist Revolutionaries' definitive dissociation from proletarian dictatorship and, lastly, the November Revolution in Germany, which overthrew the Brest Treaty and graphically demonstrated the revolutionising impact of that 'obscene' peace, all delivered a crippling blow to petty-bourgeois illusions of 'left-wing' communism. By the time the Fifth Congress of Soviets (early July) met, differences with the 'Left Communists' had virtually disappeared, and during the revolution in Germany former leaders of the 'Left' (Bukharin and Radek) publicly admitted the fallacy of their earlier tactics."²¹

** The Western press has lately been arguing in line with its interpretation of Soviet press comments on the need to fill the gaps in the history of our party and country that things are moving towards "rehabilitating" Trotsky, primarily because Trotsky was a "sworn enemy of Stalin" and a victim of Stalinism and is entitled to the aura of hero and martyr. This is the opinion expressed in, among other publications, *Der Spiegel*. Time has passed its verdict on Trotsky's role in the history of the Soviet state, irrespective of his dispute with Stalin. Trotsky's line against Lenin came out in the very first months following the October Revolution, above all during the Brest-Litovsk negotiations. His behaviour at a crucial moment of the revolution did enormous damage to the interests of the Soviet state.

A short biography of Nikolai Bukharin published in 1927 put it on record that "afterwards Bukharin openly recognised the Brest stage of his political activity to have been a very big political mistake".²²

In this connection it is worthwhile to recall Bukharin's description of Lenin's activities in the Brest period. In his article written a year after Lenin's death and reproduced in *Pravda* on February 12 this year Bukharin described, in particular, the tremendous role played by Lenin in those crucial days. Bukharin wrote: "Lenin was admirable in the hour of attack but he was also admirable in the hour of danger with the enemy's sword very, very close to our heads.

"I recall the Brest days. We, 'young' and 'Left-leaning' have already committed a mistake by precluding an opportunity to sign an agreement on peace immediately and persisted in our stubbornness. And here Ilyich rushes headlong into the decisive CC meeting. He looks like a huge lion caged by little boys. He runs about the room, indignant, with a firm determination on his face contorted by bulging muscles. 'I shall not wait a second. The game is over. *Not a second.*' His 'not a second' is said with a determined, serious and, at the same time, angry sibilance through his teeth. That was a sign that Ilyich was in a 'ferocious' mood. And Ilyich puts an ultimatum. And Ilyich overruns the previously adopted decision. And Ilyich, mighty, formidable, iron-willed and omniscient saves the revolution from the horrible enemies, from the revolutionary phrase-mongering and the revolutionary posturing which have all but delivered the Republic up into the hands of the German butchers..."

Lenin himself, looking back at the Brest period and analysing the objective factors responsible for inner-party differences, put first what by virtue of its nature had made for their rise and growth. "You know," he said, "that at that time our Party as a whole still possessed too little experience to determine, even approximately, how fast we should travel the path we had chosen. The chaotic conditions that, as you know, we had to take over from the past made it extremely difficult at that time to survey events and obtain an exact picture of what was going on. Moreover, our extreme isolation from Western Europe and all other countries deprived us of the objective material necessary to assess the possible rapidity or the ways in which the proletarian revolution in the West would develop. This complex situation made the question of the Brest peace a matter of no little dissension in the ranks of our Party."²³

Even bourgeois authors stress Lenin's sober-minded approach to the events that occurred at that crucial stage in the development of the Soviet state. "As a statesman," wrote Louis Fischer, one of the serious Western biographers of Lenin, he "observed, weighed, and reasoned, and arrived at decisions on the basis of reality. Power did not go to his head. It cleared it. Most other Bolsheviks attempted, at least in the early Soviet period, to achieve an integrity between their prerevolutionary and post-revolutionary selves. But for Lenin... his responsibilities compelled a cold, objective assessment of circumstances, compelled a sober, practical unsentimentality stripped of illusions, slogans, cant, pride, attachment to theory, and attachment to past stands and statements.. He judged the concrete situation. The situation in 1918 demanded peace at a high price. He saw this from the beginning and was ready to pay. He thereby saved the state he had created."²⁴

After the Second World War George Kennan, American diplomat and historian, showed in his book *Russia Leaves the War* that the respite after Brest had saved Soviet power. In a treatise on Soviet foreign policy under Lenin, another American historian, A. Ulam, spoke highly of the significance of the Brest peace for the consolidation of Soviet Russia. According to it, Lenin's foresight was borne out by subsequent develop-

ments, and from then on he became the only leader of the party standing head and shoulders above other leading figures.²⁵

Was the conclusion of the Brest Treaty a retreat from the achievements of the revolution? Yes, it was a retreat, or what Lenin called a backward movement during which material sacrifices, too, had to be made. But the Soviet government carefully weighed the limits of permissible concessions. Georgi Chicherin, appointed People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs on May 30, 1918, shortly after the signing of the Brest peace, reminisced that Lenin offered specific advice and recommendations on all major problems of Soviet foreign policy. "...In grappling with those constant difficulties, he showed inimitable realism, which convinced him of the need to sign the Brest Treaty. But while reckoning constantly with the gravity of our position and the need for concessions, Vladimir Ilyich always saw to it that the dignity of our state was upheld, and knew how to ascertain the limit beyond which it was necessary to show firmness."²⁶

One of the lessons of Brest was the conclusion about the need for the Soviet state to promote creative diplomacy, the delicate art of diplomatic struggle. "*So far,*" Lenin wrote in May 1918, with the Brest Treaty in force, "we are being saved *only* by the contradictions and conflicts and struggles among the imperialists... *For the time being* we have to learn diplomacy."²⁷ Lenin's "theory of respite" fully proved its worth and so did his tactic of concessions to and compromises with an enemy known to be stronger. One lesson of Brest was that a revolutionary party cannot vow never to compromise.

Brest may be described as a laboratory in which compromise, an important instrument of international politics, was tried and tested for the first time since the founding of the Soviet state. In the case of Brest, the compromise was of a particular nature, one ruling out consideration of each other's interests, a balance of interests. Nevertheless, it was a compromise which demonstrated the flexibility and dynamism of the foreign policy brought into being by the revolution. The Brest compromise saved Soviet power. At the same time it furnished an example of how a new, socialist state encircled by hostile forces can find ways of defending its vital interests, how it can use diplomatic means to strengthen a new social system.

From the point of view of diplomatic art, the Brest peace was an example of temporary settlement of the balance of forces between states. But Lenin realised the inevitability of this balance. Shortly after the Brest Treaty had become effective, he expressed confidence that that coercive peace would not last even six months. His forecast came true. Germany's defeat in the First World War and the revolution in Germany in November 1918 made it possible to cancel the Brest Treaty. On November 13, 1918, Soviet Russia declared it null and void. Lenin stressed that if we had held out (survived), being a nonentity militarily, it was only due to a correct assessment and utilisation of the difference in interests between the imperialist powers and to the right application of diplomatic means to withdraw from the world war.

The reflection of the events of the Brest period and the intense political struggle over the peace treaty bring out, seven decades on, the dramatism of the situation of the time, which often verged on the tragic, and the real historical role of the main protagonists. Each of them went down in history in his own way, for they were not supernumeraries but active proponents of a particular policy in which the complex laws governing the trend of development intertwined in a whimsical manner. History turns its light on some of them, as if to fully bringing into view their

titanic activity, and keeping others in the shadow to stress, as it were, the fruitlessness and inevitable defeat of their strategy.

The experience of Brest makes it possible to appreciate from the height of today the immense role which a bold revolutionary approach and new political thinking play at decisive stages of development. Speaking of the new political thinking which the CPSU is guided by in its activity, in particular on the international scene, we know that it has inherited from Lenin the very spirit of a broad, wide-ranging approach to the realities of the contemporary world and the ability to jettison petrified ideological dogmas running counter to the nature of revolutionary theory. The restoration of Lenin's concept of the primacy of universal interests over all others, including class interests—a concept virtually abandoned in favour of so-called ideological purity—shows that our party is creatively using Lenin's great legacy and carrying it further, deriving from it strength and certainty of having chosen the right path. In the context of present-day realities this Leninist concept serves as the basis on which the Soviet state shapes its foreign policy at this stage and will do so in the years ahead.

Mikhail Gorbachev noted at the February (1988) Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee: "The central link in the new thinking is a new role of the values common to all mankind. Their significance was stressed by Marx and Lenin. And those were not just general ideas stemming from the humanist principles of their doctrines. Stressing the importance of the internationalisation processes taking place in the world, our great teachers revealed the objective basis of the values common to all mankind and dialectically blended them with socio-class values. Now all this is becoming the backbone of practical politics."

People say that making historical comparisons is a dangerous business. This is right but only to a certain extent, until a comparison is based on the outward signs of the compared events. However, these comparisons are admissible and quite vivid when they involve the depth and scale of events and allow to see something common in the events divorced by years and decades. So, we have reasons to compare the turning points in the history of the Soviet foreign policy. These moments always reveal a revolutionary, bold and comprehensive perception not only of some periods but a grasp of the cardinal trend in development. Seen in this light, we can comprehend the internal, integral continuity of various stages in the strategic aspects of the Soviet foreign policy and its integrity.

The lessons of Brest, of Lenin's dynamic, innovating diplomacy full of revolutionary élan, are unquestionably helpful in solving the foreign policy problems facing us. In this sense Brest is not merely past history; it also plays an active role today.

¹ *Седьмой экстренный съезд РКП(б). Март 1918 года. Стенографический отчет*, Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1962, p. XL1.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1965, p. 93.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 100, 109.

⁴ *Протоколы Центрального Комитета РСДРП(б) Август 1917-февраль 1918*, Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1958, p. 209.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 214.

⁶ *Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress*, Moscow, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1986, p. 15.

⁷ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, p. 64.

⁸ *См. Протоколы Центрального Комитета РСДРП(б)...*, p. 215.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 211.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 213.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 212.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 213.

- ¹⁵ *Седьмой экстренный съезд РКП(б)* p 29
¹⁶ *Ibid* pp 32-33
¹⁷ *Ibid* p 71
¹⁸ *Ibid* p 73
 Н. К. Крупская *Воспоминания о Ленине* Moscow 1957 p 358
²⁰ V 1 *Lenin Collected Works* Vol 29 1965 p 149
²¹ *БСЭ* Vol 11 Moscow 1930 p 450
²² *Ibid* Vol 8 1927 p 274
²³ V 1 *Lenin Collected Works* Vol 29 p 147
²⁴ Louis Fischer *The Life of Lenin* New York Harper & Row Publishers 1964 p 213
²⁵ See *Ленинские традиции внешней политики Советского Союза* Moscow 1977 p 65
²⁶ И. В. Чичерин *Статьи и речи по вопросам международной политики*, Moscow 1961 p 278
²⁷ V 1 *Lenin Collected Works* Vol 35 1966 p 332
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UNITED NATIONS AND REALITY

(Continued from page 32)

is the chairman of the non-aligned movement) to the effect that the United Nations "can never be 'our' United Nations as opposed to 'theirs', nor can it be 'theirs' as opposed to 'ours'. Only as the United Nations, meeting everybody's views in part and forcing compromise from all, will it serve anyone at all." Quite true!

¹ *The New York Times* Oct 16 1987

To Cut Off the Military Branch

Aleksandr MOSTOVETS

The twentieth century marks the beginning of the nuclear age, an age that promises the unprecedented blossoming of material and intellectual culture and, at the same time, threatens to unleash incalculable misfortunes and calamities, including a world disaster. The future depends on whether the atom is used for peace or for war. At present, mankind is trying to harness the energy of the nucleus both by developing the nuclear power industry and by piling up masses of nuclear weapons.

Since the very inception of the nuclear age, the Soviet state has been in favour of cutting off the military branch of development and heading off the buildup and proliferation of nuclear weapons on our planet. The Soviet Union feels the nuclear non-proliferation regime must be strengthened as a most effective measure of preventing nuclear war and eliminating weapons of mass destruction. The joint Soviet-US summit statement adopted at Washington reaffirms the USA's and USSR's invariable commitment to the non-spreading of nuclear weapons and, in particular, to strengthening the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

For almost twenty years, the treaty has demonstrated that it constitutes a good basis for concerted efforts by states to cut short the fatal spreading of the nuclear means of mass annihilation throughout the planet. The significance and effectiveness of the treaty are also evidenced by the fact that, in terms of its parties, this is the broadest ever international arms limitation agreement.

The historic Soviet-US accords arrived at during the Washington summit, which have ushered in a process of real disarmament, impart a new meaning to the ideas of nuclear weapons non-proliferation. This, in turn, sets the stage for those countries which have not yet done so to accede to the NPT. They have justified their position by adducing, among other things, a rather valid argument that the main signatories to the treaty have never set to implementing an obligation contained in it "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control".

Several non-nuclear weapon countries continue to criticise the Non-Proliferation Treaty for allegedly containing discriminating provisions. In particular, accusations are made that industrialised nations use the non-proliferation regime to preserve their monopoly on advanced nuclear technology. Calls for free access to that technology, frequently in isolation from the tasks of ensuring nuclear non-proliferation and without regard for real needs in it, were also voiced at the UN Conference for the Promotion of International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy in Geneva (March-April 1987).

Nonetheless, the Non-Proliferation Treaty incarnates the political will of an overwhelming majority of the world's states which have every reason to believe that limiting the number of nuclear-weapon countries lessens the risk of nuclear war. The instrument reflects the

firm belief held by its parties that renunciation by non-nuclear-weapon states of nuclear arms constitutes an important guarantee of their security. Such renunciation bespeaks a growing understanding of the peril that threatens humanity's survival. There is also an increased awareness that, if there had been no treaty, rapid scientific and technological progress would have allowed many nations not only to penetrate the secrets of the atom but also to use them for far from always peaceful purposes. Such a turn of events could entail disastrous consequences for the whole world. This is why the accession to the treaty by states which have not yet done so would make a genuine and weighty contribution to strengthening international security and averting the nuclear menace. Furthermore, this would create objective conditions for the broader involvement of those countries in international cooperation related to the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

Yet, it must be regretfully said that the overall state of affairs in the nuclear non-proliferation area continues to be quite complex. New facts regularly appear indicating the desire of several so-called threshold states to acquire nuclear weapons and to gain illegal access to technologies, materials and equipment which can be used to develop nuclear explosive devices. Constantly mentioned among those states are Pakistan, Israel and South Africa.

In particular, Pakistan is bending over backwards to prepare the material basis and infrastructure for manufacturing nuclear arms for which, as has been acknowledged by President Zia ul-Haq, all the necessary conditions exist. Nor have Pakistani leaders disproved reports carried by the world press to the effect that the country boasts a "functioning nuclear bomb". It is an open secret that Islamabad is actually assisted by the US administration in developing the deadly weapon within the framework of military and economic cooperation. The militaristic thrust of Pakistan's nuclear programme, which is now a matter of public knowledge, provides - both in itself and according to US legislation - sufficient grounds for Washington to desist from rendering financial, economic, military and other support to Islamabad. The USA's stubborn refusal to face the facts and acknowledge the dangers inherent in its continued military and political interaction with Pakistan shows that in disregard for the nuclear non-proliferation interests, the United States prefers to maintain tensions in that region in order, in particular, to obstruct the national reconciliation process in Afghanistan.

Another cause for concern is that the Congress Conference Committee has in fact empowered the US President during the coming two and a half years to delete Pakistan from the list of countries suspected of developing nuclear weapons. Should Pakistan get a hold of them, a qualitatively new situation would form in South Asia, the situation fraught with most dangerous implications both for the non-proliferation regime and for the cause of world peace. In other words, such a turn of events would increase the risk that nuclear weapons are used. That is why the United States assumes tremendous responsibility by continuing its large-scale military cooperation with Pakistan.

US relations with Israel are known for their extensive politico-military interaction; while remaining the principal source of instability in the Middle East, the latter, just like Pakistan, is eager to obtain nuclear weapons. Washington's substantial military and financial support whets the nuclear ambitions of Israel which flagrantly turns a deaf ear to the world public's calls to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

At the September 1987 session of the IAEA General Conference, South African representatives declared their intention to initiate talks with the nuclear powers on the question of participation in the Non-Proliferation

Treaty—a fact which could only be lauded. From all appearances, however, that statement served merely as a cover for a political manoeuvre intended to ward off a decision to deprive South Africa of IAEA membership rights and privileges. The absence of any meaningful steps on Pretoria's part, not to mention its refusal to place all its nuclear activities under IAEA control, plainly manifests the South African regime's intention to keep a free hand in the nuclear affairs, which aggravates instability in Southern Africa.

The destructive approaches of the near-nuclear states are exacerbated by the inconsistent and unpredictable conduct of some non-nuclear countries. Those adverse trends take place against the backdrop of an objective process of further development of nuclear energy and its fuel cycle, which leads to forming and consolidating a material basis for manufacturing nuclear explosive devices in non-nuclear-weapon countries. In some cases the IAEA meets with definite difficulties in exercising control in them.

This international organisation is facing some other problems as well. The non-payment of contributions by some states, primarily the USA and Japan, has put the IAEA in a financial crisis which is evolving into a political problem, threatening to sap the agency's authority and, consequently, to complicate the task of ensuring the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

US representatives in various IAEA bodies have repeatedly stressed that the USA is strongly against the agency's politicisation. It stands to reason that some of the issues brought for deliberation at the meetings of IAEA governing bodies and at the General Conference sessions have an adverse impact on its work as a whole. It should not be forgotten, however, that the IAEA is not functioning in a vacuum and that factors like South Africa's nuclear potential and Israel's nuclear threat, attacks at nuclear facilities, and so on cannot be isolated from the problems which directly come within the agency's purview.

The USA itself has of late set to zealously foisting on the agency political questions which have no bearing on its activities. For example, the United States has begun, clearly for provocative purposes, to raise at the General Conference sessions the question of the Afghan delegation's credentials. The impression made is that, while pursuing interests bearing no relation to IAEA activities, the Washington administration is taking steps which run counter to its own appeals for normal activities of the organisation. In other words, the USA is adopting double standards in a bid to use the agency to distort the political realities of today's world.

In order to cement the international non-proliferation regime, it seems to be necessary at present to focus efforts on two main directions: first, to actively and productively continue the process launched by the Soviet Union and the United States aimed at cutting back nuclear armaments, and to work for reaching tangible agreements on limiting and eventually ceasing nuclear weapons tests, second, to undertake further efforts to attract primarily near nuclear states to the treaty.

A major part in dealing with the regional aspects of nuclear non-proliferation is played by the process of creating denuclearised zones in various parts of the world. These would greatly aid the formation of a reliable security system and help to abolish nuclear weapons everywhere.

The Soviet Union has joined the initiative of South Pacific nations to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region and has signed relevant protocols to the Rarotonga Treaty. It is imperative that the other nuclear powers do their utmost to reliably ensure and guarantee a truly denuclearised status of the declared zone.

Given the development of international contacts in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, the expanded market of nuclear materials, equipment and

technology, and the emergence of new nuclear suppliers, the task of exercising more stringent control over nuclear exports is playing an ever larger role. This matter becomes even more urgent in a situation where several states are undertaking attempts to depart from the guiding principles of nuclear export as embodied in the 1977 London agreement. The present situation calls for both unilateral and multilateral concerted actions to strengthen that control and to establish it, in one way or another, over the new nuclear suppliers.

An increasingly important area of work to ensure the nuclear non-proliferation regime covers preparations for an NPT Review Conference to be held in 1990. Since the conference is to discuss the whole range of problems related to preventing the emergence of new nuclear-weapon states, it is essential that its decisions contribute to strengthening, rather than merely preserving, the treaty. The Soviet Union has expressed its readiness to actively cooperate with all the countries concerned in actual preparations for the conference.

EUROPE: APPROACHING THE THIRD MILLENNIUM

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What is in store for Europeans on the eve of the third millennium, and what will Europe and the world as a whole look like? To answer these questions, experts in European and world security are engaged in relevant studies, and futurologists are making numerous forecasts. Most of them believe peace in Europe will be maintained. But there are obvious differences as far as the ways and means of attaining the much desired goal are concerned.

The Soviet Union and its socialist allies have come up with a large-scale programme for building a nuclear-free and non-violent world, for building a comprehensive system of international security and turning all the regions of the world into zones of guaranteed peace and cooperation. Among the chief aims of the programme is to ensure reliable European security on the basis of the Helsinki process, by expanding cooperation among states, promoting their mutual trust, and achieving disarmament.

This approach is shared to a varying degree by the public and by many politicians and statesmen in the West who adhere to different ideological views. This is seen from the documents of most of the Social-Democratic parties in Western Europe, from the calls issued by numerous pacifist organisations, from studies by international and national institutes on the problems of peace in Vienna, Oslo, Stockholm and Tampere, and from many recent developments.

The idea of safeguarding peace is also favoured by those who cling to old stereotypes of thinking, such as the "balance of forces" and "position of strength" politics concepts. But they see the maintenance of stable relations among states only in the light of a nuclear "balance of fear". Stable peace in Europe can be guaranteed, according to their logic, only by constantly building up military might, by stockpiling nuclear arms and ballistic and cruise missiles, and by developing space and other new weapons.

Thus, in European politics today there clash two concepts reflecting new and old political thinking. Which of them has a future, that is, which of them expresses the interests of all countries and of mankind as a whole?

The general patterns of the present-day developments are reflected in a specific way in Europe, half of its population living under socialism. Typical features of the present epoch, such as the organic unity of socialism and peace, the turning of the popular masses into an active factor of international politics, and a more sober assessment by the ruling quarters in Western Europe of the real state of affairs in the world are most clearly manifest on the continent of Europe. This explains why it was namely here that the cold war front was broken through and the policy of detente was initiated in the 1960s and 1970s.

The 1975 Helsinki Final Act for the first time formulated a statute of joint commitments for 35 signatory countries to promote peaceful cooperation, strengthen security and achieve disarmament not only in Europe but elsewhere in the world.

It must be mentioned in this context that departure from Leninist principles in the development of democracy and in meeting material and spiritual requirements of man in the conditions of the new social system, which occurred not long ago in the socialist countries, weakened the positions of socialism in the world and to some extent weakened the forces of peace and progress. This, in turn, led to the growth of aggressive tendencies in the imperialist camp. As soon as socialism shows a weakness, militarism and imperial ambitions are revived.

The stagnant phenomena in the economic and social life of the socialist countries at the turn of the 1980s were among the causes of what may be called the second version of the cold war. They held out a hope in the capitalist West that it would be possible to "roll back socialism", undermine its economy by the arms race and trade blockade, gain military superiority over the socialist world, and force it to its knees.

However, due to the resolute measures taken by the CPSU new leadership to effect a cardinal restructuring of the economy and democratise Soviet society, and due to the bold and long-range foreign-policy initiatives of the socialist countries, their international prestige was strengthened, the dangerous buildup of tensions was stopped, and a dialogue began among the heads of state and government of the world community on the future of the world.

A positive role here was played by the possibility of solving the problem of intermediate- and shorter range missiles. The deployment of these missiles increases, rather than lessens, the threat to the security of all states. In the opinion of most experts, the race in cruise missiles and all kinds of shields, be it American SDI or European SDI, cannot guarantee anyone's security. Describing this situation, Norwegian political scientist Marek Thee wrote: "Indeniable truth is that there exists no effective unilateral defence against nuclear weapons, against ballistic and cruise missiles".¹

Today the idea of Frederick Engels that militarism perished due to the dialectics of its own development, because of its ability to "swallow" Europe² (and now the whole world), has acquired a new meaning. This is clearly illustrated by the "loss of national consensus" in security matters in most of the European NATO countries. In the United States there are also growing doubts among politicians and public figures, that it is possible to maintain "peace through strength", through an "équilibre de terreur", says Charles-Philippe David, a professor at a military college in Quebec.³ Jonathan Dean, a well-known US diplomat, is among many others who warn against vain illusions about "weaknesses" of the USSR, which is a great power possessing a considerable economic potential and vast raw-material resources and having a well educated population.⁴

The sprouts of the new political thinking, based on the priority of common human values and the survival of mankind, keep growing. The strategy of nuclear confrontation spurring the arms race should give way to a policy of cooperation, of turning former "adversaries" into partners jointly working to guarantee security for all members of the world community and solve the global problems confronting them.

The INF Treaty signed in Washington is invaluable for the cause of European security and real disarmament on the continent. One of the reasons why the detente of the 1970s was not continually developed was that the understandings on complementing political detente with a military detente were not fulfilled.

The situation in the world today is changing largely for the better.

The successful consummation of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe placed a solid block of political and military confidence-building measures into the foundation of a common European home. The accords on verification and on-site inspection signed in Stockholm already work for peace and mutual understanding. Conditions have also been provided for solving problems related to conventional and chemical weapons, which are now in the focus of international affairs.

How should real disarmament in Europe begin? Spokesmen of the NATO countries allude to advantages of the East in some categories of armed forces and armaments. But they make no mention of the advantages of the NATO countries in air and naval forces and in other arms and services, whose activity directly concerns European security. Meanwhile the facts mentioned by the NATO spokesmen testify merely to the presence of asymmetry and imbalances which took shape historically in the process of the buildup of the armed forces of NATO and the WTO, and due to their geographic location. In our opinion, both sides should lay down their cards, exchange all data, assess it, reveal the asymmetry in the armed forces and armaments and set to solving the problems.

The Vienna meeting of representatives of states participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is focused on problems of European disarmament, on elaborating and implementing new confidence- and security-building measures. It has been decided to consider these problems at two interrelated but separate forums.

At the first such forum the participants in the European process belonging to the North Atlantic alliance and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation are to conduct talks on drastic cuts in the armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. The Budapest programme advanced by the Warsaw Treaty countries greatly contributed to reaching an understanding on the start of these talks. The socialist countries have proposed that the questions of the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments should be solved together with those related to tactical missiles, strike aviation, nuclear artillery and other tactical nuclear weapons.

This has been proposed because tactical nuclear weapons are directly involved in the military activity on the whole territory of Europe and also in the adjacent sea and oceanic regions and air space. They are part of the combined arms units and most of them are dual-purpose weapons, for they can carry conventional as well as nuclear weapons. In order to reach an early understanding at the Vienna meeting, the sides could begin by considering the question of dual-purpose weapons carriers, while their nuclear component would be discussed separately in the near future.

It would be advisable, in our view, to conduct stage by stage talks on the lessening of the danger of military confrontation in Europe, with the balance between the sides kept at the lowest possible level of reasonable sufficiency at each stage. Priority in consideration should be given to measures to eliminate the threat of a surprise attack, remove most dangerous offensive arms of both military alliances from the zone of their direct confrontation, and decrease the concentration of armed forces and armaments to an agreed minimum.

Moreover, the Warsaw Treaty countries promote elaborating a series of the strictest verification measures at all stages of arms reduction, including on-site inspection, and supplementing the reduction of armed forces and armaments with cuts in the military spending of the states.

As for the second forum to be attended by all participants in the Vienna meeting, it will most likely deal with formulating entirely new confidence- and security-building measures in Europe. They may well be

called measures for ensuring military strategic stability. That forum should consider questions of the notification of air-force and naval exercises, the limitation of the scope of their activities, the measures for preventing surprise attacks, the considerable reduction of the scope of military exercises, refrainment from a show-down of strength, etc. The positive experience of Stockholm I shows that confidence-building measures in the military sphere are more effective if they are combined with political confidence-building measures.

European security would doubtlessly gain, if the nuclear-free zones and zones free of chemical weapons are created. The Soviet Union backed up the proposals submitted by the governments of the GDR and Czechoslovakia to the FRG government on creating a nuclear-free corridor in Central Europe. It declared its preparedness to withdraw from that zone all its nuclear means of warfare: mines, missiles, projectiles, including nuclear-capable aircraft of tactical strike aviation and nuclear-capable anti-aircraft missile systems. It would be important also to create zones free of nuclear and chemical weapons in the Balkans and in Northern Europe. The Soviet Union has repeatedly expressed its readiness to guarantee and respect the status of these zones.

The Warsaw Treaty countries also fully support the Jaruzelski Plan advanced by Poland on reducing armaments and building confidence in Central Europe. Its implementation would strengthen peace and stability on the continent. The Soviet proposals on radically lowering the military confrontation level in Northern Europe and in the whole of the Arctic and turning that region into a zone of peace and cooperation and conducting relevant talks among the states concerned are aimed at reaching the similar goals. The Soviet Union's "Murmansk initiatives" evoked a positive response in the countries of Northern Europe.

A major aspect of disarmament is to guarantee security in a world without weapons. This is not a new issue. It was debated way back in the League of Nations, in the process of the UN Charter elaboration and in the first post-war years, but was frozen by the cold war and the world's split into opposed military alliances. Now it is given prominence again, but today it is to be solved in a new way, considering present-day realities. It is necessary to provide material, political, legal, economic, social, moral and psychological guarantees ruling out the probability of war, ensuring for each nation an opportunity to freely arrange its life and facilitating social and cultural progress and respect for human rights.

In particular, extension of the scope and value of confidence building measures and of international cooperation in military political, economic, environmental, humanitarian and other spheres could effectively provide for the necessary guarantees mentioned here. The guarantors of regional security could be, in the USSR's opinion, also the permanent members of the UN Security Council. Incidentally, the UN Charter does not rule out the possibility of providing a mechanism of security guarantees through regional agreements. This idea has already been supported in various forms. Thus, a new joint initiative was undertaken in May 1987 by the Polish United Workers' Party and the Social Democratic Party of Germany who proposed establishing a European confidence-building council. West German political scientist Dieter Lutz has suggested that a certain European security Council, various European consultative mechanisms, a European system of a peaceful settlement of disputes, etc., be used as the guarantors of peace.

Similar proposals in the framework of the European process were advanced before. For instance, in 1973 Czechoslovakia suggested setting up a consultative committee on security and cooperation in Europe, and Switzerland came up with the idea of elaborating a mutually-acceptable

method for peacefully settling disputes. Besides, couldn't a single system of disarmament control and confidence-building be an effective guarantee of security?

European security extends to various spheres of cooperation among states—economic, scientific, humanitarian and cultural—developing on the principles of peaceful coexistence and providing a material foundation for a common European home. The Helsinki accords in these spheres meet the objective requirements of the growing internationalisation of the economic and cultural activities of nations.

Humanitarian cooperation among states to encourage and promote respect for human rights is an integral element of the European process. It is closely associated with yet another area of international relations—the right of the peoples to arrange their own life. The approach to solving humanitarian problems can be effective only if a social and political choice made by some or other nation is duly respected. The world can be safe only when neither the rights of nations, nor human rights are trampled upon. Therefore respect for human rights is a substantial factor of peace, and the humanitarian sphere as a whole is an indispensable component of a comprehensive system of international security.

Our country works to continuously deepen the democratisation of all aspects of life in Soviet society, to really guarantee the social, economic and individual rights and freedoms of the Soviet people, to better ensure law and order in the country and widen the range of international cooperation in the humanitarian sphere. Thus Lenin's idea of the organic unity of the struggle for socialism, peace and democracy is being carried into life. As it comes out for "humanising", in the full sense of the word, humanitarian cooperation, our country seeks to clean it of political speculations and cold war propaganda tricks, and to direct it towards business-like discussion and search for practical solutions.

A serious dialogue on human rights cannot be reduced to merely the rights of individual, to considering a few personal cases. It seems promising in this context if common international legal criteria are elaborated concerning the reunification of families, marriages, human contacts, contacts between organisations, the visa system, etc. It would be good to make use of the positive experience accumulated in the countries-parties to the European Conference. It is also important that national legislation and administrative rules in the humanitarian sphere be brought into conformity with international norms and commitments. To that end, all states should adhere to the international pacts, conventions and other documents on human rights and take all that is useful in the practice of international organisations dealing with problems of labour, human contacts, information, culture, and education.

Progress in all these spheres would add a truly "human dimension" to the European process and encourage drawing together and mutual understanding of nations. Without trust among nations, Lenin wrote, there "cannot be peaceful relations between peoples or anything like a successful development of everything that is of value in present day civilisation".⁵

Humanitarian cooperation should be not a "field of tension" in the world community, but a school teaching people how to live in peace and introduce common norms of morality into international politics. Human rights should not be an arena of confrontation and propaganda rivalry, as was the case, for instance, at a recent colloquium on human rights and international relations held in Paris under the aegis of the state secretary attached to the French Prime Minister.

Human rights should become an area of productive international

cooperation. The Soviet Union expects that the Moscow conference on humanitarian cooperation, which it has proposed, will be held in the same spirit. And so should other European meetings that are to be decided on at the Vienna meeting: an information forum in London, a conference in Paris on the occasion of the 200th anniversary of the Great French Revolution, and a symposium on preserving European cultural heritage to be held in Krakow.

The broad and free growth of trade and economic ties among the countries of Europe would serve as an economic guarantee of European security. The rapid progress of science and technology and acute energy and environmental problems make European countries more interdependent and lead to further expansion of their common interests and areas of cooperation. Most foreign economists belonging to different schools agree on this in their forecasts for the year 2000.

Implementation of a series of new major decisions in the area of Soviet foreign economic policy, cooperation in production with foreign enterprises and firms, establishment of international associations, joint ventures and other promising forms of industrial, scientific and technical cooperation—all this offers favourable preconditions for the development of mutually beneficial business cooperation with the USSR's partners, in particular, in Western Europe.

Evidently it is time to start the practical implementation of large-scale projects from among those mentioned in the Final Act and those which were put forward later. The Vienna meeting is called upon to contribute to the solution of urgent environmental problems. On its agenda are proposals for convening an economic forum in Prague, a conference on scientific and technical cooperation in Bucharest, and an ecological forum in Sofia, to mention a few.

The strengthening of the economic foundation of a common European home would doubtlessly benefit not only Europeans. The countries of our continent could also join more actively in the international efforts to solve basic global problems, such as peaceful exploration of outer space, the search for new sources of energy, the overcoming of backwardness by developing countries, establishment of a new international economic order, food, raw-material, monetary and other problems.

However, at the same time one should not leave unnoticed some alarming developments in Western Europe. Clearly, some NATO quarters are attempting to "offset" somehow the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles in Europe. In particular, they are contemplating plans providing for the deployment of such weapons in the North and the Mediterranean, extending the range of action of the existing tactical nuclear weapons on the continent and the production of intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe. Whether one wants it or not, this dangerous option undermines the INF Treaty signed in Washington and further intensifies the nuclear arms race. However, this is not the alternative needed by the 35 states who cast their votes thirteen years ago in favour of a broad constructive cooperation and interaction.

The all-round development of the European process could, in our view, become in the framework of Europe a kind of a model for the practical implementation of a comprehensive system of international security. Viewed in the context of lasting tendencies in history and the general patterns of the interaction of the profound forces determining the course of

INDONESIAN PROFILE

Valeri MALYGIN

For many years since the 1965 events Indonesia, which is the fifth largest nation in terms of population, has remained on the sidelines of world politics. Although in the first years of the "new order" the government declared its adherence to an anti-imperialist and anticolonial course, in fact this course was sharply swerving to the right. A one-sided orientation towards the West led to a major re-evaluation of foreign policy priorities. The country where the Bandung principles were once proclaimed, abandoned its vanguard role in the non-aligned movement and merged with its conservative wing.

Simultaneously, there was a sharp curtailment of extensive relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The Indonesian policy of that period was a one-way street with the traffic flowing towards the West.

In recent years the foreign-policy profile of Indonesia has undergone substantial changes. Jakarta is joining actively the world community by constructively participating in tackling present-day problems.

Indonesia's voice more clearly rings at international forums, in the UN, in the non-aligned movement, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and is acquiring a more pronounced identity. There are noticeable changes in the approach to relations with the Soviet Union, too. The year 1984 was a turning point in this field. Shoots of trust were breaking through the crust of past prejudices. Contacts and exchanges began expanding, and the countries were establishing a constructive dialogue. The first Soviet Foreign Minister visit to Indonesia paid by Eduard Shevardnadze last spring served as an impetus to this process and laid the foundation for qualitative improvements in these relations.

Now a new chapter in Soviet-Indonesian history has opened up: the recent visit to Moscow by Mochtar Kusumaatmaja, Indonesian Foreign Minister. This is the third meeting of the foreign ministers of the two countries in less than a year, after Jakarta and New York. This fact alone testifies to the fact that bilateral relations are gathering momentum. However, this is not all. When contrasting the nature and content of the talks held in Jakarta and Moscow one variably feels the changes which have taken place in the very spirit of bilateral relations over this comparatively short time span. Observers were struck by the fact that discussions became more businesslike and frank and that the partners strived to understand each other, showing their interest in reaching new points of accord and finding opportunities for expanding their interaction.

Needless to say, this turn of events meets the interests of both the Soviet Union and Indonesia and corresponds to the positive trends in world developments.

The stability of the internal situation and hard-won economic progress allow President Suharto, despite certain difficulties, to feel secure at the helm of power as he steers the ship of state through the troubled waters of international politics.

Interested in creating appropriate external conditions for continued national development, the leadership of Indonesia is intensifying its efforts to improve world situation. Realisation of the need to take urgent steps to stop the arms race is expressed in virtually all statements made by the President and other public figures. This stand explains Indonesia's positive response to many large-scale Soviet initiatives including the Soviet government's programme for creating a nuclear-free world, the proposal on a comprehensive international security system and similar moves. Jakarta also welcomed the accords reached during the recent visit by the Soviet leader to the United States. In his speech at the Third ASEAN Summit Conference in Manila, President Suharto said: "In the midst of such world situation still filled with tensions and uncertainties, and while deeply concerned with the ongoing conflicts in various parts of the world, including Southeast Asia, we feel relieved that an agreement on nuclear arms reduction has been reached recently between the United States and the Soviet Union. What has been produced by the negotiation between these two superpowers can become a positive factor in the context of reducing world tension and by helping the settlement of regional conflicts. The agreement also contains greater hope that in due time the human race will be spared from the threat of its annihilation." Indonesian diplomacy also actively advocates the idea that the treaty on the elimination of all medium- and shorter-range missiles should be a starting point for the intensified liberation of mankind from nuclear shackles and encourage disarmament in other areas. Thus, speaking at the 42nd UN General Assembly session Mochtar Kusumaatmaja, Indonesian Foreign Minister, expressed the desire that the Soviet-American agreement contribute to the speediest conclusion at the Disarmament Conference of the talks on the elaboration of a convention on chemical weapons and the conference continue, as a top-priority issue, to deal with such matters as the total prohibition of the arms race in outer space.

Equally indicative is the fact that Jakarta, as distinct from the past, does not confine itself to vocally supporting a nuclear-free world but strives to make its own contribution to this important cause. That seems to be why Indonesian representatives have of late been more often elected to various UN bodies and other international organisations where their constructive role and activity are becoming more prominent.

As the Indonesians see it, the struggle for disarmament and international security is inseparable from the efforts to improve international economic relations and establish a new world economic order. They link these interrelated problems because they believe that disarmament should facilitate the transfer of considerable means to meeting the economic and social needs of the developing countries first of all. A further escalation of the arms race will lead, as Jakarta justifiably believes, to widening the gap between the rich and the poor countries which could lead to upheavals capable of undermining peace and stability in the world.

Jakarta views in the same vein the problems of the non-equivalent trade exchange, the growth of indebtedness, protectionism which directly affect the interests of Indonesia and objectively urge it to more closely affiliate with other developing nations facing similar problems.¹ This explains, in particular, the more active role played by Indonesian diplomacy in Africa and Latin America.

Taking into account the above-mentioned reasons, as well as the desire to enhance its international prestige, one should also treat in the same context the recent attempts by Indonesia to re-establish its active role in the non-aligned movement to whose birth and development an initiator of the Bandung conference has made a tangible contribution. Indonesia's offer to host the next conference of the heads of state and government of the non-aligned countries, as well as Indonesia's activity in the struggle

for peace, against colonialism and apartheid, prove the seriousness of the intentions of the Indonesian leaders to realise their ambitious plans to make their country once again a leader in the non-aligned movement.

Naturally, the shifts in Indonesia's foreign policy, which is becoming increasingly diversified, could not but have their impact on relations with Western states, first of all the USA. Mochtar Kusumaatmaja said that in its policy Indonesia was guided by its own interests and those of other countries of the region. It favours neither the USA, nor Japan.

Nevertheless, the United States retains the leading place in the scale of Indonesia's foreign policy priorities. The two countries maintain versatile and active relations in the political, commercial, economic, cultural and even military fields. Outwardly the picture of bilateral relations as it is presented in the USA seems to be unclouded. For instance, in a press release issued by the State Department in 1986 they were described as wonderful and friendly. To support this contention references were made to the fact that the bilateral trade in 1985 topped \$5 billion when Indonesia's exports, due to the oil deliveries, amounted to about \$4.5 billion with American private investments exceeding \$4 billion. Political bilateral relations are also presented as idyllic. However, in reality the smooth surface of American-Indonesian cooperation conceals rough edges caused by serious disagreements on many issues.

The Indonesian leadership is clearly less than enthusiastic about the USA's striving to conduct its policy from a position of strength, its course towards militarisation, including in the Asia and Pacific region and an undisguised disagreement with the proposals advanced by the six ASEAN countries on establishing a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in Southeast Asia and turning it into a nuclear-free zone. Sometimes Jakarta's displeasure rises to the surface. To prove the point we may refer to an article once written by Mochtar Kusumaatmaja in which he admitted the existence of Indonesian-American discord which stems, as a rule, from the differences in interpreting the notion of national interests. These differences, the minister says, are seen, among other things, in the approach to the problems of decolonisation and disarmament discussed in the UN where Indonesia and the United States hold opposite positions.

The list of the spheres and problems on which the interests of the two countries drift apart, to put it mildly, can be easily extended. These are the attitudes to Convention on the Law of the Sea, causing Jakarta's concern American-Chinese rapprochement, and Washington's encouragement of Tokyo's militaristic trends. There are serious contradictions in the economic sphere as well. At practically every meeting with top officials of the US administration Indonesian leaders pose the problem of the protectionist practices resorted to by the American partner and the need to lower the tariff barriers.

The USA not only fails to display an understanding of Indonesia's needs but attempts to use its financial and economic levers to influence Jakarta and through it the ASEAN as a whole. Their aid is accompanied by provocative calls to be more "cautious" towards the Soviet Union because of an alleged Soviet threat. The aim is to divert Indonesia from its non-aligned course and involve it, and through it other association's members, in implementing US military-political goals in the Asia and Pacific region or at least to get its tacit support for new military undertakings in Southeast Asia. However, these hopes seem to be futile. At various levels Indonesian politicians have repeatedly made statements, which have appeared in the Soviet press, to the effect that Indonesia does not regard the Soviet presence in the region as a threat to itself. Judging by the press reports, Jakarta upholds the same line in the ASEAN.

As regards Indonesia, Japan follows a course similar to the USA's. Recent meetings in Manila of ASEAN leaders with Japan's Prime

Minister Noburo Takeshita proved that Japan wants to further invigorate and develop relations with the Six under the guise of "equal and mutually beneficial cooperation" and rendering them financial support. Naturally, the Indonesians have not yet forgotten the Japanese occupation and anxiously follow the expanding of militaristic preparations of Tokyo. Here is just one example. Commenting on a report on a new military budget of Japan Teo-Sambuaga, member of the Indonesian parliament, said that many countries were worried by the growth of the Japanese allocations for military purposes. This is true first of all of those who had experienced the brutality of Japanese during the Second World War. The ASEAN countries, the MP noted, are worried by a possible Japanese expansion. They still remember the scars left by the Japanese invasion. Besides, Japan strives to establish control over a 1,000-mile zone spreading to the neighbouring countries. Peace and security, he stressed, cannot be safeguarded by building up military might. At the same time new Japanese credits and Jakarta's desire to increase their inflow and obtain access to the latest Japanese technologies are having an impact as seen by Indonesia's subdued criticism of Japan's foreign policy. It seems that the USA's economic difficulties have induced Indonesia and other ASEAN countries to shift their economic strategy towards Japan whose businessmen do not mark time in beating their rivals on their home markets. Press reports show that the profits reaped by some Japanese companies sometimes exceed ten fold and more over invested capital. Thus, there is a dark side to the Japanese aid.

As before, Southeast Asia is the focus of the country's foreign policy. The Indonesian leadership continues to pin its hopes on ASEAN for the realisation of its major goals such as the consolidation of its leading positions in the region and the creation of a favourable external situation. In its efforts to render the association's activity more efficient and the organisation more consolidated, Jakarta is simultaneously holding back the extremist elements in ASEAN who still hope to turn it into a military bloc and provoke a confrontation with the states of Indochina. This came out at a recent debate in ASEAN on a possible collective responsibility of the Six for the presence of American bases in the Philippines—attempts to make it follow this military course have not stopped. At the same time numerous statements made on this score by most diverse, including governmental, circles, indicate that there persists a stable allergy to the aftereffects of the bloc policy sickness and that they realise the pernicious consequences of tying in their policies with the American military presence. Reflecting Indonesian public opinion the influential *Indonesia Times* wrote that if the ASEAN countries are loyal to the spirit and letter of the Bandung and Kuala Lumpur meetings they should strive to get rid of foreign bases and consolidate their national and regional staunchness and that this issue should be discussed at a regular ASEAN summit meeting.

That meeting proved that the association is dominated by forces advocating a more constructive approach to problems and interested in maintaining peace in the region. The adherence, which sounded in Manila, to the idea of establishing a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in Southeast Asia and turning it into a nuclear-free region, as well as the intention to take practical steps in this direction within the framework of the support expressed for the IRM-SRM Treaty, prove that the association has a substantial anti-war potential to which Indonesia makes no small contribution.

It should also be noted that Jakarta plays a positive role in the settlement of the Kampuchea problem. Believing that Vietnam does not pose a threat to the security of the states in the region and regarding it as a prospective partner in establishing regional cooperation, the Indonesian

leadership maintains a dialogue with that country on behalf of the ASEAN countries in an attempt to speed up this process. Here an important role was played by the Ho Chi Minh formula drawn up by the foreign ministers of the two countries, which made a substantial contribution to arranging the meetings of Hun Sen and Sihanouk.

Also indicative is the fact that along with the dialogue which Indonesia conducts with Vietnam on the Kampuchea problem within the association framework it also believes it important to develop Indonesian-Vietnamese ties on a bilateral basis. Jakarta maintains close political contacts with Hanoi at various, including top, levels and gradually expands its relations with Vietnam in commercial, economic and even military fields. The facts show that this trend is rather stable and continues to develop.

Jakarta views the situation in the Asia and Pacific region as a whole with serious concern due to the growing militarisation and persisting regional conflicts. That is why the large-scale initiatives contained in Mikhail Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech and further elaborated in his interview to *Merdeka* evoked a positive response and are regarded as consonant with the national interests of Indonesia which is interested in turning the Asia and Pacific region into a zone of peace and good-neighbourliness.

It seems that in recent years this approach served to facilitate a noticeable shift in the Indonesian policy towards the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Indonesian political quarters regard the development of relations with this group of countries as a counterweight to the pressure exerted by the West which helps rectify strong leanings towards the West in Indonesia's foreign policy and as a means of diversifying its external ties and enhancing its international prestige. Taking all this into consideration, the Indonesian government proclaimed establishing and developing cooperation with these countries as a foreign policy direction.

The experience accumulated in relations between the USSR and the Republic of Indonesia shows that, despite great geographic and political distances, they can cooperate, and cooperate efficiently at that, in most diverse fields be it political, commercial, economic, scientific, technological or other ties. Experience has proven time and again that Soviet-Indonesian cooperation is gathering strength and momentum and is acquiring stability and immunity to adverse fluctuations in the international climate. This was again confirmed during Mochtar Kusumaatmaja's visit to the Soviet Union in February 1988.

When describing the Soviet Union's attitude to Indonesia, Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said at a meeting with the Indonesian Foreign Minister in the Kremlin that the Soviet approach was not influenced by time-serving considerations. The Soviet Union appreciates Soviet-Indonesian ties which are becoming more dynamic and meaningful and hopes that recent progress made in this field would be further promoted. There is no doubt that this is facilitated by the fact that despite their different socio-political systems the two states respect the historic choice made by their peoples.

Moscow displays confidence that Indonesia's contribution to the positive international processes, significant as it is, will grow, and the USSR intends to facilitate this through equitable and mutually beneficial cooperation. What are the possible ways and means of implementing this cooperation? There are quite a few possibilities. One of the main directions is through pooling and intensifying the two countries' efforts, both bilateral and multilateral, in order to resolve urgent, including regional, problems and turn the Asia and Pacific region into an area of

lasting peace and goodneighbourliness. The Soviet moves and proposals seem to have opened up an extensive area for concerted efforts.

The negotiations in Moscow revealed Indonesia's growing understanding of the essence and goals of Soviet foreign policy. Kusumaatmaja confirmed his country's positive attitude to the Soviet proposals. The Soviet Union and Indonesia hold identical views on today's main problems such as the liquidation of nuclear weapons, the preservation of a peaceful outer space, the elimination of chemical weapons. They also have similar views on the Middle East settlement, an end to the Iran-Iraq war, making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace, the resolution of the difficult problems in world economic relations, etc. All this creates a sound foundation for building an edifice of Soviet-Indonesian cooperation.

The communique on the Indonesian Foreign Minister's visit to Moscow identifies other directions of bilateral cooperation. To find ways of expanding trade exchange and of developing mutually beneficial economic ties, taking into account the available opportunities, the sides noted the significance of the first meeting of the mixed Soviet-Indonesian commission on economic and trade cooperation. They expressed reciprocal interest in maintaining cooperation in using outer space for peaceful purposes, in using the resources of the World Ocean and in other fields. They confirmed the intention to develop inter-parliamentary contacts and evaluate the opportunities for arranging exchanges in various fields.

There is no doubt that the signing of a protocol between the USSR and the Republic of Indonesia on bilateral consultations will serve as a powerful impetus to this process.

In other words, a lot has been done in the field of bilateral relations which gives one reason to look to the future with confidence.

This progress can be accelerated if both sides equally strive to achieve these goals and contribute to a further improvement of the climate in their relations and instil the feelings of mutual respect and amicability. As for the Soviet Union, it intends to strictly adhere to this line.

In evaluating the results of his visit to the Soviet Union, Mochtar Kusumaatmaja said at the press conference in Moscow that he was fully satisfied with the fact that the talks with the CPSU CC General Secretary, the USSR Foreign Minister and other Soviet officials were friendly and constructive. He said that the meeting and talks benefited mutual understanding. The high-ranking Indonesian guest also expressed satisfaction because the dialogue of the two countries is making sound headway and because, as a result of the visit, a foundation has been laid for the development of bilateral relations in the future.

Soviet-Indonesian dialogue has reached a new stage. It is broadening and opening up new fields of interaction, building mutual trust and understanding.

¹ Indonesia obtains credits through the intergovernmental group on Indonesia set up by Western countries. In 1987, it received \$32 billion worth of easy-term credit. While helping the country pay off its debts, these Greek gifts exacerbate its indebtedness which, taking into account private loans, has reached \$40 billion. As a result, Indonesia has become one of the five biggest debtors in the Third World. At the same time the index of servicing its debts has exceeded two times the limit of the "risk zone" reaching 40 per cent.

USSR—TURKEY: SCOPE OF UNDERSTANDING

Ilya LEONIDOV

Although Turkey still considers it of prime importance to maintain comprehensive cooperation with the USA and other countries of the West its foreign-policy concept (adopted by the national leadership in the mid-1960s and more or less finalised by now) increasingly displays elements of realism and common sense. This appears to be due to the present international realities and Ankara's objective stake in reducing East-West nuclear confrontation, alleviating the burdensome arms race and furthering mutually beneficial cooperation with different countries. This finds its reflection in the desire to balance as far as possible its relations with the Soviet Union and to build them on the basis of enduring stability and broader cooperation allowed by Ankara's bloc affiliation. Indicative in this regard is the first ever televised official statement made on January 4, 1988, by Turkey's present Foreign Minister Mesut Yilmaz, who said that, although the USSR and Turkey belong to different military-political alliances, "economic and political relations between the two neighbouring countries are orientated towards development.... Now a new period has set in, a new approach called perestroika has prevailed in the Soviet Union. We hope that this new approach will promote still further the good relations that have been established between us".

This member of the new Turkish government should be given due credit for his assessment of our relations which are undergoing positive and, on the whole, stable development.

Espousing broader relations in a number of areas, we are being guided by the Political Report of the 27th CPSU Congress, which emphasises in the context of new political thinking that "it is our vital, national interest that the USSR should always have good and peaceful relations with all its neighbours. This is a vitally important objective of our foreign policy".

The growing scope of understanding between our two countries has of late manifested itself in Turkey's assessments of the most important international events, among which the pride of place belongs, naturally, to the Soviet US summit agreements and the INF Treaty signed in Washington. Those agreements, and preparations for their conclusion, have evoked a broad positive response in Turkey and have been described in official Turkish statements as a historic process meeting the interests of mankind as a whole. The treaty itself has been characterised as fully corresponding with the "standpoint and national interests of Turkey" which favours its early ratification and specific follow-up steps in the disarmament area. As has been noted in a relevant statement by the Turkish Foreign Ministry, "we express the wish that the agreement on medium-range missiles... will constitute the first step towards large-scale East-West accords on all disarmament problems, which we are striving to achieve". It stands to reason that such an identity of Soviet-Turkish views on major international events proves that our relations with Turkey rest on a solid foundation that promotes the development of the whole set of those relations and also maintains a constructive dialogue on crucial international problems.

One may often hear people both inside and outside Turkey wonder, how the domestic processes and the nation's foreign policy will be affected by the early parliamentary elections held late last November.

As is well known, the elections were won again by the Anavatan Party (Motherland) that has ruled for the past four years; the party is chaired by Prime Minister Turgut Özal and enjoys the support primarily of big business. With only 36 per cent of electoral votes, the party, due in part to the amendments it introduced in the electoral law, gained 292 out of the 450 seats in the Meclisi (parliament), or about 65 per cent of the entire membership. This has enabled Özal once again to form a one-party government that on December 30 received a vote of confidence in the parliament with 290 its deputies' votes.

At the same time, the opposition represented by the Left-of-Centre Social-Democratic People's Party headed by Erdal İnönü and the Centre-Right Dogru Yol Party (Correct Way) led by former Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel has received 99 and 59 deputy seats respectively, although the two parties together have gained 44 per cent of the electoral votes. Other smaller parties, including the democratic left party headed by former Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, have not got a single deputy mandate. The above-mentioned former Prime Ministers, just like 100-odd other leaders of the political parties dissolved after the 1980 military coup, have earned the right to participate in political affairs due to the September 1987 referendum but, naturally, have not been able to take an active part because immediately after the referendum the Anavatan Party set a date for early parliamentary elections.

The parliament-endorsed programme of Turgut Özal's present Cabinet provides, above all, for proceeding with what was initiated by his first government. This means that a primary goal of economic policy is to bring inflation down to "reasonable limits", to boost export and currency-earning services, to encourage a foreign investment policy, to step up the denationalisation process, and to take some other measures primarily in the interests of big business. As regards foreign policy, the programme reaffirms Turkey's full-fledged membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) and the promotion of diverse allied relations with the USA and other NATO countries. At the same time, it stresses Turkey's desire to "further friendship and goodneighbourliness, to promote economic and trade cooperation with the northern neighbour—the Soviet Union", and with the other socialist countries.

Growing social tensions in Turkey are creating the objective conditions for a polarisation of forces in the political domain. On one end is the Anavatan Party which is doing its utmost to implement the current economic policy, and on the other, a sort of conglomerate comprising the opposition Centre-Right Dogru Yol Party and the Left-of-Centre Social-Democratic People's Party which are seeking, more or less consistently, a revision of the economic priorities. The workers' and left-democratic movements, which are gradually regaining their strength after the brutal repressions under the military rule, have of late played an ever more prominent role in domestic policy.

The wave of strikes is growing, notwithstanding numerous bans and restrictions. Trade unions have intensified their activities, which includes the top echelon of Türk-İş (Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions), that has thus far taken a frankly, conciliatory position. Democratic demands have been voiced by university students whose protests, which occasionally take rather dramatic forms, are arousing broad sections of the public, heating up the situation in the country. Attempts are being made to set up progressive public organisations to replace those closed down by the military.

Clerical forces which enjoy all kinds of support, especially from

Iran, are also on the rebound. The influence of illegal and semi-legal Islamic organisations is growing, and manifestations staged by fanatic elements are becoming more frequent.

The Kurdish movement that has of late picked up in southeast regions of the country is causing serious concern among the Turkish leadership. According to some data,¹ there are over 10 million Kurds living in Turkey, although the Turkish authorities continue to deny the existence of Kurds in the country, alleging that there are only individual terrorist acts committed by separatists. To quash the Kurdish movement, the authorities have unleashed the army which has used on a large scale aircraft and heavy artillery against not only armed groups but Kurdish villages as well.

The complexities and contradictions of the internal political situation in the country cannot but affect the foreign-policy conduct of today's Turkish leadership, particularly within the framework of Atlantic solidarity. It should be taken into account that the principal motive for the USA and NATO to keep and consolidate Turkey within their sphere of influence is the latter's strategic situation. Through the territory of Turkey, the Pentagon and NATO have direct access to the USSR's southern borders along a very extensive stretch of 618 kilometres on land and some 1,800 kilometres at sea. This accounts for Washington's very persistent desire to build up its military presence on Turkish territory and to involve it in its programmes, including SDI. There are up to 60 US and NATO military facilities, including seven major bases, nuclear arms warehouses, radio stations and radiotechnical intelligence facilities, AWACS aircraft, and over 5,000 US servicemen.² Nor has Washington given up hopes of using Turkey as an effective means of encircling the USSR with a "cordon sanitaire", cutting it off from the "warm" seas of the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. All those plans rest on a solid legal basis of the long-term Turkish-US agreement on defence and economic cooperation, dated March 29, 1980, and the so-called memorandum of confidence of November 29, 1982, which provides for the construction and modernisation of several military airfields in Turkey, including those near the Soviet-Turkish border, the deployment of military hardware, fuel and munitions on Turkish territory, and a possibility for the US Rapid Deployment Force to use that equipment.

Yet, Turkey's allied solidarity is a rather contradictory and ambivalent phenomenon which can be illustrated, among other things, by the disarmament concept that also displays substantial nuances. It is well known, for instance, that, apart from the official support for the INF Treaty declared by NATO in Brussels in December 1987, some of the bloc members have exhibited an increasing trend towards "compensation measures" designed to build up and modernise existing nuclear weapons, and to deploy new ones, not covered by the treaty. Against that background, one has to note the constructive position taken by our southern neighbour. Both prior to and after the signing of the treaty, Turkish official spokesmen made statements reaffirming Turkey's intent to refrain from assuming further nuclear obligations.

The former Turkish Defence Minister, Zeki Yavuztürk, stated in this context that after the treaty's signing Turkey would not agree to the deployment of US Lance missiles on its territory. These are tactical nuclear missiles whose installment on Turkish territory was envisaged by NATO's nuclear modernisation plans; it is being proposed at present that the scope and pace of modernisation efforts be expanded within the "compensation measures".

We in the Soviet Union believe that the former Minister's statement concerning Ankara's decision to refrain from deploying nuclear missiles in Turkey is concrete proof of support for the treaty and a display

of the Turkish leadership's positive approach to nuclear disarmament.

It is also well known that Turkey's stand was immediately subjected to growing pressure exerted by the West and especially by those forces which are zealously propounding the so-called compensation measures in connection with and in circumvention of the INF Treaty. In other words, the USA and the West are, on the whole, not interested in seeing the elements of realism and foreign-policy independence of Turkey gaining strength and the continued improvement of Turkish-Soviet relations.

To the same end, anti-Soviet campaigns are being fomented time and again, and with no holds barred, in Turkey itself. A recent example is a report, which was widely carried by the Turkish press, that in January 1988, in Istanbul a member of the Soviet delegation, that arrived in Turkey to make arrangements for a regular meeting of the intergovernmental Soviet-Turkish commission on economic cooperation, sought political asylum and allegedly asked to be moved to the USA. Eventually, the authors of that "report" had to apologise publicly for their blown-out-of-proportion fabrication, which, incidentally, coincided in time with similar articles, referring to British sources, concerning eye-opening disclosures by a Russian secret agent regarding Turkey. The goals of such campaigns as well as the forces behind them are obvious. At the same time, it is difficult to organise strong opposition to such moves in Turkey with the severe restrictions still maintained in the country on truly democratic associations.

The contradictoriness and inconsistency of Turkey's foreign policy stems not only from the complicated domestic situation but also from the conduct of its allies. It is from this perspective that we should look at the fact that official Turkish statements came out a lot, for instance, in support of the Soviet-US INF Treaty, when it was under preparation and subsequently when it was signed in Washington, but at the same time stressed that such an accord should not imply the full renunciation of nuclear deterrence. They also emphasised the growing need to conclude an international convention on the general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles. It is common knowledge, however, that Turkey is against declaring various zones free of chemical weapons and opposes the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Balkans, explaining this by the need to "secure a global balance or, more exactly, a global arrangement between the blocs", as if it were not clear that the implementation of individual, in this particular case regional, accords is a real way leading to global solutions.

On the other hand, special mention should be made of Turkey's desire to act in a constructive spirit in several bitter regional conflicts. For example, from the very onset of the Iran-Iraq war Turkey, as was stressed by its Foreign Minister at the 42nd Session of the UN General Assembly, had maintained friendly relations on the basis of mutual confidence with the two sides, observing strict neutrality. In so doing, Ankara has refused to render direct support to the military actions of the USA and some other NATO countries in the Persian Gulf just as previously it refrained from backing the US aggression against Lebanon and Libya. As President Kenan Evren of Turkey said in October 1987, "had we dispatched even one vessel to the Persian Gulf, this would have been perceived as a change in Turkey's position of neutrality". The Turkish approach to a Middle East settlement is equally positive in that Turkey is strongly in favour of Israel's withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied since 1967 as well as the convocation of an international conference and recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian

people. The PLO has its mission in the Turkish capital even though Turkey maintains diplomatic relations with Israel.

In addition, we can point to Turkey's strict condemnation of the policy of apartheid pursued by South Africa in the south of the continent and its support for the Contadora process and the Guatemala peace plan adopted at the meeting of five Central American states last August.

Such constructive elements both on the regional scale and in the terms of common urgent international problems have had a positive impact on Soviet-Turkish relations as well. A useful practice has taken shape to hold regular consultations at the Foreign Ministries' level on the UN General Assembly agenda as well as working visits to exchange views on cardinal international problems and Soviet-Turkish relations. Contacts have also been resumed and of late further expanded in the military sphere. The years 1986-1987 were marked by reciprocal visits of Soviet and Turkish delegations of ground forces, air force schools and groups of naval ships. In September 1986, Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei Akhromeyev paid a visit to Turkey, which was reciprocated in May 1987 by a visit of Army General Torumtay, Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces.

With Soviet assistance lent over the postwar period, Turkey has built 11 industrial and other major projects, with five more under construction.

The past year was most intensive in terms of our bilateral relations. First and foremost, that was the year initial steps were taken to implement a long-term agreement, stretching into the next century, on Soviet natural gas supplies to Turkey, which was signed in 1984 and effective for a quarter century. The Turkish leadership and businessmen are captivated by this deal, the largest in the history of our relations, believing, and this has been many a time directly mentioned by them, that it brings much benefit to Turkey and above all to Ankara, Istanbul and Bursa. The deal is also beneficial to us since the Turkish side will be paying for Soviet gas in hard currency and high-quality goods, and contract work to be accomplished by Turkish firms in Moscow and other Soviet cities, with the contracts at issue being all but ready for signing.

As has been recently stated by the Turkish Minister of Finance and Customs, Ahmet Alptemoçin, who held the same post in Özal's first one-party Cabinet, "we are about to address such questions as construction by Turkish companies of socio-cultural facilities in the USSR in payment for gas supplies. Besides, we could jointly build, on a compensation basis, enterprises in our two countries and cooperate in constructing industrial and infrastructure projects in third countries".

Taking into account that the 1984 long-term programme for Soviet-Turkish economic and technical cooperation encompasses major industries such as ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, oil processing, chemical, electrotechnical and mining industries, this list is self-indicative and reaffirms the existence of broad opportunities for industrial and trade cooperation. Further stages are to be specified at the regular Tenth Session of the Soviet-Turkish Intergovernmental Economic Commission. This is how things stood last year in the trade and economic sphere of our multifaceted cooperation, and it is evident that, given such a sound basis, much can still be achieved in this field. There are mutual desire and specific moves, including the establishment of permanent Turkish missions in Moscow and the holding of exhibitions, seminars and other bilateral conferences, are being made in all directions.

There is as solid a basis in the sphere of cultural and sports cooperation that was growing last year and, for the matter of that, in previous years very actively and intensely. All this shows that the present-day period in the evolution of Soviet-Turkish relations has laid down

a good basis for cooperation between the USSR and Turkey for the near future.

It should be noted that our ties with Turkey can be easily divided into two historical periods, the present one, which is called Soviet-Turkish relations, having been inaugurated by the October Revolution. But the interest of Russia in its southern neighbour can be traced to many centuries ago: it has been almost 500 years since the establishment of the permanent contacts between the two countries. Over the five centuries of bilateral relations, there were not only 50 years of war, which are much written about by historians, but also 450 peaceful years devoted to accumulating knowledge of each other, to exchanging experience, to trade and cultural contacts. Many paragraphs in the directives for the first Russian Ambassador to Turkey, Peter Tolstoi, were written by Peter the Great himself. Both the directives and the Ambassador's credentials described the Embassy's goal as "better safeguarding peace". But only Soviet-Turkish relations, notwithstanding different stages in their evolution, have not seen wars and, on the whole, are marked by the desire to build diverse and mutually advantageous cooperation, as it befits the neighbouring nations.

While advocating further development of the entire gamut of Soviet-Turkish relations in the spirit of goodneighbourliness and a more active dialogue on major regional and international problems, we have to take into consideration that the militarisation of our southern neighbour as well as the escalation of the US and NATO's military presence in its territory would merely erode Turkey's credibility among its neighbours and exacerbate the situation in the region as a whole, which would hardly be of benefit to Turkey and to its industrious and hospitable people.

¹ See *The Washington Post*, Apr. 10, 1987

² It is mainly due to the burden of militarisation that Turkey's foreign debt has grown from \$15 billion in 1980 to \$31.2 billion in 1986, which is equivalent to 54 per cent of its GNP. The inflation rate remains on the order of 40 to 50 per cent a year. The problem of unemployment is still extremely acute, with almost 4 million people without jobs, or all but one fifth of the nation's able-bodied population.

EUROPE: APPROACHING THE THIRD MILLENNIUM

(Continued from page 55)

European and world development, the Helsinki Final Act is a major milestone on the path of Europe into the third millennium. To implement its provisions aimed at strengthening security, building confidence and promoting peaceful cooperation in Europe is a quite practicable task, for all these provisions have an objectively existing basis and meet the aspirations of the vast majority of people on our planet.

¹ *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, No 4, 1984, p. 368

² Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol 25, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1987, p. 158.

³ *Etudes Internationales*, No 4, December 1986 p. 765.

⁴ *NATO Review*, No 6, December 1986, p. 21

⁵ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol 33, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1966, p. 386.

CONFLICT IN SRI LANKA

Yuri VINOGRADOV

The Middle East conflict, the Iran-Iraq war, the deliberate dragging out of the settlement of the Afghan and Kampuchean issues and military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula are the main trouble spots in Asia threatening the worst complications. And now attempts are being made to further exacerbate the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka by turning it into a seat of international tension.

"...In striving to extinguish the conflagrations that are raging already," Mikhail Gorbachev stressed in his interview with the Indonesian newspaper *Merdeka* last summer, "an effort must be made to avert the rise or intensification of new ones. What I mean is an aggravation such as might result from the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. It is fortunate that the countries concerned show proper restraint, but this is regrettably less than can be said about some other countries whose geographical remoteness from the seat of the conflict is inversely proportional to their manifestly provocative activity."

Reports on armed clashes and acts of terrorism committed in Sri Lanka by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) keep coming in.¹ On what has been a peaceful tropical island, a touristic paradise, civilians are killed or wounded, blasts are heard and enormous losses of property are being inflicted. To clearly understand the situation, it is necessary to look back.

The point is that in Sri Lanka, whose population is composed mainly of Sinhalese, there has always been a Tamil minority which now makes up about three million, or roughly 18 per cent of the inhabitants of that insular state.

Sri Lanka's Tamils form two groups. One of these comprises the Ceylon Tamils, whose distant ancestors settled on the island before the Christian era. There are about 2.5 million of them altogether. They form a densely populated group in the Northern, Eastern and North-Western provinces of the country, their proportion in the first province making up about two-thirds of the population. The other group comprises the so-called Indian Tamils, or the descendants of settlers from India brought to the island by the English in the 19th century to be used on tea and other plantations in central Sri Lanka.

The Tamils differ from the Sinhalese in language and religion. Tamil is one of the Dravidian languages of southern India while Sinhalese is based on Sanskrit with its Indo-European roots. The Tamils are mostly Hindus even though there are Muslims and Christians among them, while the Sinhalese are Buddhists.

The Tamils of Sri Lanka maintain the closest ties, family ties included, with the Tamils of India, who number about 55 million and live chiefly in the State of Tamil Nadu, across the narrow Palk Bay separating it from Sri Lanka.

Ceylon Tamils hold key positions in the economy and trade of colonial Ceylon. With the winning of independence, the growing Sinhalese bourgeoisie launched an offensive to reverse this state of affairs in its favour. And so, in 1956 Ceylon was proclaimed a Buddhist state, with Sinhalese as its official language. This decision met strong resistance

among the Tamils and led more than once to serious ethnic clashes among which those of 1983 were the bloodiest.

Politically, the struggle of Sri Lanka's Tamils is being led by several bourgeois liberal organisations (above all the Tamil United Liberation Front [TULF]) demanding autonomy for the Tamil minority within a single Lankeese state, and on the other hand, by disunited and ideologically diverse extremist organisations carrying on guerrilla operations under the slogan of founding an independent Tamil state, Ilam, in the traditionally Tamil areas of Sri Lanka.

India first found itself involved in the problem of the Tamil minority when, in the early 1960s, the Sri Lankan leadership demanded the repatriation of Tamils of Indian extraction to India. Under an agreement reached by the governments of the two countries in 1964 and known as the Sirimavo-Shastri Pact, one part of the Tamils was repatriated and the other was granted Ceylon citizenship.

During the riots that broke out in the summer of 1983 provoked by attacks on Sri Lankan army and police posts by squads of Tamil extremists (Tigers), there began pogroms of the Tamil population leading to the destruction of property. They occasioned an exodus, up to 140,000 Ceylon Tamils, their political vanguard included, fleeing to India and about 50,000 more emigrating to several Western countries. The Tamils of India joined in a vast movement of solidarity with their insular siblings.

Needless to say, the Indian government could not disregard this development. It emphatically condemned the crackdown of the Sri Lankan army and police on Tamil civilians. However, wishing to preserve goodneighbourly relations with Sri Lanka, India called for solving the ethnic problem of the island by peaceful, political means, by negotiation to guarantee the Tamils' legitimate interests strictly within the framework of one state, Sri Lanka. To this end the Indian government made a series of mediation efforts to bring about a dialogue between the Sri Lankan government and Tamil organisations, primarily the TULF. Its efforts created real prerequisites for settling the conflict.

External forces, primarily in the West, tried to prevent this. They pressured Colombo to make it seek a military solution to the problem, to draw Sri Lanka into the arms race on the pretext of combating Tamil terrorism and to drive a wedge between the two countries in this way. Revealingly, Sri Lanka's military spending in 1985 rose to six billion rupees against 3.6 billion envisaged by the budget.² The strength of the Sri Lanka armed forces soared from 13,000 to over 50,000, according to one of the estimates. Sri Lanka purchased abroad large batches of arms as well as aircraft, helicopters, armoured personnel carriers, artillery pieces, patrol ships and motor boats. The government hires numerous "foreign specialists", mercenaries to operate this hardware. And while Washington prefers to refrain from delivering military supplies to Sri Lanka (so far the State Department has confined itself to keeping Sri Lanka since September 1986 on the list of countries which "may need" US aid in combating "terrorism"), its "strategic allies and partners", primarily Israel, South Africa and Pakistan, have had the go-ahead in this respect.

As direct diplomatic relations between Sri Lanka and Israel were broken off in 1970 (as a sign of Sri Lanka's condemnation of Israeli policy in the Middle East), a Section of Israeli Interests was opened under the US Embassy in Colombo in May 1984. Thereupon Israel's secret service, Mossad, set about training Sri Lankan security forces in "anti-terrorist techniques" and intelligence gathering, backing this up with the supply of appropriate facilities.

In December 1984, General Vernon Walters (a former high-ranking

CIA official appointed US Permanent Representative to the UN in 1985) visited Sri Lanka, where he met with President Junius Richard Jayawardene and the Minister of National Security, Lalith W. Athulathmudali. After the visit relations between Colombo and Islamabad became much closer, chiefly in the military field. India's reaction was understandably negative.

The Annual Report 1985-1986 by the Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India says: "The growing military nexus between Pakistan and Sri Lanka, following President Jayawardene's visit to Pakistan in April 1985 and the visit of the President of Pakistan to Sri Lanka in December 1985 is being viewed with some concern." What makes this "growing nexus" peculiar is that Pakistan has become the biggest supplier of military equipment to Sri Lanka and has, moreover, trained Sri Lankan servicemen to use modern weapons and carry out raids on the Tamil population. Press reports say that over 200 Sri Lanka servicemen have already gone through training in Pakistan and that "auxiliary units" of Sri Lanka's security forces totalling 10,000 men have been placed under the command of Pakistani officers.

Simultaneously anti-Indian forces have been promoting a propaganda campaign over the "Tamil problem" in Sri Lanka to create difficulties for Delhi both at home and abroad, according to the Indian press. The various conferences on "violations of human rights in Sri Lanka" held in the West, primarily in the United States, are indicative from this point of view. The *Delhi Patriot* has written that, strange as it might seem, most of the speeches made at them were spearheaded against Delhi and not Colombo. Nor was this accidental. As the true spokesmen for the minority in Sri Lanka hardly wanted to put India in a difficult situation, the staging of such actions with US help gave legitimate cause for suspicion. The Indian press notes that resolutions passed by such conferences call for the establishment of an independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka.

In the summer of 1986, the Tamil Nadu police uncovered a network of foreign spies posing as supporters of Ilam. According to information released by the Indian authorities, those arrested had been closely linked with "diverse international organisations" operating in the United States, Australia, Great Britain and the FRG. These foreign agents masquerading as champions of Ilam demanded armed intervention by India in the Sri Lanka ethnic conflict. The campaign they had helped mount was aimed at creating the impression that Sri Lanka was threatened with an Indian invasion and at rousing dissatisfaction with the Indian government among the India's own Tamils. The Indian press says that these individuals also argued that the Tamils of the world should found a state of their own such as would comprise the areas inhabited by Tamils in both India and Sri Lanka.

It is worthy of note that the campaign for Ilam involves the most diverse forces whose activity is anti-Indian and being aimed at dividing India. The Sikh separatists are doing their bit by advocating the establishment of an "independent state of Khalistan" in the Punjab, an Indian state. Speaking at Harvard University on March 8, 1986, the General Secretary of their chief coordinating centre, the World Sikh Organisation, General Bhullar (ret.), committed himself to "cooperate" with the Tamils of Sri Lanka in their struggle for an "independent state". The Indian magazine *Link* has reported that the meeting involving Sikh extremist leaders was sponsored by a group of Sri Lankan Tamils closely linked with the US State Department.

The spring and summer of 1987 saw a further wave of terrorism sweep Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan press set the number of the victims of the protracted conflict of bomb blasts in big cities and shootings of

civilians—at more than 6,000. Behind these acts were LTTT members, whose obvious aim was to strain relations between the Sinhalese and the Tamils still further. The fratricidal slaughter on the island was expected to provoke retaliation ("the worse, the better"), which would disrupt political and economic life in Sri Lanka, fully destabilise the situation there, provoking foreign intervention, endanger the security of neighbouring India and aggravate an already tense situation in the Indian Ocean. "This knot," wrote *Pravda* at that time, which was so trying for Sri Lanka, "can be undone given joint efforts by both countries, goodwill, reciprocal consideration of interests, a readiness to compromise in the interest of preserving the oneness of the common homeland of the Sinhalese and Tamils, of a united, peace-loving and non-aligned Sri Lanka... The real road to a settlement of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka should be peaceful and non-violent, a road of negotiation."³

Faced with continuous and growing acts of terrorism, the authorities resolved to use force. They began bombing those northern areas where the Tigers were virtually in control; the army launched operations to reach and capture their stronghold, the city of Jaffna. The authorities were reportedly set on asking some neighbouring countries to send military personnel.

All this undoubtedly allowed greater scope for foreign armed intervention. In the Indian Parliament it was stated that the situation in Sri Lanka was threatening the whole region with a crisis that would have serious international implications. An official spokesman of India, expressed deep concern on behalf of his government at reports about the intention of the Sri Lankan authorities to ask Pakistan to help by sending air force pilots. He stressed that this, coupled with the use of Israeli and US personnel and mercenaries from Britain, would seriously aggravate the situation in the insular state.⁴

As a consequence of wide-ranging military operations, the northern areas found themselves blockaded and their civilian population began to starve. India hastened to provide humanitarian aid by supplying food and medicines.

Throughout that period Delhi and Colombo were engaged in intensive diplomatic talks, with the result that on July 29, 1987, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President Junius Jayawardene signed in Colombo an agreement to establish peace and normalcy in Sri Lanka. In compliance with a request from the Sri Lankan government, an Indian peace keeping force was moved into the northern part of the island.

The agreement recognises Sri Lanka to be a multinational, multilingual, multireligious state guaranteeing the Sinhalese and Tamils as well as other ethnic groups equal rights.

It provides for the establishment of a provincial council for the Northern and Eastern provinces, a measure which allows the Ceylon Tamils a high degree of autonomy. This single body is to be transformed into two provincial councils should the majority of the population of the Eastern Province adopt a decision by referendum. Lastly, the agreement stipulates that Tamil (like English) shall be recognised as an official language of Sri Lanka along with Sinhalese, which enjoys this status already.

By the terms of the agreement, foreign naval forces are barred from the port of Trincomali, and the Sri Lankan government shall decline the services of foreign military instructors. The facilities of the Voice of America in Sri Lanka are to be used for strictly civilian broadcasts.

Too little time has passed since the signing of the agreement, and so we can only draw some conclusions regarding this important state-to-state act. The programme for settlement which has gone down in history

as the Colombo Agreement is the only reasonable and workable alternative to violence, riots and destruction. The agreement put an end to a civil war in the making and to the real threat of the country division and eliminated a dangerous seat of tension which certain external forces would have liked to exploit. It is they who did not relish the peaceful policy of the government of non-aligned Sri Lanka, a country declaring for peace and international security, first and foremost in Asia, for disarmament, primarily in the nuclear field, for non-militarisation of space and in support of Soviet peace initiatives. They resented Sri Lanka's consistent advocacy of turning the Indian Ocean into a peace zone and the refusal of the Sri Lankan government to get involved in plans for the militarisation of the Indian Ocean, a plan providing for, among other things, the setting up of further bases in Asian countries with Sri Lanka as one of them because it has one of the world's largest natural harbours at Trincomali. The Colombo Agreement dealt a telling blow to these plans.

Important, however, is that the Indian-Sri Lankan accords grant ample autonomy to the Tamil population, whom they offer equal opportunities to build an independent, non-aligned and prosperous Sri Lanka. All progressives, sober-minded politicians and moderate population groups, or the majority, approve of the programme for settlement.

The agreement was hailed in most countries of the world; many of them see it as a logical sequel to the ideas of the Delhi Declaration with its call for a non-violent world. Noted commentators have reached a virtually common conclusion to the effect that the discontinuance of internecine war on the island constitutes a big diplomatic success for India and is a manifestation of the statesmanship of Sri Lanka's leaders. It is increasingly realised in the insular state that the agreement is a well-considered compromise by the Sri Lankan leadership, which has met the Tamil minority's reasonable demands while upholding the territorial integrity of the country.

Sri Lanka's democratic forces have expressed readiness to help implement the agreement, for it meets the real interests and peaceful aspirations of the people.

The Sri Lankan government demonstrated its firm resolve to respect the Agreement by setting Arms Surrendering Day and guaranteeing an amnesty for all extremists and the release of all Tamil political prisoners. (About 4,000 people were set free.) The Sri Lankan Parliament overwhelmingly approved a government bill for setting up provincial councils, or local government bodies, in the preponderantly Tamil Northern and Eastern provinces.

For the first time in years, said President Jayawardene in his address to the nation, speaking of the significance of the Indian-Sri Lankan accords, the agreement had established peace in the country, peace that came that very day... So, may peace reign supreme in the country for many, many years to come, he concluded.

At the first press conference held after the signing of the agreement, the President was asked why he had not requested India earlier to send a peace keeping force to Sri Lanka and sign an agreement for four years, which would have averted bloodshed. The President answered that he did not show sufficient resolve at the time, thereby making a self-critical statement in the spirit of new political thinking. At present he proceeds with determination, as is indicated by his intention to sign a treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation with India similar to the 1971 Soviet-Indian Treaty.

At a joint press conference in Delhi arranged upon the conclusion of the official visit to India by Junius Jayawardene, who was invited to attend as a guest of honour the celebrations of the Republic Day mar-

ked from January 25 to 30 this year, the leaders of the two countries reaffirmed their allegiance to the bilateral agreement with the aim of the most expedient improvement of the situation in Sri Lanka.

Developments over recent months have shown that the idea of normalisation is rejected by the extreme Right as well as by Tamil extremists. This explains the veiled threat uttered by LTTI leader Vellupilai Prabhakaran, who broke his earlier promise to stop armed struggle and refused to join in the symbolic laying down of arms by the Tigers saying, that the latter would again take up arms if they found it necessary in fighting for Ilam. It is said in Sri Lanka that the only thing the Tigers are capable of doing is to kill and plunder and that this makes them similar to the Nicaraguan contras, the Afghan dushmians and the Punjab's Sikh terrorists. It was the Tigers who set out to openly wreck the accords by resuming attacks on Sri Lankan troops and launching combat operations against the Indian peace keeping force sent to Sri Lanka at the request of its President. Acts of terrorism are becoming more frequent with the extremists falling back on setting booby-traps, firing from ambush and killing civilians. In Sri Lanka and countries friendly to it, people were outraged by and grieved about the assassination of United National Party Chairman Harsha Abeyawardene. Local observers rightly point out that the Tigers would have laid down arms long ago had they not been provided with arms and ammunition from without. The *Hindustan Times* of India, for one, has written about the contacts between the LTTI and the CIA and about the latter supplying the extremists with arms and aiding them in other ways.

The extremists' citadel, Jaffna, where they had their headquarters until recently, is controlled by Indian troops. Over 1,000 extremists were killed, and the Indian peace keeping force suffered casualties for its part.

Sri Lanka's progressives declare for the early implementation of President Jayawardene's programme for guaranteeing the agreement economically by setting up industries, small and medium industrial enterprises in traditionally Tamil areas. The government has allocated substantial sums for this project. This is the central task now, the key to implementing the agreement.

The attempts of a handful of renegades to hinder the normalisation process on the island are most reprehensible. Forces interested in destabilising the situation continue to be active. Violence may well recur but the main thing is that the leaders of India and Sri Lanka are working hard for the implementation of the Colombo Agreement, seeking the preservation of Sri Lanka as a territorially integral state.

The Soviet Union hailed the agreement reached by the leaders of the two neighbouring non-aligned countries, who showed statesmanship and awareness of the long-term interests of both countries. Implementation of the agreement will certainly help normalise the situation on the island and make for a healthier climate in South Asia. Sri Lanka and India have succeeded in working out a document which provides for a non-violent, political settlement on a bilateral basis, without interference by third countries.

Our country firmly supports the Colombo Agreement and hopes that peace and tranquillity will return to Sri Lanka.

¹ *Ilam* means "fatherland" in Tamil

² In 1987, the military budget of Sri Lanka exceeded 10 billion rupees.

³ *Pravda*, Apr 25, 1987.

⁴ *Pravda*, May 12, 1987.

A REBELLIOUS CHURCH

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Columbus and his companions set foot on American soil nearly 500 years ago. That was when the cornerstone of colonial oppression was laid. History willed that fabulous Eldorado should be conquered by men wearing armour and men wearing soutanes advancing side by side. Some of the atrocities perpetrated by the conquerors were depicted by Bartolomé de Las Casas, a Spanish Dominican monk, a rara avis in a flock of birds of prey. "I know exactly from authentic sources", he wrote in *A Very Brief Account of the Destruction of the Indies*, "that the Indians have always waged a just war against Christians while the latter have never treated them fairly.... Christians massacred Indians and committed extraordinary brutalities, using their horses, swords and spears. On entering a village, they never spared anybody's life but killed old and young alike.... Christians erected long gallows so that the feet of those hanged might almost touch the ground; hanging 13 Indians on each, they built fires to the glory and in honour of Our Redeemer and the Twelve Apostles and burnt Indians alive."¹ Las Casas' testimony will remain a terrible indictment for all time.

Catholicism with its indisputable dogmas, its multi-grade rigid hierarchy, the drill of its monastic orders, especially the Jesuits, and its sumptuous, spectacular divine service calculated to awe congregations, went a considerable way towards maintaining slavery as an institution, and after the peoples of Latin America won political independence, towards imposing the dictatorial rule of the bourgeois and landed oligarchy and imperialism. The church integrated itself into the machinery of oppression both vertically and horizontally.

In the late 1950s, however, the most monolithic diocese of the Vatican, the Latin American one, which linked together half the Catholics of the world by seemingly unbreakable bonds of both spiritual and political community, began to move, revealing centrifugal forces that had been building up in latent form.

It was not for nothing that the Vatican set about discussing the need to "evangelise barbarians for a second time", since the growing decline in the religious sentiments of Latin America's Catholics was a fact. A conference of Latin American bishops held in 1958 disclosed that Mass on the continent was attended by a meagre 9.5 per cent of women and 3.5 per cent of men. In the age of scientific and technological revolution, young people are no longer drawn to priesthood with its vow of celibacy.

The Vatican called on its dioceses in the United States and Western Europe to send priests, monks, nuns and laymen to Latin American countries as promptly as possible. It saw to it that priests selected for service in Latin America were trained at the University of Louvain, Belgium, and in Verona, Italy, but its efforts failed to produce the expected results.

The situation in the Latin American Church is indicative of the crisis of Catholicism, which was particularly obvious at the Second Oecumenical Council (1962-1965). The council reflected trends towards the renewal of Catholicism, the latter's readiness to adapt to the history-making changes underway in the world, primarily by facing up to social problems and sanctioning dialogue with dissenters. In the case of Latin Ame-

rica, Council's decisions had the effect of a detonator, with many believers coming to interpret the permissibility of evolutionary reforms as the permissibility of revolutionary changes.

Still, the main factor for the radicalisation of the Latin American Church was the upsurge in the anti-imperialist liberation struggle on the continent, which peaked with the triumph of the first socialist revolution in the Western Hemisphere. It was no accident that the process of renewal in the Latin America Church coincided with the victory of the Cuban people.

The Vatican's tolerant attitude to the Cuban revolution, unlike the interventionist line of the US Catholic Episcopate, was largely determined by the far-sighted position of John XXIII, whom rabid reactionaries had dubbed the Red Pope. In the years of the diplomatic blockade of Cuba, orchestrated by Washington, I saw at more than one formal reception in Havana the Papal Nuncio, who invariably radiated optimism and benevolence. John XXIII also agreed to the accreditation of the Ambassador of revolutionary Cuba, who subsequently became the Dean of the diplomatic corps in the Vatican.

Fidel Castro, who was educated at a Salesian college (the Salesians belong to the most conservative Catholic order) and broke there with religion, has repeatedly stressed that both a tactical and a consistently strategic alliance between Marxist revolutionaries and progressive believers and clergymen of Latin America for effecting social changes is possible and necessary. "Christianity", he said, "coincides with communism ten thousand times more than with capitalism."² Fidel Castro called attention to the fact that Christian dogma has from the outset been directed to the oppressed people and aimed at combating injustice and abuses.

The endurance of revolutionary Cuba, its policy of proffered hand towards believers—a policy that has nothing to do with vulgar anti-clericalism—and its ability to build relations with the church, properly bore fruit. In defiance of the anti-Cuban "sanctions" imposed by Washington, many high-ranking dignitaries of the Latin American Church followed the Vatican's tactics, which had proved their worth. I recall a conversation I had nearly a quarter of a century ago in the home of conservative Senator Haedo, at the Uruguayan health resort of Punta Ballena. One of the guests was Julio Laschi González, a handsome, well-groomed youngish bishop from neighbouring Paraguay, who was on his way to the Second Oecumenical Council.

After the host had proudly shown us a gift he had received from Cuban Minister Ernesto Che Guevara (who had visited Uruguay shortly before to attend an inter-American economic conference and had sent him a box of world famous Havanas), I asked the bishop about his attitude to Cuba. He set aside his glass of whiskey and wiped his palm with a snow-white cambric handkerchief. Then he took a pack of Chesterfield and a gilt Ronson lighter out of his vast lilac soutane trimmed with scarlet cord. He blissfully inhaled the smoke and said, carefully weighing his words: "It's for the Cuban themselves to solve the problem of their country, without foreign interference. We must respect people's right to make their own choices and social justice." What he meant by "we" was the more realistic-minded section of the Catholic Church, the one that had taken up the challenge of the times.

A differentiation among the Catholic clergy, especially among those on the lower rungs of the hierarchical ladder, has given rise in all the Latin American countries to an influential "liberation theology" recognising both the legitimacy of the liberation process and the permissibility

of clergymen participating in it by methods proper to the church. "The form which Christianity assumes when it wishes to appear scientific is theology", Engels pointed out. "The essence of theology, especially in our day, is the reconciliation and glossing over of absolute opposites. Even the most consistent Christian cannot fully emancipate himself from the circumstances of our time; the latter compels him to introduce modifications into Christianity..."³

The term "liberation theology" was first used by Gustavo Gutiérrez, a noted Peruvian religious reformer. He set out his concept in *The Truth Will Make You Free. Critical Notes*. The official church, he writes, "is far from God and the poor". He sees its antithesis in a "church for the poor", referring to the apostle Paul and Pope John XXIII. In contrast with the fundamental church dogma of the original sin as the cause of all human suffering, he speaks of social sin, "which has turned out to be the source of poverty and injustice". "Poverty means death. Death caused by hunger, disease, repression on the part of those who see their privileges endangered primarily by people striving to free themselves from oppression. To physical death must be added cultural degeneration." "Emancipatory evangelisation" and "liberation theology" were born of the task of making the teachings of Christ live in areas that have experienced massive and inhuman poverty, in the name of "justice and freedom as the two principal requirements of human society". With a view to achieving this end, it was permissible to cooperate with atheists, including Communists. Addressing the question of "using Marxist terms" by adherents of "liberation theology", the founder of the movement stressed the role of Marxist analysis in Latin American social thought while at the same time dismissing the allegation that "liberation theology is something of a synthesis of religion and Marxist analysis".⁴

"Liberation theology" is not homogeneous; it has a moderate wing ("evolution theology") and centrist and left one ("revolution theology"). The degree of radicalisation of the movement as a whole and of its components is influenced primarily by the scope of the liberation struggle in the region and the methods of the ruling oligarchy and US imperialism. From the mid-1960s on, a further incentive to the development of "liberation theology" was provided by a series of US-inspired military coups provoked in Brazil, Bolivia, Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, Guatemala, and El Salvador and by the terroristic practices of military regimes resorting to massive repression, which also hits clergymen.

Socialism became seen as an ideal by the more progressive section of the church. A movement of ordinary priests called Christians for Socialism has sprung up in the Latin American countries. Its spiritual leader is the Bishop of Cuernavaca, Monsignor Sergio Méndez Arceo, whom an anti-Communist Christian league calls the Red Devil. The credo of the dean of one of the most authoritative Mexican parishes may be stated as follows: "The future belongs to socialism.... It is only socialism that can bring real progress to Latin America.... I am neither a Communist nor a Marxist, but neither am I an anti-Communist or anti-Marxist."⁵

The first Latin American conference of the Christians for Socialism took place in 1972 in the Chilean capital, Santiago. It called for a strategic alliance with all democratic forces. Moderate adherents of "liberation theology" called the left Catholics' movement "anti-Christian". Slightly more than a year after the conference, General Pinochet, assassinated the lawful President Salvador Allende and showed what a "zealous Catholic" and "true Christian" can be like, for this is the Vatican old guard's opinion of Pinochet.

Left Catholics are building up the Church's peace-making potential within the framework of the Christian Conference for Peace in Latin America and the Caribbean. This organisation held its third congress in

the spring of 1987 in Havana. The delegates, who represented all continents, discussed the topic Freedom and Peace as a Requirement of the Gospel. One of the keynote speeches was made by Frei Betto, a noted Brazilian left-wing theologian and the author of *Fidel and Religion*, a much-talked-about book based on lengthy conversations with the Cuban leader.

In Latin America where the liberation movement has taken the form of armed struggle, some priests make common cause with the insurgents. This was the case in Nicaragua during the Sandinists' fight against the Somoza regime. In Colombia Camilo Torres, chaplain at Bogotá University, became the most renowned "guerrilla priest" by joining in the armed struggle in the 1960s. He was shot dead by a punitive expedition.

Camilo Torres, a man become a legend, set an example of civic courage for his staunch followers. However, his posthumous fame brought into existence a number of posturing imitators. There appeared "Camilist" books portraying insurgent priests. The temptations proved too much even for Graham Greene, who described the struggle of Latin American peoples for freedom in some of his books. In Greene's novel *The Honorary Consul* a group of leftists operating in Argentina kidnaps a sottish British "honorary" consul (whom nobody wants), mistaking him for the US Ambassador. Among the kidnappers is León Rivas, a married unfrocked priest who has withdrawn from the order of Jesuits. He has been a minister in Paraguay, where General Alfredo Stroessner, patriarch of Latin America's dictators, a US protégé and a protector of Nazi criminals, has maintained a reign of terror for decades.

Life has convinced Father León of the "absurdity" of the commandments. "Sell all and give to the poor", says the Gospel according to St. Matthew. In reality the Archbishop is drinking French wine with Stroessner. St. Luke's words: "Let the children come to me... for they are the Kingdom's blessed" used to stick on Father León's lips. For sitting before him were children "with their pot bellies and their navels sticking out like door knobs". "And give to the hungry", the Prophet Isaiah urges him. "Give what", Father León sobs in despair, having lost faith in religious solace.

On the eve of his death (he is shot dead by ranger paratroopers), the ex-priest soliloquises: "Christ was a man, even if some of us believe that he was God as well. It was not the God the Romans killed, but a man. A carpenter from Nazareth. Some of the rules He laid down were only the rules of a good man. A man who lived in his own province, in his own particular day."⁶

Incidentally, León Rivas protests against attempts to crown victims of fascist terror with the halo of "Christian martyrs". Yet, this is advocated with the best intentions by many left Catholics. Alvaro René Sosa Ramos, a Guatemalan trade union leader, who found refuge in a Catholic hospital by a miracle, is called "Christ" by compassionate nurses because, as he put it, "my body was swollen as a result of tortures, I could hardly open my eyes, my skin was bruised all over from beating".

The craze for worshipping Christ has spread to a section of radical intellectuals, for one now comes across portraits of a Christ with a rifle. Some left-wing theologians and sincere friends of our country argue that it is precisely Soviet society with its code of social justice and of class and national equality that for the first time in history has translated the commandments into reality.

The Vatican responds to the trend for renewal in evidence among Latin American Catholics by methodically taming the refractory. John Paul II, the present (264th) successor to the apostle Peter, said by

Christian legend to be the founder of papacy, plainly gravitates towards Latin America. His aim is to depoliticise the rebellious section of the church and return its socially-committed ministers from the communities of slum dwellers to temples, to their traditional activity. "Latin America, where the Catholic world has its biggest community", wrote *Le Monde*, "attracts special attention on the part of John Paul II, for it is there that the Catholic Church is more divided than anywhere else, judging by all indications."⁷ John Paul II reveals his attitude to Latin America's Catholics clearly enough during his practically annual journeys overseas, where he has already visited 19 countries south of the Rio Grande.

January 1978. John Paul II made his first visit abroad as the Pope. He went to the Mexican city of Puebla for a conference on the dissemination of Christianity in Latin America at present and in the future. The conference focused on the church's participation in social changes and on cooperation with laymen in the struggle against military and police regimes. It went down in the history of the Latin American Episcopal Council (CELAM) as the Battle of Puebla, for most of the bishops favouring renewal voiced dissent with the line of the Pope, who condemned all departure from traditional church dogmas.

April 1, 1987. The Pope's snow-white plane landed at Santiago of Chile airport. It is safe to say that no other visit by John Paul II, known as the "itinerant Pope", was followed with such interest as his 33rd trip abroad, which was his eighth trip to Latin America. In Chile as, indeed, in other countries, the Catholics had hoped that during this visit the Pope would speak of the moral responsibility of Chile's fascist leaders for events in that country.

On the one hand, the visit made for the growth of the mass movement against the dictatorship. Posters reading "Karol Wojtyla, take away the gorilla" appeared in working-class neighbourhoods. The Mass given by the Pope in the capital's stadium filled to overflowing developed into a popular manifestation. On the other hand, the Pope failed during numerous ceremonies to utter a single word of censure on the tyranny. What is more, Pinochet can boast of the confidential conversation he had with the Pope at La Moneda Palace, whose storming by the conspirators was the signal for the fascist coup, and of a joint prayer in the palace chapel. Contrary to protocol, the Pope and Pinochet appeared on the balcony three times to greet the crowd. *El Pais* (Madrid) commented on the scene as "The Pope in hell".⁸

There is every reason for that comment. Pinochet staged with the aid of agent provocateurs bloody clashes during the Pope's sermons, and no sooner had the Papal plane taken off Santiago airport, than the dictator sanctioned the murder of twelve patriots as if to hint mockingly that the apostles also numbered twelve. Pinochet affirmed without bothering to furnish evidence that there were Communists entrenched in the Chilean Church. In other words, he made it very clear that his illegitimate regime was not going to give up its privileges.

The nearly ten-year period separating the battle of Puebla from the Santiago massacre was marked by important developments throughout Latin America. The deepening anti-imperialist liberation process and the expansion of its social base constitute the main achievement of the peoples of the continent. The revolution in Nicaragua triumphed. Socialist Cuba won greater international prestige. Repressive military regimes gave way to constitutional governments in most South American countries, including the biggest—Brazil and Argentina. The struggle against foreign indeptedness produced a common platform for joint action by

Latin American governments in defence of national sovereignty. Public opinion became more anti-war. On the other hand, the United States strangled the revolution in Grenada; it has been carrying on an undeclared war against Sandinist Nicaragua and backs dictatorial regimes guilty of the torture and murder, of the priests as well, in El Salvador, Chile and Paraguay. All these factors influenced the position of the Vatican, which is unquestionably adjusting to changed realities while at the same time persisting in attempts to curb dissent.

The Vatican's attitude to "liberation theology" was brought to light by the campaign of persecution against Leonardo Boff, a Brazilian Franciscan priest and noted theologian who has published over 30 books. The best-known of these, the one that has evoked response all over the Catholic world, is *The Church: Charisma and Power*. "The church", Boff writes, "should be with the oppressed classes in their struggle against domination.... The church should defend human rights, especially those of the poor, and expose the outrages committed by the capitalist and neocapitalist system.... The church should be with all those who are fighting for an alternative to the dominant social system.... The church should fulfil a revolutionary mission, for the days of reform within the framework of the existing system are over."⁹

What angers the Vatican particularly is Boff's concept opposing "people's Catholicism to official Roman Catholicism". The fact is that functioning in Brazil alongside the official church, among the working people, are tens of thousands of grass-roots Christian communities (some sociologists put their number at as many as 150,000) which the ruling classes see—not without reason—as seats of popular resistance. Incidentally, the Brazilian Church played an important role in the replacement of a military regime that had been in power for nearly twenty years by a civilian government. A book entitled *Brazil: Never Again* was published in a large edition on the initiative of the church. It is a collection of documents exposing the crimes of the former regime; there are eyewitness testimonies by victims of police terror.

Brazil is the largest diocese of the Catholic world, and so it was decided to teach all "heretics" a lesson by penalising Leonardo Boff. In 1985, he was summoned for a "dressing-down" to the Vatican. It was the first time in the history of papacy that a non-European was faced with the Secret Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, as the Holy Office has been named since 1965. A vow of silence was imposed on Boff, which meant that he was forbidden to write or preach for six months.

Nevertheless, in the stormy sea of today, the Catholic ship, whose compartments are no longer watertight, feels anything but safe. It goes on skilfully tacking about, however. The angry orders coming from the captain's bridge still suppress any sign of mutiny.

The Vatican tries to learn more about "liberation theology" and the situation in Latin America generally. "Out of the vast amount of news, it is necessary to publish whatever we can to strengthen cohesion", wrote the Italian weekly *Panorama*, quoting what the Papal Commission for Latin America had ordered in setting up a new network of information services to cover problems of Latin America, a network which is to have subsidiaries in all European and North American countries. At the same time, a technological and organisational plan was made to computerise all Latin American Church information. The first terminals of the system are to be established in Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, Mexico City and Santo Domingo, and then, in the next two years, the programme is to be extended to every diocese on the continent. CELAM President Dario Castrillón, a conservative Colombian bishop, has entrusted the commission for means of communication with the task of collecting information on all written and oral statements by "liberation theologians" and on

their meetings. "It is an attempt to put the orthodoxy of Latin American theologians under tighter control."¹⁰

The Vatican and Latin American clergymen loyal to it try to keep pace with the times so as to offset "liberation theology". A CELAM conference which took place in the Ipacaray monastery (Paraguay) early in 1987 and elected the council's new leadership, devoted serious attention to the problem of the debt bondage of the continent. "The foreign debt", says the final document of the conference, "is a most serious threat to the future of Latin America."

The church readily undertakes to mediate in conflicts at regional level and in individual countries, doing its best to give the impression of a third force in the context of the polarisation of social and political forces in Latin America and an intensifying anti-imperialist struggle. John Paul II can therefore claim credit for the settlement of an age-long conflict between Argentina and Chile over the Beagle Gulf.

The Vatican also poses as a mediator in Central America, the most explosive area of the continent. Father Charles-Antoine, a French theologian who heads the organisation Dissemination of Information in Latin America (DIAL), wrote in his article "The Roman Catholic Church and Contadora Diplomacy", that as early as 1983 the secretariat of the Episcopate of Central America had demanded "that our peoples, and they alone, be enabled to settle their conflicts, overcome their differences and work out their own line of behaviour on so desirable a goal as peace".¹¹

The liberation forces of the region take a positive view of the goodwill of the church. There are ample grounds for this. The Archbishop of El Salvador acts as an intermediary between the insurgents and the regime. The Primate of Nicaragua, Cardinal Miguel Obando-y-Bravo, who is known for his links with the contras, now heads a commission for national reconciliation. In Colombia, where bands of thugs kill activists of left-wing parties, Communist Party representatives had an official meeting with Church leaders late in 1987, for the first time in the nation's history. Some opposition parties of Chile are contemplating the possibility of nominating Raúl Silva Enríques, formerly Archbishop of Santiago, an opponent of the dictatorship, for the office of president of the country.

At the Moscow forum For a Nuclear-Free World, for the Survival of Humanity (February 1987), the voice of the church rang out in unison with that of other peace forces. And it is well known that John Paul II has made statements in support of peace. For instance, he welcomed the INF Treaty, saying that it "opens up encouraging prospects for strengthening the disarmament process and for a future favourable to peace". At the same time, the Pope stressed with due regard to the need for full nuclear disarmament, that the treaty "is the starting point rather than the destination".

Communists, while emphatically rejecting all God-seeking, are closely cooperating with worshippers and clergymen in the struggle for democracy and peace. The dividing line between good and evil is neither demonical phantasmagorias nor vicious anti-Soviet stereotypes steeped in time-worn religious prejudice but the real problems of war and peace facing humanity today.

(Continued on page 87)

FROM THE BALANCE OF FORCES TO A BALANCE OF INTERESTS

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The new situation taking shape in Soviet-American relations gives rise to many questions. Not everything is adequately clear. Not everything corresponds to long-known theoretical postulates. Further advancement towards a nuclear-free world with a comprehensive system of international security poses new problems and requires that traditional views be brought into line with the realities. It is yet to be studied carefully whether the ruling elite of capitalism, especially the political leaders of the United States, will be able fully to recognise the need for new political thinking and go over from confrontation to joint or parallel actions with the socialist world in building a world structure resting not on strength but on a balance of interests. What will prevail in the end—mankind's interest in self-preservation and survival or narrow egoistic class imperatives?

A superficial observer may be struck by the abrupt change in US policy from tough confrontation to a constructive dialogue on the most urgent nuclear problem, a dialogue which culminated in signing a treaty under which, for the first time in history, two classes of nuclear weapons are not just to be limited but scrapped altogether. A more attentive look will reveal, however, a number of circumstances that had led to this change in the US stance. It is safe to say that the salutary changes in the Soviet Union during that period are one chief cause behind all this positive development because it would be no exaggeration to regard them as the basic element lying at the core of all further positive changes.

A RELAPSE OF HEGEMONISM

In the early 1980s, the growth of conservative tendencies in US domestic and foreign policies, combined with the accelerated buildup of the most up-to-date weapons in a bid to regain military superiority over the USSR and other socialist countries inescapably led the US ruling elite to an open proclamation of social revenge. The idea was to pursue a policy in the country and on the world scene, which would enable US monopoly capital not only to restore, but also to greatly consolidate its global positions.

On the domestic scene it was planned, first, to increase the share of national wealth going into the corporations' coffers (by reducing taxes on capital and by cutting wages and state spending on social needs) and, second, to lift political and administrative restrictions regarded by the big and middle bourgeoisie as encroachments on "free enterprise" (state regulating norms and labour union activity).

In foreign policy it was planned, through an accelerated arms race in all fields, the use of "economic" and "psychological wars" and, if need be, by using armed forces first, to bolster the tottering US positions and suppress the national liberation forces and, second, to greatly weaken socialism and ultimately push it from its positions.

US imperialist counter-offensive was facilitated by the new upswing in scientific and technological progress, which led to the rapid development of industries using sophisticated technologies and stimulated definite economic growth in the country. By the mid-1980s, the economic growth rate went up, inflation went down, and business activity increased in some sectors of the economy. The growing internationalisation of production, which benefited primarily the American transnationals, had a definite role to play in that process. Moreover, the militarisation of the economy, this traditional stimulator of economic growth, also worked.

However, an objective and thorough analysis of the results produced by the US domestic and foreign policies in the 1980s leads one to see that this improvement is unstable and temporary. Some structural problems of the US economy are beginning to grow more acute. The federal debt has now surpassed the \$2 trillion mark. Annual interest payments alone amount to 15 per cent of the state budget. The deficit of the balance of foreign trade reached \$171.2 billion a year, primarily due to rising military spending. As a result, it turned out that the adoption of regulation methods based on the ideological principles of neoconservatism, far from solving the old problems of US capitalism, has created new ones in the economy and in social relations.

Nonetheless, the temporary strengthening of domestic economic, political and ideological positions of the monopoly and middle bourgeoisie owing to the specific interaction of domestic and foreign political processes, gave the US ruling elite confidence in its strength and made it still more unscrupulous in imposing its will on the allies, in employing arm twisting tactics against developing countries and in taking a more aggressive line with regard to the socialist countries.

Reliance on strength in US foreign policy was largely a result of the internal regrouping in the country's ruling circles during the past decade. That was done in accordance with the conviction, current in the influential quarters of the ruling class, that the weakening of the US positions in the 1970s had been a departure from the norm. The key thesis in that point of view was that the exceptional position occupied by the United States in the capitalist world after the defeat of Nazi Germany and militarist Japan was natural and had to be retained indefinitely.

The conservative sections of the monopoly bourgeoisie which held this view, primarily in the southwestern and western states of the country, ousted the traditional liberal coalition from the control of the US political mechanism. They were used to acting in the business sphere aggressively and without scruple, and so they acted in much the same way in politics. There is a striking similarity between the conservative formulas they have offered in the economic sphere—unrestrained competition and the technological "reindustrialisation" of America—and their idea of effective solutions of international issues (reliance on the arms buildup, on new technologies and on strengthening militarism).

The coming of the present Republican administration to power has not so much opened a new cycle in US policy, than completed a rather long regrouping of forces aimed mainly at strengthening and stabilising US capitalism in the changed domestic and international situation. Many aspects of the present foreign-policy course of the United States crystallised already by the end of the rule by the Carter administration. The liberal coalition gave way to the union of ultra-conservatives who linked nuclear armament with "moral" rearmament and a "crusade" against communism. They complemented their ideas of social revenge with plans for a speeded up and large-scale arms buildup to achieve victory in nuclear war or destroy the enemy through blackmail or coercion or by economic strangulation.

PARITY AND ITS CRITICS

Most typical of US conduct in the international arena is the disparity between the country's objective position in the system of modern military-strategic, economic, and political interrelations on the one hand, and the subjective ambitions, programmes and goals of its ruling circles on the other. Meanwhile, substantial changes have occurred in the position and role of the United States in the world in the past fifteen years. The changes had begun with the establishment of the general military Soviet-American strategic parity which was looked upon in definite US quarters as an unprecedented "weakening" of the United States, a loss of its former invulnerability and a drastic limitation of the possibilities for pursuing an aggressive policy in the world.

On the whole, US imperialism had to reckon with the military-strategic parity and adapt itself to it as a new condition of its existence. But parity in itself did not exclude the possibility that the policy of confrontation, increasing the risk of a nuclear conflict, would prevail in the end.

The advocates of power confrontation with the USSR never accepted parity as something inevitable and they still insist that the USA should gain military superiority by any means. The attacks by the ultra-conservatives on parity boil down to the assertion that the policy of "nuclear deterrence" does not give a reliable guarantee that a conflict between the USA and the USSR can end quickly and, more important, in the USA's favour. In the past the doctrine of "nuclear deterrence" enjoyed support in the ruling quarters of America as a strategy which, they believed, offered a chance for a successful completion of rivalry with the USSR, and within a brief span of time at that. But life proved these calculations wrong. The period of Soviet-American rivalry extended to over forty years. The futile attempts to "roll back" socialism, or to cripple its economic and military might and diminish the revolutionising effect on the world developments spelled a historic defeat to the authors of the "nuclear deterrence" doctrine. Well-known US scientist Robert Tucker wrote in the neoconservative journal *Commentary* that after World War II the USSR was nothing more than a significant regional power, whereas now the USSR possesses real global might. In his opinion, the main thing is that during the past decades "the historic security of this country [the United States] has been transformed in the most radical manner".¹

Precisely the unpreparedness of the more reactionary part of the US ruling elite to realise the character and consequences of this change in due time gave rise to this important contradiction in present-day US foreign policy: the need felt by broad sections of US society to give up the strategy of "nuclear deterrence" exists together with the ideology and policy of hegemonism that are based on this strategy and sometimes prevail over common sense, putting the nation's instinct of self-preservation to the test.

As a result, as the international situation grows worse, two tendencies in the ruling quarters of the United States begin to struggle with each other—the realistic recognition of the danger of reckless power adventurism in the nuclear age and the unremitting striving to "settle accounts" with the socialist world, for which purpose "prevailing force" should be built by the United States and its military and political allies.

In the early 1980s, it will be recalled, the foreign-policy slogans of the Republican administration amounted to the demand to reverse America's weakened position. But soon the formula of restoring the strength of America was transformed by the White House into a formula of active offensive from the positions of the America's restored strength. That occurred largely because the influential groupings which believed that the

USA could win a war, with losses amounting to a "mere" 20 million people, were given access to military policy-making.

Such venturesome ideas give rise to a hopeless policy, for, objectively speaking, the present position of America in the world prevents its return to its historical yesterday.

NEW REALITIES OF THE CHANGED WORLD

In the past fifteen years US imperialism lost its undivided economic hegemony in the capitalist world. West European countries and Japan pressed their overseas partner in some areas. They have become major economic and political centres in the world, and not only within the system of imperialism, but in international relations as a whole. In the political and diplomatic sphere, too, the United States can no longer expect unquestioned submission from its allies/rivals which do not wish to succumb to US diktat, especially when this is against their own economic interests. In a bid to regain the lost positions in its relations with other capitalist countries the United States insists that precisely it, with its global network of nuclear bases and its armed forces stationed abroad, is still the military mainstay of the world capitalist system.

Relying on its military presence abroad and various forms of military dependence of its partners, and involving them in ever new rounds of the arms race, the USA is trying to obstruct the further strengthening of the other "power centres". But, acting in this way, the United States is compelled to display some restraint and caution, for it understands that today it will not be able to pursue a policy of confrontation with the socialist countries and independent developing states unless it is supported by the other "power centres".

This situation is so dramatic for US capitalism not so much because it has lost its positions, for this is a logical process which is historically inevitable when the pattern of world interrelationships grows increasingly diverse. The futility and, at the same time, extreme danger of the aggressive foreign policy of the United States are a result of the conflict between the subjective striving of its ruling group to regain US leadership by power methods and the changed objective conditions requiring a basically new approach to guarantee survival, peace and security to all mankind. "The policy of total contention, of military confrontation has no future," says the Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Congress of the Party. "Flight into the past is no answer to the challenges of the future. It is rather an act of despair which, however, does not make this posture any less dangerous."²

Competent military experts had good reason to conclude that the nuclear balance achieved in the world between the opposed sides is on an excessively high level. If the nuclear arms race goes on, and especially if it spills over into outer space, it can increase this danger to such proportions that even approximate parity will no longer serve as deterrence.

Security can no longer be provided either by military superiority, or by a notorious "balance of fear" at an increasingly high and unstable level. Precisely this prompts the conclusion that the policy of arms race has reached the point of its historical crisis. The arms race has become absurd from the point of view of its main function, which is material preparation for new world wars, because the nuclear age has made global war so destructive that it has ceased to be an instrument for attaining economic, political and class goals.

Nuclear war cannot bring economic advantages to the aggressor, because he would at best get a lifeless desert contaminated by radioactive fallout. Nuclear war cannot be a political instrument either. And, finally,

it cannot be a means of struggle of one socio-economic system against another. Imperialism cannot unleash a nuclear war against the socialist countries without risking its own destruction. Despite the substantial differences dividing socialism and capitalism, people that live in these two systems can either survive together or perish together. The hopelessness of a world war is what mainly renders the further nuclear arms race meaningless.

One cannot fail to see that in the nuclear age the objective role and possibilities of military force in solving global problems are changing. Before nuclear weapons appeared, military might was widely used, as a rule, by the imperialist states as a means of psychological pressure on an adversary. Therefore an increase in armaments was automatically regarded as a country's political advantage. But now the majority of sober-minded bourgeois military experts and politicians agree that this function of military strength and the arms race has lost its meaning.

Not only was the balance of forces in the world changing. The mood of the American people was changing, too. The euphoria of the first term of Reagan's presidency was dying away, and with the sobering up came a feeling of impending catastrophe, which was confirmed by the warlike rhetoric of the top representatives of the administration. So public sentiments swung in favour of arms reductions and agreements with the Soviet Union.

By the end of 1986 the conservative wave was subsiding—at the midterm elections that year the Republicans lost the majority in the Senate. White House demands for greater aid to the Nicaraguan contras increasingly came up against resistance, the opposition in Congress to the forced implementation of the Star Wars programme was mounting, and attempts by the conservatives to change the alignment of forces in the Supreme Court were blocked. The Iran-contras scandal gravely sapped confidence in the honesty of the conservatives. It not only marked the start of the weakening of the conservative coalition, but also showed the first signs of its disintegration. Contradictions between Reagan and his political supporters were revealed for the first time: the conservatives began to speak openly about the loss of confidence in their idol. Extreme and irreconcilable right-wingers left the administration.

As the President moved on towards signing the IRM-SRM Treaty, the conservative opposition to an arms control policy was growing. This opposition was most apparent in the attacks on the 1972 ABM Treaty which symbolised to the right-wingers a policy of ending the arms race and a possibility of agreement with the USSR.

The arms race, swallowing up ever more funds, adds ever less to the effectiveness of military might. By the mid-1960s the weapons stockpiled in the world were enough to destroy all life on earth. From then on the nuclear arms buildup has turned into Danaïden labour. The arms race has reached its dead-end.

FROM NEW THINKING TO A NEW FOREIGN POLICY

What is the alternative to the short-sighted and suicidal policy of the nuclear arms race? The alternative has been offered by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries which have elaborated an innovative foreign policy in keeping with the realities of the modern epoch, a policy based on new political thinking in the nuclear-missile age. This alternative is being formulated by realistic-minded politicians in a number of capitalist countries and in the political parties and movements which have realised the danger of a nuclear catastrophe.

Nuclear arms have actually equated the destinies of capitalism and socialism in the face of military confrontation, have made them equally

vulnerable, and have posed a broader problem than that of choosing a social system—the problem of the survival of mankind. By the end of last century Lenin expressed the thought about priority of common human values over the goals of one or another class.³ The significance of this thought is felt most keenly now that it is becoming clear that all countries are interdependent and life on earth hinges on a single system of world survival whose elements are linked inseparably.

The complexity and acuteness of this historic moment in the life of mankind call for the need to be above the existing differences and contradictions and to adopt new approaches and new methods and forms of relations between different social systems, states and regions. There is no doubt that we have all entered a special phase of the historical process requiring that all countries of the world display creative endeavour, a new approach, and an ability to exceed the limits of usual but outdated ideas.

A solid system of international relations, meeting the demands of our time, must be built on the principles of renunciation by the states of the attempts to ensure their security solely by military-technical means. The path of unilateral technical achievements made in order to gain unilateral military strategic advantages, the path which the USA and some of its allies still try to follow, may lead only back to the initial balance, but on a higher and less stable level. And if new types of weapons are deployed in space, on which the USA has staked in recent years, this balance can be fatally upset. Security, both national and international, has become primarily a political task, and no achievements in science and technology will ever make political solutions unnecessary.

The historical experience of the coexistence of capitalism and socialism has shown that the balance of strength between them has been changing within fairly broad limits. Therefore the problem of establishing a new and comprehensive system of international relations cannot depend strictly on the balance of strength between the states of the two systems. In the first place, this problem should be solved on the basis of common interests and compromises, with both sides making concessions, undertaking voluntary unilateral actions to stabilise international relations and open up opportunities for the other side to join them or go even farther.

The struggle around the ratification of the IRM-SRM Treaty in the US Senate has proven to be not so much around the treaty itself as around the new trend in Soviet-American relations. Those who are opposed to ratification have in mind also the prospect of signing an agreement on a 50-per cent cut in strategic offensive arms, for the signing may mark a real turn in Soviet-American relations and consolidate the tendency started by the Reykjavik and Washington summits.

To torpedo the ratification of the IRM-SRM Treaty in the Senate is a hard task, considering it is backed up by the country's population and the majority of the Senators. But there is a way emasculating the treaty by adopting various amendments and stipulations, as was the case in 1972, when the Senate passed the Jackson amendment after approving the SALT-1 Treaty. And that was not the only instance. Of the 1,500 treaties signed by the United States since 1789, only 17 have not been ratified. However, 160 treaties have been practically killed by amendments.

One should not forget either that to the right-wingers the issue of ratification is whether or not they survive as a real political force. Not in today's America, but in the America of the post-Reagan period. Because successful ratification of the treaty will show to a large extent who is winning the struggle for the voters that brought the Republicans to power in 1980—either pragmatic conservatives (identified with George

Bush and Robert Dole) or the extreme right (identified with Jack Kemp, Pat Robertson). It will also confirm or disprove the fact that the political sentiments in the country have swung away from the right to the traditional centre. In this situation it is not ruled out that the ultra-right, sensing the defeat, will stage provocations against the USSR.

That is why it is more important than ever to go on pursuing a flexible and realistic policy, resist provocations and sustain the dynamic of the Geneva talks. It is important to keep the arms reduction process going at a stable pace. To waste time is inadmissible.

If we look back at the history of Soviet-American relations, we shall notice definite cycles in it. The ups and downs lasted roughly 13 to 15 years in definite succession. From 1933 to the mid-1940s the relations between the two countries were developing from calm neutrality to military alliance. That was followed by the cold war which continued until the late 1950s. The time of detente from the early 1960s to the mid-1970s was followed by a period of confrontation which, judging by the length of the preceding cycles, is coming to an end. Following this logic, there comes a period of better relations between our countries, which is expected to last until the start of the next millennium.

However, there appear opportunities, which never existed before, to break these cycles and make Soviet-American relations stable, free from long periods of sharp decline. These new opportunities have been provided by the awareness that the unjustified arms race, if it goes on, may erupt in a fatal nuclear catastrophe and that the values and interests of all mankind should prevail over state and class interests, and by new political thinking. But now it is important not only to think but also to act in a new way.

¹ *Commentary*, November 1985, p. 98.

² *Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress*, Moscow, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1986, p. 15.

³ See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1960, p. 236.

A REBELLIOUS CHURCH

(Continued from page 80)

¹ Quoted from И. Р. Григулевич, *Крест и меч*, Moscow, Nauka Publishers, 1977, pp. 36, 44.

² *Fidel y la religión. Conversaciones con Frei Betto*, Havana, 1985, p. 326.

³ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 2, International Publishers, New York, Moscow, 1976, p. 361.

⁴ See Gustavo Gutiérrez, *La verdad los hará libres. Confrontaciones*, Lima, 1980, pp. 20, 54, 208, 221 and 247.

⁵ Quoted from Carlos Fazio, *La cruz y el martillo*, Mexico City, 1987, pp. 13, 43 and 99.

⁶ Graham Greene, *The Honorary Consul*, Penguin, 1980, p. 220.

⁷ *Le Monde*, Aug. 8, 1985.

⁸ *El País*, Apr. 3, 1987.

⁹ Frei Leonardo Boff, *Roma locuta. Documentos sobre o livro Ygreja: carisma e poder*, Petrópolis, 1984, pp. 40, 183.

¹⁰ *Panorama*, Oct. 25, 1987.

¹¹ *Le Monde diplomatique*, May 1987, pp. 14-15.

A NEW SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

Vsevolod SEMYONOV,

The statement by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has created a new reality in the Afghan situation. It opened up an opportunity to sharply reverse the course of events and steer developments towards a settlement. This is a reliable, and moreover, unique chance. Striving to facilitate the speedy and successful conclusion of the Afghan-Pakistani talks in Geneva, the Soviet Union and the Republic of Afghanistan have agreed to set an exact date for the beginning of the Soviet troops' pullout from the country, May 15 of this year, and complete the withdrawal within ten months if the relevant agreements are signed not later than March 15 and enter into force in two months. It is planned that at the initial stage a major part of the Soviet military contingent is to be withdrawn.

A similar position was taken by President of Afghanistan Mohammad Najibullah.

The decision taken by the Soviet leadership is a practical implementation of the policy elaborated by the 27th CPSU Congress which put on the agenda a Soviet pullout from Afghanistan.

The Afghans have been known for centuries as a freedom-loving and brave nation. They are capable of independently dealing with all the problems involved in the national reconciliation process and setting up a coalition government. As before, our concern is to help the people of Afghanistan secure reliable guarantees against any outside interference. If the people of this nation opt for non-alignment and neutrality, the Soviet Union will be only too glad to have such neighbour. It remains true to Lenin's traditions of friendly relations with Afghanistan.

The pullout of Soviet troops is not linked in any way to an eventual establishment of a coalition government in the country, i. e., to the completion of the national reconciliation process. Agreements on Afghanistan can be signed in the nearest future unless there are some states, political forces or politicians who would frustrate a settlement, which would be a criminal act aimed against the people of Afghanistan and other nations.

The search for a political settlement of the Afghan problem is a difficult and delicate undertaking requiring political courage, realism and an assessment of the events, both inside Afghanistan and elsewhere, since April 1978 when a national democratic revolution took place in the country till the present day.

The new political situation in Afghanistan is a hopeful one. The decade since the April Revolution was marked by events ranging from successes and hopes to defeats and frustrations. While the contradictory nature of social progress is not a phenomenon unfamiliar to any develop-

ing nation, in Afghanistan, which has embarked on the road of radical revolutionary reforms, its difficulties were exacerbated by the attempts of internal and external counter-revolutionary forces resorting to violence, including armed interference, to frustrate progressive changes.

Over the past decade the Afghan leadership and the society at large have accumulated vast experience in practical activities. The national reconciliation programme provided for a discontinuation of military operations since January 15, 1987. The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) declared its willingness to renounce its monopoly of state power by offering the opposition a substantial share of posts in the government. This was a very courageous and brave move providing not only for the discontinuation of military clashes but advancing an offer to set up a coalition government and share power with the opposition including those who are waging the armed struggle against the government and even those who, being abroad, are guiding the actions of the rebels and supply them with arms and military equipment received from other states. And this was proposed by the government enjoying constitutional rights and possessing real power in the country.

The 2nd Party Conference held in the autumn of 1987 made an appeal to expedite national reconciliation by taking practical steps to form a democratic bloc and establish a mechanism for the PDPA's cooperation with other parties, to create a coalition government and local bodies of power, to offer posts in the government and local bodies to opposition members, to strictly observe the ceasefire, to assist the most expedient return of refugees to their homeland, to adopt an Afghan constitution, to elect the President of the Republic, to hold elections to the National Assembly (Parliament).

Some changes have also been made in the party Programme, the Programme of the PDPA Actions in which the April Revolution is defined as a national democratic revolution ensuring the country's progress through wide-scale democratic transformations. President Najibullah stressed in his report: "Our revolution is not a proletarian or socialist revolution and, whatever our opponents say, our party is not a communist party."

The conference welcomed the intention of the patriotically-minded clergy to set up an Islam Party and the idea of establishing a Peasants' Party uniting all farmers. A party advocating the interests of the patriotic national bourgeoisie could also have a worthy place in this arrangement. A union or a bloc of various political forces can operate within the framework of the National Front.

On behalf of the PDPA, the government and all genuine Afghan patriots, the conference reiterated the appeal to the opposition to settle the existing contradictions through peaceful means. It extended a proposal to the Pakistan-based Alliance of the Seven comprising armed opposition groups to display a constructive approach to national reconciliation and through mutual compromise to put an end to the fratricidal war. Commanders of the armed detachments of the opposition inside the country and commanders of the second-echelon groups operating from abroad were invited to join the coalition bodies of state power and administrative organs while retaining a certain degree of autonomy in the regions of Afghanistan under their control.

Over one year of national reconciliation people's power has been peacefully established in thousands of villages. The government controls all provincial and district centres, all 45 towns, more than a half of all villages and *kishlaks* in the country. Although it seems that there is no state power in a traditional sense in a substantial part of the outlying

regions, a large number of villages is still controlled by the most extreme elements of the counter-revolutionary forces.

More than 110,000 Afghans who had earlier left the country for various reasons have returned to their native land. However, hundreds of thousands of Afghans still remain in Pakistan and Iran.

Military units comprising tens of thousands of people have stopped the armed struggle and signed protocols with the government on the accession to the principles of national reconciliation. Many Afghans once again enjoy peace.

The policy of national reconciliation is an active policy influencing all aspects of the country's socio-economic and political life, its economy and culture. The nation is setting up a new pattern of state administration in accordance with its Constitution. More attention is paid to the problems of the private sector and the artisans. National congresses of public organisations have been held including those of cultural workers, businessmen and craftsmen, cotton-growers, and laws have been passed to promote their activities.

The late November of 1987 witnessed the convocation of *Loya Jirgah*, the supreme assembly of representatives of all nationalities and tribes, classes and population groups, political, state and public organisations of Afghanistan. The assembly adopted a Constitution of the country which is an instrument of national reconciliation.

More than two million people participated in four-month debates on the Constitution. The basic law of the country establishes a new political system of Afghan society, which better accords with the social structure of the society and the tasks of its development, as well as the tasks involved in the establishment and consolidation of national peace. Article 1 of the Constitution states that the Republic of Afghanistan is an independent, integral and indivisible state whose national sovereignty covers the whole territory of the country. National sovereignty belongs to the people who exercise it through *Loya Jirgah*, the National Council and the local councils.

The new political system allows for political pluralism. A bloc of left-wing, democratic parties has been created comprising the PDPA, the Revolutionary Organisation of the Working People of Afghanistan (ROWPA), and the Organisation of the Working People of Afghanistan (OWPA). Nearly a thousand people belonging to other left-wing, democratic organisations addressed a joint appeal to the 19th Plenary Meeting of the PDPA Central Committee and have been admitted to the PDPA. Its membership is now about 200,000. Protocols on cooperation have been signed by the PDPA, the ROWPA and the OWPA.

The principle of coalition government stems from the multi-party system. It implies that none of the existing parties, including the PDPA or any other parties which could be formed in the future, can monopolise power. The Constitution says that "at the present stage the PDPA is the initiator and organiser of the national reconciliation policy and actively implements it in collaboration with other political and national democratic forces". The new political system resting on the principle of national reconciliation, and the existence of many parties and a coalition government creates new, more difficult conditions for the PDPA.

In his report to the 2nd Party Conference Mohaminad Najibullah said the following: "The PDPA should ensure in real deeds, not in words spoken from the rostrum, the cohesion and the solid unity and efficiency of its ranks. It takes courage to frankly say that if today the PDPA fails to achieve this it will lose its guiding role in society and will be excluded from the political system. That is why the time has come to resolutely end factionalism and clannishness which have been sapping the cohesion of the party and undermining its discipline." The future of the PDPA

depends entirely on how promptly the party can amend the nature of its activities and assume full responsibility for the destiny of the country.

Today other parties united by the common policy of national reconciliation and upholding the principles of a sovereign, integral, neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan are able to, and do participate in the work of the central and local bodies of state power. The PDPA offered 28 posts in the government to the opposition including the posts of Vice-President and Deputy Prime Minister and expressed readiness to consider the post of Prime Minister. Already a number of government posts are held by not PDPA members.

Many opposition members have been elected to local government and administrative bodies.

Thus, it would be wrong to turn a blind eye to the realities which have taken shape in Afghanistan not only when Soviet troops moved into the country but also after the April Revolution of 1978. Afghanistan now has its own government structure and the power enabling it to maintain order in the country. Many districts, provinces and *kishlaks* have law-enforcement bodies and a more or less efficient commercial network and operating enterprises.

It is difficult to predict what the armed opposition is up to. But quite unpredictable consequence will occur if it prefers to engage in committing reckless deeds and cast aside the fact that there exists in Afghanistan the people's army and power, that the people are tired of war and that the world community is prepared to tackle the Afghan problem.

The policy of national reconciliation is an expression of a new political thinking displayed by Afghanistan. Instead of showing weaknesses it reflects the spirit, wisdom and dignity of free, honest and responsible political leaders concerned over the present and the future of their country.

Of course, the development of the new situation emerging in Afghanistan will be facilitated by its international positions which have recently been substantially consolidated. The concept of national reconciliation benefited the foreign policy of the country. This policy is becoming more dynamic and constructive. The Afghan government consistently pursues the policy of peaceful coexistence and the development of bilateral relations with friendly states. It actively participates in the UN activities and the non-aligned movement and strictly abides by the principles of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The government spares no efforts to put an end to the undeclared war and foreign interference as soon as possible. It regards as its top-priority goal the normalisation of the situation in the region and the consolidation of peace and universal security which corresponds to the vital interests of the people of Afghanistan.

Presently the Republic of Afghanistan maintains diplomatic relations with more than eighty countries. After the revolution the main goal of its foreign policy was to develop and consolidate friendship and all-round cooperation with the USSR and other socialist countries.

Now Afghanistan pursues a more dynamic policy towards the developing countries and in the non-aligned movement and is a member of the latter's Coordinating Bureau.

Last year Afghan officials visited 54 Asian, African and Latin American countries to explain the policy of national reconciliation and the position of the Afghan leadership on a political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan. They held talks on establishing diplomatic relations and an exchange of embassies. In 1987 the Republic of Afghanistan established diplomatic relations with Cyprus and Zimbabwe and opened

its embassy in Austria. Agreement has been reached on setting up embassies in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Nicaragua. There have been some positive changes in Kabul's relations with international organisations.

The Republic of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union continued to develop and deepen their relations in various fields spreading them to new spheres of life of the two neighbouring countries.

Afghanistan is following a difficult path. The years since the April Revolution have given a lot to the country. However, new efforts are needed to ensure that the national reconciliation policy leads to peace in Afghanistan. The conflict has been raging for many years with the result of the mass suffering and numerous victims of the military hostilities. This confirms the fact that nowadays an armed conflict of any kind can poison the situation in adjacent and more remote countries, to say nothing of the suffering and victims of the people in that country.

The statement made by Mikhail Gorbachev on February 8, 1988 offers hope that an Afghan settlement will mean the first eliminated seat of conflict among many others taking place in Asia, the south of Africa and Latin America. It may stimulate a settlement of other conflicts. The Soviet Union will spare no efforts to attain this goal. However, it is very important that other states in the East and the West make their contribution too. This particularly applies to the countries of the region, Pakistan, India and Iran, encouraging them to search for and find ways of overcoming disagreements and reach reconciliation.

Meanwhile, the Pakistani ruling quarters are inclined to make the signing of Geneva accords dependent on the establishment of a coalition government in Afghanistan. But is there any need to link the signing of the practically drafted Geneva accords with the complex and obviously slow process of setting up such a government? The answer to this question is clear: there is no such need. This is a matter for the Afghans themselves to deal with. Pakistan does not have the right to establish a government in a neighbouring country. And this government will be created not in Islamabad, not in Washington, and not in Moscow, but in Afghanistan by the Afghans themselves who belong to the most diverse political currents, parties and groups. The establishment of a government has nothing to do with the Geneva accords, for these agreements involve the regulation of the external factors of the Afghan situation such as the discontinuation of outside interference, including armed interference, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops, while the establishment of a government is an internal Afghan matter. Opposition groups which are on the territory of Afghanistan or Pakistan have failed to declare their readiness to begin negotiations on the creation of a coalition government. It is they, the opposition leaders, to whom the Pakistani leaders should address their appeal to establish a coalition government as soon as possible. As for Kabul, the government of the Republic of Afghanistan is prepared today to engage in this business.

DO WE KNOW JAPAN?

Marko SEMOV

What kind of country is Japan? Just what is its economic miracle? I asked myself these questions both before I left for that country and after returning. I still wonder as I leaf through my travel notes. Talking on Japanese soil with diplomats who knew the country, I asked each of them what this miracle was. But the answer I got from those experienced people, who had spent a long time in Japan and seen a lot, was invariably as hazy as the Japanese skies before a typhoon.

"How shall I put it? In short, it's Japan."

My answer is not going to be much clearer. There are still questions which refuse to fit in with well-familiar notions.

Even so, I believe I can venture some comments based on personal observations.

What strikes you about the Japanese is their amazingly unshakable sense of belonging to, of being part of the nation. They never show it off, it is wrapped in diligence, amiability, a constant keenness about what is going on in the world. Capitalism uses all that to bring in profits by making such qualities a powerful productive force.

Every Japanese citizen is a component of a whole which is needed for the collective body to function with the greatest efficiency. Behind this simple fact are concepts we cannot understand—of good and evil, of things reasonable or unreasonable. Asia is largely beyond the grasp of the European's mentality. We must reckon with and resign ourselves to it no matter how knowledgeable we should like to appear.

Japan's destiny has always been hard work and modesty, modesty and hard work. The most difficult thing is to notice an individual. The individual in that country is a statistical unit, a broiler hatched in the vast incubator of electronics and computers, of discipline and order. My Tokyo friend may be said not to count as an individual but the team he belongs to and the interests of the firm employing him and, through it, the interests of the state are all that matters. The system has been so conceived that what is valued is not the success of the individual but the strength and cohesion of the collective body, of a firm as a whole.

Japan revealed this to me during my meetings with Kane, an engineer at a major plant. He had worked at Renault's and Citroën's plants in France and knew the whole of Europe. My questions did not take him unawares, for they were like those asked by most foreigners. I will try to reproduce my conversations with him as closely as possible, consult-

The author, Deputy Chairman of the Bulgarian Committee of Radio and Television, is a well-known publicist. We think this story about his trip to Japan, written by him for *International Affairs*, offers an interesting insight into the Japanese economic mechanism, which is functioning so effectively.

ing my notes, for there is much that must seem unusual to the European.

"Mr. Kane, why are you Japanese always in high spirits?"

"We are like this from childhood. It's the very first thing we are taught: loving flowers, beauty, staying cheerful. If you're in a bad mood you mustn't show it. You can't blame it on an outsider, so why distress him?"

Kane was wearing the firm's uniform, as was everybody in the shop.

"Even the President of our firm wears this uniform, you can only tell him from others by his insignia."

"Does every firm have its uniform?"

"I think major firms do."

"Are all workers in this shop equally efficient?"

"Hardly." Kane smiled. "But what difference does that make?"

"What difference? Are they all equally useful to the firm? I mean those who can make useful suggestions and those who can't."

"The important thing is what we can give the firm as a team and not individually. This is what sets us apart from the Europeans. Big firms, such as Honda, pick prospective engineers among students. Our firm has an agreement with the Tokyo Institute of Technology. Professors single out the brightest students and recommend them to us. And we begin watching them. We pay grants to some students in their senior courses. I used to receive a grant like that. On graduating I was given a job for a trial period."

"When we get a job we're tested in different conditions. We go through various production sectors. Specialists watch us work. It's they who bring out qualities that didn't come out while we were students. The main thing is to ascertain both the knowledge gained by studying (we acquire further knowledge in periods of specialisation) and the knowledge we get by origin."

"How is that done?"

"Let us say you're assigned to the samples department to help customers. Your superiors watch you to see how you go about it, how you interact with people. After that you're transferred to, say, the finished products shop. There they test your proficiency, your sense of organisation. In each area you earn points. Subsequently you work as a hall porter and are tested for your ability to serve a customer, to answer his questions clearly and courteously. Later on you're assigned to work as a salesman because you might prove to be very good at persuading customers that our Honda is better than other firms. In the end the presidential council decides on the kind of job you can be particularly good at because you have the greatest aptitude for it both professionally and psychologically."

"Being given a job doesn't mean much, however, because you only begin to train on the job and go on training until you retire. There are many forms of training. Let us say it's planned to manufacture a new product. Workers, engineers and other specialists get acquainted with details beforehand, step by step. The result is that when production starts no time is wasted on studying it. Workers don't oppose the new, not even covertly. They are familiar with it and welcome it."

"Training is continuous in our firm. Every young worker or specialist has an instructor. Every foreman who has turned forty may train an apprentice. He watches his charge work, helps him at it and even keeps tabs on his private life. He takes his apprentice to a bar, that is, to one corresponding to his station, teaches him to drink moderately and tells him when he must leave. An instructor is the first to say whether his apprentice is in the right place. He knows the young man's state of mind and may be regarded as his 'confessor'. Every young man needs such a preceptor."

Kane continued explaining. I went back in my mind to Bulgaria's factories where, too, there are instructors. I wondered whether our experienced workers could really guide others. It is truly fortunate when you have in your collective people ready to say a kind word, people you can rely on, people you can tell your troubles to as before an altar. The days of church altars are over but people still want to unload their worries once in a while.

"Very well, Mr. Kane. And what do foremen learn to do since they can do everything?"

"That's question foreigners ask very often. You see, ours is a country of traditions that we use wherever we can. Japan was under samurai rule for 300 years. The samurai were skilled in two things. They knew how to use a sabre and were fine calligraphers. To do these things well, you have to practise all your life. Skills are quick to disappear. It was not for nothing that in the past great artists spent hours copying works of art. When work is changed forms and methods of instruction and necessary training must be changed also. A young engineer must take all courses of instruction, whether in engineering, book-keeping or trade. This adds to his knowledge and widens his horizons, coupled with self-training and the precepts of his instructor. On becoming an executive, he joins in a different form of study, mostly in the nature of debates, at least twice a week (after work)."

Listening to Kane, I felt that system of training and guardianship overhangs me so to speak. A Japanese is like a caged animal. He takes every swish of the trainer's whip as a signal of danger that threatens him unless he moves faster, unless he shows still greater submission and application than before. And he gives the whip a happy smile, thanking it devotedly for safeguarding him against disaster.

"At every stage," Mr. Kane said, "there's one quality that is welcomed most of all. You Europeans may find it hard to understand. The greatest number of points don't go to the one who does his job best or fastest but to those who best get along with fellow-workers and help create a favourable atmosphere in the collective. To be sure, talent and skill help earn points. But a negative atmosphere, an atmosphere of conflict, earns an employee a greater number of minus points. In the end the points are summed up, and he gets nothing."

"But what if, say, a worker, book-keeper or engineer doesn't get involved in any conflicts, is unquestionably able or even gifted and has made a useful proposal? What happens to his points?"

"Useful proposals are rewarded with a bonus. We have a great stake in rationalisation proposals. Nevertheless, good points are much more valuable because they enable their winner to advance sooner, they make him eligible for promotion and so hold the promise of higher pay. This takes place with everyone's consent, and in everyone's presence. If things go well pay is doubled in time."

"Who decides whether you, for one, shall become head of a section?"

"Our certification system is intricate. You've seen that all designers work in one hall. We are divided into sections, and each section has its internal hierarchy. Every day my work is seen by my colleagues. Before going out, we leave our cards. Even now my card is in a computer. (It was there, all right, and red magnetic lines were signalling that Kane was not working at the moment.) All those who aren't at their work places turn their cards red side up. Green indicates that the owner of the card is at his place. Before going out to get a cup of coffee or for some other reason, you must turn in your card. This is taken into account in computing your work time. Cards are the basis on which your work is assessed according to mood, zeal, imagination, application, discipline, respect for others. It goes on like this day after day. We write

our opinion even of supervisors, using the same indicators. Points are summed up every month. If you are found lagging behind you're reprimanded. Occasionally a deduction is made from your pay. If you stop getting the necessary minimum, your promotion is held up. If you stay below the minimum, you're demoted. That's even worse. After two demotions you're assigned a low-paid job. The only thing that can be worse than that is dismissal."

"Is that the end?"

"It's the beginning of the end. If you're thrown out of a big firm like ours; you will still have a chance of getting a job with a firm of minor importance. But you'll lose in position and pay as a result and will never regain what you had. After you've forfeited your main privilege you can only move downwards."

"I think that's ruthless, Mr. Kane."

"It's the only fair way out for us."

"What if your boss doesn't like you and gives you bad points every day?"

"That's out of the question."

"Why? Wouldn't that be humanly understandable?"

"It's impossible." Kane didn't even smile. My question struck him as too unusual. "Every one of us has his performance evaluated by all fellow-employees. When the boss's opinion is very different from that of the others it means he's incompetent. It means he has no right to evaluate others' work and earns him bad points. He has no stake in being biased. That sort of thing holds up his advancee. It slows down his promotion and ultimately tells on his income. No, that's really out of the question. It wouldn't occur to anybody."

"And who evaluates your boss's performance?" I asked, refusing to relent.

"It's done by his subordinates as well as by the heads of other sections, his superiors."

"How far does that go?"

"It goes all the way to the president of the firm. His work is assessed by the same system, and he runs the same risk. The only exception is the founder of the firm and his successors."

Kane said that very seriously.

"Suppose you're a very, very able man—"

I paused. But Kane was not flattered. Words like "amazingly" or "very" do not mean much if applied to the individual employee and not to the whole firm. He waited for me to finish.

"Suppose you are very gifted and I'm president of a competing firm and need a chief engineer like you..."

Kane nodded.

"What if I asked you to quit the firm employing you as an ordinary engineer like hundreds of others and take a chief engineer's job with me?"

"You would never do that."

"Why not? Wouldn't I be interested?"

"No, you wouldn't." He said it gently yet emphatically.

"I can't understand. Who wouldn't be interested in employing an able man as a chief engineer? And who wouldn't want to become chief engineer?"

"Let us presume that you insisted on my accepting your offer. But at the same time you would have several engineers in your firm whom length of service and efficiency made eligible for the position of chief engineer. And yet you would want to take on a new man who had skipped a rung or two of the ladder. We never do such a thing. You would earn a bad name as a manager scornning tradition and the decades-long service of people working with you. In the end it would discredit you in

everybody's eyes. You could lose everything and probably would lose all you had achieved. We never forgive things like that.

"Nobody in this country quits the firm employing him. To do so would be a sign of bad taste and poor education. It would be neither forgiven by the firm you quit nor appreciated by the firm you sought employment with. After all, he who quits once may do it again. And then, it's an unwritten rule with us that a person who has quit a firm of his own accord can't hold the same position in another firm, let alone a higher position. More often than not, a person like that loses all the privileges and points he has accumulated and finds himself stranded. And that's far from immaterial. One such precedent could destroy the atmosphere in the firm and hence the results achieved, diligence and confidence. That would spread to every echelon.

"Are you ever late for work, Mr. Kane?"

He gave me a puzzled look.

"I mean, when there's a traffic jam or something? What happens if you're late?"

"We have a sliding schedule. I may be one hour late. Why, there are those cards to register it. But later in the day I must put in the hour I missed at the beginning. And because I was late I must do more than usual. Of course, I would get paid for the extra hour I had put in but at a lower rate. That's why it doesn't pay to be late."

"What about those working on an assembly line? Take a worker who the night before had drunk too much? I can see that you Japanese are different from members of our teetotallers' society. Would he be fired?"

"Not right away. He would first get minus points. If he did it again the minus points would be doubled because he had been late for a second time. In that way the points would add up to a definite number and he would be transferred to a low-paying job. And then it would be almost impossible to come back."

"What happens when an employee falls ill?"

"His duties are taken over by a member of the management. You'll recall that everybody in our firm goes through all stages from porter to manager."

"And if there were an outbreak of flu? Would you stop the assembly line?"

"No, because the whole management would take over if necessary."

"What if the whole management fell ill?"

"The engineers would step in."

"And if there were too few of them?"

"The presidential council would take over."

"What if even that weren't enough?"

"If every single employee, including the president, joined in work at the assembly line but still it weren't enough the line would have to be stopped."

"May I invite you to a glass of saké tonight?"

Kane smiled. No, tonight was out of the question. He had yet to make up for the time he had spent talking with me.

That meant I had robbed him of an evening. Well, maybe he would accept my invitation the following day.

The next morning he would get up earlier than usual. He would cut his lunch break short, fulfil his quota and come at 7:30 sharp in the evening unless his chief was delayed until after seven. Should his chief be delayed, Kane would ring me up to tell me he would be late.

SDI Erodes Strategic Stability*

Robert ENGLISH

To president Reagan, the strategic defense initiative is a purely defensive program—a “peace shield”. So why does the Soviet Union consistently talk about “space-strike weapons”, emphasizing the potential offensive uses of SDI?

The Soviets may be right. The technologies now being researched in American laboratories promise an astonishing new generation of weapons—offensive and defensive—whose impact we can hardly predict. If deployed in space, they could destabilize the strategic balance. These weapons will differ from earlier generation chiefly through a quantum leap in speed, range, and accuracy. They will resemble earlier generations, however, in that the chief distinction between an offensive and defensive weapon will remain who's got it, and where it's pointed.

The offensive potential of Star Wars technology became clear to members of the Reagan administration last year [1986 — *Ed.*], when they tried to draft statements that would reassure the Soviets that the intent of SDI was purely defensive. One administration official involved in the drafting says he learned about a highly-classified Pentagon program “that would allow us to attack Soviet missile silos from space, using exotic technologies”.

Predicting the potential uses of weapons that only exist at this point on the drawing board is obviously risky. There is considerable scientific debate whether these exotic systems will even work in their intended defensive role. Nonetheless, consider some of the possible offensive uses of SDI technology:

The free-electron laser. Now the hottest of SDI's directed-energy programs, the ground-based free-electron laser is supposed to shine a powerful beam up through the atmosphere, which will be reflected by orbiting mirrors to disable a Soviet missile in its early, boost phase. Studies show that a laser powerful enough to stop a missile could also start a conflagration on the ground. This suggests that lasers might also attack aircraft

* The political and scientific communities and the public in the United States are heatedly debating the issue of the Reagan administration's Strategic Defense Initiative. The tremendous risks inherent in the Star Wars programme are very well understood by many people. SDI advocates are attempting to divert attention from the dangerously adventurous nature of that programme by claiming that the Soviet Union is allegedly also immersed in SDI or SDI-related research.

In his NBC interview, Mikhail Gorbachev said the following on that score, “Well, it's really hard to say what the Soviet Union is not doing; the Soviet Union is practically doing everything that the United States is doing. I'd say we are engaged in research, basic research, which relates to these aspects which are covered by SDI in the United States. But we will not build an SDI, we will not deploy SDI, and we call on the United States to act similarly. If the Americans fail to heed this call, we will find a response that will be ten or a hundred times cheaper, but then the guilt, the blame will be with the Americans, with the US administration.”

This is an article by US expert Roberts English, which he submitted to *International Affairs*. Robert English is a senior analyst with the Washington-based Committee for National Security and has been with the US Defense Department for several years. The article is interesting for its ingenious analysis of how the SDI programme is able to destabilise the strategic situation and hinder the lessening of military confrontation.

in flight, or disable "soft" ground-based targets such as radars, communications nodes, power grids, and so on.

To overcome atmospheric interference, lasers will employ techniques such as "adaptive optics", variable wavelengths, and a precisely-pulsed beam. As a beam is directed earthward it undergoes far less "angular disturbance" since the densest part of the atmosphere is closest to the earth's surface. While the presence of thick clouds would impede a laser strike, an attacker has the luxury of waiting until conditions are ideal (the defender does not).

The space-based kinetic kill vehicle. Under SDI, a fleet of satellites could be deployed, each bearing a number of chemically-propelled rockets. These would use sophisticated guidance to home in on Soviet missiles and warheads, destroying them by force of impact. It does not take an engineer to see that, with specially-designed re-entry vehicles, this concept could be adapted to strike targets in atmospheric flight or on the earth's surface.

Fears that the Soviets were developing a nuclear "orbital bombardment system" in the mid-1960s quickly passed when the technical and political obstacles were fully understood. However a 1976 report of the US Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences cautioned that in evaluating an "orbital bomb system, one must recognize that technology is not stationary, and what may be the right answer today on technological feasibility may be different tomorrow."

Tomorrow is almost here, and the picture is indeed different. Advances in missile guidance, including radar and infrared terminal (homing) systems, raise the no-too-distant prospect of near-perfect accuracy. And modern shaped-charge explosives or hypervelocity "kinetic energy" penetrators should make it possible to destroy even hardened targets, possibly including silos, with non-nuclear warheads.

The X-ray laser. This exotic weapon will focus some of the tremendous radiation generated by a nuclear blast in space into a coherent beam. Although SDI officials say it is designed to disable a missile early in flight, they have conceded that the X-ray laser would make a "gangbuster" anti-satellite weapon.

It is well-known that X-rays cannot penetrate the atmosphere. What is less well known are the "secondary effects" that will occur when the beam of X-rays collides with air molecules in the upper atmosphere. Through a process known as "Compton scattering", these collisions will knock loose enough electrons to create a brief but powerful current that follows the "cone" of the original laser beam. Simultaneously, this surge of electrons, like any current, will generate a strong electromagnetic field. According to physicist Ted Taylor, a former top weapons designer with Los Alamos National Laboratory, either of these phenomena have the potential to wreak havoc with high-flying aircraft, if not terrestrial targets.

Other nuclear-pumped directed-energy weapons. Beyond the very short wavelengths of an X-ray laser, nuclear-pumped directed-energy systems could produce weapons which operate at much lower frequencies, offering an entirely different set of offensive possibilities. Radio and microwave frequencies, for example, have no trouble penetrating the atmosphere. Depending on their power level, such "radio frequency" weapons directed at radar and radio antennae could burn out or jam important sensors and communications equipment.

Even more fantastic might be the use of long-wavelength directed-energy weapons to exploit a phenomenon known as the hazardous effect of radiation on ordnance—the so-called "HERO" effect. Many accidental deaths have been caused by the handling or storage of munitions in the vicinity of powerful radio transmissions. At the proper frequency, electro-

magnetic radiation can create an unintended current in the detonators of various conventional explosives, with disastrous results.

The aerospace plane. Although technically not part of the SDI program, this system certainly holds promise as another space-age weapon. The aerospace plane, or trans-atmospheric vehicle, will take off and land on ordinary runways, travelling up to 25 times the speed of sound in low earth orbit. In other words, it will offer the speed of a missile with the flexibility and accuracy of a manned bomber.

If developed, these and other "space-strike weapons" would create a dangerously unstable strategic situation. They might make a first strike appear more feasible to an attacker—and perhaps even necessary. Threatened with split-second attack from space-based weapons, the leaders of either side might decide that they have no choice but to strike first.

In one such scenario, space-based weapons could perform as a precision adjunct to nuclear attack. First, directed-energy weapons would launch multiple, instantaneous attacks upon satellites, airborne command posts, early-warning radars, power grids, communications networks, and other critical "command and control" targets. Then, with the victim effectively blinded and at least partially paralysed, missiles, kinetic energy weapons, and even aerospace bombers would follow with strikes against offensive forces. Everything, from silos and mobile missiles to strategic bombers caught on the ground and missile submarines found in port would be at risk. Hardened command bunkers would also be destroyed. Finally, laser and radio-frequency weapons could cause further damage and impede any efforts towards reconstitution or retaliation.

Of course, the preceding assumes what may be an unrealistically broad panoply of high-performance space weapons. At this point, nobody can really say just how much is feasible. Perhaps more likely is a situation in which each side has some offensive space capabilities, but neither has overwhelming superiority. Even so, the threat of instantaneous space attack will push both to a hair trigger posture. Any crisis could escalate unavoidably.

Clearly the most destabilizing aspect of space-based weaponry is the extraordinary speed with which it could attack. To date, none of the advances in the strategic weapons of the past 20 years have made a first strike credible. No matter how great one's advantage in megatonnage or accuracy, the attacker could never escape devastation so long as the enemy had enough time to launch his missiles in retaliation. All this could change, however, as space weapons shrink a half hour of warning to a matter of seconds.

On the few earlier occasions when they have addressed these concerns, administration officials made two points. At first, the line was that the offensive potential simply did not exist. In the words of one SDI official, these scenarios were so much "hogwash". With a growing body of scientific opinion arguing the opposite, the administration is finally admitting that this was wrong.

A few days after the October 1986 Reykjavik summit, SDI director Lt. Gen. James Abrahamson admitted the potential for space-based offensive weapons. Abrahamson cautioned against the president's notion of sharing SDI technology with the Soviets because it "could be used in weapons against us".

Now the administration argues that even if space weapons do have some offensive potential, it is irrelevant, since our SDI program is only interested in defensive applications. Yet this argument ignores the fact that responsible military planners must judge their adversaries in terms of capability, not intent.

The offensive uses of space are nothing new to American strategists.

As early as the 1950s, Wernher von Braun advocated the construction of nuclear-armed space stations:

Military men continue to plan for a war in space. Gen. Robert Marsh, then-Air Force Systems Commander, testified before Congress in 1982 that "we should move into war-fighting capabilities—that is ground-to-space war fighting capabilities, space-to-space, space-to-ground...."

To be sure, most "Star Warriors" have toned down their rhetoric since the president's 1983 speech cast space weapons in a benign light. But the Soviets know that influential SDI advocates, such as Edward Teller, have long called for exploiting technology to achieve outright military superiority. Even if the Soviets believe the president's promise of peaceful intent, can they be sure that the same promise will bind Reagan's successor?

Beyond words, however, there is also plenty to worry the Soviets in our actions. For example, the Department of Defense has studied the possible use of space-based non-nuclear projectiles against surface targets, according to Dr. Robert Bowman, former director of Advanced Space Programs Development for the Air Force and a critic of SDI. Department of Energy officials have discussed their research into kinetic energy penetrator warheads for hard-target kill. And the Air Force is funding development of a warhead designed to home in on Soviet ground-based radars.

Similarly, the persistent reluctance of the U.S. to join Moscow's efforts at a nuclear test ban can be traced to American research into future nuclear weapons with great potential as offensive space weapons. In the 18 months since the Soviets halted nuclear tests, the U.S. has conducted 24 test blasts. These have included Department of Energy research into "nuclear-driven directed-energy weapons", such as X-ray lasers, optical-wavelength lasers and microwave weapons. Los Alamos National Laboratory is also currently investigating an "electronic kill" nuclear warhead, designed to disable Soviet mobile missiles with an enormous electromagnetic pulse, according to a former official of the Laboratory. The administration's budget request for fiscal 1988 raises spending on "nuclear-driven directed-energy weapons" from \$317 million to \$481 million, an increase of over 50 per cent.

The hardliner's answer, of course, is to ask another question: What about the Russians? Yes, the Soviets are researching most of the same technologies that we are. No, they are not ahead. According to Richard Perle, the Soviets may have "discovered the potential for offensive uses of space". It is clear that he may be trying to pin the blame on the Soviets. Next we may hear about an "offensive space-weapons gap" in favor of the Russians and about the need to mobilize everything to close that gap. There have been such cases in the past.

Reflections of a Labour MP

Anthony Wedgewood BENN,

MP (Labour Party),
GREAT BRITAIN

Capitalism, in order to sustain itself, has always resorted to increasing military expenditures which harnessed the working class into the production of weapons, while other members of the working class were put into uniforms. And those weapons and those armies were used to extend and expand the influence of the capitalist countries that became imperialist or to employ them in conflicts with other countries.

Since the 1940s a new factor has appeared. With nuclear weapons capitalism cannot risk war because it would destroy the home society and the centres of power of capitalists themselves whereas in the old days war killed only the working class.

It should be emphasised that for whatever reason, any country that acquires and retains a big military establishment may find that military influence grows within its society. We have seen many examples when newly independent countries, former colonial territories, who fought a battle for national independence, built up a military establishment to attain freedom and fight off attacks only to be later on used for a military coup. And one can imagine circumstances in any country where a very strong military establishment that was not accountable to the political leaders of that country could under certain circumstances play too powerful a role either in influencing a policy or even in taking over power.

Equally important is the problem of the non-equivalent exchange between developed capitalist states and the Third World countries. It is an historical fact that the first industrial country in the world was Britain who having built up its industry, used it to extend control through a good deal of the world. Its colonies bought British goods and provided cheap raw materials. That was an historical fact and a classic example of imperialism by the old method of stationing troops abroad.

Now we have a new form of imperialism which depends less upon the presence of occupying troops but more upon its overseas bases as is the case with the United States, for example, which has two thousand military bases abroad. The American government supports anti-communist military leaders, gives them weapons officially to fight communism, but actually to hold down their own people, so that the profits of American companies can be protected.

I can imagine circumstances where capitalist systems that had lost their colonial or near-colonial control would be able to trade with other countries without that former exploitation. But, of course, if that happened then the economics of capitalism would be changed, and a capitalism denied the right to exploit abroad or at home would be a capitalism that looked less efficient and, therefore, would probably not be able to compete successfully with any socialist society that had carried

Excerpts from an interview granted by Anthony Wedgewood Benn to Sergei Chichkov, an *International Affairs* correspondent, during the former's visit to Moscow in last November.

through socialist transformations to avoid exploitation and had developed efficient systems of production and distribution.

Would the capitalist system be able to adapt itself to the realities of a nuclear-free and weapons-free world? To my mind this problem is associated with the previously discussed issues. I am sure that no progressive change has been made to my knowledge without a struggle and, therefore, if we are to bring about a nuclear-free and weapons-free world there will have to be struggle not only for human rights but for peace. And this struggle for peace will have to take place inside each country and be international in character because, of course, capitalism is now increasingly an internationalised system.

In 1986 I went to Spain for the referendum on NATO, and I spoke at some meetings against Spanish membership in NATO. And I was criticised by some of the journalists who asked me why I was "interfering" in Spanish internal affairs. Well, of course, every day American businessmen, British generals, French bankers, the Pope can travel everywhere and take care of their affairs, and the big business and the Church, and the military and the bankers are very, very well organised internationally. Labour is not. So, we need a very powerful peace movement to make a nuclear-free world come about.

I also believe that a fair economic order and respect for spiritual values will depend upon a higher degree of equality, economic equality, than capitalism can easily accept because capitalism depends upon inequality in order to provide, first, the incentive for people to compete and work harder. And then it depends upon a rich class who is able to control the whole economy and develop it in a way that maximises their profits. And if by human struggle, a struggle for peace or justice, or spiritual values, these inequalities are removed, it is like taking an old clock and removing the clockwork, the machine, the mechanism by which the system has previously worked. So, it no longer works, and we shall have to see how things will develop.

The only thing I would say is that we must never assume that were we to transform capitalism by a common ownership and socialism that all these problems would disappear because there is an old saying of a British professor of the 19th century: "All power corrupts or tends to corrupt. Absolute power tends to corrupt absolutely."

It is clear from the discussions in the Soviet Union that recently there have been breaches of socialist legality over the years here which reflected the corruption of power even though that power did not rest upon capitalist ownership but upon bureaucratic control.

I think that all systems rest upon several layers. The top layer are leaders. Now they are usually quite unimportant: you could replace most of them except for some very exceptional ones, but in general leaders are disposable. Below that there are policies of the state that are important because they relate to the needs of people, but these policies may change with circumstances. And the level of policies, the level of the institutions: are they democratic or not? That is a much more important question, but the whole of society like a building rests on the bedrock of moral values. Is this a society, you'll have to ask yourself of any society, based on the idea that men and women are brothers and sisters living in one world, or is it just a jungle which we shall call a market economy, or capitalism? And if it is a jungle, then those values will reflect themselves to the top. If it is a society based upon human respect for spiritual values then, of course, those values will reflect themselves through the institutions, through the policies, through the people. So, one has to be careful not to confine the questioning just to one side.

What can be done to make Soviet-British relations friendly? I have

the most warm feelings towards Russia, as the Soviet people have towards the British. I visited the Soviet Union several times, while my father was here in 1926. And my brother was a Soviet expert and so on.

When I was a young man in 1941, when I was sixteen, it was the Soviet people who resisted Hitler, and with a loss of millions of people they really bought with their blood the liberty that I enjoy. So, I have a very strong feeling. I say this at many meetings and people, particularly younger people, understand it. And I understand younger people who don't want to see a war and destruction of their life; they want peace. Maybe the problem is more of a middle area of age, of people who perhaps lost some of their ideals. But what I think is happening now is that we are developing a new mentality, a new phenomenon which is a "do-it-yourself foreign policy", that is to say, you cannot wait for the Foreign Secretary to see Mrs. Thatcher, to have a word with Reagan, to explain to Gorbachev what we want. People want and have to do it themselves.

For instance, in improving British-Soviet relations, apart from the British-Soviet society, trade union delegations and touring groups have their role to play. Once we had in my town a delegation from the Crimea. They brought with them a very famous Soviet singer Sofia Rotaru, and they came with some musicians who performed. And that was a tremendous success.

In Chesterfield, which I represent in the British Parliament, we have set up an international committee of our own. We have not waited for the Labour Party to do it. In 1985 we decided to hold a summit meeting in this little town of one hundred thousand people. And people laughed: how would you have a summit in a little town? We asked the Soviet Embassy to send a senior diplomat, and they sent a senior official from the Soviet Embassy. Many people turned up in this little town, an almost 100 per cent turn-up. Incidentally, such audiences are a rare thing in little towns in Britain. It was a week after the Libyan bombings. And questions were asked about Afghanistan, Grenada, the Libyan bombings, Star Wars, the Berlin Wall and so on. The effect of this was to create a feeling that foreign policy and friendship belong to us, not to the politicians, but to us.

Here is another example, the General Secretary who is a caretaker in a local trade union office, came to Moscow in 1986. We gave him a letter to Mr. Gorbachev, and people laughed and said: how can this man representing a few hundred socialists see him? So, we said: this is our General Secretary and Gorbachev is the Soviet General Secretary, so it's obvious he'll take a letter. When he arrived, he was treated with great courtesy by the Moscow peace committee, and he came back with photographs, and so on. Then we had a big socialist conference in Chesterfield not long ago, and we had three Soviet delegates.

So, in effect, I would say that if we are going to do anything in the world—human rights, security, friendship—we have to do it ourselves: you cannot wait for the people at the top to do it. And we have to start on this basis.

This is why I am here. I wrote to the Soviet government with some proposals and Mr. Zamyatin, Soviet Ambassador in London, said to me: "Why can't you come to Moscow?" Now, I have brought with me one particular proposal which, I think, is useful.

It is a proposal that we should sign an Anglo-Soviet treaty of friendship. I'll explain what I have in mind. In order to find the origins of this I went back to the library of the British Parliament and I pulled

TRUTHS THAT TAKE SOME GETTING USED TO

Igor YANIN,

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"Peace forces," "peace champions," and "progressives throughout the world"—many articles on international topics bristle with these cliches. They have become so familiar and common that sometimes people do not take the trouble to think about what lies behind them. And yet, it is far from an idle question.

The more broad a word's meaning, the more interpretations that word allows. This sometimes leads to a distressing gap between the word and its meaning, the rigorous definition and the cliché, a "gift from the past" in other words, a gap between a stereotyped and an objective portrayal of reality. Take an expression like "people of goodwill", an almost baroque-like poetic expression which, when used in political statements obscures the meaning of an exceedingly important social phenomenon, and does nothing to explain it. Any simplistic approach to a complex and multidimensional phenomenon comprising contradictory trends is bound to be misleading.

We are witnessing rapid change. Many notions and premises firmly entrenched in people's minds are changing too. They need to be dialectically reinterpreted if they are not to turn into Bacon's "spectre idea".

The present-day peace movement differs from the anti-war struggle of the 1950s, the 1960s and even the first half of the 1970s. It is being joined by ever new socially significant groups of the population which have their own ideas of what their political tasks are and of relations with their allies. Today the democratic character of the movement manifests itself not only in the nature of the demands and the social composition of its participants, but, also very important, in the fact that people espousing very diverse philosophies, ideological and political views are uniting on a democratic and equal basis to pursue a common goal.

This disparity and ideological mosaic of the social forces which find the idea of war abhorrent, frequently result in a "case of homonymy" when the anti-war movement is taken for something that it is not, and goals are imputed to it from which it is far removed. A vivid example of such a substitution of concepts are attempts to identify "peace-loving public opinion" with a concrete part of the political spectrum nationally or internationally. In this way an artificial attempt is made to compare and contrast notions which exist in different systems of coordinates.

In an attempt to reduce the actions of various contingents of the anti-war movement to a common denominator, people often act contrary to the logic of the task: for example, the thesis "peace-loving public opinion" is matched to an anti-thesis such as "anti-communist forces" or "anti-Soviet circles". Extremes meet, and reverse examples can also be cited. Trotskyist organisations involved in the anti-war movement believe that the main cause of international tension lies in the real, historically established forms of the socialist system. From this they draw the conclusion that a "radical change of the social system in the East is the most promising perspective for the policy of peace".¹

Such juxtapositions deny the new quality of the peace forces, namely, the tendency towards transideological nature. Needless to say, nothing is to be gained if we judge a particular peace organisation using only the ideological criterion (which is in this case undoubtedly of secondary importance) ignoring the very *raison d'être* of the movement, namely its attitude to the issue of war and peace. And yet the ideological factor needs to be taken into account if only to preclude attempts to consolidate the movement on theoretical platforms other than the "ideology of peace" equally acceptable to all the opponents of war whatever their philosophical beliefs.

It may sound paradoxical, but the main condition for the unification of the peace elements "from above" or for their interaction in the struggle against militarism is their dissociation "from below", that is, scrupulous respect for the ideological sovereignty of each contingent in the anti-war movement. The possibility of being involved in joint action is conducive to trust between the partners in the movement, and objectively contributes to their unity.

Likewise, the growing constructive potential of the peace movement is an objective process: some consistent conservatives and anti-communists are prepared, for the sake of a common goal, to cooperate with their ideological adversaries, and to welcome, for example, the Soviet peace initiatives, while the Left which visualises a model of socialism different from the model of existing socialism is prepared to leave aside arguments and engage in dialogue with existing socialism often coming up with joint initiatives. Naturally this practice rules out any attempts at making ideological "converts" among the partners in the movement under the cover of peace rhetoric or "winning" in the propaganda war.

It is only if this condition is observed that the opponents of militarism—an aggregate of parallel, different and not infrequently diametrically opposite political forces—will be stimulated to cooperation with each other in the spirit of new thinking. New thinking is also very necessary for the peace forces in order to get rid of the "enemy image" stereotype, a high priority not only for governments, but for the anti-war movement as well. The "enemy" often has three hypostases—the state, the ideology and the partner in the dialogue who is sometimes seen as "a puppet" in the hands of the first or a "missionary" spreading the "gospel" of the second. The movement, which expresses the common interest of mankind (and herein lies its strength) is called upon by history to lead the way in reappraising all the secondary interests, to offer the world an example of human harmony, a mode of life that rules out intolerance and confrontation. Otherwise, the anti-war movement will be compromised and robbed of its meaning. One can go along with Johannes Pakaslahti, Secretary-General of the World Peace Council, who said: "Much too often people rightly argue that 'we cannot have confidence in your movement since you cannot even live in peace among yourselves'. Instead of divisions we need broader cooperation and dialogue."²

If the anti-war movement is to be effective it must be an autonomous and independent force, that is, not anti-American, nor anti- or pro-Soviet, but a force that addresses itself to all the subjects of international life with the one goal—the readiness to work consistently for security and for universal “positive” peace.

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What part do the Communists in Western countries play in the present-day struggle for peace? Traditionally, we used to say that they play “the leading” role. We thus fell into the above-mentioned trap by making this political phenomenon polysemantic. How does one interpret the words “leading role”? If we interpret them literally, meaning the organising role of the communist parties and the mobilising effect of their actions are we playing a verbal game that is not conducive to a sober view of the state of affairs?

Indeed, the communist movement itself does not need the rhetoric, one of whose results, the thesis about the “hand of Moscow”, has long cloyed the palate. Marxists in Western countries work in very difficult conditions and have to take into account the most diverse factors, such as political traditions, and the history of their countries, the ingrained anti-communist prejudice among people, the pressure of the mass media, and the attempts by the Socialists and Social Democrats to oust Communists from the internal political life, to “push them off the chair” on many questions. This is a fact. It is equally a fact that the peace supporters in the USA and Western Europe do not carry Red flags when they march through the streets to press their demands.

If the Communists have a claim to “leadership” in the struggle for peace it comes from their unchallengeable and unique merit: equipped with the scientific Marxist vision of social and economic processes they are more clearly aware than anyone of what causes international tensions and the arms race, by revealing the political intentions and implications. The mobilising role of the communist parties is thus not direct, but mediated. In disseminating their knowledge of the workings of society, they help to recruit new members in the anti-militarist movement, explain the need for broad international unity of all peace forces, irrespective of their social and class status and their ideological background.

The latter is a particularly challenging task because of tenacious prejudices, stereotyped approaches and assessments afflicting all the participants in the anti-war movement. This poses the Communists with an exceedingly important task—to set a public example of a dialectical approach to all the potential participants in the peace-making dialogue. Needless to say, they have to adjust their own behaviour to the criteria of the peace-making dialogue. Such a dialectical approach will provide a “magic crystal ball” through which it will be possible to see the evolution of many social phenomena and factors, the interconnection of primary and secondary interests, and to turn a former avowed enemy into a fellow worker for peace. Today’s priorities, far from implying a “revision” of the Marxist-Leninist teaching, on the contrary make it imperative to go back to its foundations.

A much-quoted provision in the Manifesto of the Communist Party is that the workers will liberate all mankind by liberating themselves. Frederick Engels did not take long to see the flexible link between these two goals, and he later pointed out the most important of them: that the working class will not be able to liberate itself unless it liberates all society. Thus, the founding fathers of Marxism anticipated and forestalled all possible accusations of “class narrowness” and stressed the universal character of their philosophy. Elaborating Marx’ idea that “communism is humanism”, Frederick Engels wrote: “Communism stands

in principle above the breach between bourgeoisie and proletariat, recognises only its historic significance for the present, but not its justification for the future; wishes, indeed, to bridge over this chasm." Therefore, communism "is a question of humanity and not of the workers alone".³ When we talk about "the struggle for peace as a world historic mission of the working class" it would be wrong to believe that the constant character of this task means that the essence of its subjects remains unchanged.

The social and economic changes which have occurred in Western society, the results of the scientific and technological revolution, the stratification of the proletariat, and the complex relations between its various sections have made an imprint on the consciousness of the workers and their social behaviour determining the character of their actions against the war menace. It cannot be gainsaid that the working people are objectively interested in peace. And this has been backed up by relevant theories. But there is an equally objective contradiction between the anti-war struggle, which is a struggle for the long-term interests of the proletariat (not always clearly understood) and the concrete economic priorities of some sections of the working class, for example, those engaged in arms manufacture.

This contradiction can readily be observed in Sweden, where conditions for successful anti-war activities seem to be highly favourable. For a long time the Swedish peace supporters enjoyed the patronage of their symbolic leader, Prime Minister Olof Palme. The Foreign Ministry and the Swedish parliament granted special subsidies to many of their organisations. Of course, the support was not rendered indiscriminately to all the groups and trends advocating anti-war slogans, but only the organisations "recognised" by the state. What is important for us here is the trend itself, for it highlights another characteristic social trend in today's Sweden. The arms manufacturing companies (which are few in number) wield enormous influence, as noted by Maud Sundquist, Secretary for international affairs of the Left Party—Communists of Sweden. "They ... blackmail trade unions with threats of high unemployment and put pressure on parliament and the government. It was no accident that a former Defence Minister once described the military-industrial complex as military-trade union and military-communal: arms manufacturing factories are very influential locally, and they have an ment that works against the anti-war movement.

The activities of peace supporters thus proceed on two levels—the national (and sometimes international) and the local, communal, i. e., where the question of jobs is decided. Not infrequently "communal" thinking prevails over the political, civic thinking. Richard West, Director of publications with the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, cites paradoxical instances when people living near the nuclear complex in Savanna-River (South Carolina) and exposed to a constant threat of radioactive contamination, are in the front ranks of those who want the centre to continue its production, because otherwise they would lose their jobs. Their jobs are at stake, and this is the most potent argument that works against the anti-war movement.

There is an element of paradox in the fact that workers themselves sometimes oppose certain actions by West European pacifists. An example in point is the picketing of the US military base in Florennes, Belgium, where medium-range missiles were being stationed, by the opponents of "rearmament". Repeated protest demonstrations were staged close to the missile site in which Belgian Communists took part. Referring to the pacifist blockade of the Florennes base Jan Debrouwere, CC Political Bureau Member of the Communist Party of Belgium, stressed that the "locals did not welcome our presence; there was even

a degree of friction. The reason is that the area had been deep in crisis for several years. There was an economic slump, and unemployment affected virtually every family. A change ... began ... with the stationing of the missiles. A US Army unit of some 1,000 men was billeted in Florennes, and this created hundreds of jobs—drivers, chefs, waiters.... This situation is far from encouraging. Many of our illusions have been shattered, but facts are facts, and they should give us food for thought".

Another sobering factor is that many workers and hired employees in general who take part in public opinion polls usually put unemployment at the top of their list of concerns assigning military danger to second place at best. People are exposed to heavy social and economic pressures, and they have to confront the problem of survival. The working people can only "politicise" this problem by joining the anti-war movement if they have the necessary minimum of financial independence and social security.

Nor does the false dilemma offered by the war business—"disarmament or jobs"—facilitate the task of involving many sections of the population in the anti-war movement. The dilemma has so far "worked" because there is no socio-economic alternative often referred to as the "economics of peace" to replace the "economics of war." How can a concept be developed that would appeal to all working people and thus bring more of them into the anti-war movement? A lot will depend on the answer to that question, and, most important, the broadening of the social base of peace-making actions, their "proletarianisation", and their conversion into an influential factor of international life.

In the meantime the anti-war movement waxes and wanes, reaching its peaks when important political decisions are adopted (e. g., on the production of the neutron weapon, on Euromissiles) and dying down after the decision has been taken, regardless of what the decision is positive or negative. Theebb and flow of the anti-war movement are to be attributed to the fact that the peace forces are not constant fixtures in international life, like a Greek Chorus commenting on the entrances and monologues of the main protagonists. Peace supporters are an active factor in world politics and their heterogeneity introduces two components into the anti-war struggle, a constant and a variable.

The constant is the permanent organisations, many of which have their own research centres and publications (now successfully augmented by videos), teams of authoritative professionals, experts and scientists, economists, lawyers, doctors, ecologists, specialists in high technology, etc., as well as numerous religious and women's organisations. The educational, "alarmist" and mobilising role of these centres is critical during turning points in social development, when many people become involved in active social life and have their "moments of truth" and "crises of consciousness". At such periods the tide of the anti-war movement mounts: the trade unions, previously silent, take to the streets with anti-war slogans, students leave their class rooms and middle-level employees and civil servants make their voices heard. This is the great variable component in action.

Such a process was observed in Western Europe in the early half of the 1980s when the American Euromissiles were deployed. This was a novel political phenomenon for the old continent. What seemed to be unrealistic happened, as anti-war strikes swept major enterprises. The strikers did not demand higher wages or jobs. The strikes were over a concrete political issue, something that used to be considered outside the trade unions' domain. For the first time in Western Europe workers left their tools for five minutes to protest the "rearmament". Strikes

were staged at most factories in the FRG in response to the call from the Confederation of German Trade Unions in October 1983. Workers in many other countries followed suit. On May 10, 1984, the Federation of the Netherlands Trade Unions, jointly with the No to Cruise Missiles Committee brought about a general nation-wide stoppage for 15 minutes. In Denmark on October 24, 1985, the Central Confederation of Trade Unions organised a "peace strike" in which about a million workers, employees and students took part.

Those years saw impressive manifestations. But even these events fail to give a full profile of the anti-war movement. The reason is that the anti-war movement includes, so to speak, runners of different distances. There are forces which set themselves long-term goals (nuclear disarmament, ruling out war from international life) and the forces which operate intermittently, i. e., the strata of the population which are mobilised over short-term, concrete issues (for example, opposition to the deployment of missiles). These contingents of the anti-war movement move into battle when political tensions reach such a high pitch as to overshadow the ordinary social and economic problems and priorities, which at normal times keep their minds off lofty civic goals. The impossibility of having their demands realised immediately, as in the case of Pershings and cruise missiles, pulls the ground from under the feet of such protesters and makes their protests irrelevant.

Thus, one front in the anti-war action is dismantled and the constant element of the movement again comes to the fore—the people who have a strong personal motivation in opposing militarism. Among them are the scientists whose civil awareness is enhanced by their knowledge and the consciousness of their unique responsibility. This assigns them the role of trumpeters sounding the alarm and experts who are competent opponents of the government and the military establishment. The voice of retired military and diplomats who used to be members of the political elite is no less authoritative. For example, representatives of the American establishment Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Gerald Smith and George Kennan have called on the US administration to renounce first use of nuclear weapons, while Kennan has proposed that the two nuclear powers—the USSR and the USA—cut their nuclear arsenals by 50 per cent.⁴

The scientific community and occupational groups, such as concerned physicians, economists, lawyers, military men, etc., provide peace supporters with the arguments, which, devoid of any political or ideological bias, sound convincing to any audience because they rely on rationality and common sense coupled with scientific competence. Thus, the opposition is not between ideological doctrines, but between supra-class ideas and the views that stem from the inertia of military-technocratic thinking and ideological fanaticism.

It is common knowledge that "pure" information and common sense are more convincing than political rhetoric, which is often used to cover up past sins. No wonder the militarists are unhappy because they have to wage their battle in an alien field where they have to argue and discuss things instead of the producing the bogey of the "enemy", as they used to do. No wonder the advocates of power politics trying to avoid substantive arguments with the pacifists deliberately introduce an ideological slant into the discussion and variations on the "hand of Moscow" theme come to the surface again. The conclusion suggests itself that "confrontation" politicians would like to see the anti-war struggle ideologised because it is far easier to talk not about the main problem, but the ideological and political issues surrounding it, issues that usually have a "delicate" history. By imposing a juxtaposition between "us" and

"them," "the Green" and "the Red", the custodians of the cold war tradition try to introduce its spirit into the anti-war movement, to blow it up from within.

Many peace supporters are aware of the danger of the political label being stuck on them and are looking for alternative ideological justifications of their joint actions. Contributing to these sentiments is the growing mistrust of "politics in general", which has brought the world to the brink of a catastrophe, and the mistrust of the "system", and the "system's" parties, which have forgotten public needs in their obsession with the political game. This increases the appeal of "universal values", which the Church and its actions provide a ready organisational form. The clergy's growing authority is partly due to the fact that religious organisations provide shelter for all the disenchanted, for the critics of the authorities and the traditional political institutions. The Christian Church has been quick to respond to this social need, and has managed to interpret it in its own way and steer it in the desired direction.

The active involvement of religious organisations in anti-militarist actions was among the remarkable features of the anti-war movement in the 1980s. In fact the Bonn demonstration of October 10, 1981, which marked the start of the all-European movement of protest against the Pershings and cruise missiles, was a joint initiative of peace supporters in several countries under the umbrella of major evangelical organisations, such as the West German Action to Atone for Sins and the Dutch Reformers. On available evidence, a large part (in some countries the major part) of the demonstrators was linked with religious quarters. The Church then is a strong claimant to "leadership" in the anti-war movement. There is public response to the activities of Christian Churches whether it takes the form of appeals from its top or parochial initiatives. With some simplification, one can say that the clergy take the largest number of protesters into the streets because they have a vast following.

Several reasons account for the Church's leadership. The anti-war theme has long received thorough treatment in the documents of the main international Christians forums, such as the World Council of Churches, the Christian Peace Conference, the Conference of European Churches, the Lutheran World Federation and Pax Christi. It was also important that the Church was a pioneer peace-maker: its statements against militarism were made much earlier and more clearly than by non-communist civic movements. As a result, the time-honoured and highly topical appeal of the prophet Isaïe to "beat one's swords into ploughshares" is seen as both a basic Christian tenet and a valuable heritage of humanistic thought.

The invasion of Franciscan monks into public life provided a model of skilful translation of an ancient religious and moral tenet into practical actions. They made the headlines in 1980-1981 when they launched a "peaceful offensive" on the eve of the 800th anniversary of the birth of François d'Assise, the founder of the Order. According to the vicar of the Church of St. François, the idea arose out of attempts to answer the question: what does the presence of François and Franciscans mean in today's world? The Order felt that to increase its role in public life it should not only update some of its religious dogmas, but "return to the sources". The vicar stressed that the ideas of the 12th century monk, credited with the expression "our little brothers" are still relevant today: "St. François came out for peace, for all-embracing love of nature. The misfortunes now afflicting mankind are the threat of war which will de-

stroy civilisation, the gulf between the rich and poor countries and the destruction of nature. Therefore, the ideas of St. François should be propagated on a wider scale, applied to this century and brought to human hearts." ⁵

It is significant that even people whose social role would seem to confine them to the realm of metaphysics are displaying a dialectical approach to the changing reality, to their philosophical premises and to the idea of cooperation with all partners in peace-making activities. Their position is constructive and therefore progressive. Here is an occasion to renounce another stale cliché and to deepen the content of the well-worn expression the "entire progressive mankind".

The key criterion of progressiveness that is now obviously coming into play is the attitude to the problem of mankind's survival, to ensuring a peaceful, and only peaceful, perspective for its development. Otherwise all talk about "progressives," "reactionaries" and "obscurantists" with regard to a particular movement or political figure would be nothing but a tribute to dogma divorced from real life. Thinking does not have to be "new", but merely rational to set aside the argument about the comparative advantages of philosophical systems in order to assert by practical deeds a philosophy of life, because only a philosophy of life can claim to be a "politically correct" and be a true philosophy.

Perceiving the world through stereotypes and thinking in outdated images is not only unpromising, but dangerous. It impedes the establishment of sincere cooperation among all the peace forces, cooperation free of mutual suspicion. It is important to understand this today when the anti-war movement still entertains many outdated notions.

One such notion is pacifism, which has long acquired a derogatory connotation and is often described as an "ideologically untenable line", a "concession to the class enemy," in short, a "political error". In spite of the progress of new political thinking in the Soviet Union, dialectical thought has yet to reclaim the category of pacifism. As things stand now, the term has acquired a double meaning and in most cases what is today described as the pacifist (anti-war) movement is not what it actually is. It is unlikely that views borrowed from the beginning of the century, during the struggle against "social chauvinists" and "bourgeois pacifists"—can be of use to today's opponents of war and the advocates of a non-violent world. We should not forget, of course, that the Communists' attitude to pacifism is derived from the statements of Lenin who rightly believed that in his time the only possible way to put an end to the imperialist war was through the "revolutionary overthrow" of bourgeois governments, as the Bolshevik Party did in Russia.

That is why in the years that followed, a critical attitude to pacifism was all but written into the charters of the communist and workers parties. For example, the Manifesto of the Comintern to the World Proletariat explained: "Pacifism is a movement which seeks to bring an end to war and usher in eternal peace. The pacifism of bourgeois humanists has yielded no results because they preach peace while capitalist society is preserved, ... which in its very essence is a source of struggle, discord and wars. The proletariat and its party counter the wicked wars of the capitalist period not by pious appeals for peace, but by striving to turn bourgeois war into the class, civil war of the proletariat and all the working people against capitalist oppression." ⁶ But can we blame the pacifists today for wanting peace while ensuring the preservation of capitalist society in which they live? I think such an attitude should be seen not as an ideological sin, but as an example in

assimilating one of the tenets of new political thinking, among whose main ideas are peaceful coexistence and ideologisation of international relations. Thinking which relies on "quotations" is barren and can only result in obscuring the spirit and scientific essence of Lenin's teaching on war and peace.

Perhaps the main flaw in drawing artificial analogies between the present historical situation and the conditions which prevailed at the beginning of the century is that such an approach is at odds with Lenin's methodology of studying the phenomenon of war, his dialectical approach which prescribes the need to "detect" the fluidity and interpenetration of concepts, awareness that they tend to outlive themselves and inevitably turn into their opposites. Thoughtless and mechanical application of Lenin's descriptions to the present time would violate the scientific principle which was flouted by the pacifists in Lenin's time—a concrete historical approach to the phenomenon of war and the peace slogans.

Pacifism, for all its diversity and contradictory nature, is the real force for survival in the West today, the most authoritative and promising force. Therefore, we should not try to stick old labels on it, but respect and cooperate with it constructively in the spirit of new political thinking, or, to put it another way, in a sober and realistic spirit.

Engels wrote in his time that when people begin to appeal from "the facts which have had their day to so-called eternal justice" this proves that a given system has "half outlived its day".⁷ One would hardly be justified today in concluding that a particular system is moribund only because we hear on "both sides of the barricades" powerful voices in favour of universal human values which secure the unity of civilisation in the face of a common danger. There are perhaps more grounds for saying that confrontation is outliving itself because it makes humanity's main interest hostage to secondary and transitory goals.

Humanisation and democratisation of international politics with the aim of uniting the world community does not "abolish" the class approach, but on the contrary, calls for a scientific Marxist examination of the problems of the anti-war movement. It calls for a united front of Marxists, pacifists and all responsible elements, irrespective of their philosophical, political, religious and national differences. Respect for these differences will only bring more cohesion to the ranks of the peace supporters.

¹ Quoted from: *Marxistische Blätter*, No. 4, 1983, p. 51.

² *World Marxist Review*, November 1987, p. 77.

³ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, International Publishers, New York, Moscow, 1976, pp. 581-582.

⁴ G. Kennan, "A Modest Proposal", *New York Review of Books*, July 16, 1981.

⁵ *Panorama*, Aug. 17, 1986.

⁶ *Манифест Коминтерна к мировому пролетариату*, Moscow, 1924, p. 51.

⁷ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1987, p. 138.

CLARITY

Notes by a Lecturer

Valter SHONIA

In lecturing on the Washington summit, primarily its main result, the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, I discovered a phenomenon which I think needs to be understood and responded to.

The fact is that, while my audiences generally take a positive view of what I tell them on the subject, they ask me almost every time two or three questions voicing misgivings either directly or indirectly. They fear that our country may have gone too far by committing itself to eliminate more weapons than the Americans. "Aren't we helping the Pentagon win the military superiority it has been seeking for so long?" they ask. Questions like this understandably concern the quantitative parameters of the treaty, or a criterion which our analysts have explicitly rejected as inapplicable to the problem of security.

The arguments I give during my lectures seem to be appreciated and are hardly ever contested outright but in the end I am asked whether we are not making a mistake that could affect our security.

Under these circumstances the easiest thing to do would be what we have repeatedly done in similar past situations. We could pretend that no such doubts exist, could attribute them to the ignorance of people asking questions out of place or, better still, to conservatism or to the scepticism typical of the man in the street. Such a response would certainly be improper and misleading but then it would be more convenient because the general picture would look bright, and it would not be necessary to get to the root of the issue. Yes, it would be the simplest reaction, except that it would also be irresponsible.

In short, this sort of thing cannot go on just because it has occurred before. The values and principles of the post-April 1985 period call for an entirely different approach to the phenomenon, which must not be seen as a misfortune but as a blessing, not as a misunderstanding but as a sign of growing public interest in the affairs of the country, a desire to assess everything critically, refusing to take anything at its face value, a desire to test everything by comparing it with one's own experience and knowledge, by consulting one's own heart. And this means that we can congratulate ourselves on the appearance of truly inexhaustible possibilities of constantly verifying the policy we have chosen and of amending it if necessary so as to gain a real and not imaginary, make-believe public consensus. After all, no matter how many dozens, hundreds or even thousands of experts are behind a decision, no matter how clever and knowledgeable they are or how hard they try to take everything into consideration, it is always necessary to consult the only infallible authority, the people's collective wisdom. Discussion and debate are among the methods of consultation that have proved their worth. They have to be carried on openly, in public, and not behind closed doors, not in a narrow circle, and without fear of some imaginary harm. Foreign policy themes must be rid of taboos in the same way as

internal ones. This is how the problem presents itself today and how we should proceed in practice.

To go back to the point at issue, I must admit that the arguments and explanations of experts notwithstanding, doubts and concern persist and are expressed, which suggests that something is wrong with or does not work in either our actions or our arguments. Be that as it may, further explanation is required, all the more since looming large is the prospect of a new and more far-reaching understandings with the United States (on a 50 per cent cut in strategic armaments), such as may give rise to similar doubts.

Let us begin with the quantitative parameters of the treaty.

It would seem that many of the questions concerning them are asked because we avoid giving all the facts or do not say plainly enough what is perfectly evident, namely, that we have made substantial concessions to the Americans on this point. In particular, we did not insist that the final balance establishing reduction levels of both sides should take account of either the corresponding missile systems of Britain and France or US forward-based weapons. We know this well, and so do the Americans (who boast of it everywhere) and world opinion. Such is reality, and attempts to discount it, to represent it of small importance or, worse still, to justify it, provoke a natural reaction, with people wondering whether the caginess of some is not due to their trying to conceal something unacceptable.

There is, for instance, the strange argument used occasionally in our press that we are eliminating more medium- and shorter-range missiles because we have more of them than the other side. That is like saying that our country's high rate of alcoholism as compared with other countries, is due to the fact that we have more drunkards.

It is equally unconvincing to argue that the INF Treaty should be approached from the standpoint of algebra or even higher mathematics and not arithmetic. Inevitably, the question arises: Why this scornful attitude to arithmetic since it is precisely due to this respectable discipline that there has been and is yet likely to be so much controversy at Geneva?

I am sure there is no need to resort to this kind of explanation, which is often more like dodging the issue. We have done nothing that we should reproach ourselves with; indeed, since we have made some concessions to secure results in an exceedingly important area of world politics, we ought to widely publicise this as an achievement of principal value. Isn't that why the world is applauding us now and why the CPSU CC General Secretary is ahead of recognised Western leaders in public opinion polls? World opinion knows well whom and what it is indebted to for the first breakthrough in the sphere of disarmament (although it is only fair and proper to give due credit to the other side as well).

I may be wrong but perhaps our reserve on this score arises from the self-sufficiency of experts who think everything is so obvious that no explaining is needed. As it happens, it is needed. There may be diplomatic considerations, too, to the effect that if we enlarge on this, the other side may take us at our word and want us to make still greater concessions at the talks on strategic offensive weapons. If this is how matters stand, those fears are not merely exaggerated but unwarranted. The reader will excuse me if I say that in holding talks as in playing bridge, the partners do not necessarily have to put their cards on the table in order to know the cards of the other side. Hence to "divulge" something evident can hardly result in revealing something still unknown to or unsuspected by the other side. What is more, to do so is to strengthen in the latter's eyes that which had seemed to be a weak

point in our position. This is the actual purpose of recurrent "leaks" of information allowed by our negotiating partners.¹

But now that we have called a spade a spade, we must answer a far more difficult question relating to the substance of the matter. Couldn't we have done without those concessions and achieved the same result at a lower price? Yes, we now have, for the first time in man's history, a treaty on real reductions in nuclear armaments. But surely, we are not the only ones to need it. Surely, it benefits the Americans as much as us. So why must we pay a higher price than they?

This approach may seem arguable but there is some logic to it. Nobody can deny that it is better to be healthy and rich than poor and ill. But the moment this logic is absolutised it becomes formal, divorced from life and amounting to its antithesis. We have not satisfied ourselves of this by hearsay but by our own experience, for throughout the postwar years we followed precisely this logic where disarmament was concerned. We did not for one moment admit the possibility of sacrificing something bigger to disarmament than others did. It had to be nothing but a straight swap. We were so certain of the realism and permissibility of seeking disarmament from this position that we refused to restrict our participation in the arms race to any extent and, as a consequence, ceased gradually to notice that we were moving in the wrong direction. True, our approach was not motivated by malicious intent or duplicity. It was sustained by a harsh reality, a deadly sword posed over our heads. But even when the sword became double-edged we went on along the same lines for a time and even allowed ourselves to be carried away; we let ourselves go at the risk of losing both our face and our values, and even began to comport ourselves in some respects like those whom we regarded as our antipodes.

This may have been one of the reasons why the theory of "two superpowers" and their "equal responsibility" for the arms race was conceived and gained currency. Few were those who probed into the origins and evolution of this race. People drew conclusions from what was going on before everybody's eyes, the fact that we were virtually seeking disarmament "from a position of strength" and might therefore be seen by some as a match in amorality for those who are now bragging openly of it. Yet, the means by which socialism attains its goals are anything but immaterial to it. "The end justifies the means" is a principle which socialism cannot accept. And disarmament is probably the noblest and most humanistic of all objectives, hence the means for achieving it must meet the aims. This is the principal moral lesson drawn by the new political thinking from the past, a lesson which enabled us to thoroughly revise our earlier approach. It became clear that in the face of the threat of nuclear disaster socialism could not follow a principle alien to its nature—"tit for tat". It cannot go along with fatalists and adventurers who refuse to give up their bid to gain superiority and whose motto is "After me the deluge". Socialism is confident of its future and must therefore be a bit wiser, a bit more far-sighted, a bit more generous and tolerant, must strive for the solution of existing problems primarily through selfless effort. (Warmongers on the extreme right are talked about so much that it is hard and possibly unnecessary to treat them with any leniency. But looking at the problem from a broader, more mature perspective, I occasionally catch myself thinking that, barring the drive for profit from arms contracts, the hard-headedness and ignorance of these people are not unlike those of a small child. It might well be easier for them to take the right road if the response to their obstinacy were not an attempt to outdo them, but to demonstrate sincere goodwill, an example worth emulating.)

This approach is heuristic not only because it reinstates socialism as a primordially humanist system. The important thing is that it helps proceed from words to deeds by leading disarmament out of its impasse at long last and putting its realisation on the agenda. It is therefore safe to say that without this the INF Treaty would have been unattainable. We could not have broken the resistance of the opponents of disarmament. Even now that the quantitative indices are favourable to them, these forces in the United States are busy assailing the treaty in an attempt to torpedo its ratification by the Senate. Nor is this just a game (although some elements of it are here). It is a tough position objectively necessitating the following choice: either the treaty will be ratified and then real nuclear disarmament can begin even if we have to pay for it more "dearly" than the other side; or the impasse will persist and hence no hope will be left of overcoming inertia over these problems, which poses a mortal danger to all. I think the choice to make is obvious and our selfless effort will benefit the cause of disarmament and not those who would like to win military superiority over us.

Can we fully safeguard ourselves against the risk in question, and if not, hadn't we better wait for brighter days? This is—again on the face of it—a perfectly legitimate and natural question to ask, especially for those, I believe, who bear the heavy burden of responsibility for making the right decision. But to put the question in this way is to delude oneself or to court failure.

History has never yet given anybody a chance, above all at crucial stages, to make decisions without inconveniencing himself in any way, or risking anything. This has always taken political courage and intuition making it possible to foresee what is beyond the reach of any exact science, even one equipped with the most sophisticated computers.

Surely the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty was a risky act of courage. The reason why imperial Germany signed it with us in 1918 was admittedly not a desire to strengthen Soviet power and safeguard socialism in Russia. But the treaty was the only way to achieve these ends, and therefore Lenin took the risk. And now let us imagine for a moment that those who had to make the decision turned out to be overcautious and preferred to wait until the terms were more favourable to them. The very idea is disconcerting.

This applies to the latest case, more or less. Of course, we cannot shut our eyes to the influence and activity of those forces in the United States and the West at large who do not see the disarmament process that has begun as the road to survival but as an almost historic chance in the struggle against socialism. There is no overlooking the excessive enthusiasm about power politics, said to have made the Russians more tractable, or the painstakingly fostered hope that this can be used as a precedent for making us in the future agree to the gradual elimination of our heavy missiles, which are particularly dangerous for them, without any real or prospective pledge to keep the arms race out of space and stop it on Earth. (Wasn't this, incidentally, why a US Senator went so

(Continued on page 130)

IRM-SRM Treaty—A Personal View

Diana SMOLENSKAYA

In my view, the agreement on eliminating medium- and shorter-range missiles, known as the IRM-SRM Treaty, considerably strengthens the security of the USSR and its allies and, at the same time, meets the security interests of the United States and its allies.

Is there a contradiction in this assertion? Let us examine the main provisions of this document.

First. The medium- and shorter-range missiles to be scrapped under the Treaty are the most dangerous class of weapons which possess destabilising capabilities: a very brief time period is needed for them to reach the vital population centres they are aimed at, they are highly accurate, are in constant combat readiness, and are highly mobile to provide greater opportunities for use in a surprise attack.

The presence of these types of missiles greatly increases the first-strike danger. Their elimination renders meaningless the NATO doctrine of "controllable escalation" of a nuclear conflict, which lowers the threshold of using nuclear weapons and creates the illusion that a limited nuclear war is acceptable. Ephemeral as they are, such illusions are dangerous in that someone may want to test them in practice. It is appropriate to recall here that it was namely the Pershings which were to be used for a demonstration nuclear strike.

Therefore the liquidation of the missiles removes these apprehensions, diminishes the risk of a nuclear conflict for both sides, and consolidates strategic stability.

Second. Under the Treaty the sides would have no right to develop and manufacture new types of ground-based missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 km. The Treaty also envisages that neither side has the right to deploy such missiles on its territory or elsewhere in the world. This rules out the possibility that the USSR and the USA will have them in future.

All this creates a more predictable and therefore controllable situation for both sides.

Third. The Treaty sets a very specific timetable, order, methods and procedures for destroying the missiles.

It provides for a system and mechanism of verification and inspection of missile destruction, and, after they have been destroyed, inspection will continue for ten years at the sites where such missiles were deployed or manufactured. The verification and inspection measures include on-site inspection on a permanent basis or at request which cannot be rejected. Furthermore, the principle of reciprocity is to be strictly observed as regards all components.

Thus, each side may be sure that the obligations under the Treaty are not violated, which increases mutual trust.

Fourth. As it takes into account the interests of the allies of the USSR and the USA, the Treaty enjoys their full support. Moreover, two Soviet allies—the GDR and Czechoslovakia—and five US allies—Britain, the FRG, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands—are, in fact, parties to the Treaty, for they have agreed to inspection at deployment sites on their territory.

Thus the Treaty creates no problems in the relations among Warsaw Treaty or NATO allies. It is assumed that its non-ratification may complicate relations within these alliances.

The Treaty, based on principles of equality, reciprocity and equal rights and obligations of the sides in all its major provisions, envisages unequal reductions. The Soviet Union is to destroy all its medium- and shorter-range missiles (1,752 missiles), while the United States, too, is to destroy all its missiles of this class (859 missiles).

It is this aspect of the Treaty which has evoked the greatest doubts. Soviet people ask if such inequivalent reductions are justified and whether they are a forced concession to the United States. Another aspect of the Treaty causing critical remarks is that it does not take into account similar nuclear missiles of Britain and France.

In this connection I should like to note the unprecedented and encouraging fact that at a joint session of the foreign affairs commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Yegor Ligachev, Eduard Shevardnadze and Dmitri Yazov emphasised that such apprehensions existed among Soviet people, the Soviet leaders responded to those apprehensions with some convincing explanations.

Now I should like to state my point of view on that score.

Why indeed are we destroying more missiles than is the United States? My answer is this.

It is an entirely new kind of a treaty in the field of nuclear arms that envisages for the first time not a limitation fixing a top level, but a real reduction, and sets a lower level of armaments, that is, a zero level accepted by both sides. This means that each side must destroy as many missiles of this class as it has. The asymmetry in nuclear arsenals, which had taken shape in concrete historical conditions and which exists now, presupposes asymmetrical arms reductions. This is not a question of unequal reductions. On the contrary, the principle of equality is thus asserted.

In the course of the consistent reduction of all components of the armed forces of both sides, which is expected to be done in the future, this asymmetry will be evened out on both sides.

One should remember also that in the context of the Soviet-American balance of forces the weapons to be reduced do not have the same capability. The Soviet missiles cannot reach US territory, while American ground-based Pershing and cruise missiles can hit targets deep inside Soviet territory.

In this situation the "exchange rate" is determined, naturally, with due account of the combat capabilities of particular weapons and the amount of threat they pose.

Also important is that before the signing of the IRM-SRM Treaty nothing prevented the United States from increasing the number of its missiles in Europe or deploying missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 km in the countries neighbouring the USSR which either had given, or would have to give, their consent to that. But now, when the Treaty comes into force, the USA will not be able to do that.

Thus, on the global scale the Treaty eliminates quite a broad spectrum of weapons where the arms race could sharply intensify. Considering the different geographic locations of the USSR and the USA, such a solution meets our interests. The United States, for its part, will be guaranteed that the Soviet missiles of the classes that are to be destroyed will not appear within a range enabling them to reach its territory.

As regards the nuclear missiles of Britain and France, as I see it, important here is that both sides have agreed that the subject of negotiations between them can only be the weapons of the two sides. This is important to us as well, because the allies we have now, or those we

may have in the future, may not want any of their weapons to be reduced under agreements they had not signed.

From the military point of view, considering the present levels of armaments, the existing nuclear weapons of Britain and France do not make our defence weaker and provide no superiority for the opposed forces.

The IRM-SRM Treaty is fully in accord with the fundamental conclusion made by the 27th Congress of the CPSU that in the present conditions genuine security can only be reciprocal and general. It signals the start of advancement towards an era without wars and without weapons. This start, however modest it may seem in comparison with the remaining arsenals, is most valuable. Until now the shadow of the nuclear threat has been growing longer, blocking out the Sun. Since the signing of the IRM-SRM Treaty, the Sun has risen higher, and the shadow is getting shorter.

REFLECTIONS OF A LABOUR MP

(continued from page 104)

out the treaty signed by Stalin and Churchill in 1942 which had two parts: one, the defeat of Hitler, and, secondly, Anglo-Soviet cooperation after the war. If we remove the references to the war what is left without adding one word or changing any part, is a superb treaty of friendship.

So, I have a document for campaigning: sign the treaty of friendship with Russia. Now, if you say that immediately people will say: "Oh, we like Mr. Gorbachev and his openness. We like his reforms, why not sign the treaty?" And it is in my opinion, it is a more useful educational document, than saying: let us get rid of the intermediate nuclear missiles but keep the strategic ones.

It seems to me that we must not allow the discussion of our relations to be confined to the discussion of what is the least dangerous weapon we can use to kill each other. We must think and discuss how we can work together for peace and friendship.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE FALKLANDS CRISIS

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THE CONFLICT BREAKS OUT

On April 2, 1982, following protracted but fruitless Argentine-British talks on sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (the Malvinas), Argentine troops landed there and lowered the Union Jack at Port Stanley, the islands' chief harbour, to hoist their own national flag. The nearly 150-year-long dispute over the islands entered a decisive phase. On the same day, the Thatcher government decided to send a landing force to the Falklands.

Over 100 ships of the British Navy, or two-thirds of it, sailed for the South Atlantic. Both politically and militarily the move was risky for the Falklands are separated from Argentina by a mere 500 kilometres while Britain is 12,000 kilometres away. How was the British force to be supplied since it would require several weeks to reach its destination? Would Britain be able to use any bases near the islands? Last but not least, what would be the reaction of Latin American and other countries? Which of the belligerents would they side with?

Representatives of Latin American countries accredited in London pointed out that as far back as 1965 a UN General Assembly resolution had described the status of the Falklands as colonial and called for a negotiated revision of it, that is, virtually recognised the illegitimacy of Britain's possession of the islands. Most Latin American ambassadors recognised Argentina's claim to the Malvinas as perfectly justified, even though some of them doubted whether Argentina had proceeded properly and wisely by using armed force to free them. Some ambassadors said US diplomats in Washington and Buenos Aires had hinted to the Argentine military leadership that in the event of conflict the United States would side with Argentina. It would appear that this US hint played a notable role when Buenos Aires opted for the use of force on the Malvinas.

HAIG OR DULLES?

In those days I had several meetings with British MPs. Our conversations centred on the question of what the US attitude to the conflict would be, of whether Washington would back Britain or Argentina, with which it was linked by a treaty of alliance as with other American states. We recalled time and again the 1956 Suez crisis, during which Britain made common cause with France and Israel in fighting a colonial war against Egypt. At that time (1956) US President Dwight Eisenhower and

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles condemned the allies' action and informed the Prime Minister of Britain's Conservative government, Anthony Eden, that the American public did not support the idea of using armed force against Egypt. Many British politicians emphatically accused the United States—somewhat excessively—of Britain's defeat, which compelled Eden to step down.

To reassure public opinion, *The Daily Telegraph*, a newspaper close to the Foreign Office, carried an article under the heading "Haig Is Not Dulles". (Alexander Haig was US Secretary of State during the Falklands conflict.) Comparing the positions of the two secretaries of state, the paper wrote that it would be a mistake to draw a parallel between Suez and the Falklands, because the circumstances surrounding the two crises were "different".¹

In launching military operations against Argentina, Margaret Thatcher certainly hoped for US support but she may have had some doubt as to how serious and effective the support would be. Why was she doubtful? Because the United States was reluctant to sour its relations with Argentina and other Latin American countries, and second, because the so-called special relationship between it and Britain had visibly declined in the 1970s and occasionally tended to fail. True, on coming to power, Thatcher did her best to strengthen them. I often heard her speeches, and in almost every one she assured the United States of her loyalty, extolling Ronald Reagan. Once she even stated that Britain should follow any advice offered by the United States.

The result was good personal relations between the top leaders of the two countries. Still, London was not entirely certain that the United States would take a stand favourable to Britain. My interlocutors, including Conservatives, complained of the growing "unpredictability" of Reagan's policy. A former Conservative Prime Minister, Edward Heath, told me that it was hard to deal with the Americans because they were disinclined to lend an ear to dissenting opinions, even those of their allies. And James Callaghan, former head of a Labour government, talking with me during the Falklands crisis, said he was for cooperation with the United States but the policy of the US administration was selfish and aimed primarily at gaining military superiority.

This explains why Alexander Haig, knowing how Britain felt, "assured the Prime Minister" during a meeting with her in London that "there would be no repetition of Suez, in which the United States had coerced Britain and France into retreating from a military expedition... I am in London to help the British."²

SO-CALLED NEUTRALITY

But the problem had a further aspect. Open support for Britain's claim to the islands could embroil the United States with Argentina as well as with other Latin American countries, all the more because the Organisation of American States condemned Britain's action, with 17 votes in favour and four abstentions (United States, Chile, Colombia, and Trinidad and Tobago), and urged the United States to stop helping it.

This circumstance induced Washington to conceal its real aims and intentions with regard to the conflict. It declared its neutrality and, furthermore, stated that it would work to reconcile the parties to the conflict and to prevent hostilities from developing any further. Immediately after the war broke out the US President said that his policy was to be a friend of both sides. "Because they are both our friends," he said, "I have offered our help in an effort to bring the two countries together." Pentagon spokesman affirmed that the United States was going to move "right down the middle". "We are not going to give anybody any help either way."³

The US President sent the leaders of five Latin American countries a message saying: "My Government fully understands the deep national commitment of Argentina to recover the islands and its frustrations of... fruitless negotiations."⁴ Messages from the President and Secretary of State to the leaders of South American states even stressed that the United States appreciated the anti-colonial sentiments of Latin American countries.

Besides, US political leaders feared that should Argentina be defeated, this would result in overthrowing the junta and replacing it by a left-wing nationalistic government. "The US," wrote Smith, a noted British commentator, "values Argentina as a potential collaborator in stemming the spread of communist influence in Central America."⁵

Actually Washington's policy was far from neutral. It was by no means aimed at averting war or reducing its proportions, let alone at contributing to the decolonisation process. The attitude of US statesmen was motivated primarily by what they saw as the need for Britain to retain its sovereignty over the islands. Even at the beginning of the conflict, *The Daily Telegraph* wrote that "the United States recognised Britain's sovereignty over the Falkland Islands".⁶

That is why the US government decided to interfere in the conflict and informed Britain and Argentina that Secretary of State Haig was going to visit London and Buenos Aires as a "mediator".

Since the United States and Argentina are signatories to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance under which any armed attack on a country of the continent is regarded as aggression against all American states, Argentina could be expected to ask the other parties to the treaty, primarily the United States, for military aid in the fight against Britain. It was with an eye to preventing this that Haig's mission was organised.

The Argentine government immediately agreed to receive the US Secretary of State. As for the British Cabinet, it was slow in answering, for it preferred a military solution. Forty hours passed before London signalled its readiness to receive Haig, apparently realising that a rejection of mediation would meet with disapproval in the United States as well as among the general public both in Britain and elsewhere. Haig conferred with Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Méndez in Washington and then flew to London to meet with the British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. He was lucky, for his negotiating partner was Francis Pym and not Lord Carrington, who had headed the Foreign Office until early April 1982. As a matter of fact, personal relations between the foreign secretaries of two friendly powers could hardly ever have been more unfriendly than those between Haig and Lord Carrington. I saw the latter on various occasions, both when he was Foreign Secretary and afterwards, when he became Secretary-General of NATO (in his latter capacity he spent many of his weekends in Britain and not in Belgium and therefore used to appear at various receptions in London). He is an intellectual type, a politician having views of his own which he never hesitates to uphold. The staff of the Foreign Office respected him primarily for what was described as his decency and independence.

Late in February 1982, or slightly more than a month before the Falklands crisis broke out, it became known that during a private conference at the State Department, Alexander Haig, annoyed by Carrington's comments on the Middle East problem, had called his British counterpart a "duplicitous bastard". This caused a major diplomatic scandal and an explosion of anti-American sentiment in Britain, all the more because the affront had been done to a politician respected in his country. At diplomatic receptions in London guests spoke frankly of Haig's boorishness, of his patronising attitude towards even cabinet ministers of NATO coun-

tries whom he felt he could bawl out. They said the Secretary of State was fond of strong, often obscene language. One day he had described the European members of NATO as "cowardly European friends", Saudi politicians as "arrogant", and so on. Afterwards this information leaked into the press.

Diplomats accredited in London said they could imagine what talks between the two politicians would have been like, especially in view of the fact that earlier, too, Haig had been sharply critical of Carrington, had hardly denied the insult and had shown no intention of apologising to the British politician. One day a British diplomat told me that Haig was more likely to sow division than reconcile people.

But on April 2, 1982, Carrington, plainly acting on a hint from Thatcher, took the blame for Britain's inadequate preparation for the conflict and tendered his resignation. On April 5, Francis Pym, until then Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Speaker of the House of Commons, became the new Foreign Secretary. He is a man of a different mould. Like Haig, he devoted a considerable part of his life to military activity. He fought as a young man in World War II and was decorated for valour. He headed the Defence Ministry for roughly two years (1979-1981) and was shadow foreign secretary for some time while the Conservative Party was in opposition. It was this kind of partner that Haig had to negotiate with.

"AMERICAN-STYLE" DIPLOMACY

On arriving in London (April 8, 1982), Haig said that Reagan had asked him to represent the President in the talks with Britain, a "close ally and friend". According to official US spokesmen, however, the Secretary of State had brought no plan for a peaceful settlement, his intention being merely to discuss "general ideas" for resolving the conflict. After holding talks in London, Haig flew to Buenos Aires and then came back to London. There began "shuttle diplomacy". Back in London on April 12, after visiting Argentina, Haig said that he now had "specific ideas".⁷

The British press summed up those ideas as follows: Argentina would withdraw its troops from the islands, leaving its flag there, and Britain's "task force" would go back. Many in London's diplomatic quarters were of the opinion that the plan provided a sound platform for a peaceful settlement of the crisis. This hope was dashed, however. A British official spokesman said that "there was no change in the British position"⁸ which obviously implied that Britain did not approve of the plan.

The day after Haig returned from London, the White House spelled out the details of his plan. The United States was offering to participate in administering the islands in conjunction with Britain and Argentina. What did this mean in practice? It meant that in addition to one colonial power, Britain, there would be another, while Argentina would be assigned a secondary role. The issue of sovereignty over the islands would be shelved. What is more, Argentina would be faced with a bloc of two of the mightiest imperialist powers. I need hardly add that it rejected the offer.

The United States, in particular its First Executive, urged the Argentine President to show greater "flexibility". Under US pressure, with the British armada approaching the Malvinas, Argentina made concessions by proposing to end hostilities according to UN Security Council Resolution 502, which made no mention of the issue of Argentina's sovereignty.⁹ The Argentina's new plan provided for the pullout of its troops from the islands, the return of the British fleet to its bases, the establishment of a joint administration by Argentina, Britain and the United States on

the islands until late 1982 and negotiations after December 1982. The Prime Minister's office declared at once that the plan did not meet British demands, and after an urgent meeting of the cabinet it was declared "unacceptable". The British leaders said in unison that unless Argentina acceded to the proposal of the Foreign Office by unconditionally withdrawing its troops, Britain would use force.

The United States liked the point on joint administration because it would give Washington access to the islands. But it did not want to spoil relations with Britain, and therefore Haig stated confidentially to the Argentine government that the United States could no longer fulfil its mediation mission. He warned that should a war over the Malvinas break out, Argentina would be held responsible for it.

Cuban and Nicaraguan diplomats told me that in Buenos Aires, as distinct from London, Haig was following a "tough line", trying to force Britain's patently unacceptable proposals upon the Argentine leadership and even to intimidate Buenos Aires. British Labour leaders whom I saw in mid-April likewise said that Haig was "pressuring" Argentina, not so much holding talks as demanding acceptance of the Anglo-American proposals. Subsequently this information was confirmed. According to Haig's recollections, he made it clear to the Argentine leaders that should they insist on remaining their governor, there would be war.

The US Secretary of State used less than decent methods in his "American-style" diplomacy. The Argentine leadership presumed that the United States knew everything about British actions and plans. Taking advantage of this, on April 18 Haig rang up William Clark, National Security Adviser to the President, and told him "confidentially" that a British invasion was "imminent". He used an ordinary telephone for the purpose, well knowing that it was tapped and that his "confidential" information would immediately reach the Argentine leadership. "I played a wild card,"¹⁰ he writes frankly, meaning a game calculated to intimidate Argentina and make it accept the US terms.

NON-BELLIGERENT ALLY

Late in April the Argentine government stated again that it could not accept the proposal for withdrawing its forces and virtually recognising British sovereignty over the islands and asked for "clarification". On April 27, Haig told the Argentine representatives frankly that the United States could not support the demand for establishing Argentina's sovereignty over the islands. And on April 30, when the British armada drew near the Malvinas, the United States declared, this time publicly, that inasmuch as Argentina had turned down the compromise proposed to it, the Secretary of State was discontinuing his mediation. At the same time, Haig announced a US decision to stop all export of arms and military equipment to Argentina and to refuse it credits.

Haig no longer concealed the fact that his mission had been pro-British from the outset. "My sympathy was with the British," he admits in his memoirs.¹¹ On April 29, 1982, the US Senate and on May 4 the House of Representatives passed a resolution stating that the United States could not stay neutral in the British-Argentine conflict.

Haig's mission gave rise to lively discussion and conjecture in the London diplomatic corps. Every month representatives of the socialist countries were invited to luncheon by one of the ambassadors, and naturally, war and Haig's talks were among the main topics broached on the occasion. Those exchanges of opinion were particularly important because no accurate idea of Haig's proposals could be derived from official sources. "We have heard about the shuttling back and forth," Eric Hefler, a

left Labour MP, said in Parliament, "but no one has said officially what the proposals were and are."¹²

At a meeting late in April, a group of ambassadors from the socialist countries said that Haig was carefully avoiding all proposals and initiatives on the main issue—sovereignty over the islands—and was trying to reduce the matter to an intermediate variant in which the United States could mediate so as to join in the administration of the Malvinas and perpetuate their presence there as a result. Well-informed of the situation, they expressed the view that Haig's mission had practically paralysed the Latin American and European countries' activities, and had nullified the opportunities (if modest ones) for settling the conflict.

Early May witnessed events that had a tangible impact on the course of the conflict and the situation of the parties. The US stance was the main topic of news reports and of conversations between politicians and diplomats. The latest moves of the US administration were discussed from different angles but all political parties and the media recognised that the balance in the conflict had tipped markedly in favour of Britain as a result of Washington's activity. British Foreign Secretary Pym said he was glad "to have the world's most powerful state on our side". In an editorial, "A Friend Indeed", *The Times* wrote: "Now the United States is throwing its weight on Britain's side, this is doubly welcome.... When Mr. Pym meets Mr. Haig in Washington this weekend he will be speaking to him once again as an ally and a partner, not as a neutral personage."¹³

The British Communists' newspaper *Morning Star* pointed out that the United States had given Britain the "green light" to make Argentina submit.¹⁴ This was encouraging Margaret Thatcher to start military operations as the conflict developed.

In other words, the period of the United States' active "peace-making" mission was over. Haig's "shuttle negotiations" had eventually enabled Britain to develop military operations unhampered and dampened UN efforts for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Now that Britain was all set for an offensive, Haig's mission was no longer necessary. Haig stated: "The United States, by involving itself in the negotiating process at a high level, had helped make it possible for Mrs. Thatcher to do what she did."¹⁵ This was also admitted by some British politicians, primarily Conservatives, who made it clear that from then on Britain was left completely unhindered in its war on Argentina.

True, some organs of the British and American press represented the end of Haig's mission as a diplomatic setback for the United States. *The Times*, for one, wrote that the failure of the mission was due to Haig's "clumsiness" and exposed him as "lacking in real influence".¹⁶ But this was not quite right as I see it. Haig did accomplish his task, at least the minimum he was entrusted with achieving. He fell short of the maximum—making Argentina withdraw from the Malvinas and recognise British sovereignty—but this is a different matter. The minimum plan for his mission provided favourable conditions for the advance of the British naval force while at the same time creating the impression that the United States was engaged in vigorous peace-making efforts and that Britain's policy was "defensive". The situation was probably defined best of all by a Latin American ambassador. In those days he said that Haig would, of course, like his mission to be a complete and evident success, which would have meant returning things to their preconflict state and earning him the laurels of a peace-maker, but he could hardly hope for it in good earnest. It would have been too great a success while now both the United States and Britain were satisfied with the outcome of the mission. As for Argentina, it would have to answer for both starting the conflict and failing to prevent its military phase.

No wonder the US position on the conflict angered Argentine opinion. Washington's policy was condemned even more vehemently than "Britain's policy", being seen as an act of betrayal that would be remembered by many generations of Argentines. The Argentine Ambassador to Washington handed in a note virtually accusing the US administration of complicity in Britain's military action. The note stressed that the US position had merely hastened a military dénouement of the conflict. The US stand was condemned by many other Latin American countries.

The American press wrote outright that Washington's approach to the conflict betrayed, among other things, a desire to bolster the position of Britain's ruling Conservative Party. *U. S. News & World Report* commented as follows: "Her [Prime Minister Thatcher's.—V. P.] fall—considered inevitable if fails to restore British rule over the Falklands—could bring to power in London a weak, left-leaning coalition opposed to US nuclear strategy in Europe and lukewarm on defence."¹⁷ Haig suggested as much by saying that, as far as the United States was concerned, the "Falklands was not an isolated problem among other things", for it also involved "the survival or failure of a British government that was a staunch friend to the United States".¹⁸

And so, with Haig's mission over, the United States became a non-belligerent ally of Britain. In pursuing this policy, it had reason to expect that it would be less difficult to induce Britain to adopt a decision on the military use of the Malvinas favourable to the United States and enable it to strengthen its positions in the South Atlantic than to secure a similar decision from Argentina. *

WE WERE GIVEN EVERYTHING WE ASKED FOR

The United States extended both diplomatic and considerable military aid to Britain from the outset of the conflict. A few days before Argentina's troops landed on the Malvinas, the USA passed to Britain information obtained through intelligence satellites on the advance of Argentine naval forces to the islands (the British government acknowledged the US action). It was this information that helped Britain form a fleet at an early date and send it to the Malvinas. Washington's action made the Thatcher government confident that the United States would continue giving Britain the military help it needed. The British fleet made Ascension Island its base. The island belongs to Britain but is in effect at the disposal of the US military base sited there, and British aircraft used it for refuelling. The United States promptly sent several tankers to the island with fuel for British aircraft. Under the 1962 British-US Treaty, Washington must meet from its military base on the island all British requests for servicing facilities. Britain's air raids on the Falklands would have been impossible but for the US airfield on Ascension Island.

Besides, Britain used US satellites to communicate with its ships and submarines. The British "task force" was equipped with US air-to-air missiles, heavy helicopters and other armaments. The White House assured London that the United States was willing to comply with any British request for military aid. Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger promised as much to his British colleague. ** At the same time, Haig assured Britain that his country would deliver no arms to Argentina.

On the day the war came to an end, British MPs speaking in Par-

* In the end these expectations materialised. In March 1987 it was announced that US aircraft were allowed as from March 12, 1987, to land at the British military base on the Malvinas and that they would use the military airfield built there by the British in recent years.

** During the conflict the United States supplied Britain with 100 million dollars' worth of arms, according to some estimates. (See *The Falklands War. Lesson for Strategy, Diplomacy and International Law*, Boston, p. 168.)

liament heaped praise on the United States for rendering essential assistance in the war against Argentina. During the debate the Prime Minister was asked whether it was true that the United States had supplied Britain with the unique AWACS aircraft. She bluntly refused to answer. "I do not give details of help received from the Government of the United States of America," she said. "I can say only that it has been splendid. I believe that *we have had everything that we have asked for*" (My italics.—V. P.).¹⁹

EMBARRASSMENT AT THE UN

The support which London got from Washington at the UN was also very important. Every time the Security Council discussed draft resolutions aimed at settling the conflict such as were unpalatable to Britain, the US delegate took a stand against them, thereby making things easier for his British colleague, who could thus dispense with applying the veto. "The fact that Britain did not have to use its veto in the Security Council until last week" [early June 1982. V. P.], wrote *The Daily Telegraph*, "is a remarkable testimony to his achievement."²⁰ The paper was referring to the British delegate, who undoubtedly owed his "achievement" to the US position.

Early in June there happened something which threw light on the US attitude to the crisis. A draft resolution calling for an immediate end to hostilities was put to the vote in the Security Council. It was on that occasion that, for the first time since the beginning of the conflict, Britain voted against.

At that same time, the heads of seven major Western nations were holding a regular meeting in Versailles, with Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher attending along with their foreign secretaries. On the evening of June 4, Alexander Haig read the draft resolution. He instructed the US delegation to vote against it and informed Francis Pym of his decision. On getting the instructions, leading State Department officials in Washington doubted the correctness of the decision because it would make no real difference, since Britain would use the veto anyway and relations between the United States and Argentina as well as other Latin American countries would be damaged. But, those at the State Department decided to keep silent because the draft would be rejected by Britain and not the United States.

As a result of State Department pressure and after some reflection, Haig issued the US delegation to the UN with new instructions saying that it should abstain and not vote against. But it was too late. The US Permanent Representative to the UN, Jeane Kirkpatrick, voted in conformity with the initial instruction, that is, against the draft. On receiving new instructions a few minutes later, she surprised the Security Council by asking again for the floor and stating that for technical reasons she had not received appropriate instructions in time and that her veto had been a mistake. "Were it possible to amend her vote, she would like to change it to an abstention."²¹

On hearing of Haig's new instructions, the British representatives at Versailles were enraged. Asked by a participant in the meeting whether it was true that the British were angered by the US stance at the UN, Margaret Thatcher snapped: "I don't do interviews at lunch."²²

I have said that one day Haig called Lord Carrington a "duplicious bastard". This time the British press, recalling the fact, quoted a senior British politician as applying the definition of "double-dealing" to US policy. ***

Washington's support for Britain in the conflict understandably wea-

*** See *The Sunday Times*, June 6, 1982. It is interesting to note that in his book *Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987*, recently published in the United States,

kened US positions in Latin America. An OAS leader said in this connection that the United States had never before done so much to destroy its own image in Latin America.²³

Washington certainly saw this and did its best to set things right. The White House, welcoming the end of the war, expressed "readiness" to help settle the dispute. Its statement deliberately refrained from mentioning either the victor or the vanquished. Contrary to expectations, the US President did not send his ally, Margaret Thatcher, any message congratulating her on victory, and a White House spokesman refused to explain the reason. However, it was clear to everybody that the United States wanted no further deterioration of relations with South American states. Influential members of the US administration insisted that from then on priority in foreign policy be given to rectifying and improving relations with Latin America.

There can be no doubt that during the conflict the United States was motivated by selfish ends as it strove above all else to strengthen its presence in the area of the islands, tie British foreign policy to that of the United States still more and strengthen Atlantic solidarity. Many statements made by Washington and the American press at the time implied that Britain was "indebted" to the United States. Indeed, British Conservatives themselves told me after the war that Britain would always remember the "generosity of the United States" and would certainly reward it for what it had done.

It is also important to note that when hostilities had already begun, US military men and journalists drew attention to the great value of the experience of British operations against the Falklands to the US Rapid Deployment Force. They regarded the British armada's thrust towards the islands as a prototype for such operations, including US operations in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.

Mention should also be made of a further aspect of the problem taken into account by Washington in aiding Britain. To rehabilitate the economy of the Falklands, especially by working oil and gas deposits, Britain would have required huge investments which it simply could not afford. This aspect was not accentuated at the time, nor are the British keen on calling attention to it today. But during the private conversations I had at the time, many businessmen touched on the subject. I recall, in particular, two conversations about it. I had one of them in January 1983 with Ph. Harvey and R. French, leaders of Britain's biggest chemical company, Imperial Chemical Industries. They told me that the military expedition itself had entailed enormous expenditures and that the further maintenance of the islands would cost still more. One of them said, half in jest and half in earnest, that if he could have it his way he would give the inhabitants of the Falklands a million pounds apiece [the population of the islands was close to 1,800 at the time.—V. P.] provided they renounce their British nationality and refuse to stay within the British Empire. That would be much cheaper than maintaining the Falklands.

My interlocutor during the other conversation was Lord Shackleton, Chairman of the East European Trade Council. He headed a government-appointed commission which was drafting a programme for the economic development of the Falklands after victory. He said that to revive economic activity on the Falklands, Britain needed to make large investments. There were minerals on the islands but Britain could not exploit them just yet. It was clear even then that the Falklands could not exist succes-

its author, Bob Woodward, writes that during the war over the Malvinas William Casey, then Director of the CIA, likewise played a double game. He maintained "friendly relations" with the Argentines to get secret information from them which he subsequently turned over to the British secret service.

fully without ties with the United States and Latin America. I may add that this was what the United States counted on as a means of entrenching itself on the islands after the war.

Washington's position during the conflict laid bare the most negative aspects of its foreign policy. Nevertheless, members of the US administration, far from regretting their activities, were proud of them and of the results they had produced. According to Haig: "The course we took was right for our mutual interests and for the collective interest of the West." The US Secretary of State described Britain's action in the war over the Malvinas as a "historic turning point" in contrast to the "long and dangerous night of Western passivity".²⁴

Needless to say, the neocolonial policy of Britain and the United States helped to build up tension in the South Atlantic rather than ease contradictions between Britain and Argentina.

¹ See *The Daily Telegraph*, Apr. 8, 1982.

² A. Haig, *Caveat. Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy*. New York, 1984, p. 273.

³ *The Times*, Apr. 7, 1982; *The Daily Telegraph*, Apr. 12, 1982; *The Guardian*, Apr. 7, 1982.

⁴ *Time*, May 17, 1982, p. 23.

⁵ *The Times*, Apr. 10, 1982.

⁶ *The Daily Telegraph*, Apr. 2, 1982.

⁷ *The Daily Telegraph*, Apr. 13, 1982.

⁸ *The Guardian*, Apr. 13, 1982.

⁹ *The Guardian*, Apr. 17, 1982.

¹⁰ A. Haig, *Op. cit.*, p. 288.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 266.

¹² *House of Commons. Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. 22, Apr. 29, 1982, Col. 1054.

¹³ *The Times*, May 1, 1982.

¹⁴ *Morning Star*, May 1, 1982.

¹⁵ A. Haig, *Op. cit.*, p. 298.

¹⁶ See *The Times*, May 5, 1982.

¹⁷ *U.S. News & World Report*, Apr. 19, 1982, p. 24.

¹⁸ A. Haig, *Op. cit.*, p. 266.

¹⁹ *House of Commons. Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. 25, June 15, 1982, Col. 740.

²⁰ *The Daily Telegraph*, June 11, 1982.

²¹ *The Sunday Times*, June 6, 1982.

²² *Ibidem*.

²³ *Time*, May 17, 1982, p. 22.

²⁴ A. Haig, *Op. cit.*, pp. 298 and 297.

CLARITY. NOTES BY A LECTURER

(Continued from page 117)

sentimental as to call his conversation with the President on this topic a "feast of love"?²

Yes, all this is there, and to make the advance to a nuclear-free world that has begun irreversible, much strenuous effort will yet have to be made. But nobody has ever expected or promised anything different. So what do we have? The fact is that nuclear disarmament, the pivot of all human hopes and aspirations of today, has been given a first and very tangible spur and it is now possible to influence this process, accelerate it and prevent inertia from slowing it down. In other words, humanity is now in a position, as distinct from the recent past, to make a more encouraging choice. And this means a lot.

¹ The Americans say they welcome increasing openness and democracy in our country. If they mean it, they should fully reckon, as we do, with the effects of this process, that is, with greater public control. This implies that in our country nobody could bring himself to do what had no chance of standing the stern test of public opinion.

² For as long as these "risk factors" persist there will be a clear-cut limit to our readiness for selfless effort beyond which we neither will nor can go; it is the vulnerability of the potential aggressor. Nobody should entertain any doubts or illusions about this.

RATIFICATION

The procedure of ratifying the Treaty on Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles began almost simultaneously in Moscow and Washington.

On January 25, 1988, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet passed a resolution expressing its intent to closely examine the Soviet-American treaty which had been already approved by the USSR Council of Ministers. The foreign relations commissions of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of the Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet drafted a relevant conclusion reflecting the opinion of the Soviet public and experts. Relying on this conclusion the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet will thoroughly examine the treaty and pass a resolution on its ratification.

On January 25 the US Senate also began its deliberations on the agreement on the elimination of two classes of nuclear weapons. If ordinarily an important international instrument is discussed in the Foreign Relations Committee, this time the document is also to be examined in the Armed Services Committee and the Intelligence Committee. The Armed Services Committee mainly investigates the military aspects including the consequences a "legalised" treaty would imply for other Pentagon projects, as well as for the security interests of the United States and their allies. The Intelligence Committee deals with the verification problems.

However, it is necessary to note that although both committees are empowered to conduct hearings to clarify individual aspects of the agreement they can neither propose any amendments to the treaty, nor recommend its ratification. They only submit their findings to the Foreign Relations Committee, and on the basis of their reports the latter drafts a summary report and a "resolution on ratification" to be submitted to the Senate in full session. Following the plenary examination of the instrument and, probably, after approving some amendments and supplements to it, there must be a final vote on the treaty. It will be considered ratified, if at least 67 Senators out of the 100 vote for it. Simultaneously the President will sign an instrument of ratification, and then the agreement on IRMs and SRMs enters into force.

Here arises a legitimate question: what is the correlation of forces on Capitol Hill in the "crucial battles" around this epoch-making instrument?

It is generally believed that the core of the Senate, or about 70 of the 100 Senators, favour the treaty, with some "minor reservations" and are probably ready to accept it as it was submitted by the administration for ratification. This group includes such prominent law-makers as Claiborne Pell, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Edward Kennedy; Alan Cranston, a leader of the Democratic Party in the Senate; Sam Nunn, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee and Robert Dole, the Republican minority leader in the Senate. Equally important is the fact that all Democratic presidential contenders and the leading Republi-

can candidate George Bush have declared their support for the Soviet-American agreement.

There is "assured" opposition to the treaty by a score of ultra-conservative Republican Senators led by Jesse Helms nicknamed Senator No for the hard line he invariably takes. One also cannot discount the possibility of a growing number of No-men. In this respect quite indicative are the results of the voting last October on the Helms amendment which, if passed, would have prohibited the US President from signing the INF Treaty until he publicly proved that the Soviet Union had not violated the ABM Treaty. Although that move was defeated it was supported by 28 Senators.

The ultra-Right opposition has quite a few supporters outside the Senate. As a rule, these are people who view any US-Soviet accord as an unacceptable return to detente. They even set up a special committee in Washington against ratification of the INF Treaty, a lobby whose sole aim is to knock together a team of at least 34 Senators opposing the agreement. Precisely 34 votes are needed to make the ratification end in failure. The opponents of the treaty enjoy the "intellectual backing" of the so-called Atlantists led by Henry Kissinger who theoretically substantiates the fallaciousness of the document. He trumpets alarm over a breach in the united USA-Europe front which a "nuclear undocking" of the USA and NATO would allegedly cause. It comes as no surprise that the former State Secretary opposes not only and not so much the treaty itself as the trend it reflects.

There is an additional risk factor involved which can overrun all calculations. This is a group of the wavering Senators who remain undecided as regards the treaty. It includes first of all novice Republican Senators elected in 1986 and some Democrats from the South who hold more conservative views than their party in general does. Observers believe that the outcome of the ratification process will largely depend on the position eventually taken by this group of wavering Senators.

Although the correlation of forces in the Senate allows for optimism in appraising the chances for ratification, nonetheless the situation does not exclude various unexpected developments which may call in question the fate of the treaty. For instance, the role of such unforeseen impediments can be played by various tactical ruses of the Right who are inclined to lead the discussion astray from its subject to the examination of minor, concomitant problems. Acting precisely in this manner the Helms group has requested several times the postponement of ratification until the Soviet Union dismantled the Krasnoyarsk radar station and clarified the situation with mobile ABM radars near Gornel.

Observers believe that the greatest danger to the treaty is posed by the attempts of its few but very arful opponents to wreck the agreement through all sorts of amendments, specifications and supplements, including such that would require new talks with the Soviet Union. Incidentally, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee once adopted 20 various supplements to the SALT-2 treaty. The ultra-conservative Senators have plenty of opportunities to torpedo any serious work on the understandings: according to the rules of procedure amendments can be made both when examining the instrument in the Foreign Relations Committee and at the subsequent plenary session of the Senate.

The Helms group intends to supplement the agreement, for example, by linking the ratification of the INF Treaty to the Afghan problem, to the "rectification" by the Soviet Union of "its violations" of the existing accords on curbing the arms race or to its concessions in the elaboration of future agreements, on strategic offensive arms in particular. There might also be amendments introduced to cover potential risks. Such is, for example, the "long-range legislative initiative" which would provide

for some items in the Pentagon budget allocating funds to produce compensatory systems of weapons in case the American side learns that the Soviet Union violates or sidetracks the INF Treaty.

Some supplements "improving" the treaty in the field of verification can be proposed: more on-site inspections, inspections on the unspecified objects, i. e., not covered by such verification measures.

There are all kinds of so-called killer-amendments. For instance, they may confirm the USA's right to deploy new tactical nuclear missiles systems or increase the number of existing missiles in Western Europe if the Soviet Union is "caught red-handed" in violating the agreed-upon schedule for eliminating missiles, as well as other provisions in the agreement.

By attaching a set of amendments to the treaty the conservatives want to use it to "rectify" the disproportions in the Europe-deployed weapons. It is quite possible that Senator Nunn who supports the agreement in principle only will propose a reservation under which the US administration would be prohibited to eliminate the remaining Pershings at the final stage of the implementation of the INF Treaty if by that time no tangible progress has been made in reaching an agreement on conventional weapons.

The tactic used by the treaty's supporters is to turn these amendments into recommendations which would not affect the document itself. In general, it should be noted that the policies pursued by the administration and the Democratic majority in the Senate are determined on the whole by the need to speed up ratification in order to, taking into consideration the regrettable SALT-2 experience, make it possible to extricate the present agreement from the realm of election debates. Otherwise the INF Treaty will become a hostage of American domestic politics with all the ensuing consequences. The same logic requires that the ratification process proceed against the background of business-like smooth Soviet-American relations untarnished by needless external irritants. It is important that this condition be realised by both sides.

The discussion over possible amendments shows that the debate in the Senate is relevant not only to the future of the INF Treaty but invariably concerns the content of the Soviet-American relations, their existing concept and the alternative of its evolution. It would be hoped that the agreement under review will be a good cause for re-evaluating many established ways of thinking and elaborating realistic approaches to interaction between the two great powers.

Pyotr GOROKHOV

On the History of Socialist Community

Л. Н. Нежинский. У истоков социалистического содружества. СССР и страны Центральной и Юго-Восточной Европы во 2-ой половине 40-х годов XX столетия. (The Early Years of Socialist Community. The USSR and the Nations of Central and Southeast Europe in 1945-1950), Moscow, Mezhdunarodniye Otnosheniya Publishers, 1987, 272 pp.

This book illuminates issues connected with the initial stages of socialist construction in Central and Southeast Europe and the development of international relations from their transitional forms to the new socialist form. Two concepts of the revolutionary development process are laid out. According to one, the revolution went through two separate strategic stages, one growing into the other: popular democratic and socialist. According to the second concept, most countries of the region went through two revolutions—a popular-democratic one and a socialist one with the first developing into the second; Yugoslavia and Bulgaria are said to have had from the very beginning socialist revolutions (p. 52, 53). But, regardless of how the revolutionary process in these countries is interpreted, this process was due to the deep, internal preconditions and revolution was not exported by the Soviet Army (p. 57, 58).

The book closely examines common traits as well as national unique distinctions of the revolutionary transformation in these countries. The author stresses that the victory of socialism was due in large measure to the unity among the working class and the merger of the Communists and the left Social Democrats into united proletarian parties (p. 71-72). Control by Communist Party representatives of government bodies of internal affairs and state security in these nations was important in aiding socialist revolution success (p. 129) as was the presence of the Red Army which prevented the export of counter-revolution by the imperialist countries (p. 61).

Speaking on the specifics of the socialist revolutions in these countries, the author

stresses the difference between them and the October Revolution, pointing to the activities of the national fronts which in many of these nations consisted of several political parties. With the development of the revolutionary process, the parties of the bourgeoisie and the landowners which were part of the government, finding themselves isolated, appealed to foreign reaction to assist them. However, thanks to the solid alliance between the working class and the peasantry in these countries and the USSR's economic and political support, the popular-democratic power not only survived under imperialist pressure, but was able to consolidate the revolutionary achievements which were made and later make the transition to socialism.

Much of the work concerns itself with the young people's democracies' foreign policy, in particular foreign economic policy. The author convincingly shows how these states were able to attain economic and political independence from the West because of the USSR's support and direct aid to the people of these nations, who were suffering from the destruction caused by the war. The USSR gave decisive assistance in concluding just peace treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania which had for so long been hindered by the manoeuvres of imperialist diplomacy.

Nezhinsky gives solid evidence to show how, aided by Soviet diplomacy, the popular-democratic states rebuffed attempts by the Western nations to seize a portion of their territory and give it over to neighbouring bourgeois states, for example, handing over a considerable part of Albania to Greece. He shows how the USSR helped justly resolve Yugoslavia's and Poland's territorial

problems as well as problems related to reparations of Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria. Due to the USSR's assistance, the Danube nations were able to defend their independence and sovereignty in resolving shipping problems in the Danube basin. Nizhinsky examines various forms of food, economic and financial aid lent by the USSR to the nations of Central and Southeast Europe as well as trade and economic agreements the Soviet Union concluded with these nations.

The author refutes allegations made by bourgeois scholars about the Soviet Union's economic exploitation of the people's democracies and points to how the USSR, in consideration of the poor economic state of these countries, cut reparations and developed mutually beneficial economic cooperation by establishing joint stock societies which would later form the basis of national industry.

Much of the book deals with the assimilation of the Soviet Union's experience. The author writes of how the communist and workers' parties of the nations of the Central and Southeast Europe tried to take into account their specific conditions for development. But for a number of objective and subjective reasons most of development was based on an uncritical imitation of the Soviet experience since there was no other example to follow. This was one reason why internal crises arose like those in the GDR in 1953 and in Hungary and Poland in 1956. The author justly stresses that Stalin's personality cult led to a serious deformation of foreign policy, in particular of Soviet-Yugoslav relations from 1948 through 1955. Due to the restoration of Leninist norms within the CPSU and the Soviet state, mistakes were corrected as was reflected in the USSR government declaration of October 30, 1956 *On the Basis of Development and Further Consolidation of Friendship and Cooperation Between the Soviet Union and Other Socialist Countries*.

The book is not free of shortcomings. The main one is that the author cannot seem to get off the beaten track when illuminating many issues. He follows the interpretation of the development of socialist community by Soviet social scientists, and this interpretation, it must be said, is not always correct and not always able to stand up to scientific criticism. Even now only one way is

given—there is no allowance for variations—for the consolidation of the socialist community, although alternatives did exist, if only in the form of "national models of socialism", worked out in the initial postwar years in some countries, and tendencies towards regional cooperation including plans for federalising the Balkan people's democracies and for their customs union. The author decided against touching on this issue which has for so long been taboo.

One can also point to a methodological error made by the author: he makes non-differentiated use of the concepts of the "world socialist system" and "socialist community" (p. 3-4, 294, 243), although these are distinguished in political documents and scientific literature. At one point Nizhinsky himself mentions this (p. 247). Undoubtedly, there is no impenetrable wall between the socialist community nations and other socialist countries, which are component parts of the world socialist system. However, the fact remains: China, North Korea, Yugoslavia and Albania do not belong to the multilateral organisations of fraternal states³ and do not participate in joint work on coordinating foreign political and foreign economic actions, ideological and international activities. The authors' nondifferentiated use of the aforementioned concepts does not allow for the explanation of the book's title *The Early Years of Socialist Community* because the reader is not given an answer to the question of what historical conditions existed for most of the countries of the region to unite in CMEA and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and what the reasons are for the non-participation of the aforementioned countries of the world socialist system in these organisations today.

It must also be noted that the author says nothing of what influence the peculiarities of development of Yugoslavia and Albania (countries which in the course of the anti-fascist war of 1941-1945 formed their own popular-liberation armies) had on historical developments.

On the whole, in spite of the noted weak points, the book will be a useful publication. It is a popular scientific study which acquaints the reader with various viewpoints on the problems of the revolutionary process, the formation of interstate cooperation in the 1940s in this region of the world.

Yuri NOVOPASHIN,
Boris POLYAKOV

The Paradoxes of an "Information Affluence"

Gérard Mermet, *Démocrature. Comment les médias transforment la démocratie*, Paris, Aubier, 1987, 262 pp.

The all pervading information flow has become a distinguishing sign of the times, with the mass media having evolved into an independent phenomenon. Its significance needs no proof. It is therefore only natural that this phenomenon is evoking the keen interest of specialists, philosophers and sociologists who are trying to analyse it, offering their own vision of the mass media's role in society and the nature of its inter-relationships and possible evolution.

This is the subject of a new book by well-known French sociologist Gérard Mermet, a prominent expert in social psychology and the author of several interesting studies which provide a broad panorama of social processes occurring in France in the 1980s.

The book's central idea is that the present level of development of the mass media is changing the nature of bourgeois democracy in industrialised nations. Pursuing M. Mac Lulian's tenet that personality is moulded by the mass media, the author claims that the press, radio and television subordinate both the individual and society as a whole to a sort of "soft dictatorship" that opens the way to the most sophisticated forms of manipulation of the human consciousness. That is why Mermet submits that at present the West is confronted with a new social model which he wittily calls a "démocrature" (p. 7). According to the author, that system combines the benefits of a democracy and the shortcomings of a dictatorship. Unlike many bourgeois sociologists, however, he does not regard that system as a "mediacracy", i. e. unlimited dominion of the mass media, but rather as a "neocracy", stressing thereby the complex interdependence between its three major components, namely sources of information ("actors"), its recipients ("audience") and the media itself.

It is symbolic that the notion of "actor" is given an unusually broad interpretation, encompassing not only performers themselves (politicians, public and religious figu-

res, actors, journalists, sportsmen) but also institutions, organisations (a nation's leadership, enterprises, political parties, trade unions, and the church) as well as goods, services and ideas. The "audience" comprises all members of society, users of information. Apart from the press, radio and television, the author includes in the mass media category the cinema and other entertainment, books, music, photography, telex, telephone, a computer network, and so on. Each of the three elements indicated by the author seeks to make the three-piece structure operate to its own advantage, which, according to Mermet, gives rise to contradictions between the actual state of affairs and the "theoretical mission" of the mass communications as well as between social needs and a direct audience response.

The author indicates quite a few faults of the modern mass media pattern; the main shortcomings, in his view, are as follows: selection of subjects and events on the basis of their visual effect rather than their significance; coverage of events and facts not in their objective reality but through well thought-out *mise en scènes* and gaudy decorations designed to attract audience's attention; superficial examination of simple issues to the detriment of an in-depth analysis of complex problems; preference given to the rare, abnormal, negative and frightening over the ordinary, normal, positive, and reassuring; and a hypertrophic and distorted reflection of reality. Elaborating on the idea that the mass media, and television in particular, are "reforming" objective reality, Mermet legitimately notes that such a practice eventually leads to the dissemination of false truths and stereotypes and the propagation of certain reactions and models of behaviour.

Thus, the principal drawback of the new system—"démocrature"—is that "our vision of the world largely depends on how it is presented to us" (p. 230). Yet, the author, places the burden of responsibility for the

distortion of reality on the "audience" that gives preference to sensationalism. For the same reason, the mass media allegedly "cannot show the world as it actually is" (p. 230) but rather is compelled to chase after sensations and to "trade" in goods "in short supply", i. e. to actively explore relevant and attention-getting subjects like terrorism, crime, AIDS, drug addiction, scandals, or traditional topics like sex, violence, money, and celebrities (p. 131). Even though Mermet mentions the pressure brought to bear on the mass media by shareholders, promoters and information "carriers", he does not ask a question that naturally arises in this context: Who benefits from this distortion of reality? Herein lies a substantial methodological weakness in the author's "objective" approach to covering the entire gamut of problems related to the mass media in modern Western society. Such an approach misinterprets the socio-political role and true function of the mass media within bourgeois democracy, of which it is an integral component, in spite of the much-publicised autonomy, suprapartisanship and lack of bias.

But the powers of observation and perspicacity of a highly knowledgeable sociologist have not allowed Mermet to brush aside the problem of the relationships between the mass media and big business. He adduces specific examples to show that many managers of major enterprises and firms regard the information sphere as a most promising market for the future. According to the book, half of all business activity in the United States is closely linked with the gathering and processing of information (p. 57). Business interests and personal ambitions of big-league industrialists, in the authors' view are grounds for pessimism as regards the future social role of the mass media. "Money, image, fame and power are the main reasons behind the attraction felt by the vested interests to the mass media. This phenomenon will undoubtedly be of major consequence for the life of each and every person" (p. 59).

Having arrived at this conclusion, however, Mermet is reluctant, for some reason to take up the problem, so acute for both France and other industrialised nations, of the concentration of mass communications in the hands of industrial tycoons, as a result of which "freedom of information" is but a sham. Leaving aside that process, Mermet has also passed over the problem of

growing socio-political tensions and conflicts which have become a daily part of the world of journalism in France and other countries. He also skips over the plainly anti-socialist and anti-Soviet thrust of much of bourgeois mass media, occasionally suffering from outright subjectivism. In particular, referring to many cases of distorted truth during the Chernobyl tragedy, the author accentuates only the fact that the authorities deliberately published lower-than-actual data concerning the radiation level in France in order not to arouse public opinion. Yet, he turns a blind eye to the fact that many organs of the press, radio and television in the West, exaggerating the magnitude of the accident, were spreading the most far-fetched rumours and fabrications regarding its implications for the USSR.

Such "omissions" by Mermet do not detract from the importance of the book which contains many accurate judgements and descriptions. Of interest, for example, is a thesis on the "demassification" of the mass media, which would appear paradoxical at first glance. But the author conclusively shows the growing selectiveness of the mass media, the increasingly differentiated approach taken by the press towards various sections of the reading audience, the orientation of information towards specific social groups with due regard to age, sex, occupation, cultural level, and political affiliation. The trend of "personalisation", which is dialectically conducive to the growing massiveness of the media, is plainly seen in the programmes of "free radio stations" (there are 2,000 of them in France) as well as state-owned radio stations.

Similar changes are occurring in French television. Even though, according to Mermet, in general it has thus far maintained its orientation towards an "average statistical" viewer, the collapse of the state monopoly and the emergence of cable TV technology are steadily leading to a 'segmentation' of telecasts and the programmes as a whole. The author shows that, given the tough competition and the existence of a European TV network and satellite broadcasting, Western nations are suffering from a veritable "war of images" that dramatically affects the quality and nature of telecasting, which, in turn, has an adverse impact on shaping tastes, a general educational and cultural level, and information provided to broad strata of the population, particularly youth.

This phenomenon cannot but cause concern, considering that the French spend an average of six hours daily, that is, all their free time, for "communicating" with the mass media. According to numerous public opinion polls, 33 per cent of the national population prefer watching television to all other pastime activities. Mermet notes that television is the most potent drug there is; it dooms the viewer to a passive perception of images and ideas.

The book focuses on the process of information "objectivisation" that is reflected in having constant references to expert opinion and in the frequent conducting of public opinion polls. The author points to the biased character of expert views and the personal interests that motivate experts. He critically analyses the polling pattern which opens up quite a few possibilities for distorting the true state of affairs (the wording of questions, the time schedule of polling, etc.). The authors' conclusion is rather eloquent: "On the whole, public opinion polls constitute an effective instrument wielded by those who wish to juggle with public opi-

nion" (p. 140).

In conclusion, Mermet outlines main trends of further development of the mass media, about which he is rather pessimistic. First, he worries over the fate of French culture in the face of the information expansion of countries boasting a more powerful press, radio and television and, in particular, the veritable diktat of mass Anglo-American culture. Second, the author presumes that the information "superabundance" may cause a psychological shock among its users and a real idiosyncrasy which might result in an actual boycott of the media by the audience. Finally, the researcher doubts that, if the present trends continue, any positive changes or the "humanisation" of mass communication are possible.

On the whole, notwithstanding internal contradictions, some debatable points and a certain incompleteness of the analysis made, Gérard Mermet's new book is undoubtedly an interesting and unique study which gives a deeper insight into the complex processes transpiring today in the bourgeois mass media.

Boris GRIGORYEV

The Mechanism of Inter-System Economic Relations

Л. А. Славинская, *Механизм экономических отношений Восток-Запад*
(The Mechanism of East-West Economic Relations), Moscow, Mezhdunarodniye Otnosheniya Publishers, 1987, 248 pp.

The monograph under review is one of those works which forces the reader to take a fresh look at what would seem to be a traditional problem. The author attempts not only to develop his own concept of inter-system economic relations, but to interpret on its basis the practice of East-West business cooperation today.

We found the author's study of the actual structure of the mechanism of East-West economic relations a fruitful one. The complexity, specificity and contradictory nature of this mechanism lie in the fact that the system of concrete economic and economic-legal forms of organisation, instruments and methods of control "is a form of conflict of

production relations between two antagonistic modes of production apparent in phenomena of the international division of labour" (p. 16). At the same time, one can only agree with the author that "in any given historical period the level of contribution made by East-West economic ties to the social and economic development of socialism and capitalism in the final count is determined by the pace of their competition in all spheres of public life and to a large degree depends on the correlation of the two sides' economic potential" (p. 62). The author distinguishes internal (national) and external (international) aspects with the former playing the decisive role as well as

the interplay of concrete forms of economic ties among state-partners, and economic methods and instruments for organisation and regulation of these ties and, finally, the institutional-legal formalisation of cooperation. The author notes that inter-system production relations are built on the basis of objective economic laws common to both socialism and capitalism.

Much of the book focuses on an analysis of actual functioning models of the mechanism of relations between socialist and capitalist countries. Unfortunately, these questions are seen mainly as they relate to the European CMEA countries, including the USSR. This study would have benefited from an analysis of models of economic ties like those between Yugoslavia and the West and China and the West which possess many specific features. A study of the differences among countries, of the diversity of forms of the economic mechanism existing in economic practice would, on our view, notably enrich the work and allow the author to make additional conclusions and practical recommendations.

Tracing the basic tendencies in the development of planning and management of external economic ties of the European CMEA member countries with capitalist states on the national and international levels, the author arrives at the conclusion that "realisation of the possibilities of the socialist integrational mechanism by introducing methods of planning and management of economic ties between the socialist countries and the West on the basis agreed upon within the framework of CMEA is currently not only desirable but vitally necessary" (p. 112). However, the author merely lists the possible ways of solving this problem. Beyond the framework of the study are important issues concerning closer coordination of policy pursued by the socialist countries in international economic organisations.

Revealing what is general as well as specific in state-monopoly regulation of economic relations with socialist countries, the author examines in detail its national aspect (the policies of the USA, the EEC and Japan) and only partially the international one. Outside the range of vision remains the majority of international organisations—

NATO, COCOM, GATT, the IMF, and Trilateral Commission, and so on which deal with the coordination of the West's foreign economic policies with regard to the socialist countries.

Of interest is the conclusion, though not adequately backed, that of late an "obvious imbalance is observed on an international plane in the development, on the one hand, of the system of planning and management of foreign economic ties of the socialist countries with the West, and, on the other hand, of the system of state-monopoly and private enterprise regulation of economic relations between the capitalist partners and the socialist countries" (p. 172).

As the author notes, the lower level of the Soviet Union's development of economic relations with the capitalist countries as compared to the other European CMEA member countries in the sphere of production and production-dependent areas to a substantial degree explains the negative trends in the structure of trade between the USSR and the West. The fact that these problems are posed is important. Unfortunately, however, they are largely explained schematically.

The author pays particular attention to ways of improving the mechanism of economic relations between the USSR and the capitalist countries, primarily to the elaboration of a broad range of specific proposals for achieving the foreign economic goals outlined in the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers. We can not altogether agree with all the proposals advanced. Clearly doubtful, for example, is the thesis that the greatest opportunity for expanding Soviet export of machine tools through the development of cooperation with the West lies in the mass production of standard lathes and not in making special, unique lathes which determine the level of progress in lathe building (p. 226).

On the whole, this monograph is distinguished by the fresh approach taken towards the problems examined and by the striving to elaborate concrete proposals for increasing the effectiveness of the mechanism of the USSR's and other CMEA countries' foreign economic ties with the capitalist countries.

Sergei SHIBAYEV

RESOLUTIONS

ADOPTED BY THE 42ND SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 41/92 of 4 December 1986, entitled "Establishment of a comprehensive system of international peace and security",

Emphasizing that the great political, economic and social changes and scientific progress that have taken place in the world since the adoption of the Charter of the United Nations and the most acute urgent task of the present day—to remove the threat of a world war, a nuclear war—give increased importance to the purposes and principles of the Charter and to the need for their more effective application in the conduct of States, wherever carried on,

Convinced that in the nuclear and space age, in conditions of the indivisibility of peace and security in all parts of the world and the increasing interdependence among nations, the challenges of our times make a strengthening of multilateral co-operation in all fields and collaboration on ways and means to implement the security system provided for in the Charter indispensable,

Convinced of the need for the effective universal application of the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force in international relations and of the importance of the role of the United Nations in this regard,

Reaffirming the inalienable right of every State to choose its political, economic, social and cultural systems without interference in any form by another State,

Recognizing the common interest of all nations in promoting an effective and comprehensive approach to security, which will seek the common security of all nations, by their joint actions and in all fields,

Convinced that new thinking that stems from the knowledge that States can only survive with one another, not against one another, should govern their actions,

Emphasizing that in their approach to the problems of security, States should give priority to universally accepted human values and the promotion of the rule of law among nations in accordance with the Charter,

Expressing its firm conviction that ensuring reliable security for every State and for all States together is possible only through peaceful political means, by strengthening international mechanisms, above all the United Nations,

Emphasizing that, in accordance with the Charter, universal and comprehensive security requires joint efforts of all the participants in international relations, without exception, in the crucial, essential for international security and interrelated areas of disarmament, peaceful settlement of crises and conflicts, economic development and co-operation, preservation of the environment, and promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion,

1. Urges all States to focus their efforts on ensuring integral universal security through peaceful political means on an equal basis and in all spheres of international relations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and within the United Nations framework;

2. Solemnly reaffirms that the collective security mechanism embodied in the Charter of the United Nations constitutes the fundamental and irreplaceable instrument for the preservation of international peace and security;

3. Expresses its conviction that there should be continuation and development of an effective dialogue in the United Nations and other forums in all directions and at all levels, in order to bridge different concepts and examine generally acceptable ways and means of ensuring comprehensive security in accordance with the Charter, bearing in mind the realities of the nuclear and space age;

4. Declares that the road to security lies through practical steps to strengthen trust among States on the basis of overcoming confrontational approaches and consolidating the norms of civilized conduct and the atmosphere of information of the public and openness in international relations;

5. Reaffirms that all states should adhere strictly to the fundamental principles of international law, especially respect for the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of States, non-intervention and non-interference in their internal affairs, refraining from the threat or use of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, equality and self-determination of peoples, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, co-operation among States and compliance in good faith with their obligations assumed in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

6. Calls upon all States, including in bilateral and multilateral forums dealing with disarmament issues, to multiply their efforts in order to prevent an arms race in outer space and to halt and reverse it on Earth, to lower the level of military confrontation and to enhance global stability;

7. Calls upon States and United Nations organs, within their mandate and in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter, to utilize fully the existing means of peaceful settlement of international disputes and conflicts through negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, the use of good offices, including those of the Secretary-General, or other means of their own free choice;

8. Calls upon all States and the appropriate economic forums to use to the maximum extent all opportunities for promoting a stable and equitable world economic environment and, to that end, to strengthen international co-operation for development and to work towards a new international economic order, elaborating the necessary and mutually acceptable measures ensuring economic development and equitable co-operation;

9. Calls upon all States to co-operate broadly with each other in the humanitarian field and to promote and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all;

10. Considers that interaction in the ecological sphere should become an integral part of comprehensive international security;

11. Calls upon Member States to strengthen and enhance the role and efficiency of the United Nations system as an indispensable instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security with a view to solving international issues for the benefit of all States and elaborating guarantees of comprehensive security for all on an equal basis;

12. Further calls for the implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations;

13. Calls upon international and national non-governmental organizations and political and public figures in all countries to make their positive contribution to the development of a productive and meaningful international dialogue on the ways and means of promoting comprehensive security based on the Charter and within the United Nations framework;

14. Requests the Secretary-General to explore the ways and means of organizing an exchange of views on the subject among the Member States and to report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session;

15. Decides to include in the agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Comprehensive System of international peace and security".

DECLARATION ON THE ENHANCEMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 41/76 of 3 December 1986, in which it decided that the Special Committee on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Non-Use of Force in International Relations should complete a draft declaration on the enhancement of the effectiveness of the principle, including, as appropriate, recommendations on the peaceful settlement of disputes, and submit its final report containing a draft declaration to the General Assembly at its forty-second session,

Taking note of the report of the Special Committee on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Non-Use of Force in International Relations which met in New York from 9 to 27 March 1987,

Considering that the Special Committee has completed a draft Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations and decided to submit it to the General Assembly for consideration and adoption,

Convinced of the need for the effective universal application of the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force in international relations and of the importance of the role of the United Nations in this regard,

Convinced also that the adoption of the Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations should contribute to the improvement of international relations,

1. Approves the Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations, the text of which is annexed to the present resolution;

2. Expresses its appreciation to the Special Committee on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Non-Use of Force in International Relations for completing its work by elaborating the Declaration;

3. Recommends that all efforts should be made so that the Declaration becomes generally known.

ANNEX

DECLARATION ON THE ENHANCEMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The General Assembly,

Recalling the principle that States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,

Recalling that this principle is enshrined in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations and has been reaffirmed in a number of international instruments,

Reaffirming the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the Definition of Aggression and the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes,

Reaffirming the obligation to maintain international peace and security in conformity with the purposes of the United Nations,

Expressing deep concern at the continued existence of situations of conflict and tension and the impact of the persistence of violations of the principle of refraining from the threat

or use of force on the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as at the loss of human life and material damage in the countries affected, whose development may thereby be set back,

Desiring to remove the risk of new armed conflicts between States by promoting a change in the international climate from confrontation to peaceful relations and co-operation and taking other appropriate measures to strengthen international peace and security,

Convinced that, in the present world situation, in which nuclear weapons exist, there is no reasonable alternative to peaceful relations among States,

Fully aware that the question of general and complete disarmament is of the utmost importance and that peace, security, fundamental freedoms and economic and social development are indivisible,

Noting with concern the pernicious impact of terrorism on international relations,

Stressing the need for all States to desist from any forcible action aimed at depriving peoples of their right to self-determination, freedom and independence,

Reaffirming the obligation of States to settle their international disputes by peaceful means,

Conscious of the importance of strengthening the United Nations system of collective security,

Bearing in mind the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms as essential factors for international peace and security,

Convinced that States have a common interest in promoting a stable and equitable world economic environment as an essential basis for world peace and that, to that end, they should strengthen international co-operation for development and work towards a new international economic order,

Reconfirming the commitment of States to the basic principle of the sovereign equality of States,

Reaffirming the inalienable right of every State to choose its political, economic, and social and cultural systems without interference in any form by another State,

Recalling that States are under an obligation not to intervene directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State,

Reaffirming the duty of States to refrain in their international relations from military, political, economic or any other form of coercion aimed against the political independence or territorial integrity of any State,

Reaffirming the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in the Charter,

Reaffirming that States shall fulfil in good faith all their obligations under international law,

Aware of the urgent need to enhance the effectiveness of the principle that States shall refrain from the threat or use of force in order to contribute to the establishment of lasting peace and security for all States,

Solemnly declares that:

I

1. Every State has the duty to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Such a threat or use of force constitutes a violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations and entails international responsibility.

2. The principle of refraining from the threat or use of force in international relations is universal in character and is binding regardless of each State's political, economic, social or cultural system or relations of alliance.

3. No consideration of whatever nature may be invoked to warrant resorting to the threat or use of force in violation of the Charter of the United Nations.

4. States have the duty not to urge, encourage or assist other States to resort to the threat or use of force in violation of the Charter of the United Nations.

5. By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right freely to determine, without external

interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

6. States shall fulfil their obligations under international law to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in paramilitary, terrorist or subversive acts, including acts of mercenaries, in other States, or acquiescing in organized activities within their territory directed towards the commission of such acts.

7. States have the duty to abstain from armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements.

8. No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind.

9. In accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, States have the duty to refrain from propaganda for wars of aggression.

10. Neither acquisition of territory resulting from the threat or use of force nor any occupation of territory resulting from the threat or use of force in contravention of international law will be recognized as legal acquisition or occupation.

11. A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.

12. In conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with the relevant paragraphs contained in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States shall fulfil in good faith all their international obligations.

13. States have the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations.

II

14. States shall make every effort to build their international relations on the basis of mutual understanding, trust, respect and co-operation in all areas.

15. States should also promote bilateral and regional co-operation as one of the important means to enhance the effectiveness of the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force in international relations.

16. States shall abide by their commitment to the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes, which is inseparable from the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force in their international relations.

17. States parties to international disputes shall settle their disputes exclusively by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. For this purpose they shall utilize such means as negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice, including good offices.

18. States shall take effective measures which, by their scope and by their nature, constitute steps towards the ultimate achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

19. States should take effective measures in order to prevent the danger of any armed conflicts, including those in which nuclear weapons could be used, to prevent an arms race in outer space and to halt and reverse it on Earth, to lower the level of military confrontation and to enhance global stability.

20. States should co-operate in order to undertake active efforts aimed at ensuring the relaxation of international tensions, the consolidation of the international legal order and the respect of the system of international security established by the Charter of the United Nations.

21. States should establish appropriate confidence-building measures aimed at preventing and reducing tensions and at creating a better climate among them.

22. States reaffirm that the respect for effective exercise of all human rights and fundamental freedoms and protection thereof are essential factors for international peace and security, as well as for justice and the development of friendly relations and co-operation

among all States. Consequently, they should promote and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, *inter alia*, by strictly complying with their international obligations and considering as appropriate becoming parties to the principal international instruments in this field.

23. States shall co-operate at the bilateral, regional and international levels in order to:

(a) Prevent and combat international terrorism;

(b) Contribute actively to the elimination of the causes underlying international terrorism.

24. States shall endeavour to take concrete measures and promote favourable conditions in the international economic environment in order to achieve international peace, security and justice; they will take into account the interest of all in the narrowing of the differences in the levels of economic development, and in particular the interest of developing countries throughout the world.

III

25. The competent United Nations organs should make full use of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations in the field of maintenance of international peace and security with a view to enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force in international relations.

26. States should co-operate fully with the organs of the United Nations in supporting their action relating to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the peaceful settlement of international disputes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. In particular, they should enhance the role of the Security Council so that it can fully and effectively discharge its duties. In this regard, the permanent members of the Security Council have a special responsibility under the Charter.

27. States should strive to enhance the effectiveness of the collective security system through the effective implementation of the provisions of the Charter, particularly those relating to the special responsibilities of the Security Council in this regard. They should also fully discharge their obligations to support United Nations peace-keeping operations decided upon in accordance with the Charter. States shall accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the Charter.

28. States should give the Security Council every possible type of assistance in all actions taken by it for the just settlement or crisis situations and regional conflicts. They should strengthen the part the Security Council can play in preventing disputes and situations the continuation of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. They should facilitate the task of the Council in reviewing situations of potential danger for international peace and security at as early a stage as possible.

29. The fact-finding capacity of the Security Council should be enhanced on an *ad hoc* basis in accordance with the Charter.

30. States should give full effect to the important role conferred by the Charter on the General Assembly in the area of peaceful settlement of disputes and the maintenance of international peace and security.

31. States should encourage the Secretary-General to exercise fully his functions with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security and the peaceful settlement of disputes, in accordance with the Charter, including those under Articles 98 and 99, and fully co-operate with him in this respect.

32. States should take into consideration that legal disputes should, as a general rule, be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court as an important factor for strengthening the maintenance of international peace and security. The General Assembly and the Security Council should consider making use of the provisions of the Charter concerning the possibility of requesting the Court to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.

33. States parties to regional arrangements or agencies should consider making greater use of such arrangements and agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate, pursuant to Article 52 of the Charter.

Declares that nothing in the present Declaration shall be construed as:

(a) Enlarging or diminishing in any way the scope of the provisions of the Charter concerning cases in which the use of force is lawful;

(b) Prejudicing in any manner the relevant provisions of the Charter or the rights and duties of Member States or the scope of the functions and powers of the United Nations organs under the Charter, in particular those relating to the threat or use of force;

Declares that nothing in the present Declaration could in any way prejudice the right to self-determination, freedom and independence, as derived from the Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right and referred to in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, particularly peoples under colonial and racist régimes or other forms of alien domination; nor the right of these peoples to struggle to that end and to seek and receive support, in accordance with the principles of the Charter and in conformity with the above-mentioned Declaration;

Confirms that, in the event of a conflict between the obligations of Members of the United Nations under the Charter of the United Nations and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the Charter will prevail in accordance with Article 103 of the Charter.

PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE

The General Assembly,

Inspired by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a result of man's entry into outer space,

Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,

Reaffirming that the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind,

Reaffirming further the will of all States that the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be for peaceful purposes,

Recalling that the States parties to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, have undertaken, in article III, to carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding,

Reaffirming, in particular, article IV of the above-mentioned Treaty, which stipulates that States parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner,

Reaffirming also paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, in which it is stated that, in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty,

Recalling its resolutions 36/97 C and 36/99 of 9 December 1981, as well as resolutions 37/83 of 9 December 1982, 37/99 D of 13 December 1982, 38/70 of 15 December 1983, 39/59 of 12 December 1984, 40/87 of 12 December 1985, and 41/53 of 3 December 1986 and the relevant paragraphs of the Political Declaration adopted by the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Harare from 1 to 6 September 1986,

Gravely concerned at the danger posed to all mankind by an arms race in outer space and, in particular, by the impending threat of the exacerbation of the current state of insecurity by developments that could further undermine international peace and security and retard the pursuit of general and complete disarmament,

Mindful of the widespread interest expressed by Member States in the course of the negotiations on and following the adoption of the above-mentioned Treaty in ensuring that the exploration and use of outer space should be for peaceful purposes, and taking note of proposals submitted to the General Assembly at its tenth special session devoted to disarmament and at its regular sessions and to the Conference on Disarmament,

Noting the grave concern expressed by the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space at the extension of an arms race into outer space and the recommendations made to the competent organs of the United Nations, in particular the General Assembly, and also to the Committee on Disarmament,

Convinced that further measures are needed for the prevention of an arms race in outer space,

Recognizing that, in the context of multilateral negotiations for preventing an arms race in outer space, bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America could make a significant contribution to such an objective, in accordance with paragraph 27 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Noting with satisfaction that bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America have continued since 1985 on a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate-range, and in their relationship, with the declared objective, endorsed in the joint statement of their leaders on 21 November 1985, of working out effective agreements aimed, inter alia, at preventing an arms race in outer space,

Anxious that concrete results should emerge from these negotiations as soon as possible,

Taking note of the report of the Conference on Disarmament,

Welcoming the re-establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space during the 1987 session of the Conference on Disarmament, in the exercise of the negotiating responsibilities of this sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, to continue to examine and to identify through substantive and general consideration issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space,

Noting that the work accomplished in 1987 by the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament has contributed to a fuller identification of issues and a better understanding of a number of problems and to a clearer perception of the various positions,

1. Recalls the obligation of all States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their space activities;

2. Reaffirms that general and complete disarmament under effective international control warrants that outer space shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and that it shall not become an arena for an arms race;

3. Emphasizes that further measures with appropriate and effective provisions for verification to prevent an arms race in outer space should be adopted by the international community;

4. Calls upon all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and to take immediate measures to prevent an arms race in outer space in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding;

5. Recognizes, as stated in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament, that the legal régime applicable to outer space, as such, is not sufficient to guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the significant role that régime plays in the prevention of an arms race in that environment, the need to consolidate and reinforce that régime, to enhance its effectiveness, and the importance of strict compliance with existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral;

6. Reiterates that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects;

7. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to consider as a matter of priority the question of preventing an arms race in outer space;

8. Also requests the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its consideration of the

question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, taking into account all relevant proposals, including those presented in the Ad Hoc Committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space at the 1987 session of the Conference and at the forty-second session of the General Assembly;

9. Further requests the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish an ad hoc committee with an adequate mandate at the beginning of its 1988 session, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects;

10. Urges the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to pursue intensively their bilateral negotiations in a constructive spirit aimed at reaching early agreement for preventing an arms race in outer space, and to advise the Conference on Disarmament periodically of the progress of their bilateral sessions so as to facilitate its work;

11. Calls upon all States, especially those with major space capabilities, to refrain, in their activities relating to outer space, from actions contrary to the observance of the relevant existing treaties or to the objective of preventing an arms race in outer space;

12. Takes note that the study on disarmament problems relating to outer space and the consequence of extending the arms race into outer space, called for in resolution 41/53, has been prepared by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and that, after a final meeting of the group of experts held in September 1987, the report was finalized and being prepared for publication in autumn 1987;

13. Requests the Secretary-General to invite the views of Member States on all aspects of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session;

14. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to report on its consideration of this subject to the General Assembly at its forty-third session;

15. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all documents relating to the consideration of this subject by the General Assembly at its forty-second session;

16. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

The General Assembly, noting the joint statement released by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the end of the meeting between the Secretary of State and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, held at Washington, from 15 to 17 September 1987, urges the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the United States of America to spare no effort in concluding, in accordance with the agreement in principle reached at that meeting, at the earliest possible date a treaty on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles to be signed at a summit meeting to be held in the fall of 1987 between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, as it was agreed, and to make a similarly intensive effort to achieve a treaty on 50 per cent reductions in their strategic offensive arms within the framework of the Geneva Nuclear and Space Talks.

IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 41/60 I ON A NUCLEAR-ARMS FREEZE

The General Assembly,

Recalling that in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, adopted in 1978 and unanimously and categorically reaffirmed in 1982 during the twelfth special session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament, the Assembly expressed deep

concern over the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race,

Recalling also that, on those occasions, it pointed out that existing arsenals of nuclear weapons are more than sufficient to destroy all life on Earth and stressed that mankind is therefore confronted with a choice: halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament, or face annihilation,

Convinced of the urgency further to pursue negotiations for the substantial reduction and qualitative limitation of existing nuclear arms,

Considering that a nuclear-arms freeze, while not an end in itself, would constitute the most effective first step to prevent the continued increase and qualitative improvement of existing nuclear weaponry during the period when the negotiations take place, and that at the same time it would provide a favourable environment for the conduct of negotiations to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons,

Firmly convinced that at present the conditions are most propitious for such a freeze, since the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America are now equivalent in nuclear military power and it seems evident that there exists between them an overall rough parity,

Conscious that the application of the systems of surveillance, verification and control already agreed upon in some previous cases would be sufficient to provide a reasonable guarantee of faithful compliance with the undertakings derived from the freeze,

Convinced that it would be to the benefit of all other States possessing nuclear weapons to follow the example of the two major nuclear-weapon States,

1. Urges once more the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, as the two major nuclear-weapon States, to proclaim, either through simultaneous unilateral declarations or through a joint declaration, an immediate nuclear-arms freeze, which would be a first step towards a comprehensive programme of disarmament and whose structure and scope would be the following:

(a) It would embrace:

- (i) A comprehensive test ban of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles;
- (ii) The complete cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles;
- (iii) A ban on all further deployment of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles;
- (iv) The complete cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

(b) It would be subject to appropriate measures and procedures of verification, such as those that have already been agreed by the parties in the case of the SALT I and SALT II treaties, those agreed upon in principle by them during the preparatory trilateral negotiations on the comprehensive test ban held at Geneva and those contemplated in the document on verification measures issued at the Mexico Summit on 7 August 1986 and drawing upon the results of the work of the Group of Scientific Experts in the Conference on Disarmament;

(c) It would be of an initial five-year duration, subject to prolongation when other nuclear-weapon States join in such a freeze, as the General Assembly urges them to do;

2. Requests the above-mentioned two major nuclear-weapon States to submit a joint report or two separate reports to the General Assembly, prior to the opening of its forty-third session, on the implementation of the present resolution;

3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session an item entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 42/39 H on a nuclear-arms freeze".

CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) WEAPONS

The General Assembly,

Recalling its previous resolutions relating to the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and of their destruction,

Reaffirming the urgent necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiat-

ing, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972,

Taking note of the Final Document of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, adopted by consensus on 26 September 1986, and in particular of article IX of its Final Declaration,

Having considered the report of the Conference on Disarmament, which incorporates, inter alia, the report of its Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and noting that following the precedents set over the past three years, consultations are continuing during the inter-sessional period, thus increasing the time devoted to negotiations,

Convinced of the necessity that all efforts be exerted for the continuation and successful conclusion of negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction,

Noting the bilateral and other discussions, including the ongoing exchange of views between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America in the framework of the multilateral negotiations, on issues related to the prohibition of chemical weapons,

Noting further with appreciation the efforts made at all levels by States to facilitate the earliest conclusion of a convention and, in particular, the concrete steps designed to promote confidence and to contribute directly to that goal,

Wishing to encourage Member States to take further initiatives to promote confidence and openness in the negotiations and to provide further information to facilitate prompt resolution of outstanding issues, thus contributing to an early agreement of the convention for the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction,

1. Takes note with satisfaction of the work of the Conference on Disarmament during its 1987 session regarding the prohibition of chemical weapons and, in particular, appreciates the progress in the work of its Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons on that question and the tangible results recorded in its report;

2. Expresses again none the less its regret and concern that notwithstanding the progress made in 1987, a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction has not yet been elaborated;

3. Urges again the Conference on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to intensify, during its 1988 session, the negotiations on such a convention and to reinforce further its efforts by, inter alia, increasing the time during the year that it devotes to such negotiations, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, with a view to the final elaboration of a convention at the earliest possible date, and to re-establish its Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for this purpose with the mandate to be agreed upon by the Conference on Disarmament at the beginning of the reconvening of the Conference in 1988;

4. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session on the results of its negotiations.

PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND MANUFACTURE OF NEW TYPES OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND NEW SYSTEMS OF SUCH WEAPONS

The General Assembly,

Recalling its previous resolutions on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons,

Recalling also the decision contained in paragraph 77 of the Final Document of the

Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, to the effect that, in order to help prevent a qualitative arms race and so that scientific and technological achievements might ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes, effective measures should be taken to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements and that efforts aimed at the prohibition of such new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction should be appropriately pursued,

Noting that in the course of its 1987 session the Conference on Disarmament considered the item entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons",

Taking into consideration the section of the report of the Conference on Disarmament relating to this question,

Convinced that all ways and means should be utilized to prevent the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons,

Determined to prevent modern science and technology from leading to the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction that have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of weapons of mass destruction identified in the definition of weapons of mass destruction adopted by the United Nations in 1948,

1. Reaffirms on the basis of the common desire of the international community the necessity of prohibiting the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons;

2. Requests the Conference on Disarmament, in the light of its existing priorities, to keep constantly under review, with appropriate expert assistance, the question of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons with a view to making, when necessary, recommendations on undertaking specific negotiations on the identified types of such weapons;

3. Calls upon all States, immediately following the identification of any new type of weapon of mass destruction, to renounce practical development of such a weapon and to commence negotiations on its prohibition;

4. Once again urges all States to refrain from any action that could lead to the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons;

5. Calls again upon all States to undertake efforts to ensure that ultimately scientific and technological achievements may be used solely for peaceful purposes;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all documents relating to the consideration of this item by the General Assembly at its forty-second session;

7. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to submit to the General Assembly for consideration at its forty-third session a report on the results achieved;

8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament".

NAVAL ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENT

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 38/188 G of 20 December 1983, by which it requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, to carry out a comprehensive study on the naval arms race,

Recalling its resolution 40/94 F of 12 December 1985, by which it requested the Disarmament Commission to consider the issues contained in the study on the naval arms race, both its substantive content and its conclusions, taking into account all other relevant present and future proposals, with a view to facilitating the identification of possible measures in the field of naval arms reductions and disarmament, pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament, as well as confidence-building measures in this field.

Recalling also its resolution 41/59 K of 3 December 1986, by which it requested the Disarmament Commission to continue, at its forthcoming session in 1987, the substantive consideration of the question and to report on its deliberations and recommendations to the General Assembly at its forty-second session,

Having examined the report of the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission on the substantive consideration of the question of the naval arms race and disarmament during the 1987 session of the Commission, which met with the approval of all delegations participating in the substantive consultations and which, in their view, could form the basis of further deliberations on the subject,

1. Notes with satisfaction the report on the substantive consideration of the question of the naval arms race and disarmament by the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission;

2. Requests the Disarmament Commission to continue, at its forthcoming session in 1988, the substantive consideration of the question and to report on its deliberations and recommendations to the General Assembly not later than at its forty-third session;

3. Also requests the Disarmament Commission to inscribe on the agenda for its 1988 session the item entitled "Naval armaments and disarmament";

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Naval armaments and disarmament".

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SECURITY

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3201 (S-VI) and 3202 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974, containing the Declaration and Programme of Action of the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974, containing the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, and 35/56 of 5 December 1980, the annex to which contains the International Development Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade,

Bearing in mind the Final Act of the Seventh session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,

Recalling its resolutions 40/173 of 17 December 1985 and 41/184 of 8 December 1986, as well as Economic and Social Council decision 1987/162 of 8 July 1987,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on a concept of international economic security,

Reaffirming that co-operation among all countries should be based on respect for independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of each State, and on the right of the people of each country to choose freely their own social, economic and political system,

Convinced that the efforts of States to co-operate in all areas of economic activity contribute to the reinforcement of international peace and security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and recalling, in this connection, the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development,

Further convinced of the need to strengthen the United Nations and the United Nations system to achieve the purposes set out in the Charter of the United Nations, in particular in Article 55, and to create conditions of stability, well-being and economic and social progress, and to promote the development of developing countries,

Recognizing that the increasing complexity of the interrelated issues of money, finance, external debt, trade, commodities and development calls for a universal, more comprehensive and continuing dialogue to address these issues on the basis of common interest, equality, non-discrimination and collective responsibility and to the mutual benefit of all countries,

Aware that both national and international policies should be growth-oriented and mutually reinforcing in order to make interdependence, in contrast to the experience of the recent past, a vehicle for transmitting and cumulating positive impulses and benefits for all countries, with special emphasis on the development needs of developing countries,

Reiterating that the alleviation of the most urgent economic problems of developing countries is a major factor in ensuring international economic stability and a better political climate,

Calling for the reinforcement of multilateral co-operation in promoting a common understanding and determining practical approaches and measures to deal with problems of growth, development, in particular of developing countries, and other international economic issues,

Recognizing that the strengthening of co-operation within the United Nations system, including its operational activities, would help to create a more predictable and more supportive international economic environment and increase confidence in international economic relations designed to bring about a healthy, secure and equitable future for the world economy,

Reaffirming that regional and subregional economic integration could in appropriate cases serve as an essential element in strengthening economic and technical co-operation, in particular in the sphere of science and technology for development, as it contributes to a more predictable international economic environment,

1. **Takes note** of the report of the Secretary-General on a concept of international economic security;

2. **Emphasizes** that the Charter of the United Nations provides a basis for the conduct of relations among States in a manner that would promote the shared objective of revitalizing development, growth and international trade in a more predictable and supportive environment through multilateral co-operation and thus also promote peace, security and stability;

3. **Expresses** its conviction that the search for international economic security should be based on a constructive, universal, more comprehensive and continued dialogue within the United Nations and the United Nations system aimed at developing practical approaches and measures that contribute to improvements in the international economic system through reform and strengthening of the framework of principles and rules governing trade, monetary and financial relations within which countries operate;

4. **Recognizes** that the United Nations should make a greater contribution to the efforts of Governments to improve their capacity to manage the interrelationships among different economies and the linkages between various sectors and issues;

5. **Requests** the Secretary-General, in monitoring the development of international and multilateral economic co-operation, to continue his efforts to enhance the United Nations capacity to focus on current and potential problem areas in the world economy in order to assist Governments in taking concerted measures, in particular to solve development problems of developing countries;

6. **Also requests** the Secretary-General to consult with eminent persons representing all regions on principles of international economic security in the light of the present resolution, keeping in mind the existing mandates on development and international economic co-operation, and to submit the findings thereon to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session through the Economic and Social Council.

INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN THE HUMANITARIAN FIELD

The General Assembly,

Noting that the United Nations under its Charter has to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of a humanitarian character,

Guided in particular by the commitment in the Charter to reaffirm faith in the dignity and worth of the human person,

Mindful of the significant contribution to international co-operation in the humanitarian field made by organizations and agencies of the United Nations system,

Recognizing the positive role played by the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues,

Recognizing, in this connection, the importance of the contribution of governmental and non-governmental organizations, including the contribution of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies,

Recognizing the significance of the existing workable system to promote, facilitate and co-ordinate humanitarian activities carried out by Governments, the United Nations system and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations,

Mindful of the importance of promoting universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and on international co-operation in the humanitarian field for improving relations among States and peoples,

Stressing the need for the international community to continue its efforts in the field of humanitarian activities and to provide the resources to develop further activities in the humanitarian field,

Conscious that people want to live in a better, safer and more just world,

1. **Encourages** the international community to develop further its co-operation in the field of international humanitarian activities;

2. **Calls upon** all States to co-operate for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms and to work together to promote international co-operation in order to solve existing humanitarian problems of international concern;

3. **Encourages** the international community to contribute substantially and regularly to international humanitarian activities;

4. **Considers** that international co-operation in the humanitarian field will facilitate better understanding, mutual respect, confidence and tolerance among States and peoples, thus contributing to a more just and non-violent world;

5. **Invites** Governments, the United Nations system and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to develop international co-operation in the humanitarian field on the basis of relevant international instruments;

6. **Decides** to consider the question of international co-operation in the humanitarian field under the item entitled "New international humanitarian order".

QUESTIONS RELATING TO INFORMATION

The General Assembly,

Recalling its previous resolutions on questions relating to information,

Recalling the recommendations of the Committee on Information as adopted by the General Assembly in paragraph 1 of its resolution 41/68 A of 3 December 1986, as well as the provisions of that resolution, taking into account the views expressed by delegations at the forty-first session of the Assembly on 3 December 1986,

Reaffirming the mandate given to the Committee on Information by the General Assembly in its resolution 33/182 of 18 December 1979,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on questions relating to information,

Encouraging the Secretary-General to continue necessary action in order to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the Department of Public Information, with particular emphasis on securing a co-ordinated approach to priority issues before the Organization,

1. **Takes note** of the comprehensive report of the Committee on Information which served as an important basis and stimulated further deliberations, and urges the full implementation of the following recommendations as adopted at its substantive session:

(1) All countries, the United Nations system as a whole and all others concerned should co-operate in the establishment of a new world information and communication order, seen as an evolving and continuous process, and based, *inter alia*, on the free circulation and wider and better balanced dissemination of information, guaranteeing diversity of sources of information and free access to information and, in particular, the urgent need to change the dependent status of the developing countries in the field of information and communication, as the principle of sovereign equality among nations extends also to this field, and intended also to strengthen peace and international understanding, enabling all persons to participate effectively in political, economic, social and cultural life and promoting human rights, understanding and friendship among all nations. The ongoing efforts of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, which retains the central role in this field, to eliminate gradually the existing

imbalances in the field of information and communication and to encourage a free flow and a wider and better balanced dissemination of information in accordance with the relevant resolutions of that organization, adopted by consensus, should be reaffirmed;

(2) Fully aware of the important role that the media worldwide can freely play, particularly under the present situation, it is recommended that:

(a) The mass media should be encouraged to give wider coverage to the efforts of the international community towards global development and, in particular, the efforts of the developing countries to achieve economic, social and cultural progress;

(b) The United Nations system as a whole should co-operate in a concerted manner, through its information services, in promoting a more comprehensive and realistic image of the activities and potential of the United Nations system in all its endeavours, in accordance with the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, with particular emphasis on the creation of a climate of confidence, the strengthening of multilateralism and the promotion of the development activities in the United Nations system;

(c) All countries should be urged to extend assistance to journalists for the free and effective performance of their professional tasks;

(3) Aware of the existing imbalances in the international distribution of news, particularly that affecting the developing countries, it is recommended that urgent attention should be given to the elimination of existing inequalities in and all other obstacles, both internal and external, to the free flow and wider and better balanced dissemination of information, ideas and knowledge by, inter alia, diversifying the sources of information and respecting the interests, aspirations and socio-cultural values of all peoples, as a step towards the attainment of a free flow and a wider and better balanced dissemination of information;

(4) The United Nations system as a whole, as well as the developed countries, should be urged to co-operate in a concerted manner with the developing countries towards strengthening the information and communication infrastructures in the latter countries, in accordance with the priorities attached to such areas by the developing countries, with a view to enabling them to develop their own information and communications policies freely and independently and in the light of their history, social values and cultural traditions, taking into account the principle of freedom of the press and information. In this regard, full support for the International Programme for the Development of Communication of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, which constitutes an important step in the development of these infrastructures, should always be emphasized;

(5) It is recommended that the need be stressed to promote the access of the developing countries to communications technology, including communication satellites, modern electronic information systems, informatics and other advanced information and communication facilities with a view to improving their own information and communication systems in accordance with the specific conditions prevailing in each country;

(6) It is recommended that the Department of Public Information of the Secretariat, in co-operation with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, should explore further ways and means of strengthening co-operation and co-ordination with the News Agencies Pool of Non-Aligned Countries, with the Eco-Pool of the News Agencies of Non-Aligned Countries, as well as with the regional news agencies of developing countries, as this constitutes a concrete step towards the elimination of existing imbalances. It is also recommended that the Department of Public Information should establish adequate co-operation with the developing countries in the audio-visual field, especially with the Broadcasting Organization of the Non-Aligned Countries;

(7) Reaffirming the primary role that the General Assembly is to play in elaborating, co-ordinating and harmonizing United Nations policies and activities in the field of information and emphasizing the central role of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in the field of information and communication, it is recommended that the United Nations system as a whole and all others concerned should be urged to give that organization adequate support and assistance in the field of information and communication. The Department of Public Information, in particular, should co-operate more regularly with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, especially at the working level, with a view to maximizing the contributions of the Depart-

ment to the efforts of that organization in further promoting the attainment of a free flow and a wider and better balanced dissemination of information;

(8) Article 19 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which provides that everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression and that this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers, and article 29, which stipulates that these rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, should be recalled;

(9) The Department of Public Information should be requested to disseminate information about the United Nations activities in the field of human rights. The Department of Public Information should be requested to make broad use of the fortieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which will be observed in 1988, for the dissemination of information on human rights;

(10) The United Nations system, particularly the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, should aim at providing all possible support and assistance to the developing countries with due regard to their interests and needs in the field of information and to action already taken within the United Nations system, including, in particular:

(a) Development of human resources as indispensable for the improvement of information and communication systems in developing countries, and support for the continuation and strengthening of practical training programmes, such as those already operating under both public and private auspices throughout the developing world;

(b) Creation of conditions that will gradually enable the developing countries to produce, by using their own resources, the communication technology suited to their national needs, as well as the necessary programme material, specifically for radio and television broadcasting;

(c) Assistance in establishing and promoting telecommunication links at subregional, regional and interregional levels, especially among developing countries;

(11) The Secretary-General should be requested to ensure that the activities of the Department of Public Information, as the focal point of the public information tasks of the United Nations, are strengthened and improved, keeping in view the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the priority areas such as those stated in section III, paragraph 1, of General Assembly resolution 35/201 of 16 December 1980 and other pertinent resolutions of the Assembly and the recommendations of the Committee on Information, so as to ensure an objective and more coherent coverage of, as well as a better knowledge about, the United Nations and its work. It is recommended further that no new public information units independent of the Department should be created in the Secretariat of the United Nations;

(12) The Secretary-General should be requested to provide the Committee on Information at its substantive session of 1988 with a feasibility study on the consolidation and co-ordination of all public information activities within the United Nations with specific reference to the financial implications as well as to the effectiveness of the Department of Public Information as the focal point for public information activities;

(13) The Department of Public Information should be requested to continue its co-operation with the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, as well as with intergovernmental organizations and regional organizations, and should monitor, as appropriate, important meetings of that Movement, as well as of intergovernmental and regional organizations, with a view to promoting a free flow and a wider and better balanced dissemination of information;

(14) In the light of the serious economic situation prevailing in Africa, the Secretary-General should be requested to ensure that the Department of Public Information continues to do its utmost in bringing to the attention of the international community the real dimensions of the plight of the African people and the tremendous efforts of the African countries towards recovery and development, as well as the positive response by the international community, with a view to increasing its contribution to alleviating this human tragedy. In this regard, the Secretary-General should be requested to ensure that the Department of Public Information continues to do its utmost to disseminate widely and to publicize the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and

Development 1985-1990. In this respect, the efforts of the Department of Public Information should be commended;

(15) The Department of Public Information should be urged to give the widest possible dissemination of information pertaining to acute world economic problems in general and, in particular, to the severe economic difficulties of the least developed countries and the need for strengthening the international economic co-operation aimed at resolving external debt problems of developing countries;

(16) The relevant paragraphs of General Assembly resolution 59 (I) of 14 December 1946, in which the Assembly stated, *inter alia*, that freedom of information is a fundamental human right, must be reiterated;

(17) The relevant provisions of the Final Act of the Conference of Security and Co-operation in Europe, signed at Helsinki on 1 August 1975, and those of the Concluding Document of the meeting of representatives of the participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, held at Madrid from 11 November 1980 to 9 September 1983, should be recalled;

(18) The relevant provisions of the Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace should also be recalled;

(19) The final documents of the Conferences of the Ministers of Information of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Jakarta from 26 to 30 January 1984, and at Harare from 10 to 12 June 1987, should be recalled;

(20) The Conference of Ministers of Information of States Members of the Organization of African Unity, held at Addis Ababa in March 1985, which expressed its conviction of the importance of a new world information and communication order, should be noted;

(21) The relevant resolutions on the question relating to information of the Fourth Islamic Summit Conference, held at Casablanca in January 1984, and the Fifth Islamic Summit Conference, held at Kuwait in January 1987, should be recalled;

(22) The relevant section of the Political Declaration adopted by the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Harare from 1 to 6 September 1986, should be recalled;

(23) The Department of Public Information should continue to maintain consistent editorial independence and accuracy in reporting for all material produced by the Department and should promote, to the greatest possible extent, an informed understanding of the work and purposes of the United Nations system among the peoples of the world, *inter alia*, the cultural, humanitarian, economic and social programmes of its specialized agencies, taking necessary measures to ensure that its output contains objective and equitable information about issues before the Organization, reflecting divergent opinions where they occur;

(24) The Department of Public Information should, in the context of the review of its role, performance and method of work, consider the feasibility of applying modern technologies for the collection, production, storage, dissemination and distribution of information materials, including the use of satellite facilities, having in mind the possibility of owning one in the future. The Secretary-General should be requested to submit such a feasibility study, including its financial implications, to the Committee by its next organizational session, at the latest;

(25) In this regard, attention is drawn to the success attained by the ARABSAT, BRASISAT, INSAT-1B, MORELOS and PALAPA satellite systems and the CONDOR project, designed to promote national and regional integration, and the improvement of communication infrastructures;

(26) In the light of the present financial difficulties of the Department of Public Information, it is recommended that the Department consider expanding the programme of telephone news bulletins that are paid for by its users. The Committee on Information notes with appreciation the positive response of those countries that are assisting the United Nations in resuming the short-wave broadcasts through their respective national networks free of charge. In the light of this successful co-operation, the Department of Public Information is requested to continue its contacts with interested countries and broadcasting organizations, in both the developed and developing countries, especially those with recognized capabilities, to solicit this type of co-operation and to report to the Committee at its substantive session in 1988 on the outcome of those contacts. The

Department of Public Information should be requested to ensure that these radio programmes are objective and professional;

(27) The Committee on Information takes note with appreciation of regional efforts, especially among the developing countries, as well as co-operation between developed and developing countries to develop further their media infrastructure, especially in the areas of training and dissemination of information, with a view to encouraging a free flow and a wider and better balanced dissemination of information;

(28) The Department of Public Information should continue its annual training programme for broadcasters and journalists from developing countries. The Committee on Information notes that the workshop for the familiarization of news agencies of developing countries with modern technologies, as recommended by the Committee and approved by the General Assembly in its resolution 41/68 A of 3 December 1986, has not been organized owing to financial constraints. The Department of Public Information is once again requested, in co-operation with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the News Agencies Pool of Non-Aligned Countries, to ensure the continuation and expansion of this kind of activity. In this connection, the Department should continue to examine the possibility of allocating a week of the programme for a visit by journalists and broadcasters from developing countries to one of the developing countries that expresses readiness to receive them for the purpose of acquainting them with the ways in which information on the United Nations is received and utilized;

(29) In order to enhance awareness and understanding of the lofty objectives of the United Nations, the Department of Public Information should provide assistance, in an objective and equitable way, to educational institutions of Member States for teaching about the structure of the United Nations, as well as the principles and purposes enunciated in its Charter. In order to implement this recommendation, the Department should continue to organize seminars for educators and education policy makers;

(30) Within the World Disarmament Campaign, the Department of Public Information should encourage coverage aimed at the promotion of a climate of understanding, confidence and co-operation, peace and development, and the enhancement of human rights;

(31) The Department of Public Information should be requested to continue to cover adequately and accurately all United Nations activities pertaining to the situation in the Middle East and the question of Palestine, in accordance with relevant United Nations resolutions, and to report to the Committee on Information at its substantive session of 1988;

(32) The Department of Public Information should continue its activities and dissemination of information on the policies and practices of apartheid, giving due attention to the unilateral measures and official censorship imposed on the local and international media with regard to all aspects of this issue;

(33) The Secretary-General should be requested to intensify his efforts in order to alert world public opinion to the illegal occupation of Namibia and to continue to disseminate adequately and accurately, with the full assistance of the United Nations Council for Namibia, the Department of Public Information and the United Nations system as a whole, information relating to the struggle of the oppressed people of Namibia for self-determination, national independence and freedom as well as to the need for the full and speedy implementation of the United Nations plans for Namibia;

(34) The Department of Public Information should further cover adequately and with impartiality the activities of all United Nations peace-keeping operations, in view of the paramount importance of such operations for the maintenance of international peace and security;

(35) The Secretary-General should be requested to ensure the continuation and improvement of United Nations radio and television programmes and, inter alia, to strengthen the Middle East/Arabic Unit as the producer of Arabic television and radio programmes. The Department of Public Information should implement the provisions of General Assembly resolution 38/82 B of 15 December 1983 on the Caribbean Unit. In view of the importance of United Nations radio programmes in the Asian and European regions, the functions of the Asian and European regions, the functions of the Asian and European Units should not only be maintained, they should also be expanded;

(36) The unique function of the United Nations information centres as one of the most

important means of disseminating information about the United Nations among the peoples of the world is recognized. In this regard, United Nations information centres should continue to assist press and information media in their respective countries in accordance with the mandate given by the General Assembly and should intensify direct and systematic communication exchange with local information and educational institutions and non-governmental organizations in a mutually beneficial way. Every effort should be made to establish close co-ordination with other field offices of the United Nations system, particularly those of the United Nations Development Programme, in order to avoid duplication of work. Co-ordination with other United Nations offices should take into account the functional autonomy of the United Nations information centres. The Department should ensure open and unhindered access by all people to all United Nations information centres and to all materials distributed through the centres;

(37) The Department of Public Information should disseminate information concerning the decisions of the United Nations dealing with acts of terrorism in all its forms, taking into account particularly General Assembly resolution 40/61 of 9 December 1985, as well as the relevant statements of the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General;

(38) The Secretary-General should continue to strengthen and accelerate his efforts to develop a system for monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of the activities of the Department of Public Information, particularly in the priority areas determined by the General Assembly, taking into account the need to improve data collection procedures, analysis of feedback data and end-use of the Department's materials, and maximizing the efficiency of the operations in all their aspects;

(39) Future reports of the Department of Public Information to the Committee on Information and to the General Assembly, in particular on new programmes or on the expansion of existing programmes, should contain:

(a) More adequate information on the output of the Department in respect of each topic included in its work programme, which forms the basis of its programme budget;

(b) The costs of the activities undertaken in respects of each topic;

(c) More adequate information on target audiences, end-use of the Department's products, and analysis of feedback data received by the Department;

(d) A statement detailing the priority level that the Secretary-General has attached to current or future activities of the Department in documents dealing with such activities;

(e) The Department's evaluation of the effectiveness of its different programmes and activities, with particular reference to the need constantly to review internal programme elements and activities;

(40) The steps taken by the Department of Public Information in redressing the imbalance in its staff should be noted. The Department should continue its efforts to that end. The Secretary-General should take appropriate steps to increase the representation of underrepresented developing countries and of other underrepresented groups of countries, especially at the senior levels, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, and to submit a report to the Committee on Information at its substantive session in 1988;

(41) Member States should be called upon once again to make voluntary contributions to the United Nations Trust Fund for Economic and Social Information;

(42) Note is taken of the report on the curtailment of radio programmes and the improvement in the distribution of taped radio programmes produced by the Department of Public Information, and the Department is requested to take steps to improve their distribution, to examine its current effectiveness and to report to the Committee at its substantive session in 1988. In this connection, the Department of Public Information should explore adequate measures to resume radio programmes that have been curtailed, bearing in mind the need to ensure effective utilization, timeliness and maximum audience impact;

(43) Note is taken of the report on the programme and activities of the Joint United Nations Information Committee, and the Secretary-General is urged to continue his efforts to secure a sound and stable financial basis for **Development Forum**, the only inter-agency publication of the United Nations system that concentrates on development issues. The Secretary-General should continue to ensure that **Development Forum** retains its edi-

torial policy of intellectual independence, thus enabling this publication to continue to serve as a world-wide forum in which diverse opinions on issues relating to economic and social development can be freely expressed;

(44) In order to ensure a better image of the United Nations and to promote a more accurate understanding of its activities, the Department of Public Information should guarantee daily coverage of all United Nations meetings through issuance of the daily press releases and the weekly news digest in all working languages. The Department of Public Information should continue to co-operate closely with and provide assistance to the members of the United Nations Correspondents Association, taking into account their needs and requirements, especially in the area of press releases which provide them with the necessary raw material for adequate reporting. The Department of Public Information should be requested anew to use the official languages of the General Assembly adequately in its documents and audio-visual documentation in order to inform the public better about the activities of the United Nations. The Department of Public Information should again be requested to make balanced use of the two working languages of the Secretariat, in conformity with General Assembly resolution 2 (I) of 1 February 1946 in its written and audio-visual documents and to provide the two press sections with the means of producing and distributing press releases and, accordingly, to arrange appropriate staffing. The Department of Public Information should co-operate with delegations when they request that their views be reflected with accuracy and objectivity, by issuing addenda or corrigenda in the language of the press releases;

(45) The Department of Public Information should improve the timely distribution of its materials to subscribers and United Nations information centres, particularly the *UN Chronicle*, a major source of information on the United Nations to its recipients, and should reassess the effectiveness of this publication and report to the Committee on Information at its substantive session in 1988;

(46) The Secretary-General should be encouraged to continue and intensify his efforts to explore all possibilities of securing adequate resources for the continuation of the *World Newspaper Supplement* project. The Supplement should be properly labelled to identify its sources;

(47) It is recognized that free distribution of materials is necessary in the public information activities of the United Nations, but, as demands increase and whenever it is desirable and possible, the Department of Public Information should actively encourage the sale of its materials;

(48) It is requested that the recommendations relating to the activities of the Department of Public Information of the Secretariat be implemented within existing resources;

2. Requests that the recommendations relating to the activities of the Department of Public Information of the Secretariat be implemented within existing resources;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Committee on Information, at its substantive session in 1988, on the implementation of the above recommendations;

4. Also requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session on the implementation of the present resolution;

5. Requests the Committee on Information to report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session;

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Questions relating to Information".
